05000282/FIN-2016004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Properly Implement a Post-Maintenance Test Procedure during Safety Injection System Valve Testing |
| Description | Green. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed, and an associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to properly implement surveillance procedure (SP) 1088B, Train B Safety Injection Quarterly Test, Revision 24, while performing a post-maintenance valve stroke test. Specifically, on November 14, 2016, while cycling a safety injection (SI) system pump suction valve, operators exposed the SI suction header to reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure, causing a relief valve to lift as designed, a subsequent unexpected RCS pressure drop below 240 pounds per square inch (psig), and requiring operators to trip both reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). The licensee entered the issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CAP 1541821. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to properly implement procedure SP 1088B as required by TS 5.4.1.a was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor and a finding in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Configuration Control and affected the associated Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Since the finding pertained to an event while the plant was shut down, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Since the inspectors answered No to all questions within IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the performance characteristic of the finding that was the most significant causal factor of the PD was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Teamwork in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, and involved individuals and work groups not communicating and coordinating their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety was maintained. [H.4] |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2016004 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Hausman G O'Dwyer J Bozga K Riemer L Haeg M Garza M Jones N Feliz-Adorno P Laflamme P Zurawski R Baker S Bell |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2016004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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