ML20214J220

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Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Rept SWEC-SQN-20, Inadequate Implementation of Fuel Handling Procedure;Untimely Plant Access Procedure
ML20214J220
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/13/1986
From: Birchell R, Knightly J, Stewart D
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20214H850 List:
References
SWEC-SQN-20, SWEC-SQN-20-R, SWEC-SQN-20-R00, NUDOCS 8612010212
Download: ML20214J220 (5)


Text

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SWEC-SQN-20 SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nitelear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 0 TITLE: Inadequate Implementation of Fuel Handling Procedure; Untimely Plant Access Procedure REASON FOR REVISION: N/A SWEC

SUMMARY

STATEMENT: The items in this report were identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis. All items evaluated within this report were verified to be adequately addressed and were closed by NRC.

PREPARATION PREPARED BY:

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Title:

Inadequate Implementation of Fuel Handling Procedure:

Untimely Plant Access Procedure SWEC Concerns: A02850124027-001

-002 Source Document: NRC Report 50-328/84-36 Report Number: SWEC-SQN-20 I

Evaluator: 8 /0/8/8I Date

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Reviewed by: 10!

J. J. K1ightly Date Approved by: tsMv /o/t _(

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k Report SWEC-SQN-20 NRC Report 50-328/84-36 I. INTRODUCTION During a routine Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) follow-up inspection of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's (SQN) unit 2 rod control cluster assembly (RCCA) damage (November 28 - December 3, 1984), the NRC inspector identified and reported (reference 1 ) one violation. In addition, the NRC inspector had a minor concern involving the SQN plant access procedure for offsite personnel. These issues were addressed as i issues in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic

analysis, as follows
1. A02850124027-OO1 (Violation 50-328/84-36-01), Inadequate Implementation of Fuel Handling Procedure.
2. A02850124027-002, Untimely Plant Access Procedure.

Information on the background, corrective actions taken, verification methodology and analysis, completion status, any pertinent references for these items is included in this report.

II. VERIFICATION OF THE SWEC ISSUES A. Background

1. The NRC inspector identified the following violation (328/84-36-01): Technical Specification 6.8.1.6 requires that written procedures be established and implemented to control refueling operations. The licensee's Fuel Handling Instruction (FHI)-7, " Refueling Operation," Revision 16,Section III establishes and requires the operator to verify, before raising the fuel transfer side upender, that the conveyor at reactor

, lamp is illuminated on the reactor side console and that the fuel assembly (FA) is clear of the transfer tube.

- Contrary to the above, on October 25, 1984, FHI-7 was inadequately implemented in that the conveyor interlock was challenged by raising the reactor side upender without the

' conveyor at reactor lamp illuminated. In addition, verification was not adequately performed to ensure the required conveyor location before raising the reactor side upender.

2. In addition, a minor concern was identified with the amount of time required to process unescorted access requests for offsite NRC inspectors. No response was required by the NRC for this concern, and the concern was not tracked by the NRC for closure.

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i B. Corrective Actions Taken

1. The SQN response (reference 2) to the violation stated:

Immediately af ter damaging the RCCA in the FA, refueling operations were stopped for investigation. To correct the binding near the reactor side upender, plant instruction change number 84-1687 for FHI-7, dated October 29, 1984, was issued to raise and lower reactor side upender before receiving the FA to remove small alignment offsets of the upender with the fuel transfer canal.

In addition, permanent corrective actions were taken to replace the transverse digital counter quadrature conversion circuit with a bidirectional motion decoder to prevent noise received in the circuit to reset the digital counter. To ensure proper i alignment of the reactor side upander with the transfer canal,

, guide pins were installed for the upender. To provide visual verification, a television camera will be used to verify the conveyor at the reactor side upender stop and clearance from the fuel transfer canal, as specified in FHI-7, revision 17, instruction step I.4.

2. A02850124027-OO2, Untimely Plant Access Procedure Each month the NRC provides TVA with a list of NRC personnel who have a security clearance and have completed the required training for unescorted access. When NRC personnel arrive at SQN and are on these lists, the Public Safety Shift Supervisor can provide site specific training for unescorted access-in accordance with Public Safety Instruction MI-72, "Special Procedures for Processing NRC Personnel into the Protected Area" (reference 3). This was the corrective action requested by the NRC (reference 1, page 3).

C. Verification Methodoloav The SWEC concerns identified for ECTG verification were stated as

(( follows:

  • RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item l

A02850124027 Inadequate implementation of RIMS-OO1 fuel handling procedure A02850124027 Untimely Plant Access Procedure RIMS-002 ECTG reviewed the SQN Compliance Licensing files for internal and i

external correspondence related to this issue, the applicable p procedure, and the NRC status and tracking system for the issue.

This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this f verification activity.

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.e-s I -D. Verification Analysis

. The ECTG review indicated that the NRC violation and concern were

. adequately resolved as identified in Section II.B. The required I' corrective action was found acceptable to the NRC and the violation 3 closed in report 85-44 (reference 4). The NRC closure stated:

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)' In addition to correcting equipment problems (IE Report 50-31'0/84-36), the licensee has specified in fuel handling

' instructions that all interlocks are to be checked out and functional. Also, if it is necessary to bypass an interlock, g

the procedure requires approval by the refueling SRO and clear i documentation of the event. Further, before raising the upender, the licensee's instruction requires visual verification i that the fuel assembly and any inserts will clear the transfer tube flange. The verification is done by means of an underwater TV system. The violation is considered closed.

III. ' REFERENCES

1. NRC Inspection Report number 50-328/84-36, dated January 23, 1985, i John A. Olshinski to H. G. Parris.
2. Response to NRC Inspection Report Number 50-328/84-36, dated February 19, 1985, H. L. Abercrombie to J. W. Hufham.
3. SQN Public Safety Service Instruction MI-72, "Special Procedures for li Processing NRC Personnel Into the Protected Area", Revision 2.

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(. 4. NRC Inspection Report Number 50-327/85-44, 50-328/85-44, dated January 14, 1906, David M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris.

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