ML20247L685
| ML20247L685 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1989 |
| From: | Riley H ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247L671 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-73246, NUDOCS 8906020234 | |
| Download: ML20247L685 (277) | |
Text
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it COMPRESSED GAS .
SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT May 8,1989 Prepared by M&RDn Reviewed by 1b Approvedby Y[ - J \
Concurred by WbbbW tr !
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13-MS-A20
' COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
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Table of. Contents Page
, Table of Contents- , i.
Executive Summary. .iv I. Purpose and Objectives' l. ..
II. Analysis and Evaluation 3
A. Background
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'1. Description of the Unit 3 Event 3_
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- 2. Safety Significance 4 3.
Description of. compressed Gas System 4 4 . Safety Design Basis 7 5.
Concerns with Compressed Cas. System- 8'
- 6. APS Responses to Generic Letter 88 14, 9 B. Results 17
- 1. Analysis of the Unit 3 Event
- 17
- 2. Review of PVNGS Historical Documents 21
.. 3. Nuclear Utility Survey 24 4 Comparison of System Function and the Design Basis 26
- 5. Comparison of ADVs to MSIVs.'FJIVs 33
- 6. Effects of Compressed Gas Quality On Safety Related Equipment 44
- 7. Evaluation of the Preventative Maintenance Program for the Compressed Gas System 51 III. Conclusions 54 A. Nitrogen Subsystem 54 B. Documentation of System 55 C. Preventative Maintenance 55 IV. Action Plan 56 yr Appenkices Appendix A - APS Responses to Generic Letter 88-14 A1
, Appendix B - Historical Document Sumnary B-1 L 2157A/2333A 2159A/2334A
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COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS (f7 f '
Table of Contents.
(Continued) ,
Page Appendices (Continued)
Appendix.C - Reference Material Associated with the Nuclear Utilities Survey C-1
. Appendix D - Failure' Data Trending Report for ADVs.
Appendix E - Preventative Maintenance E-1 I
Appendix F - Leak Tests of ADV Instrument Air Check Valve F-1 Tables .
Table 1 Time Sequence of Unit 3 Trip 14 .
( ' Table 2 Compressed Gas System Design Basis 15 Table 3 Comparison of the Compressed Cas System in Unit 3 with Design 19 Table 4 Comparison of the Unit 3 Trip with Previous Trips in Other Units 20 Table 5 Summary of Con' c erns Identified by the Historical Documentation Review - 22 Table 6 Comparison of PVNGS' Design with Surveyed Plants 25 Table 7 Main Steam Isolation valve 39 Table 8 Feedwater Isolation Valve 40 Table 9 Atmospheric Dump Valve 41
- " Table 10 Failure Analysis of MSIVs and FWIVs 42 Table 11 Safety Related Pneumatic Equipment That Requires a Ppermatic Supply to Fulfill Its Safety Function 46 Table 12 Safety Related Pneumatic Equipment That Does Not Require Pneumatic Supply to Fulfi.11 its Safety Function 47
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13-MS-A20:
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM' EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS Table of Contents (Continued).
Page
. Tables (Continued)
Table 13- Additional PMs Required for Instrument '
Air Subsystem 52 Table 14 Additional PMs Required for the
, Nitrogen Subsystem 53 '
Table 15 PVNGS Action ~ Plan 57
' Figures Figure 1 PVNGS Instrument Air Subsystem of the Compressed Gas Systen,- 11 Figure 2 PVNGS Nitrogen Subsystem of the Compressed
. Gas System 12
- C1 Figure 3 MSSS Compressed Gas Supply to Safety-
, .Related Equipment 13 Figure 4 Atmospheric Dump Valve and Control Equipment - 36 Figure .5 FWIV Control Logie ,, 37
' Figure 6 MSIV Control Logic 36 L~
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- 13-MS-A20
- COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
' EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report was' generated in response to two issues. First, it ' documents 'the results of an off-normal
'pover to the extpressed gas system (CGS) at(transiant) ' condition evaluation involv March _ 3, 1989. Second, it PVNGS Unit 3 that occurred on-corrective action plan for the enhanecment of theassesses the adequacy of the CGS and pre reliability. system's functionality 'and-
-t on March 3, 1989, PVNGS Unit 3 suffered a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) which' resulted in deenergization of non-essential electrical equipment, . including _
the CGS compressors.
During the first few minutes of this event, the CGS responded in accordance with its design basis (e.g., when the instrument. air subsystem header pressure dropped to 85 psig, the nitrogen subsystem supply valve opened to allow nitrogen to repressurize the system). P,eweve r, .
approximately- 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 hours into the event, the operators noted that-the pressure in the instrument air subsystem header ha.d dropped to approximately of 30 psig- 65 psig, significantly below the minimum header design pressure Although the CGS is not required for. safe plant shardown, it is desirable the system be maintained and operated in that I demands under both normal and off-normal conditions.such aThe manner that meets system importance of this system(GL)
Letter has88-14 been repeatedly addressed by' the NRC, most recently in Generic APS was in the process of evaluating the operation and maintenance of the instrument air subsystem, as part of the response to GL 88-14, when the Unit 3 incident occurred.
A comprehensive review of system design, operation and maintenance was l performed. This review included the following:
Review of trip reports . associated with the Unit 3 event omd l
previous trips to analyze CGS performance, identify conmon abnormalities and determine if the recently observed response to l the loss of power idas typical.
Review of associated PVNGS historical documEts to identify whether the CGS design basis has been altered and thus contributed to system performance problems observed during the Unit 3 or previous events.
- Survey of other utilities to compare the configuration of the PVNGS CCS with that recognized design of similar and nuclear plants and identify industry maintenance consideration at PVNCS. program improvements for Comparison of the CGS design basis with its performance to determine whether any other potential system rroblems exist.
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13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIf Comparison of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and Toe dwate r Isolation Valves (WIVs) vich the temospheric Dump Valu s (ADVs) design and function. This was dono to determine if any instrument c.ir subsystem design or maintenance deficiencies found on the ADVs could apply to MSIVs and WIVs.
Evaluation cf compressed gas quality effects on safe ty related equipment to identify possible advers2 - system interactions that could impact the performance of safety related components at PVNCS.
Comparison of the CCS maintenance program with the manufacturer's recommended practices to develop new or revise existing maintenance ,
tasks that would impreve system reliability.
The results of the above evaluations were compiled and conclusions were reached regarding the adequacy of the existing system des &gn and current, maintenance practices. A comprehensive corrective action plan and schedule for system enhancement was developed. Evaluation results were as follows:
Review of the nitrogen subsystem performance during the Unit 3 event showed that this system failed to meet its designed header pressure. Furthermore, review of plant trip review reports showed that a reduction in header pressere had bee n' observed .on two previour occasi.ons in Unit 1 and in 1985. Corrective action will consist of performing a flow test to determine if the nitrogen subsystem, as carrently configured, can provide the proj ected normal and/or off-normal system demands. Based on the results of this test, further action vill be taken to either identify potential leakage paths in components served by the CCS or to identify individual components whose malfunction (other than leakage) could reduce pressure in the header. In the event that the test shows the nitrogen subsystem is not able'to meet the system demand, a compensatory action plan vill be developed to ensure that a backup diesel powered generator will be available to assure continuity of system cperation.
A review of associated PVNGS historical documentation identified two concerns with air Quality control at PVNGS. First, a failure in an ADt that occurred in 1988 may have been due to the presence of particulate matter in the instrument air subsystem. Second, a 3 number of Engineering Evaluation Requests (EERs) were written to address moisture accumulation in the system. Since both of these o- concerns have been linked to component failures at other plants, as s; noted in Generic Letter 68-14. APS is taking action to develop a systematic air quality control program which will ensure that moisture, particulate and hydrocarbons are maintained at !
sufficiently low levels and thus not adversely affect the i performance of safety related components interfacing with the CCS.
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13-MS-A20' COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS -
Survey of other nuclear plants showed that most- plants,. includin5 PVNGS, do, not have current as-built calculations .that reflect normal and off-normal leads on the CGS. In order 'to- determine if the system is properly sited, the existing PVNGS calculation used to. site the passive nitrogen subsystem will be revised to reflect the current loads on the system. These loads will then be compared :
with the rated and tested capacity of the liquid nitrogen storaSe tank. The survey also showed that three utilities have a non-lE BOP diesel that provides a backup power source - to the compressor, two utilities have 1E power to the compressor and three utilities have no backup for their instrument air subsystem. APS < will'.
perform an evaluation to determine the benefits and feasibility of providing lE power to the CGS as an additional or alternate backup system.
Comparison of system function with its design basis revealed that original design requirements for the nitrogen subsystem are 'not-fully. met. APS will perform flow testing and modify some system.
components in an effort to increase system reliability and meet the intended design basis.
Comparison of the ADVs' with the MSIVs' and F".'IVs' design and function revealed that pneumatic component. leaks on the MSIVs and FWIVs could affect their perfor=ance. APS will perform leak rate
,C calculations and verification tests on the valves pneur atic components and improve associated maintenance practices. Leak tests will be performed prior to any Unit restart.
Evaluation of compressed gas quality indicated that it could adversely impact the performance of safety related equipment.
Corrective actions will consist of ensuring proper maintenance practices for., major CGS components, periodic monitoring of air quality in all three units and selective examination of safety equipment pneumatic components. These actions will ensure that required cleanliness standards for air quality are being met and/or maintained. ~
Comparison of the CCS preventative maintenance program with the maintenance requirements of CGS components' manufacturers recommendations, identified a number of areas where the PVNGS program will be enhanced.
i The corrective action plan developed vreies fwn activities that will be performed prior to any Unit restart tc activities that will become part of the PVNGS lifetime desQn, monitoring and maintenance prgram. Implementation of this plan is intended to achieve the improved fur.dtir.ality and reliability {
reflective of the subject system's importance. l l 1
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l 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS I.
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES The overall purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of findings related to an event that occurred at PVNGS Unit 3 on March 3 1989, to ideetify lessons learned frem this and previous events, and to document and schedule needed improvements that will establish an acceptable standard of safety and reliability for the compressed gas system (CGS) at PVNCS.
In order to ensure that a comprehensive review of the CGS is performed and that improvements are made thus establishing an acceptable standard of safety a'nd reliability for the wystetc.
seven independent reviews of the CCS were performed. Review topics were chosen to ensure that all aspects of system design and maintenance were researched and analyted. These topics and the review methodology are discusse,d below:
Analysis of the March 3,1989 Un1*: 3 Event The post trip report for the Unit 3 event was compared with previous trip reports to determine if the response to the loss of power was typical.
Corrective action was formulated te address repeated abnormal system responses. ,
Review.of PVNCS Historical Documents Historical enginesting documents were reviewed to identify any operational concerns or changes to the design basis of the CCS system that might have contributed to the March 3, 1989 Unit 3 trip or previous events.
These same documents were also reviewed te identify repeated abnormal system responses.
Corrective action was formulated to addrest, operational concerns,
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l' changes to the design basis, or repeated abt.ormal system responses.
Nuclear Utility Survey I
The following eight nuclear plants were contacted to gather i I
information on the design and maintenance of their CGS:
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Diablo Canyon i 7 - Rancho Seco j St. Lucie j San Onofre (SONGS)
Troj an !
l Vaterford Vogtle "
This information was used to develop corrective action for system design, documentation, and preventative maintenance at PVNCS.
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13-MS-A20 r COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS s
Comparison of System Function and Desi5n The design basis of the instrument air and nitrogen subsystems was defined and compared with system performance to identify areas where the plant .did not following areas were addressed:
or could not meet its design basis. The Air quality Normal and Transient System Loads Corrective action was developed for arear where the p'lant did or.
could not meet its design basis.
Comparison of ADVs, FWIVs, and MSIVs ,
The valve type, safety function, and actuaring system of the ADVs, FWIVs, and MSIVs were compared. to determine if these valves are susceptible to a common failure mechanism, A failure analysis due to compressed air problems (e.g.c loa air pressure, dirt, water) was performed to determine if the function of these valves could be compromised due to poor air quality.
Corrective the action was developed to incorporate lessons learned from ADV response on the loss of the instrument air subsystem to the FWIVs and MSIVs.
Effects of Compressed Gas Quality on Safety Related Equipment All safety related equipment that requires compressed gas was identified and tabulated.
Post trip related equipment had failed due to air quality. reports were review Engineering Evtlua't' ion Reports records (EERs) and failure data trending were reviewed to determine if the compressed gas system has experienced problems related to air quality.
The potential impact of these problems was if gas quality could have evaluated to determine previous plant trips. contributed to the' Unit 3 event or to Correttive action was developed to improve air quality in the CCS.
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COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS II.
ANALYSIS.AND EVALUATION .
bk. ; backston'nd '
- 1. . Description of the Unit 3 Event On March 13, 1989,
- to inability of PVNGS the Unit 3 suffered a Loss of.0ffsite: Power -(LOP) due-aj fast and NAN-S02 bus from the auxiliary; transformer to transfer bus to transfer the loads on NAN-501 Transformer. As a result, the non' essential -
the 'startup including the CGS compressors, were de-energized. . electrical ' equipment,
.The sequence of events. was:
Large ' load r4j ection.
-The steam bypass control valves perforced'irradically.
Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) was received causing the main steam valves (FWIVs) isolation valves.(MS2Vs) and feedvarer isolation-to isolate.
The unit experienced an LOP.
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- There was a lossaof power to the - instrument air subsystem.
compressor.
The ADVs were required for shutdown.
For the Tab 33 1. time sequence of the CGS performance during the Unit 3 trip, see The ADVs, MSIVs and FWIVs require' compressed air to recharge their accumulators,.
addition, normal loadsafter wouldthey have performed their safety function. -In be expected to . decrease 'some; the CGS, however, would continue to support some normal users.
Following loss of the the instrument air subsystem header pressurecompressors and continuing compres minute and 45 seconds. At this dropped to 95 psig in . 1 instrument air subsystem header sounded in thetime, the low pressure alarm for the instrument air subsystem header Control Room. When the and 42 seconds after the LOP), pressure dropped to 85 psig (2 minutes the (PV-52) automatically opened. nitrogen subsystem supply valve Between 1 1/2 and 2-1/2 u
the pressure in the instrumer.t air subsystem main headerhours after L had dropped to approximately 65 psig. The nitrogen subsystem of the CGS is expected to maintain the pressure at 100 psig in the nitrogen subsystem header and 80 psig at components in the instrument air ~ subsystem header. Drop in pressure from the nitrogen to 65 psig represents a discrepancy with the expected pressure subsystem.
13-MS-A20 1
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS l
L 2. . Safety Significance The Unit 3 loss of power event demonstrated the importance of a non-safety related (NSR) system such as the compressed gas system to the plant operation.
Although the CCS is not required for a loss of power event, it is clear that the system must be designed, maintained and operated in such a manner that ensures a reliable compressed gas supply and will not challenge safety related systems or disable safety related equipment. As presented in Section VI. actions will be taken to improve the functionality and reliability of the CGS. The" system is NSR, but interfaces with safety related equipment.
- 3. Description of Compressed Gas System The CGS at PVNGS is composed of the instrument air subsystem and the nitrogen subsystem (See Table 2, Figures 1 and 2). Both subsystems and their equipment are classified as non-safety related (NSR) with the exception of the containment isolation valves. Neither subsystem is required for emergency plant shutdown.
Safety related valves and dampers relying on compressed gas are designed to fail in the " safe" position on loss of compressed gas or are provided with individual safety related air / nitrogen accumulators sized to j- properly operate the valve without reliance on the NSF. CGS. The MSIVs,
( FWIVs and ADVs fall into the latter group. The accumulators are considered part of the system that contains the valves. These accumulators cre separated from the NSR CCS by "Q" class check valves, as indicated in Figure 3.
Compressed gas plant demands are normally met by the instrument air subsystem. It is only when the instrument air subsystem header pressure drops below 85 psig that nitrogen is automatically introduced into the air header via valve PV-52 which automatically opens on reduction of air header pressura.
Each compresses medium, a'ir and nitrogen, are supplied by independent and diverse sources. Their configuration, equipment, and interface is discussed in the following sections.
- a. Instrument Air Subsystem The instrument air subsystem is shown on Figura 1. Its primary '
du compenents (comp'ressors, air receivers, pre and.pfterfilters, and dryers) can provide a continuous supply of compressed air for pneumatic instruments and valves at a nominal pressure of 110 psig with a lower than -40F dev point.
Each of the three compressors can supply 500 scfm of compressed air at 125 psig. Each compressor is two-stage, double acting, reciprocating type with water cooled non lubricated cylinders. The 4
13 MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS compressor pistons are provided with rings made of teflon which do net require lubrication. This ensures oil free compressed air which minimices the potential for control system component failures.
During narmsl ' operation, one of the three compressors supplies all compressed air requirements while the other two compressors are in standby. In the event of a loss of one operating compressor or heavy air demand, the resulting low pressure initiates automatic start of the standby compressor (s). -
After leaving the compressor, the air passes throu5h a water cooled after cooler and a moisture separator to remove condensate entrained in the air ficw on its way to its associated air receiver. Three air receivers (one per compressor), each with a capacity of 151 ft3 at 100 psig (1150 sef each) .re installed at the discharge ride of the compressors and are interconnected. This capacity provides 30 seconos storage of compressed air to allow a standby compressor to be brought on line. The volume per receiver is sufficient to prevent compressed air pressure to decay below the minimum system pressure of 30 psig during this time.
After leaving the receivers, the compressed air is conducted from the discharge header through one of two 100% capacity prefilters.
The prefilters are rated at a removal efficiency 99.9% of particles greater than 0.3 microns. The air. continues to one of two dessicant type dryers, each with dual towers. The dryers use activated alumina which lowers the air flow to a dew point lower than -40F.
The desiccant is regenerated periodically by directing a portion of the flow from the discharge of the in service tower through the o*her tower to the atmosphere. Tower switching is performed automatically and is initiated by a timer in the dryer's local centrol panel.
Next, the air passes through one of two 100% capacity afterfilters which is rated to remove 99.9% of particles greater than 1 micron.
This compressed air is distributed to the various plant instruments, valves, and components. The distribution system is corrosion-resistant copper tubing and fittings with bron=e/ brass !
valves and soldered joints.
The main distribution header is 3" l diameter. l 1
7e b. Compressed Gas Interface 1 i
When inr,trument air subsystem header pressure drops below 85 psig i such as occurs in the event of a compressor trip (i.e., loss of power), the nitrogen subsystem automatically initiates nitregen gas flow into the instrument air subsystem header. This occurs whe,n 1
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i-1 l 13-MS A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS compressed gas back-up valve PV-52 opens on a low pressure signal from PSL-52. Nitrogen gas is then distributed to components that were served by the instrument air subsystem.
- c. Nitrogen Subsystem As shown in Figure 2, liquid nitrogen from the 3082 gallons (equivalent to 255,000 available scf at a delivery pressure of 100
- psig) capacity storage tank passes through the low pressure
.vapori:er, which can supply a gaseous nitrogen flow of 1000 sefm.
After leaving the low pressure vapori:er, the nitrogen passes through the low pressure regulators where the pressure is reduced
, from 150 psig to 115 psig. From this point, it is distributed to various equipment (volume control tank and gas stripper for purging and for low pressure blanketing requirements on other equipment) including the instrument air subsystem header when required.
The original (1976) liquid nitrogen storage tank sizing calculation 13-MC-GA-205 evaluated two cases:
- 1. Refueling shutdown and subsequent startup
- 11. Consumption during 30 days normal operation !
C Case (a) establishes the liquid nitrogen storage tank size at approximately 3000 gallons. Included in case (b) for " normal operation" is an allowance for emergency nitrogen backup to the instrument air subsystem of 350 scfm for. one hour (21,000 scf).
This is approximately 8% of the capacity of the liquid nitrogen storage tank. (Note: Based on recent measurements in Unit 2 during normal.. power operation, instrument air subsystem flowrates averaged 301 scfm (see Section IV.D)).
The low pressure vaporizers are rated at 1000 scfm for eight hours of continuous operation. At this rate, the contents of full liquid nitrogen storage tank can be consumed in slightly over 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
High pressure nitrogen is also supplied by the liquid nitrogen storage tank. Liquid nitrogen from the storage tank is pressurized to 2400 psig by the liquid ritrogen pumps., The pressurized nitrogen is then conducted to the high pressure vaporizer, which ,
- can supply 300 scfm of compressed nitrogen gas. High pressure {j compressed gas is supplied to the high pressure storage cylinders. (
Approximately 65,300 scf of compressed nitrogen can be stored in the high pressure storage cylinders. After the compressed gas has j been regulated to 650 psig, the compressed gas is conducted to the {
high pressure header for distribution to various equipment to l 1
4 13-MS A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS supply .high. pressure ' blanketing. gas and makeup to .the. ADV accumulator.
Where nitrogen pressure required by the components is less than the'high header ~ pressure, regulating valvesare provided
.in the lines supplying the components. '
High pressure compressed nitrogen cylinders (Figure 2)'also serves as a backup to the low pressure compressed gas system and, if fully charged, can be ,used as ~ an alternate: source of backup providins
'approximately 3 additional hours backup to. the' instrument air
-subsystem at 350.scfm.
4.
Safety Design Basis The CCS has no safety design basis since its: operation is not required. ~
for safe shutdown nor is it part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure boundary. The nitrogen storage tank is designed and located such that a tank rupture vill not acversely affect any system, component, or structure required for safe shutdown.
During. normal operation, the instrument air subsystem supplies filtered,-
dry, located oil-free air for pneumatic instruments dampers and componerr:s throughout the plant including the active safety 'related pneumatically operated valves located in the main steam support structure (MSSS) building. These valves are atmospheric dump valves (ADVs), cain steam isolation valves (MSIV), and feedwater isolation, valves ( WIVs )' .
The CCS is used to provide motive force to position valves under normal shutdown, surveillance tests, and trips without loss -of the CGS compressors. Upon loss of the instrument air subsystem, the low-pressure nitrogen subsystem fulfills this function.
There is. industry wide concern relating to adverse affects on safety related equipment . caused by instrument air subsystem failure and/or air quality. The effect on the safety related valves due to loss of instrument air subsystem and its quality will be examined in the following paragraphs.
As will be explained in Section IV, the nitrogen subsystem automatically supplies plant pneumatie demands when instrument air subsystem is at 85 psig or below (e.g. , large plant demand or loss of power trip).
In the event that the nitrogen subsystem fails, the safety related pneumatically actugted valves (ADVs, MSIVs, WIVs) ' can still perform
'" their safety related function since they each are supplied with safety related accumulators. The other safety related equipment will fail in their " safe" position.
Therefore, loss of compressed gas does not affect plant safe shutdown.
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,,- 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS In conjunction'vith-the compressed gas - design basis, which requires'~a
-40*F dev point at 125 psig, and 400, SCPM, APS used the' standard 4
.ISA-S7.3-1975 as a guide.to establish . instrument air subsystem ' quality; values. These are listed below: '
7 Dew Point -
Shall be 18'F below minimum local ambient temperature-corrected to line' pressure.
Particle Size - Maximum particle size in the air. stream. shall be 3.
microns. -
Oil Content-- As close to 0 w/w (per weight) or v/v (per volume) as
- l. possible and not higher than 1 ppm.
Contaminants -- . Free of corrosive contaminants and hazardous gases.
Currently, there is no design basis for the quality of the nitrogen in:.
the CGS.
- 5. Concerns with Compressed Gas Systems l
Generic concerns with CGS or instrument air systems have been er. pressed in the past. -The concerns center around the issue. -that ~ instrument air systems are usually not safety related. They interface, however, with R
safety related systems, thus creatin5 a potential that a. malfunction of a non-safety related system.could adversely affect a safety related system.
INPO SOER 88-01 was issued recommending the following:
- a. Provide procedures to assist operators in the identification, control and recovery from partial or total loss of instrument air events. _
- b. Provide classroom and simulator- training' on loss of instrument air events to operators. Additionally, provide training in the importance of instrument air systems and the pctential for common mode failures caused by particulate, hydrocarbon, and water contamination to operators and maintenance personnel who work on air systems and air operated components.
- c. Periodically monitor instrument air quality and maintain the air quality at ISA-S7.3 standards. Also, ensure that the station's preventative maintenance program provides for replacing filters and desiccant material on the dryers on a regularly scheduled basis.
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- d. Verify that safety related accumulators and associated check valves are capable of performing their function on a loss of
, instrument air.
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13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS A number of regulatory documents address this issue.
Notice 85-35, and I&E I6E Information Information Notice 85-35 Supplement 1 identified various occurrences of safety related accumulators bleeding down due to check valve leakage. The original information notice identified a specific type of check valve (Parker Hannifin C Series Catalog 2502) installed in air lines for MSIVs and FW1Vs which had experienced this type of leakage. Pertaining to the check valves to the ADVs, APS did not specifically Notice 85-35. address this as part of our response to I&E Information However, APS did evaluate these check valves as a part of our response to INPO SOER Table 5. 88-01, refer to item d on previous page and NUREC-1275, Volume 2, " Operating Experience Feedback Report-Air Systems Problems" indicates that performance of air-operated safety related components may not be in accordance with their intended safety function because of inadequacies in the design, installation, and maintenance of.
the instrument air system.
On August. 8, 1988, NRC issued Generic Letter addressing the 88-14 specifically concern of a malfunction of a non-safety related instrument air system discussed design of the adversely affecting a safety related system. NRC air systems, the quality of the air supply, testing of the system, Specifically, NRC and its backup for safety related systems.
requested that all licensees review NUREG-1275, Volume 2, and perform a design and operations verification of the instrument air system.
- 6. APS Responses to Generic Letter 88-14 The APS response to Generic Letter 88-14 presented actions taken to address the NRC concerns along with commitments to address items that could not be completed within the required response time. In order to perform the review of the PVNGS instru=ent air subsystem with the Buidelines presented in NUREG-1275, a list of safety related components that rely on instrument air subsystem was developed.
practices, Maintenance emergency procedures, and training were verified to assure the functionality of safety related equipment in the event that the instrument air subsystem is lost.
Furthermore, the system function, as designed, was verified for adequate performance through a review of pre-operational start-up test data.
The testing performed verified that, on a component basis and valves would position themselves upon loss of the instrument air subsystem, to their proper mode, open or closed.
'" However, exception was taken to Regulatory Guide 1.68.3 as documented in the FSAR, and no integrated flow test for the condition of loss of the i
instrument air subsystem was performed,
! bleed-down test of the valves fed by theand there was no gradual instrument air subsystem for final valve position.
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In the APS letter dated February 20, 1989,. the following commitments were. ~
a made to improve the reliability of the instrument air ~ subsystem:
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- b a scope ' . of changes .and associated schedule for completion to meet. air quality standards will; be provided in Lthe
. :- , supplemental response; the.. abnormal operating procedure for loss of the instrument-air --subsystem; will' be' revised -to = addrest SOER 188 , , recommendations'by June 30,'1989; additional. operator training .for loss of instrument air subsystem will .be developed 'as part.~ of~ simulator certification under 10CRF55; '.
the Engineering De' sign. Basis review will be completed during-the first quarter of 1991 a . program quality .for' periodic testing and preventative ~
maintenance of the instrument air subsystem will be developed.
The APS supplemental response dated April- 27, 1989 provided the. Unit 2 test results indicating.the acceptability of- the air quality for the instrument air subsystem.
commitments: -
APS has made the 'fellowing additional reduce the micron rating of the afterfilters before any Unit restart; conduct air quality tests during the humid months; perform air quality verification tests on a periodic basis; the schedule for the commitment to prepare the Engineering Design Basis _ manual has been' advanced to the first quarter of 1990.
APS responses to Generic Letter 88-14 are provided in Appendix A to this report. .
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- f. TO . SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT NCR Q n-l I -\ ADv "A" (179)'
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ADV FILTER 25 MICRON FIGURE 3 4/27/s9
l .
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS TABLE 1 TIME EEQUENCE OF UNIT 3 TRIP l A1>.RM TYPER l l
- l. - _ D7ENT I ACTl'AL TIME l l
l l l Main Steam Isolation Actuation Signal l 1:03:48 l l
1 l l IA Compressor A, B and C Trouble Alarm l 1:06:00 l l
1 I l IA Header Pressure Low Alarm Vas Initiated Due l 1:07:46 l l To Hender Pressure Dropping to 95 psig l l l 1 I l Nitrogen Backup Supply Valve Open Alarm l 1:08:42 l l 1 l l While en Nitrogen Supply, the IA Header Pressure l 2:30 - 3:00 l l was Observed at 65 psig l l l 1 l l While on Nitrogen Supply, the IA Header Pressure l 2:50 - 3:20 l l Was Observed at 67 psig l l 1 I I l IA Compressor B in Auto l 4:01:36 l IA Compressor C in Auto l 4:01:39 l l 1 1 l Nitrogen Back-Up Supply Valve Closed When IA l 4:06:23 l l Header Pressure Reached 105 psig l [
l i I l Air Compressor A in Auto l 4:06:23 l l ' i Document and operator testimony indicates a minimum nitrogen tank Note:
level of 95" after the event. This is equivalent to 160,000 scf of nitrogen since the nitrogen liquid in tank is maintained at 150 psis.
P .
-14
I l'
l 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS -
C.
TABLE 2 l COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM DESIGN EASIS l
l 1 l 1. The CCS is non-quality related with the exception of containment -[
I l
pentration piping and associated isolation valves. l 1
l l 2. The CCS includes the following equipment: l l
A. 1 l Three oiless compressors each rated for 506 scfm at 125 psig. The l l compressors are non-lubricated to ensure oil free air. l 1
B. l l Three aftercoolers and moisture separators for moisture-free air. l l
1 l C. Three receivers with a total capacity of 453 cubic feet. l 1
D. I l Two prefilters designed for 98k removal efficiency for particles of l l 100 microns or larger at 400 scfm. l l
1 l E. Two air dryers, each rated for a -40 deg. F dewpoint at 105 psis l l (operating pressure).
l l
1 l F. Two afterfilters designed for 97% removal efficiency of particles 25l l microns and larger at 400 scfm. l 1
I l 3. The CCS maintains a minimum system pressure of 80 psig during normal l l operation, and a maximum system pressure of 125 psig. The compressor l l normal. operating range is 110 psig to 120 psig. l l .
1 l 4.' The CCS fails during a loss of power event.
l 1
l l 5. A CCS failure has no effect on the capability to perform a safe reactor l l shutdown, All air operated valves in ESF systems are designed to fail [
l in the " safe" position upon loss of instrument air, and as such do not l l negate the safety related functional performance of the system. l 1 -
1 l 6. All pneumatically actuated active safety related valves which are l l required for safe shutdown are provided with safety related l l accumulators (i.e., MSIV, FRIV, and ADV). l
' 1 1
l 7. CCS containment penetrations are provided with Seismic Category I, j l Quality Croup B, Isolation Valves which are located in Seismic Category j l I Flood and Tornado protected structures. They are also protected from l l missiles and pipe breaks.
l 1
I
. l 8. The CCS is designed and constructe-d in accordance with Regulatory Cuide l 1.26 and Quality Classification Group D.
. . . . q
, T; 13 MS A20-
~
+
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS' TABLE 2-i
. (Continued)-..
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS, l .
~ .
1 l . 9.
A nitrogen back-up supply is automatically introduced to. supply the CGS l,
- l. l header,when system pressure falls below 85Lpsig.
- l:
- l l 10. The' nitrogen subsystem supply includes the:following equipment:
l.
i
~
.l
-l A. .One liquid nitrogen storage tankLwith.3082 gallon. capacity at-245 l'
l.
l psig. ' This tank shall allow for a refueling shue.down and startup, -[
] or 30' days.use by the served systems, whichever is greater, while l l the gas storage. capacity shall be based on 7 days' normal usage. l1 1
1;
'l B. One low pressure vapori:er rated for 60,000 scfh (1000 scfm) at l- 150 psis. l-l
' l-j.
I 4
C. One.high pressure vapori:er raced for:18,000 sefh (300 scfm) at 2450l l psiS.
J ~l l
l( l 'l . D. ' Gas . storage tanks' with a capacity of 66.800 SCF.
l ~ 11'. The 'high pressure nitrogen header which feeds the safety injection tanks l-
-l and.the atmospheric dump valver are regulated down at 650'psig. l 1
I e 0 4
e l ..
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- g 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS B. Results
- 1. Analysis of the Unit 3 Event An evaluntion of the CGS performance during the recent Unit 3 trip was conducted to detemine if the system performed as designed. In addition, the CGS performance durin5 the Unit 3 trip was compared with its performance during previous trips in Units 1 and 2 which involved a loss of power to the instrument air subsystem compressors. The purpose of the comparison with other trips was to:
Identify any common abnormalities in the CCS performance that were observed in the recent Unit 3 trip and the previous PVNGS trips.
Make recommendations to resolve the causes of the abnormalities identifed above.
Resules of the evaluation are provided in Tables 3 and 4 One common abnormality was identified which occurred in two previous trips. The common abnormality is the reduction of CCS header pressure to approximately 65 psig while the system was fed by the nitrogen subsystem. Although the system is not required for safe shutdown of the plant, the intent of the CGS design has been to maintain a header pressure of at least 80 psig at
.the instruments even after a loss of power to the CGS compressors. This intent was to be satisfied by the passive backup nitrogen subsystem by introducing, nitrogen into the air header after the loss of power to the compressors. A review of the nitrogen subsystem design indicates that the maj or components are sized to deliver as much as 1000 scfm of nitrogen on demand. A review of the Unit 3 data indicates an air consumption rate of approximately 400 scfm between the time when the compressors lost power and the time immediately before the introduction of nitrogen into the air header. This calculated air consumption is after the MSIS actuation which means that the MSIVs and FWIVs had already actuated and were consuming air
.through the hydraulic pumps. The estimated Unit 3 air consumption rate of 400 scfm is derived using the following parameters:
instrument air subsystem piping and tank volume (estimated at 545 ft3) initial tank pressure of 120 psig just before compressor loss final tank pressure of 85 psig just before nitrogen backup valve opens time between the compressor loss and the opening of nitrogen backup 7' valve from the computer alarm typer output provided in Table 1 (2 min. 42 seconds). During this time, the system demand was only met by the volume of air in the instrument air subsystem.
The consumption rate derived from the Unit 3 data shows a much less instrument air use than anticipated by the design calculation for the nitrogen system demand during a transient condition (Reference section IV.D). This is because'the calculation assumes that all normal loads are
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS maintained as part of the demand and the MSIV/FWIV use a maximum vendor specified air usage of '56 sefm each. The condition identified in the calculation for transient condition is very conservative and may not be the true representative of the instrument air header demand at all times. The air consumption rate during the Unit 3 transient is not significantly higher than the air consumption rate during normal condition which has- been monitored for the past few monthq in Unit 2 and documented to be approximately 320 sefm.
An air consumption rate of 400 scfm during the transient in Unit 3 indicates that the possibility of a large air consuming component may not be valid. This relatively normal flow rate also shows that the leakaSe is relatively small through the system. Analysis of the Unit 3 data points to the failure of the nitrogen subsystem in providing the required demand even at the relatively low flowrates.
The evaluation of the system piping / valves identifies pressure restricting components which lead to a reduced pressure at the interface between the nitrogen backup supply and the main air header.
Other aspects of the CGS performance (with exception of the reduction of pressure to 65 psig while on nitrogen supply) is in accordance with the desi5n as shown in Table 3.
As a result of this review, the following action plan will be taken by APS in order to resolve concerns with the reduction in air header pressure:
A flow test of the nitrogen subsystem backup to the instrument air subsystem will be conducted at the air header interface in order to determine if the nitrogen subsystem can provide the proj ected air header demands at the required air header pressure.
If the results of the nitrogen test show an adequate supply of nitrogen and sufficient pressure, then a review of the air header end user vill be conducted to identify any component which could become a extensive air consuming component upon loss of power.
If the nitrogen test shows that the nitrogen subsystem does not supply the adequate nitrogen supply at the required pressure, then the component within the nitrogen supply system will be investigated and if necessary replaced for failure to comply with the system intended design.
=>
L . .
4
- 0 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF THE COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM IN UNIT 3 TRIP WITH 1
1 l TOPIC l I PERFORMANCE l- 1 l l Compressors tripped l l when NAN-501 and { This action is per design. The compressors are l l NAN-SO2 lost never l fed from load centers that lose power when the l I two buses lose power.
l Air header pressure l This action is per design. The receivers are l l reduced to 95 psig l designed to provide sufficient capacity to l
l in 1 minute 45 seconds l allow for tripping of one compressor l l l l
l and subsequent automatic ener5 1 zation of one of 1 l the remaining two compressors. The CCS is l l
l l not safety related and is backed up by nitrogen l l supply which has sufficient capacity to feed l l
l the air demand. The receiver sizing l l l
l therefore did not consider the rate of pressure l 1 loss when all 3 compressors were lost because l l
l nitrogen system is expected to operate to l l
t curriv the air demand.
( l The nitrogen backup l l valve opened in 2 l This action is per design. The nitrogen backup l l valve is designed to receive a signal from the l l minutes and 42 seconds l air header sensor and open when the supply
] after loss of power to l pressure falls below 85 psig. The system is l
l compressors l not required for safe shutdown but the intent l-l l
l l of the design is to avoid air header pressure {
l 1A pressure was observed 1 reduction below 80 rsic at the instruments levell l between 64-67 psi 5 l This action is not consistent with design.
l The low pressure nitrogen skid is desi 5ned to ll l approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> .
l provide a flow rate of 1000 scfm as stated l after loss of power to l in the purchase specification. This flow rate ll l compressors l..is above the anticipated air header flow rate l l l
l which is normally 400 sefm. The nitrogen l
l subsystem in Unit 3 should have maintained the 'll l pressure in the air header at or above the l l 1 minimum recuired nressure of 80 psic'.
l g
l f
[r ..
i 13-MS A20 COMPRESSED GAS lTfSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS TABLE 4 COMPARISON OF THE .'JNIT 3 TRIP WITH PREVIOUS TRIPS IN OTHER UNITS l l l l TOPIC l PERFORMANCE l 1 _ I l
l l l l
l Nitrogen supply valve l The air pressure in Unit 3 is consistent with l l opened at.2 minutes and l the pressure reduction in other trips which l l 42 seconds after loss of l involved a loss of power. There are four l l power to the compressors. l trips that clearly show the nitrogen supply l l l valve opening between 2.5 - 3.5 rinutes upon l l l loss of power to the compressors. References l l l PTPas 1-85-006, 1-86-001, 1 86 0P and 1-88-004.l l '
l-1 I i l MSIV and WIV operation l The MSIV and WIV operation in Unit 3 trip is l l l consistent with operation in other trips. l l l None of the post trip reports identified l l l abnormalities in the operation of the MSIVs or l l l WIVs due to loss of power to the air l C' l- l compressors. Reference PTPas 1-86-001, l l l 1 86-007, 1-88 004 and 2-86 004. l l _ .. '
I I I l l Atmospheric Dump Valve l There are five trip reports that indicate that l
.l (ADV) operation l ADVs were required to operate to cool the plant l l l while the electric power to the air compressors l l l was lost. The ADV operation in all cases was l l l satisfactory. However, concerns were raised l l l due to the sluggish response time of the ADVs. l l l Reference PTRRs 1-85-004, 1-85-005, 1-86-001, l l l 1-88-004. l i l I I
I I I l Air header pressure l There are two other instances where the post l l reduced to 65 psig while l trip reviews indicate that the air header l
l the header was supplied l pressure was reduced to 65 psig in Unit 1. In l l by nitrogen l both cases the air header was supplied by l
,',. l l nitrogen backup. In both cases, the ADV l l l operation was successful and no apparent safety l l fl related equipment failure due to reduction in l l l air header pres.sure was identified. Reference l l l PTPas 1-85-005 and 1-85-006. l 1 I I
L.
(
[
13-MS-A20-
. COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION'AND ANALYSIS l ..
2.c Review of PVNGS Historical Documents A review of historical documents pertaining to the- design ~ and operation-of, the CCS was conducted to determine possible effects on the design basis.- Special attention was~given to design / operational . concerns that were . reported or documented previously and'again. identified or observed duri,ng the recent Unit 3, trip.
The type's'of engineering documents -that were reviewed include. Plant:
Change Requests (PCRs), Field Charge Requests (FCRs), Licensing Documenes (LCTS & IEIN), Non Conforanance Repnrts .(NCRs), Start up Field Reports (SFRs), . Design Change Packages (DCPs), Site Modifications (S-Mods),
Supplier Document Change Notices (SDCNs). Engineering. Evaluation Reports (EERs'), Post- Trip' Review Reports-.(PTRRs),' Purchase Specifications for
. procurement of various compressed gas components, and Special Plant Event Evaluation Report (SPEERs/SPs).
Detailed' results of the review' are shown in Appendix B. The major l concerns are identified in Table 5. These concerns may be summarized as follows:
-EER- 85-CA-013 was issued to documen: a' reduction in air pressure in Unit 1 to 65 psig. .T51s occurred as a result of
- an loss of power to all compressey s.
EER 83-IA-001,. 83-IA-002, 84-IA-007 and 85-IA-008 docu=ent cases of moisture in the compressed gas header.
A total of 43 FCRs identify additional piping or ' air users that are not shown in the existing PVNGS calculations.
APS has. identified action plans to address each of the concerns as stated above.Section VI of this report presents a detailed corrective. action plan. ,
Summary of corrective actions are as follo's: w Update PVNCS calculation (s) to reflect the as built condition Develop a program to monitor air quality and correct existing conditions as required Perform testing to verify ti c capacity of the nitrogen
> subsystem
1 i
l i
13 MS A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYS!EM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS !
TABLE 5
SUMMARY
OF CONCERNS IDENTIFIED BY THE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION REVIEW I I l_Dpqpe.umen t I I concerns l l l
l FCR l l
] A total of 43 FCRs have identified installation of additional l l piping or air users to the plant compressed gas system. This l l l as-built condition is not reflected in the existing l l l calculations.
l ' l I I I
l EERs I l An EER was issued to document the air header pressure reduction l l
l to 65 psig. A check valve was identified to be the root cause l l
l l of the problem but no corrective action was initiated. Other l l
l EERs were issued to document moisture in the air header.
' l I
I I
l Generic I l Generic Letter 88-14 has been issued to address air quality C l Letter l problems at nuclear power plants. For response to this letter l l
l l see Section II.F of this report. l 1 I I
I I I
l I&E Notices l I&E Notice 87-28 address air system problems at U.S. Light l l l Water Reactors. The response to this document is not l
l l complete; however, the following reviews are being conducted: l l 1 -
l l
- Air system quality review l l l
- Loss of air system recovery review l l
- Adequacy of backup air accumulator review l l
l l
- Adequacy of gradual loss of air pressure l l
l l l l I6E Notice 85-35 and Supplement 1 identified varius occurrences ll l l of safety related accumulators pressure bleeding down due to l l
l check valve leakage. The original notice identified a specific l
} l type of check valve (Parker Hannifin C Series Catalog 2502) l l
l installed in air lines for MSIVs and FWIVs. APS~ issued DCPs l
- l l to remove these check valves.
l L. I I I I
.1
-22 L _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ t
13-MS A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EJALUATION AND ANALYSIS
(:
TABLE 5 (Continued)
SUMMARY
OF CONCEPSS IDENTIFIED BY THE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION REVIE'.;
I i l_ Document I concerns 1 1 l 1
I l I&E Notices l APS' reponse to I6E Notice 85-35 only discusses the MSIVs and l l (Continued)l FWIVs. However, we did look at the concerns as part of our l l l response to INPO SOER 88-01 and it was concluded that there l l l vas no problems with the check valves to the ADVs. This was l l l based on no plant failures or no documented failures from the l l l manufacturer. We have performed a backleakage test of the l l
l l check valves to the ADVs to find the leak rate values. This l l
l test was done for all 3 Units and the values were found to be l very low, <1 scfm. l 1
I I I
l l I&E Notice 88-24 identified failure of air operated solenoid l l
l valves affecting safety related systems. AFS is presently l C l l reviewing this IEN for applicability. To date APS has not l l l observed any failures of air supplied ASCO solenoid valves l l l through review of our Failure Data Trending System. l 1 ,1 1
l l I&E Notice 86-50 identified inadequate testing of safety l l l related pneumatic components or systems. PVNGS has had plant l l l trips in which the CGS was lost under slow decay conditions. l l l Problems have not been detected except for sluggish ADVs. l l l l
l l I&E Notice 88 51 addresses the adequacy of surveillance l l l testing to ensure operability of valves following maint- [
l l enance. This IEN is under evaluation. APS will l l l evaluate adequacy of surveillance testing against this l 'l problem. l j
l t I I i 1
O km
-23
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _____.___.____J
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
- 3. Nuclear Utility Survey A
utility survey uns conducted to gather information on the CCS of plants L,
that are similar to PVNGS. Details of the survey and its results are presented in Appendix B. This section presents an overview summary of the Appendix.
The purpose of the survey was to gathe'r information on CGS design and preventative maintenance programs and use the information to develop improvements to increase system reliability of the PVNGS CCS. Such reliability improvements would be the result of design modifications and/or changes to operating and maintenance procedures.
Information from other utilities was gathered by means of a of 15-question survey encompassing a broad scope of information. Eight utilities manufacturer, were chosen for survey on the basis of size, age. NSSS location and availability of information sources. Nuclear power installations contacted were Diablo Canyon, Rancho Seco, St. Lucie, SONGS, STP, Trojan, Waterford and VoStle-Table 6 compares the PVNGS design with that of other plants surveyed. As can be seen from the table, the PVNGS CGS design, components and maintenance practices are generally consistent with those of simil e plants. Areas of potential improvement developed from this survey are as follows:
Most plants, including PVNGS. do not have current calculations that reflect normal and off-normal loads on the compressed gas system. In order to determine if the PVNGS system is properly si:cd, the existing calculation should be revised to reflect current loads on the system.
Tests should also be performed to verify that the nitrogen subsystem is capable of meeting the system demand.
Two plants sur'veyed provide a 1E power source to be used if non-1E power to the compressors is lost. Although PVNGS has a passive nitrogen subsystem that functions to restore system pressure if the compressors are lost, a study will be performed of the benefits and feasibility of providing lE power to the CGS compressors as an additional or alternate backup system. -
PVNGS has reviewed its preventative maintenance activities, including
,those for air quality control to ensure that they are adequate to ensure system reliability.
Since this issue has been addressed in other sections of this report (e.g., IV.F IV.C), specific recommendations are not provided in this section.
C .
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, 1 13-MS-A20' 1
' COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS-P4 .;
~
'4 Comparison of. System Function and the Design Basis The purpose'of this.section is to analyze the' CGS performance to ensure -
- that - it meets.. . the system's original . system: design requirements.
' Performance data was'obtained frota actual plant data, and, manufacturer's-test data have been compared to the design basis.
-The~ CCS is comprised of two subsystems; instrument air and nitrogen. -The
- nitrogen subsystem serves'as a backup to .the Instrument -Air subsystem.
Data ~ collected from a Unit 2 air quality test from February 12.to March 1 "
27 was useo to measure the performance of.-the instrument air subsystem to its. design basis. In addition, manufacturer's data was used to compare
~
- the. performance of both subsystems to the CGS design basis.
- a. Instrument Air Subsystem
- i. Air Quality The air quality' test conducted in Unit 2 uas in response. to-NRC Ceneric Letter 68 14.- " Instrument Air Supply System
. Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment". The rest was run under normal full power conditions for approximately 2 weeks prior to unit shutdown (resulting from ADV concerns).
, A -summary of the air quality te s t. results and their respective design basis values-are below:
1 I I I i 1 l l LO7 i HICH I AVERACE I DESTCN BASIS l 1 I I I I I l DEUPOINT I -85 I 58 I -80 I -40 l 3' i F l l l 1 l FLOW RATE (SCFM) I 170 l 300 l 301 1 400 l
- 1. I I I .
! I l OIL CONTENT (PPM) 1 0 l 1 I .03 i OIL FREE l l 1 1 l l 1
.5
- l. PARTICLE SIZE l i 15 l .65 l 25* l l (Microns) ! I I I
_l
- Actual design basis documentation for particle size indicates a 97% removal efficiency for particles 25 microns or larger.
Afterfilters' 25 micron rated cartridges were replaced with 1 G miemn rated cartridges 99.9% efficient. This was based on Filterite recommendation, yhich is the afterfilter supplier, l as documented in vendor correspondence dated February 6, 1984 1 (Log Number M054-65). Design basis documentation will be changed to reflect as built configuration.
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'A3-MS-A20 j APPCDIX C k.
, ; UTILITY RESPCMSE3 TO SURVEY OH INSTRUMENT AIR TABLE OF CONTENTS
.4 Diablo Canyon
'Palo. Verde Nuclear Generating Station Rancho Seco S t.. . Lucie St.n Gnofra Nuclear Generating Station South Texas Project
.7-roj an Wa$erford Vogtle O
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- t D-MS.A20 APPE.NDIX C l.
) safety related. The quality of gas frem these scurces is not known. .
- 6. Compressors: 2 Atlas Cepco, capacity unknown, but both are 100% capacity
' 4 Joy Mfg., 334 scfm at 100 psig, all 25%
capacity (These are seldom used) 1 Altas Ccpco, located outside, use for outages only Receivers: 2 - 631 cuft at 120 psig Dryers: 2 - one will be replaced shortly '(dessicant is damaged). Dewpoint is -40 F (Design).
Technical Specification limit is -18.
Dessicant heated.
- 7. The dryers have both pre- and post-filters. They are both rated at 1 nicron.
No filter regulators are used.
No finer filters or filter rec.ula: Ors.are used.
Other filters are us;d thrcughcut the plant, for ext =ple when the instrument 1_ne comes off the header have pressure regulators with filters and sc=e instru=ents have their own filters.
S. The dessicant is =cnitered =cnthly since G.L. 88-14.
Actually the dessicant is monitored via the dewpcin:. If there checked.
is a problem with noisture, then the dessicant i.y Filters are nonitored per delta p nonitors with annunciators.
Generally, the plant relies en the annunciators (see Question 13).
The plant is also in the process of ordering new water-
,, cooled compressors. They will ask the vendor for a l
{
naantenance schedule and program.
- 9. Yes, there have been sene problems with the dryers. The i dessicant in the dryers was not checked between 1976 and 1988. It had deteriorated during this time. Alsc, when
There'have been no problems with the filters.
h e
9
s 13-MS-A20
/.PPENDIX C There has also been ver~v hich maintenance on the Jev compressors. There has also been a quantity of water (e.g., gallons) in the system frem improper connections.
- 10. - Air qualit-j was not nonitored prior to G.L. 88-14.
Contact does not feel that thev can neet ISA-7.3. Thev are finding 300 particles > 3 nicrons in spite of thei' small filter sice. .
Dewpoint is maintained >= -18 T.
They have no problar.s with oil. Cc= pressors are oil less.
The new aL: qualli tonitoring program is as fo11cws:
o IA pressure is checked continuously o Dewpoint is checked at the dryer cutlet monthly o Every six =enths particulcre and oil are sa= pled They are in the process of installing sample taps and have been b:owing down the system since Dece=ber.
Yes, noisture has been accu =ulatine in the IA system.
It has presented a pr:bler. They Ere rewriting the procedure to look for noisture and blowdown the svste= ~
if it is found.
- 11. Piping and Tubing are copper.
Valve material is not known.
Vessels (receiver tanks) are thought to be carben steel.
Filter body material is not known.
Other naterials centained in the system nay be stainless steel.
- 12. Design: 120 psig
,, Normal: 90-120 psig Mini =um: 90 psig
- 13. Yes, pressure is continuously in the control roen, one panel contains all IA indications. They continuously
' monitor dewpoint and alar =~with hich dewpoint. Also alarm for high delta P acrcss filter in the control room. Also high temperature in the air header, air dryer prcble=s, and. alar s en the cc= pressor (e.g., low oil, high oil, temperature).
o a
. ______m________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .__ _ __ _ _ . _ _ .___ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
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. i3-MS-i20' APPC7LXX C
- ji ;. , _ ; . ,
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- 14. Demand: L.1200 se'fm including the SA system
. Abnormal:" Not:known ,I
' Source: Estimate q 15 , - The response.tn G.L. ss-14.. indicated that there was a~
preblem with the IA system at Diablo Canven. The utility was aware of the. problem prict to the ^ cena-i -
letter. The plant hai been triered'ence due to -i~~c system proble::.s. They have pur^ chased new ccmure$scrs '
anc. new dryers to tmFrove the system.
- They did not commit to meet ISA-7.3.in the gene e -
- letter respor.se.
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. 13-MS-520 APPOGIX C PVNGS INSTR"MIUT AZR SURVEY BASELINE O2.TA Source: Tom Ballweg, Bechtel Gleniale f.602) 342-8524 Mechanical lead 1.
The' instrument air system is dedicated solely to instrument air.
- 2. Yes, II power.
power to the IA system is lost during a 1 css of non with an am,A backup system consistinc of licuid nitrogen mlent vaperiner is orovided and desicned to provide a passive backuo in the event that tressure in the IA system drops bel'ow B5 psig. There i's no way':o restore the ce= pressers in the event that non-1E pcwer is unavailable.
- 3. No, there are no safety related pertiens of the IA system.
valves as Accumulates needed. arectrovided to safe:v-related belcng to the same These syste=a~cu=ulaters as the valve,are cens:dcred to rc to the IA system.
- 4. There are 244 :;afety related valves and dampers which rely on instr *: en air. Most of these are designed te fiil safe en 1 css of IA. The saferv-related active valves that reruire air to fulfill their safety related functions are she fo11 ewing:
o MSIV o ADVs o FWIV These valves' are provided with accumulators to ensure their safety related function. The ADVs have nitrogen
, accumulates, the MSIVs and FWIVs have small air accumulators used to position a shuttle valve.
is not safety related. The air cuality of the This scurce nitregen is not non; ored. ~
- 6. Compressors: 3 - 500 scfm at 125 psi, Ingersell Rand Receivers: 3 - 151 cuft Dryers:
1 - 400 scfm twin tower with dewpoint of -40 r, dessicant heatless manufactured by Ke p 7.
The dryer has both prefilters and post filters. Thev are cartridge type. The micron rating is unknown. ~
e e
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C i
i Filter regulators are used for instruments. The =icron I rating is not known, f
Moisture separators and filters are used in varicus pcrtions of the lines, for example in line to the ADVs.
B. The existing preventative maintenance tasks include the i following:
o Inspect, clean, or replace air ce= presser inlet .
filter annually.
o Re=ove and replace instru=ent air prefilters se=i-annually o Rs=ove and replace instru=ent air pectfilters annually o Replace dessicant annually
. In addition to these tasks, surelemental tasks such as
~
disassembly of drain traps inclbding inspection and cleaning of the internals are also perfer:ed en the prefilter, =cisture separa cr, and receiver en a quarterly basis along with a =ultitude cf other tasks perferred en related instru=ents, relays, =c:crs, bearings, vibratien nenitoring and st= lar equipment.
Additienal =aintenance ite=s are being censidered.
- 9. Call maintenance
- 10. The air quality that is neasured is c1cse to neering
.e_e. 7.,.
See G.L. 88-14.
~
Yes, =oisture does accu =ulate in tne IA system.
Engineering,reguests prepared fcr^the IAS over the las:
four years andacate =casture occurs.
- 11. Piping and tubing: Carben steel frc= the cc= presser up
, to the prefilter. Copp3r or brass for the rest of the system.
Nitregen syste= up to the isolatien valve is carbon steel.
Valves: Brass O'
Vessels: The ADV accumulators are stainlens steel.
The IA receivers are carbon steel.
The dryer,is carben steel.
Filters: Dryer pre and post filters are' stainless steel e
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13-MS.A20 APPEND 1X C 1
1 i
Other: : Moisture separator in 'line to MSSS has an i aluminu= body *
- 12. Design: 125 psig
, Normal operating: 105-110 psig Minimum: 85 psig
- 13. IA pressure is continuous 1v monitored and alarmed in the control roc =. A local fick indicater was recent1v added in Unit 2. This will provide a local readcut. TF.ere is also a nitrogen pressure noniter. There era local delta p monitors on the pre and post filters which alar =
indirectly in the centrol rec =.
- 14. The IA demand during nor=al operatiens is 300-400 scf=<
During upset conditions this demand may reach 880 scfr.
The nor=al demand was neasured in unit 2 and acrees with the original calculation (13-EC- A-204) used t5 sice the dryer.
The upse de=and is based en a calculation that assu=es that the hydraulic accumula:crs fer the 4 MS:vs and 4 MFIVs ar'e being recharged si=ultanecusly. ,
' 15. .PVNGS was in the process of conducting an air qua'.ity test on Unit 2 at the ti=e of the respense to Generic Letter 88-14. Preli=inary results are as felle.cs:
o Dew point is approximately -10 F at 120 psig. Since this is greater than the design value, cc=pensa: cry neasures are in olace to open low point drains en the air distribution' piping on a periodic basis to i
prevent noisture accumulation.
l o Particulate are prede=inantly less than 3 nicrens in size with some particulate in the 3-5 nicron range, o Hydrocarbons are less than 1 pp=.
The. . ut. ilit. y will evaluate.the data and deter =ine if nocif.ications c: changes in preventative maintenance are requirec.
PVNGS is also in the process of revising its emergency procedures to consider:
l
{ o Indications of. loss of instrument air, such as l alar =s, autc=atic acticns, functions lost.
i 1 l o Identification of critical cc=penents operated by l 1
1 4
.e 13 MS-A20:
APPCIDIX C .
instrunent' air and the position in which they fail.
o Expected systen and. plant responses to'a Icss of instrument air and-the consequences of these' responses..
o Actions to take the intended if critical cenoonents do not fail-in position. ~
k o ~ Manual actions'the operator should be exoected.to
'take'to respond to a loss of instrumenta'ir event.
o Restoration is regained. actions to be taken after instrument' air
- Sinulator training is being enhanced..to' include loss of instrument air..
Frequency of preventative maintenance tasks related to air cuality is being reviewed and nay change depending on the results of the air cuality test.
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13-F.S-A20 APPENDIX C RANCHO SECO REspCNSE TO IA SURVEi' Source: Masa Nakao (Sechtel) San Francisco (415) 768-2363 Hechanical Engineer Gary Aron (SMUD) Rancho Seco (209) 333-2935, x 4759 Syste=s Engineer 1.
Instrument air is fed frem the service air system. The service air systen is also used for respirators in containment. Th air compressors,e3system line then receivers, up is the suchlinethatsplits. there are 3 pricrity air operated valve in the systa= cuts of f A service air loads if necessary.
- 2. Yes, loss of non-1E power. power to the instrument air system is lest durine a ce= pressor lined up There with the is a hack-un instrument air diesel-driven systen which can be manually started in the event of a Lop, hcwever this ccy. pressor is not safety related. There are no connections to 1E pcuer available.
3.
No is Seismic portien Iof the IA systen is safe:v related, but there the fellcwing:(ncn-Q) bhckup air to shme valves, includine '
o ADVs o
o Main Teedwater Isciatien Control valves Energency Teedwater Isclatien Con::cl valves In addition, there is Appendix R backup to the sane ec=penents the Turbine Bypass plus theValves.
CCW valves, Feedwater valves, and consists of air bottles that This Appendix R backup a certein mininun syste= pressure set are to trevide. air when is rea'ched. There is an alarn for low bottle air pressure.
Two Safety Teatures Valves (the Let'down Isola:ica and Reactor by accumulators. Coolant pump Seal Return Isolatien) are backed 4.
Safety includerelated active valves which rel'v on instrument air the followinc:
o Main Teedwater Isolation valves o Aux Feedwater centrol valves o ADVs 5" All of'these have valves have accumulators. air bottle backun. Thev do net Nitrogen is no need to use the air.fer respira:crs. used because"cf the 5.
The instrument air es=presscrs are backed un by a diesel-powered air co=presscr and by backup air bc tles (to scre 9
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. 13-MS-A20 APPE'@IX C' i
.s . :l valves).
The diesel nust be manually started. The p , operation of:the back-up air bottles is automatic. There p .are two alar:s, one fer less of IA, one:for low bottle L pressure.-
E Although'the P&ID. indicates'that the backup system-is "Q" , this.is not assu=ed to be-the case and was not indicated as: such to the NRC in the respense to G.L. SE-l 14.
l, 6.. Compressors: 3' service air compressors. rated'at.300 cfm '
', at 125 psi. Manufacturer net known. In normal o running,peration one fullytwo ec= ressers loaded and oneare cycling; with demand, with the third unit in auto-start standby.
I diesel-driven ec= pressor. Rating, manufacturer not known.
. Air Receivers: 3 for the service air.cc=presscrs.
Capacity, manufacturer not known.
1 fer the diesel-driven instrunent air cc presser. Capacity, = manufacturer ne kncun.
Dryers:- 4 associated with the service air systa=, rated' at 900 cf= with a required dewpcin: cf -40 F.
2' associated with the instru=ent air syste=,
rated at 900 cf at 100 psig. There is also a sta.ndb.v dr.yer with a ca acity of 340 cfm at 100 psig.
Type of dryer is dessicant heatless.
- 7. The dryers associated with the service air syste: have post filters only. The rating is 1 micren. 'The ty,re cf nec a is not kncun.
No IA system.
information on the diesel-driven cer,cressors fcr the Filter.reculators are used u= stream of accreximatelv 90%
of the valves. They are rat'de at 4 0 nic're' ns. ~
There are moisture separators in the service air system.
3, There is an absorber in the diesel-driven IA system.
B. Surveillance is as fo11cvs:
o Air cc= ressors r'eceive a ncnthly PM where the blew by is checked and the filters are checked. This is l
e
/_ _ __- -
a ____--_ .___ - _ _ -- - --_-_- - -- - -
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C
.~
censidered a " mild trendine". There is also a 120 day inspection where ec= pressor valves are opened and checked for wear. Vibration is monitored quarterly.
o Dryers are nonitored every 30 days and the system is lubed. The dessicant is inspected annually.
o Filters are on a 120 day PM cycle.
o The system is blowndcun nonthly and checked fer noisture or other abnormal conditiens.
9.
There have been no problems in years.
- 10. The utility attempts to meet ISA-7.3. Thev feel thev do meet this standard for dewpoint, particula'e, and ~
hydrocarbons quality.
although they have-not tssted for air There is abut point (no .recurder, constant this canmonitorine be used).of Dew in-line dew ceint is alar ed in the centrol reem. The utility is des'icninc sanpling equipment now. Breathing air is already~
, ~
nonatored monthly for hydrocarbons and par iculares, using filter paper. They also the IA system. There used Oc have a =cnthly bicudewn of not at this' time.
be =cisture years age, but
- 11. Piping Lnd tubing:
Valves:
Vessels:
Filter bedies:
Other:
. 12. Design pressure: 125 lbs Normal cperating pressure: 100 lbs Minimum operating pressure: 50 lbs (verify with Gary) 13.
Instrument air pressure is menitered continuously and alar:s in the control rec =. It is not data legged; h wever, they do plan to de this in .the future. There
.are also local indicaters around the compressors dryers, filters, headers. ,
There ismalfunction.
in the control roem for cc pressor also annunciation
-, dewpoint is nonitered continuously at the output The of the IAS air dryers and filters via a digital readout meter.
dewpoint is recorded at least once per shift and thereThe is contrcl roem annunciation on high dewpoint.
- 14. The demand is approximately 250 cfm ('-20%) . This is
,,' estinated based on air cc pressor usage.
cf demand are outdated. The syste nay be Calcula:icasundersized.
O g e
f.
L I 13-;15 A20 f
APPE!; DIX C 1
1 4
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1 15.
Rancho the Seco has IA system imple.mented since lo81: a number of improvements to o
Installation cryer of a new, high capacity desiccant air o
Installation of a centinuous readcut dewooint i nonitor with control rec = annunciation
~
o Cc=plete revisiens to the ner=al and casualty operattng precedures o
An aggressive preventative maintenance pregram The following modifications were =ade to introve reliability and centrol of critical valves:"
o An auto-start atr compressor (with en low system pressure),
a ec=clete instrumentdiesel-driven l
grade air o
filtration and dryer package Ccmpressed air bottle back-un svster that passively supplies two heurs'of instrument grade air
~
to several critical valves uren 1 css of the ner:a1 a i r s u.c.o 1 .v The IAS at Ranche sece is designed and cperated to maintain air quality tha: sects or exceeds ISA-7.2.
A portable dewpcint meter is being purchased to verify air acisture centent at the points cf use cf the IAS.
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- * .. 13.MS . A. 2.0 , g. .
- t. ,,- APPENDIX C
- L n:n 1
1 ,. .
..~ .
~
~ r Lyn 1 L
- n3tru2Ent Air 00Eifn 32.313 C'sstionairt + .
veility c=:.parison
- Purpere: .
Assist apt in und2: standing ths design apprecch and beses :: '.
- nstrur.cn Air used in c hor large nucinar y war plants, "
To applied
.be learn ofte successful paio Varda. prcetieas used in c:hnr pla .:s that =ay ~
To avoid pr:his . trats. ace =untarad by othara. :.
a Cont::: 1 -- Ybof MEc3- ....J..,..
... P3. 5'r.\ac$r @. ^d' Ph:ns : (1) w * - W:. :.
01:1c : 4M (.3 :.2 c a..w ---
- 1. ..:. . .
Is the Instrur.gn: Air (IA) systs: dedicats.d te instrume.: tir , ..
cr is it als usad fer c hsr purpenes such as sarvi a r.ir, lah air, at:? Dascrib: any c e.sr uma , ,
i i
- it
.h.ers : C^~-1.-:n, . n. ;oe.
i i . t i s
, c.ir rc W.t.remmi d.sP.
t .
, M.E. bl( f. bc typ p};gs \ .y,,b (,q- i
(
/
- 2. Is 7:ve.r :: th A systa: 1ert during i isss c (L 7)? R:V d:ar the syster. ras;:nd? Can e.a An:n 1-E p:ver cer. press: s he j
. c:nnected := a 1-2 povar scur:a? X:v? Describe secres?
I M pmtta b Eb.\ b., y\.o ofic,.Q mne. de een. pew us >nc.s y b,u.e i
1
- 3. "s the If so, IA systar.the describe 'er r.ny pertien of it nadary ra!.r.ta d (i . e . ugn);
scraty raia.ted inta;f acas and tun::icn:, '
NS b.u t e. i ct do 'md: taif L&.
, j
.1 d i A0Vs) Wh : .saf'aty require ::1stad 1.ir := activt f nifill valves (e.v. TX~V, ME V, 80 bi:Vd:Vn, '
hn.ir sa f t Y rtitted fun i:n?
I%'IY, tiit.lf Oc any ei thast valvas have !A er Nitregen ec::: lat :: t:
Ensura thtir sats:y ralttad f:ncti n? :> ascribe ther. c.nd their '
F:00:01ater gt.s seu:::,
W.Nske.at:mv\dat6[ Lit)
.E . De the "A cc.prassers hav e a b e. hur e v s t.a= '
i.the avant cf a less ef IA (e.y. li~uid ni re: en w'ith' a vep:ri:sr) ? :' se, vi s.-
- .s it r.nd hev idess' i ver%? :s the be ku; 'j e.ir qu:lity cf the 5t::r.; supply? ch:3,ty, "O" per icn :: sys::
? Whr.. is O.:
des:ription manuti if p zzihla via talae: v.
$Ardh c.u hocGCqv8tg ibLW h.si;cis'rarc. fi S M NO. .
- - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - -- -A
13-MS-A20.
, APPENDIX C. *
~-
.non - .
1x Instrur.snt Air C4alyn 'Ba sis cuestiencire * .?aen 2* ~
V:itity eczpar!sen .
Mc.my'eMar6fvb 2.
- hol MO
- 6. Hur.ht.: capacity 2. % $*5My Chitgebrict[p':
of IA cenpras: .: 7 ,,
~
and =: nut 1 turer Mu .--
C.me
- 'een Nu: har , M Lsh. r g ' c.W , ,
and vc16u __
e tha air receivar:7 Nu=bar capacity _
o the H _cryers? required dcup:1..t - 40*?
7W *ther
&? C c4' et FM despeat.1. NsYnh x ht$d m ..ai e :: .') _~ 2 /%) M%etc.'d 1- :..
4-- ;.,n,v.. w .,,x:::. 4 ..-
r,<
. 7. ..
Denzofthe typa madi: d:fer have prefilters and/cr pos filtar ? Descriht and si ren ratiny in anch.
frt. Bid Q ket dm:s .
n u -
s c .' -
t t s
a_ e- i n_s.
i
. n c _ ,. sc , . >
bc c. screrj-
- 1 <
f fidtar raquieters c:n used, Vh:
rz:ingd.,is venar-11y used? ty;e of :edia a d 21:::n
(-so ne.M u g C4"
- 1" cd s lo :.c. .
1 Ars th rs any ra~ula.tarm c3e husd7applic:. i:nz vhera finer fi2 tars er fi'. *r
- ascribs th:s
- EF;11:3ti0n5' type ef :::odia and ; icren :::in; f er aten APP 11: tica-U*80 !hi *h '
hkM.m-2dc'rSU.bc. .
vr. - -
Art thart S$Y C:r.tr nig &1lanteus in'ing filtg;; tnf/:: : ig;g7g ccptr::::: in::allad in tha :A s Wh:: is their purper.a?
h'Att is the medis and Irr:n :::ystan? ing?
, 80 Ab bis htM E.
Describafilters crycem, the prevantive reintan:nes preg 2 applied :: the de s crib ed, th:va ., filtar re? laters, r.cirture seppere:=rs at:.'
.s.=7 What is d na and t- vhst fraquanev t: each -
-DECU otA^ t %
pae.t a:.;u &c=6.
\
{ p . w d p - p h i f pre.t. b a c!,& p n -
.w-Pw,iradssth&d 1 i .
l -
y.
I
.. - s . e.,:. 5 6> a:Ge m 9,; _ ;,,,, m ,, o
+ *%'*-
.Q- ~ 13 F.S-A20' APPENDIX C *
~
. . 2r: re::n ; Air Design 31 sis Questientira 717a Uti:.ity cczptrison ,,,
5, 7er the dryers, filt: 2, filter raq" aliter: *: described ab
, have thars been any. probless?
14e 7
Trag ent changa cuts? g h.3 F.igh.1 s L -
untfailurum?
ef cerrsc ivc : intanence (L.c. ::10 n::icn'c un:::pactsd l- ,
bib 4 -
- 10. What air gut 11ty do yet r 7.:ir .. .
};
dess yeur cir. gaslity conpar,[a :m and/cr achia
- :s A-; . ::7 9t2p%%fbdct.)lr.kodrg~h*p b t.. n.-
a -
I,1
, ~5 6 4 @ i. W M b k . g a
Descriks ders tr. innthesus air :;utlity : nit: ring pr:gre y n garlity? usa? lic s -
hu: L :.he :::q ency1.
Q te heg\;
D:t.$cre.500hrebtSt.'(4 IONSper p::/,k tvIdt@
s ,
en,0 M O(0 cu, .onS -
Dess isters 5 -
pr:ble:7 H:V a = ===u l e t e 17. -ha IA systs:? :::ss it present a is it daats with?
separaters, s o :.ngtry d: jar = , e::}( a . y . hi c W.e ,, n, . ::1ps , . r.cis:
NESg p g hs.g-b . g ce,,:,
b dee n low pgg h
- 11. Whr.: ::: rial:
tra used in the IA sysu=7 i Pipir,7 and tubing _ odiAn, A S.3,I ,t dEMc,3 ^
., e -h e s -
... Va.1yes M 55 ; ,
.i
(
Vaasals _ tBJb' *5\e_e.k .
' ~
Tilts; bedias .
.. . i C hor ?
- 2. N Whe.: is thu CA design p: nazurm? .1@ }
Pra ssure? \lt -!% M*nL: : :part:1y,; 7::::grn? N::::1 epart in:
_ty. %uw;* l
- 15. IE ~,. '. p r a 8 s
- S tat'. { te t4 p t cent:.nucus-ye . Q.{/er
-- se, fl:
V new isr. nite:gf (pgriedi:t1ly c:
'10-M S cens? yncrs? E:v ::a g c,. ., y . . 3
"' 8 g
h
r* " ' * * : w : ~ ae- n. .x m t I I* '* ~ .. . .. ..
- 3. e:
13 MS.A20 j
in:n ,...AFFENDIX C_ '
, , . . . i 1 st a
i
- nstrument Air Dasign Basis Questientira - hga (
. l
- es:11sy cc:rpa:-inen -
l I
4 14.Durin7
'Jha.tUpset is tha IA dentnd
/alner::1 c nditier.s- (set:) curing nen.s.1 epir:ti:ni -
atc) ?
(s.g. LCP, N5:3,.5:AS,-A7As,~ l W.at is mu W -
.taisurarents,the sourca of tha data (e.g. cair:1sti:n:', c;cratin-etc)?. Daarribs it. '
' . "l>o ne h DM -!
Ecs tharc been chtlinsd'fr:: pieany cerrsirti=n of !A de. end/=ense:pti:n' dati' ~
1 i er Bern.al er expa.n:- ctedtasupsa,t ;h demandiupsats er tri;z :: tha "dasign hemis,a Describa it.
~~O ON-S(1od
- 15. .
i Chtrie .tri:e the utility 't u t.oreth h
Mr ipdad t::rrgotu.d je.$\ytt phth W b' ""#
'pi\.qe.xsRted.on. T V 4
.g
~I (, y Lb s
ps r Mp~ n J gieec:.sks S ( Sont e d a
O..
o
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - ~ ^ '
I l 13-MS-A20 APPENDDC C ]
1 o 1
..-~.. I SONGS RESPCNSE TO IA SURVEY l i
Source: Ramsey Clark, SCE SONGS (714) 368-9169 Sys: cms Engineer Don Watkins, SCE SCMCS !
(71) 36E-9829 l l
- 1. The instrument air system is dedicated to instrument esir, i There air. is a separate system for service air and brear..ing The instrument air rysten is prcvided with three i compressors that are located in SONGS Unit 2. Two cf these compressors are powered frem separate Unit 2 buses; one cc= presser is powered frem a Unit 3 bus. Thus the power for the instrument air system ecces frc= three separate scurces.
- 2. Yes, power to the IA syste= is Ics: during a less cf non-1E pcwer event. There is no previsien fer 1E backup.
- 3. No pertien cf the IA system is saf ety related.
Safety related active valves that require air Oc fulfill 4.
their safety reacted function are as fc11c.ts:
o ADvs o CCW Ncn-Critical Loco Isclatien o See G.L. 85-14 sespense (not availabic)
- 5. The ADV valves are provided with separate stand-alene nitrocen accu =ulators to ensure their safety related function for the required time the valves =us function.
A smaller accumulator is used Oc take the CCU valves to their safety related positien (belew 70lbs)
The remainder position on less of of the valves fail instrument air. to their saferv related
~
6. Cc= pressors: 3 rated at 800 scfm at 110 psi, Ingersol Rand. All three are 100% capacity, but they nor= ally operate at 50%.
Receivera: 3 Capacity and manufacturer not known.
s .
Dryers: 2 rated at 650 scf=. Refrigerant type with required dewpoint of -34 T.
- 7. The dryers have only post filters. They are rated at 5 nierens. The filter is a cartridge. type.
- e 4
1 m_.._._________._ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
n Q.{ @ '
1;,
,y )
'~
- as^ 13.Ms.A20 :io p:
g y.- APPENDIX C. i
+
K.
r.
F p :- n.
, 2. .
3 i
p , ', Tilter regulators are not used. ;
.y There are no applications where' finer-filters are'used.
?
They are.not. required for-the valves. : Valves only require < So nicrons.. ,
] .
3 lThere noistureare no'other in separators miscellaneous the-IA system.- inline-filters.and/cr-
- 8. -Contact: Butcher, Maintenance, (714)I768-6607, for infor=ation on maintenance.- *
- 9. The answer'to each section of.this! question is no. -There !
has dryers..
been one problem, a less of refrigerant in the
~10. Air quality requirements are as fc11cws:
o Dewpoint > 34 T o Particulate.<= 5 nicrens i
i
-San onefre blewscown the system every cutage. Basically the system remains dry:and clean. T.i.e o n l
~
=y. ,
recularly =enitered is dew cin:. This is cniiter cred- that is .;
using a te=perature gage, 'enca a shift er.cnce a day. '
- 11. - Piping end tubing: Before dryer,is carben steel j schedule 80, AS%I-SA-1065. Beycnd.
the dryer is cepper, seamless, ASTM l 3
B-88, Type L, and bronze.
Valves: Carbon Steel, ASMI SA 216 or SA 105 (P&IO)
Bronze (SCI) .
l
. Vessels: ? :
Filter Bodies: ? !
~
Other: ?
i 12... Design: 110 psi
~
Normal: 102 - 110 psi. Cc=presscr starts at 102, cuts-cut at 110. ,
.'i Minimun:~ 70 psi' i 3,' 13. 'There is a pressure differential (delta p) cauce in line. They also Xcep watch on the ce= pressor. There j
are co=eressor trouble alarms and pressure alar:s in the '
control ^ roc =. Also, if.cne ec= presser fails to start, the ner:t one starts. j 4 e I
- j
[
i-l' ' 13-MS-A20
! APPENDIX C 14.
Hermal IA demand is 380 scfm. This includes both units.
Compressors are tested daily by blowing down the receivers to make the compressors load at 100%.
The, designed instrument for SA and air system (cc= pressors) was originally IA. Now caly required to handle IA. the system (compressors) is The ce= pressor demand is based on observation of the time the runs. There was a calculation performed "long ago". The actual demand agrees very will with the measured de. mand.
15.
As a result of G.L 88-14, the utility did the following:
o Started monitoring dewpoint temperature o
o Custified the type of dryer used Committed the ADVs would be added to the test orocram (This is because, although the ADVs are backed'up'by nitregen, they are only separated frca the remainder of the IA system by a check valve. If the check valvo leaks, the actual available pressure kncun. They have is ne:
new added Ica% rests to the Secticn XI test progran. .
I 1
Ge ,
e j
l
+
Duc5/E3 ::: g.: I -- "./ 52/M.. :.r . * ~NEY
~~ ~ ~ 13-MS-A20
. .**rnso '. ' APPENDIX C ..
,. 3 i
l
- In s trum e nt Air De s i gr. ?>a s i.s Qu e s tienaira
?tTA 1 -
Utility com.,;: Arizon
.. ~
.n.
, PJrpesst .
.Azrist APS in unde.rsttnding the design A;;r:Ach thd bassa ger l Inn t."J.mant Air ta t,d in ether 1r.rp4 ,nuci o.tr power pitata.
To letra of sucesssful practiess used in ether plants that =gv ba Applied to PLlo Vardt. -
To avoid problsn t. rats enc untsrad by ctharz..
, T*3 e a Ccntnct1 A't Co'W /lms.) s.,._ims& 1.cse::.1On: _ 66 cm .G ~?'
Phena : (_re.2 )_.a :.: - 7x o .a -
':itit: m e .v. .cr
.l . Is thG Ins tr*Jr.cn'". AI r (*J.} systs"2 de diO.:Obd tD inNt "JOCO*, 117, er is it Al s e us ed f r O th er p;;p-Os a s sue".~. As servi n tir, lth Airf 4507 De scrib a t.ny ctha r Us h s .
7~r'E =~A sysrrr,., <* r s r;= /s .srxmrz y p e :;
- C Arc ~3 r;; '^' S r"c '"f~~"'~~
- !4 . smuier ,e,,e :rs rm / vo si c < c.-,-:.6 = e,ee u=: .= S-o sc
"'~*fA? Ss:vicc.s .
- 2. Is p:ver t= th. :A sys == :.:s: curing a less of n n 1-! p:ver (I.,07) ? .M:w dcas thz systa: rasp =.d? CAn 52.2 IA cetpressers be
. cc .nsetad to a *,-I p= var scures? Ecv? De s crib a sour:27 o Jr .r~A c.n.ri"c.<. .ssa,e is ca.Jdstrc=. r= r uf < dad-/f C A b'c~ scc . o Wc';cS"r~cse.c~ L:Jx#- t cio .,,.:~A Mof t' S774 C 6 a~ ?:/A' " A d L F .
l META 'fr.<E / c.r7dd A'4~::P.N.d6:D 73 A?f 5:P"rCf" 7"4" l:'" C:: +//"e:# r.s r,#. .
t ,
i'
}
- 3. Is the IA syeten. er any per ,ien of it sr.faty rsir.ted (1.s. "C") ?
!! se, '
describe t.;e safe:v* related interfac-a.s and functi ns.
% merum
'l cad / w/*.e"m<~+t es rw ce .::-A sysrc r' / S S4ffrf *dA T'~;* - :~~A 'S
\ M=*'/b cD 7o .r !/~fr"',L.d?As r";> d.:v~r:As *'dr.!f3~ D4 VC':. .f. : fresw )
.~'a. Jct /c.e ,, ig csncw.srs ,e,c/c .cAQ c,J *4:.o :S c.s;~ .i: .
' ' ~A 5'rt .CA .c!7Y #pcpic D /;-ude r7c .J .
- 4. WhatWC7G.~a# za. *1ty ra.fCS sJCactive vtaves (s.v. 7 nry, xs:v, 50 hi:wdevn, eted
- i.
DVF ) 2:T* ira tir to fulf1*.1 tbs.ir AAf aty related fu.neti:n1 U= E~ t= r,. a . m,ey ,eeto. e: > co 1,.c c wwa A? Eo G.'.<= e"~
n . M */~O F UL F/L.c r,~./ (a.i< MSc"fy' /;'d~C/ 7"d2> ***?u d e- Y7 h d*
I Do any of these vs.1ves have :A er Xit:0gan acru= 11tcrz te
! .. s.nsura tha.i r saf s ty reittad run0*.icr.7 Describa tha.1 anf ,.hti:
l 'r,, &C0"4:01t.%:r sj't.s acurea.
? s# ?~ ;~7~/* psc yyc ,c-z,,,oygo ,a# m a Wd~.'. 4 W :.*? 5. c4 c'tfrr7:: .
i **'/'WA~~/u c C 'e.eA7;u:. .: o*%Cd* l's CD s J A'.A~CE C c" 4 /sc Mr hub rAf'7Y MM Asse s'CCy rnt/& A 7~;r,4 S ,
I. DO *' h e IA c:cr.pree s crs hcVe E h a c k*0 p s y s t t.: in the EYtn*. Of r.
j
, 10sc Of *A (a.g. 117.:id nitrernn vith c. vap.r-iu r)? If se, wh:: 1 is it r.nd hev cess 1: verk? ~s th.e htekup p" 7 P t- is .he (r er cuti:x. ef th. de=x:p run:.y? m--un m:i:n er ers =-
descriptic.. n.Anur.1 if pes sibia vir talacepy, l
~~'C 1
ser. tics ,se .cr.:.v c ~~Mes s:c.c .:: 6 , a 4 - ' d C M^'
/a usc-w r;w rwc .::A cones:r :sa.,e. .: . ~ ,.< cr-) O d " ' " * '
c%8:0L% @@eN /9Be ma A sww e ho o~ "' ~==' M '*A~"'
24/25/99 :::05 ELD 3 5/SC/RECE.=T!CN157CNS 13-MS.A2623-APPCIDIX C
- e. ,
C. In s tr/.= s nt Air De
- ign Ea r l y Q*.ta s tiontir a
.. . Utility Comparismo Ge YUnbar * '? cc cf IA cenpressers.pacLty ?
__h 9 D M gnd x,tnugg.ctura /,uge:.&>:t-x"As.:
MMer - / &nd'Y luta d ':*O _p7-~ #
___ Cf the tir ractivtyg7 W=ber ) capacity _ 4 C'o her-*
cf ths IA cryers?
rsqaired devp= int --4/o F c'. __
Wpa of dryar (e.7 sto s ) - 'b x U / < A s r-refrigart.nt, cassicAnt haatless er heated,
. 7. Dere s tha ~ d:,yer have prati:ters and/c post filters? percriba t'/pa of zadia and mieren ratiny in sach.
W M'4~4 s c'*!& M4tr if Mc:./7cre ,.m- /J.ca s ) ace;r>:* -ps c re re .
r<<c WR AAmics.o,J W*c -a- <::t p r.ws=a.), ./:W /T"Ed~ om C/ #serni.::c
.m,+,.ni.c a.ecr :i.cc=:, .co' c.-r ,c txr-m e.a.a.),
Ifflitarrehlaters
- Lting in cancr are u s e :1, wht: typt 1y us ad? pierg- cf madia and =icr:r.
.:r m c of u.nw rac u.coc , yg - ,,rx c pa a
- s. y y.eacy ea,~ retwpc~"rr Ju.*-M e 7: e c= .
. ,ms e,s;:gx ,,s pn su.ic,2oJ -c 47/, /C Ars chara t=y applicati:n vners finir filtars c; filter ray 212 rs.. ire used?
typ8 C4seriba these appli:.::icns.
I =adia and 7.dOren TL:1.r.; for atCO applicati:."..oss.: ribe th:
,1A:9;;;.E' 4x .o.>
14',6 /,.A<)
- .s//cic,.q saif.: taiwc/ ce;n .-v.er Cc-Wor.c A cc w oc2 eSy ;t;
.',.q .sy.s & - 7~WE' r.fo a r s;r:;=.oWCcJr, eccpuem e rvi /c r.::> .:: .-.4- 7, .2, Are thars any separaters cthar miscalir.nscus inline filtars and/ r :is :::
instr.11.ad in tha 01 sy::ar? XJ.it is thair purp::a?
What in tha r.edia and =1:ren ratt.y?
ip4Ge e <f.de v.> rac-tr v ms~ ec.-e wwro c.,c ernse.c ,,a swe c.c +.Je=ou=
-x .r,.sm-7.
psrcx : + 4% e.
s.! #
e b Describe the preve.tive =tintanence pr:gran applied t:
d: farm, fil ars, tha OI'80 ri D 4 d 2U: CVE. filter regulaters, noistura sepp. arts: s a::.
.t as ? Yt.E t is d nt kr.d 10 Vht.t fraq"uanOy t: &ach
' i 'c t scrz .c i,,c s A/: AcpcAccW a,~~e,o N c bro a n c c Tr + / co c-s v .i? M .
M.<c De y C;?. s,4.JO MwS rK E' .-
.Cf, s*.#"i":.c :; s :sc!* M ce C 1
M d/, [ N *
/ / n,,. h .
O **
fk{&. U C"**\Y? W .***' U $* V .
.J e,
. ...ri
/aru, ,s.e wee::> .cr /s4-Jrevr.x. m. .c
- e. .
W- Y /A) f l'* f l,
\ .
E L .. - .
t.
. . . 2.5 5eEO/:E!E UCNID3 13.gg.g20 W
- s. APPENDIX C ,
1 . .
+ .-
, % .3trascnt Air De.siyn Basis Q'Je3t1:ntira Ut.liity cespu-ieon
~. .
9.
Tor th e d: f s rs , filtar h&VS there been any pr:s,. bl er.zfilter
? repaltters at; dascribag g s s e eraru~i- c= >c c-: < /6 <r'b A4+cf 7;;.rca.c <<~* 'E scc.J sQ o .
one/G>JL
<*t<**JT' c f.+.e .<.<>t*cx', Jg m
?ra r.Itat c.hanga euta? o c L t.,.n .r. 9 r;w 7 W o=' 2'A CoM#Jf.
. .. AJ O High at:=unt cf correctivs r_aintane.nca unnpaetad f a.ilures? (i.e. u 1*gn;;;;,, g7 20 '
10.7~What e.1: qus.lity do you rer.: ire does
/ d ~<C. your air Taclity cc pare to 25A-7.37and/cr achieve reu-in 1y?
..,., .: ac vec c/*JCc~' .~7CCr* t%C* Cc~A~
CA AccJe<c; r:. s '16i:7 7j'.Jf" MJ'4c?nd*>J7;re c77~cr>c 7-ZA - 0 D e s e:.*ib a the c ; .::'~p ,;7, .5 ,
d a t a: r.i n e t?.etir 7.:ality =enitoring progrs= yeu use? E:s e r.:ality?
Ed' m % Wht.: is tha "rer.:ancy?
73:s r ,czsac rs,i'c2. Asw.r ,e -cccepJ.e e~ eve:c.y' .dc7"uGL/.~JC . o uracr s G' '.
V. sea .ec:.w c
c ,-: o ed~ M c'<*~JC / 's vr=::A Irva" 7 :
7:-e e so.c <> r'si7.s.
c s. >.*re c. i Mn:ucA-rz~~ c..:.: Jrf.M & / CA *), .:) Z:.: IGG -
' .<-> ris E .**A c'rsrc~M Deas ==1sture <t rae -Q, s) a c:an:
a== =ul:ta in the ar +rs.e---icr.x,i r sc 7;; ;e t.o es.
n r n:w:.s.c pr:b .ar.? A systas? coes it prasan:
Mcv is it dstit vith? ( e . g . bl evt:n.-.,
raper:t:rs,
,o r r7 'cn3
!!'-C.3= 3 ~ .:st
LL Vu z __
/'AC.s.: ) erew- -
LY:
. . - . VeasnLs _ Svn!
.s c7 l.ci<* sr n-im )
. t' Tiltar bedies _ u_. e .).v' srYM.L Cthar */
. 12. *- ~. . e. : is the Pr e s t:ura ? /C. CIAMint d esign
=u. pressura ? _/50__ N :t', c p t rt 1..-
- r
- .'. 7 oc.-r v7. .J o .c yF.-4 n c~erttiri c
rra s s t.rs ? -' M ""
s . .'r n'G .
- 13. *s ~ ;. pressura
.. e .
xm centinucusly)7 ana/cr :: se, flovhc-/neniterg is dent 7(;:.e.ric.dic.:.11y cr O . n-tro ? r-ev fraqus.;!Y?
e s**'a"r
$k f N l ** #Y
'$h,}O ,y se rJs co) A'e C= = ~e c'~ *g-e
( Q4WC,$g Qg g psf
.A s 9 cms > m ,,.,, y. ,. :.g. cc.,.a7::= ; g., .c e .
j.. F :.o J J A' # ' ~0 /C AL*-4 V /O C4 ;. g. cA.',a C y',
E.1.d /G::<: fgs,oe-::> fS * ' .
A#F (>/Cw(5~ :ti .d<
13-MS-A20 ..
I APPE.SDIX C 8
p
..~
Onatrument Air Desiyn 3ssis 9.:estientir Usility couperis.an a 14m*=) That is ,ths :A .danand (ser::)D2Ln7
. curin 7 g Lmn n c sum e. 6 SE seem v.s ng. x - LCP, pic X5:3, ge m s:A2 W*
Mat la the neures maasurementa, es:).7 of the data (a. -
C.%cuspr7c.) oOo. pese:13e gt, g. calculations, cperatin:
ncsoy '
edtained tron pirMas there buen t.,ta up3,3, A dany
. gne cer ala;ien og er nc=al o: expe.n:ctad upsa,t ;A der.ind?g; po.
go gg, g;;p, jeen,uz(tion Describa it.dssien b:zs" '
15.
Chart =tarito the GU= t::-ir a schedule fer duture actien.: Actions .. z Xada. tr. ken and 0 =itr ,
e.nd c =1:= ants ? Wh t is th=
mas m Mh(
s.. .
--*, . s ese c J .se.em/ryc-:2 , / p
'n e 4 9 e
'S e
G b
1
.=*a ...
- D.e e
. F ,.'
.:1' . .
- e. '
OO. S e
- f. e e
.-~.
Se 1
1 e
- I
.***.*.: a..
- ue emn.e 4
, _ , - - " - ~ - - _ _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - --
13-MS-A20 APPSNDIX C I .
8 *
! TROJAN RESPONSE TO INSTRUMENT AIR SURVEY .
- Source:
' Pietro Martinelli, Bechtel San Francisco (415) 768-0445 Mechanical Engineer
Jack Siebel, Pp&E Trojan Plant (503) 464-7527 Engineer 1.
Instrument air is used for both safety and non-safety related instruments, to agitate the resin beads.for service air,'breathine air and ~
compressors into service air and ihstrunehtThe svstemair. solits after the two systems are automatically isolated at a presetThese pressure.
2.
Yes,the with power is lost to 3 of the 4 ccmc system. On two 25% cc= pressors.e 100% comeressc'resscrs associatedr is lest alone w retains There is'ene 25% compressor Ghich however, this power, since it must cc= pressor is wired into the 1E system; diesel generater frem a re=cte statien.be leadedAlsc, manually
'heonto the hooking up to fire water atcompressor recuires water which is obtained hv na
~
a dedicated area.' The 25%'
cc presser is adequate is 25% when service air, breathinc fer all instrument air, etcair needs (it in). are added Per Jack25%,
approximately Siebel, nc: the25%.
cc= pressors are actually .
On loss of pcwer the 1A
~
, syste: does net the presence of the receivers.irrediately lese all pressure because cf decays. Instead, the pressure 3.
The accumulates for auxiliary feedwater and the accumulators for the PORVs are safety related. Interface with the non-safety provided by double check related portion of the system is valves.
4.
There areair receive two to tvces
' fulfilloftheir valves that are recuired to safety ~
related functions:
the steam turbine admission and the PORVE. valves for the auxiliarv feedwater required to open and may need to close later.The steam admission' valves are need air to open to mitigate a low The PCRVs
" high point vents on the pressurizer. temperature /overpressurization There are valves, other valves, such as the feedwater isolation required to open,that are designed to fail closed and are not (
-s
- and valves, such as the ADV valves, i that a r. are assumed to fail and are not provided with backup As noted in Question 3, the auxiliar I and the PORVs are supplied with accu =y feeduaterThe ulatcrs.
valves !
accu =ulators are small tanks with double check valves i
j 1
i l
4
1.
t-L L
L ..
l ,
13-MS-A20 APPEND 2X C l .
that store the air in the event of IA loss. They are periodically tested for air recentien about once a year.
5.
Theback no ADVs uphave non-safety for any crade nitrogen backup.
other' falves. There is
, 1 4
- 6. Compressors: 4
- 3 337 acfm rated at 100 psi (Joy Mfr)
~
1 650 acfn rated at 100 psi (Su11 air)
Receivers: ~ 4 - 3 57 cuft 1 96 cuft Dryers :'
Two non-redundant trains. One rated at 60 scfm at 125 psic attwin
-40 Fdrver
~
is a is regenerati'.. dessicant heated dryer. The other train cons. :s of a te=corary drver with no documentation. The utility has ccanitted to document this dryer per G.L. 85-14.
7.
The dryer both rated has at both prefilters and pestfilters. Thev are porous stone.
10 nicrons. The prefilter censists cf
~
The ecs:-filter is class fiber. The utility is in the pr'ecess of changing the rating cf the post-filter to 0.3 nierens.
The new media not kncwn.
Filter regulators are used. They are rated at 10 and 4 0 microns package. and are supplied by Fisher as part of a standard No credi Filtering will be handled at the dryer.1s taken for these filter regula:crs.
There are noisture no other miscellaneous separators in the IA systen. inline filters and/cr B.
There is no programmed maintenance to the filters or point of use regulators. The dryer postfilters are changed approximately once a year.
significan: maintenance of the dryersThere is no the=selves.
- 9. There have been sc=e prcblems:
Corrosien last year duringwas found on the inside of the dryer vessels the outage.
,. Wall hole. It resulted in a through-There were no other eeneral problems. One brand of regulator may have leaked.
the brand. Mr. Siebel was not aware of
- 10. To date, Trojan has not tested for air cualitv. Thev are now strivine to meet ISA-7.3. To do this, thev vill' ~ i implement three new procedures as fellows: "
o Blewdown system periodically l o
Kaasure air quality (e.g., particulars, i
I l
4
l 13.MS.A20 APPENDIX C
, hydrocarbons) quarterly o Perform leakage testing They already monitor dewpoint continuously.
11.
Piping and Tubing:cepper and galvanized carbon steel valves:
Cast iron in galvanized carben steel piping, brass and bronze in copper piping Vessels:
Accumulates are stainless steel in containment, carbon steel outside of containment Filter bodies: Filter bodies are galvanized carbon steel downstream of the drvers.
regulaters they are steel orIf used in brence Other:
Some stainless steel is used in system
- 12. Design Pressure: 135 psig Nornal Oceratinc Pressure:
Minimum Dperati5g Pressure: 110-119 80 psig'.
csic '
At 95 pEig, the service air and breathing air headers are isclated.
- 13. Pressure is continuously monitored. There is a 1ccal alarm low and a pressure. trouble licht in Flow is~nct the centrol rec: to indicate
=cnitored.
14.
The estimated instrument air demand durinc normal operation is 32S-350 acfm (550 if SA is i5cluded). This has not been tested but is estimated based on compresser usage time in the field.
from formal tests. There There has been no correlation is no ca_'culation.
The IA demand during upse:/abncrmal ccnditicns is not hncun.
- 15. The utility's response to G.L. .
85-14 is attached.
The utility committed to verify the design of the safety-related portion of the system by test during the next outace 4/89-6/89).
loss of air w(ill be recorded. Response to gradual and sudden i 4,
The utility also maintenance committed to verifying the adequacy of practices, emergency procedures and trainin:
en the instrument air syster and to develocing a crocras for maintaining proper instrument air quality. ^ ' ~
f Also, in November, .the utility voluntarily issued'a LIR i
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- j 13.MS.A20.
- APPENDIX C' ..
I l^ E . 1 1
I. -
to the NRC solder. joint. because a'1'".IA line: opened up at a bad All- four compressorsincident This came on al=est tripped the plant.
adequate air. - and could barely supply:
end still almost went over pressurs in containment;They ran the s
. They are 'now doing, a 5% sanple test on Lsolder joints.
The problem seems to be that there was no procedurec in existence for soldering at'the time the. work.was performed.
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t 1 13.MS-A20
(' APPENDIX C
('M~'
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b WATERFORD RESPONSE TO INSTRUMENT AIR SURVEY-contact: _ Moue Ureiuoli
.. Phone: 1504) 467-8228..r3670 Location-: Waterford. 13. -
Title:
.Licensine Encr.
1.
Is the' Instrument Air (IA) syste=. dedicated to
.- such instrument as air, orair, service is itlab alsoair, used for other purposes
.uses.. etc.? . Describe any other
t air compressor if pressere drops below se point.Will connect to Service A L 2.
i
' Is. power power (LOP)to? the IA system lost during a loss of ncn-1E.
How does theLsystem respond?.
Describe source. compressors be. connected to a 1E power source?Can How? the IA Yes, non-12pcwer to the IA system is icst 'during1 a -less cf power. However,
.per:anently wired to a 1E bus.the IA cc= pressers are to 1E will trip on LOP, but theyThe nay IA cc pressers' tied be manually restarted en the diesels.
2.
Is (i.e., the %A:
"Q")?systen or ary pertion of it saf ety relatec interfaces and functions. If so, describe'the safety related No, into-system.hewever, SR nitrogen and N p accu =ulaters are tied pressure decreases to.the se:Ocint.The nitrogen The N,aunc=atictlly accumulacerstarts after IA is set to 600 lbs. Valves will never see loss of pressure.
4.
What safety relat'ed active valves (e.g., TWIV, MSIV, SG blowdown, ADvs) related function? require air to fulfill their safety-There are 173 use the IA system.SR air operr.ted valves and da=pers that accident nitigatien.37 are needed fer safe shutdown or secu:aulators er nitrogen Allbackup:
37 either have air 3 valves (2 SI recirculation one heat exchanger valve) have isolation valves and air accumulators.
+
34 have nitrogen backu.r.
s*
Do any of these vaives have IA to ensure their safety related fuor nitrogen accumulators and their accumulator ges source.nction? Describe them G
j 13-MS-A20 4 .A??ENDIX C i
' .e l
Yes - 3 valves have air accumulators as noted above.
5 ..
Do the IA compressors have a backup-system in the event of a loss of IA (e.
t vapori cr)? If so,g.what, liquid is it nitrogen and how with doesait verk?
Yes - accumulators, liquid N2 with vapori:er to 34 valve,s.
IA accumulator to other 3 valves.
Is the backup "Q"? What is the air quality of the backup supply? obtain pertien of syste= description manual if possible via telecepy.
No, the backup is not "Q". The aii quality is not known.
6.. Number 2 capacity _280 scf5 et 100 rrie manufacture ' Nash and of IA compressors?
Number 1 and volune _100 cf of the af.: receivers?
Number ? ca acity 360 refs
-40C? rectired devpcint et drver hischirre of the IA dryers? ~
Type of dryer (e.c., refrigerant, dessicant heatless er heated, etc.) Derricant hee:1 erg 7.
Does the dryer have prefilters and/or postfilters? Yes, pre- and pcs: .
rating in each.
Describe type of nedia and micron pcs:- 10 nicrcn. Cartridge type filters, pre- 3 nieren, If filter regulators are used, what type of nedia and micron rating is generally used?-
Do use these - upstream of every valve. Does not kn v size. Type = cartridge.
Are there any regulators applications where finer filters or filte are used? Describe those applications. {
Describe application. the type of media and micron rating for each j Only as noted above.
Are there any other miscellaneous inline filters and/or noisture separators installed in the IA system? What is their purpose?
"v What is the media and micron rating?
Not to Doug's knowledge.
8-Describe the creventive maintenance procram acelied to the dryers, f'il t e t s , 1:- er regulators,'meistu'e r Scyarators, etc., descrioed above.
e What is done and at 9
N I. 2 4
,ewm, - - ' r.
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,,.l 13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C. .
l what frequency to each ite=y P.7Aventative maintenance for all =ain components -
dryers, accumulators, regulatcrs.
. Dov3 not:know durations. Thinks 6-1F =onths..
Also, the annunciation following conditions:-is provided in-the control roc = for
.o; . Instrument air receiver pressure Hi/Lo o . Instrumentiair compresser A(S) trip /trcuble
- o , Instrument air co= pressor A(B) separator . level Hi/Lo
'o o' . Instrument air dryer ' A(B) trouble Instrument air o Instru=ent air drver bvoassed
^
. o Instrument air. pressure backuo valve coen.
o compresser A(3) locked 'out
. Valve = operator nitrogen backup actuated / trouble 9.
For the dryers, filters, filter regulaters, etc.,
described above, have there been any problems?
No. (Big prcble= with ce= pressers. -Infer =ation frc=
vendor not adequa:e to rebuild cil-free ce= pressor.)
Frequent-changetouts?~ .
No.
High arount of corrective maintenance (i.e., malfunction or unexpected' failures?
No. .
10.
What air quality do you require and/or achieve routinely? Hov does your air quality compare to ISA-7.3?
Not insoected until' GL 88-14. Accent criteria carticles 5 10 microns, dewpoint 1 -10 T, hyd'ocarbens 5 3.pp=,
^
r
', Met cc==itted to ISA-7.3. Waterford will not atta=c: to use criteria in ISA-7.3.
- Describe the air quLlity =enitoring progra= you use.
How do you deter =ine the quality?
' frequency? What is the 3- -
Take air samples frc= 4-5 points throuch IA syster once a fuel cycle '(13 months); analyte per Q10, part 1.
~
Does =oisture accu =ulate,in,tthe IA system? Does it present a proble=? How is a dealt with? (e.g.,
l 3 I
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Wy '
13 .MS-A20 APPESDIX C j
blowdown, etc.) .
traps, moisture separators, secondary dryers, p"
- No - no problems to date.- Very small if any.- N/A.
11.
What naterials are,used in the IA system?
Piping and tubing Brass Valves Br?ss or corretible vessels Tilter bodies Air receiver - es /?)
Brass or cercarible (?)
Other? ?'
w.
12.
What is the IA design pressure? '120 lbs. Normal operating pressure? pressure? -100 l bs ._ Minimum operating
_60-90 lbs. (Must trip plant per off ner=al procedures if pressure drops below this point.)
13.
Is IA pressure and/or flow monitored-(periodienlly or continuously)? If so, how is-it done? Where? Ecv trequently? -
There is continpous indication in CR.
Alar =ed at three setpoints:
1 pt - 2 IA compressors kick in 2nd pt - 1 SA cc= pressor kicks in 3rd pt - bypass filter dryers (disabled now)
As final backup could manually load on 2 SA.
14.
What is the280 1260-300) IA demand sef elant(sefm) during normal operation?'
, drvers. During upset / abnormal and 120 sefn (curce flow \ fer conditions (e.g., LOP, MSIS, SIAS, AFAS, etc.)? Dees not kncv.
What is the source of the data (e.g., calculations, operating measurements, etc.)? Describe it.
Tests for GL 88-14 review.
Has there been any correlation of IA demand / consumption data obtained from plant tests, upsets or trips to the
."Describe design basis" or normal or expected upset IA demand?
- e, it. -
Did not find original design basis. Assumed it was 280 scfm and they forgot flow requirements due to dryers.
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13-MS-A20-APPENDIX C r ..
- 15.
Characterize 14.
the utility's response to NRC. Bulletin 88-Summari=e actions taken;and commitments-made. What uis the schedule for future actions and commitments?
Problems: Rebuilding. compressors
, ., Air dyypp takine more air than expected Few minor questions Minor' Commitments: IA Sampling program Minor procedure changes More surveillance testing .
Plan to address these items by next outage (S/89)-
Also found procedural deficiencies as follows:
o Did'not call for blowdown of system whenever dryer is bypassed.
Did instrnot describe
==en; hcw to set the turce rate on the air dryers " ~
o Did not provided for blowdown in the event noisture is detected-Several reliability:
ite=s are planned to increase systen o Replace 10 micron dryer pestfilters with 0,3 nicron filters o Install automatic drain valves in the dryer prefilters o
Install air manual receivers drain valves on instrument and service o
l l
Reevaluate the filter / dryer bypass setpoint value The generic letter resconse also contains an extensive discussion of safetv-r' elated valves, includinc a discussion of those'which are required to actuate durine a safe shutdown. To ensure that valves that must ~
functi
<> proced.on do function the utility will nake tevisions to ures as follows:
o ;
Two secarate tests will be cerformed on each nitrogen '
accu =ulator, one check valv'e operability test (quarterly) and one systen leakage test (every is tenths) -
i l
l 5 l s
2 c. _
. 13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C
!~ I i-
- nstrumen Air Cetign'Sesis Ques:10nneITe ()t. ./
U:111:y ccmperisen MND E.3d z.1517. / C.B.RD.iD 0132-
- U Y' U D E In the Instriment Air (2A) system dedi r.ed to instrunent 'IITLD DEL $ [SC 1
1.
or is it car.
Cir..ete? also unec !cr other pur;oses such as service air. Jab Describe cny otner uses.
Answer:
The cc pressed ear supply 31ne in each unit branches to suppJy bott the service car system and the ,
instrument tir sysica fer thh j unit. The service car cystem c=nzists cf a pref!! cr, e dryer, end en after-filter.
air Iceps. from which the air flows to the varicus service A bypass I!nc crcun the cryer and filters allows for maintenance end also provides overfjew prcte activity,
- ion during perieds of high plent main antnce such as refueling. The instrument car system consists of two dryers in parallel. each having e prefilter end efterfilter.
The ear ::: the syste .
flows to the various instrument air Jeeps in the plan . ,
2.
Is power to the IA system 1est durin; e loss of ncn 1-I p wer (LCF)?- How does the system res end? Can the IA c::preescrs be c nne::ed to e 1-1 power source? Ecw? Dese;1bc : urce.
Answer: Power :: the ear c::;ressers su;; lying *-e - ----
air is lett upcn loss-of-offsite-p:wer. The sys:c: is not requ: red for sefe shu dewn er accident nitig-tien. ~
therefere the system is nc: proviced with power fr::
e 2-I bus.
- 3. Is the IA syste er any pertien of it safety-rel:te: (i.e. *C")?
.If se, describe the safety-related in crfnces c:c fune-icns.
Answer: The piping which penetrates the contair. ment 11 Sefety C'ess 2 and Seismic Ceterary 1. No part of the syste is requitec to pertura en ev'.1ve safety-reletet iun:::en.
All safety-related valves which are su;; lied air by the instru:ent nir system are cesigned to estume a fail-sete pesi iss upon Icss cf instrumen air.
4.
Whet sefety-rejeted ective valves (e.g. Th'IV, P.SIV. SG bicudewn.
.ADV's) require air to fulfill their sefety-reltted Inne-icn?
l Answer:
4 See e::cched lis f or all saf ety-related cneu. tiendly {
n- opere:ed valves for Plan: Vertie (FSAR Tab 3e v.3.3-2').
( 1 Do any of these velves have A er Ni regen ec : uic:crs te l ensure their atte:y-related fun :!cn? Describe them and their accuccia::: gas 2 urce.
Answer: See answer to cues !ct 11.
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- . - ~ . - _ _
APPENDIX C
- 2 ".5-A20-5.
k Do JosstheEIA of IA compresser's have a backup system nt in of-thea eve
. , ai it anc how does it work?(c.r. iiculd at:rogen w:th a vascriter)? . If so. w air cuality of' the backup supply?Is the backuo "Q"?.'*dht is the description.nanual !! pensible via telecepy.Obtain pertion of system
, Answer:
Some air-operated velves are' supplied or other inde:enden:
em.
n:c.rs wit increased refiabi!!ty for normal operationair source for the pur these compenents.cre required'for stic shu:foen None of uccident mi:!getion. er
- 6. Number cassettye '
Number and volume of the air. receivers?and manufacturer-of IA crmpr Type of dryet- (e.g. refrigerant, etc.) cotsicen Number. ryers?etaccity, and req hentleesor bettad. .
,.nswer:
for Units 2 End 2:
. Compressc~rs:
Quen ity: 4- Air P.ecejvere:
Cepecity: 885 S0?M Quentity: 7 "Gnuf acturcr: Sullair Volume:
110 cub : fee:
Quantity: 3 lnztrument Air Dryers:
Ccpe:: y: 750 ECTM Quenti:y: E
' Mancincturer: Ingersell-Rend Ct;c:::y:
740 S07%
Required Dewpe:nt: -60 f Type: Regeners :ve .
- 7. de s s1 CEr.:
- Does the dryer have prefilte type of media cnd r.
- cren rn ng :rs in and/or each.
post filters? Describe the Answer: ~Prefilters: Coelescing: 3 Lictens
. Afterfilteret Pertic-1:te: 3 njerens If filter regulaters are ussc, whe:
reting is genereJJy used? type of media and micron Answer:
Filter terulaters micron rating of 30-50. are typi::lly metal-elemen With a Are there are regulators anyused? applications where finer falters A or !!!ter Describe these app!!:ations.
as
- ype of cedia cnd micron rating for each applicati on.
Describe the 1 Answer: No cther applice: 1cns Are there any other miscellanecue inline f!2t reperator: ins calco in the 1A system?
Wht ers and/or coisture is -he med:a and cier:n ret:nr7 Whe:':s :near purpose?'
Answer: The system coes n :
cther then receivers, Enchese cryersasso::sted w::h :ne cc presse snt:in filtere or
. the ::: resser st::::ns.
- t. E-__-______-. - l-l
- 13-P.S A20-e 47 ;.
- APPENDIX C-NI 13.- Is IA'pressufe end/or flow monitored (peitedien!!y er
.w continuously)7 11 30 how is it dene? Where? d' ew 'f requently?
k ;
~
Answer: The' instrument.cfr syslec is.previded.With
. , 11, K
-instrumentation:to seesure flew'and pressure-continuously This Jinstrumen:ntien is lo stedl
' An.the header downstreen of.the dryers and prict .
+
to the tir, distribution loc;. Flow is- monitored U
' by t Jocal =eter,while pressure is:noni Ored in the~ main cont'rol recm and.the' plan: ce=pu er.
3 4 .. What is the'IA demand (sef ) during ncrmej operation?
~
During upset /abnormaj.cenditgens (e.g. LOP, hSIS. SIAS. AFAS.
etc) 7 What-is the source of the dait (e.g. calcuistions, operating measurements.,etc). Describe it.
Esa there been any correlation'of IA demand'/conen=ptien dets-obtained from plant tests, upsets. or trips to'the " design'cesis" or normel cr expected upset.1A danand?' Dese:1be it.
Answer: P!3nt operati.ig' experience (Unit 1).shows the: the ner: 1.ccmpre: sed car ce=endLfer instrumen and service cir'(cc bined) is apprcx::ctely 1700 507X.
This is based en tr.e fac: that one'un:: o;ert:es with one cc: pressor in ser.' ice end e seccnd in a cycling mcde to :eet demand fluctustiens. No tests or meesupe:ents have been made to tes:
.he:perfer:ence of the jnstrument cir sysics c her
( -
then pre-cperctional tests c ccnfirr. the operability of the'aystem. .
.} 15. Chtrecteri:e'the t:111;y's respense to II Sulle:In S5-14.
Sunstri:e actions taken and ce==1:nents made. -What is the schedule 'for further acticna and cc ::: ents?
- Answer: Refer to a tected jetter nt:ber E,* V-00197 dated 2/17/S9: Enfrsten to NEO.
-)
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F:
l 13 .YS-A20
. APPENDIX C l-
{
- APPENDIX C UTILITY RESPONSES TO GENERIC LETTER 88-14 0
l s
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~.13-MS-A20
~ APPENDIX C. .
.. 4
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jI
! !; l 'I '
- UTILITY RESPONSES To GENERIC LETTER-88-14:
-a. ,
TABLE CF CCNTENTS a-1 Generic Letter 88-14
.. *, n i .
Diablo Canyon..
~
[
it.
F Palo' Verde- '
i ,
, Rancho'Seco.
i.<- St. Lucie.
{ . South. Texas Project
. . Trojan ,,
.Waterford
.. Voetle' G
9 4
8*
4 6
P I
O
M' 13-MS-A20 p r.sc APPINDIX C .
a . *[ %. UMTED sTMEs .,
j 'fD e( . !; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wassincrew,o.c. esss
~]"k, *' ..
- f t #$g[g'j
~
.. g; O B M3 TO ALL HOLDERS OF OPERATIUG LICENSES OR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
SUBJECT:
INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM PROSLEMS AFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPt'ENT (GENERIC LETTER 88-14)
The NRC has been studying the problems associated with instrument air systems for a number. of years. The results of these studies, including concerns .
relating to adverse effects on safety-related ecuipment caused by instrument air system failures, were'most recently identified in NRC Information Notice 87-28 Supplement 3, dated December 28, 1957. This infor.mation notice transmitted to all licensees and applicants a report that addresses these concerns, NUREG-1275, Volume 2 "Operatinc Experience Feecback Repor:-Air- .
' Systems Problems." This re' port indicates that the performance of the air-operated safety-related ccm onents may not be in accordance with.their intended. safety.. function"because of inacecuacies in the design, installation,
~
and main'tenance.of the instrument air system. The recort also indicates that anticipated transient and system recovery procedures are frecuently inacecuate and that operators are not well trained for coping with loss of instrument air conditions.
The pur:ose of-this generic le::er is tc recues that each licensee /arolican:
) review NUREG-1275, Volume 2,'anc perform a cesign anc operations verifica icn
-- of the instrument air system.
This verification should include:
- 1. Verification by test that actual instrument air cuality is consistent _ -
with the manufac.urer's reccmmencations for incivicual componen s served.
- 2. Verification that maintenance practices, emergency procedures, and training are adequate to ensure that safety-related equipment will function v as. intended on less of instrument..air.
- n. :
.(-
- 3. Verification thai the design of the entireHnstrument air system '
including air hr other pneumatic accumulators is in accordance with
. its ir.t9nded function, including verification by test that air-cperated safety-related components will perform as exp.ected in accordance with all design-basis events, including a loss of'the normal instrument air
~
system.. This design verification should include an analysis of current w air operated component failure positions to verify that they are correct .,
- for at:u. ing required safety functions.
- In addition to the above, eats licensee / applicant should p-ovide a discussion of their program for maintaining proper instrument air cuali:y.
'h -
- i. -
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8303120294
13*MS A20 APPE.1 DIX C
- 2-The NRC staff requires each licensee / applicant to provide a response to the staff within 180 days that confirms that verification as described above has been performed.. The staff recognizes that some instrument air system testing as indicated in') tem 3 above may have potentially adverse consequences on plant power operation, and therefore, such testing should be performed at a
.refuelin0 or other scheduled outage in order to avoid adverse system interactions.
If' instrument air system testino cannot be completed within 380 days, it may be deferred until the next sche 3uled outage.. However, the licensee / applicant should indicate in its response those tests which have.been completed and.these which will be' completed at a subsecuent outage.
In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f), th'e respense should .
consist of a submittal signed under oath or affirmation which irdicates that the above actions have been completed or that the licensee's plan / schedule has been provided. The submittal sheuld also identify any components that cannot actcep,ish their intended safety function, and state the corrective acticn taken or to be taken. When all requirements of-this generic letter have.been impicmented, a written notification should be provided stating that all actions are complete. Each licensee / applicant should retain the documentation assembled for this verification for. future audit by the staff.
This documentation should be maintained for a mini =um of two years frem the date of the licensen's/ applicant's submittal. -
}
~ This'iequest is covered by the Office of Mar.agement and Buc;et Clearance Number 3150-0011, which expires Decemoer 31, 1989. Ccements on bercen an'd i ' duplication may be directed to the Office of Managemen: and Euege:, Reper:s P.anagement, Rocm 3200, New Executive Office Building, Washing en, D.C. 205C3.
' Any ouestions recardine this letter should be directed to William f.eFave, U.S. ' Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Washington, D.C. 20555, (301) 4c2-0252.
Sincerely, . ,
k/CJ.P -l M .
Frank J Mirag1.c, Jr.
Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Reculation l
[
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- l
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. l 9 Degummanuene
w APPENDZX C '
. PG*,E - L e t t e r No. CCL-s!-c.41.
? ,( ENCLOSURE PGLE RESPCNSE TO GENERIC' LETTER.88-14 .
Generic Letter (GL)-88-14', "Instru=ent Air Supply System Preble=s'Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, dated August 8,1988. requests that. licensees reviev HUREG-1275.. Volume 2, and perform a design and operations verification of.. the instrument air system. The evaluation that has-been perfcr=ed for the
~ Diablo Canyon Pover' Plant-(CCPP) instrument air system has! identified several-areas ofLeoncern. .These cencerns are: the existence of contaminants in the instrument air, insufficient procedural guidance.. insufficient preve'ntive maintenance, insufficient surveillance testing, degraded air dryer, desiccant, marginal back-up-syste= capacity on four safety-related valves, . and
. insufficient air' quality monitoring. .
PG&E:has been developing long term improvements to the instrumen: air system.
since April 1988. These: improvements were initiated in part by MRC'IE Information Notice 87-28,. " Air! System Problems at U.S.1.ight Ha:er Reac::rs,"
and in part by the plant improvement program. The purpose of'the plan improvement program is to perform integrated operations, design, and.
maintenance review of selected systems. The results of the plant i=prevement program for the compressed air sys:e= vill be presen:ed in a reper: wnica viii.
be completed in July 1929.
C * '
Provided belov are PGLE's responses for the ite=s requested to be verified in GL 8S-14 and a discussion of the program being used at CCPP for maintaining proper instrument air quality.
4:
Item 1 of r;t 9914 Verify by test that actual instrument air quality is consistent with the manufacturer's 'reccmendations for individual cccponents served.
l Retronse 1r PG&E is in the process of obtaining and revieving the manufacturers' l instrument air quality recommendations. This effort vill be cocpleted by
-March 31, 1989. For those recommendations which have been obtained, manufacturers have specified instrument air quality requirements of a maxi =um allevable p. articulate si::e of 5 microns with no oil or, reisture present.
Air sampled at DCPP~ vas found to exceed manufacturers' recc.rt.endations fer particulate. The prirary source of this contamination was deter =ined to be
.from the service air system which is cross-connected to the ir.strumen: air system. The service air systei: censists of car:en steel piping, which has a p,otential for corrosion, vnile the instrumen! eir system is CCc00 sed of CO?;er pipi.ng, which is resisten; to corrosion. A corron set of perranent incecr come'ressors/drycrs/ air receivers feed both the ins:rument air and service air systems. A temocrary outdoor air c0=cres:Or/cryer unit connec ec to :ne service air system is ot:asionally used :: su;pismen; service air
- s. ,'
APPENDIX C requirements. In the past, this tem;crary outdoor compressor / dryer unit had less stringent meisture ind filtration control standards than.those for the per:.anent compressors. These less stringent controls on misture and filtration contributed to the corrosion in the service air system. During the period of heavy ab demand on the instru ent air system, the particulate.
migrated frca the service air system into the instru=ent air system.
In ordct to prevent a recurrence of this contamination, Operating Procedure, n-I, "Ocepressed Air System 'Make Available and Place in Service," is being revisel to require isolation of the service air system free the instrument air systen prior to use of the temporary outdoor air cecpressor. This vill prevett contamination of the service tir piping. In addition, the noisture and f'lltration requirements for the temocrary com;ressor/ dryer have been upgrad3d to that of the permanent ccepressor/ dryers.
In order to remve accumulated particulate, the initrument air headers are now being blowndown. As of January 16,1959,10 of the 76 major heacers have been blowndown. The cleanup process is continuing at the r.aximum rate of about five headers per week. During the perforr. lance of this task, it has been observed that virtually all heacers procuce rust and scale at the beginning of the blevdown,-but eventually procuce clean air. After all headers have been-cleaned, tests will be performed to determine if aeditional actions are necessary based on the air quality survey results.
Item ? cf GL oc_14 -
, . Verify that maintenance practices, emergency procedures, and training are ade;uate to ensure that safety-relatec ecuipment will functicn as intended on loss of instrument air.
peme As recomended in the November 8,1985, HUKARC letter en GL 88-14, P%E is adopting the INPQ SOER 85-1, " Instrument Air System f ailures," recommendations I through 5 to satisfy this item. A sumary of the actions is proviced belce:
maintenance: Maintenance practices have been improved to assure that clean dry air is provided to safety-related equipment. This vill
' raintain the equipment in a condition to perform their intended function or loss of instrument air. A new preventive r.aintenance (PH) program has been adopted for the cecpressors.
The DCPP air dryer desiccant was observed to be partially deteriorated froc age and the dryer was damaged by rust. The desiccant has been replaced and the dryer edified and tested to
's assure adequate performance. The new PH program for the dryer includes periodic dev point renitoring of discharge air to determine desiccant condition so it can be trended and replaced vnen necessary. A tem:'orary dryer has beer, installed to im;reve capacity and reliability. D PP is now in the process of j 250ts/00stg 3
w.
p .h ,
.; }
<s Y, -
13-MS-A20 APPENDL% ' C .
investigating system upgrades .which would include nev
, /~. . water-creoled tecpressors and possibly'a vendor-su; plied W'
maintenance package. In addition, as described in item 3 below,-
-testing of air-operated valves is perfor=ed:to ensure they -
function as intended on loss of instrument air.
O Procidures:'- -Procedural changes'have beenlmade t'o assist the operators in-L responding toaa-loss. of instru=ent air.- Changes were made to reflect system upgrades made in-1983, specifically,sinclusion of
. the continuous dew ' point ' monitor, aew arrangement of rental air
~ compressors and' air' dryer, and different filters. The~ loss or ,
degradation of instrument-air pressure' response ~ procedure'was updated to. include a list of; valves affe:ted by loss of pressure; and the. positions to which they are designed to fail-' -Instrument' .
air operating procedures are also being revised to include actions to be taken when reisture is suspected ini the system.
Specifica11y; blowdown locations:were identified at' low points e to remove water. * '
Training:- Operations and maintenance training programs have been revised to incorporate the information described in 50ER 85-1. Partial and complete loss of. air scenarios are being conducted on:the-DCPP simulator to increase the awareness of plan: o;erators to various system and plan; responses and further to increase their
' f amiliarity with- using piant ' cravings to loca:e -leaks. .A:normai
' Operating Procedure AP-g, "Less of Alt," which includes a-description of the components that f ati on loss of instru ent sh air, has been included in the Opera:crs requalifica: ten prcgram.
Item 3~of GL ES 14 l Verify that the design of the entire instrument air system including air or other pnuematic accumulators is in accordance. with its intenced . function, including. '
verification' by test that air-operated safety-related components will perform as expected in accordance with all .]
design-basis events, including a loss of the normal 'i instrument air sys:em. This design verification shod d include'an analysis of current air-operated cceponent failure positions to verify that they are correct for
,- ass 6 ring required safety functions.
!.eteense
- 3' A complete review of. the entire instrument air system design, including air or i other pneu=atic accumulators, is in process and will be complete by the end of i 1989. '
To meet SOER 88-1 recomencations, the ccepres:ed air supply to the instrumen:
Air header has a 1 micron afterfilter loca*pd downstream of the air receiver e
25075/CO67K i 2
r:
V MS- A20 -
L APPE.NDIX C tar.ks and upstream of all instruments. This filtering process and the use of oil free co(npressors and continuous dev point eenitoring provide for prcper air ouality to the instrument air system. See Item A below for a discussten of how instrument air quality vill be monitored in the future.
The Generic Letter notes that the testing referred to in this item r.ay have adverse consequences ^on plant operation, and hence'r.ay be postponed to the next scheduled outage after .the-submittal of this res ense. Therefore, in.
accordance with GL 88-14. the following paragraphs provide a schedule of the ~
tests to.be performed during future outages ~ and a discussion of those tests l that have been performed.
During the last DCPP Unit 2 refueling outage, the back-up nitro;en sup:1y system to the'10 percent steam dump valves and the pressuri:er PCRVs, PC/-456 and PCV-455C was tested. In addition, the air' supply check' valves to the H5IVs were tested (this practice was initiated by an earlier INPO SOER concerned with MSIV reliability). The successful operation of thesc components has been demonstrated.
St.rveillance test procedures have been approved to test the air st.;;1y back-c; systems for all air-operated valves re;uired to function to achieve safe shutdown. The test procedure includes testing with a gradual loss of air i pressure. .The valves included in this test prc; ram are in the back-up pneumaticisystems for the pressuri:er PORVs, PCV-e55C and PC/ 455; the spray and charging valves, 3145, 8136, 8147, and 8148; the RCS sample iscla:icn l
valves, 9351 A, 9351E 9355A, and g3555: and the charging header flow control valve HCV-142. In additien, surveillance tes: procedures are being deveicped 1
(. for'the following valves with backup air: the ASW su; ply to the CCW heat
' exchangers, FCV-602 and FCV-603; and the CCW supply te the RHR heat i exchangers , FCV-364 and FCv-355. These tests vill be performed at the ner:
refueling outage of each unit and at all subse:;uent refueling outages.
l Design verification to confirm that the capacity of the back-up systems is j sufficient to support the necessary numoer of valve operation cycles over the j necessary time duration is still in progress as part of the overall design ;
review. When PGLE has ccepleted its design verification, a:prcpriate actiens, ;
if required, vill be taken to ensure adepuate back-up capacity is available to i support the necessary number of valve operation cycles.
The current failure positions of air-operated valves were reviewed and all 1 safety-relate'd component failu're positions were verified t'o be ccrrect. l Demonstration that air-operated valves vill move to their design failure positions was accomplished after the initial valve installation or after major maintenance. These tests include a modulation of the air pressure: the air
- pressure at which the valve begins to open or close is recorded and confirmed to be acceptable.
Ito- a $f ra oc_1a Each licensee / applicant should provide a discussion of
. their program for maintaining proper instrument air quality.
L ,
8 25072/0067g 1
13 .MS-A20
- g. APPENDIX C Pemonse C Several featurcs of the POE instru ent air. quality program practices have been described above. These include: the adoption of new preventative maintenance tasks; the revision of' operations and maintenance training programs; the revision of procedures; and the preparation of surveillance tests that vill be performed each refueling outage. Furthermore, future.
< -system improvements are under development as part of the plant improvement
' program. '
- In addition,' instrument air quality is being monitored in three ways. 'First, the instrument-air moisture content is checked by continuous der point nonitorir.g.. : Annunciator vinder PX-1316 has been changed to alarm on. detection of an unacceptable der point cendition. Second, on a monthly basis, the outlet-dev point of each plant dryer will. be monitored to evaluate the desiccant condition and. efficiency. Third, routine sampling for particulate and oil content vill be performed on a six-month frequency initially. Since the oil content.is expected to be low (DCPP uses oil free compressors), the frequency of sampling.
oli sampling may be lessened based on the results of the first year of
- As reco,cended by 50ER 88-1, ANSI Standard ISA-7.3 should be met at the exit of the air receivers..
~
c '
t 25075/cas;g .
_ _ _ ________ m.__ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _
4
,,u- 6 ~0 ;~ '1 13.gS.A20 -)
APPL, LY, C-
~
v-
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C.
t- <
.. ,j . x. .
g Arl:ena Nuclear Power Project 3
- o ecs1::n '. emotmx.m:cu no:1 scu '
l 161-016c7 333;/JMg-February'20, 1969
.. +.
'{
l Docket Nos. STN 50-528/520/530
- i i
i Document Contro1~ Desk -: 1 U.S. Nuclear Regula: cry Cec =issien Mail'S:ation PI-137
~
Washing:en. D.C. '20555 A
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
PaloVerde Nucica: Generating S: :1cn (?V::CS)
Uni:s 1, 2 and 3 Ceneri Le::e: SS-II., " Ins: unent Air Supply Sis:e=-
P:chlets Affec:ing Szf e:y-Kele:ed Iquipten:"
' Tile: EC-010-025; 2C-055-025 Referents:
1.c::cr f := ::EC to All E 1ders of Cens:ru::icn-
- Permits f or Ee:1e:: hver Rese:::s Es:ed .
~-
Augus: E, le22; Subje::: Cencri: Le::er EE-l'. ')
s
.l
\
"Ihe referenced le::er re:;ues:ed a review of NUKIO-1275, Volume 2 and a de:ign '1 cnd opert:icns verifica:1:n of :he ins::::en: si sys:e:. In order to acce=plish cir was produced. this task a lis: cf safe:y rela:ed cc=penen:s tht: :ely en ins::uzen:
uni:. ~he :o::1 nunber of e penen:s iden:ified was !!.4 fer etch j
' Attachmen:s 1 and 2 pr: vide :he ?VNCS response :o Generic Le::e: ES-14 t
. .If you have.zny ques:icas, please cen:a:: Mr. A. C. Ecgers cf ny s:sf f.
Ve r.v trul.v .vcurs ,
N\-
. ^ +~
D. 3. Earner Execu:ive Vice ?residen: ,
DEK/JMQ/vlb i
-A::tchmen:s c:: A. C. Gehr (a;l v/c)
~
s . . . s.. c..
~. .
- e. -
- e. . b ...t...
M. J. Divis
. 2. Mar:in e
r ., .
13.MS.A20
. . APPENDIX C.
U.S. "uclear Reguletory Co==1ssten
- en Page 2
's g 161-01697-tEK/Jy,Q Fe bruary- 20. 1c..ce.
,, s.
bec: W. 7. Quir.n (7C35) all v/a R. M. Butler (6102)
C. V. Sovers (6102)
V. M. Si=ko .
(6077)
R. I. Younger (6070)
C. L. Story (6310)
- 5. M. Meyers (6070)
L. O. Inglish (6070)
R. E. Eu:ard' (6070)
D. N. Renn (6070)
E. C. Sec: ling (7034)
. !!. 7. Hod Ee (7044)
E. W. Riley (7044)
- 7. C. P:cvicervi (7011)
J. 3. Cederquier (6956) .
F.. L. Jenkins (6956)
U. 7. Fernev (6135)
E. i..Asher (6FE4)
J4 V. Scr.nie (6 :4)
C. D. Ch : h=tn (6515) '
? L. .Brcndj es (c210)
A. C. Regers (7Ca5) .
R. A, Bernier (7048)
J. ' f. LeC1:ers (g;;;)
G
/
- ~
Y (W
.G D
G
4 '1 .
7 M
- y. : ,[
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'13.MS-A20' APPENDIX C A 0
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ST.CI 07. A*CCNA ' )
') *s.
CDUNn* OT' MA?.!COPA) '
4l- I.. Donald 1Bc.
c.,Ar.,:ena NuclearLPower Karner. represen: tha: I am Execu:ive Vice presiden: -
-signed Proj ect. . that the foregoing- documen: has been to do so.bytha: me on behalf of Ari:ena-Public Service Company vi:h full authori:-
. I have rea'd such docu=en: and knov i:s con:en:3, and tha: .
' :ne bes: ~
c' my knowledge and belief, the s:a:e=en:s made ~ herein are ::veco ,
'd ;
.\ ~.) kw Denaid I, Xtzner-Svern :: befere ce iiz' M'l _d y et S: ht.r. .m , s. e..t e. .
~.
5 y a-: l . l,."
No:::y Pi:lic My Cc::=issien Ixpires: '
' L'1 C := irk.n E ci:r !--- s.4w
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9 4 a y. c 13-MS'A20 -
APPENDIX Cl 1
... 4 A- m ENT 1 .
. i~ .-
RES PONS E To -
Vr? .'.?." . Cn' . .* *." ~n* i C.
-c. CNS 0.
w"?N-r.'. C '.*. . u- . e c . l u :
y L9.7!.0". 3 Verifliation . by test. - that ac:ual instrumen:
consis: enc vi:h .the . manufacturer's. air quality 1:
individual ccaponen:: served. recer.nendatien: :fer A P S
- E S ? C h'S E. The and although the,majer suppliers of the affec:ed components we vendors did= no documen:f in writing, .the PVNCS- co==it' to any. specift:<
quality were . developed' using -ISA-S7.3, testc procedures;
.1975 ., aquait:vz fer- air S:andard for Instru=en Air" for' guidance. '
Becauseresul:s.
the -:es: 'all thheand Unitsdesign a: Palo tesdefoare of'standa':2 des changes expected to. be' similar. Therefore, .the.' air .the Uni:s- are results from Unit 2-vill = determine- :he . design'.codifica:icns- quali:y :es:'
, fer all 3 units.
In order p ccured :o:o perfors' this verification by tes:. ecui;:en: vas tes:- air cuali:y and :es:
installed in Uni: 2: connections were An air quali:y cas:
Preliminary resul:s.a,f:e:is4 cur:*ently being c=ndu::ed en Uni:
czys are as follevs:
2.
-J '
The des pein: is spp cxima:ely -10*T a:
ceasured dev poin: is grea e 120$ ?!!S. The Compensa:ory measures are curre:n:r :han ly.in place 'the design valde.
poin: d:: ins to. cpen" Ice basis to preven:on the air dis: ibutien piping on a periodi:
. mois:ure accu =ul'a:icn.
' The particula:es are-predomina:
size, :houever 1y less :han 3 micten Lin.
si:e'and no significan:there ere par:1culates in :he 3 to 5 mieren quan:i:y of particula:es g:sa:e:
- han 10 microns.
Hydrocarbons are less :han 1 ppm.
,- The air quality data vill be men:h in order :o ob: sin adequa:e :es:taken for app:cxima:elv one data. ~
~
Af:e sufficien; de:e;=ine wha: da:4 is collec:ed i: vill be evaluated :o te ensure main:aining i=provemen:s :he ins::u=en: or mo, deifications may be required
"" 4a:a vill also be air quali:y. The :es:.
used :o adj us: the frecuen: ce
+ te en:s:ive main:ensn=
sr;plemeniil le::e e :ssks as nc:ed in A:::chmen: ;.
A vil'.
he providec by A;; i'. 25. *p!?
inci:a:in; if any impr veeen:s or accifica:icn .
vill be es:e and pr:viding :he sche:ule for cc pie:icn.
p
.17:M/005"E
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13.g3-A20-
-APPENDIX C
's
'AC 70N ?- .
..s_.
.. verifica:Len ha:' maintenance- Frac: ices, and ' training . are adequate to- ensure emergency--qpreceeu that safe y. rela:e C <V . APS 7's?ONSE equipnen:: vill: functien as. in: ended on loss of ins::=en; att, ;
'Pa!-ie.an e. *rree<e.s.
y' s~
Preven:acive main enance : asks vere reviewed and"'a:e iprevidet
' .in -A::acheen: i 2 -" Program for P.aintaining Ins::=en: : Ai:-
, Quali:ya., '
. : I-are nev treeed.:re s APS instrumen has reviewed the abne:-.al operating procecure i for less .ef-air and is making enhancements to the.exis:inr:
s procedure Significan:':o further address the fo11oving rece=enda: Lens -frei Opera:in5 Experience Reper- _ (SCII)
" Ins:r=en: . Air System. Tailures:" ES.01 procedure The' :t<isicn of this-.
is expec:ed_:ha: is cu'rren:ly in :he review and approval process 1:; .
) the procedure vill be revised by June'30, legg,
- indica:icns of: less of inst:=en; air.- su:n .as au:cmatic ac: ions -fune:icns les:. alares.
iden:ifica: ton of critical ccepenen:s opera:ed bv ins::=en-'
air and :he 'pesi:ica in hi.;:h : hey fail.
- P*C-jds7s:emandplan: respenses :e a,le,3 of. -g n, t r=, n
. -- - - ...e c.nsecuen:es-o: :nese ,3 pen 3,,,
. . *- ac e..
4
. icns d :e :ake if Cri:ical cc :enen:s do ~--'
ed.pcs .e..c...
r- e 1- <
-'-- 3-*-
- manual ac:1 ens the opers:or sheuld be expe::ed to take .::
, respend :o a loss of ins::=en: air-even:,
w restoration ~ ac: lens to be taken af:e re gaine:i. ins::=en: at: 's i Tre e -t r The Opera: ions s:aff is ::ained on the abn:::a1 opera:ing.
' procedure for loss of ins::=ent air. The . raining c:nsis:s og a valk th:= ugh and discussien of :he p:ccedure in :he simula:er.
A:
less theofpresen:
ins::=en: i=e :he air..
simula:or is ne: medeled :o illus::a:e The ca.fune: ion scenaries fer the Easi: Si=ula::: and Eeeualifica:icn Courses vill be deve' epee v
in cenjune:icn vi:h :he ri ula:icn cer:ifica:ica unce ICC. p.5 5 , .
.essen and main:ahance 'pizns have been revisec :: sensi:i e plant cpera:i:ns pers:nnel rela:ed e:vipnen: :n cccmenencoce :. e ..dnera:i'1:y of safe:7 failures :na: ::uld :esu.':
from air de; aca:Lon.
. - 'y
- _ _ _ , _ , _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - ^- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - -
1 13.Ms.A20
.. APPE5 DIX C AC ECM 3 Verifica:ien-:ha:
system inciuding air er the design of the entire inst:.sen: at:
other pne=at'c ace =ulators is. in accordance vi:h its intended function, including serifica:g en ,
by tes: that air-operated safety. rela:ed compenen:s vill perferr.
even:s. as expec:ed in accordance with all design. basis.
including t y s t'e = . This design a verificatica less of the shouldnor.a1 include ins:1.:sen: at:I an analysis of tha: curren:
they are air cc cpera:ed:ee: componen: failure posi:1 cts to verify for assuring recuired safety f=ne:icns.
A'S TE!*MSE y ed"esde., er - r -.:- . 41. s v g r .., n. r i ,
Verifica:icn of the design of the inst =en; air sys:em vill be performed in conj une: ion vich our Design 3 asis p.eviev P:cgram.
non.ssie:ySin:e related thebut insinterfaces
- =en: air sys:e= is cis:sified as vich safety related systems.
it vill be related systems. Due to the large scope of the program, the reviewed immediately af:e: the safe:y reviev is expec:ed o ; .i e. c..., to be cempleted during the first quarter V. - < z s. . . . t. . - e. r.
..._.n..<.
m .m s . . . ~._.1.
... a...
s.,<,.,
.J e r., :. , a :i cn of
- ne cesign of the pne=a::.c ace =ula ::s was cene as a resul: ef SCEF. 53 01. A?S u:111:es :hree safe:v rela:ed air er gas reserveir systems. They are the gain 5:ea: Isela:ien Valve / Tee vate: Isolation c .....,... .
.. . ... . .n. ,.i valve at:
.. . r..... c. . ..,. y ..e a .....,....,
. .. ... s.
.e .
D<.se.: Ce.e
..z...se.
e.as
.. ...c . .
a c:=ula:::s . The secumula::: capacities vere reviewed fo-
... s..... .
( :hese sa.'ves and found to be acecua:e.
.,. . e s s... . . e s ae c . . . < . .. . o u ., ., . . ec.a...es The ec:=ula ::
c........... .: . ..e.,..,.... .;e ..,
. . + , . .
a..p,. ce ..a :. .
- y. -..
. . . . . . . . . . . cause . ..
.... s. .s. . e a..
visual alar: :o annuncia:e in :he respec:ive unit's Main Cen. oi. V.oc . . k..e 7..
e . e a. .. .. - v D .ie s e .i C c .e . .-. ... - S....'...-3 n' .3 .
v.3 s u.s
, .a .. e j. . . .,. s .r..e w . <. . .n u .. 3, v 3....e s .. y e w. .4.. ... a. S.t. a. d '.c . i pressure indica:ers. These pressure indicators are meni:ored periodically by auxiliary cpera: ors.
V.-<<!:s.*. '.... .e-Verifica:icn by :es: vas ac::=plished
, . .o.e...<...,
e . . . . . . . . .es.,.. throu,ch the
...3 -.o...1
- y. 3 . . .. ..d.e...e.'.......- ,es..e. c.. .
of the ILL safe:y i .s . . . e .. - e.'. . ." s" "..e rela:ed valves and dampers which rely en
- p. .3 .. .g.". ...
. s < . . ..e.. . .. es ed. '.r." -he .. p.eer e..- .'-...-1 .-
su ve.i. . a .. e . e s . .e . es.e.3
. . . . . . . . .es.e-
. s e,v .
tests verified the failure posi icn cf the equipmen:
b.,.
iscla:ing:he posi:i:=s the valve air supply /dampe and/or ass =ed.air signal then noting :he
.,,,,, . .t . i. . .. ., .<. ., . i r _. : . . . ,
..... e ._. , .4.. .. < , y
. .u. e . . . . . e ..... e , c .: ..e .-...,..e,.<..a
.c
. e.s.. e ...u.. ..,y z .:e-
.... . .... . . . .r. .. ve., .. ..,.....
c.
.. ... e.r.
.. .. s
.a . : .
.os.. . e g..a.s~ ..
reac::: safe:y .
-u.e
.. r,.ec . e.,.t
.e.v..s
. . . es.,...,. 2 1*
.ec .. ... u. e .3........- ..
--.g
. . .c ... .s.. ., .. . 1 a . . <wa .....a .t.. : ;. ,
o .r ...u. t
.o... . . . .. ..e
- he antay e . .
- a *. ..u e 0:Ces.
y en.a...... .
. r.... ..
4
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-13.Ms.A20:
APPENDIX C a i.
f j C: .
. All - ; the' .: componen:s te s ted ' s a **' 8 < 'c .c " -
r dis-..er..cy was found . .3 3../ exce ts--" ' ' ' ' '
.-. 7- on- -
one' d"-"Pe . - 4 h'e <
.ndivieug: y3, ;
't - P.e rf o rme d .- th e g , , ,' .g .
==1 d the;tes:,co ge. -
acceptsble. . however .. he doc " ed. an- .4ncor ,c: . , , * , .- - ' ...
!: pos!eten- A . rates: of the- d- pe.> soas 'ceen - Perf:: ed:
verifying,i: goeg , ,gy 4, -" -- .q8. Proper posi: ion.. ;
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.he nine 'ecmponen:s tested by the Uni:\ 1 su're~s'."**
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va8 *the samer as .the' aoau; ed. :e. 4..ure .
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Due .to the '
standardi:s: ion- *"4- #
d88-Sn an-e .the;1same 'l Preoperational and su:veella ce tes: program applied too als chree uni:s. 4. may be assumed tha: this ve .<<<**..e*
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to. all E.nree units.
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The program periodic :es: for maintaining air quality vill primarily be a functien of a of air quali:y and the preven:stive main:enance p:: gram.
The air quality tes: procedure shall be performed in each unit on a periedie basis to be de :e CNrmine d ' 'f rc: :he 1. results of the initisi air cuality tes: as 2
described in ACT ', of A::achmen: !
three units af er co pletion of the design The p ccedure vill be effective in all i
- 1. This procedure vill measure such parame:ers modifica: ions described in AC- CN.
as total at: flow.
humidity /dev poin:. par-icula:es and cen:a=inan:s includin- hyd::carbens and water vapor.
A review of the existing, preventative maintenance tasks was performed uhi:h include :he following:
- Inspect, Re:cve andcleanreplace or replace instrumen: air co :ressor inle: fil:er: perforced annually.
- Remove and replace ins
- :u=en: air p cfilters; performec semi. annually.
- air after fil:ers; perf:::ed annually.
Replace dessican:: perf:::ec annually.
The frequency of these task: may change cepen:en: en :he resui:s of :he
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supplemen:al tasks such as disasse::iy cf crain ::aps includin; inspec:1:n and cleaning cf the -in:ernals are also perf ::ec :n :te prefil:e:. meistu:e separs::: and receiver en'a cuar:er".y basis alen; vi:h a multi:uce of c:he asks perfer:ed en re'.z:ed ins::usen:s . relays. =c::::, bea:ings, vibra-Len monitoring equipmen: and sf=11a ecuip=ent.
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written by March 31,
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- o es 1959 to change :he fil:ers inside :he air regula:::s supplyin5 safety rela:ed valves and ce=penen::. This work is scheduled implemented every :ve .vears. : be l
on the air c.us'.ir.v tes: analysis.The frecuen:v cf :his verk ca.. chante dere . e.e. . .
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' ! APPENDIX-C f
AACRAMENTO Mume: PAL UT!UTY D!$Tmc7 2 (201 s ! b
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AGM/NPP E9-033 AN ELECTElO SYSTEM SERVING Thi HEAnT OF CALIFCEN FEB1S1ES .
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^ U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc: mission Attn: Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555 Dociet ho. 50-312
' Rancho Secc Nuclear Generating Station License No. DPR-54 RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 88-14:
AFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED ECUIPMENT INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY
- Attention: George Knighten The District hereby provices infer ation recues ed in Generic Le::er EE-14 "In::rumen: Air Sucoly Sys:e= Preolems Affecting Safety-Related Ecuipment."
SMUD received the Generi: Le::er en Auge:- 23, 19EE.
Members of your staff vi:n cues-ions recuiring seditional informarien er clarification may con:ac: P.r. S: eve L. Cruns t- (2D9) 233-2935, ex ension .:513.
Sta:e of'Califcrnia i.M c
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o . uwe.wc r Coun:*v of Sacramen:o $ D 3* # du.# leu c:c. CY. !.!,
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Dan R. Xeuter, being firs: c'uly sworn, deposes. and* says: that he is Assistan:
General Manager, Nuclear Plant Manager of Sac;ramento Municipal Utility-District (SMUD), the licenses herein: that he has executed the feregoing occument; tha: The statemen s made in this 60cumen: are rue e.nd corre:: tc tne best of his knowie:
to execute this cocumen;ge, information, and belief, and tha: he is authorized on behalf of said licenses.
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Dan R. Keuter Assistan: General Manager l Nuclear Plant Manager j
' Subscribed anc affirmed o before me on this Ncay of 3'Sh e 19E?.
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. . , . APPEliDIX C Attachment I .Page 1.
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I~ REVIEH OF NUREG-1275, - Vol. 2 * .
d The District has reviewed NUREC-1275, Vol. 2 and is aware cf the pctential im:act'of a poor' quality Instrument Air System (IAS) on the '
proper functicn of' the facility. As noted in the NUREG, Rancho Seco had'
.l. '- three reportable occurrences involving instrument air quality problems.
,7 i Since 1981. (date of'last ec:urrence), the District implemented a nutoer
- cf hardware and precedural improvements. These improvements include:
installation of a new, high capacity desiccant air cryer, installation of a' continuous readcl.t devpoint monitor lvith Centrol Room annunciatica, complete revisions to the normal.and casualty operatine precedures, and an aggressive Preventive Maintenance (?M) pregram. F.ecen:1y, tv0 additions were made to the IAS to ' improve overali systam Reliability. and control of. critical valves uoen a loss of air su; ply. These-additiens include (1). An auto-star: (on lov system pressure), diesel-driven air'
- compressor with a complete instrument grade air filtration and dryer .
package, and (2) Compressed ' air bottle back-up system that passively supplies two hours of instrumen: grade air to several critical vi.1ves upon a'icss of the normal air supply. . .
In sup;crt of providing a consistent su; ply of instru=ent grade air, Rancho Seco employs a thercugh PH program on all the IAS su:;1y cc=enents . The FM program includes ecm:resscr inste :icns, cryer lubrication and ins;ecrien, cryer cesic:an: inspec:icn. anc af ter-filter inspec:icn and change out. Atci:icnally, sys:Em walk vns tre performed to check for air leakage at cc :enen:s 2.nd system c nnec:icns.
, II. AIR QUALITY REVIEN -
The District reviewed Quality Class I air-c:erated cc :Onents vi:h re;ard to vencor rec:=enda:icns en :he air quality for. Each cc penent. The reviev vehfied that each component's opera ing pressure .re;uiremen vere satisfied. If the supply pressure requirement was less than the normal IAS header pressure, then the use of an upstream filter /regula::
set to the correct supply pressure vas verified.
The air cuality rece=endations of the manufac:urers are su=arized in A:tacnmen: II. -
- The IAS at Rancho Seco is designed and operated to main:ain air qua;ity
', that mes:s or extceos the requirements of ANSI /ISA 5-7.3, Quality Standard for Instrument Air. -
i s' Hei tture Centamina tien The IAS devocint is.menitored : ntinuously at the out:ut cf the ai-cryers and fii:Ers via a cipi:a1 reaccu: me:er. The cew:cin; is rec:r:e:
at leas! Cnte per shift by the plan: CPera: Ors, and the uni! ?r: Vices an inpu: :D a Con:r:1 Room annun:iztor on hign de.: in:. cew:cin:
Coni ct it- caliora:ed on- an annual tasis. Tne ins:rumen: The,ir a cryers maintain the cew: in: a: -50 : -50*T a: a:::::neri: :ressu e (-II ::
-50*T tt 100 : sic). Tur:ner inferma:icn*cn :ne air cryers is ::n:Eine:
in Se::icn :V.
i 1
. 13.MS-A20 I
- - APPENDIX C A2tachmene 7
{
Fage 2 l f ,4
( 'meter A monthly blevdown of the IAS at various e pitr-l lo is being purchased to verify air moisture centen Use of the IAS. a t th e "* ci n ts "#
! Particulgfe Centa-<nec3en s
A
- present. SHUD is' investigating a methed to accuratelv sa
- ~ Die for particulate 2AS contamination filte: S are at vericus functioning as designed.
points of use to ir.sure that th -
temperature. 0.0 micron rated units. The IAS filters are. hich
, is contained in Section IV. Further information en the' filters 011 contamina tion Rancho Seco uses Teflen-ringed, reciprocal air ccepressors, which prevent condensed hydrocarbon contamination of the sys:sm. The diesel driven back-up air ccmcressor uses a carten bed adscreer to prevent o con:Emination.
in Section IV. Further information en the air cc: pressors is contained A quarterly check of the Service Air System (same ccccressors at the IAS)a.nalysis and for hycrocartens test. is perfertec as a part cf a brea:ning tir st: cli III.
VERIFICATION OF HAINTEhANCE, PRCCEDURES, AND TF.GNING -
LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR Preventive Main p+ance Air Ocarated Cemcen W i The present FM program lu:;cicates and strckes the air-operated compenents to ensure smoo:h operation.
- to include a systematic inspection and, when required, replace air-operated actuator internals. of
=en:.T
, Ime cenev D creders; December.25, 1925.Many Rancho Seco procedures were revised durin
- Air System" was extensively rewritten to reflec: Operations Casualty P
..', to the IAS durinc tne outage. the modifications cade The purpose of asualty Procedure C.23 is to ". . . picviCa the
- ", the consequences of a partial or to:al less of pian; C.23's' air."coera Protecurt Validation."Edeuuacy to perform its intended func:icn was verifie ..
affected sections of the procecure.This precess involvec a walk-:nrougn of :ne areas cf concern. sucn as: The vaik-thrcugn adcressed varicus i
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- Sufficien; infor akien :o cerfor.. scecifiec a::io$5 b
- Prcoer secuente of.s ecs for ccers-ica '
Ecuirment line-uc! ccrrect Attrevia:icnr anc nc=enclature clear Communica: ion difficulties Ins:rumen: values correc: -- F ocer ur.' s.
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- Appr1 dix c 44 t
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Rancho Se q
^
, classroc co oper' itorsc receive. training on air-o'perated val' es: v by 'beth' instru-etien and on-the-job' training. They receive classrce
,:[ instruction through various lesson plans dealing with both syste a+
- cperation and' specific cc ponents (pneumatic valves),
' 8 4 One; example of classroc training is.a generil course on valves which covers of variousthe design, ty cons;ruction, manuti cperation, and normal . operation basic course. pes of valves, includihg pneumatic (diaphrag:L This is a'
' n,on-s af e ty-re that acdresses all. valves, both safety-related'and-l ated.
A second course addresses the Auxiliary Feedvhter -(AFH)- Fies Cen:r:1 Valves (ADVs ) .
Turbine Bypass Valves (T5Vs), and Atmospheric Dum: Valves
- local operation of valves that.are .normally re ctely opera:ed It also
' covers the basic com:enents of local valve con:rcis and lectl.c; era icn of the AFH flov Con rcl Valves, TBVs, and ADVs.
During the on-shift, on-the-jcb training each license candidate
. receives, the candidate cc pletes a training check'shee he has: locally opera:ed mejer me: r/ air-optri:ed valves. documen:ing that These valves incluce the AFH Fiew C n:rol Vilves. TEVs. and ADVs, as veil as c:hsr air-opert:ed valves Ce.g. Lettown Iscit:icn Valve).
- r .
Additientily. Operatiens personnel receive trair.ing on air-c:ert:ed
('
valves associated with specific systems. This is given as par: cf system training and includes purpose, func:icn, and nor:Ei/t:n=r:11 cperation of the' recpective system afd Cc ponents.
Rancho Seco re: Qualification 'trainirg also covers Casualty Precedures.
Casualty Procecure C.23 " Loss of Plan; Air System" is covered
. .extensivelyontheannualoperatingext7 IV.
. CCHPOND:T' DESIGN VERIFICATION OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AIR SYSTEM AND AIR-CPE Suroiv Svsr.rm-Chmeenents
.# ~ The three piant air cc pressors employed at Rancho Seco tre single stage, The nor:11 dual-acting o reciprecal compressors with Teflon rings (oil free).
output frc: pera:ing pressure ran9e is 100 to 110 psig. The nominal each unit is 2TS cfm. . Normal opertrion has two uni:s -
'" running, one fuliv loaced and one cycTine with demand with the third uni: in Eu o-s:ari s:andby.
after s:ier an: 20is:ure te;tra:or Downstream prior :oofaireach tir ccm:ress:: is in receivers.
The plan (SAS). tir receivers su::iy to:n tne IAS and Service Air System At :ne ini:it:icn :oint of :he Service A s: ring-;c-ciose, pri ri:y valve closes upcn a ceir het:er, a :neurt:i:.
-L rease in :ne Servi:e Air hea:er ;ressure. This feature ensures the Pitn: Air C:::ressers se:.:1y :ne :A5 hetcer in :ne even: of a failure cf :ne SAS nit: Er.
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. ..e 13 MS-A20
. Attachment y APPENDIX C Page :
The IAS has two dual-tower desic: ant dryers piped'in parallel, with one unit normally in service.
.. The ccin dryer has a design ca:Ecity of j 900.cfm and a rated outlet dewpoint of -40*F at 100 psig.
s dryer has a capacity of 340 cfm and a -40*F dewpoint rating at 103The. stan psig.
8 Downstream of the drvers are three parallel-piced afterfilters, etch rated for a maximum flow of 360 sc fa.
particulate size o.* 0.9 micron absolute a:Each filter is rated for a 90 scfm ,(100 psig).
Dtttribution Pirine -
- The IAS distribution piping uses both icco and single run header designs. 3 used for small branch headers and local co :;enent The supplies i distribution not seismically . system is not consicered safety related, therefore, it is suppor:ed. ,
Back-ur 9 vite t -
8
)
In additicn to the main IAS supplies, two back-up sys: Ems are installed in the IAS: '
(i)
The ciesel criven air ccm:resser is a~ self>cen:ained Ins:rumen: Air unit which au:c-star:s en low IAS pressure er up:n a less of 120Y AC to its ba:tery charger and hea:ers. The uni: c:nsis:s of a 600 cfm rc:ary screw air c mpressor, air-to-air Ef ter::cier, and a
- filtration and cryer package. (This package in:iuces a c pre-filter, a hea:less desic:Ent air c'ryer, a car:en cec oEles:in; il adsorter, and a 0.9 micrcn afterfilter.)- The uni: is tie: into the IAS header valve cownstream of the IAS filters, using ta in-line check to preven ficw back into the n:rmal IAS su;;1y com; nents.
This Eir compressor package supports the plant's recuiremen:s for Instrumen: Air in the event of failure of a su; ply com;cnent (i.e.,
filters, dryer), or a loss of pcwer to the plan Eir ccmcressers.
(2) ~
The compressed air bottle back-up systems consist of high pressure cylincers, pressure recucing staticas, icw pressure alarms, anc spring-1cEcad, soft-set: check valves. These sys: ems are passive
- upplits of instrument grade air to various valves upon a 1 css of normal IAS header pressure. The back-up air systems are designed to initiate and supply the valves for a minimum of two hours without c:eration ac: ion. These back-up air systims su;;1ying valves cen: rolled bv the Emercency Feecwater Initiatien and Con:r:1 (EFIC} system are s'eismictily'designec.
Accumulhs Two SEfe y Fea ures valves (the Le:dewn Isolation and F.ea:::r Cce;En:
Pum: Seai ~.e Eir event. Tne urn Is:la:icn) tre etcke: u: by Ec:umula :rs for a irss :f si2eC at:u.uia ;r! an: *uting Ere seismically COUr.!e: in; to OrCvice In E :i*ier., *Le interfE:eEn 20eCua e cuan ity (,f Lir fer CICsere Cf ne VEIvis.
cae: K sof:-sei:, string-IcECe: cesign. vlives used for the a**u.?uia:Or! are i i
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_APPE! DIX C-
. Attachment I.
Page S J
Oua l i tv c'1 a s s ; i g e n . . .u c--. .w.r e
, A list of all Quality Class I air-cperated components was cc piled to
-[. cetermine' and verify their failure medes and Instrument Air requirements.
.l.
4
[ - A'll the ccmponents that perform a safet~y related functien: fail in their designed' fail-safe ' position u;cn a loss of Instrument. Air. These
- failure positions are verified by surveillance testing. The ce=;onents
' backed up by either accumula: Ors or high pressure cylinders all have interfacing check valves and have been tested to ensure the check valves function to' isolate the normal air sup supplied from the back-up air source. ply when the cc=ponent is being The design of the IAS supply com:enents, maintained in ac::rdance vith the PM program, permit the IAS to be operated within the ' guidelines
- prescribed by ANSI /ISA-57.3, thus meeting the air. quality reccamendations of the manufac;urers, as listed on Attaennent II.
No other testing i.5 planned with regard to air-operated cc :enents.
System Reviews Dete minitt4- r;il"-= r- v e-.'e en- e r 3 ;1 vd e c a r--- ~r-et -f Int- use-- u:
This rescrt analyzed the failure of the IAS su::1y cc ::nen:s a d the
. failure moce of air-opera:sd cc penen:s up n 2. ioss cf air and -heir affec: on the plant curing power opera:icn and following a trusien:.
Actions resultine.frc this rep;r: included ic:rovemen:5 in :ne operating procedures, training of operators- and staff, revisicas .to the piping anc instrumentation drawings, and the ac'ditica cf the back-up t.ir
- systems notec earlier.
Svetem statur pecor' (ssp) en theTds/SAS:
This report summarized all problems, concerns and encoing activities on the IAS and the SAS. Scme of tne sources drawn upon to ceveicp the repor; vere pir.n: interviews, D~C reports , Our.er's Grcup recommendations, and investiga:lons by the assigned System Engineer, she SSR was used to prioritize activities on the system during the Restar program, including modifications and tes:ing. Improvements
continue to be made to the IAS and its associated procedures and documentation as a resu M of the SSR on the IAS/SAS.
n Extenced aue en ed Svt em Reviev and :et* Precram (E SP;D):
SASRTp, a safety Sys:e= Fun:-ic al Inssec-ion type tr0 gram, evalua:ed t e ace:uary cf various a::ivi-ies anc sys ems (the IAS vas a seit fys!!S) in su0 PCT- of the Eestar* pT0 gram. Ihs reviev tiam used :ng st saCE fu"~ amen ai Evalua:i0n ~ECnniOuf! Es tne NEC in thEir Augmirti:
57!:20 EEvii an: IE!! Er0gra:r (ASE.I?) in 0er icn.
- Inf TE00r brcut.
u: s0e:ific contfrns in *nf tria! of 20di fi'CE icn Citig*! . 00 Era-inb OTO:E urft, anc :e! inC, vnica resui!E; in fi;ne r cr.angis *. I r. E E00r0;rit i arti cf riv;Ew. -
n:Ern Or rEs0iU~*0n Of :ng i:s: via ar engir.st-ing 1
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11 13-MS.A20' i- . ..' APPENDIX C
'*1 . Attachment Ia Page 6 it ,
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Svetem Desien Bete, - ps:
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91 1A System Desion Bases document.has been drafted which summari:esLthe.
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Lentire plant.- ' design of the IAS and its ability to' support l opera: ion:oflthe g.
, . V.
TESTING SUKuARY _- SPECIAL TESTING '
v L[ . The following is a: summary; of the:special t'esting' perfcrmed on. the:IAS *
~
p ;during'the Restart program.
' s R i ~
STP.1107. Plant Air,5ystem functional Test
'This ' test performed an' actual ' verification c't the control logic' of the. >
. Plant' Air Compressors to ensure the trip 'and low pressure auto-star::
controisifunction as designed. ,
STP.1043' Diesel. Driven Air Compressor--(DDAC) Ac'ceptance' Test:
57P.1071 Recovery: Gradual Loss of the IAS With DDAC Auto-star and Head.er
~
t This test tripped al'1 threelPlant Air Compressors, allowincLthe IAS~
heacer pressure to degrade. Ucon' reaching.the designated se::cint,.the CDAC au:o-s ar:ed, racovered the heaoer pressure, and maintained i;.
, S77.784 IAS/SAS Priority Valve functional Test.
This tesi ver$fied that upon a degradation of the SAS header pressure.
the priority valve closed to supply only ,the IAF from the air receivers -
STF.774 Compressed Air Ecttle Back-up System Functional Test
- This test verified the function of the new battle bacx-up systems, L
incluc'ing air supply duration .(time and valve strokes), alarms, and the
, ahility to isola a -he norcal air' supply upon ini:iation. .
STP.10 SEA Suoden Loss of IAS to an ADV
- This test verified tha't u:en a sedden loss of air t'o an ADV (wi:h main
,, Steam heaoer pressure) the back-up air system initiated and the vaive
. remained in its initially closed positicn. j STP..TE2 Gradual L:ss of :AS to an ADV
. In'is es was a verifica: ton cf :he acces:ic meni :rs fer :he A Ys. tu-inciuce: a verifica:icn tr.c: ucen a crace 1 loss of IAS :: an A:V (wi n
.( --
main s:eam neader p; essure) the bo:-le cack-co air sys:e- ini:ia:ec an: ;
oroviCed m0!ive and cta!rcl air to !:rOke the valve.
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.13 MS-A20"
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Il , = p ' ~1 f , '.. 1 APPENDIX C:
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k 7 STP.105SB. . Gradual and Sudden Loss' ef ' Air to the TSVs This test performed. b'ot.6 a cradual and. sudden ~1oss of air to the TEVs i jl:
ll (with' main ~ steam header pressure)'to verify that' the bottles back-up air -
system initiated and maintained operability of the valves; the TSVs-
,l>. maintained the main steam header pressure duringJthe test.
- c. -
STP.105SC Gradual Los's' of Air .to' an ATH Control Val've This ' test verified that upon a gradual loss of tirnto an AFW Centrol' Valve.. the bottle back-up air system. initiated to maintain the valve:in.
its initially closed position; the subject valve fails opent upen a to:al' loss of air. .
~
STP.667 Sudden Loss of Air to an AFH ' Control' ValveL This test was a verification of 'the EFIC system. but l included a verification: that upon a ' sudden loss of air to an AFH Centrei Valve. .
With the AFW system cperating, the back-up air sys Em!ini:ia:ed and-maintained con:rol~of the valve.
. STP.1055D' Gradual Less of Air to MFW Regulating Valves . ,
_This test per'fermed a gradual loss of air tc'a set of Main Fescwa:er (MFH)'Regula:ing Valves. vi:n feecwa:er flew throu;n the valves.
test verified tna: :ne bO:tle back-c3 air system ini:iated. anc in.The conjunc icn <wi:5 a MFW iscia:e signal, su;;1ied air :0 close :ne MFW
, valves. .
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13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C
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' Air Oueli ty Decemmendatiens
! [f.I-BETTIS
-Clean,l dry air:
lJ . , FISHER - , .
Clean,udry air.- '
CONTR0MATIC.
. . Clean, dry air BORG_HARNER 4 , a
- Clean, dry air P
.CCI
. Clean, dry air . '
'GRINNELk. - Ciean, dry' air.
- XIELEY.L'MUELLER Ho' data' -
CCH:.N No data.
CC'! TROL C0uo^'!?uTS I :
Manufacture'r Ai- Ouelity Decc.- .enti ti ent EAILEY-Clean ; dry air CCNOTLOH-
'5-micron particula:e size, supplied tith upstream filter /regula:or, dry air .;
. . 1 ASCO .
_. Clean, dry air i
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- . APPENDIX C"
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.L-SS-539 2 h-
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U.'S. Nuclear.'Regulato:,f Co==ission Attn: Docu=ent Con:rol Desk-Washin5:en, D. C. 20$55 Cen:lemsn: -
Re: S:.1.ucie Uni:s 1 and 2 Doclie: Nos. 50-335 and 50-329 L . Instru=ent. Air Supply System ?:oblems Affecting
.Sa'erv oalated Yeuir-e-t Icenerte ter rF-1LT
. Florida Power & Ligh: Cc=ean.y (T?L) has received the subiec: Generic Le::er-(GL) -
ca:ed Aug..s: E.-.19EE, and is :aking action and perfor=ing verification recues:ed by it. Due :o outage schedules and pre-picnned hardware =ocifica::.cn.. TFL vill no: respond to :he C1. b'y its Februs:f le. 1959 due data. T?L's de: ailed senecu.e.for response.is s::ac.nec. -
This' response schedule has been discussed vi:h the GC staff.
Please' con ac: us if you have any cues: ions abou: this schedule.
Very ::uly yours, fd -flNU M -
'*J. T, Conway1 Senior Vice Presiden: - Nuc' ear VTC/T.JU/cm A::achmen:
cc: Malcolm L. Ernst. Ac:ing Regional Adminis::ator, Region !!, US57.0 m e -
Senior Residen: inspec:cz, US ai S:. 1.ucie Plan:
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13.xs.A20 It APPENDIX C l[ _
Fer-ease'Sebedule
.t S:. Lucie Units 1 ~ and 2.
,. , , Ceneric Letter 88-ll. -
i i
,' Ins u=ent' Air Supply Syste= Proble=s Affectin5 Safety-Related Equip =en:
.I:em 1. Verification by ;es: tha: actual ins::n=en: air quali y is censisten:
.. vith the =anufac:urer's' rece==enda: ion . for 'indivicual ec=:enents .
I: served.
.Co=plete Response June 30, 1989 ,
Item 2. Verification that =ain:enance practices, e=ergency procedures, s'n d trainin5 are adequate to ensure that safety-rela:ed equip =en: vill
. function as intended on icss of ins::n=en air.
Co=plete Response March 15, 1989 1:e 3. . Verifica:Len tha: the' design of . he entire instru=en: . air . syste=
includin5 air or other pneu=stic accu =ula crs is in accc dance vi:h its in: ended fune:icn....
Cc=ple:e Response March 15, ice 9
. . . . including verifica:icn by :es: tha: air-operated safery rela:ed ce=ponents vill perfor= as enpected in accordance with all design-
. basis events, includin5 a less of :he ner=al ins: u=en; air
- syste=....
Condue: ce= pie:e valve testing and in:egra ed less of _ sir tes: (as and ?f required)
S:. Lucie Unit.1: May 1990 (aro.iected) r S:.. Lucie Uni: 2: Dece=ber 1990 (projected)
....This design verifica: ion should include an analysis of curren: ,
. air operated co=ponen: failure posi: ions to verify tha:. they s.re cc ree: for assuring required safety functions.
Co=plete Response March 15, 1989 l I:e::. . In addition :o the"above, each licensee /applican should previde a discussion of their progra= for =aintaining p;cper inst :=en: air quali:y.
Co=plete Respense March 15. 1989 N e at . Asn e O N .u. e i
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". Houston Lighting 8: Power . . P.O. Box 1700 Houston. Texas 77001 (713)22s.c211.
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- ' : Tile No.: G03.081 J ;,.
.;, . 100?R50.54(f) ,
'U. S. ; Nuclear . Regulatory Cc==ission .
Attentions. . Docu=ent Control' Desk Washingten,'DC =20555
~'
. South Texas Proj ect Ilectric Genera:ing Statica.
' : Units 1 & 2 . .
s ,
' 't. . Docket'Nos. STN 5 0-4 98 , S*"N 50-4 9 9
-Respense-to: Generic Letter 25-014 "In:::~e. ment Air Su=elv Svste= Pre'clee : Affecti. Saf e:v Related Ecuirment"'
Fur:ua= .to'10CTR30.54(f), Housten. Lighting 6'?cuer Cenpany (HLi?)' ~
submits the attached response to Generic Letter 88-014 H:.i? has reviewed!the-Generic Letter and N"JF.EG-1275, Volt.e 2, anc'has perfo =ec'a design-anc
. operations verifica:icn of the Instru=en: Air-(2A) syste= fer Sc.
e- unit -ef the South Texas Project Ilectric Generating Sta:Icn (5:2Z33).
t'i? has dete=ined tha: the preble=s asscciated with a less of :'A. supply; to'saiety related.cc=penents a: S:2Z3S are'=itiga ed by the. design of these:
ce=penents, ' the surveillance . testing and' preventive =aintenance. perf c=ed e,n -
thefec=ponents, and the procedures in place to-respond to a less of !A. :Esch safety related air operated valve or da=per was tested and ccnfimed to 1 4 operate' properly during the initial startup pregra . The design._cf these ce=ponents was reviewed and . f ound to be appropriate. A per=anent procedure vill be developed which vill ensure that IA syste= air. quality is =aintained
. withis' vendor. specifications. ,
If you should havs further questions en this =atter, please cents:: [
Mr. M. A. He3urnet: a (512)~972-8530, 1 7,
,E. . /. ': *l': J.J. y s
.7. H. Goldberg .
Group Vice ? resident. Nuclear
.7HG/* *?I/ c r 8810000012 :::$1C13 PLR
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Ecgionali Ad.inistrator, Regien :IV Rufus S. Scott Nuclear ReFul: Lory Cc==ission'. Associate General Ceunsel
'611 Ryan Plana-Drive, Suite-1000 Houston'Lighti.g & Power Cc=r.anyJ
~ ,. Arlington,.TX 76011 1
. P. O. Box s 1700-
.. . Houston, TX :77001 George; Dick, ?roj ect Manager .
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission INFO . . -
Washington, DC~ 20555 Records Center .
1100-Circle 75 Parkvay Jack I. Bess A:lanta, Ga. 30329-2064-
- d. . Senior Resident Inspector / Operations e/o.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=.issien
- Dr.: Joseph M. Hendria
- 2. O. Box 910. 50 Ee11por: Lane .
3ay City TX .7,7414 -
Ie11 pert, NY 11713 J. I. Tapia ' '
=Senice Resident Inspector / Construction.
c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc==issien.
'?. O. Sex 910 2ay CI:y, '"X 7741/.
J. R. New :an, Iseuire Nes-.an . & Hol:ning e r, - ? . C.
1615'L' Street, N.V.
~Vashington, DC 20036-R. I.. Range /R. ?. Verre:
Central Power & Light Cc=pcny ,
P. O. Sox 2121 ,
Corpus Chrisci, '"X 78403 R. John, Miner (2-copies) .
Chief Operating Officer City of Aus:in Ilectric Utility 721 3arton Springs Road Austin, '"X 78704 i .
R. J. Costello/M. T. Hard:
C1;y Public Ser rice Board
- 2. O. 2nx 1771 .
San Antonio, TX 78296 3: .
I 1
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- NUC*.IAR RIG'w~.ATCRT CC.WISSICN A ,
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) Docket Nos. 50-498
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South Texas Iroj ect . -)- -
Uni.ts 1 E 2 Ar7::A'r :
Js H. Goldberg being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is
" Group Vice President, Nuclear of Roustun I.ighting 6 Power Company; that he is .
duly authorised to sign and file with the~ Nuclear Regulatory Cc. ission the attached response to NRC Generie . Letter.88-014; -is f amiliar with the content thereof; and'that the matters set forth.therein-are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. .
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- 3. E. Goldberg V .
Group Vice ? resident, Nuclear Sub:cribed and svors to bef ore. =e, a Notary Public in and for The State of Texas this. /3 " day of Occo-,e ., 19ES.
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- 13-MS A20 APPENDIX C1 Attach =ent--
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, .(7 File No.: GC2.02 L \, '? age 1 EL&? Response to GUL 88-014 " Ins t ru=e n: Air Supply Syste:
ogeblems'Affectin: Safe:v Related EcuiO=ent" Generic Letter 88-014' requires licensees and holders of constru::len per=its to perf or= a design and operations verification of their plants' IA ll syste=s.
I This verification process =us: 'contain four elements, each of'whi:h is' addressed separately below.
Element 1: The licensee verifica:Icn should include. " verification by test b
~
that actual air quality is censistent with the =anufae:urers' rece==e.nda:icns for individual ce=ponents served."
J Response:
Frior to entering Mode 4 for Unit 2 EL&? vill develep and cendue:
a te=porary engineering procecure (TI?) to' verify that adequate quality cf IA is suppliec ,to safe:7 related air-operatec valves and da=pers in both Units 1 and 2. This prececure vill include tests cf the IA syste= sir fcr particulate contn=ination. . oil conta=ination, and dev point te=perature.
Using the kneviecge gained fr== this testing, EL&P vill devel:p a procecure to replace the III. EL&? vill consider the guidance of ANS: Stan'dard ISA-57.3, " Quality.Stancard for Instru=en: Air " te deveicp the acceptance criteria fer this procecure. The manufacturers' -rece==enda: ions for air quality for the safety related air-cperated ec=penents at S!?I23 vere reviewed in the verification process ani ISA-57.3 was deter =ined to have the =cs:
strinEen: IA quality require =ents.
At ST?IGS, the IA and Service Air (SA) ecepressors contain cylinders which utilize reflen rings instead of oil fer lubrica:lon. This design i=hibits oil centa=inatien of the A syste=. In additi.cs, the' ~A systa= does set interface with en=tonents which could introduce oil contamination into the IA.
- As an extra measure of assurance, EL&? vili modify the preventive maintenance checklists (?MCs) for -he IA and SA'c = pressers :: {'
include a check for oil contamination. The procedure which vill replace the CI? vill also :nntain a test for oil centa=inati n. ,,
The FMCs will be modified and the procedure develeped and imple=ented by June 30, 1989.
. 4 Ile=en: 2: I
.I
?-
~
The licensee verification should include. " verification tha:
- maintenance prac:!ces, emergency procedures, and training are adequate to ensure that safety related equipment vill fune-icn as intenced on loss of instru=en: air." ,
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APPENDIX C * ~
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. .v .5 ST-HL-AI-2SEE
' T!!e No.^ G03.08 Page 2 b
4 l Responses _ HL&? periodically tests airfoperated valves and da=pers which:are .'
required to be tested.bylthe ST?EGS Technical _ Specifications (TS).
Some
'- safety-related valves are not required to be tested because~
they are nc ' r'e' quired to =itigate the: consequences , of an' acciden(
and do not perfor= a. function in-shu :ing down'the: reactor o cold-shutdown. . Sc=e saf ety-related d ampers are not required' c t o . be .
tested by the Technical Specifications. EL&? vill' ensure that these dampers are periodically =enitored to verify functienalL operability. _
b The ST?IGS vork request programs,'the Maintenance Vork'Kecues.:
programs also contain requirements which: ensure appropriate post-maintenance testing is perfor=ed on. air-opera:ec valves and' d ampe rs .
Once a problem with an air-operated valve or da=per is corrected. -
~
the equipment histery file'is updated to reflect the maintenance.
perfer=ed. The equip =en: histery file.prevides data fe trend..;
of'the ec=ponen:'s failures. In this fasnion, repetitive er ce==en mode failures (such as equip =ent failures or cleanliness
[ .prc:le=s) vill be' identified in ace:rdance with' plant procecures. .
With regard to plan: off-normal'and e=ergency precedures, two ccaditions need to be addressed: gradual and cc=plete loss of IA.
A= of f-nor=al procedure addresses a gradual lcss of IA up to and including syste= pressure degrada:icn requiring plant shu:dcrn.
This procedure also addresses'less of IA due to loss of ele :rical power to the system and due to loss of cooling water ,te the compressors.
This procedu~re does r,ot adcress stat en respense te a ce=plete ' f ailure of the IA 'syste= in =enjunctic: vith a icss cf effsite power (LCO?) or a design basis accident (DEA).
- a. After a complete loss of IA, the Main Stea= lsolstica Valves
~-
and Feedvater Regulation Valves vould fail c1csed. Subsequen loss of " steam generator water level vould cause a reae::: trip and plant. operators would respend in accordance with the e=ergency procecures f r a reactor trip. The e=ergency procedures address lack of IA in contain=ent, verificati:n f contain=ent isolation valve positions, and reestablishment of IA.
NL.88.2:7.04 h
-- ________________._________._._.____._____._m ___ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ .
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- b. In response to a loss of IA due to'a LOCP, .the S!?IOS reactor' n .
vould trip, and the plant ri via the e=ergency: procedures as' described above.operater vould resp The IA:vould Le reestablished via the Lalance of ?lan: Diesel Generater.
c.
In response to the other DSAs which could cause a loss cf 'A, p . O.
plant' operators can bring the plant vithout manipulation of the air-operated to Mede 4 (H:: Shutdevn) compenents.
Tro= Mode 4, the plant may be brought discussed in Appendix A of Chapter 5.4to'ModeJ5 (Cold Shutdevn) as
. of the S!?IGS ISAR.
. EL&P vill enhance its off-nor=al operating procedure for loss of
.IA by adding a-list of the,=ajor cc=ponents whose operatien =ight .
be affected by a less of IA. .This ennancec procedure vill'be
-effective Dece=ber 31, 1988.
' additienal drawings to supplenent'In the additice.
piping EL&P is develeping-ani instru=en:
diagrs=s (?& ids) of the IA syste=. These supple = ental dravings vill further assist operaters curing the response to a 1 css,cf IA.
. The supple Dece.:ber 16,=en al drawing: fer Unit.1 viii.be issued by i '
1968, and. : e ccrrespending cravings f or Unit; 2 vill be issued prier :o Initial Cri isality of that unit.
The ST?IGS ::sining progrs= aedresses the concerns of this Gene-ic Le:ter. Maintenance. personnel receive training en =aintaining ne cleanliness recuire=ents of syste=s opened for mainter.ance. In addition, the obj ectives of the maintenance training en air ce= pressors accress the ' impact upcn STIISS if.the !A ryste= fails.
Initial training for licensed operators includes the following: ..
a.
Lecture cn the IA syste which requires the cperater :: becc=e fa=111ar with the syste= function, design, ce=por.ents, flev paths, nor=al operation, and backup functicas and LOC? conditions. abner =al operation including
- b. . ..y Lecture on the off-ncr=al procedure for a less of IA which -
requires the operator to be able to siste the purpose of the procedure, plan: symptoms that **
procedure, a.nd the require i=ple=entation of the '
. i==ediate actions of the procedure.
," c.
Si=ulator training on the South Texas Plant Specific Si=ula:er during which.
=alfunctica by opera: diagnosing cts are therecuired to respond to an IA syste:
condition fre= indications, perfor= int recuired i==ectate actions, and ce=Pleting
. appropriate supple =entary ac: ions.
i NL.EE.327.04 I
,______________m___ _ _ _ _ _ . ___ . _ _ _ ._ . _ - _. _ __ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _
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'. :13-MS A20 APPENDIX C *.
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i ST-EL'-AI. Esi; y7
- Tile No.s. G03 '. 0S u X ' '
Page L^
P . During annual requalification' training, licensed operators are
.. . required to respend to a~si=ulated loss of IA on the si=ulater.
Hinor procedural changes.are cenveyed to the, operators via a required reading list, and =ajor procedural changes are discussed in classroom lectu,res or training ,is provided en the si=ulater O
Ile=ent S:
.The design licensee ~ verification of the entire instrument should include, " verification that the-air syste= including air or other pneumatic accu =ula: ors is in ae'cordance with its intended function including verification by test that air-operated safety!
related'co=ponents design-basis' events, vill perforn-as expected in accordance with'all" syste=. including a loss of the nor=al instru=ent. air current This design air operated ce=penent verifica:ica should include an analysis of they'are correct-for assuring required safety functions." failure _po Respense:
During the recently ec=pleted star up preeperational test pregra=
EL&? tested safety related air-cperated. valves and ca=pers a:'the-cc=penen:
tes level. to verify their response to loss cf !A. These procecures includec the guidance of Regula cry Guide 1,68.2..
These tests ccnfirned that safety related air-operated valves.and
.da=pers of IA. assu=ed their required safety function positten upon less In with 10CyRio.49, a~ddition. ELL? has qualified. as requirec-in ec=pliance equipment qualification air-operated valves and da=pers in the S!?I3S pregram.
The at design of the saf ety related air-operated valves and da=pers STIIGS Generic Letter. also addresses to a certain extent the' concerns cf t. sis In the absence of air pressure to actuate the ce=ponents, springs provide. he,=otive force to positica the valves and da=pers la thei~r required saf ety fune !cn positiens Where syste= functics requires that safety related valves er ds=pers be streked or thro: led, related =c:ct operaters or electro-hydraulic operatorsthe STPIGS desig in place of s
air operators and safety related air accu =ulators. .i A
Tailure modes'and effee,ts analyses STFIGS safety related fluid and HVAC systems.(TMIAs) have been pericr and da=pers are included in these analyses. TheAir-cperated ST?IGS TSAR valves, i
. docu=ents these analyses in the chapters associated vith each system.
)
1 i' *
These docen docu=ents and Instru=ent includh LoopP& ids. Logic Diagrams, Ins rumen Data Sheets, Diagrams. These design docu=ents and revisions thereto are independen 1.y design reviewed per apprevec )
procedures. '
1
. I 1 i i UL.BE.227.04 l 6 j
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- Tile No.: -G01.CS ,
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An.' additionalf ailure. position review has' been conpleted f or each 41r-operated valve and da=per which cust be in a prescribed'
+ *
, position'to psrfor= its safety function. The results of this review indi'cate the ST?IGS design is correct.
' Preoperational, acceptacce, and surveillance test procedures vere prepared using the design documents described above. These procedures tes to the design.
the operation of the valves to assure confor=ity.
Ile=en
- 4:' The 11:ensee should.also, " provide.a discussion of their prcgrr for =aintaining preper instruaen: air quality".
t Responre:
The pregren fer maintaining IA quality at 5;?I35 includes the.
preventive maintenance (IM) progrs=, the surveillance tes:
prog;c=, and a per=anent test procecure.
L
~0he IM tragra: =aintains the functienal operability cf the.;A syste= and alcs in =sintaining preper air quality by the
- inspectics, cleaning, and reverzing of ce=penents.vni:n affee: -he
.IA quality. The !A systen inle: filter and silencer,~ he 1A syste= after::cler and =cisture separators, the IA syste= =oisture-traps, and the ~4 dryers rece:ve preventive maintenance
. This r;aintenance is cae part of the pregra= to ensure the quality cf A is,vithin vencer specifications.
!. i The surveillance tes phegrs=containsperiodicteststoensure operability of safety related air-operated ec=ponents as required by the S!?IGS OS. C:=ponents which fail surveillance tests are repaired and re:es:ed to ensure operability. The surveillance
' test progra ensure.s saf ety relatee air-operated cespenen;s vil; l.
function as intended upen ce=and (ver. ting cf IA).
A per=anent tes: procedure o routinely tes: IA quality at varicus ,
locations will be develeped and implemented for both units by .;une 30, 1989. Perfer=ance of this tes .g and resolutica of any acverse i findings frc= the tes vill ensure tha: the air quality of :ne_:A -
syste= =eets ANSI ISA-57.3. , ** * '
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. yebruary 3, 1989 i . Trojan Fuelear p11nt 7
,, Cocket 50-344-License Nyr-1
- l, U..:. Nu:Isar Ragulatory Cc=isei:n ATTN: 0:nu=ent C f. trol Da:k
ashingt
. n DC 20555 L Cear. Sir:
Nucles? Regulat:ry C =issi:n (Np.C)
Cen ri Lattar 32-14 . nst::: ant Air supply sv:te- -ch!= z Affecti , ss!-tv =1sted ?:ui w.t i
cane-i: L:tter 23-14. rac, vests th:t mach 11:an:aa reviaw N,fEI:;-1:75, *
.. V:1ums 2, "Cpersting Txperien:e Tacd=2:k Repert - Air Syste.
pr:bla=s,' and perfer: a design and operati:ns verifiestien cf the
!..::: ;= ant air a ys te. ..
The senari: letts: 'dentifies i six spe:ifi: acti:ns fer lic:nsass.
Tha six acti:ns at: -(1) review V';;.I:;-1:75,. Volu .e 2, (2) tasn sir quality to ensurs the air system pr:vides air that neets :: p:nant e.anuf acturer's ree::::endatiins, (3) verify r.aintenance pract!:ss, a:cer;ency precedurss and training are adequate to ensure that safety-related equip =6nt vill function -as intandad :n 1:ss :! inst.~:: ant air, (A) verify that the design of the antire inst:.:: ant air tystu:
is in ac::rdan with its intand6d fur.:tien, (5) pr: vide a discus-sien of the progra:n for =aintainin5 pr:yer inst.acant air quality, and (5) idantify any ::=penent that cannot se::=71sh 1 its intended -
functi:n and. state the cerractive acti:n isken er the : rrective
- action schedulad to be taken.
- In response to Cener!: Latter 88 14, Portland Cener:1 !!actr!: (pCZ) has devoleped a detailed acti:n plan to address all actions requested
., in Generic !.etter 88-14. The detailed action plan ident!!!es indi-vidual responsibilities and acti:n c:mpletion dates to assurs that the specifi: actions require'd by Cencric Letter 88-1 A arm conyleted in a timely manner.
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AFFENDiX A
.. - 4 13-MS-A20 i 7.f:. *.-
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ATTACHMENT 2 C.
PROGRAM FOR uAINTATNTNG AIR nUstI??
3 The ~ program for. maintaining air quality periodic test of air quality and the preventative maintenance program. vill The airtoquality test procedure basis shall be performed in-each unit on a. periodic
- be. determined described in ACTION 1 of Attachment 1.from. the results of the initial air quality test as three units after The procedure. vill be effective in 'all
- 1. This procedure completion of the design modifications described in ACTICN vill measure such parameters as' total air humidity / dew point, particulate flow, water vapor. ad contaminants includin5 hydrocarbons and .
A review of the existing, preventative maintenance tasks was performed which~
include the following:
Inspect,
?
- Remove and replace instrument- air prefilters; perform Remove and replace instrument air after filters; performed annually.
Replace dessican:; verformed annually.
The frequency of.these tasks analysis of the air quality test.. may change dependent on the results of. the C. .In addicien to these tasks supplemental tasks such as disassembly of drain traps including ins cleaning of the internals are .also performed on and separator and receiver on'a quar:erly basis along witha'the prefilter, moisture tasks perfstmed on related multitude of other monitoring equipmen: and similarinstruments, equipment. relays, motors, bearings, vibra: ion In addition, written by preventative March 31, 1989 ' maintenance to tasks are currently scheduled to be
, supplying safety related valves and components. change the filters inside the air regu implemented every two years. This work is scheduled 'to be on.the air quality test analysis.The frequency of this work may change dependf.ng e
l l'
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MPENDIX A 13-MS-A20
.r h ls Arizona Nuclear Power Project P o Box 52034
- PMcENix. ARIZCNA 450724:34 161-01881-DSX/JMQ
.g. April '7 -1989 4 '
l-
- l Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530
.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission 1
Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station F1-137 1
Washington, D. C. 20555
- I..
References:
'(A) Letter from NRC to all Holders of-Construction Per=its for Nuclear Pever Reactors dated August 8,.1988.
Subject:
(B) Letter fro D. B. Karner, APS to NRC dated Februarj 20, 19S9. Subj ect:
Generic Letter 88
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PV::CS)
Units 1,'2 and 3
, Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 88-14 4
"Instrucent Air Supply Syste: Preblems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" File: 89-010-026; 89-056-026 Generic Letter 88-14, Item I recon = ended verification by test that actual instrument air quality is consistent with manufacturer's reco=sendations for individual components served.
Reference (B) stated that the air quality data vill be taken for approximately one month in Unit 2 in order to obtain adequate test data. It also stated that a supplemental letter would be provided by ' April 28 1989, indicating whether any . improvements or modifications will be made and providing the schedule for completion. See Attachment 1 for response.
3 Also, Generic Letter 88-14 Item 3 recommended a verification of the design of the entire instrument air . system. Reference (B) stated that the review is expected to be completed during the first quarter of 1991.
APPENDE A 13-MS-A20 U. S. Regulatory Commission 161-01SS1-DBK/JMQ Attention: Docu.:ent Control Desk April 27, 19c9 Page 2 However, a limited scope design review has aircady been performed, also the schedule for completion of the fer.:.a1 review has been advanced and is expected -
to be completed during the first quarter of 1990. See Attachment 2 for details.
Very truly yours, m
i .~, s %N D. B. Karner Executive Vice President DSK/JMQ/jle Attachments cc: T. J. Polich (all w/ attachments)
T. L. Chan M. J. Davis J. B. Martin C
s.
d l
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- k. ._ ,- . .
y , APPENDIX A . 13-MS-A20 2
l .-
ih, f- U.-S. Nuclear' Regulatory Co==ission -~161-01831-DBK/JMO
'(R Attention: Document Control Desk April 23. 19o9
. Page-3L ~
bec: E. C2. Sterling f u /h C . -(all w/ attachment)-
M. F. Hodge .
%es C-lG.Ckj H. W. Riley- #JEawr, R. Rios-pg 2.u.c9 F. Honer T 4 a.. m .x; V.'F. Quinn i 2A4hf" */t ? '
A. C. Rogers- CN R e.3 <..cq
- R.'A. Bernier (//c /J. a.u -if .
C. M. Souers .svr m~ccrig jdt)
K. M. Johnson 'A n m it w J' Bfs b R. E. Younger '
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J. u. Dennis C#0 hb $/U.0 C. D. Church:::an OB// '3r. EBC4t .g$4i 74$t.Y' A .UE'WWf
'T4C(W P.'3. Miley J. R. 1.oCicero #
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J. T. Reilly J. E. Allen I
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..-- g APPENDIX A 23-MS-A20 '
-- . Attschment 1 Unit 2 Test Results/Evaluatien 1
3 . System Dewpoint, particulate and hydrocarbon tests were conducted on the Instrument Air to ascertain the quality of instrument air delivered compressor / dryer system. by. air The design dewpoint for the instrument air system at Palo Verde is -40' F at 125 PSIG and. the teut. data obtained supports this te=perature requirceent. The dew point temperatures, as- measured, are' quite acceptable as they range .between
-5B' F to -85*F corrected to a line pressure of 125 PSIG. - The minimum vinter design temperature as described in Section 9.4.2 of the PVNGS FSAR Table 9.4-1 is 11* F.
The ISA-57.3-1975 " Quality Standard for Instrument Air" reco~ ends that the dewpoint at line pressure be at least 18* F below the mini =um temperature (11* F) te which any part of the instrument air system is exposed at any season in the year.
-7" Therefore, the maxi =um allowable dewpoint. at PVNGS is F and we sr'e well within the guidelines of the ISA Standard. However, tests will be' conducted during our most humid conths to verify that dewpoints can be maintained rate.
at.-40' F, or below, at a line pressure of 125 PSIG at a nor=al flow ISA-S7.3-1975 recoc= ends that the particle si:e in the air stream shall not.
exceed 3 microns. The test runs . have given part'icle sizes ran;ing fro: .5 microns to 15 microns. Only two particles of the 15 micron size were encountered in 25 ceasure=ents . taken in 10 days during the test. On the
, average, the particle size was approxiestely .65 microns.
~
The oil content shall be as close to zero per weight ratio (w/w) er volume ratio (v/v) as possible per the ISA Standard and under no circumstances shall it exceed one ppm w/w or v/v under nor=al operating conditions. The average oil content in the air samples tai.en was ' 0.03 pp=.
The following action resulted from the evaluation of the air quality data:
Change the afterfilter internals (cartridge) from the current l'cieren rated filter to a .45 nicron rated, filter or smaller in Units 1. 2, and 3.
This task will be completed before the Unit 1, 2, and 3 restart from the current outages.
Following test will be perfor=ed the upgrade on a periodic basis. of t,he . filters, the air quality G
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APPENDIX A - 13-MS-A20
'Attscheent 2 D_esten Review of :he Instrument Air System a
A limited scope design review, of the instrumed, using the documents that air. system has' been perfor.ed #
represent the actual installation at the plant. The design bas 1s Criteria Manual.- documents' reviewed wer'e Regulatory Guides,10 CFR 50 and the A number of design output documents, design modification packages and other associated engineering documents were also reviewed. -
This limited ' scope review indicates ~. that the' system - delivers, as designed, quality air to meet or exceed the requirements of the design basis.- The cceplete review for the adequacy of the existing design basis and development of the Design Basis Manual for Instrument' Air will be completed during the' first quarter of 1990. .
i .
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13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 1
b
~
APPENDIX B llISTORICAL DOCUMENT REVIE'J e
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F 13-MS-A20 l
l
. COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS APPENDIX B
,, HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION REVIEW ,
A review of the historical engineering documents pertaining to the design and operation of the CCS was conducted to determine the effects of the documents on the design basis of the CGS . Attention was .given to identifing design / operational concerns that were reported or documented previously and again identified or observed during the recent unit 3 trip.
The types of documents that were reviewed are as follows:
Plant Change Requests (PCRs)
Field Change Request (FCRs)
Licensing Documents (LCTS & IEIN)
Non conformance Reports (NCRs)
Start up Field Reports (SFRs)
Design Change Packages (DCPs)
Site Modifications (S-Mods)
- Supplier Document Change Notices (SDCNs)
Engineering Evaluation Reports (EERs)
(
Post Trip Review Reports (PIRRs)
Purchase Specifications for Procurement of Various Compressed Gas Components Special Plant Event Evaluation Reports (SPEERs) and Special Reports (SPs)
Necessary information is provided in the following pages.
O ap8'
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B-1
'1 13-MS A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS L PCR l l TYPE OF DOC l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l j ITEM I OR EVENT 1 OR TITLE I SYSTEM IMPACTS l l l I I i
l 1. l 10 of 39 l Corrections to the l All were PCO/PCRs l l l PCRs l Instrument-Data l applicable to all l l l l Calibration List to l three units, 1 PCO/PCR l l l l reflect as-built plant l vas for Unit 1 only. l l l l conditions. l l l 1 I I I l 2. l 21 of 39 l Corrections to P6 ids l All were PCO/PCRs l l l PCRs l and other plant' l applicable to all l l l l drawings to reflect l three units, 2 PCO/PCRsl l l l as-built conditions. l were for Unit 1 only. I l l l 1.e.. correct / add l l l ! l missing valve and line l l l l l numbers, correct line l l l l l connecting points or - l l l l l valve locations, l l l l -l indicate proper line l [
l l l routing, show capping l l C l l
l l
l that was not indicated.l l correct symbols used, 1 l
l
~l l l add or correct notes, l l l l l indicate or correct l l l l l Pipe support l l l l l configurations, etc. l l 1 I I I I l 3. l 1 of 39 PCRsl To change a time delay l No affect on system l l l l rate. l pressure. l l l 1 1 I l 4. l 1 of 39 PCRsl To change the contact l No affect on system l l l l development chart. l pressure. [
l i I I I l S. l 1 of 39 PCRsj Non-applicable to the l No affect on system l l l l CCS. I pressure. l l 1 1 I I l 6. l 1 of 39 PCRsl To correct the IA l No affect on system l 1 l l l compressor motor space l pressure. l q,
' l l l heaters type utilized. l {
l l l Unit 1 only. l l l 1 ~ -l I I l 7. l 2 of 39 PCRsl To allow for tubing l No affect on system l l l l adaptcr site change l pressure. l l l l which was different l l l l l than what was initially l l l l l specified. One PCR wasl l l l l for Unit . only. l l 1 I l_ l l B-2
,. 'o > xi
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ik. ,
+
' 12 -MS - A2 0 --
COMPRESSED GAS. SYSTEM EVhtUATION AND ANALYSIS m
l- j. TYPE OF DOC-l ' DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION .[-
CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS. l j' ITEM f OR EVENT I OR TITLE l- SYSTEM IMPACTS j i I .I . .
I l-
'l 8. l2.of 39 PCRs l One PCR was to revise. I No: affect on system - [.
- l. l -l a . valve specification .l pressure. ll 3. .
'l l -l so that it.'s design ,[
.]-
l .- ;l l pressure is: lowered. l~ l
'l' l l The valve.in' question ~ l- ]
.l. l l'is on the line . l -l
'l. l l connected to the EDT l , 'l 7
l l .l'. Refer to PCR'No'. 85-13-l 'l:
,l l .l GA-012). The.other j 1-l l l PCR; No. 86-13-IA-003, - l-l l, .l . .,l was issued to increase l l
- l. l l l the deadband and l ll l -l l tolerance for a .' l - l.
. l -. l :l pressure switch. --l .]
l 1 ! I j '-
o l
B-3
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13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS m
l l TYPE OF DOC l ' DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l l TTEM.i OR EVENT I OR TITLE I SYSTES TMPACT9 ,l l 1 l l 1 l 1. [.685 of 810 l These did'not have any-l No affect on system l l thing to do with system l pressure.
~
l l FCR.s l l l l pressure, they involve l l l l l vith pipe supports, l l l l l indices revison. l- l l l l removal of peripheral / l l
~
l l l support equipment, l .
l j l hanger removal or-l l l' l l l additiot4, revision of j l l l l weld symbols, etc. l l 1 1 I I I l 2. l 125 of.810 l Over 90% of these have j l l l FCRs l been issued as DCNs to l l l l l 13 type drawings. -
l l l 1 1 I I l 2a. l 10 of 125 l Are " paper change" l No affect on system l.
l l FCRs l type, and involve l pressure. l l l l changes to valve l l l l l numbers, line numbers, l l l l l general notes, l l l l l references, etc. l l l l l' I I l 2b. l 36 of 125 l These involved minor l No affect on system l l l FCRs l additions or removals l pressure. l l l l of piping sections due l l l l l to the rerouting of l l 1 l l piping; the original l l l , l design provided l l l l l interferences with l l l l l structural components, l l l l l Junction boxes, l l l l l supports, other lines, 1 l l l l etc. l l l l l l l l 2c. l 36 of 125 l These. change dealt withl No affect on system l
' l l FCRs l changes that do not l pressure. l l l l affect system pressure l l l l -l'or supply because l l l l l they involve minor l l l l l components changes l l g l l such as a valve, l l l g l l addition of a cap, [ ~ l l l l l drain removal, etc. l
= . i i -
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13-MS-A20
..- , C0!iPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS. 'l -
tca
.l I l TYPE OF DOC l ' DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION..l CONCLUSIONS $CMMENTS ,l
.l ITEM f OR-EVENT' I 'OR TITLE I SYSTEM' IMPACTS l m
l__ .l- 1. -l. _
- l. '<j_ k
- l. 2d. l.28.'of 125' l These added piping~
, _ l Total' increase'of: ' '
l-l l' FCRs l'to. improve accessibil .l_ system demand wiJ1
-l
.l. l l ..ity, branching of. J'be estimated with . 'l l- 'l l- ing of existing l lines,- l completion of detail' - l.
l l. l ' facilitate other. equip-l- calculations. l-l l -l ment, etc. The piping l l l added is somewhat more l l l -l,'
'~
l l l than in the. case of_ l l' l l l plain rerouting. Thesel -l
-l FCRs are: 23368-M,
, l l l l
- j. l. l 23369-M, 23370-M, l l l 23372-P, 23373 P,
- l: l l l l l 'l 26964-P, 26969-P, l l
_l. J, l 27136-M, 27137-M, -l 'l l l- l 27138-M,'27142-M, l l l l l 27143-M, 27144-M, l -
l g~ j [ l 27145-M, 27561-M, l l
( l y ] 28275-P, 28405-P, 1 l l ,l l 74084 P, 75572-P, l l l ') l 63778-P, 63953-P, l l l l l 64375-P, 24452-M, l l l l l 25362-P, 25363-P, l l 1 l l l 33968-P,'35328-P, and l l l l l 36094-P. l l
~~ 1 I I I I l 2e. l 15 'of 125 l These were to add new l Total increase of l l system demand sill be
~
l l FCRs l supply of air to l
l l l different points in ] estimated with l l l l the plant. These are l completion of detail l l ] l primarily for use in l calculations. l l ; l vendor equipment and -l l l l l areas that had been l l l l l overlooked such as l l l l l pneumatic valves, HVAC l l l l l system components, etc.l l
., l l l These FCRs are: l l l l l,23599-P, 26714-P, l l l .l -l 26809-P, 26809-P, l l l l l 26810-P, 27560-P, j l l l l 27798-M, 27800-M, l l l l l 27803-P, 27804-P, l j j l l 28087-P, 28088-Me .
l l
[ l l l 28172-P, 28273-P, l l
\ l l l 25352-M, and 26160 P. l l 1
l 1 I l B5
13-MS-A20
. COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
- LICENSTNG l l TYPE OF DOC l OOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l l TTEM f OR EVENT I OR TITLE' ! SYSTIM IMPACTS l l l l . I I l 1. l RCTS #38462 l Failure of air check l Faulty check valves in l l l IEIN 85-35 l valve to seat in l MSIV and FWIV actuator l l l I/17/88 l response to gradual l assembly was replaced l l l IE1N 85-35 l decreasing of air l with reliable units l l l Supplement l pressure. l which are not prone to l l l l l leak. See Section IV.Ej '
l l l l for additional review l l l l l of ADV check valves. l ,
I l i I I i l ' 2. l~RCTS # 36100l Excessive pneumatic l IN 86-51 was considered l l l IEIN 86-51 l leakage in the l closed since it address!
l .l l automatic depressur- l ADS /BWRs problem and l l l l i::ntion system (ADS). l PVNGS does not have l l l. l .l this system. l l 1 I I i l 3. l RCTS # 38048l Air systems problem at l ANPP LTR. 161 00514 l l- l and LCTS
- l U.S. Light Water l UFQ/JBW. 9/17/87 for l
- j. l 38050, IEIN l Reactors. l departments review. l l l 87-28, l l Review to include: l l 1 l l 1. Air system quality l l l l l 2. Loss Air Sys. l l l l l Recovery .
l l l l l 3. Adequacy of backup l l l l l air accumulators l l l l l 4. Adequacy of gradual l l l l l loss of IA Sys l
.l l l l Pressure. l l l l l This IEN parallels l l l l l Generic Letter (CL) l l l l l 88 14. The APS , l l l l l response for this IEN l l l l l will be covered in CL l l l l l 88-14 Also see l l l l l Section IV.E for chech l l l l l valve discussions and l
," l l l l Section II.F for l l l l l generic letter. l l l 1 1 I I I I ' > I L
B-6
ja 13 MS A20 '
COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEMI E VALUATION AND' ANALYSIS.
- i LICENSING
.]
l
- l. s l TYPE OF DOC l' I)OCUMENT. DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS ,j
- l ITEM i On EvrNT i On TITtt. i- SYSTEM IMPACTS [. 1 l -l .
l~ l . .
~l ;
l' .4. l RCTS # 39139l Loss: of energency l EAR 88 1256 This . l --
l boration. capability duel specific problem has' .l:
- l. l'IEN 87-57 l l'
-l l to nitrogen gas' l been investigated and- 'l .;
l l' l intrusion. l found not to be speci--l ,
l l .l l fically' applicable at l, j j 'l .l [ PVNCS. APS will review l l ll l l gas intrusion possi . l:
l l l l bilities as pr.rt of- l ;
l l l l our~ continuing INPO l ,;
l l l' l SOER 86-03 check valvo.l !
l .l l l program. l 1
1 I . l .
I - .
l l 5. l RCTS #38072ll Failures of air l Results of IEN 88-24. 'l. l
- l. l IEIN.88-24 l operated valves - l review may affect IA ll l l' l affecting safety l component performance. l l l l related systems. l This problem concerns l' l over-pressure of safetyl-(
- f. I ~l l '
l l l l related solenoids- l l l l l because they were not- l l l l l noted for the IA sub. [ i l '- l l l system pressure. APS~ l
, l l' l l is presently reviewing l l l l j'this IEN for applica- l- ;
l l l l bility. To date, we l l l l l l have not attributed' l l l l l any failures of air l l l l l l supplied ASCO solenoids l '
l l l l through review of our l l l l l Failure Data Trending' l l l l l System. .l
-l 1 1 1 1 l 6. l RCTS # 30623] Operability of auto- l Address ADS /CE BWR 'l l l IE Bulletin l matic depressurization-l problem and PVNCS does-l l l 80-01 l system valve pneumatic l not have this system. l-l l l supply. l l
~ l i I i 1 l i I l
B-7 a____=___ __ _ - _ _ _ - - -
L t
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS LICENSTNG j 'l TYPE OF DOC j ' DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l l TTEM l OR EVENT I OR TIT Q l SYSTEM IMPACTS [
l ! l l 1 l 7. l RCTS # '58350.l Review NRC Ceneric l Refer to Section II.F. l l l NRC Letter l Letter 88-14, l of the report. l l l GL-88-14 l Instrument Air Supply l l
'l l l System problem l l l l l.affecting safety- l l l l l related equipment. l l l l l l 1 l 8. l RCTS #38477 l Instrument Air Supply l This IEN refers to . l l l IEN 89-26 l to Safety-Related l design problems which l l l l Equipment l primarily rely on IA l l l l [ system to provide l l l l l containment isolation l l l l l valves. This IEN is l l l l - l presently bein5 l l l l l reviewed. Refer ao l l l j l Sections IV.A and F l l for discussions of the l l l l l PVNCS design which n'aveI l l l j l [ [ been evaluated to date.]
l l l l 1
' l 9. l IEN 86-51 l Excessive Pneumatic l This IEN concerns l l l l l Leaka;;e in the Auto- l pneumatic leakago from l i l l l matic Depressuri::stion l accumulator and their l l l l System. l appropriate systems. l l l l l This concern is l l l l l addressed for the ADVs l l l l [ in the ADV report, for l l l l l the MSSVs, WIVs in l l l l l Section IV.E of this l l l l l report and for the l l l l l check valve isolating l l l l l the CCS from the accum-l l l l l ulators in Section IV.El l l l l of this report. l 1 1 I I I 3 1 ' ' ' I J
a B-8
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS LICENSING l l TYPE OF DOC l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l ITEM I OR EVENT I OR' TITLE I SYSTEM IMPACTS l
1 l I I I l
-l 10. l RCTS #36390 l Inadequate testing to l This IEN conceres l l l IEN 86-50 l detect failure of l testing safety related l l- l l safety related l pneumatic components
] [
l l pneumatic components orl under slow degrading l l l l systems. l air conditions. This l l l l l concern was also- l l l l l raised by CL 88-14 l l l- l l l l l PVNGS has had several- l
[ trips in which CCS l l l l l was lost under slow l
[ l l l decay conditiens.
j l l l l
l Problems have not been l l l l detected exct.pt for l l l l -
l' sluggish ADVs. See l l l l l Sections II.F, IV.A. l l l l l and IV.T of this reportl l l l l for evaluations. [
] l 1 1 I l 11. l IEN 88 51 l Failure of MSIVs l This IEN addresses the l l l RCTS #038423l l adequacy of surveil- l l l l l lance testing to ensure l l l l l operability of valves l l l l l following maintenance. [
l l l l This IEN is under [
]
l 1
j' l l evaluation. The fail l l
l l l closed MSIV at Dresden l l j didn't close on slow l
l l l l loss of lA due to l l l l l overtorqued packing. l l l l l Surveillance testing l l~ ] l vas not rigorous l
l l l l l enough to detect. l l l l l Engineering vill l l l l l evaluate adequacy of l l l l surveillance testing l l
[
- l l I
l l with this problem. l l I I l
B-9 m____.____._ ________
l 13 MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
^
l l
ECE l l l TYPE OF DOC l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l l' CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS j.
- i. l_ UNIT I DATE I OR EVENT I OR TITLE I SYSTEM IMPACTS _l l l l l l l 3 l l08/10/82l NCR PC-4382 l 3" Check Valve Cont. l Work performed-to closel l l l NCR PC-4383 l Isolation 1
l out DER 82-33. l 1 I i l l 1 l11/06/81l NCR NA-586 l l CA-Pr Reg. Valve CH-831l N 2 PRV cannot meet l l l l l l design pressure l l l l l l DER 81-44 l l 1 I I I i 1 I I i
l
- 9 O
O B-10
Upi '" ; , i
$ 2 J
13-MS-A20
.r COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS-
,K m i I
-l l TYPE 0F DOC-l ' DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION' l. CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS [
j' ITEM I OR' EVENT I' OR TITLE 'I SYSTEM IMPACTS -l-l 1 -I -
l- .
l.
l . U2 l'DCP l Alarm settings were- l Vill. enhance the r l'
-l 2SJ-IA-055- l lowered for.
l- l reliability and avail-1l-l U3. l.3CJ-IA-055 l-differential pressure l ability of the IA: l -.
l for IA prefilters and j system by facilitating l
-l -l l l 'l afterfilters. l. timely detection ot' l ll 1 .l- l l filter clogging and- . l.
.l' l l. I prevent pressure- drop . l
'l - l ~! -
1: .1 lU1, U2l DCP .. l Faulty operation of- l Will' enhance CA l T .l &'U3l 1SJ/2SJ/3CJ-l programmable controller l system reliability. 'l
.l l CA-022; l in the Panel J-CA'i-E01 l
-l 1 l l .l due to overheating. .l. l l- l l I l
.lUl, U2l DCP. l Change valve PCV-023, l The. change was made to l--
l & U3l 10J/2SJ/3CJ-l 024 and 025 from hard l stop leakaSe of l
.l l CA-025 l seat and plug to soft l nitrogen gas past .l
-l l l seat and plug. l these valves. !.
I I I I l-lUl, U2l DCP l Drains for removal of l 1" drain lines were. l
-l l 1CP-IA 005 l condensate. l added to remove' con- l l l 2CP IA-005 l l densate from air l l l l l compressor discharge .]
l l l l P i ping. l
~-
l lUl, U2l DCP I I I l' l Added instrumentation. l For nitrogen backup, l
.l & U3l 1SJ/2CJ/3CJ-l l control valves were l l l -IA-023 l l added. l 1 I I I I I l lUl, U2l DCP l The regulation air and l Instrument air l I l & U3l 1SM/2CM/3CM-l control air was piped l compressor control air l l l IA-044 l from a point upstream l and regulation supply [
l l l of the air dryers l air lines were repiped l l l l which caused moisture l from downstream of the l
- l l l collection. l air dryers. l I I - 1 I l-l U1 & l 1SM/3CM-IA- l' Replace purge air ball l The ball check valve l l U3 l 051 l check valves with l required much higher DPl l l l swing check valve. l for full opening and l
' l l l. l were not suitable for l l l l l the service. l l 1 I I I B-11
_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - _ ____a
w y 4
a l
'13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 1:1!2D i
'l . l l TYPE OF. DOC- l- DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION - l- - CONCLUSIONS /COFDIENTS _ [-
-l UNIT I DATE I--OR EVENT I 'OR TITLE I SYSTEM IStPACTS l 1:- 1 I .1 +
I- -l 13 l l08/08/87l 1,2,3-SM GA'l GA Sys Setpoint' changes l Revise:setpoints for. l l l l'001 l l PSV-80 and PSE-147. j' l- I .
l- .
l I- 1 l 13 l10/31/87l 1,2,3-SM-IA l Moisture problem in IA l_ Installed a' permanent- l-
~
-j l l 003. l lines. l moisture' filter in the-l
_' l . l l~ .l-l IA line to MSSS. l-1 23 I I .
. l l01/12/88l 1,2,3-SM-IA l IA line excessive
- l- . .I l l' Installed. test- l_ y l_ l l 004 l moisture and vibration.l connection on e'ach l- l l' l .] l 'l-IA dryer to monitor l l l l l :l performance. .l l l l l. -l' Installed intake _. _l l l .l l l silencers on each. .l
.l l -l l . l IA compressor. ;l.
I I l -
1 I .I l 13 l12/08/87l 1,2,3 SM-IA l Compressor loads l Provide separate po*'er l j_005 l l; l resulting in nuisance .l supply to Breathing l l: .. l . l -l alarm actuation in .l Air'CO & 02 mo'itors.n l l l l l l control room. l l [
l l l 1- .
I 1 i
-l. 13 l12/24/87l 1,2,3-SM-IA l Improve reliability of l Add local compressed l l j. l 007 l air supply to SG no:::lel N2 backup and pressure l l l l l dams, j' alarms to air supply. l l 1 I I I l'
.l 13 l04/20/88l11,2,3-SM-IA l Improve reliability of l Add backup N 2 supply, j l l l 008 l air supply to fuel pooll alarms, and_ panel. l l ] l l gate seals. l l l l l l .I I l t i i I l
?:
L .
B-12
13 MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS f.PQ
^) l l TYPE OF DOC'! DOCUMEST DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS j_
l UNIT f DATE I OR EVENT I OR TITLE I SYSTE'i IMPACTS l l 1 l l 1 1 1 13 l03/08/88l SDCN A00795 l Use of stem globe ] Extended stem globe l l l l (M104-55) l valves in N2 system. l valves may'be used overl !
l l l l l standard stem globa l l l l l l valves, j l I l l 1 13 l l [07/30/84l SDCN 1250 l Air Dryer Cam Timer l Change factory set- l l [ [ (M104-8) l Settings. l points. ]
1 I I i i I l 13 l07/30/841 SDCN 1251 l Air Dryer Cam Timer l Change factory set- l
[ [ l (M050-52) l Settings. l pointa. ]
1 1 I I I I 13 l12/14/84l SDCN 2541 l l Discharge PS relocation l Location prevents l
[ [ j (M050-52) l at air compressor. l actuation on high l l l l l l discharge pressure. [
l i I I I 13 I
] l11/06/85] SDCN 5114 l Compressor Maintenance ] Routine maintenance [
f l l l (M050-11) l Information revised. l information added. l
( l 13 I I I I l l l10/14/87l SDCN 8938 l Liquid Nitrogen System l LP Header setpoint l l l l (M104-55) l Instr. Manual Changes. I changes. l l 1 I I I I l 13 l10/14/871 SCDN 8939 l Liquid Nitrogen H and Ll PSV 80 and PSE-147 l l [ [ (M104-1) { setpoint changes. l Letpoi'nt changes, j i i i i i 1 l 1 i i
_l
)
l ' !
i B-13
) j J
P.
13-MS.-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
-f.
y
' l' l l TYPE OF D0'C' l' DOC 1' MENT ')ESCRIPTION : ]. CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS.-l l_ITI'M i DATE I -OR EVENT l OR TITLE 'I ~ SYSTEM IMPACTS f
l i -l- 1 I
l 1. 102/18/82l EER I
=l How long can the I l'
.l NitrogenLsystem can , l :- i l l l 82-IA 004 Lj nitrogen system supply l supply IA system loads?l; a-
.l: l ) 'l the IA loads-during- l for one hour. . ,
l l l .l normal plant operation.l Reference Bechtel'
'[.
l l
.l2 l
l
] l 1etter to.ANPP dated j 1 l
l' l .l l 5-13-80. 1:
2.
l l l' l - ?!
l l07/20/84l'.EER l Nitrogen backup'to l No nitrogen.back up forl l l. l 84-1A-003 l instrument air and l service air which may l ;
l l .l -l plant service to be . l be used for breathing l.
l .' l
.l j..
l l removed because of the l air. Tie between- :l'
.j l l need for breathing air.l service air and l-l- l l -l nitrogen system was l, l l-l l -
l removed by DCP-IA 062. .l-l l l l I 1 I l 3. 101/30/85l EER l Remove nitrogen backup l Service air for l-l.
l j.84-IA-006 l connection to l breathing air and use l-1.. l. l l l instrument and service l of portable co.r. pressor (.
.l. l j. l air. l during outages. 1
-l l l l l Nitrogen is a backup 1 l l l l l for instrument air -l l l. l l l system DCP IA-062
- j. l
. l l l l broke the tie-in. l 1 I i 1 I l 4. l10/19/84l EER j Excessive water in the l Engineering recommended l
.l l -- l l 84-IA-007 l IA system. l no action as.no l j l l 84-IA-008 l l l moisture was found. l l l l j j l l Engineering recommend.ed{ j l l l blowing down low l l l l l l point drains once per l .{
j j j l l l.24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. l .
i I I I I
- 5. I l l03/21/83l EER l Moisture in the air l Those valves were l l l l 83-IA 001 l system upstream of the l identified which were l l l l air dryer. !
l l to be kept fully. closed l '
l l l l l during periods when IA'l l l- .] l l compressor is not in 4 l
l l l l l operation.
l l l l I I
- 6. I l08/07/86l EER l l Instrument air system l As nitro 5en is a back- l l l l 86-IA-011 l capabilities are l up for instrument air l l l l l insufficient to l system, no diesel l
[ l l l l adequately insure safe l driven air compressors l
(., l l l l shutdown during l are justified. l l l l l prolonged blackouts. l l l- 1 I I I
l B-14 j
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS f.E3
'l l l TYPE OF D06 l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l ' CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS [
l ITEM I DATE I OR EVENT I OF TITLE I SYSTEM IMPACTS l l l l l [ I l 7. l01/06/83l EER l Instrumentation Air l Excessive moisture l
'l l . l 83-IA-002 l Compressor Unloader l collection control air [
l l l l Control Air Supply l lines going to the l l l l l l unloader causing l l l l l l operator problems. l l l l l l DCP IA-044 rerouted l l l l l l control air to down- l l l l l l stream of dryers to l l l l l l eliminate moisture l l l l l l problem. l l l l l 1 I l 8. l10/07/85l EER l During LOP, N2 tank l Determine the time l l l l 85-GA-013 l observed to be l available with various l l l l l decreasing at a rcpid l usaSe for liquid.N2 l l l l l rate. l levels. Detes;.ined [
l l l l l concerns with a check- J
( l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l valve (IAN V056) that l l could be restricting l flow. System Engineers l l
l l l l [ determined flow to be l l l l l l acceptable. Checkvalvel l l l l l would not be replaced l l l j l l due to funding l l l l l l problems. l I I I I !
l 4
L B-15
i 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS ms l l DOCUMENT. DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l l ITEM 1 OR TITLE I SYSTEM IMPACTS [
l l 1 l l 1. l PTRRs 1-85-006, 1 l PTRRs shew a rate of l l l 001, 1-86-007, and [ consumption of air l l l 1-88-004. l such the time span l l l l between the corepressor l l l l trip and to the l l l j nitrogen supply valve l l l l opening is anywhere l l l l from 2.5 to 3.5 l l l l minutes. The nitrogen l
] l l supply valve open l l l l signal in unit 3 was .l l l l received at 2 minutes l l l l 42 seconds into the [
l l l event,which is l l l l consistent with the l l l l previous PTRRs. [
l l I I l 2. [ PTRRs 1-86-001, 1 l 007, 1-88-004, and J PTRRs indicate that thel l l MSIV and the F'JIV l l l 2-86-004 l operated vi thout any l l l l apparent problems. l l l l MSIV and FVIV l l l l accumulators are l l l l normally charged and l l l l are maintained charged l l l l during the normal l l l l operation of the plant.l l l l The loss of IA header l l l l pressure does not l l l l result in loss of l l l l hydraulic charge and l l l l does not degrade the l l l l operation of the valves) l l l since it is only l l l l required to close once l l l l to fulfill its safety [
l l l function. l 1 I '
l Note 1. PTRR were reviewed for failure of air-operated valves after receipt of an ESFAS signal.
B 16
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION !.ND ANALYSIS C f.IfE l l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l
- j. ITEM I OR TITLE I SYSTEM IMPACTS l q l l I I i l 3. l PTRRs 1-85-004, 1 l PTRRs indicate that l j l l 005, 1-86-001, 1 l ADV were equired to l j l l 007, and 1-88-004. l operate to cool'the l l l l plant. The ADV -l 1 l l operation in all cases l.
l l l vas_ satisfactory. How-l l l- l ever, concerns were 'l l~ j l raised due to the l l l l sluggish response time l l l l of the ADVs. An obser-l l l l.vation of the data in l l l l PTRRs stated above showl l l l that the primary mode l l 1 l of for,ce for the ADV l l l l operation was the ADV l l l l nitrogen accumulators l l l l and not the IA l
~
l l l system. l l l . I I l- 4. l PTRRs 1-85-005 and l PTRRs indicate the l l l 1-85-006. l similar condition as l l l l identified in the unit l l l l 3 trip. The IA header l l l l pressure was reduced l l l l to approximately 65 l l j l psig while the system l l l l was on nitrogen backup.l l l l In both cases, the ADV l l l l operation was success- l l l l ful and no apparent l l l l safety related equip- l l l l ment failures were l l l l identified. The l l l l concern were identified]
l l l in the PTRR and the l
_ l l l resolution of the l l l l concern indicated l l l l
. l satisfactory operation l l l l of the IA system duringl l l l the plant trip. l I I I l ,
l
(
B-17
.-x--- --
i 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 1 'C P.O / SPECS / CORRESPONDS $CE
' l' l l TYPE OF DOC' l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS l l_ UNIT 1 DATE I OR EVENT I OR TITLE f SYSTEM TMPACTS l l l l 1 -
1 I l 13 l05/27/84l Letter B/ l Instrument Air bryer l Change factory settings l l .l l ANPP-E- l Adjustment (Spec. MM- l and change pre and l 1 -l l 116691 (MOC l 054). l after filter setpoints l l- l l 322116) l l from 20 to 5 PSFD. l 1 l l l l (Note 1) l 1 1 I I I I l 13 l12/05/83l Telex 391 l Incorrect prefilter andl vendor recommends l l l l (Ref. No. l afterfilter l reinstallation. l l l l 218218) l installation (Spec. l Operation of dryer willi l l l l MM-054) l be impaired if large l l l l l l amounts of water enter l l l l l l the system. [
l i I I I i l 13 l01/14/82l Letter B/ l FW Control Valve Besignl Instrument Air and l l l l ANPP-P-83800l (Spec. FJi-100) l Nitrogen Gas Valve l l l l l l usage discussed. No I
( l l
1 l
l 1
l 1
l l
1 l l system impact-design l INTO only.
I l
l I
l 13 l03/16/82l Letter'(Ref.l Safety Relief Valves inl Valves are incapable oft l l l No. 163117) l Nitrogen Supply System.l relieving over- l l 1 l l l Pressures. Use of l l l l l l rupture discs is l l l l l l recommended by vendor. l l l l l l (Note 2.) l l l 1 l I 1
Note 1. Implemented in DCPs 10J-IA-055, 2SJ-IA-055, 3CJ-IA 055.
- 2. Rupture Discs. installed per P&ID 13-M-GAP 002 I
l I
Cs I
L .
B-18
1 q,,
1 13 MS-A20' COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS SPEER /SP ,.e i
'I
. .3 i: -l l l TYPE OF DOC *l DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION l 1IE11_j. DATE - I OR EVENT- l' OR TITLE l ' CONCLUSIONS / COMMENTS I SYSTEM IMPACTS
-l' [
'{
- l. l' .l l l l l
I I l l l l-1 l01/07/88l SPEER No. l Inadvertent opening l This is a valve tubing l-l
] l' l 88-01-001 l of'an'MSIV due to l. problem and notlan.IA. l l l. l l air leakage:in the l System problem. [.
.l' l. , ], l solenoid piping and l l
- l. l l. l missing 0-rings in l l.
- l. l l l the air supply tubing l ' l' l l j. l to the valve l .{
l l l l solenoids. l l
.I I I l l .
l l- 2 l07/21/87l SP Number
~
.l l l- l to the air dryers, l the wrong position of l
] l l l l the solenoid valve. l l l l l l ' t.
- l f 1 '
i e
4 i
B-19 e l
13 MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS APPE: DIX C REFERE::CE MATERIAL ASSOCIATED.1;ITH THE NUCLEAR UTILITIES SURVEY e
g
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C.
.. -Bechtel Power Corporation.
Eng:neers - Construe: ors 100 0 N. 43rd Avenue Sune 1 I Glencale. AZ E53C2 .
TELErsoNE: (602)242 5500 o
TELEX: (602) 842-E526 EE/A'GP-1791 April 10,1989 Arizona Nuclear Pouer Project .
P. O. Box 52034 - Hail Station 7034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072 - 2034 Attention: Mr. E. C. Sterling Nuclear Engineering Manzger
Subject:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project Bechtel Job 18601 ANPP Master Agree:ent PYS6-10638 Jcb Orcer 264 Instrutenf Air Utility Survey
_T_ L l e : E.60.C2.6L
Dear F.r. Sterling:
Enclosed is the Final Report on the Utility Survey of Instrucent Air Design Bases and Practices. As requested.by H. Riley, the survey covers St. Lucie, Waterford and SONGS, the balance of the NEC Regien V plants, plus two others.
The survey data was collected over a period e" three days and ec: piled inte the enclosure. -
- The survey data was tabulated to facilitate ec=parison with other plants. A brief list of potential enhancements to the IA Systen was developed basec, in part, on infor:ation obtained during the survey.
If there are any questions, please contact ce at 842-8504.
Very truly yours, BECHTEL POKEPORATP3N
~W
. 4 w
' S. H. Freid {
Project Engineering Manager SEF:TCE:ph
Enclosure:
Finni Eeport on the Utility Survey of Instrument Air Design 3ases and ?raqi. ices
- cc:e. J. E. Allen w/ enc 1. M. F. HocEe W/20C1. A. N. Heward w/c enc 1.
O. E. Earner w/o enel. E. W. EileY W/ enc 1. J. N. Tench w/o enei.
s 13.MS-A20 APPE?iDIX C l
l l l p.,
\
~4$
l u,.-
. Arizona Nuclear Power Project Final Report on the Utility Survey of instrument Air Design Bases and Practices
.- c-
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for the
- - Palo Verde Nuclear. Generating Station April 1989
- )
Eecntel PAuer Corporation,10040 tJorth 43rd Avenue Suite 1-1, Glencale, A:85302 j (602) 842-8500 , FAX (602) 842-8526 j
13-MS A20 APPINDIX Cm L.
.; L -.-. ~
FINAL REPORT ON THE ' UTILITi' SURVEY
[
'OF INSTRUMENT AIR DESIGN BASES AND PRACTICES .
n TABLE OF CONTENTS -
Page Introduction '1 Scope- 1-Purpose 1 Nethodelegy 1 i Results , 2
-Potential Enhancements. 2 System Enhancements 2 Maintenance Enhancements . 3 Conclusion 4 Appendices Appendix A - Survey Questionnaire Appendix 3 - Utility Respenses to Survey en Instrument Air Appendix C - Utility Responses to Generic. Letter 88-14 Table Tabulation of Instrument Air Survey Results
/s % .
INTEANAL CONTACL NO.
18601 264 -
RIP'; 053 I
e n
- W
13-MS-A20-APPDTDIX C i.*
FINAL REPORT ON THE UTILITY SURVEY
. OF INSTRUMENT AIR DESIGN BASIS AND PRACTICIS
. -Introduction The' Instrument Air System (IAS) at nuclear power plants is typically a non-safety related system,. As such it is-considered related systems.
to be more vulnerable to failure than safety ~
Because of recent events at PVNGS Unit 3 and increased industry and NRC concern with the IAS, aPS is evaluatine -
ootions for' design modifications and fer' changes to cperating and maintenance procedures in order to =ake the IAS system more reliable.
this evaluation process.
This survey is designed to previde input fcr
-Secee The survey includes information on system design and maintenance practices.
. operations or training.
It does not centain information en ourcese The specific purposes'of this survey are as follcws: ,
o Understand the design approach and bases fer the Instru=ent Air Syste=s e= ployed-at other large .:WR nuclear power plants
- o. Learn of successful practices used by other plants that may be applied to Palo Verde o Avoid problem areas encountered by other utilities Methodoloev -
In systems order at to other obtainnuclear detailed powerinformation plants, a on the instrument questionnaire was air developed that includes 15 questions covering a broad scope of information on design, operations, and maintanence. This questionnaire is included in Appendix A.
Concurrent with the develcoment of the questionnaire, eight plants were chosen to be surveyed. Selection criteria,for
~
, these plants was based on the following: -
o Similar site and age C-E plants o NRC Region V plants o Availability of sources of information (e.g.,
contacts, P& ids, Systems Descriptions, respenscs to
( --
1 1
O
c 8
I l
\
. 13-MS.A20 AFFENDIX C l
Based on this selection criteria, the plants surveyed were: 4 o Diablo Canyon 4 o Rancho Seco
- o St. Lucie
o Vogtle The survey was largely performed on the telephone, although personnel involved in the survey also used P& ids, Systems Descriptions, UFSARs and other materials to gather infer ation where these sources were available. A copy of rescenses to Generic Letter 88-14 was also ebrained, when available, and used to supple =ent infer =ation gathered ever the telephone and frem plant documents.
Fesults Results of the survey are presented in Appeqdix 3 and are presented en the summary table included w_th this repert. In sc:e cases the individual (s) contacted for the survey did nc knew a carticular answer. This is indicated en the table as a cuestien mark. Accendix C centains copies of the responses to'G.L. SS-14 sub=i:ted by the plants in the survey. The G.L. 88-14 response for San Cnofre was not available.
Potential Inchancerents Eased on information gathered frc= the 8 plants surveyed, a number of design and maintenance enhancements to the IAS are ,
included for consideration. These are meant to be used fer developmental purposes only and are not final recc==encations.
System enhancements:
Suggested system enhancements include the following:
o De=enstrate capacity of nitrogen backup system o I= prove nitrogen backup system capability o Consider wiring one or more compressors to a 1E power source o Isolate non-vital IA loads in, event of low IA
, - header pressure o Increase dryer capacity o Add receivers downstream of the dryers to s=coth surge demand on the dryers 2
G
l13-?.5 A20 6 -
APPENDIX C f.
-~
Most plants provide only.one form of backup'for the IAS.
. Either they backup the entire instrument air system-(e.c., bv diesel-driven compressors or by 1E power to the comeressers)'
or they backup only components necessary for safe' shutdown i ,. ;vith'a local backup system (e.g., nitrecen or air bottles).
The PVNGS-design actually provides both'Lickup for entire
}
system and local backup for components required for safe .
shutdown. This~ design should be conservative.
l L Since, in spite of the conservatism,ca icwer^than exeected L pressure was observed in the IAS, it has been orcres'd e that- .
the nitrogen backup system be tested to ensure' that' it is capabic of providing a flow that is adecuate for the svstan' demand during an upset event. If the nitrecen systenfis ~
tested and found to be inadecuate for the actual urset
~ demands, consideration could'be given to providine'a 1E =cwer source for'one or more of the-cc= pressors, to providing h diesel-driven compressor for use when non-1E power is Icst, or to adding the capability to cut unnecessary leads, such as these in the yard area.
Also, since the nor=al IA dryer de=and is at the limit cf the PVNGS dryer capacity and'since an upset conditien may result in higher demands en the dryer and lead to higher dewpcints, it is suggested that consideration be give.T to increasing the dryer capacity. Also consideration shculd be given to adding additional receiver capacity downstream of the dryers to saccth:the surge' demand on the dryers.
Maintenance Enhancements:
Suggested maintenance enhancements include the follcwing:
o Develon-air cuality monitorine crecram Ivaluate adequacy of dryer fiiters for particulate
~ ~
o removal o Consider periodic inspection for check valves that provide isolatien between the IAS and backup air er nitrogen Most utilities are developing procedures to nonitor air cuality as a result of G.L. 88-14. This would include continuous ne'nitoring of dewpoint at the dryer outlets, and periodic monitoring.for particulate and hydrocarbons.
Some utilities have or are planning to replace their pre and or post filters to those with a lower micron rating to meet ISA-7.3. If PVNGS is not meeting the requirements of this
<, standard, this could be a consideration.
A number of plants have or are planning to initiate periodic-inspection programs for the check valves that provide isolation between the IAS and the backup air or nitrocen source. This includes both functionality tests and leak
. l
\. -
3 1
\.
e l
.1
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. 13-MS-A20 APNNDIX C testing andl appears to be done on an annual basis or at refueling outages.- These valves could be.added to the PVNGS Section XI program,-if they are not currently included.
Ce ne-lu.s ien l q
l The existing PVNGS design bases and practices appear to be ;i
. generally' consistent with the utilities surveyed. .However, i
!G.L. 88-14 has heightened industry awareness of the i vulnerabilities of the IA. system. For this reason, it is recommended that PVNGS evaluate the above suggestions to enhance the overall reliability of the IA system.
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-A20 APPE.iDIX C
[
APPENDIX A SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE P
9 i
C . .
9
m___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C Instrument Air Design Basis Questionnaire Utility Comparisen
Purpose:
Assist APS in understanding the design approach and bases for Instrument Air used in other large nuclear power plants.
To learn of successful practices used in other plants that may, be applied to Palo Verde.
To avoid problem areas encountered by others.
w
Contact:
Location:
Phone: ( )
Title:
- 1. Is the Instrument Air (IA) system dedicate'd to instru=ent air, or is it also used for other purpcses such as senice air, lab air r etc? Describe any. other uses.
- 3. Is the IA system er any portion of it safety related (i.e. "O")?
If so, describe the safety related interfaces and functiens.
Do any of these valves have IA or Nitrogen accu =ulators to
- cnsure their safety related function? Describe them and their accumulator gas source.
- 5. Do the IA cc= pressors have a backup svstem.
in the event cf a less of IA (e.g. liquid nitrogen with a vapori::er)? If so, what is it and how does it work? Is the backup "Q" ? What is the ,
air c.uality cf the backu.e suct.iv.?
. . obtain .ocrtion of svste: .
l description r.anual if possible via telecepy.
4
... 13-MS.A20
.., APPENDIX C Instrument Air: Design Basis Questionnaire Utility Cc=parison
- 6. Number _ capacity - and manufacturer o., AA compressors? -
Number and volume .of the air receivers?
Number capacity required dewpcint of the IA dryers?
Type of dryer (e.g. refrigerant, dessicant heatless or heated, ete.)
- 7. Does the dryer have prefilters and/or pest filters?. Describe-type of nedia and micron rating in each.
If filter regulaters are used, what type cf media and micron rating is cenerally used?
Are there any applications where finer filters er filter regula:crs are used? Describe these applications. Cascribe ch
' type of media and nieren rating fer each application.
Are there any other miscellaneous inline filters and/cr ==istur separaters installed in the IA system? What is their purpose?
What is the media and micron rating? .
i i
- 8. Describe the preventive maintenance prcgram applied to the dryers, filters, filter regulators, noisture sepparaters etc.
', described above. What is done and at what frequency to each item?
/ . !
- 9 l
l s l
u______________ . . _ . _ _ . . . - _ - .
.)
n
~ # .
- MS-A20
. APPENDIX C
' Instrument Air' Design Basis'. Questionnaire
~
Utility Cc=.carison 9.' For the dryers, : filters, : filter regulators etc described ' above,
.have there been-any problems?
4 Frequent change outs?'
High amount.of-corrective maintenance (1.e. malfunction or.
unexpected failures?
/
- 10. What air quality do ycu require and/cr achieve routinely? .How
, doesyour air c.uality cc= are to ISA'-7.3?J .
' Describe the air quality nonitoring prcgran you use? How'do you-
. determine the' quality? What-is the frequency?
'I
- d. Does noisture accu =ulate in the IA sysce=? Dees it present a
- problen?- How is it dealt with? (e.g. blewdcun,. traps, ncistureL separators, secondary dryers, etc)
.. 11. What materials are used in the IA system?
Piping and tubing Valves Vessels
Filter bodies -
s Other ? .
.ss . .
- 12. What is the IA design pressure? _ Normal operating' Pressure? Mini =um operating pressure?
~ 12. Is IA pressure and/or flow nenitored (periodica'ly er _
continuously)? If so, how is dene? Where? Ecw frequently?
9
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ ^ - ^
m.
- .13-MS A20
. .c . -
_ , - APPD? DIX C s
y
. Instrument" Air Design Basis Questi6naire-c D Utility ce=parison- .
w i
' ._/ -
- i. . ._
14.0What is th'e IA demand.(scf ) during nornall operation?
. ,. A f; _
. - During upset /abnor=cl conditions (e.g.1Lo?, MSIS, SIAS, A F A S ,.'
.etc)-?
~ '
m; ,
g What isjthe. source of the data (e.g. calculations,.'operatin~
~
~
. measurements, etc)? ' Describe it.
4
- Has there been any correlation of-IA de=and/consu=ption data
- obtained from plant tests, upsets er trips to the " design basis"-
- or normal.or_ expected upset.IA. demand?: Describe it.
L- .15 . Characterize the utility's'respense'to !&E Bulletin'88-14.;
, Su==arire actions taken'and cen=itzents made. What is the schedule for future actions.and cc= i:=ents? .
e 4
- 9 4
v e
e P
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1 l ,
} A3*MS A20 f
n APPENDIX *: i
. '(
1 APPENDlX e
. UTILITY RESPONSES TO SURVEY ON INSTRUMENT AlR
(
dp e
9 e
-- - - - - - - - ~ _ _ _ _
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AN9 ANALYSIS The dewpoint values are corrected to accomodate for actual system pressure (125 psig) since actual readings were taken at atmospheric pressure. The average particle size was calcuated by adding the number of each size particles, and dividing by the total number of particles in their respective size ratio.
Dewpoint .
The instrument air subsystem is provided with two desiccant-type dryers with dual towers (see Section II). Each dryer is rated for an outlet flow of 400 sefm of air with a de .r point of- -40*F at system design pressure. Test values show an average dew point of
-80*F, at system design pressure (125 psig) with an average flow of 301 sefm. The test also indicates a dew point of -85'F at the highest recorded value for it.s trumen t air demand of 390 scfm (February 24, 1989). Therefore, the CG dryers meet the design basis under normal operation.
Oil Content The instrument air subsystem is designed to provide a continuous supply of filtered, dry, oil-free compressed air for pneumatic instruments. It has been established per the test results that g instrument air meets the filtration and dew point (dry) levels as 1
' described in the design basis. Since specific values for oil content are not part of the design basis, ISA-S7.3-1975 " Quality Standard for Instrument Air" was used as. a guideline for the determination of the oil content. This standard indicates the acceptable oil content per weight (w) or volume (v) ratios as:
OIL CONTENT - as close to zero (0) w/w or v/v as possible; and under no circumstances shall it exceed one (1) ppm w/w or v/v under normal operating conditions One (1) ppm was the highest reading recorded during the test, I occurring only once on February 13, 1989. As shown in the test summary, the average oil content of .03 ppm. is below the 1 ppm noted in the ISA standard.
Particle Size The filter efficiency is a ratio of the particles present upstream
> of the filter to the particles that remain downstream of the filter. Filter efficiencies are usually expressed for a variety of particle sizes. For example, a one micron numerically rated filter may remove 97 percent of all one micron sized particles present in the filtered medium. The same filter may remove 99 percent of all three micron and larger sized particles and only 95 percent of all one-half micron' sized particle's in the filtered medium. Therefore,
( a 99% rated filter may pass some particles greater than 3 microns
( but will remeve these larger particles at a greater efficiency (i.e., 99.9% for example). i l
n - _ _ . _ _ _ - _ . - - - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ -
V
.O 13-MS-A20-COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS'
- +
Two airfilters are provided downstream of the' air dryers which have 999 E 94A' removal efficiency for particles 1 micron. and -larger. Test data . indicates that only two . particles- 15 microns in site were found'and no particles greater than 15 microns were encountered in?
25 measurements ~taken in 10 days during-the test. ' Additionally test data summary shows an average particle size of .65.: microns in' the. air , stream . downstream of the airfilters. Therefore,. design-basis of the afterfilters of 97% removal. efficiency. for' particles 25 microns or greater has been .et- m since 1 micron filters are-installed. However, based on ISA-S7.3-1975. PVNGS ' air- quality guideline, afterfilter cartridges. rated for 0.45 microns 99.98%
efficient will be installed before restart to further increase-filtration efficiency.
Additionally, filter / moisture separators were installed in the IA~
line to the MSSS by S-Mod IA-003. This filter / separator provides additional air ' filtration to the safety related equipment (i.e.,
MSIV, WIV , and ADV valves) located in this building. -The filter / moisture separators are 99.9% efficient and .can remove particles as small as 0.01 microns. Note that a filter / separators have now been installed in all Units.
ii. Normal and Transient System Loads Instrument air demand flows for normal and transient modes' were made in calculation number 13-MC-IA-301. The normal instrument air demand is estimated to be. 400 scfm; the transient air demand is estimated to be 884 sefm.
Normal System Loads ~
The CGS is designed to maintain clean and dry air for an , estimated:
normal load of 400 scfm in accordance with the design basis Table
- 2. Test data from rhe air quality test in Unit 2 show system perform:ua exceraing design requirements at an average flow of 301 scfm. The test also showed that the system air quality exceeded
, the' design requirements at the highest recorded flow of 390 scfm during the test. Therefore, the system meets the required air quality at the normal load (400 scfm).
. Transient System Loads
' The increase in air demand to 884 scfm during the transient condition takes into account the air consumption in the MSSS increasing from 45 sefm to 529 scfm. This is due primarily as a result of the vendor specified maximum at 56 scfm 80 to 100 psig required by each of the four MSIVs and the four WIVs immediately after the unit is tripped. However, at lower air pressure and higher hydraulic pressure, within the valve components, air consumption will be reduced proportionally. Refer to Section IV,.E for description of valve operation.
-28
f 13-MS A20-
^
' COMPRESSED CAS' SYSTEM EVALUATION'AND ANALYSIS !
A maximum estimate 'of transient duration time due to MSIV and WIV recharging is.19 minutes. This is derived the WIV :
(worst case) hydraulic actuator cylinder volume by dividing,3)
(1805-in by the:
rate of discharge (97 in 3/ min.),for the~ hydraulic pump ~with an 80-1 psig air supply.
As shown by the test results. the system can adequately meet thel normal air demand of 400 scfm. For the maximum estimated transient. ,!
load ofL 884 sefm, the following parameeers,are listed in order to determine if instrument air subsystem can'still' meet design basis:
~
Compressors - 500 sefm each at 125 psig- total' for three (3) , is 1500 sefm per calculation number 13-MC-IA-205 Dryers -- Each dryer rated at 400 scfm at -40'F dev point, 2 total; however only one (1) used at a time, total flow 400 scfm (calculation number 13-MC-IA-206)
Afterfilter - One per dryer: rated 400 sefm; 25 microns at 97%
efficiency IA Header - Main header capacity is sited to carry about 1000 scfm capacity per calculation number 13-MC-IA.300
~
From' the above information it can be observed that the IA header and compressor can easily handle estimated transient flow of. 884 scfm. However, the dryers and the afterfilters would experience flow greater than twice their capacity for short transient periods (19 minutes).
At the _ transient flow of 884 scfm, the afterfilter can still. meet its desi5 n efficiency of :9% for 1 micron rating .but with an-increase in pressure drop. ~
Afterfilter manufacturer (Filterite) and dryer manufacturer (C. M.
Kemp) were contacted for expected equipment performance at transient conditions.
Filterite stated that the rated filtration can still be met by the afterfilter but with an increased pressure drop. Filterite calculated a pressure drop of about 3 psid for the afterfilter at a 1000 scfm flow with a 0.2 micron rated cartridge. (Per Telex Filterige to APS dated April 13, 1989). For a .4 micron filter,
. this pressure drop would be less. The 3 psid is less than the 9.77 psid used in . Calculation 13-MC-IA-301. Therefore, afterfilter performance during a transient is acceptable.
i It is unlikely that the dryers will be able to maintain a dew point of -40'F at 884 scfm. As was observed from the Unit 2 results,
( there is a built in margin in the dryers since the average dew
( point was at -80*F for 301 sefm average flow. Additionally, ISA-S7.3-1975 " Quality Standard for Instrument Air" states dew point requirements as follows:
13-MS-A20
. CCMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS Dew Point - The dew point shall be at least 18'F below the minimum temperature to which instrument air subsystem is exposed at system pressure.
C. M. Kemp, dryer manufacturer indicated that heatless desiccant dryers will experience " moisture breakthrough" when airflow exceeds the dryer's rated capacity (per conversation memorandum dated 4/26/89, File No. 89-175-419.M054). The dew point will rise from its steady state value and may take several days to recover. Based on the calculation parameters and assuming several events a year, C. M. Kemp Co. does not believe that the dew point will rise significantly above its normal flow value. PVNGS has a preventative maintenance task to replace desicant yearly.
Therefore, dryer performance during a transient is acceptable.
To be conservative, after a moisture breakthrough occurs, the desiccant in the affected dryer should be replaced. This can be done by isolating affected dryer and switching flow to standby dryer. Saturated desicr. ant can then be replaced by following approved maintenance procedures.
Based on this review, it is concluded that the instrument air subsystem can meet instrument air plant demand during normal and transient conditions.
. nitrogen supply valve PV-52 opens to introduce nitrogen inte the system header.
Calculation 13-MC-GA-207 has identified normal and upset. conditions pressure drops at the low pressure nitrogen supply interface to the 3" Turbine Building instrument air header. The upset condition initially considered a 1 psid pressure drop across spring loaded check valve IAN-V056. It was later determined that installed valve spring has a 24.2 pound cracking pressure. This force equates to an actual pressure drop across valve of 18.6 psid. For documentation on this matter, refer to BECHTEL-CONVAL letter
,, BE/CO-1805 dated 04/13/89.
Findings in Appendix B (historical research) indicate that CONVAL, the supplier for this check valve, recommended a replacement for the subject valve as its pressure drop was considered high (Ref.
EER 85-CA-013). The valve spring was not changed at that time since the system operation was deemed acceptable and funding was not available to change the spring (see Appendix B).
1-
- - = - _ _ _.
=g .l.,'
,r L
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS' Calculated pressure drops,: with a l'psid and 18.6 paid across .valveL IAN-V056, will be~ tabulated for. comparison. ,The pressure drop vs.
flow rates are shown below.
I I i 1: , .
1 l FLOW (SCFM): l PRESSURE DROP. l PRESSURE DROP OF- l l l WITH 1 psid. 'l ,18.6 psid ACROSS {L l f ACROSS TAN-VOS6 1 'IAN-V056 l 'l_
I l- 400. 5.55 I l' 1 l' 24.15 l.
I l-l 700 1- 16.84 I
I
.l.
3 5 .~44
.l. I i l
1 l 1000 1 34.34 I 52.84 j.
The increased pressure drop was obtained by. the additional losses at the higher cracking pressure .of 18.6 psid. -.This provides.a-close approximation of the pressure" drops for.the flows indicated.
A-nitrogen subsystem pressure 'of - 100 psig was assumed -in calculation 13-MC CA-207. This pressure can be adjusted up or'down to reflect variations in system pressure corresponding ,to. the adj us tment.
Calculation results' of '100 psig nitrogen subsystem pressure show 'the available pressure. at the.
instrument air interface with. the previous calculated pressure drop at 400, 700,-
and 1000 scfm flows. The resulting pressures at the instrument ~a ir -
header are tabulated as follows:
l FLOW RATE l PRESSURE l PRESSURE l l (SCFM) f (UTTH 1 PSID) I (UITH 18. 6 PSID) l l l 1 400 I l 1 94 45 l 75.85 l 1 I l 700 I-l I 83.16 I 64.56 l l 1 l 1000 t 65.76 I l I 47.16 [
Review of the above data indicates that at flow rates of 400 and 700 scfm, with I psid across valve IAN-V056, the minimum design pressure of 80 psig can be maintained. It is only at the highest fe flow of 1000 scfm that the system- pressure falls to nearly 65 psig. Plotting the above points pr> duces a curve which intersects at the interface point for the transient flow rate of 884 scfm at about 73 psig. Using actual low p ressure regulator setting of 115 psig as the nitrogen subsystem pressure with 1 psid for IAN-V056, results in an available interface . pressure of 109.45, 98.16 and 80.76 psig for flows of 400, 700, and 1000 scfm respectively.
- o. 7 ...m ur
$U! '
113-MS-A20.
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS C
In the actual' configurati~n, e ' corresponding to :the low'. pressure regulator. setting ': of '115 psig and 18.6 psid across valve I AN-V056,;
the nitrogenfsubsystem .can supply ' plant pneumatic: demands. nnly
~during . normal operation. Ac.700 and 1000 scfm' flows, the minimum R80 psig'for pneumatic'needs is not maintained. Plotting a parallel' curve -to,.
previous subsystem ' configurations, a'69'psig available pressure' at the instrument" air is. obtained 'at the transient flow : of 884'scfm in' actual: subsystem configuration.
In- the above: configuration, .the 69 psig pressure approachesthe reported. instrument air header pressure of 65 during the Unit' 3-event.
=However,. the plant demand during. the trip has beeni estimated substantially below transient flow ;of 884 scfm. . Plant 1
demand-is ' believed to be closer, to 400 scfm (see Section IV).
- Based on the'above information, it is recommended that a flow test' be performed co evaluate actual N2 L' performance. to verify actual-
- system pressure drop.
It- is also ' recommended . that spring in valve IAN-V056 be replaced with a spring corresponding to 1 psid or lower. Additionally, the low pressure regulator' setting should be' changed from 115 psig to
. 125 psig to provide for higher nitrogen. subsystem . pressure. For further details refer to Action Plan Section VI.
9 G
- _-___:_=__-____] '
i j- 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS S'.'9 TEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
- 5. . Comparison of ADVs to MSIVs/WIVs Due to the recent problems associated with the ADVs APS compared the ADVs to the MSIVs, and WIVs to determine if similar compressed gas problems could exist on these valves and to determine any additional preventative maintenance that should be performed on these valves. A comparison of the valves' safety functions, compress,ed air functions and affects of air quality on equipment is presented in Tables 7, 8. and 9.
The WIVa and MSIVs have similar designs. The only significant design differences,between the two are the valve sizes and the redundant control system on the MSIVs. The WIVs achieve redundancy by using two valves in series. The desi5 n concepts used for the compressed gas components in these valves are identical. Below is a comparison summary of the valves.
1 l i I l l ADV I WT" /S T'? l ;
I I I I l 1. Valve Type l Offset globe-used for steam -l Double disk wedge-used l l l flow modulation l for isolation. l l 1 1 I l 2. Safety Function l Used during plant cooldown l Used one time only in l l l for extended periods to l response to a MSIS for l l l remove heat from the steam l system isolation. l
-l l generators if the condenser l Valves must reposition l l l is not available. l from fully open to fully!
l l l closed in 4.5 seconds l l l l for MSIVs and 9.6 for l l l l WIVs. l l l 1 I l 3. Actuating l Pneumatic - Uses compressed l Hydraulic - Uses a l l System l air to actuate the valve with l hydraulic system to l l l a safety related high pressure l actuate the valve. l l l nitrogen filled accumulator l Compressed air is l l l as a backup. The nitrogen j required to actuate l l l accumulator pressure is l solenoids which in l l l monitored to ensure valve l turn allows the l l l operability. A t. fety relatedl hydraulic system l
l l check valve betwesn the l to actuate the valve. l l l compressed gas mud nitrogen l A safety related check l l l backup is used to make the l valve is used to make l
% l l class break from non-safety l the clasip break from l l l related to safety related. l non safety related to l l l Refer to Figure 3 and 4. l safety related. Refer l l l l to Figure 3, 5, and 6. l l 1 I l
C
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13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS f
C :
l i
l l l !
l f ADV I WIV/MSIV l 1 l l -
l l 4. Safety-Related l The spring-loaded check valves l Check valves have been l l Check Valves l that form the barrier between l replaced under DCP's 1, l l l nitrogen and instrument air l 2, 3 FM-SG-151 to ensurel l l were tested by bleeding down l gradual loss of l l l the instrument air and meas- l compressed air. J
-l l uring the backleakage. For l Reference IE Notice l l l Units 1 and 2 (Dresser-Hancocki 85-35. l l l valves), the backleakage was l l l l below the design leak rate. l l l l The APS leak rate test resultsl l l l were confirmed with vendor l l l l test data. The Unit 3 valves'! l l l (Kerotest) leakage was higher l l l l than the Unit 1 and 2 valves. l l l l The Unit 3 valve seats will bel l l l relapped or replaced prior to l l l l restart. Leakage for an off l l l l the shelf Kerotest valve was l l l l measured by bench test and l l l l found to be acceptable, l l C l l (Ref. Appendix F) therefore, l l l l rework of the installed Unit 3l l l l valves will provide an accept-l l l l able seal. Depending on the l l l l test results and a study of l l l l the nitrogen subsystem for thel l l l ADVs, change to a soft seat j l l l check valves will be . l l l l considert" to provide a l l ,
l l tighter seal. l l l l .
I i l l These valves will now be l l l l included in the ASME Section l [
l l XI leakage testing program. l l l l The leak rate under gradual l l l l loss of instrument air will l l l l be measured on a regular l l l l basis. l l g i I I 9 I L
13-MS A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS Description of MSIV and FWIV Operation To fast close the MSIVs and FWIVs, a signal is sent to select pilot solenoid valves that reposition the 4 vay shuttle valves to direct hydraulic fluid into the top of the cylinder and vent the bottom. The fluid is charged in the hydraulic accumulators and is maintained at approximately 5200 psig to ensure sufficient stored energy to fast close the MSIV and FWIV Figures 5 and 6.
The slow open and close modes are non safety related. Select pilot solenoid valves are required to position the 4 way shuttle valves that allow hydraulic fluid to be pumped from the reservoir into the actuator cylinder. The high pressure hydraulic fluid is not used for the slow positioning' modes.
Analysis of the MSIVs and FWIVs for Compressed Gas Problems An analysis was performed on the MSIVs and FWIVs to determine if compressed gas system problems (low air pressure, cirt, moisture) could compromise the valves safety function. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 10. The actions that should be taken from this analysis are f- 1. perform periodic leak cbacks of the valves' pneumatic
( fittings,
- 2. perform periodic compressed air quality tests at the outlet from the instrument air subsystem dryers,
- 3. perform a leak rate vesiculation to ensure that the pneumatic accumulators are sized properly.
Sa
4 f ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT e
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- -13 MS-A20 r . COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION-AND ANALYSIS-
- c ,r TABLE 7
' MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE-
- b
- ! l'. -COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
- Main'St'eam Isolation Valves-J[
l .
l-l '2. : COMPONENT TAG NUMBERS: 13JSGEUV170, 13JSCEUV171 ,l L l- 13JSGEUV180, 13JSCEUV181 l
1 .
.I
- 03. COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION: Valves are required to close in response- l ll response to a Main Steam Isolation Signal. .
-j
' l'- .
4 .. ' INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM FUNCTION: -l.
-l
" l
'l . .
l l A. Provide'an air supply to the safety related air accumulato.s ll l whileLin turn actuates the safety related solenoids acting as -l l pilots for the valv's hydraulic actuator.- .l 1
I
.l B. Provide the motive force fer the air operated hydraulic pumps. j' l 'l-1 5. INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM CHALLENCES TO COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION: ~l
'l l-l These valves are designed to operate under a loss of the instrument. l l- air subsystem. Each MSIV has 2 separate afast close" actuators; .l l each having one. safety related. air accumulator that supplies 1 air to [.
l four solenoid valves which are' used to control the valve's hydraulic l l actuator. The MSIV's pneumatic system is isolated from the instrument j' .
l air system by safety related check valves. The MSIV's safety related l l " fast close" function is maintained by two nitrogen charged l-l accumulators in the hydraulic portion of the valve, see Figure 6. 'l 1 l l A loss of the instrument air subsystem will render the MSIVs hydraulic.]
l pressurizing pump inoperable. The pumps functions are to: l l 1) repressurize the MSIV hydraulic system after the MSIV has either l l opened or closed; or 2) Open and close the MSIV in the " slow" mode. l l Both these functions are non-safety related.
l L
i I l Contamination in the instrument air subsystem could plug the MSIVs in l
-l line filter. Loss of the. instrument air subsystem does not compromise l
. ,3, l the MSIV's safety function. Water in the instrument air subsystem l l could affect the filter, regulators, check valves, or solenoids and l l cause the MSIV to not operate properly. [
l I p
- _.L^_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
L 1
l'
.13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS TABLE 8 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE I
- 1. l l
. 'l COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Feedwater Isolation Valves 'j
- 2. l' l COMPONENT TAG NUMBERS: 13JSGAUV0174, 13JSCAUV0177 l-
. l 13JSCBUV0132, 13JSGBUV0137 I l'
- 3. l-l COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION: Valves close in response to an MSIS.
1 l
~ .
l 4 I INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM FUNCTION:
I .
l.
1.
l- A.
Provide an air supply to the safety related air, accumulators which-l.
l- in turn actuates the safety related solenoids. acting as pilots'for l l the valve's hydraulic actuators.
l
.l B. l~
l Provide the motive force for the air operated hydraulic pump. l l
- 5. l l
INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM CHALLENGES TO COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION: l-l- ~These valves are designed to operate under a loss of the instrument l l- air. The four pilot solenoids, used to control the WIV's hydraulic l l actuator, are supplied with air from a safety related accumulator. Thel
] W1V's pneumatic system is isolated from the IA cystem by safety l l related check valves. The WIV's safety related fast close" function l l is maintained by a nitrogen charged accumulator in the hydraulic l l portion of the WIV, see Figure 5.
l I -
- I l A loss of the instrument air subsystem will render the WIV's hydraulic]
l pressuri::ing pump inoperable. The pump's functions are to: l l 1) repressurice the WIV hydraulic system after the WIV has either l l opened or closed; or 2) open and close the WIV in the " slow" mode. l l Both these functions are non-safety related.
l l
l l Contamination in the instrument air subsystem could plug the WIV's in l l line filter. Loss of instrument air subsystem does not compromise l l the WIV's safety function. Water in the instrument air system could l l affect the filter, regulators, check valves, or solenoids and cause thel
, l WIV to not operate properly.
' l I
I l
C_--___-------- '
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND. ANALYSIS TABLE 9 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE 4
1 l
l 1. COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Atmospheric Dump Valves l 1
l 2. COMPONENT TAC NUMBERS: 13JSCAHV0179, 13JSCAHV0184 l'
l l 13JSCBHV0178, 13JSCBHV0185
.l 1
I l 3. COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION: Provides a means of removing decay heat l l from the NSSS when the condenser is net available, or after MSIS. l 1
l l 4 INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM FUNCTION: l l
l l The valve is designed to open and modulate in response to varying l l instrument air control pressures and dedicated nitrogen accumulators l l will provide motive force during loss of the instrument air l l subsystem. l I
1 l S. INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM CHALLENCES TO COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION: l l The valve is designed to operate after loss of the instrument air 1 i subsystem. When the air pressure reduces in the supply line, a !
[ dedicated safety related nitrogen accumulator supplies the required l l motive force to operate the valve, See Figure 3 and 4. {
l 1 l Contamination in the air supply could plug the valves' in line filter, j l Loss of air does not compromise the valves safety function. Water in l l the instrument air system could affect the filter, check valves, 1 l positioner, I/P converters or solenoids and cause the valve not to l l operate properly.
l l_ 1 l
l l
b 41-
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS TABLE 10 FAILURE ANALYSIS OF MSIVs AND FWIVS e '
I I I l Postulated Problem i Solutions / Corrective Actions l 1
1 I
l 1. Air components could be degraded. l la. Coalescent air filters (.01 by moisture or dirt in the line. l l j micron) have been installed on l l (NPRDS data indicate this is a j the MSSS line to reduce moisture l l common problem for steam and l and particle carryover to these l l feedvater isolation valves). l components. l l 1 l
l l lb. Ensure air quality from the l
} l Instrument air dryers through l l l regularly scheduled surveillance l l l and preventative maintenance. l l l '
1
] 2. Leaks in pneumatic system. l 2a. Air reservoir has a low l l (PVNCS has experienced leaks l pressure switch that alarms whenl l on MSIV's and ADV's as evidenced l the pressure falls belov 70 16 l l in failure data trending reports, j psig. l l Also, NPRDS data list several l l l examples' relating to pneumatic l 2b. Quality class break check valves l l leakage on steam and feedwater l have been replaced per vecdor l l isolation valves). The l recommendation under DCP's 1, 2,l l accumulator reservoir may not be l 3 FM-SG-151 to ensure proper l l large enough for proper solenoid l seating under gradual loss of l l action. l instrument air. l l l l
l l 2c. Failure Data Trending Reports l l l document many leaks on the l l l valves' pneumatic fittings. l l l Establish a program to l l ,
l periodically check for leaks andl
] l repair as nacessary. l 1 I I
l l 2d. The accumulator si::e has [
l l sufficient margin as noted in l l l the.PVNGS response to SOER
' l l 88-01. A pneumatic pressure vs.ll
- l l leak rate calculation will be l l l performed for the valve l
l l pneumatic system to determine l l l the valves functionality l l l including system leakage. l l 1 l
l l
l
-42 !
b
g;[-
! j' ,
,r
- tE7 1 1
- , i s r
- s. y .
, :13 MS-A20-5 -
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
+
l:, TABLE 10 l'
FAILURE ANALYSIS OF MSIVs AND IVIVS' e e (Continued) '
. . p. .
,1
-Postulated Problem l ! Solutions / Recommendations l' l'
,l. .
.l 3. Pneumatic' system'. pressure may not-l 3. . The valve l solenoids,.' air ~pressurej 4
- l
, j. be great enough to actuate l ' regulator. and air reservoir werel-solenoid valves, l 'l , supplied as an. integrated system-l.'
l l by the valve vendor. ..The low ]
?, l. l. " pressure' alarm is ' set at 70 6 l
-l l- psig. The valves require a l;-
'l l nominal 40. psi to shuttle- [?
j
-l ::(Ref:.IE 87-28); ,
'- l l '
-I 9
0 4
4 4
5
-*' j
L.
I )
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
- 6. ' Effects of Compressed Gas System Quality on Safety Related. Equipment-An evaluation was performed to determine.the effects of compressed gas quality. on ' safety -related.' equipment. - Safety . related -equipment that requires. compressed gas has been identified and tabulated in Tables 11 and 12. The equipment can be classified into two groups:
- a. ' Valves- that require a pneumatic supply to fulfill their safety functions. This group consists of ADVs, MSIVs and.-
FWIVs. These valves use a safety related check valve to I
isolate their safety related pneumatic supply from_non Jsafety related instrument air subsystem.
- b. Valves.'and dampers that do not require a pneumatic supply to
. fulfill their safety functions (fail safe under. a loss of compressed air) - this group comprises all other safety related valves and dampers that are not listed above.
NUREG 1275 Vol.-2 (Dec. 1987) documents events at various nuclear power.
. plants where contamination (particulate, moisture, and hydrocarbons) in the CGS has. been responsible for malfunctioning of control valve components. The components listed are E/P or I/P converters', solenoid air pilot valves, and valve air operators. This NUREG was used as a developmental reference for Information Notice 87-28 (Air System Problems.
at U.S. Light Water Reactors) and Generic Letter 88-14 (Instrument Air Supply Problems Affecting Safesty-Related Equipment).
Observations of excessive moisture in the instrument air lines have been documented'at PVNGS. Several EER's identify events where moisture has been observed in the instrument air lines. Site Mods 1,P. 3-SM-IA-003 installed coalescent filters in response to moisture found in the instrument air lines to the MSSS. Also, failure data trending records indicate that dirt has been found in the compressed gas lines. This is an industry problem as evidenced by a review of NPRDS data.
Until recently, APS did not have a program to monitor compressed gas quality. APS is now developing this program. Prior to testing in Unit 2, maintenance was performed on all significant compressed gas components tut were used in the test. Preliminary results of air quality tests in Unit 2 are good. Dew points of -58F at 125 prig line pressure, particulate contamination mainly less than 3 microns in size, and air.
with no measurable hydrocarbon content has been observed.
APS is using ISA S7.3-1975 (American National Standard Quality Standard for Instrument Air) as its compressed gas guideline. The ISA standard is referenced in ANS 59.3 (safety criteria for Control Air Systems).
j' ,.
a h4 l>
c, 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS APS is not concerned with the nitrogen gas subsystem quality since 99.9%-
pure nitrogen with:less than 5 ppm ' oxygen is utiliced and particulate measurements, after system. flushing, are . consistent with the current instrument air subsystem valves..
Since PVNGS has experienced moisture and dirt in the: compressed gas' -lines-the reliability of the compressed gas,could be'affectedi To -address this concern, PTRRs were reviewed for all'three PVNGS units.
With the possible exception of one occurrence, the instances where safetys related' pneumatic valves failed to fulfill their safety functions were-not related to dirt or moisture in the instrument air subsystem. One incidence; in another event, was caused by.the improper wiring of a. flow switch. The Unit 3 trip of March 1989, shows many, valves and one damper that appeared to not completely isolate on a CIAS, SIAS, and M515. . The cause of this event was'found to 'be- failure of the . Safety Equipment Status System. The operation of another valve: CH-507, was questioned'on this trip. The valve failed open which resulted in -damage- to a RCP' seal An.-evaluation determined that the valve operated per the current plant design on loss of instrument air. The present plant design- basis--
of this valve -(fail, open or fail closed on loss of instrument air) is currently being evaluated. The one case where particles may 'have-affected valve performance is with- respect to ADV 1JSGANV0179 on Trip 1-88-004. As of 4/22/89 the EER documenting this condition was _still 9=( open. Conversations with the SG system engineer revealed that the EER root cause will be indeterminant with dirt as a suspected cause. This could affect the valve's ability to operate. To eliminate these concerns a sampling program is being developed to determine if long term degradation of pneumatic components could occur.
As a result of the information prssented above, the following corrective.
actions will be taken: -
- a. Before restart of the three' PVNGS units, ensure that the compressed gas system maj or components (compressors, moisture separators, all drain . traps, receivers, air dryers, dryer pre-filters and after filters) receive preventative maintenance in Units 1 and 3. As a minimum, Maintenance procedures that were performed in Unit 2 prior to the air quality test should be completed for Unit 1 and 3 also,
- b. Monitor the air quality on all three units every three months for the first year to ensure that the ISA S7.3-1975 standards are G
maintained. After the first year, based on the test resulta, adj us t the monitoring schedule up or down as appropriate.
- c. Bef6re restart of PVNGS Unit 2, inspect selected Unit 2 valve pneumatic components for evidence of corrosion, contamination, or moisture. f I.f contamination is found analyze the material content.
Determine the hffect of the contamination or corrosion.
, ,p
. :+
S4, ,
ym g 13,MS-A20 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS- ,
h.:
- d. ' After restart of PVNGS Unit' 2, disassemble: a.. representative-
- p[(
sample, >
i I , Sr from.'all three'PVNGS units, pneumatic components to. ensure.
that the pneumatic components are clean. . Any. found; particles;' will
- be- analyzed for chemical' content. -If significant copper is present G3L in any an analysis of compressed' gas pipe sectins willLbe. performed-
.to determine. the extent of the problem within the' piping. . lf; considerable corrosion is seen, pipe flushing,'or .more, additional-filters will be evaluated for a corrective action.TheJamount ofL components to be. sampled will be, based on 95. percent' confidences U
that 95 percent of_the valves' pneumatic systems are' corrosion free and free of damaging particles.
- e. For continued monitoring, a . letter will ;be . issued: .to 'all
. Engineering Evaluations system engineersL and funic ~ maintenance managers.
document The letter will requires _that ..the Lsystem : engineers-moisture, any suspect pneumatic valve failures due to contamination',:
or corrosion.
Engineering Evaluations will L . record where-
- the event occurred containers for analysis.and save the contamination material in clear Also, the letter ~will ensure - that maintenance- is aware of -the: contamination concerns and initiates EER's when suspect materials are found in pneumatic components.
f TABLE 11 SAFETY RElATED PNEUMATIC EQUIPMENT TMAT REQUIRES A PNEUMATIC SUPPLY TO RTLILL ITS SAFETY FUNCTION I
I l JSCAHV 0179 SG 2 LN 2 ATM DMP VLV l l JSGAHV 0184 SG 1 LN 1 ATM DMP VLV l 1 JSCAUV 0174 SG-1 ECONO FW UPSTR ISOL l l JSGAUV 0177 SG 2 ECONO FW DWNSTR ISOL l l JSGBHV 0179 SG 1 LN 2 ATM DMP VLV l l JSGBHV 0185 SG 2 LN 1 ATM DMP VLV [
1 i
l JSGBUV 0132 SG 1 ECONO FW DWNSTR ISOL l i l JSGBUv 0137 SG 2 ECONO FW DWNSTR ISOL [
l JSCEUV 0170 SG 1 LN 1 MSIV l l JSCEUV 0171 SG 2 LN 1 MSIV l l JSGEUV 0180 SG 1 LN 2 MSIV l l JSGEUV 0181 SG 2 LN 2 MSIV l
.- 1
- I 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ I
l 13 MS-A20
' COMPRESSED.CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS-TABLE 12 SAFETY RELATED' PNEUMATIC EQUIPMENT THAT,DOES NOT-REQUIRE A PNEUMATIC SUPPLY TO FULFILL ITS SAFETY FUNCTION '
(fails safe.under loss of IA) '
- c. a I.. .
. . I-l JCHAHV '0507- ,RCP BLEED-OFF TO RDT j.
l JCHAUV 0506 RCP BLEED-OFF TO VCT' ISO l l JCHAUV 0516 ' LETDOWN TO REGEN HX CONT.ISOL l l JCHAW. 0560 . REACTOR DRAIN ~TNK OUTLET ISOL l l JCHAW 0580 MAKE UP.TO REACTOR DRAIN TK l l.JCHBUV '0505 RCP BLEED OFF TO VCT ISOL l l JCHBUV 0515 LETD0kW TO REGEN HX CONT ISOL l l JCHBW 0523 REGEN HX TO LETDOWN HX ISOL l l JCHBW 0561 REACTOR DRAIN TANK OUTLET ISOL l l: JCHEFV 0204- LETDOWN RAD MONITOR l
- l JCHEFV 0241 SEAL INJECTION TO RCP 1A l -
.l JCHEFV 0242 SEAL INJECTION TO RCP 1B l l.JCHEFV 0243 SEAL INJECTION TO RCP 2A l l JCHEFV 0244' SEAL INJECTION TO RCP 2B ,l l JCHEHV .0239 REGEN HX TO CHARGING LINE l l JCHEHV 0250 NITROGEN.TO PUR FILTER C l JCHEHV 0532 RWT TO BORIC ACID MU PUMPS l
l l JCHELV 0110P REGEN HX TO LETDOWN HX l l JCHELV 0110Q REGEN HX TO LETDOWN HX l l'JCHEPDV 0240 REGEN HX TO CHARGING LINE l j'JCHEPV 0201P LETDOWN BACK PRESS VLV l l JCHEPV 0201Q LETDOWN BACK PRESS VLV l l JCHEUV 0231P CHARGING PPS TO SEAL INJECT HX l l JCHEUV 0500 LETDOWN TO VCT/ PRE-HU IOX SELECTOR l l JCHEW 0520 ION EXCHANGER BYPASS l l JCHEW 0521 RAD MON & BORONOMETER BP l 1 JCHEUV 0565 PRE HOLDUP ION EXCHANGER INLET DIVERTER VLVl l JCHEUV 0566 CAS STRIPPER DIVERTER VALVE l l JCPAW 0004A CONTM PRG PWR-ACCESS ISO VLV l l JCPAUV 0004B CONTM PRC PWR-ACCESS 153 VLV l JCPEUV 0005A CONTM PRG PWR-ACCESS ISO VLV JCPBUV 0005B CONTM PRG PWR-ACCESS ISO VLV l JRCEPV 0100E PRZR SPRAY l l JRCEPV 0100F PRZR SPRAY l D l JRDBW 0024 EXT CONT ISOL VLV FR RW SUMP l l JSGAUV 0172 . SG DOWNCOMER FW ISOL VLV l l JSCAUV 0175 SG DOWNCOMER FW ISOL VLV l l JSCAW 0500P SG 1 UPSTM BLDWN ISOL l l JSCAUV 0500S SG 2 DWNSTM BLDWN ISOL l l JSGBUV 0130 SG DOWNCOMER FW ISOL VLV l l JSGBW 0135 SC DOWNCOMER W ISOL VLV l
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
-C.
TABLE 12 SAFETY RELATED PNEUMATIC EQUIPMENT THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE A PNEUMATIC SUPPLY TO FULFILL ITS SAFETY FUNCTION (falls safe under loss of IA)
- (Continued)
I I
l JSGBUV 0500Q- SG 1 DWNSTRM BLDW ISOL l l JSGBUV 0500R SG 2 UPSTM BLDWN ISOL l l JSCEUV 0169 SG 1 MSIV BYPASS l l JSCEUV 0183 SC 2 MSIV BYPASS l~
l JSIAllV 0619 N2 SUPPLY SI TANK 2A l l JSIAHV 0629 N2 SUPPLY SI TK 2B ,
l l JSIAHV 0639 N2 SUPPLY SI TK 1A l l JSIAHV 0649 N2 SUPPLY SI TANK 1B l l JSIAUV. 0682 RWT RETURN HDR CONT ISOL VLV l
[ JSIBHV 0612 N2 SUPPLY SI TK 2A l l JSIBHV 0622 N2 SUPPLY SI TK 2B l l JSIBHV 0632 N2 SUPPLY SI TK 1A l l JSIBHV 0642 N2 SUPPLY SI TK 1B -l l JSIBUV 0322 HOT LEC ING CHK VLV LEAK ISOL l C l JSIBUV 0332 l JSIBUV 0611 HOT LEC INJ CHK VLV LEAK ISOL SI TK 2A FILL /DRN l
l l JSIBUV 0618 SI TK 2A CK VLV LEAK LN ISCL l l JSIBUV 0621 SI TK 2B FILL /DRN l l JSIBUV 0628 SI TK 2B CK VLV LEAK LN ISOL l l J3IBUV 0631 SI TK 1A FILL /DRN l l ,JSIBUV 0638 SI TK 1A CK VLV LEAK LN ISOL l l JSIBUV 0641- SI TK IB FILL /DRN l l JSIBUV 0648 SI TK 1B CK VLV LEAK LN ISOL [
l JSIEHV 0661 SI DRN TO RDT l l MHAAM01 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAM02 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAM03 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAM04 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAMOS AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAM06 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAM214 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHAAM216 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l 9 l MHABM01 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l
l MHABM02 '
AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHABM03 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHABM04 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHABM05 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHABM06 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l
l MHABM215 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l .
l MHABM217 AUX BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHPAM01 FUEL BLDC HVAC DAMPER l
-48
a
~ - --- - - -
i
'I
^ 13-MS-A20. d u 8 COMPRESSED CAS: SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
/
TABLE 12 1 Y
SAFETY RELATED PNEUMATIC EQUIPMENT THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE A
' PNEUMATIC SUPPLY TO FULFILL ITS SAFETY FUNCTION 1
(faiIs safe under loss of IA) p (Continued)-
l.,
1 l .
l-l MHFAM02 FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l 1
E l MHFAM03 FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER 'l l MHFAM04- FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER 'l l MHFEM01 FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l' l MHFEM02 FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER' l l MHFEM03 FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER [
j.
l MHFBM04 FUEL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l MHJM101' CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l:
l MHJAM15 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l:
l-MHJAM16 CONTROL BLDG HVAC_ DAMPER ~ 1l" l MHJAM23 . CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER [ J l MHJAM25 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l
!. l MHJAM28 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l g y l MHJAM34 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l
'( l MHJAM36 CONTROL BLDG liVAC DAMPER l
_l MHJAM51 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM52 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER j.
l MHJAM53 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM54 CONTROL BLDG llVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM55 - CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM56 . CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l
~
l MHJAM57 CONTROL . BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM58 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM59 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJAM62 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l j MHJAM66 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l tiHJBM01 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM10 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM13 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER [
1 MHJBM23 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM24 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM28 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l
. l MHJBM31 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER [
l MHJBM32 CONTROL BLDC HVAC DAMPER l 1 MHJBM34 .. CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM38 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM52 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJEM55 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l MHJBM56 CONTROL BLDC HVAC DAMPER #
l l MHJEM57 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l l Mgjp,M58 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l 49
. L__. __ __ O
A'
~
ll;? , ,
l1!;' ' '
!i 8 13-MS.A20 f- l COMPRESSED CAS. SYSTEM EVALUATION'AND ANALYSIS-r>
- 4 i - f-U , < TABLE 12-
- *. *fj.
SAFETY REIATED PNEUMATIC EQUIPMENT THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE: A
.fr' '
- -+:
~ PNEUMATIC . SUPPLY .TO FULFILL ITS SAFETY FUNCTION .
~ (fails safe under loss of IA)'
(Continued)-
g ..
i; k' I ..
I
" 'l MHJBM66 CONTROL BLDG HVAC DAMPER l_MHJBM67
.l1
u, , I l-
'\-
r 6
4
+
4 e
O
.__.__.__________._._.m.
j; p 13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVAI,UATION AND ANALYSIS-
- 7. Evaluation of - the Preventative- Maintenance Program for the
. Compressed Gas System
, .A . review of ~the' plant . Preventative, Maintenance. Tasks was' conducted to.
. identify possible additional maintenance tasks that could enhance system
- , reliability.
' Supplier documents for maintenance of various components was conducted to identify possible additional maintenance tasks that could enhance _ system reliability.
Supplier documents for . maintenance of various components within the CGS
. were reviewed to determine,the recommended, maintenance intervals. The.
manufacturer's' PM' requirements were then reviewed against the PVNGS SIMS Repetitive Work Tasks to ensure compliance with the recommended FMs.
The result of the review identified some. discrepancies between the PMs recommended. by the manufacturer and PMs currently performed by PVNGS.
Incorporation of the discrepancies to the PVNGS Repetitive Work ' Tasks will enhance the -system reliability. The recommended additional work tasks to be included in the PVNGS PM program are identified in Tables- 13 and 14_ attached. These additional FM tasks range from manual operation of safety valves once every refueling- to a full tear down of' liquid nitrogen pump once every two years.
In' addition to the identified discrepancies above some PM tasks listed in the SIMS Repetitive Work Task data base are not kept current. This means that the task is not performed on the originally scheduled
- o C .
1
]
l i
13-MS-A20 l
COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 1 C
. \
- 4 1
TABLE 13 l ADDITIONAL PMs REQUIRED FOR INSTRUMENT AIR SUBSYSTEM j I I . I ;
ITEM l
l l
MAINTENANCE / TEST l' l I
I I I l Monitor air quality for particles, l Test every three months. l j_ moisture content. and hydrocarbons !
l l 1 I l Compressor free air regulator. l Revise operations procedure to drain l l t these filters ar least once a week l l 1 I l Compressor after-cooler. l Inspect for plugging yearly. l l l l !
l Safety valves. l Manually " pop" the valves once for l l l I refuelinn to verify oroner oneration. l 1 1 I l Compressor solenoid valves. l Inspect and clean (as necessary) on l l t annual comoressor tear down. l l 1 I l Compressor sequence controller
~
l Adjust / verify proper operation during l l PIC-39 and PCV 43 1 annual comnressor tear doen. [
l l l l IA header nitrogen isolation valve. l Verify proper operation at refueling. l l (TAN-PV-52) d l l i l l Dryer desiccant i Replace after a transient.
l l I
_ l L
e e
t l
13-MS-A20 f- COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS i
l TABLE 14 ADDITIONAL PNs REQUIRED FOR THE NITROGEN SUBSYSTE'i l l l l Liquid nitrogen storage tank l Visually inspect every 6 months. l l M-GAN-NO1 !
l l l Move regulator through 10 PSI of l l Tank pressure buildup regulator l adjustment and reset to original set - l l J-CAN-PCV 06 I noint everv 6 months. l l l Move regulator through 10 PSI of j l Tank pressure economizer regulator l adjustment and reset to original set l.
l J-GAN-PCV oA I noint everv 6 months. 'l i I l l Calibrate liquid level gage for "0" l Calibrate at every 6 months. l C l ' I l l Perform maintenance on various sub. l
,l Liquid nitrogen pump M-GAN-P01A & B l components every year or 1000 hour0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> of j l l operation ner Tech manual. l l l Run the control valve through 20 psig l l Nitrogen regulators J-GAN-PCV-49, l bf adjustment. Return to setpoints l l 49A and J-GAW-PC-41 I once everv three months. l 1 .
l l -
l Nitrogen temperature valve l Check for shutoff at -20F with l l J-GAN-TCV 48 i refrigerant every three months.
l l l Run the regulators through 20 psig of l l Nitrogen regulators J-CAN-PC-31 l adjustments every three months. l l J-GAN-PC-38 I Return to set noint. l 1 l l l Nitrogen safety valves J-CAN-PSV 29 l Test and reset every year. l l and 36 I l
l l 1 l Rupture Discs J-GAN-PSE 85 & 92 l Replace rupture discs every 3 years. l "5 i f I
1 O
L -
13-MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS III. CONCLUSIONS This section addresses the adequacy of the existing CGS on the basis of information in Sections IV.A to IV.C. It also presents corrective actions
.that are intended to enhance'the functionality and reliability of the CGS.
A. Nitroren Subsystem Review of the March 3, 1989 Unit 3 event (Section IV.A) has shown that the CCS did not function as designed during the LOP trip. While the nitrogen subsystem at was designed to maintain the pressure in the compressed gas header two or above hours 80 psigthe following theUnit actual pressure observed was 65 psig to 67 psig one to 3 event. Furthermore, review of plant trip reports showed that, while on nitrogen backup, a reduction in header pressure had been observed on two previous occasions.
Since the CCS did not function as designed, corrective action will be taken to ensure that value under the pressure in the compressed gas header meets its minimum design all plant events.
following: This corrective action consists of the Performing a flow test of the nitrogen subsystem downstream and including the nitrogen backup isolation valve to the CG header to determine if the nitrogen subsystem provides the projected demand.
The flow test will be performed first since the analysis indicates that the nitrogen subsystem is not functioning in accordance with its intended design. This is determined by the approximate rate of flow of 400 scfm between the time when the compressor power was lost and the time when the nitrogen backup valve opened. This flow does not appear to be excessive. This is also. confirmed by the review of the system which identifies component.s that may result in
~
significant pressures drop in the system. Also,
~
nitrogen tank had 95 inches the liquid (equivalent to 160,000 scf nitrogen gas) reserve when the compressor power was restored. All of the observed and calculated data, point to the failure of the nitrogen subsystem to provide the required demand even at the relatively low (400 scfm) flow rate. Depending on the results of the test, either one of the two following actions will be taken:
If the nitrogen flow test shows an adequate supply of nitrogen, review the components that are supplied by the compressed gas header to identify potential leakage paths.
If the nitrogen tests shows that the nitrogen system does not provide an adequate supply of nitrogen, review I individual components whose malfunction ,could cause reduced pressure in the header.
If test results do not resolve the nitrogen tupply problem, utill:e a backup diesel powered air compressor for system redundancy.
g 7 .
r' 13-MS A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS B. Documentation of System A survey of other nuclear power plants with similar designs shows the PVNGS design.to be comparable to that of other plants. However, a concern was
' identified with a lack of design basis calculations for normal'and off-normal (transient) loads on the CGS in that the original calculations. performed in 1975 to site the CGS have not been updated to reflect new pipe routing and loads that have been added to the system since the oriS inal design. This calculation is necessary to determine if the system is properly sized for the present loads. To correct this situation, the calculation for siting . will be revised.
The nuclear . utilities. survey showed that three utilities have a non-1E BOP l diesel that provides a backup power source to the compressor two utilities have 1E power to the compressor and three utilities for no backup to their instrument air system. PVNGS will perform a study to evaluate the benefits i
l and feasibility of providing 1E power to the compressed gas system compressors.
l Review of post trip review ' reports for Units 1, 2 and 3 identified one instance of safety related pneumatic valve failure'that appeared to be due to
. poor air quality. This failure involved an ADV valve that did not respond to an open signal. Although the root cause of this event was indeterminate, the failure may have been due to the presence of particulate matter (e.5., dirt).
In addition, a number of observations of excessive moisture in the compressed gas lines have been documented at all three units.
l To ensure that air quality does not adversely impact the performance of safety related components that rely on the CGS, APS is developing a systematic air quality control program. This program is designed to ensure that moisture, particulate, and hydrocarbons in the compressed gas system are kept to low levels that will not adversely affect the performance of safety related components that rely on compressed gas for their operation. In addition trending of any components suspected of air contamination failure will assist
- ' in finding any foreign materials that was not removed by this program.
l C. Preventative Maintenance Review of preventative maintenance programs currently in existence against the PMs required by the manufacturer also identified a number of areas where the PVNGS program for the instrument air and nitrogen subsystems could be enhanced. These enhancements are shown on Tables 13 and 14 m
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13 MS-A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS IV. ACTION PLAN l
As a result of this study, an action plan has been developed to ensure that the CGS and its interfaces to safety related components are designed and maintained to appropriate ' standards. This plan includes tasks that will be accomplished before and after any Unit restart, and any compensatory measure.
Projected completion dates for the tasks af ter restart are provided.
The action plan presented in Table 15 was developed following a complete review of the CGS. Although the system is non-safety related, it is recognized that the reliability and improved functionality of the system would enhance overall plant performance. The implementation of this plan is intended to achieve this goal.
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13-MS A20 COMPRESSED CAS SYSTE'i EVALUATION AND. ANALYSIS s APPENDIX A APS RESPONSE TOs CENERIC LETTER 88-14 4 i f 1 1 I l
. 1
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C'f , AppgNDIX 13-MS-A20 a d s ,[, , , L , c, W ,,.... lt i Arizona Nuclear Power Project P O Box 1:034 e phoenix. AAIZONA 85072 2334 ' ., 161-01697-DBK/JMQ.. February 20, 19c9-Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530-Document Control Desk
>U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission Mail Station F1-137 Washington,'D.C. '20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNCS)
, Units 1, 2'and 3-Generic Letter 85-14. "Instru=cnc Air Supply System Problems-Affecting Safety-Related' Equip =ent" File: 89-010-025; 89-056-026
Reference:
Letter from NRC to All *dolders of Construccicn Permits for Nuclear Power Reactorc Dated- ' August 8,198B; Subj ect: Generic Letter 88-14 The~ referen.,ed letter regt. tested a review of NURIC-1275, Volu=e 2 and a design and operations ver;fication of the instrument 'airl system.
~
In order to accomplish this task a list of safety related cc=ponents that rely on instru=ent air was produced. The total number of components. identified was 144 for each unit. Attachments 1 and 2 provide the PVNCS response to Generic Letter '88-14
, If you have any questions, please centact Mr. A. C. Rogers of my staff.
Very truly yours,
*^Q5)
D. B. Karner Executive Vice President DEK/JMQ/vib
,. Attachments cc: A. C. Gehr (all w/a)
T. J. Polich T. L. Chan . M. J. Davis
- 1 J. B. Martin e
. . , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - - S- -
w . y .: ,, n
- ., s, ,
' APPENDIX A
. , 3.K5 . ~
13-MS-A20 3
~
. U.S. Nuclear Regulstory ' commission
.- : Pose-2 - 161-O'1697-D3OJMQ.'
February 20,f1989 iw
' bec:, W. F. Quinn (7035) all w/a R.- M. Butler - (6102)
G. W. Sowers: (6102) W. H. Sicko'
-(6077)
R.--E. Younger (6070)
.G. L.- Story -
(6310)
- S. H. Moyers' (6070)
, L.'O.'English (6070)
R. E. Eu:ard (6070) D..N.1Renn . (6070) E.LC. Sterling- (7034) M. F.:Hodge: -(7044) H. U2 Riley (7044) F. C.' P svlocki. (7011)
..J. B. Cederquist (6986) ,
1R. L.fJenkins (69S6) W. F. Fernow- (6155). L B. F. Asher -(6994) J. W. Dennis
'(6424)
C. D. Church =an (6915) P. L. Brandjes (6310) A.'C. Rogers (7048) R.-A. Bernier (7048) x J. R. LoCicero .(6144)
.l
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e
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2 . u : -
- - - - - - - - - - _- -- - A
.. > . - -1 ,
p mn+ 3 j ,,.,c.. > APPENDIX A 13-MSAA2'O '
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n ' - STATE OF ARIZONA' ).
/)[ss.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA)-
- I, Donald 'B; Karner, represent that I am Executive Vice President-'
of Arizona Nuclear Power Project. -that the_ foregoing' document has ;been Sf signed ' by me on behalf of . Arizona Public Service ' Company 'with; full authority to do. so, that:I have read such document and know its contents, and , that to
- the best of my knowledge -and belief, the state =ents made therein are true. 7*
r_-- ) ._.e Dcnald 3. Ka:ner [ Sworn to before.me this' A'l dcy of S E u r* 2 :- , 1939. , L' . t . % r~ A ,J. ~ l t. 9 4 Notary Publ,1c, ;, ,,
-My Commisaion Expires: +
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- APPENDIX A.
13 MS Ab0
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hTTACFMENT l' J(_ ~ l)
. RESPONSE TO VERIFICATION ACTIONS 0T CENERIC LETT i
3 ' ACTION 1
.Verifientien by , test that.
consistent' with the manufacturers actual instrument aib quality is individual components served. recommendations fer JAPS RESPONSE- The major suppliers of the 'affected components were contae and although
. document in writin5, the vendors did not coe.mit to any specific quality were developedthe PVUGS test procedures for : air t using ISA-57.3, 1975 -~ aQuali:y f Scandard for Instrument Air" for Suidance. '
Because
~
the test.all three Units at Palo Verde are of' standard -design expected toresults and' design be "similar. chan5es for .the . Units are' Therefore, .the
, results from Unit 2 vill determine the designair quality test modifications
.for all 3 uni:s.
In order procured toto perform this verifics:ica by tes:, equipment was. installed.in Unit tes:2.air quality and. tes: connec:fons were An air quality " test is currently being conducted on Unit 2. Preliminary results after 4 days are as follows: The dev point is approxima:ely 10*F at 120 PSlC. measured 'dev point The is. greater than the design value. 8 Compensatory point dr~ains measures are currently in place to open. lov basis to prevent moisture accumula: ion.on the air distribution The si:e,particulate however are predomins:ly less than 3 mieren in. size and no significantthere are particulate in the 3 to 5 nic:en then 10 microns. quan:i:y of particula:es greater ' Hydrocarbons are less than 1 ppm. The air quality data vill be month in order to obtain adequate test data.taken for approximately on
"" Af:er determine sufficient what data is collected. it vill be evaluated to to ensure maintaining improvemen:s or modifiestions the instrument air quality. may be required data will also be The tes:
used to adjust the frequency of prevents:ive maintenance tasks as noted in A :schmen: supplements 2. letter vill be provided by April 23 A 1939 indica ting' if any improvements or modifications will be made and providing the schedule for completion. 1572E/0059K
b_ c
.,,. ? APPENDIX 1-r 13-MS-A20 ?
5 ?. ) ACTION 21 tf M .1 D k$ ' Verification that =aintenance practices. . emergency' procedures l and , training; are.' adequate. to ensure?'that- safety.related equipment vill function as intended on loss .of-instrument' air. [
.APS oESPONSE!
Maintenance Prsed ees t Preventative in maintenance tasks' vere reviewed and are provided Attachment 2 " Program for Maintaining Instrument Air
. Quality". ,
i' Emeteenev' Procedures-
- APS has reviewed the abnormal'operatin5 procedure for ; loss - of instrument. air, and E
is. making enhancements- to the. existing . procedure Significant to further address the following recommendations ' fremi Operating Experience Report. (SOER). . 88-01
" Instrument Air System Failures:" The revision of, this.
procedure 1 1s currently in the review and approval process. It. is expected that the' procedure vill be revised by June 30, 1959.
'* indications of loss of instrument air. such as alarms, automatic actions, functicns lost.
y
- identification of critical compenents operated by instrument air and the pos,ition in which they fa G.
f..
- expected system and plant responses to a loss of! instrument.
{. air and the consequences of"these responses.
- actions to take if critical components do not fail in the intended position.
manual actions the operator should be expected co- enke to respond to a loss of instrument air evert, ,
.
- restoration regained. actions to be taken after . instrument air is. >
4 Trainipe The Operations staff is trained on the abner =al operating procedure for loss of instrument air. The training consists of a valk through and discussion of the procedure in the simulator.
.l At the present time the simulator is not modeled
~
' loss of instrument air. The malfunction scenariosLfor to illustrate the Basic Simulator and Requalification Courses will' be developed in conjunction with the simulation certification under 10C.R55.
3 Lesson plans have been revised to sensicite plant operations and maintenance personnel on the vulnerability of sa fe ty related equipment to commoti .. mode failures that could result from air degradation. 7,
-44 .
+ ..
APPENDIX A 13-MS-A20
. . d.
ACTION 3 Verification that the design of the entire instrument air system including air or other pneu=stic accu =ulators is in accordance with its intended function, including verification
, by test that air-operated safety-related compenents vill i perform events, as expected in accordance with all design-basis including system.
of T,his designaverification loss of the nornal should instru:ent air include an analysis that they are correctcurrent air operated component failure positiens to ve for assuring required safety functions. APs PES?ONSE Verifiestien of instrument Air Svstem Desien Verification of the design of the instrument air system vill be performed in Program. conjunction with our Desi n 5 Easis Review non-safety related b'ut interfaces with is Since the instrument air system classified as safety systems, it will be reviewed immediately after therelated safety related systems. Due to the large scope of the program, the review is expected of 1991. to be completed during the first quarter voristeettee of o ev-seie aceu 91 ster 0. sic, Verification of the design of the pneumatic accumulators was done as a result of SOER BS-01. A?S utilites three safety related air or gas rese rvoir systems. They are the Main Steam Isolation Valve /Feedvater Isolation Valve accumulators, atmospheric air accumulators, dump valve nitrogen' gas and the Diesel Generator air accumulators. start The accumulator capacities were reviewed for these valves and found to be adequate. The accumulated pressures are continuously monitored' with an in place alov accu =ulator pressure" type alarm which causes an audible and visual alarm to annunciate in the respective unit's Main Control and Flasks Room.thsThe Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air
- Atmospheric Dump Valves have instal, led local pressure indicators. These pressure indicators are monit: red periodically by auxiliary operators.
i veriff ection hv Test l Verification by test was accomplished f through the i preoperational testing pro 5rsm and surveillance tests. Out of the 144 safety related valves and dampers vh 1 instrument air',135 were tested by the preopera. ich rely on program and nine were tional testing tested by surveillance tests. The tests verified the failure position of the j isolating the air supply and/or air signal then equipment by - positions the valve / damper assumed. noting the Annivsis of Failure Positfoes The failure modes of the 144 valves and dampers vete analyted { j to ensure that they failed in a position of,least risk to reactor safety. i
)
The preoperational tests results for the failure cede of the i 135analyted the vaf9es and dampers isilure modes. for Unit i vere pulled and compared to j
)
-3 e
-. ~ - - - - - . _ - - - _
~**4 APPENDIX A 13.NS.A20
, s.
All the: components tested ' satisfactorily' except: th'at a on one ; damper. discrepancy.vas found ~ en that damperThe individual who
~ determined,the L test t performed' the. test
.;. acceptable, however, he;-documented; an incorrect. , failure- l
~
position. A retest. of 'the' damper: has. been.' performed! j verifying it does. fail' in the proper position. i The nine components tested by'the' Unit 1 surveillance tests : { have been verified that. their failure positions frem the ; surveillance test was the 'same as the analyted failure ; positions. ' Due -to the standardi:stion in design ..nd the same .i' preoperational. and surveillance test program . applied- to- all-three. units, it may be assumed that this verification' applies -.
' to'all three units.
4 9 1 b 4 , s 9
/
Nrknci Ga mi Eccci Ccetany 13-as-A26 . . APPENDIX C Document'Cente:1 Cesk
.. Tebruary 3, 1989' pita 2
~_ ' .
A review Of UUREC-1275. Volume 2..has recently toen c:=pleted. Each specific issue described in ICREC-1275 has been reviewed for appil-cability to the Trojan Nuclear plant. Recone.end:tions resulting fr== th: review aro currently being assessed, roll: wing c =pisti:n of this assessment, appr:prista correctivo action will be scheduled and included cn tne dat lled acti:n plan.
' The dasign of the safety-relattd perti:n of the instr.: rent air sy::ta . i will to veriflad t: be in ace:rdan:8 with its intandad functi:n by assessing instr.: ent air system test dat: and :ssessing existing-inservi:a test (IST) data and .aintanan:n test d:ts. The tasts will bc :enducted during the 1989 refuelins cutage that is schsdulad t:
begin en April 6, 1989 and extand i: June .t. 1989. The scheduled tasting in:1tdes' sarpling of the instr.: ent air systa :: data =ine a sual air quality being supplied t : rp:nants. A rspid and tradual 1:ss of instrument air tast will als: he cendu:tsd en perti:n: :( - the dafaty-ralatad secti:n of the instr.: ent air systas. The r:pid i' less of air data vill to cbt:inad using tw: metheds. One set of dass will be ebt:ined by tasting the safety-related ::: ul ::rs and associated ch::k valves !:r: (1) !. cur =ain s ca: is:lati:n valves. (:) f:ur auxiliary (secvatar pu :p ste== inlet valves, and (3) two prassuri:ar ; wer-cycrsted rella! valvas. The other rapid 1:ss :! - in s tr.::e n t air test data vill ta =bt:ined using test results it:= tha ::: presra: and a Hsint:nsnes precadura. The scadu:1 less of inst r.::en t air tests will te limitad t: tasting the same a:cumulat:rs and 'asse:12 tad check valycs in:1uded in the rapid 1 css of instrument air test. V;r!!ication of the adequacy of r.aintenance practicos, ace:gsney precedures and training en the instr.:: ant air systa=, t: ensure that safety-related equi;mant will functi:n as intsnded en 1:ss cf ins tr.: ent air is being ::nducted. This ver!!!:ati:n will be c:=ple:A), as currsetly scheduled in the detalicd a: tic's plan by . August 3 89. l l pcr will develop a presram for maintaining pr per instr.: ent air quality when all desis . at:d pr:cedurs reviav and system testing has been ecepletad. and after all significant ::d!!!=ati. ens, if any, have been c =pleted. A discussion of the presr:: will be incluced in a future submit'.a1 to the NRC. t
'non all Cenori: 1, attar 83 t a. Lasting and associated short-ter-
==difientiens, !! any, have been ::eplated ?cI w!!! submit a lettse t: the N;t0 that pr vides a status :( the in e t : .:=:nt air acti:n plan. It is anticipated that thiJ latter will be su b*.i t t e d In .
August 1989. { I 1 e
' FF. .I. ' H ' i GG "ELi[. .!c - . ;-j j g ___ d 93 ,
L ,a 13-MS-A20. APP iDIX C'
' Mdd GaneG! EdO CPM"ITf *
=- %- ~
Cecument~Centrol Desk
; Tebruary 3, 1939 Psee 3 ,
When all requirements of.Generie I,ctter $3-14 h:ve been impla.= anted, PCI will-submit-a 1ctter to tha NEO st: ting that all :ti':ns asscelated with the generi: letter have been eenplated. t
-Sincerely,
.i TOW / ORS /RNS/=r 273SW.0139 c: Mr. John 3. Martin C::N:"l132INCI 3Y:
Re icnal Administrster, Regien V U 3. Nuclear P.esulat:ry C:::.i:si:n /g C-pwr rfj g Mr, Willia: T.' Dix:n i
- y. 7 Yun:
// /)
Ij// b, ja St:ta of Crsgen Department of Enersy r M M'+ C. A.-Cir.:::st
. Mr. R. C. 2:re f e
- NRO Resident Inspector J a '
- Troj sn- Nuclear F1snt K. D .
ACT:0N ENC:NIE2: A. N. Rollar 0$
!Lb/, / ^%'
y J. M. Seibel/ . Subscribed and sworn to tefere me this 3rd day of February 1$39. 4 Y J TF wer- d . . . 2r%Y.,
. Notary Pub!!: et crag:n
~
r ..S SWv . e*. My C = 13Si:n EX; ires! UM M / 1 ./ am a ce , Ict. (k. %[.,
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g\ ' g- --- C U [ $ j A N A ..
.M7 E eC*mE Sr.:EEr . * ~ P.O. ECX CC310 -
V PGWER& LIGHT y.'?Q f.h'.T - NEW CRLEANS LOUIS 3AN A. 70160 '. .(50 4 195 31:0 t ' Tebevary'21. 19S9
, * , W3PS9-00bS' A4.05: ,
QA. 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Concissien. m ..,.: Documen: Cen:rol Des.s - +
. Washington, ..C. 20353 ^
Subjec:: -Va:erford 3 SIS
- Docke: No. 50-382-License No.-NPT-3I Generic.ie::et 85-14 __
. Gentlemen:
The NEC issued Generic te::er SS-la, Ins:rumen: Air Supply Syste $k s
. Aff ec:ing Saf e:y-Rela:ed Equipmen:. en Au;us: S. 1955. The purp se.ei'this generic.le::er.;vas :
reques: : hat licensees review NUEE.-!:75,'3cicca 2, anc perier= sys:es. This verifica:icn was a design and opera:icns: verifica:icn of : heir-ins:ruman:~ air
- o -include:
1. Verifica:icn by :es: :ha: ac:ual ins.:ru:en: air-quali:y is c:nsis:en:
- vi:h served.
- he manufa urer's recc==enda: ions for individual ce:penen:s 2.
Verifica: ion tha: =ain:enance prac: ices. e=ergency procedures, and .
- ainin;; are adequate :c ensure :ht: safety-re.'a:ed equip =en: vill-function as in: ended on loss of instru:en: air.
3. Verification :ha: :he design of :he entire ins:runan: ai: sys:e= including air or c:her pneusa:1c accu:ula:ers is in ac::rdance 1:h its in enc 3d fune:ica, including verifica: ion by :es: tha: . i air-opera:ed safe:y-rela:ed cc=penen:s vill perfor= as enpec:ed in i - acecrdance vi:h all derign-basis even:s including a loss of :he nor:a1 instru en: air sys:e=. This design verifica:1cn should include an analysis of curren: air opera:ed cc=ponen: failure posi:icns to verif 4 cha: they are correc: for assuring required safety functions. D To perfer: the above, a =ul:1-discipline :ssk force was fer=ed :: review, evalua:e and respond 'to the generic letter. This task fer:e censis:ed cf represen:stives fre: Opera:icns. Plan: Engineering, P.ain:enance. Nuclear Opera::.cns Suppor: and Assess:en: (NOSA), Nuclear Opera:icns En;ineering anc Cens:ruc: ion (NOI5C) and iicensing. 4 - o r . . _ t .. : *'*> . g ,- 2 ;..:..; , c ... ,y g: . .- . 4 i s.
! ;9 p,f 8' AN ECUAL CpPC ATUNIN EMPLOYE A" t I l
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C Pe;;e .' V3PS9-0028
. Tebruary 21, 1989 The a:: ached response has been divided in:o three (3) seerions corresponding respec:ively to the above. A'descrip: ion of the instrumen; air system has been included as a preface to the response.
Should you require ad'di:ional infor:acion, please feel free to. con:ac: ne or L.k'. Laughlin, Site !.icensing Supper: Supervisor, a: (30!.) t64-3499. This response is subni::ed as recuired under affidavi: under provisions cf Section IS2a of the A:omic Energy Ac: of 19fI., as anended. Very :ruly yours, f l
/
s\.7"./ k..-l. R.T. Eurski Mantger Nuclear Safe:y 6 Reguls::ry Affs:.rs
.u.. w.i
... . e.s..
A::a:h=en: cc: R.D. Mar:in, NRC Region IV J.A. Calve, NRC-N7J. D. I.. k'iggin:en , NRC-NFJ. hRC Residen: Inspec:ers Office E.:.. Slakc V.M. 5:evenson i.' l l l 1' ._---.
l'
. :13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C UNIlED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIClI
~
In : 1e matter of
)
)
Louisiana Power & Light Ccmoany
.. ) Occke t,'o. 50-352 Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station ) -
AFFIDAVIT R. F. Burski,being duly sworn, hereby deooses and says that he is Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manater of Louisiana Power Company; that he is duly authori:ed to sign anc file with the Nuclear
. Regulatory Commission the attached resoonse to flRC Generic Letter -
that he is familiar with the content thereof;. and that the matters set forth informa therein are'true tion and belief. and correct to the best cf his knowiecge,
. ' , l. .! .4 /
', ; /J..-X s.? i u r s e. -
Nuclear Safety & Regula;ory Aff airs. l'a n a g e r STATE OF LOUIS!AtiA)
)ss -
PARISH OF ORLEAtlS ) Subscribed and sworn to before me_, a Notary Pubiic in,and for the Parish ano a:ht.a cove named this s.o
.. c.
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- cav of < / l-/ u ,x ,. , '
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- Hotary Puolic
/ ut, * ' ! LL; .uw j
My Commission expires c.'ue4'_ '/ i i 6
e 13 *MS.A20 -f APPENDIX C l l p **e e G
% S 0 4
e 9 9 4 f*o*===amg .
" M = E 7.J b 7w
- Fl5 ?C."SI TO CE.VE.,I : C *,=:-. . ...:. . s . . .
n w 0 em m h=*** C, . A ^ O CvUgy l'
=,
s t D :tia :'l 2 ' . S. c, .n. d l l l l k
- _ _ - _ - - _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^^ -- -- --- - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
4 13-MS-A20 , SYSTIM DEscRIP- cy APPENDIX C i The' instrument air system a
'Ja terford 3 is designed to prov- 'e a reliable supply of clean, dry, oil-free air fer pneumatic instruments and con::els ,
and pneumatically operated valves during normal plant operation. The instrument air system serves no safety functien. Air operated valves tha; are required for sa fe shutdown and accident mitigation are previded with safety related accumulators. ane instrument at system consists of: 1. tuc horizontal, oil-free, single stage, retary air ccepressers
- 2. two air dryer assemblies vi:h pre- and a f ter- fil:ers
- 3. one vertical air receiver Each instrt=ent air compresser package censists of an inle filter, cc= pressor, moitture separater, hea t exchanger and discharge fi;;er. Air from these pcchages is d'senarged in c the inst.-tment air r~ceiver by a common header.
The air then passes threegh the air filter / dryer assemblies. ( a . . auring normal opera tions , pressure in :he air receiver is maintained be veen 2.:-120 ps:g. Shculd pressure in the receiver
- all bel:- '05 psig, the second instrument air compresser star:s autecat:cally. If pressure P
e l 9 l 4
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C drop below 100 psig, s cross connect ! valve between the instrument ab.d. station air systems opens allowing stat :n air to help maintain instru.ent
, air system pressure. The service air is introduced upstream. of the -
instrument air receiver and the air filter / dryer assemblies. riease note that at Vaterford 3, the station and instrument air compresso'r a re identical units. The only difference in systems is that the statien air system does not have air filter / dryer assemblies. The instrument air filter / dryer assemblies a're provided with an automatic bypass which opens when dryer outlet pressure ells below c5 psig. A strainer is inst.alled in the filter / dryer bypass line to coarse filter :.he air. Annuncia:. ion is provided in the ec:..rsi room fer the folic in; c ndi-icns:
- 1. Ins.rument Air p.eceiver Pressure Hi/Lc
- 2. Instrument Air Compressor A(3) Trip / Trouble
- 3. Instru=ent Air Coepressor A(E) Separator Level Hi/Lo 4
Inst umen- Air Drver A(3) Treuble
- 5. Instrument Air Dryer 3ypassed 6 1 Instru n nt Air Pressure E a c k.4 ^.'a lve. Op e n
- 7. Inst.rument Air Compressor A(E) Locked Ou.
S Valve C'pera tor N. St4ekup Actua tesi/ Trouble 2 e i I a O
! - ~ 13-MS A20 Even though, they are not s$!!!hEIYlkted, the instrument air compresrcrs a-supplied power from safety' buses. If a loss of offsite power oc:urs, the instrument air compressors trip. They can be manually reconnect.ed to the emergency diesel generators at the control rocm's discretien. p
.e 4
0 0 4 4 4 0 e g 4 l'
+
O s i 1
.___m__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
j 13-MS-A20
; APPENDIX C SECTTON 7
. l. .
. . A list was prepared of all safety related air. operated components
. . This s .
list consisted of 173 valves and dampers. Purchase specifications for th majority of the above were reviewed fer air quality requirements. They specifiedonlycle$n,dryair. The major manufacturers were also contact to determine if there was any specific air quality requirements for thei: equipment. They confirmed that the only requirement was for clean, dry air. The purchase specifications for the ins u=ent air supply system, i.e. compressors, dryers, etc. , were then reviewed fer cuality require =ents on the discharged dir. The only' requirements were to provide clean, dry air. The pre-operational startup : b n procedures (Syl.-23-001 thrcugh 003) fc: the instrument air sys;em were reviewed. The accep;ance criteria for particulate and organics were as follows:
- 1. No particulate vill be larger than 1/32 inch by 1/16 inch when air is sampled th ough a cesh fil:e fer a 1- inute blevdev..
2. Tne system piping shall be free cf organics as verified by black ligh: exar.u:.atien of the sa::.ple filte: :l o t.h .
.rhes - criteria were documented as met.
9
. . 13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C -
4
- l. ~~he pre-operational startup test procedure (S?O-23-001) was also revieved.
I. f The acceptance criteria for the instrument air dryer was an outle:!devpoin ( . . temperature of -40 degrees T or lower.
- This criterion was documented as !
met. i l e e Frior to the issuance of Generic Le::.er 88-14. Vaterferd 3 did not have an instrument. air sampling program. In response to this letter a sampling ' i program has been initiated.
. L?&I. has reviewed applicable instrument air system drawings and iden:.ified those headers which feed the majority of the safety-rela:.ed air cperated valves. Frem this, fif teen (15) loca-icns were then identified at which ::
draw samples. Samples will -be taken f cm five (5) sample 'poin .s a: leas. ence each refueling cycle on a re:ating basis. In this way all '.5 pein:s will be sampled once every three refueling cycles. A c::::act has been awarded to an outside laboratory to analy:e these samples. In crder to obtain suitable samples for analysis, special sa=pling equipmen is recurrec. . . acts ecu:p=en :s cescricec cescw. 1. sampling pump eceipped with adjustable f_'ov meter and pre-eighed nuc1copore filters i 2. tedlar b2E ecuipped wi:.h isolation valve
- 3. hygrometer We 2ne appropriate test. procedure .a instruct personnel how and where to drav i the air samples, wi'l be in place pric: to the next refueling cutare.
4p p I h e
F-r 1 1 ( '; I
- j
- - 13-MS A20
. Although the instru=ent air APPEN sa= DIX C procedure is not pling 5
complete, a special'
.. r/ '- test procedure'en vork authorization (VA) 01032052 was issued t ' perform ;
C- the initial instrument air sa:pli:g. The air sample drawn during this ter vill be analyzed for moisture, particulate and hydrocarbons . The acceptance criteria are as follevs: Pa rticula te . 10 microns Devpoint .
-10*T Hydrocarbons 3 ppm The acceptance criteria for particulate was based on the presently installed dryer filter size of 10 mierens. For devpoint, local cli=a. c conditions were reviewed and used to determine the accep;ance criteria.
The hydecca rbon acceptance criteria was based on informa ti:n fr:= :ne startup flush packages. Because the compresso:s are an oil free :ype, no oil or hydrocarbons were found in t:e originti flush saeples. The :hree
-(3) ppm acceptance criteria was based on this vi;h a slight alleva :e f::
natural background levels of me:hane. aesting z.o r .s.yc.roctrbon.s v .
.33.
De per:.or.med during :.s. s special.tes; and then only af ter a major system modification, i.e. compressor replacemen: with diff eren; type . h' ash air teepressors s re cil f ree, wa ter-ring type compressors. The dryers are an activa:ed dessicant type. Introduction of 5, oil into the idstrumer; air system fro these components is no: c r e d i'b l e . Therefore, pending sa:isfacterv results on the :nitial sample, :o further hydrocarbon , i es: ng vill be peri:rmed except as previous 1, s:sted. I i .f . _t
r, . 13-MS-A20
,he
+ instru"*nt air Sac?leAPPENDIX C -
" or the 8PeCial test was tar'en on Tebruary 13, 1929 and sent to I=viron= ental Industrial Research Associates (EIRA) gc
! analysis.
^
.The results of the air sample are not expected b f e ore this response is due to the NRC.
Therefore, within 30 days of receipt, 1,P&I. . Vill provide the NRC a s . ate aent of Va terford 3 i nstrumen:. air quality. O m 9 0 4 0 , L . e 9 9 1 9 e
/ ee l
l l f f ( s
13-MS-A20 ; In~edditicato-theabeve,^dYfEhIhaEceprocedures, calibration procedures I and repetitive tasks for the safety related air operated components vere reviewed for adequacy. No m4jer deficiencies were discovered by this reviev. Several enhancements were identified and are being evaluated for pcssible implementation. A review of normal, emergency and off-normal operating procedures was performed to determine which addressed or needed to address actions foli.oving loss of instrument air. In addition to the nine (9) Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), the following five (5) procedures were
- icenti::ec.
1. 0?-500-005, Annunciator Response for Cen:::1 Reo: Cabir.et E
- 2. .
0?-500-001, Annunciator Response for Con ::1 Eco: Cabine: E 3. OP-500-010, Annunciator Respense for Cen:r:1 Room Cabine: L
- a. O?-901-03E, Ins;rtmen- Air Syste: "a l f ur.::i c n
- 5. C.:-0:-016, 1:strumen: Air Syste:
The following iters were ide:-ified as potential deficiencies. They are presentiv. being reviewed with Coeratiocs . personnel. At.tr0r riate Orc:edure changes will be imple=e ed by the nex refueling outage for those items confirmed as deficiencies. 1. O?-500-010 does not recuire bio devn of tc:t instrument air system
,g, counstreas of :he dryers whenever the Ins rumen: Air Dryer Eypassed, E-7 ala rm is rece:ved.
i 8 .
- 13-MS-A20
'g APPENDIX C j hain?.e:ance personnel .excludi:g engineers and supervisors, receive genera; a
3 - plant syste= tru ning and specific training in their respective discipline, i.e. electrical. No specific training is given the maintenance craft
.e . .
1 personnel regarding' loss of instru=ent air and/or the rela:.ed precedures. This training would not be relevant to the duties these individuals are 4 c::pectcd ' to perform. Engineering personnel including Maintenance engineers and supervisors are of fered instrument air system training under the " system of the month"
. i training program. _his training not only covers system and componen:
i operating parameters but also provides training en the felieving precedures:
- 1. Operating procecure 0?-3-016: Ins trumen:. Air Sys tem
- 2. Off-Scr:21 procedure 0?-901-033: Instrument Air System Malfunc:.icn
. This training has been reviewed and censidered adecuate for these individuals.
Opera:icas person cl, as par: cf their license training, receive syst.e= and
, off-normal precedure training. They also receive simulaf.or ::aining involving less of ins.rument. sir. A review ci .his 7. raining has been performed and found te be adecuate.
- v
.it.:
O
j'~- ' APPENDIX C 13-MS-A20-SECTION III e a A review cf the instrument air supply system was performed by LP&* . The
, e g ability of_the system to supply the required quantity and quality of air was reevaluated. Testing.
was also performed to determine the presen: 4 -
. condition of the equipment. '
o . As previous.ly discussed in Section I, the only air quality requiremen:.s-
' for the supply system or air operated components are clean, dry air. The acceptance criteria established in the sampling procedure vill satisfy these air requirements. It is anticipated that'when the results of the ini;ial air sample are received,.:he acceptance criteria vill be met.
anstrumen; air compressor design and performance were reviewed. The criginal system design required the capacity oi each ccmpressor :o be 250 SCyM at 100 FSIG. Compresse capacity tests performed in December, 1953 showed that both instrumen; air compressors were operating at considerably less than this capacity. A detailed analysis performed by L?&L determined that the plant air de=and was approximately 250 SCTM. The ope:stion of the filter / dryer assemblies was also reviewed. Each
, , , assembly is rate'd at 360 SCTM. Vaile in operation, each filte:/ dryer assembly requires approximately 60 SCyM con:.inuous flow for regeneration.
This regeneration flow is discharged to atecsphere and is therefore los; v s l from the sys:em. Compressor out.put is split between the two assemblies. l l Excep fer main.enance periods, both dryers are continuously in serv.ce. This means a regenerar.icn flow of approxima:.ely 120 SCTM is continuously los; to atmosphere. l ..,
, .:.-1
(- APPENDIX C. 13-MS-A20
- . Given.
1 a system de=acd of approxi=ately 2SO SCTM and filter / dryer purge requirements of approxi=ately 120 SCTM, a total ci approximately 400
'is, needed for normal plant operation. ,
i, .
. In their present condition, both
. compressors are required full time to meet the flow requirements. Once ::
compressors are reworked, one' compressor operating full time and acother. j leadingintermitte.ktlyshouldprovidethe'requiredflow. I Rework of the j , instrument air compressors will be templeted by the next i refueling outage. 6 To reduce compressor demands, the possibility of using one. filter / dryer. assembly at a time.is being considered. Tull flow through one assembl'y ha: been attempted with unsatisf actory results. The pressure drop acr ss the assembly exceeded vender recommendations. The cause of the pressure drrp, across the . filter / dryer assembly is being investigated. Depending en the results of this investigation, the use of a single assembi. witn the o;her in standby is being censiderec. This shculd recute n regeners:~ien i!:w receirements considerably thereby decreasing compresso: cemands.
'Jhile evalua ting sys te= perfor=ance , several items which could increase system reliability were identifi.ed.
These items vill be evaluated fer possible inr:rporatien. They are as follows:
, 1. Replace 10 micron dryer afterfilters with 0.3 micron absclute filters 2.
Install automatic drain valves in the dryer prefilters. l - owe
. 2.;-2 s
e
1 , l
.3.~
I - 13-P.S A20 4 APPENDIX C ~' 3.
,L . '. - -
Install =anual drain valves en instrument and . ervice a receivers. I , 4
- Rrevaluate the filter / dryer bypass se point value.
On the basis o'f the above evaluation, the inst,rument air system is m its intended function; providing adequate amounts of clean, dry air . Eve with the compressors at
~
less than rated capacity, the system's performan:
~
is adequate to satisfy plant requirements. The system as it
. is presently operating was compared to the TSAR sys:em description. Several minor discrepancies were found.
As previously discussed, several ideas for possibly increasing system reliability and/o efficiency were identified duding sys cm review.
~ These items are curren:1
. -b'eing evaluated for possible incorporation. After making the final determination as to which, if any, of the above will be added to ne system, t,he ISAR will then be revised to make necessary corrections and' reflect all enhancements.
As stated in Section I, k'aterford 3 bas 173 safety-related valves and dampers. The f ailure position, following less of instrument air, for each component was identified. This was then compared to the actual componen:
,,. failure posi: ion. /.11 components failed to the required position.
Periodic surveillance are performed to ensure valve operability. In
~" addition to this, air operated components were successfully tested for los of ins rument air and power during pre-operational st:rtup testing. Each componen: was tested individually as part of its respective system's pre-operational test. .
9 9
...,J e
't 13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C A further review of the above t
cc:ponents s performed to deter ine which received an Engineered Safety Teature (EST) artuation signal. Th .( . . and corresponding position for each component was identified.
, The pr.sitions these components were required to move to en their respecti actuation signals were verified to be cc rect. These valve. eperations are i -
tested periccically under the foll' wing o surveillance procedures: OP-903-029, Sa fety Inj ection Act.ua tion Signal Tes t OP-903-032, Quarterly *ISI Valve Tests t. 4 OP-903-033, Cold Shutdown ISI' Valve Tests e OP-903-036, Containment Spray Actuation Signal Test OP-903-0!.0, Contain=ent Isola. ion Ac.uatica Signal Test OP-903-Ot.7, Emergency Teedwate: Actuation Signal Test OP-903-091, Recirculation Actuation Signal Test O?-903-092,
.in Steam " solation Actuatien Signal Test 0?-903-094, ISTAS Subgroup Relay Test - Operating O?-903-095, ESTAS Subgroup Relay Test - Shutdown A review of all safety-related valves was also perfor=ed to iden:.ify which were serviced by accu =ulators.
Thirty-four .(31.) valves use nitrogen accumulators and 24 are provided with air accumulators. Tour (l.) other
,.i component:,
to be addressed lat.er in this section, were identified as needing further evaluation.
-- EP&L has reviewed the design of the nitrogen accumula.c systems. There are ten accumulators which service St. valves. These ac:umulators were verified to be of sufficient size to satisfy :.he ti=e and stroke recuiremen:.s'of their respective valves.
'.?&L also reviewed design g
u.,
** . . ~ ~
13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C I drawings to v erify tha the seismic and piping ' class' require =ents were (.. correct for the nitrogen acr=ulator systems. These vere found to be
'[(. I acceptable for their intended functions.
I.
.It should be noted that
. the seismic qualification of individual cceponeni.:,
. associated with valves and/or valve operators, i.e. filter regulaters,.
electric /pneutnatic transducers etc., were not reviewed. This individual ; omponent record scarch and verification'vas determined to be beyond the scope of Generic Letter 88-14 ( Air accumulators are ins:.alled on 24 valves. The function of these 24 valves was re-reviewed to determine :.h=ir requirements for operating post acciden.. , Of the ... valves, oca.y4 (S2 oven. .a- ; Sa:e:y .,nj.ecticn F.ectreula:, ion Sump Ou-le. Valves) were required to enarge posi.icn ( folleving loss of instr =en; air .o mitigate :he conse:;uences of an acciden:. One (1) valve (CC 620; Fuel Fool' heat Exchanger Temperature Centrol Valve) required at acc=u.'ater only to close :.o 1:s "f ail saf e" j position on loss of inst =en; air. For the remaining 21 valves, the
. 1 position they fail :o oc loss of instrument ,
air was deter = iced'to be a ! safe position. ; These valves are not required to change frc= this l position for safe shutdove or accident c:itiga r.i on. Their respective ; accumulators, therefere perform no safety-related functions associated wit.h valve ac.ua. ion. Although it. may be convenien from an opera:.ional i I standpoint
~
W to operate :hese 21 valves following loss of instrument air, it.is no; required.
~he acc=ulator: for :hese 21 valves are therefere !
co: vithi
- e purview of this generic le::er and wi21 cc: be adcressec f u r t.h e r .
- For .he re=a.icitt 3 valves with air acce ulai. ors (C: 6:0, S-1 e
13-MS-A20 AFFE:: DIX C
. '602A & 3), a review of capacity, seis=ic and pipi:g class require:e::s vas performed by LP&L and found to be adequate as is.'
TheairaccumulatorsassociatedwithvalvesSI602A&Bveresizedtballe
. each valve to cycle,once vi:hin an hour of loring instrument air. This va verified'by test in August, 19ES under VA 09000219. however, during desig-review, the possibility these valves may need to ope: ate beyond the.preser.' .
60 minute limit was ide'ntified. This situation is being reviewed further by LP&L under Problem Evaluation /Information Reques:-(PEI?.) 10673. , During the above reviews, four (4) additional components were identified-whose position for an Engineered Safety Feature (EST) actuation signal is different frem its loss of instrument air position. These compenents ei;.her do not have accumula ors or have enes tha: have not been :es:ed. They are: SVS 101 & IC2; Switchgear ."akeup Dacpers
, TV ISLA & B; Feedvater Isolatio: Valves Valves FW ISLA & 3 cust close on a main steam isciation signal (MSlS).
These valves have s=all accumula: ors as part of their operator assemblies,. but are not leak tested. This situatien vat reviewed by LP&L. The feedvater regulator valves TV 173A & B and the startup regulator valves TV 5- 166A & 3 fail c1csed on a loss of ins:rument air. Therefore, feedvater isolation valves ISLA & E are redundant for isolatics feedv::er flev. I:
- ne unlikel'. event :tese valves fail "as is" c less cf instrumen; air, TV
. 173A & I acd TV 166A & E will c1cse. Surveillance testing cf these valves to insure operability is discussed later in this sectiet.
u -o
' 2
- . - o 13-MS-A20 APPENDIX C O'.'S 101 & 102
, ,, ; are fail open danpers which were originally designed to clos p- on a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).. These components do co:
s have a ccu=ula tors. LP&L, under pI1R 10672, has reviewed the above and determined the SlAS to these cempece::s is not _. required for sa fe shutdown of the plant or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, the, fail open position on loss of instrument air is acceptable. . Leak testing of th'e accumulator systems had only 'been performed on the nitrogen accumulators. During startup, the ten (10) nitrogen accumula tors vere tested in accordance with SPO'-25-001. During operation, surveillance procedure OP-903-032 leak tested the two check valves associated with each accumula tor system. A review of this procedure' identified a need to reevaluate the tes: dura:ica and acceptance criteria. Test requirements have been re-evaluatec anc :he above procedure vial te revised. Two (2) separate tests vill now be pericrmed on each nitr: gen accumulated. The fir 3: is a check valve operability tes o be pericrmed once a qua rter. This is a functional tes: to insure the check valves are not s uck in the open position. The second is a system leakage test which will be performed once every months. Each nitrogen accumulator vill be isolated from its respective air and nitrogen sources for a predetermined time. Any leaking components
-s within the test boundary will be identified. At'the end of the time, the prersure drop and subs'eque:: leakage for the accu =ulater vill be determined.
This testing vill be sdded to surveilla:ce procedure OP-903-032. - e
..i e
, 13-MS-A20.
' APPENDIX C, 1
As: discussed l earlier -in this section. ecly three (2) of the 2f. va
. k; -
. :nir accumulators are within the' scope of this' report and reouire=t
. e s t in g'.
~
; [, s. ,
4ne accu =ulator 1eskage tests for valves SI 602A & 3. have been added j , surveillance procedure OP-(03-032.
',.l : The fail safe position of valve CC'62C
- p. is closed.-
. It has po safity related requirement'to move from this.
position. T.. ,
- The. only function 'of the acedulator is .to fa11 this. modula valve; closed on loss of. instrument ~ air..
A leak oricapacity test isfnot ;
- applicable in this E ins tance.
To ensure.. valve operabilityra funct.ional-
.i-
' test..vhich fails air.to the. val'ee and verifics' closure, vill be performed once every 18 months.
This-functional test vill 'also 'be part of O?-903-033.
. As previcusly discussed, the elesing o'f valves yW 172A'& 3 and FV 166A &
on less of. instrument air is used in lieu of leak. testing the accu.clators. ~ on TV IE!.A & B. To insure the above, a-functienal test. which fails air to' the TV 17~A & 3 and TV 166A & 3 and verifies closure vill be perfer ed ence every cold' shutdown. This functienti test vill be par. of 0?-903-033. The above changes vill be incorporated into surveillance procedures O?-903-032 and 0?-903-033 by the next refueling outage. Vith the completion cf these procedure revisions, testing vill be adecuate to insu~ operability of the required accumulator syst. ems. I i III-B f-
[p.,, /;kb % 4
- -- - --- -- p m"'
~
L,;.- .- ,
- ( * -
.'13.MS-A20:
y g- 2.
- APPENDIX ~C
.OP-901-038' does.not~ 11st those . components';; whose . position en :an' Esh-
... : 1 L. . .
signal is different t'h'anlit's. fail"ure position on a lo O e
.y. .,- ssco f Instrum,.
Air. 9
- 3. :Neither 0?-901-038 nor 0?-500-003
' reference the: inflatable Spen Tue'-
Pool. seals. 4 OP-3-016 did not, describe'.how to' set
- _ - the purge . rate. on the Ins rumen:
Air Dryers. .
> : 4 c
15. OP-3-016, Step 6.1.11 only recuirss blevdown of the system ng; du . st:: tup through SA-1271 and'IA-140. This.is satisfactory if no meisture.is discovered during blevdcun. If moisture i.s:found, thenf ,
' additional blowdown at
,,' other.poin.s may be necessarv to ensure there-
'is no moisture in the system.
A 6.
'The Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) checklists reference v
~ PSL 404-A(3) and PfL 406-A(3). The Unique Number Identification-(UNID) ' numbers 'for these valves have been changedand . - to S SSL S006-A(3).
.. A review of the training received by Operations, Maintenance ad n
Engineering personnel was performed. The review was to-determine which
=-
groups received or needed to receive training relar.ed to a loss of instru$ent air event and the adecuacy thereof. 9e a hO
'e s I
s ~V ' 1
- q;
,a 2
.- A -
t 13-MS-A207 APPENDIX C
- lb ' '
February b ,.[1959e g [3 7.1 E 1 1 ELY-00197' . 0955D
- , Co-42Y
'GC U. S. . Nuclear Regulatory Coccission
- Region -II, Suite 2900 101 Marietta: Street N. V.
Atlanta, GA 30323 l' YOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 2. 1 and OPERATING LICENSES NPF-68 AND NPF-79 GENERIC LETTER NO. 8.3-14 INSTRUMENT AIR ~ SUPPLY SYSTEM PROsLir.5 AFFECTJhd 5AFEiiiELATED EOU Gentleren: Generic Letter 88-14 requested that each licensec/ applicant review NUREG -- 1275. Volume instrument air system. 2 and perform a design and c::erational verification of the
^1 to the NRC within 130 days.A response to this generic letter was to be submitted I .
ilhe reviews and/or investigations indicate.ins chat the design i l ta liation, testing, operation and maintenance of the 11strument air systems at Plant Vogtle are adequate to ensure the proper anc reliable operatien of pneumatica lly-opera ted, safety-related equip v:rit. If you have any questions, please advise. Mr. V. G. Hairston, III states that he is a Senior Vice President of Georgia Power Powr CompanyCompany and and that, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Georgia forth in this letter and enclosures are true.to the best of his knc<1 edge and beli GEORGI \ POWER COMPANY xr ..", 7.0-.y,- ," ye :. ,; _. ; y 7,, ,
# g rJ .
v -r a;- 4 y: y *A f ff,f .,;;
,. 6. Hairston, ill ~
Sworn to and subscribed before me this / '7 '#- da< of February, 1989.
* //o - s s,, //.. .
- l. 1, *t if fl'
- i .
hoy ry ruosic WM/ijb E IDI k
.= a
\
C_2__________--------------- -- -~ I
s 13-MS-A20
.. APPEIDIX C
.. Georgiu nmer x.g.:.
1. ELi-00197' Page 2 . 1 .
- l'
Enclosure:
t
! cc: _Georcia Power Con:cany
.l Kr. P. D. R1ce
^
1 Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. GCHORMS U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Corr:is s ion Mr. M. L. Ernst. Ac;1r,9 keg ior,a i Acc.ini strator Mr. J.J. F. B.Rogge, Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (2 copies)
~
Mr. Senior Aesiden: Ins::ecter-Opera:1ons, Yeg:le
~
0 M I' P . l' C- -
I}' . f, ,
- s- y ..
7.
'13-MS-420 o
, ..; l W,.oy . .;
L ( YOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT: UNITS 1 AND 2-RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 88-14 G.L. Item li Verification by test that actual instrument air cuality is con- q l
- sistent with the manufacturers' recceendations for individu ccmponents served.
A. Actio'n Plan: ,
- 1. 1 Yerify the'Instrurent operational Air Quality fro = performance of pre-test procedures. l '
- 2. i Periodic verification during performance of preventive j maintenance Air Syste=. (PH) tasks associated with-the Instrument:
-3. 1 Select sample points and conduct ai.itional in-plant testing to measure actual instrumnt air quality. 1 4
Verify diesel generator air start system air quality from I preoperational test procedu'es. r H ' e B. Resconse: I Testing follows atofYEGP: instrument air system air quality has been accomplished as i l a
- 1. Testing activities test procedures conduring the performance of preoperational sisted of verifying the air .quslity (moisture and oil content) icrnediately devnstream of the afterfilter for each set of. dryers and at the end of selected feeder lines. This testing was accomplished in '
accordance with the YEGP stated position of conformance to Regulatory l.9.68.4.2. Guide 1.68.3 which is provided in FSAR Sectien' This staterent of conformance comitted YEGP ! to rxeting the quality requirements of AN5!/!5A 57.3-1975 for verifying moisture and oil content and noted that veri-fication of particulate size at the end of each feeder line ; is not considered necessary at YEGP since "the VEGP instru-ment air system design is such that instrument air is { i filtered at the dehumidifier and at each instrurent (by a
.y local filter /regulato-) in accordance with individual l instrument manufacturer's requirements." To meet the i
requirements of ANSI /ISA 57.3-1975, for maximum allevable oil content was established asthe acceptance ! 1 ppm (v/v) and.the r.uimum aliceable reisture content was i established at -15CF oewpoint at line pressure (see TSAR ! Section 9.3.1.2.2). The results of the preoperational test-( These results shewinc of instrurent air quality are tabulated in Tables 2.' that preoperational testing verified tha t the instrument air systems for both units pee; the , { noisture and oil content recuiremnts of ANSI /ISA 57.3-1975. l .m_ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _
v ..
-l .; -+ -
13-MS'A20 APPENDIX C 4
-p i FESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER E.S-14
, Page L 2.
For Unit 1, periodic verification during perfor:.ance of PM.}}