05000282/FIN-2008005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure of Contractors to Follow Welding Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, in September 2008 for the failure of contractor welders to adhere to welding procedures during structural weld overlay (SWOL) repairs on a pressurizer surge nozzle. A review of the weld records indicated that the welders either failed to utilize the correct travel speeds in performing the SWOL or to accurately document relative travel speed settings as required by procedure, in order to ensure that the correct heat input (a welding essential variable) was maintained. The inspectors also identified that the welders failed to input the correct welding parameters into the welding controller for a portion of the overlay as required by procedure. This resulted in the heat input parameters being exceeded. Corrective actions for this issue included the removal and repair of the weld. This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to control the heat input could have reduced the impact toughness of the pressurizer weldment such that it would be susceptible to brittle fracture. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the contractor subsequently addressed the programmed versus actual travel speed discrepancies and determined that the resulting heat inputs were bound by the welding procedure specifications (WPS) parameters. Furthermore, the contractor repaired the surge nozzle as a result of using the incorrect welding parameters before returning Unit 2 to service. The inspectors determined that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Work Practices area because licensee personnel failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractor activities such that nuclear safety was supported |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
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| Report | IR 05000282/2008005 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil G O'Dwyer J Giessner K Stoedter L Haeg P Zurawski R Jickling R Winter T Bilik |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2008005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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