05000282/FIN-2008005-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Control Rod Bent due to Contractors Failure to Follow Procedures |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1 was self-revealed on October 9, 2008, due to the failure of contractor staff to follow procedures during refueling activities. This failure to follow procedures resulted in the insertion of a plug in a local leak rate testing port on the fuel transfer tube flange. The plug subsequently contacted a control rod located in a new fuel assembly and damaged the control rod while lifting the fuel assembly to a vertical position. Corrective actions for this issue included removing the plug, inspecting the fuel bundle and refueling equipment for damage, verifying the clearances between the fuel transfer tube flange and the upender basket, establishing a minimum design clearance between the fuel transfer tube flange and the top of a control rod, and using underwater cameras to ensure that clearances were maintained during fuel movement activities. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to follow procedures during refueling activities could lead to the unknown installation of other equipment and increase the potential of damaging reactor fuel and/or plant equipment; therefore become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, and determined that this type of finding was unable to be evaluated using this Appendix. As a result, the inspectors submitted the finding for management evaluation using IMC 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. NRC Management reviewed the details of this issue and concluded that this finding was of very low safety significance because the insertion of the plug, and the subsequent contact between the plug and the control rod, did not result in damage to irradiated fuel. The inspectors determined that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Work Practices area because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, was maintained such that nuclear safety was supporte |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2008005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil G O'Dwyer J Giessner K Stoedter L Haeg P Zurawski R Jickling R Winter T Bilik |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2008005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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