ML20217C034
| ML20217C034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1997 |
| From: | SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217C031 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9710010128 | |
| Download: ML20217C034 (16) | |
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FNP Unit 1 Technical Specifications Ganged Parsa UJ1ill Enition Page 13 3/4 7 7 Replace Page B 3/4 7 8 Add 9710010128 970925 PDR ADOCK 05000348 P PDR
1 FNP Unit 1 Technical Soccittiations Tvned Panes l
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4 ELKHT_.SYSTEHg BASES 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS This specification deleted.
3 /4. 7.13 & 3 /,i.7.14 FUEL STORAGE POOL DORON CONCENTRATION & FUEL ASSEMBLY STORACE J The spent fuel storage racks contain storage locations for 1407 fuel assemblies.
The spent fuel racks have been analyzed in accordance with the mothodology contained in WCAP-14416-NP-A, Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis 1 Hethodology", Revision 1, November, 1996. This methodology ensures that the spent q fuel rack multiplication factor, koff As less than 0.95, a= recommended by ANSI
$7.2-1983 and the guidance contained in NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees from B. K. Grimes, *0T Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications", April 14, 1978. The codes, methods, and techniques
, contained in the methodology are t'ed to satisfy this kerg criterion. The spent 4
fuel storage racks are analysed to allow storage of all Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments up to 5.0 w/o U-235 utilizing credit for checkerboard configurations, burnup, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers, and soluble boron, to ensure that k,ff is maintained 5 0.95, including uncertainties, tolerances, and accident conditions. In addition, the opent fuel pool keff is maintained < 1.0 incliding uncertainties and tolerances on a 95/95 basis without soluble boron. No credt.t is taken for the presence of Boraflex absorber in any of
, these analyses.
The soluble boren concentration required to maintain keff 5 0.95 under normal conditions is 400 ppn.
The following storage configurations and enrichment limits were evaluated in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal 2.15 w/o U-235 can be stored in any Jell location as shown in Figure 5.6-2. Fuel assemblies with initial nominal enrichments greater than these limits must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as s'vwn in Figure 3.7 1.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equa) to 5.0 w/o U-235 can be stored in a 2 out of 4 checkerboard arrangement as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement, 2 fuel a9semblics can be stored corner adjacent with 2 empty storage cells.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies can be stored in a burned / fresh checkerboard arrangement of a 2X2 matrix of storage cells as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the burned / fresh 2X2 checkerboard arrangement, three of the fuel assemblies must ha've an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 1.6 w/o U-235, or satisfy a minimum burnup requirement for higher initial enrichments as shown in Figure 5.6-
- 1. The fourth fuel assembly must have an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 3.9 w/o U-235, or satisfy a minimum Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber requirement for higher initial enricpments to maintain the reference fuel assembly
- k. less than or equal to 1.455 at 68 F.
Eleven damaged Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies can be stored in a 12 storage cell configuration surrounded by empty cells as shown in Figure 5.6-6. The eleven fuel assemblies contain a nominal enrichment of 3.0 w/o U-235.
FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-7 AMENDKENT NO.
PLANT SYSTEMS DASES
[ Specifications 3.7.14 and 6.6.1.1 ensure that fuel assemblies ar. atored in the
- spent fuel racks in accordance with the configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis.
The most limiting acciderL with respect to the storage configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis is the misplacement of a 5.0 w/o U-235 fuel assembly into an empty storage cell location in the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement. The amount of soluble boron required to maintain keff less than 0.95 due to this fuel mieload accident in 850 ppm. The 2000 ppm limit specified in the Lco is consistent with the normal boron concentration maintained in the spent fuel pool, and bounds the 850 ppm required for a fuel misload
- accident.
, Specification 5.6.1.1 b. requires that a boron concentration of 400 ppm in the spent fuel pool will maintain ;egt 5 0.95. A cpent fuel pool boron dilution analysis was performed to determine that sufficient time is available to detect and mitigate dilution of the spent fuel pool prior to exceeding the kerf design 4 basis limit of 0.95. The spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis concluded that l an inadvertent or unplanned event that would result in a dilution of the spent fuel pool boron concentration from 2000 ppm to 400 ppm is not a credible event.
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e FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-8 AMENDMENT NO.
FNP Unit i Technical Snecifications Marked-Up Paces
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Pt.A.'ff SYSTEMS l BASES 3/4.7.12 FIRE BAJULIER PENTTRATIONS 3
l This specification deleted.
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FARLIT-tJNIT 1 3 3/4 7 7 AMENtMINT No. 25, 96
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. Insert 5 3I4 713' FUEL STORAGE POOL BORON CONCENTRATION 3/4 7 14 FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE The spent fuel storage racks contain storage locations for 1407 fuel assemblies. The spent fuel racks have been analyzed in accordance with the methodology contained in WCAP 14416 NP A, Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology" Revision 1, November,1996. His methodology ensures that the spent fuel rack multiplication factor, k,n is less than 0.95, as recommended by ANS! 57.21983 and the guidance contained in NRC Letter to All Power Reactor
' Licensees from B. K. Grimes, "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and
' Handling Applications" April 14, 1978. The codes, methods, and techniques contained in the methodology are used to satisfy this k,, criterion, ne spent fuel storage racks are analyzed to allow storage of all Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments up to 5.0 w/o U 235 i
utilizing credit for checkerboard configurations, burnup, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers, and soluble boron, to ensure that k ,is maintained $_0.95, including uncertainties, tolerances, and accident conditions. In addition, the spent fuel pool k,,is maintained < l.0 including uncertainti" and tolerances on a 95/95 basis without soluble bor w._ m . c ~~. on/N. ed. F i t k w C.e S . p n. w - u e Q- .
The soluble baron concentration required to maintain k,,,C 0.95 under normal conditions is 400 ppm.
, The following storage configurations and enrichmen,t limits were evaluated it, the spent fuel rack
. criticality analysis:
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal to 2.15 w/o U 235 can be stored in any cell location as shown in Figure 5.6-2. Fuel assemb!!es with initial nominal enrichments greater than these limits must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as shown in Figure 3,7 1.
Westinghouse 17Xt7 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal to 5.0 w/o U 235 can be stored in a 2 out of 4 checkerboard arrangement as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement,2 fuel assemblies can be stored corner adjacent with 2 empty
. storage cells.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies can be stored in a burned / fresh checkerboard arrangement of a
- 2X2 matrix of storage cells as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the burned / fresh 2X2 checkerboard arrangement, three of the fuel assemblies must have an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 1.6 w/o U 235, or satisfy a minimum burnup requirement for higher initial enrichments as shown in Figure 5.6-1. The fourth fuel assembly must have an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 3.9 w/o U 235, or satisfy a minimum Intergral Fuel Burnable Absorber requirement for higher initial enrichments to maintain the reference fuel assembly k. less than or equal to 1.455 at 68' F.
Eleven damaged Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies can be stored in a 12 storage cell configuration surrounded by empty cells as shown in Figure 5.6-6. The eleven fuel assemblies contain a nominal enrichment of 3.0 w/o U-235,
- Spectications 3.7.14 and 5.6.1.1 ensure that fuel usemblies are stored in the spent fuel racks in accordance with the configurations assumed in the syn. fuel rack criticality analysis.
The most limiting accident with respect to the storage configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis is the misplacement of a 5.0 w/o U-235 fuel assembly into an empty storage cell
. location in the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement. De amount of soluble boron required to maintain k,n less than 0.95 due to this fuel mistoad accident is 850 ppm. He 2000 ppm limit specified in the LCO is consistent with the normal boron concentration maintained in the spent fuel pool, and bounds the 850 ppm required for a fuel mistoad accident.
,' IrmA. S j c4nk,
. Specification 5.6.1.1 b. requires that a boron concentration of 400 ppm in the spent fuel pool will chaintain Le $_0.95, A spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis was performed to determine that
. sufficient time is available to detect and mitigate dilution of the spent fuel pool arior to exceeding the
(, design basis limit of 0.95. De spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis conc uded that an inadvertent or unplanned event that would result in a dilution of the spent fuel pool boron concentration from 2000 ppm to 400 ppm is not a credible event.
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FNP Unit 2 Technical Specifications Chanced Paces
- Unit 2 Revision Page B 3/4 7 7 Replace Page B 3/4 7-8 Add
FNP Unit 2 Technical Specifications Tyned Pages
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES.
3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION This specification deleted.
3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperature in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can j cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance for instrument error of 2'F.
3/4.7.14 & 3/4.7.15 FUEL STORAGE POOL BORON CONCENTRATION & FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE The spent fuel storage racks contain storage locations for 1407 fuel assemblies.
The spent fuel racks have been analyzed in accordance with the methodology contained in WCAP-14416-NP-A, Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", Revision 1, November, 1996. This methodology ensures that the spent fuel rack multiplication factor, kegg is less than 0.95, as recommended by ANSI 57.2-1983 and the guidance contained in NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees from B. K. Grimes, "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications", April 14, 1978. The codes, methods, and techniques contained in the methodology are used to satisfy this kegg criterion. The spent
< fuel storage racks are analyzed to allow storage of all Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments up to 5.0 w/o U-235 utilizing credit for checkerboard configurations, burnup, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers, and soluble boron, to ensure that kegg is maintained s 0.95, including uncertainties, tolerances, and accident conditions. In addition, the spent fuel pool kegt is maintained < 1.0 including uncertainties and tolerances on a 95/95 basis without soluble boron. No credit is taken for the presence of Boraflex absorber in any of these analyses.
The soluble boran concentration required to maintain kef f $ 0.95 under normal ,
conditions is 400 ppm.
The following storage configurations and enrichment limits were evaluated in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis:
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal 2.15 w/o U-235 can be stored in any cell location as shown in Figure 5.6-2. Fuel assemblies with initial nominal enrichments greater than these limits must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as shown in Figure 3.7-1.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal to 5.0 w/o U-235 can be stored in a 2 out of 4 checkerboard arrangement as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement, 2 fuel assemblies can be stored corner adjacent with 2 empty storage cells.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies can be stored in a burned / fresh checkerboard arrangement of a 2X2 matrix of storage cells as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the burned / fresh 2X2 checkerboard arrangement, three of the fuel assemblies must have an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 1.6 w/o U-235, or satisfy a FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-7 AMENDMENT NO.
.. _ . . _ ._ . . - - -_ ~ -- - _ - - _ - _ - - . - - . - -
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES
, minimum burnup requirement for higher initial enrichments as shown in Figure 5.6-
- 1. The fourth fuel assembly must have an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 3.9 w/o U-235, or satisfy a minimum Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber requirement for higher initial enricpments to maintain the reference fuel assembly
- k. less than or equal to 1.455 at 60 F.
Specificationt 3.7.15 and 5.6.1.1 ensure that fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel racks in accordance with the configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis, i
The most limiting accident with respect to the storage configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis is the misplacement of a 5.0 w/o U-235 i fuel assembly into an empty storage call location in the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement. The amount of soluble boron required to maintain xe gg less than 0.95 due to this fuel misload accident is 850 ppm. The 2000 ppm limit specified in the LCO is consistent with the normal boron concentration maintained in the spent fuel pool, and bounds the 850 ppm required for a fuel misload accident.
Specification 5.6.1.1 b. requires that a boron concentration of 400 ppm in the spent fuel pool will maintain kegg < 0.95. A spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis was performed to determine that sufficient time is available to detect and mitigate dilution of the spent fuel pool prior to exceeding the kegg design basis limit of 0.95. The spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis concluded that an inadvertent or unplanned event that would result in a dilution of the spent fuel pool boron concentration from 2000 ppm to 400 ppm is not a credible event.
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d FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-8 AMENDMEhT NO.
FNP Unit 2 Technical goccifications Marked-Un Paces p
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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 1
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3/4.7.12 FIRE BAARIER PENETRATIONS This spcification deleted.
} 3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPEPATURE MONITORING The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment vill not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental ,
- qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive tesperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILJTT. The temperature limits include an allevance for instrument error of 2 F.
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- 3/4 7 11 FUEL STORAGE PQOL BORON CONCENTRATION 3/.1715 FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE ne pent fuel storage racks contain storage locations for 1407 fuel assemblies. ne spent fuel racks have been analyzed in accordance with the methodology contained in WCAP 14416 NP A, Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", Revision 1. November,1996. His methodology ensures that the spent fuel rack multiplication factor, k,n is less than 0.95, as recommended by ANSI 57.21983 and the guidance contained in NRC Letter to All Power Reactor 4 Licensees from B. K. Gr!mes, "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fwt Storage and Handling Applications", April 14, 1978. He codes, methods, and techniques conMned in the methodology are used to satisfy this k,, criterion. The spent fuel sturage racks are analyzed to allow storage of all Westinghouse 17XI7 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments up to 5.0 w/o U 235
! utilizing credit for checkerboard configurations, burnup, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers, and soluble boron, to ensure that k ,is maintained 10.95, including uncertainties, tolerances, and accident conditions. In addition, the spent fuel pool k,,is maintained < l.0 including uncertainties I .
GandCk tolerinces w .C on La 95/95 s u basis without soluble boronA creu o A 6 4 (m%
- The soluble boroW concen* ration required to maintain k.,10.95 under normal conditions is 400 ppm.
, ne following storage configurations and enrichment. limits were evaluated in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis:
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal to 2.15 w/o U 235 can be stored in any cell location as shown in Figure 5.6-2. Fuel assemblies with initial nominal enrichments greater than these limits must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as shown in Figure 4 3.7-l.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments less than or equal to 5.0 w/o U-235 can be stored in a 2 out of 4 checkerboard arrangement as shown in Figure 5.6-2. In the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement,2 fuel assemblies can be stored corner adjacent with 2 empty storage cells.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies can be stored in a burned / fresh checkerboard arrangement of a 2X2 matrix of storage cells as sl.nwn in Figure 5.6-2. In the burned / fresh 2X2 checkerboard i arrangement, three of the fuel assemblies must have an initial nominal enrichmbnt less than or equal to
, 1.6 w/o U 235, or satisfy a minimum burnup requirement for higher initial enrichments as shown in Figure 5.6-1. The fourth fuel assembly must have an initial nominal enrichment less than or equal to 3.9 w/o U 235, or satisfy a minimum Intergral Fuel Burnable Absorber requirement for higher initial enrichments to maintain the reference fuel assembly k ,less than or equal to 1.455 at 68* F.
Spectications 3,7.15 and 5l6.1.'1 ensu , that fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel racks in i accordance with the configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis.
The most limiting accident with respect to the storage configurations assumed in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis is the misplacement of a 5.0 w/o U-235 fuel assembly it.to an empty storage cell location in the 2 out of 4 checkerboard storage arrangement. The amount of soluble baron required to maintain k,,less than 0.95 due to this fuel mistoad accident is 850 ppm. The 2000 ppm limit specified in the LCO is consistent with the .ormal boron concentration maintained in the spent fuel pool, and bounds the 850 ppm required for a fuel mistoad accident.
Specification 5.6.1.1 b. requires that a boron concentration of 400 ppm in the spent fuel pool will maintain k,,10.95. A spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis was performed to determine that sufficient time is available to detect and mitigate dilution of the spent fuel pool prior to exceeding the k,, design basis limit of 0.95. The spent fuel pool boron dilution analysis concluded that an i
- ssa u
- S, ant,
- . s inadvertent or unplanned event that would result in a dilution of the spent fuel pool boron concentration fro n 2000 ppm to 400 ppm is not a credible event.
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