IR 05000317/1998099
| ML20248F183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248E333 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-98-99, 50-318-98-99, NUDOCS 9806040142 | |
| Download: ML20248F183 (7) | |
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Enclosure 1 SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT NOS. 50-317/98-99and 50-318/98-99 BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on April 24,1998, to assess the nuclear safety performance of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant for the period October 20, 1996, through April 18,1998. The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Managernent Directive (MD) 8.6 (see NRC Administrative Letter 93-20). The Board members were: Charles W. Hehl (Board Chairman), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region I (RI); Larry E. Nicholson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Rl; and S. Singh Bajwa, Director, Project Directorate 1-1, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The Board developed this assessment for the approval of the RI Regional Administrato The performance ratings and the functional areas used below are described in NRC MD 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (sat P)."
1 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - OPERATIONS Management attention and involvement in operations was properly focused on safety and resulted in a superior level of performance. Communications, procedure quality and the use of pre-evolution briefings were strengths. When problems were identified, action was promptly taken to improve performance. Operator response to transients was exemplary, with precise demonstration of command and control, proper use of emergency operating procedures, and an overall high regard for nuclear and personnel safety. Reactor startups and shutdowns and other power changes were completed without problems. Detailed safety assessments were used in planning for safety related equipment outages. Operability determinations were thorough. The operations and training departments were effective in maintaining operator knowledge and skills, although some training weaknesses were identifie Operators used good three-point communications, good shift turnovers, and good procedures, contributing to superior safety performance. Control room operators were attentive and responsive to plant conditions, and knowledgeable of the status of annunciators. Non-licensed operators were knowledgeable and performed wel Good management oversight, good pre-evolution briefings, and excellent communications were observed during plant power changes and testing. This superior level of performance was clearly demonstrated during a unit shutdown and entry into reduced inventory for repair of a reactor coolant pump sea Risk assessments were effectively used for equipment outages. BGE did a very good job in planning the removal of a safety related bus from service. The effectiveness of the planning enhanced safety by minimizing the time the bus was out of service. The coerators conducting the evolution had been effectively trained 9006040142 980526 PDR ADOCK 05000317 G PM ;
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Enclosure 1 2 for the activity and the operating staff conduct in the evolution of de-energizing and re-energizing the safety bus was excellen Technical specification implementation was generally good; however, early in the SALP period, a technical specification for a safety related door was misused. Also, later in the period, operators were slow to recognize that a secondary control element assembly indication system was inoperable. In both cases, operations management responded to the problems with an aggressive effort to reinforce technical specification compliance and the need for questioning attitude Control of the plant during unanticipated events was exemplary. During these transients, control room operators were attentive and responsive to plant conditions. The operators demonstrated good command and control, properly used procedures, and conducted appropriate status briefings, resulting in excellent operator response, and assurance that the plant remained in a safe conditio Management did a thorough review of each transient and after the cause of the problem was understood and corrected, the plant was returned to power without complicatio Management and supervisory attention to operations performance was eviden Early in the SALP period, a number of switch and valve mispositionings by operators were identified. Additionally, a lack of ownership for fuel handling activities by operations contributed to problems in this area during the 1997 Unit 1 refueling outage. In both cases, the Operations Department took comprehensive corrective actions and effectively mitigated these trends. Safety tours conducted by the general supervisors and operator performance observations conducted by shift supervisors were two examples of management oversight initiatives implemented by Operations management. During these tours, supervisors assured that plant operators used procedures correctly and used peer- and self-checking techniques when performing valve and switch manipulations. Excellent efforts also went into evaluating and minimizing control room deficiencies and operator workaround Quality assurance involvement in identifying and correcting weaknesses was eviden Although operator performance was excellent, some training weaknesses were noted, such as a lapse in training on the use of self-contained breathing apparatu While the requalification training program was good, problems were identified in the development of an initial examination for senior reactor operator candidate The Operations area is rated Category 1.
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Enclosure 1 3 11 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE Maintenance performance improved as demonstrated by improved equipment performance. increased supervisory oversight, increased accountability, and l conservative decision making contributed to these performance improvements.
l However, there continued to be maintenance related plant transients, although the l frequency of these challenges declined from last period. Increased preventive l maintenance resulted in a decline in the need for corrective maintenance, although a number of deficiencies with emergency diesel generators occurred. Good procedures, procedure use, and thorough pre-evolution briefings were a strength of the observed maintenance and surveillance testing. Good oversight of off site electrical work groups was established. Quality verification personnel provided good oversight of maintenance activitie Management involvement in improving equipment performance was evident. For ;
example, prompt and effective replacement of a power supply in the control element l l drive coil power programmer cabinets avoided an unnecessary transient on the l- plant. The root cause evaluation for a compression fitting that failed in service ( identified that corrective actions for prior compression fitting problems were inadequate. The evaluation and root cause analysis of this event were thorough and self-critica Maintenance performance was generally characterized by knowledgeable workers,
- improved field performance, and a reduction in personnel errors. As a result, the I
number and frequency of maintenance-related plant transients declined. While the reduced frequency reflected improvement in maintenance performance, some maintenance activities continued to challenge operations, including two reactor trips and one rapid shutdown' Also, a fuel transfer carriage containing an irradiated fuel
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j' assembly became stuck in the fuel transfer tube due to poor material condition of the fuel handling equipment. Late in the SALP period, there were a number of -
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material condition problems with emergency diesel generators. In one case, problems with diesel governors contributed to the plant exceeding the limiting l condition for operation time for one engin Good supervisory oversight of maintenance was observed. Management established accountability of maintenance supervisors for the performance of off-site electrical work groups used in the protected area. Using this sponsorship and with training of the groups to site work standards, the performance of these off-site groups improved. The maintenance department also implemented a performance improvement program, and timely corrective actions were taken when performance problems were identified. As a result, rework was rarely necessar Surveillance were conducted safely with good use of self-checking. With few
[ exceptions, surveillance procedures were very good. Individuals performing testing
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demonstrated good use of self-checking techniques. The pre-test briefings were good in scope, content, and level of detail. An appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to testing, consistent with its sensitivity and difficulty.
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Enclosure 1 4 Overall, the performance assessment organization provided effective monitoring of maintenance activities. For example, a leak repair that had been poorly planned was stopped by the performance assessment staff. However, there were significant problems with performance monitoring of maintenance activities in high radiation areas. These problems were reflected in the repeat problems with pre-job briefings and planning for the radiological aspects of high radiation area maintenanc The Maintenance area is rated Category I PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING l l
I Performance in the engineering area was generally effective. System engineers and i system managers were knowledgeable and responded well to technical issues, j resulting in engineering that was generally effective in contrast, there were i instances of weak engineering support to operations and maintenance, and maintenance rule implementation was deficient in multiple area ]
l During this period, management oversight in engineering was evident, resulting in l generally good program development and implementation; however, the results of l engineering efforts were mixed. Specifically, management oversight of the !
maintenance rule prom.m implementation was not effective. Maintenance rule I implementation inctded cumbersome evaluations that resulted in unacceptably :
i slow equipment classifications. Also, BGE did not effectively evaluate a degraded l condition for the power-operated relief valves within its motor operated valve i program. Industry-identified concerns in other engineering areas were adequately considered, and corrective actions related to engineering performance were :
generally comprehensiv '
i Engineering support of operations and maintenance was generally good. Resolution l of higher priority items was timely and effective. Operability determinations were
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well-written and showed an improving trend. The risk-informed decisi.on making, l self-assessment, and root cause evaluations also were satisfactory. Safety I assessments of equipment taken out of service were good, and BGE had
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implemented an effective on-line maintenance program which appropriately I
! considered risk in the scheduling and implementation of the work planning proces l Howevet, engineering failed to properly specify the power supply voltage setting for !
one channel of rod position indication, resulting in a condition outside the plant technical specifications. Also, BGE did not aggressively pursue ongoing control l room ventilation concerns within the corrective action system.
i System managers (engineers) were very knowledgeable of their assig. led systems .
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I and effectively identified and responded to technical and surveillance issues. The engineering activities related to the service water / salt water system were improve The containment tendon surveillance program was extensive, and the follow-up actions on the issues identified through the surveillance tests were appropriat However, there were a number of problems with emergency diesel generators, including poor resolution of a speed indication deficienc .
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Enclosure 1 5 Engineering performance in various other areas was generally good. Safety evaluations (10CFR50.59) were generally well-written, technically rigorous, and included appropriate supporting documentation. However, the 10CFR50.59 screen for an ammonia tank installation did not consider the UFSAR description and no safety evaluation was performed to consider if an unreviewed safety question was involved. A safety focus was evident in tiie in-service test (IST) program. Non-conservative assumptions that had existed in control room and off-site dose calculations had been identified by engineering and were being addressed in a licensing submittal to NRR. In contrast, BGE did not properly manage a commitment to the NRC to update the technical specification bases for charcoal filter testin The Engineering area is rated a Category PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT Overall performance in the plant support functional area was rated Category Poor performance in the radiological controls program was the dominant factor in establishing the rating in this area. Various corrective action efforts were not effective in preventing significant and repeated radiological control problems throughout the period. Radiological effluents and environmental programs were effective. Some problems were identified in radioactive waste shipping activitie Corrective actions in emergency preparedness were not fully effective as evidenced by repetitive dose assessment performance weaknesses and missed equipment surveillance. Plant security performance was very goo Significant problems were experienced throughout the period with the implementation and adequacy of the radiological controls program. Early in the period, multiple radiation safety barriers failed (e.g., poor pre-job surveys, briefings, and other work controls) resulting in a diver in the spent fuel pool being in vicinity i of spent fuel and very high (greater than 500 rad per hour) radiation. The seriousness of this event was not realized and a subsequent dive was allowed to occur prior to fully understanding the root causes and consequences of the original even Poor performance of the radiation protection program continued throughout the period as evidenced by inadequate control of access to locked high radiation areas, workers entering high radiation areas without proper dosimetry, and workers erecting scaffolding into a high radiation area without proper radiological surveys or posungs. Corrective actions did not prevent workers from continuing to enter containment without proper dosimetry, nor did they prevent inadequate radiological controls for work in the reactor coolant pump seal area. Additionally, there were problems with decontamination of used anti-contamination clothing and examples of failure to make radiological surveys prior to working on the fuel handling equipmen Additionally, just prior to the end of the period, deficient radiological controls resulted in an unplanned exposure and multiple examples of workers not wearing proper dosimetry during radiological work in the Unit 1 reactor vessel annulus.
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Enclosure 1 6 Significant performance deficiencies were identified in these events, including the failure to directly monitor a worker's teledosimetry, the failure to control the individual's radiation exposure to site limits, the failure to correctly calculate a worker's stay-time, and inappropriate oversight by radiation protection supervisor These problems occurred, even though the tasks were considered " higher-risk" work, requiring comprehensive planning, preparation, management oversight, and direct radiological control. The above examples indicated the licensee's ineffectiveness in addressing the significant performance deficiencies involving radiological controls. Performance assessment oversight of radiological safety was not eviden In contrast, effective contamination controls were noted. Effluent and environmental monitoring programs continued to be effective. Contamination detected in sewage sludge was identified and controlled. Overall performance in radioactive waste processing was good. However, some weaknesses were noted in radioactive shipping activities, includin0 problems with waste concentration l averaging and determination of scaling factors for certain radionuclide I Performance in emergency planning was mixed. The facilities were well maintained, and a new plant information center was commissioned. However, some surveillance of emergency preparedness communication equipment were missed. A performance weakness involving dose assessment was identified but not promptly j corrected. Scenario control and critique of the biennial exercise was wea Security performance was a strength. Security equipment was well maintained, and effective controls were established to identify and resolve security program problems. Housekeeping was very good overal The Plant Support area is rated a Category _
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Enclosure 2 Calvert Cliffs Planned NRC Inspections May 25,1998 - December 31,1998 IP-Inspection Procedure Core-minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
Core Resident Activities Not included INSPECTION TITLE / PROGRAM AREA PLANNED INSPECTION
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PROCEDURE DATES COMMENTS '
Tl 2515/109 Motor Operated Valve Program 6/1/98 Safety issue inspection IP 92904 Followup - Appendix R ltems 7/6/98 Regional Initiative IP 37550 Engineering - Support to 8/98 Regional Initiative Operations j i
IP 92904 Followup - Occupational 9/21/98 Regional Initiative i Exposure Control IP 92720 Corrective Action 9/98 Regional Initiative i IP 84750 Effluent Monitoring 11/16/98 Core IP 92904 Followup - Occupational 12/7/98 Regional Initiative Exposure Control i i
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