ML20214J144
| ML20214J144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1986 |
| From: | Russell J, Smith F, Stewart D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214H850 | List:
|
| References | |
| MC-40512-SQN, MC-40512-SQN-R03, MC-40512-SQN-R3, NUDOCS 8612010173 | |
| Download: ML20214J144 (8) | |
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: MC-40512-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plani Element REVISION NUMBER: 3 (Final Report)
TITLE: Containment Vessel Plate PAGE 1 0F 8 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revision 1: Revised to incorporate Technical Assistance Staff (TAS) and Senior Review Panel (SRP) comments.
Revision 2: Revised for minor format and grammar corrections, wording clarification, incorporation of corrective action, and the h addition of Attachment A.
Revision 3: Revised to incorporate SRP comments.
PREPARATION PR PARED BY:
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SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS PEER:
L hU. Y$ /O - 3 /~ 9 (o (7 SIGNATURE DATE R2 hn SIGNATURE Ohf/ DATE CONCURRENCES A s // -
CEG- f r //![!hp SIGNATURE SRP: act1/1. //-/2-d DATE SIGNATURES DATE APPROVED BY:
MUA,,sY tl-is& NiA ECSP"MiNA&ER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
- SRP Secretary's signature indicates that SRP files contain documentation of full panel concurrence.
1255T 8612010173 861117 PDR P
ADOCK 05000327
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: MC-40512-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 PAGE 2 0F 8 I. Introduction This element report addresses concern XX-85-120-003 and is specific to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN). ,
II. Summary of Perceived Problem
- Heat numbers were placed on approximately five plates on the containment vessel, without Quality Control's knowledge, when it was discovered there were no heat numbers on the plates.
III. Evaluation Methodology A. Reviewed expurgated file to determine if any additional information was available.
B. Detenmined if any other reports exist which deal with the subject concern.
C. Reviewed Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-865-SQN to determine if findings and conclusions were adequate.
4 D. Reviewed documentation researched in the NSRS report to verify findings.
E. Contacted NSRS Investigator for additional information.
F. Contacted individual E for clarification of information (individual E designated in NSRS report).
G. Observed support pads for heat numbers.
H. Reviewed certification documentation and contracts for heat number tractability and correct material usage.
I. Reviewed TVA storeroom requisitions forms (575s) for structural steel other than American Society for Testing and Material (ASTM)
A-36 issued from Power Stores to ensure correct material was issued for generic applicability purposes.
IV. Summary of Findings A. A review of expurgated file XX-85-120 revealed no additional information.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: NC-40512-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER: 3 PAGE 3 0F 8 IV. Summary of Findings (Continued)
B. A review of Employee Concern Task Group (ECTG) file XX-85-120-003 revealed NSRS Report I-85-865-SQN, Improper Placement of Heat Numbers.
C. A review of the NSRS report revealed that the plates in question were installed in the summer of 1980. This infor: nation was provided by individual E of the report whose name was revealed by the concerned individual (CI) as the foreman over the crew which 4 installed the plates in question. A conversation between NSRS and individual E revealed the installation location of the plates in
+ question. Drawing 47W2500-35, Revision 13. "Nechanical Pipe
' Support Pads for Containment Liner," detailed the location of five steel support plates. Mark numbers 124 through 128 were welded to the unit I containment vessel liner for support of piping hangers.
These plates were added by workplan 8434 to support piping in the i
- ice condenser system. The work acccaplished by the workplan, the i foreman involved, and the timing of the work match the information given by the CI.
l A review of the workplan by the NSRS investigator was initiated and was found to contain the Quality Control (QC) Inspection Records
! for the welding of these five plates to the containment vessel.
This information was found on pages 107 through 127 of workplan 8434. Although TVA construction procedures did require that heat l -numbers be attached to material used in the containment vessel i structure construction, the procedure used by Office of Nuclear
! Power (ONP) outage and plant maintenance did not. *A TVA American l
Society of Nechanical Engineering (ASME) code specialist indicated that this latter practice is an acceptable interpretation of the code. However, (ONP) procedures do require that the heat number for such material be traceable to its source material.
Traceability for workplan 8434 was verified by the QC inspector and cognizant engineer when they signed the QC Inspection Record.
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j The NSRS report concluded that, "This employee concern is not substantiated. The records of the work done to add five plates to i the containment vessel in 1980 indicate that the heat numbers for the plates were checked by the QC inspectors and documented in inspection reports. There was no requirement to add heat numbers j'
to the plates welded to the containment vessel in workplan 8434, y
and thus no requirement for QC inspection of heat number transfer.
The differing requirements used in the construction of the
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3 j containment vessels and what ONP used to add these pads are the result of acceptable interpretations of ASNE code requirements."
Through review and verification of the NSRS report findine,s, the g
conclusions of the report were found to be adequate.
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- Editorial comment: Documentation traceability to installation is adequate.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: NC-40512-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 PAGE 4 OF 8 D. Review of drawing 47W2500-35 Revision 14, found that five support pads were installed on the interior containment vessel liner in 1980. The pads were identified by the drawing as mark numbers 124, 125, 126, 127, and 128. A review of workplan 8434 revealed the material storeroom requisitions (form TVA 575) indicating heat numbers for structural steel issued from Power Stores, and the QC Inspection Record (test data sheet) which indicated the heat numbers i for the five pads used. -These numbers do coincide. The inspection i records, found on pages 107 through 127, were signed off by the
' inspector for material verification and approved by the " cognizant engineer."
, E. Telecon with the NSRS investigator revealed the name of the foreman indicated by the CI. It was also indicated by the NSRS investigator that the material used for the pad was questioned by the QC inspector for heat number traceability. During initial fabrication of the pads.
QC questioned the validity of one of the heat numbers. It was discovered at that time that no certification documentation was available for the steel. Documentation was obtained from the vendor and the material was verified by QC. This information was obtained from the foreman by the NSRS investigator.
F. Telecon with the crew foreman revealed that the responsible engineer I
would order material on a form 575. The material would then be picked up at the Power Stores warehouse by the craft. At that time, the material would be taken to the machine shop for cutting (fabrication). QC personnel, at the time of fabrication, would transfer the heat number from the original piece of steel to the l fabricated pieces. The foreman stated that he was sure that the material in question had heat numbers inscribed, and that the' correct heat numbers are on the steel. He stated that the heat numbers may not be visible because the plates had to be pressed to meet the curvature of the containment liner. Thesa plates could have been pressed, wheroas the heat number would be against the containment liner.
G. Upon visual observation of tha support pads, it was found that there was no evidence of heat numbers on pads 124, 125, 126, and 128, although indentations were observed on pad 127. Due to the thickness of paint, the number inscribed could not be verified.
H. A review of the certification documentation Certified Material Test Report (CMTRs) for the 1-1/4-inch thick steel plate used for fabrication of the support pads found certified heat numbers 8013226 and 432E0141 to be ASTM A516, grade 70 as required by note one of drawing 47W2500-35, Revision 14. "All pad material shall be ASTM A516 Grade 60 or 70 carbon steel plate, Level 1, in accordance with
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: NC-40512-SQN
- SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER: 3 PAGE 5 0F 8 IV. Summary of Findings (Continued)
SQN Construction Specification N2G-877." However, review of the IR3 CNTR for the 1-1/4 inch plate, heat number 7487540, which was also requisitioned from storage for use in fabrication of one of the pads in question, identified the material as being certified to ASIN A36 only. The CNTR also identified the purchase contract as 771841.
Through review of the contract it was discovered that the material procured was ASTN A36.
I. A random review of all 575s on file for structural material other than ASTN A36 requisitioned from storage from November 30, 1979, through January 8, 1981, was performed to determine if the correct material was issued and if the incident involving the issuance of incorrect material on 575, number 1256 was isolated or common. The review revealed that three heat numbers were issued other than the three mentioned in paragraph F that were structural materials other than ASTN A36. The storeroom requisitions 575s involved the issue of ASTN A572 steel plate (HT 74Z0328), ASTM A240, type 304 stainless
, steel plate, and ASTN A588, Grade A plate. A review of the heat code sort revealed that the material was properly issued.
Therefore, the issuance of incorrect material on 575, number 1256 was determined to be an isolated incident and was not determined' to be generically applicable to all storeroom issues.
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Conclusions
- 1. No requirement was found to place heat numbers on the plates at i Fabrication or Installation. l I
- 2. No requirement was established for Quality Assurance to validate the lR3 placement of heat numbers on the plates. l l
- 3. During the concern evaluation, it was discovered that the incorrect I type of structural steel, (A36) HT 7487540, was used for the fabrication of support pad mark number 125 (reference drawing 47W2500-35, Revision 14. note 1). This material was issued from the SQN construction warehouse as ASIN A516, grado 60 material. After review of the procurement and certification documentation, the material was found to be ASTM A36 and did not meet the material requirements of as-constructed configuration of the previously referenced drawing (reference Corrective Action Tracking Document lR3 (CATD) No. 40512-SQN-01). l l
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: MC-40512-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER: 3 PAGE 6 0F 8 V. Root Cause:
- 1. None l l I
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- 2. None- lR3 !
- 3. Inadequate inspection of material by the QC inspector and l !'
warehouse clerk upon issuance from storage. l Note:
Naterial is traced by use of the storeroom requisition (form TVA 575) !
at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Office of Nuclear Power. This material is t verified by the field inspectors by cross-checking the 575 description j to an identifying mark on the meterial. Very seldon, if at any time, between issu.nce from storage and installation is the heat number or ,
material description verified by use of the heat sort printout or the i material certification documentation. This method, in which the 575 ;
is used for material verification, can allow incorrect material to be "
issued from storage and installed.
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.I Corrective Actions:
VI.
The following corrective actions will be taken by Sequoyah Nuclear !
Plant Office of Nuclear Power as a result of Conclusion 3 in Section IV of this report:
A. Metallurgical Test will be performed on the support pad in question to determine the material type and grade.
B. If material is verified as being the incorrect type and grade, material will be removed and replaced with the correct type and grade material.
Reference:
CATD No. 40512-SQN-01 VII. Generic Applicability None - (Concern was specific to SQN and was determined to be isolated for structural materials.)
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t TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: MC-40512-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 PAGE 7 OF 8 VIII. Attachments Attachment A: Concerns Printout (Identifies relationship of Nuclear Safety and Genaric Applicability).
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REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY EE Hm OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER FREQUENCY - REQUEST 3NP - ISSS - RWM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
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LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION SUBCATEGORY: 405 MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION ll @
ATEGORY: MC ADEQUACY OF MATERIAL n
GENERIC APPL QTC/NSRS +P EO CONCERN SUB PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION S CONCERN $ 2Q NUMBER CAT CAT LOC FLQB REPORT R DESCRIPTION g g 405 NNNW SS SEQUDYAH: HEAT NUMBERS HAVE BEEN PL A - O XX 120-003 MC SQN .I-85-865-SQN CED ON APPROX. 5 PLATES ON THE CONTA E T50191 K-FORM INMENT VESSEL HHEN IT HAS DISCOVERED $
THERE HERE NO HEAT NUMBERS ON THESE PLATES. THIS HAS DONE WITH OUT QUAL >
ITY'S KNOWLEDGE AND VIOLATED THE QA PROCEDURE. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORM ATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.
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- PSR Codes:
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- SS--Nuclear Safety Significant a g as NO--Not Nuclear Safety-Related gg E i
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