05000397/FIN-2010006-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Evaluation of Offsite Electrical Power Capability to Safety-Related Emergency Core Cooling System Equipment During a Design Basis Event with Offsite Power Available |
| Description | The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which requires, in part, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, as of July 30, 2010, the licensees design control measures failed to verify or check the adequacy of design voltages to safety-related emergency core cooling system equipment powered from the 4160 Vac, 480 Vac, 120 Vac, and 125 Vdc distribution systems during a lossof- coolant accident with offsite power available. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports 219208, 219122, 219267, 219277, 219335, 219122, 219328, 219170, 220268, 220317, and 222419. The team determined that the failure to verify and assure adequate voltages to safety-related emergency core cooling system equipment powered from the 4160 Vac, 480 Vac, 120 Vac, and 125 Vdc distribution systems during a design basis loss-of-coolant accident with offsite power available was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team performed a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, \"Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,\" determining that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensees interim calculation and operability determination demonstrated the operability of offsite power during a loss-of-coolant accident with offsite power available, in that the emergency core cooling system components would be operable and able to perform their safety function. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance |
| Site: | Columbia  |
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| Report | IR 05000397/2010006 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz W Sherbin M Young B Larson S Makor J Nicely |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2010006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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