Regulatory Guide 3.24
| ML13038A434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/31/1974 |
| Revision: | 0 |
| From: | US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RG-3.024 | |
| Download: ML13038A434 (13) | |
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIONREGULATORY GUDIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS.REGULATORY GUIDE 3.24GUIDANCE ON THE LICENSE APPLICATION, SITING, DESIGN, ANDPLANT PROTECTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUELSTORAGE INSTALLATIONDecember 1974IDEA. INTRODUCTIONAn "independent spent fuel storage installation"(ISFSI) is a self-contained installation for storing spentfuel. It has its own support services and operatesindependently of any other facility; i.e., it is not a partof either a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessingplant. Such an installation is visualized as being capableof storing 1000 tons or more of spent light-water reactorfuel.Licensed spent fuel storage installations historicallyhave been integral parts of either fuel reprocessing plantsor nuclear power plants. Such plants have been licensedunder 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70 in addition to 10CFR Part 50.An. ISFSI, independent and separate from either anuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant, wouldbe licensed under Parts 30, 40, and 70. An applicant fora license for an ISFSI meeting the requirements for aPart 70 license would automatically satisfy the require-ments for a Part 30 and 40 license. Therefore, a licenseapplication for an ISFSI would be reviewed under therequirements of 10 CFR Part 70."Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures forEnvironmental Protection," 10 CFR Part 51, sets forththe Atomic Energy Commission's policy and proceduresfor preparing and processing environmental impactstatements and related documents pursuant to Section102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of1969 (83 Stat. 852). Certain limitations on the Com-mission's authority and responsibility pursuant to theNEPA are imposed by the Federal Water PollutionControl Act amendments of 1972 (86 Stat. 816). Theselimitations are addressed in an Interim Policy Statementpublished in the Federal Register on January 29, 1973(38 FR 2679).Regulatory Guide 4.2, "Preparation of Environ-mental Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," is generallyapplicable as a guide for the preparation of an environ-mental report for an ISFSI. Subjects that are pertinentonly to nuclear power plants are obviously notapplicable, however, and subjects that are important toan ISFSI, such as spent fuel transportation, should beemphasized.This guide discusses the license application, siteevaluation, design, and plant protection of an ISFSI. Itdescribes the measures acceptable to the Regulatorystaff for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. Inaddition, it identifies the information needed by thestaff in its evaluation of an ISFSI application.B. DISCUSSION1. General ConsiderationsAn ISFSI could be substantially larger than. anyexisting spent fuel storage installation associated witheither a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant.The ISFSl could have an inventory of long-lived fissionproducts and fissile materials greater than that in anyexisting nuclear reactor or presently projected fuelreprocdssing plant.An ISFSI will function solely in a protectivecustodial capacity, providing stable storage conditionspending some future disposition of the spent fuel. Thefuel assemblies and their contents would not be changedby the activities conducted at an ISFSI.While the spent fuel is in passive storage. decay heatand the modest pressure within the fuel tubes are theonly driving forces for dispersing the relatively largeinventory of radionuclides contained in 1000 tons ormore of spent fuel.The stored fuel elements should be protected fromincidents or accidents resulting in massive ruptures offuel elements, and the pool water level should bemaintained. Leakers should have special handling,USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisionsdesired to the US. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public Attenion Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions formethods acceptable to thp AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of mtprovementts in these guides are encouraged and should tbe sent to the Secretarythe Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques by the staff in of the Commission. US. Atomic Energy Commission. Washington, D.C. 20545,evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents. or to provide guidance to Attention Docketing and Service Section.applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliancewith them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite tothe isuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. I. Power Reactors 6. Products2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportationn3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational HealthPublished guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Reviewcomments and to reflect new information or experience. 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General including encapsulation. to provide storage conditionsequivalent to those for undamaged fuel elements.It is assumed that the storage pools will be builtbelow grade. The large heat capacity of the pools shouldallow adequate time to take corrective action in case ofan emergency. Even in the event of an earthquake orother extreme natural phenomenon, sufficient coolingcan be provided by emergency action in time to protectthe health and safety of the public.Storage pool water becomes contaminated with radio-nuclides from defective fuel elements and withactivation products on the fuel surfaces. This materialshould be confined and treated for disposal.Accident analyses should be based on the release ofthe volatile fission products contained in the stored fuelunder defined accident conditions.2. License ApplicationBecause of the substantial quantity of containedradioactivity and the cooling requirements involved in anISFSI, the review and evaluation of the engineereddesign and detailed safety analysis for the installationmust be conducted prior to licensing. For this reason, alicense application for an ISFSI should include a safetyanalysis report similar in scope and detail to thepertinent parts of a safety analysis report for a fuelreprocessing plant.The licensing of an ISFSI would be a major Federalaction within the meaning of the National Environ-mental Policy Act of 1969. Therefore an applicantshould prepare an Environmental Report that can serveas the technical basis for an evaluation by the Commis-sion of the potential environmental impact of theinstallation.Detailed engineering plans should be filed with thelicense application, and -its supporting environmentalreport at least nine months before the start of con-struction activities.A site evaluation should be provided to ensure thatthe natural characteristics of the site are sufficiently wellknown to provide the bases for the engineering design ofthe installation.The applicant's safety analysis, environmental report,and security plan are fundamental. to developing thebasis for design of the installation. The licenseapplication should take into account all proposednormal operations, any credible off-standard conditions,and the existing potential for interaction between theinstallation and the site due to natural phenomena.When a fuel storage pool is part of a reprocessing.plant or a nuclear power plant,. fuel storage pooloperators are licensed under the provisions of 10 CFRPart 55. ISFSI operators should have a comparable levelof training.3. Site SelectionSite selection criteria should be based on the safe-keeping of the relatively large inventory of radionuclidescontained in the 1000 tons or more of spent fuelexpected to be stored in the installation. The possibility*of an uncontrolled release of radionuclides, driven -bythe energy available as decay heat and gases under:pressure within the fuel cladding, should be consideredin the design of structures, systems, and components andin plant siting. Together, these criteria should be thebases for the final engineering design and can only besuitably developed from a relatively complete knowledgeof the physical characteristics of the candidate sites.The siting considerations for an ISFSI should includethe structural engineering plant siting factors, theenvironmental effects of construction, the potentialeffects of plant effluents from normal operations, andthe potential effects from off-standard conditions. Ad-ditionally, the potential for effects on the plan! and fuelin storage that might be attributable to site character-istics or the environment should be reflected in thedesign of plant structures and equipment.In general, safe storage of irradiated fuel is dependenton maintaining the integrity of the fuel cladding as theprimary barrier to the release of radioactive materials.Fuel cladding is designed to withstand a far more severeenvironment in a reactor than in a storage installation.Therefore, under the low temperature conditions ofstatic storage, the cladding provides an effective barrierto the escape of fission products and fissile materialsinto the storage facility. The installation should bedesigned to ensure that the integrity of cladding is notlost because of either mechanical damage or the effectsof excessive temperature.Historical information of public record concerningthe regional and local meteorology, geology-seismology,and hydrology should be supplemented by on-siteanalyses *to provide a basis for judgment specific to thecandidate site. From these analyses the extremes ofwind, snow, and ice loadings; the precipitation; theprobable maximum flood; the design earthquake; thesurficial and foundation geological structures; thetopography; and any potential for landslides, liquefac-tion, or subsidence should be determined.4. Design ConsiderationsThe design considerations of an ISFSI are somewhatcomparable to those for smaller facilities of the sametype at a reprocessing plant. However, particularconsideration may be needed for the ISFSI because ofits size, existence as an individual entity without thebackup of an associated facility, and loading of 1000tons or more of spent fuel with a potential inventory ofrelatively long lived fission products in excess of 109curies and with cooling requirements in excess of 107Btu/hr.The safe storage of irradiated fuel depends onmaintaining the integrity of the fuel cladding as theprimary barrier to the release of radioactive materials.The basic design consideration is the protection of thefuel cladding, not the-protection of the pool structures.The ISFSI should be designed to ensure that the3.24-2 integrity of the cladding is not lost through mechanicaldisruption or excessive temperature.An ISFSI would be licensed under the provisions of10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70. Some provisions similar tothose for plutonium processing plants would be appro-oriate for these installations. Two of these that are ofparticular importance are: (1) confinement components,systems, and structures important to safety should bedesigned and constructed to withstand natural phenom-ena and (2) quality assurance criteria such as those inAppendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 should be applied tosafety-related structures, systems, and components.a. Pool IntegrityThe design earthquake is based on the assumptionthat the storage pools will be built below grade anddesigned with a high degree of resistance to groundmotion. Furthermore, it is assumed that the storage poolor pools will be built either in impervious soils or with asecondarywater containment envelope. The leak rate ofsuch a containment envelope should be low enough that,in the event of a gross pool leak, makeup water could besupplied to the pool at a rate sufficient to keep thestored fuel adequately covered. During the design forultimate decommissioning of the installation, considera-tion should. be given to disposing of potentiallycontaminated soil or other fill materials between thepool exterior walls and the secondary pool watercontainment envelope.Large. spent fuel storage pools should be built as aseries..of separable modular units or with provisions forisolating sections of the pool when necessary. Amaximum capacity of about 500 tons of spent fuel perpool module or section appears desirable.b. Heat DissipationA 5000-ton ISFSI would be ex ected to have acooling demand in the order of 5 x 10 Btu/hr or more.No difficulty is anticipated in dissipating this quantity ofheat by conventional means. If evaporative coolers areused, a reliable water supply shouldbe available for poolmakeup water and cooling tower blowdown. RegulatoryGuide -1.27, "Ultimate Heat-Sink for Nuclear PowerPlants," gives guidance on the degree of reliabilityrequired.Certain designs of the installation and local siteconditions may result in a need for the cooling system tobe serviced by the emergency power supply system ofthe installation.c. VentilationA fraction of the fuel assemblies received forstorage at an ISFSI will presumably be "leakers," andsome fuel assemblies may develop leaks later while inlong-term storage. Such leakers should be encapsulatedin a secondary container reasonably promptly. However,until they are encapsulated, some fraction of thecontained volatile radionuclides would escape. Inaddition, cask unloading, decontamination, and otherroutine operations may result in airborne radioactivematerials.The ventilation system should be designed toprotect the operators and to keep the activity levels inthe personnel occupancy areas (and radioactive materialsin gaseous effluents) as low as practicable and within thelimits of 10 CFR Par',20.d. Liquid EffluentsRadioactive liquid effluents should not bedischarged to the natural area drainage system. If this isnot feasible, the treatment system for liquid effluentsdischarged to unrestricted areas should ensure that theradioactivity in such effluents is as low as practicableand within the limits, of 10 CFR Part 20.e. Waste TreatmentProvisions should be made to render contaminatedwastes into a form suitable for land burial or shipmentto the planned Federal repository.f. Accident Design ConsiderationsAn ISFSI should be designed to preclude thefollowing as credible accidents:(1) Criticality(2) Exposure of stored fuel through loss ofshielding water(3) Dropping of heavy loads on fuel(4) Multiple massive ruptures of fuel elements bymissiles(5) Complete loss of cooling waterg. Storage Racks *Storage racks should be designed with adequatespacing to meet criticality requirements and be struc-turally compatible with seismic and missile protectiondesign criteria.5. Physical ProtectionAn ISFSI should be protected from acts of industrialsabotage that could directly or indirectly endanger thepublic health and safety by releasing radiation (airborneradioactive particulates rather than gaseous fissionproducts). This protection should be achieved by estab-lishing and maintaining a physical protection system asrequired by 10 CFR Part 73.Further, interfacing the security organization and itsfunctions with the plant should be considered. Iden-tifying vital equipment, as defined in 10 CFR §73.2(i),and integrating physical protection considerations intothe layout and design of the installation as early aspossible should help preclude requirements for sub-sequent modification of the installation.3.24-3 Site location is important with respect to theavailability of timely and significant assistance fromlocal law enforcement authorities (LLEAs) in the eventof attempted industrial sabotage. A progressively larger*onsite guard force will be needed as the distance of thenearest significant LLEA increases. In particular,licensees who possess or use SNM are required by 10CFR Part 73 to take certain actions to protect theinstallation against industrial sabotage. The particularactions applicable to a spent fuel storage installation areprescribed in §73.50, which requires:a. A physical security organization including asupervisor, qualified armed guards, and written securityprocedures.b. Physical barriers, including multiple barriers andmonitored intervening clear areas and isolation zones.c. Detection and alarm systems, with annunciators intwo continuously manned central alarm stations .andself-checking and tamper-indicating capability.d. Access controls to limit entrance of personnel,vehicles, and packages into protected and vital areas,including use of metal and explosives detectors, randomsearches, badging system, escorts, and appropriate keys,locks, andcombinations.e. Communication systems, including continuouscommunication between each guard and the centralalarm station, capability to request assistance from theLLEA, two-way radio voice communication, con-ventional telephone service, and independent powersource.f. Liaison with local law enforcement autfioritiescapable of providing assistance to the licensee's securityorganization in the event of a security threat.g. Testing and maintenance of security equipment.Section 73.40 requires submission of a security plan tothe Commission for approval. Such security plans consistof two parts. Part I should discuss vital equipment, vitalareas, and isolation zones. It should also demonstratehow the applicant plans to comply with the require-ments of 10 CFR Part 73 cited above. Part II should listtests, inspections, and other means to be used todemonstrate compliance with such requirements..C. REGULATORY POSITION1. License ApplicationThe applicable regulatory requirements are in thefollowing parts of 10 CFR:19 -Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers;Inspections20 -Standards for Protection Against Radiation30 -Rules of General Applicability to Licensing ofByproduct Material40 -Licensing of Source Material51 -Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Proce-dures for Environmental Protection70 -Special Nuclear Material71 -Packaging of Radioactive Material forTransport and Transportation of Radioactive MaterialUnder Certain Conditions73 -Physical Protection of Plants and MaterialsThe applicant should provide:a. An emergency plan.. consistent with 10 CFR§70.24(a)(2), such as Annex B which is currentlyroutinely incorporated in Part 70 licenses. A copy ofAnnex B is attached as Appendix A to this guide.b. A quality assurance program consistent with 10CFR.Part 50, Appendix B. A description of the programand current status .of project design and procurementactivities should be included in the license application. Acopy of the applicant's Quality Assurance Manualcovering design and procurement should be submitted tothe appropriate Regulatory Operations Regional Office30 days before the license application.c. Design criteria consistent ;with those in theproposed 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix P, "General DesignCriteria for FuelReprocessing Plants."*d. Design criteria consistent with those in Sections Iand 11. of the proposed 10.CFR Part 50, Appendix Q,"Design Criteria for the Protection of Fuel ReprocessingPlants and the Licensed Material Therein."*e.. A two-part security plan consistent with 10 CFR§73.50.f. Information .sufficient to demonstrate thefinancial qualifications of the. applicant to carry out theactivities for which the license is sought.g. Financial information pertinent to the proposed-decommissioning plan.h. .A site evaluation based on the factors, to theextent applicable to an ISFSI, identified in § 100.10(b),(c), and (d). of 10 CFR Part 100. This evaluation shouldcontain an analysis, and evaluation of the majorstructures, systems, and components of the installationthat bear significantly on the acceptability of the site forits intended use.i. A summary description and discussion of theinstallation, with special, attention to design andoperating characteristics, unusual or novel designfeatures, and principal safety considerations.j. The principal, design features for the installation,including:(1) The principal design criteria for the instal.lation. (See proposed Appendix P to 10 CFR Part 50 forguidance.*)(2) The design bases and the relation of the designbases to the principal design criteria.(3) Information relative to materials of con-struction, general arrangement, and approximatedimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurancethat the final design will conform to the design bases.with an adequate margin for safety.*39 FR 26293, July. 18, 1974.3.24-4
-~a ilysi(ifid valualion W the ?design ýand .peffhtm'ce ... .. f systems, and ýcomponeMts;.ofibth iisait ný e i-js mijpperiuing -servides-v with"-.the objective of assessing the risk to the publich)healthiband safety resulting from the operation of the instal-lation and includiif tlg rm ofinatiai (f-)io iflnfP. .,(1) The margins of safety during normal andabiio a.'Lcqnditfins- ntiipated, durgiihe'life of the('2' ('2) rbtý,adequacy ",.of;itructures, ;systermsT-and,components provided for the mitigation:of.the:,con-sequences of accidents, including natural phenomenaeven ts. 1; .. .. ; "' i.- :1. An identification of the variables, conditions, orother items that are determined. to be the probablesubjects of license conditions for the installation.m. An identification of any items requiring researchor development to confirm the adequacy of their design;an identification and description of the research ordevelopment program that will be conducted to resolveany safety questions associated with the plannedinstallation and its operation; and a schedule of therequired programs showing that such safety questionswill be resolved before completion of construction ofthe facility..n. The technical qualifications of the applicant toengage in the proposed activities and his personneltraining program.o. A description of the instrumentation and controlsystems and of the auxiliary and emergency systems.p. A description of radioactive waste handling,treatment, and disposal systems.q. A description of the means for controlling andlimiting radioactive effluents and radiation exposures toplant personnel. to levels that are as low as practicableand well within the limits set forth in 10 CFR Part 20.r. An estimate of the quantities of each of theprincipal radionuclides expected to be released ingaseous and liquid effluents to unrestricted areas duringnormal operations.s. An identification of a spectrum of design basisincidents (DBIs) due to industrial sabotage, thepossibility of which reasonably exists although thelikelihood may be small. The plant design and securitysystem should be evaluated in terms of adequacy topreclude or to minimize the danger to the public thatmay ensue in the event of a design basis incident. A"design basis incident" in this case is a postulatedcredible incident and the resulting conditions for whichsecurity related equipment meets its functional ob-jectives. Examples of security related incidents include acredible armed intrusion, breach of a protective barrier.or malfunction of security equipment.t. A description of systems used to clean up andmake up pool water, with particular emphasis on thecapacity of these systems to handle the volumes involvedand both soluble and insoluble radionuclides.u. A description of plans for preoperational testing ofthe installation.2. iteiSelection:... .... ...e-i" xal, I 0 6'l;. .-GI:.i tL , i,. .n:< IT site;,.sould the, nfollowi~g, conitd i rio s ir 1: j ',, -.- -.(1) ,:Twrershould! .he m o stoApes, close enough to theprnoposedyi insiallation:-.to;ube ,a;:landslide hazard. Alter-natively., ;the !lopes!,shouldj,;be;,engineexedIto. remainstable.,with :a conservative !factor of safety iunder bothstatic: and dynamic conditions.(2) Capable, faults* should-be sufficiently -remoteto preventr surface movements on the -main strand or anysplay in the site area.(3) Foundation material should be unweatheredbedrock or other material with a low liquefactionpotential.(4) There should be no potential for differentialsubsidence such as that associated with karst topo-graphy, solution cavities, differential compaction, orman's activities (such as fluid withdrawal from thesubsurface and .extraction of minerals). Karst topo-graphy need not necessarily eliminate a site fromconsideration if the applicant can show that thepotential. for sudden collapse can be eliminated byremedial work.b. GeologyInformation should be provided to show that siteconditions meet the above criteria. This information canbe obtained from literature reviews and on-site fieldinvestigations such as.the following:(1) A visual inspection of the site and study ofrainfall, geologic structure, and topography 'can provideinformation to show that there is no landslide hazard tothe fuel storage installation. Detailed investigations maybe required to determine stability under dynamic (earth-quake) loading conditions.(2) The absence of capable faults and the stabilityof the foundation material can be determined byreviewing literature and confirming geotechnical siteinvestigations. The site investigations may vary fromprograms involving a simple visual examination for a sitewith completely exposed bedrock foundation materialto programs that require trenching and stripping for siteswith bedrock covered by a thin (up to 15 ft) layer ofunconsolidated material. Sites with deep soil will requiremore detailed programs, including but not limited totrenching, stripping, drilling, hydrologic testing,laboratory and field testing of soil properties, andgeophysical surveys.Onsite investigations may reveal fractures. Ifso, conclusive evidence should be presented to demon-strate that the fractures have not been displaced or arenot capable faults.(3) The absence of a potential for sudden sub-sidence can be determined from the literature review and*See 10 CFR 100 Appendix A for a definition of capable faults.3.24-5 on-site investigations. Investigations will reveal whetheror not the site is underlain by limestoneý,)4blbimi,."gypsum, or other soluble material that can result in karsttopography. If such material is known to iindmlie thesite, then onsite examinations can be expected to revealth"1 96tigtik[l dd n orsof such a potential would be the presence of sink,'lhlbE4;:-soin lnraxul&ie.-T1 iA sl~I~s4t:ia a ?f$eW of re~ `sis ri"ofrtMihoring.611i ¶nd miring activities, orother activities such as waste, itlsposalror-ý'rawval.of.flffidsg the, n be eipewtad. rto providethe riirifoi mationfneeided ,,to": datermine .,,hethr. ,suchactivities have affected the site to the-extent -that theyhaveipioduced apotýentiai for sudden subsidence. Shouldsuch a potential be indicated, a more detailed investiga-tion should be performed.c. Seismology -Design Earthquake(1) General Seismic HistoryA full review of the seismic history of theregion in which the site is to be located should be madeto identify earthquakes that have taken place in historictime and that could affect the selection of a DesignEarthquake. All earthquakes within the same tectonicprovince as the site (or adjacent tectonic province to thesite if near a border) should be examined for location,size, reliability. of data, and effect on the site. Tectonicmaps should be used to define the tectonic province(s)of significance to the site.(2) Specific Seismic HistoryHistoric earthquakes that may have affectedthe site itself should also be considered. All those thatresulted in or are projected to have had an intensity ofIV or greater at the plant site should be included in theconsideration. (Intensity IV earthquakes can bedetermined by a review of the U. S. Coast & GeodeticSurvey, National Oceanographic and AtmosphericAdministration, and U. S. Geological Survey literature.)All earthquakes with an epicentral intensity ofV or greater should be shown in a table. This tableshould include the following estimated or measureddata:(a) Earthquake magnitude or highest inten-sity;(b) Location of the epicenter or region ofhighest intensity;(c) For earthquakes with intensities of VII orgreater at the site, an estimate of the resulting intensityor acceleration and duration of ground shaking at thesite.An appropriate time span should be considered forvarious intensity levels if a statistical analysis is applied.It should be recognized that there may beappreciable differences between the characteristics ofthe material underlying the epicentral location and thecharactedstibs if h o hghe -.s .I(3) Definition:-of lgiw ogq Al f B!quake event that has a reasonably high ofocuurreazeýr based ,on studies! -of .hiWrx j.sei ci ty: andstUttumaligeology.,...;.. .(4) Determination of the Design EarthquakeIn evaluating historic seismicity and regionalstructural geology, the historic earthquakes identifiedfrom the above investigations should be associated withtectonic structures to the extent practical.If historic earthquake. data indicate a highincidence of earthquakes along only a particular portionof a tectonic structure, the probability of similarearthquakes in the future should be assumed uniformlythroughout the same segment of the tectonic structure.(Where geologic evidence indicates that the structure is amajor, continuous, through-going structure withsignificant displacement, a more conservative assumptionmay be appropriate.) These earthquakes should be usedin determining the maximum vibratory motion at thesite that could be caused by an earthquake related to thetectonic structure.Correlation of tectonic structure and historicseismicity may not be possible because (a) there isinsufficient data or (b) seismicity appears uniform over anetwork of tectonic. structures ,or cannot be correlatedwith specific structures. If so, the. seismicity should beidentified with the tectonic province in which it isreported.(5) Selection of a Design EarthquakeIn view of the limited consequences of seismicevents in excess of those used as the basis for.seismicdesign, it appears appropriate that the design earthquakedeveloped from the above information -should be such asto have a predicted recurrence interval of about once ina thousand years.d. MeteorologyWhile an elaborate continuing program ofmonitoring and measuring on-site meteorologicalphenomena comparable to that for a fuel reprocessingplant should not be necessary, the consequences of therelease. of airborne radioactivity under both normal andaccident conditions should be determined by theapplicant. Regulatory Guide 1.23, "On-Site Meteoro-logical Programs," provides guidance for the basicelements~of a suitable-program.3.24-6 The meteorology program should be commen-surate with the postulated modes (release height andduration) of releases of airborne radionuclides undernormal and accident conditions, as determined by theapplicant and confirmed by the staff. Guidance is givenin Regulatory Guide 1.23 (Safety Guide 23), "OnsiteMeteorological Programs."Presentation of long-term historical records of theextremes of temperature, precipitation, wind, snow, andice, and their resultant loading parameters, should beincluded to aid in evaluating the design bases. Addi-tionally, site-safety considerations require that the jointfrequency distribution of wind direction, velocity, anastability be sufficiently well known to demonstrate withconfidence the probable dispersion of airborne effluents.Representative (preferably onsite) data and conservativeatmospheric diffusion models such as those presented inRegulatory Guide 1.3, "Assumptions Used for Eval-uating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Lossof Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors," maybe used to estimate the dispersion of airborne effluents.The occurrence of extreme weather phenomenasuch as hurricanes, tornados, water spouts, and violentthunderstorm activity should be considered as part ofthe site safety analysis to provide the essential technicalbasis for site selection and installation design. Thetornado history in the area should be evaluated andapplied to the analysis of safety as a potential source ofmissiles. Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornadofor Nuclear Power Plants," is applicable to an ISFSI.Also applicable is WASH 1300, "Technical Basis forInterim Regional Tornado Criteria." The data applicableto the. selected site in these documents should be used indeveloping the missile protection design bases.The consequences of accidents due to extremeweather conditions including missiles should be eval-uated based on (1) a postulated release of a justifiablefraction of the stored available inventory of volatileradionuclides in the spent fuels that have experienced theminimum decay time since reactor shutdown for whichthe ISFSI is designed and (2) expected adverse atmo-spheric diffusion conditions. The techniques in Regu-latory Guide 1.25 (Safety Guide 25), "AssumptionsUsed for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Conse-quences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the FuelHandling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pres-surized Water Reactors," are applicable to this eval-uation.e. HydrologyThe overriding considerations from the standpointof hydrology are the potential interactions of the ISFSIand the natural water bodies, surface, and groundassociated with the site, Direct communication betweenthe fuel storage environment and surface or groundwaters should be precluded. Such communication cangenerally be presented through controlled circulation ofcoolant water and retention, cleanup, and controlledrelease of potentially contaminated waste waters.Appropriate site selection can limit the potentialfor flooding. A high ground site above historical floodplains is more suitable than a site at lower elevation. Theapplicant should identify a design basis flood for thepurpose of evaluating the safety of the selected site; thedesign of structures, equipment, and componentsessential to the protection of the public health andsafety; and the possible consequences of a flood equal tothe Probable Maximum Flood or of floods caused bymeans of comparable risk other than precipitation. TheProbable Maximum Flood or the controlling floodconditions characteristic of the region and site should beconsidered in evaluating site safety.At iocations near large surface bodies of water, theoccurrence of tsunami and seiches should be considered.The historical basis for assumptions should bedocumented, along with the estimated consequences ofsuch phenomena. General information requirements onthis subject are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.59,"Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Plants."Cooling water discharges such as those caused bycooling tower blowdown to surface waters are regulatedunder the Federal Water Pollution Control ActAmendments of 1972 (86 Stat. 816). The applicantshould determine what present and proposed regulationsare applicable to the. selected site. Section 401(a)( ) ofthe Act requires, in part, that any applicant for a licensefor an installation such as an ISFSI provide the AECwith certification from the State that any discharge willcomply with applicable effluent limitations and otherwater pollution control requirements. In the absence ofsuch certification, no license can be issued by the AECunless the State fails or refuses to act within a reasonableperiod of time,The applicant should make conservative calcula-tions of the dispersion and dilution capabilities andpotential contamination pathways of the groundwaterenvironment of the proposed installation underoperating and accident conditions. Applications for alicense for an ISFSI at sites that are in areas with acomplex groundwater hydrology should includeassessment of potential impacts on the groundwatersystem. Similar assessments should be made for siteslocated over major aquifers that are used for domestic orindustrial water supplies or for irrigation water.f. Water SupplyWater from surface or groundwater sources shouldbe suitable, both in quality and quantity available, foruse by the ISFSI on a uninterruptible basis. The need tomaintain a depth of high quality shielding/coolant waterconditioned to control corrosion, algae growth, and scaledeposition is fundamental to the operational safety of anISFSI. The availability of highly dependable supplies ofhigh quality water is therefore a prinrw) considerationfor site selection.Guidance on methods for ensuring reliability ofthe water supplies for normal and emergency use isavailable in Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink3.24-7 for Nuclear Power Plants," and Section 2.4 of Regula-tory. Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content ofSafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants." Theengineering design description should delineate thebounds of the water supply systems and provide detailsconcerning volume, transfer capability, alternativesources, pumping capability, redundant equipment andcomponents, operating procedures, and maintenanceplans.Water use and the resulting commitment of naturalresources should be addressed in the applicant'senvironmental report.g. Site Evaluation Considerations(1) Design FeaturesNormal operations of an ISFSI should notresult in the release to the unrestricted area of contami-nated liquid effluents containing radioactive materials inconcentrations exceeding the ALAP design objectives forlight-water-cooled nuclear power plants.*The structure enclosing the fuel storage poolshould have an appropriate ventilation and filtrationsystem to limit the release of gaseous and entrainedparticulate radioactive mateiials under normal operatingconditions to quantities that will not exceed the ALAPdesign objectives for light-water-cooled nuclear powerplants.*The heating, ventilating, and air conditioningsystem should provide for controlled leakage of air fromthe fuel storage pool and the cask handling areas underall normal and off-standard operating conditions. Thestructure enclosing these areas need not be designed towithstand extremely high wind loadings, but leakageshould be suitably controlled under all conditions of fueltransfer and storage. The design of the ventilation andfiltration system should be based on experience insimilar facilities and on the assumption that the claddingon a fraction of the stored fuel might be breached as aresult of an accident. The inventory of radioactivematerials available for leakage from the building shouldbe based on the average fuel characteristics used for thedesign basis fuel.The use of a closed-circuit shielding/coolantwater system is assumed. This is a prudent means oflimiting the risk of releasing radioactive material to theunrestricted area. Drains, permanently connectedsystems, and other features that by maloperation orfailure could cause loss of coolant that would uncoverfuel should not be installed or included in the design.Systems designed for maintaining water quality andquantity should be designed so that any maloperation orfailure in those systems from any cause will not causethe fuel to be uncovered.*WASH 1258, Volumes 1 and 2. "Numerical Guides for DesignObjectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet theCriterion 'As Low as Practicable' for Radioactive Material inLight-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plant Effluents."Reliable and frequently tested pool watermonitoring equipment should be provided to providealarm both locally and in a continuously mannedlocation if the water level in the fuel storage pool fallsbelow a predetermined level or if there is a high localradiation level. The high radiation level instrumentationshould automatically actuate the pool water filtrationsystem.Similarly, reliable and frequently tested airmonitoring equipment should be provided to alarm bothlocally and in a continuously manned location if theactivity level in air from the storage pool areas exceedspreset limits or if high radiation levels are detected. Anautomatic interlock with the high radiation levelinstrumentation should actuate the ventilation confine-ment system.(2) Off-Standard ConditionsThe full range of conditions outside thenormal operating modes should be considered off-standard conditions. For the purpose of this guidance,off-standard conditions are considered to be bounded bynormal operations on the one hand and design basisaccidents on the other.(a) Process DeviationsThe applicant should provide a compre-hensive safety analysis that takes into account the fullrange of tasks and the conditions to be preserved for safeoperation. Engineering estimates of the potential hazardsand consequences that may be associated with operatingoutside the bounds of normal conditions should beincluded. The analysis should determine the safeoperating range of critical unit operations, identifypotentially controllable off-standard conditions ordesign features, and establish actions appropriate formitigating the consequences of off-standard conditions.(b) Loss of PowerLoss of power is a site-safety-related off-standard condition of potentially serious consequences.Circulation and cooling requirements will probablyrequire continuous pumping capability. Ancillarysystems for safety and security should providecontinuous instrument, lighting, alarm, and ventilationcontrol power. Availability of reliable primary power toessential systems is a basic consideration for siteselection. Redundant §ystems for alternative powersources or auxiliary systems such as diesel generatorinstallations can support the primary power source.(3) Natural PhenomenaThe site-safety analysis provides a technicalbasis for design criteria considerations of plant-siteinteractions. The potential actions bctween the naturalenvironment and man-made structures are factors in siteselection that should influence engineering judgments inchoosing among design alternatives..24-8i:,
.(a) MeteorologySite-safety considerations require thatmeteorological parameters such as wind direction,velocity, atmospheric stability, and the joint frequencyof occurrence be known well enough to demonstratethat the .joint dispersion of gaseous and particulateeffluents will be predictable, within the bounds ofconservative models conventionally used for analyzingthe radiological consequences of accidental releases ofradioactive materials.(b) HydrologyIf pool water leaks to the ground,adequate time should be available to sink survey wellsfor any monitoring that might be considered necessaryafter the leak occurs and the. region to be monitored isdefined. In addition, strategically located inspectionwells should be sunk at the time of construction tocheck for subsurface water movement and possibleoutleakage.h. Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, PopulationCenter DistanceThe applicant should determine the exclusion area,low population zone, and population. center distanceusing a method analogous to that given in § 100.11 of 10CFR Part 100. This procedure involves an estimate of:.(1) The potential risk from the most severe upperlimit accident and(2) Dose rates at .various. points downwind due tothe. passage of the resulting radioactive cloud (underconservative atmospheric dispersion conditions).No minimum values have been established forthe size of the exclusion area, distance to the outerboundary of the low population zone (LPZ). or popu-lation center distance. Past practice has usually been toestablish, the population center distance as being atleast 1 1/3 times the distance from the installation tothe outer boundary of. the LPZ. Typically, the. distanceto, the boundary of the LPZ is about 3 miles..The.applicant should identify industrial, military,or other installations in the area with which the.ISFSImay potentially interact.i. Accident AnalysisThe considerations of normal operations, off-standard conditions, design basis accidents, and naturalphenomena provide part of the technical basis foiassessing the suitability of structures, equipment, andcomponents relative to candidate sites. The accidentanalyses complement and supplement the other analysesby considering the possible effects of events that arecharacteristically infrequent, sudden, and potentiallyserious incidents. Such events include:(1) Leaking fuel assemblies,(2) Fire,(3) Loss of coolant or cooling capability,(4) Dropped fuel assembly shipping cask duringcask handling operations.(5) Missile penetration of the storage buildingwith fuel damaged in storage,(6) Natural phenomena,(7) Very low probability accidents (such as air-craft crashes).The applicant should perform detailed engineeringanalyses of such accidents and their calculated potentialeffects in terms of radiation dose commitment toindividuals and populations within, the region that mightbe affected. Such analyses will provide the -technicalbasis for judging the suitability of the selected site andthe proposed plant design.3. Design ConsiderationsThe ANSI draft standard N305, Revision 7, dated'November 8, 1974,* "Design Objectives for HighlyRadioactive Solid Material Handling and StorageFacilities in a Reprocessing Plant," is applicable to anISFSI with the following exceptions and clarifications:"Section 2, Glossary of Terms":The terms "Operating Basis Earthquake" (OBE) and"Safe Shutdown Earthquake" (SSE) are not applicableto an ISFSI. Rather, the term Design Earthquake asdefined in Section. C.2.c. of this document is applicable."Section 3,. Structural Criteria":"3.1.2.2 Missiles" -The missiles of interest are thosethat could rupture fuel within the pool or could damageequipment. or structures that could fall into the pool andpotentially rupture stored fuel.In addition, the Regulatory staff considers the followingdesign requirements to be applicable:a. The design should preclude cask handling cranespassing over the fuel storage pools.b. The building itself need not be designed towithstand high winds, provided critical, equipment isprotected. * .c. The design basis for the ventilation system shouldbe defined. This definition should include a descriptionof the emergency air cleanup system used to accom-modate ruptured fuel. Calculations should be based onthe design basis fuel characteristics.d.. The heat removal system pumps, heat exchangers,and associated piping should be protected from credibleaccidents and have a backup power supply. However, ifthe applicant can show that under emergency conditionsthe pool structure can stand the' stresses imposed, thatthe consequences of any loss of normal coolingcapability will not lead to excessive radiation doses, and*Copies of this draft standard may be obtained from theAmerican Institute of Chemical Engineers, 345 E. 47th St.,New York, N.Y. 10017.H3.24-9 that there is an assured source of pool makeup water,cooling by boiling of the pool water is acceptable andthe cooling system need not be protected fromaccidents. The makeup system should be capable ofwithstanding any credible accident or a backup watersystem capability should be provided. If the backupsystem is not permanently installed, the applicant shouldshow that the time required to implement the system'suse is less than the time required for hazardousconditions to develop. If the pool structure cannotwithstand the stress of water boiling, the cooling systemshould be designed and built to withstand any crediblesite-related natural phenomena. The makeup coolantwater system should be equally reliable.e. Onsite radioactive waste treatment facilities shouldbe provided. These facilities should be designed torender all site generated wastes into a form suitable forinterim storage and ultimate final disposal.f. Provisions should be made for (1) receipt of casksunder abnormal circumstances, such as loss of coolant,and (2) expected cask maintenance, repair, -andmodification activities.g. A cask drop analysis should be made. This analysisindicates the need to provide a shock absorber in thebottom of the cask unloading pool (CUP).h. The storage pools should be of modular design.Each module should have a maximum capacity of about500 tons of spent fuel.4. Physical ProtectionSome of the guidance on physical protectionprovided in Regulatory Guides 5.7, 5.12, 5.20, and 5.30is applicable to an ISFSI. Regulatory Guide 5.7."Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, VitalAreas, and Material Access Areas," is applicable forthose parts related to material access areas (i.e., sectionsD.2, D.3, and D.5.b). Regulatory Guide 5.12, "GeneralUse of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilitiesand Special Nuclear Materials," and Regulatory Guide5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Qualifying of Guardsand Watchmen," are applicable in their entirety.Regulatory Guide 5.30, "Materials Protection Con-tingency Measures for Uranium and Plutonium FuelManufacturing Plants," is generally applicable except forthose parts regarding emergency protection measuresthat affect activities appropriate only to material accessareas.a. Vital Areas and Vital EquipmentSeveral specific areas at an ISFSI should bedesignated vital areas because of their importance forprotection against sabotage:(1) The cask unloading area should be a separatepool connected by a canal to the main storage poolsystem. The unloading pool should be designated a vitalarea.(2) The spent fuel storage area should bedesignated a vital area. It includes the pool systemconsisting of the water containment structure and thesupporting auxiliary systems used to maintain appro-priate radiation shielding and cooling. Vital equipmentin this area includes the nuclear fuel in storage, fuelstorage racks, radiation monitoring and alarm systemsfor fuel cladding leakage, pool water leakage detectionsystem and liquid level monitors, pool water lossmakeup and ,cleanup systems, decay heat removalsystem, ventilation and confinement system, andemergency systems for purposes such as fire protection.(3) The onsite auxiliary power supply system,regardless of its location, is considered vital.(4) The onsite central alarm stations should bedesignated vital areas. Vital equipment in these areasincludes communication equipment; primary controland annunciation equipment for alarms; metal andexplosive detectors; card-key readers; closed circuittelevision; and an independent power supply system(i.e.,, backup or emegency power).b. Physical Protection Design Criteria(1) The design of an ISFSI should be based on thephysical protection criteria set forth for fuel repro-cessing plants in proposed Appendix Q to 10 CFR Part50.*(2) The design, fabrication, erecting, and testingof structures, systems, and components important tophysical protection of the facility should be conductedin accordance with an acceptable quality assuranceprogram, as outlined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,"Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plantsand Fuel Reprocessing Plants."(3) The concept of isolation (e.g., automation,remote handling, and controlled access) should beincorporated into the design. The isolation should limitaccess to vital areas or equipment to only thoseindividuals who require access.for essential purposes orfor performance of duty.* (4) The location and arrangement of equipment ina vital area should be evaluated with respect to the needfor the equipment to be contained in that location andthe capability for regular testing and inspection. Equip.ment other than. process or vital equipment should notbe located in a vital area.(5) Equipment used to store, transfer, or protectmaterial or to protect the plant should be designed tofacilitate maintenance and testing so that compliancewith applicable regulations and license conditions can beverified.(6) The double barrier concept, controlled access.monitored isolation zones, designation of vital areas, andthe use of keys, locks, and combinations should beintegrated into the facility layout and design.(7) Isolation zones should be monitored toprovide timely detection of intrusion and to permit*39 FR 26293, July 18, 1974.3.24-10 subsequent guard action and notification of the local lawenforcement agencies (LLEA).(8) Isolation zones and clear areas betweenbarriers should be illuminated to at least 0.2 foot-candle.(9) The design for access control of personnel,packages, and vehicles through physical barriers shouldinclude provisions for verifying identity and authority,alarming, emergency exits, operating unmanned exits,searching packages and individuals upon entering, anddetecting firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices.(10) The design should preclude simultaneoushandling of shipments of irradiated fuel and receipt ofmaterials other than irradiated fuel in a single area.(11) The .facility should be designed to permitcontinuous surveillance of occupied vital areas andalarming of unoccupied vital areas.(12) The facility should provide backup meanssuch as emergency power and redundant hardware. Itshould accommodate alternative procedures to providecontinued protection in such events as power failure,equipment malfunction, or individual guardincapacitation.(13) Alarm systems should be designed to meetperformance and reliability. characteristics described in§ 73.50(d)(1).(i4). Communications equipment for use by plantpersonnel and the LLEA should be designed withappropriate re dundancy and flexibility, as described in§73.50(e)(1) through (4).c. Security PlanA two-part security plan should be submitted witha license application for an ISFSI..As a minimum, thefollowing elements should be addressed:(1) Security force equipment. organization,responsibilities; and.procedures.(2) Integration of security provisions with the siteand installation layout.(3) A description of the physical protectionfeatures of the installation.(4) Security ajeas, including those protected byphysical barriers and isolation zones: vital areas andequipment. *-(5) Access monitors'and controls- for personnel,vehicles, and packages; a badge system; access authoriza-tion and registration; personnel escort; and the use ofkeys, locks, and combinations.(6) Surveillance systems, including intrusion anddetection alarms.* (7) Central alarm and communication systems.(8) Response capability assessment arid followupfor alarms and threats.(9) Availability of assistance from local lawenforcement agencies.(10) Testing and inspection of security relatedequipment and devices.(11) Maintenance of control records.(12) Security audit program.D. IMPLEMENTATIONThe purpose of this section isto provide informationto applicants and licensees regarding the Regulatorystaff's plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.Except in those cases in whichthe applicant proposesan alternative method for complying with specifiedportions of the Commission's regulations, the methodsdescribed herein will be used in the evaluation of licenseapplications docketed after January 11 1975.3.24-11 APPENDIX AANNEX B to 10 CFR Part 70, Licenses"Emergency Plan"MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSEE'S PLANS FORCOPING WITH RADIATION EMERGENCIESThe licensee shall develop and maintain an emergency plan and implementing procedures for coping with radiationemergencies which shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:1. An organization for coping with radiation emergencies, in which specific authorities, responsibilities, and duties areclearly defined and assigned. The methods used to assure that persons assigned specific authority and responsibility areinitially qualified and are periodically trained so that they can continue to properly fulfill their duties should bespecified. The means of notifying persons assigned to the organization in the event of an emergency and the means ofnotifying appropriate local, state, and Federal agencies so that emergency action beyond the site boundary may betaken should be specified.2. A list of employees of the licensee (by position), other than those assigned to the emergency organization, whohave any special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions. A similar list shall be made of other personswhose assistance may be needed. The special qualifications of these employees and persons shall be specified. All of theforegoing lists shall be available to the individuals responsible for directing the action necessary to cope with theemergency.3. The actions planned to protect the health and safety of individuals and to prevent damage to property both withinand outside the site boundary in the event of various types of emergencies that can be anticipated, i.e., internalaccidents such as criticality, fire, and explosions, and natural occurrences such as floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes.This should include the means for determining: (i) the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials, includingguidelines for evaluating the need for notification and participation of local, state and Federal agencies, and (ii) thetype and extent of protective action to be taken within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety andprevent damage to property.:4. The post-accident recovery and reentry actions including guidelines for implementing these actions which shallinclude (i) corrective actions that may be necessary to terminate or minimize the consequences of the accident, (ii)criteria for plant reentry, (iii) securing the accident area from inadvertent or unauthorized reentry, (iv) and resumptionof operations.5. Procedures for notifying and agreements to be reached with local, state, and Federal officials for the early warningof the public and for appropriate protective measures should such measures become necessary or desirable.6. Provisions for maintaining up to date: (i) the organization for coping with emergencies, (ii) the procedures for usein emergencies, and (iii) the lists of persons with special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions.7. The specifications for emergency first aid and personnel decontamination facilities, including:(i) Identification of individuals directly involved in the accident;(ii) Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;(iii) Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of personnel;(iv) Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate emergency first aid treatment;(v) Arrangements for the services of a physician and other medical personnel' qualified to handle radiationemergencies; and(vi) Arrangements for transportation of injured or contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside thesite boundary.8. Arrangements for treatment of individuals at treatment facilities outside the site boundary.9. Provisions for testing, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to assure that employees of the licensee arefamiliar with their specific duties. Provisions for participation in the drills by other persons whose assistance may beneeded in the event of a radiation emergency shall be included.3.24-12 10. The provisions for the training of persons other than employees of the licensee whose assistance may be needed inthe event of a radiation emergency.I1. Provisions for maintenance and storage of emergency equipment, considering the various types of accidents thatcan be anticipated, also, the performance criteria of the various types of equipment.The licensee's emergency plan shall consist of a document providing the objectives and the bases for the actions to betaken to cope with various types of accidents which affect, or threaten the health and safety of the general public,employees of the licensee or other persons temporarily or permanently assigned to the facility. It should specify theobjectives to be met by the' implementing procedures and should assign organizational and individual responsibilities toachieve such objectives.Emergency procedures shall consist of a document defining in detail the implementation actions and methods necessaryto achieve the objectives of the emergency plan for each set of circumstances considered in the emergency plan. To theextent possible these two documents should be separated.1-=3.24-13