05000315/FIN-2013004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Improper Setting in Digital Control System |
Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) occurred because the licensee failed to adjust a key parameter, (KWINIT), in the turbine digital control system after replacing and calibrating the turbine control system linear variable differential transformers. Vendor documents for the generator recommended an initial load of 2 to 5 percent of full load when the turbine generator is synchronized to the grid. For Cook Unit 1, this equates to 22 to 54 megawatts. However, the licensee did not adjust the KWINIT parameter, which is used to determine control valve position, after the turbine control system linear variable differential transformers were replaced and subsequently calibrated using a tighter tolerance than previously used. Consequently, when the turbine generator was synchronized to the grid the turbine control valves opened more than on previous synchronizations, which resulted in picking up excessive load. As a result, reactor cooling system (RCS) temperature momentarily lowered below the minimum temperature for criticality. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee stabilized the plant by taking manual control of the turbine generator. The licensee has entered the condition into the corrective action program (CAP) as AR 2013-7472. Using IMC 0612 the inspectors concluded that this issue was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute in the Initiating Events Cornerstone and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, the inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause both a reactor trip and a loss of mitigating equipment. The inspectors concluded the finding had an aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not coordinate work activities to address the impact of changes to work activities on plant performance. |
Site: | Cook |
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Report | IR 05000315/2013004 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Cushman D Reeser J Ellegood J Gilliam J Lennartz K Riemer M Bielby M Mitchell T Taylord Szwarcm Mitchell J Lennartz J Benjamin J Ellegood P Laflamme |
CCA | , |
INPO aspect | WP.1, WP.1 |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Cook)
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