ML20214J101
| ML20214J101 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1986 |
| From: | Murphy M, Russell J, Stewart D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214H850 | List:
|
| References | |
| 310.01-SQN, 310.01-SQN-R03, 310.01-SQN-R3, NUDOCS 8612010161 | |
| Download: ML20214J101 (15) | |
Text
1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 310.01-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Element REVISION NUMBER: 3 TITLE Operations Frogram and Procedures Inadequate REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to SRP comments. TAS conunents, and SQN corrective action response. Revision 1 Revised to incorporate additional TAS comments. Revision 2 Incorporated IN-85-933-010 and XX-85-007-002 Revision 3 PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
v J. H. Muir SIGNATURE
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i REVIEWS PEER:
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- SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCES i
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SIGNATURE SRP: daees4A 1 //-/3-$4 DATE SIGNATURE
- DATE APPROVED BY*
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lf"0'h N/A ECSP MAN #GER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
- SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
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' 2288T 8612010161 861117 PDR ADOCK 05000327
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. __ ...--n-TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OPERATIONS CEG Subcategory: Operations / Operational i
Element: Operators Programs / Procedures Inadequate i
Report Number: 310.01 SQN (Revision 3)
SQP-5-003-001
( SQP-5-003-002 l XI-85-067-001 l SQM-6-013-002 l
i SQP-6-010-001 XX-85-022-001 IN-85-933-001 IN-85-933-010 XX-85-007-002 Evaluator: D. E. Smith /)L '9'-l /
{ Date l Evaluator: John H. Muir //-0 "840 J. Nu e Date Reviewed by: // / 4M8 //-bf/-
OPS CEG4tefd6er Date Approved by: h*. ,# f(-I-76 i W. R. Lagerdreh Date 1614T
Revision 3 1: I. . Operators Programs / Procedures Inadequate This report primarily addresses concerns describing past or potential incidents involving operations personnel directly relating to a lack of experience or training.
I-The scope of this investigation will be directed toward:
(A) Evaluating each individual concern and, (B) Establishing whether the stated incident was a result of:
! (1) Operator error
(
' (2) A failure of other involved personnel to adequately comprehend all circumstances of an incident, (3) Inadequate procedures or, (4) A combination of the above II. Specific Evaluation Methodology The following concerns were reviewed:
JR1 SQP-5-003-001 Concern: Sequoyah - On the evening of 12/9/85, an electrician operated l a valve in the unit 2 RHR heat exchanger room without a unit operator I present. This caused a spill (unknown amount) of what the CI described as " reactor grade" (highly radioactive) water into the room. The spill was secured by a health physics technician who happened to be in the area. CI stated that it was alleged that a unit operator had told the electrician to go and separate the valve, and that unit operators are not authorized to give such directions. CI could provide no estimate of amount of radioactivity released, and stated that "everyone is~being real c3osed mouthed about this thing". CI has no further information, and is anonymous.
SQP-5-003-002 Concern: Sequoyah - CI expressed that management / supervision have an attitude of "' Hurry up and get the job done" in an effort to get the plant on line. CI feels that procedures are not being followed in an effort to accomplish work as quickly as possible, and evidenced this by the radioactive water spill which occurred on 12-9-85, and addressed in this file, concern 001. CI has no further information, and is ;
anonymous.
Page 1 of 10
Revision 3 XX-85-067-001 Concern: Sequoyah - Small problems in plant operation were disregarded (1983), and the plant (unit 1) was kept operating as if in a race, which resulted in bigger problems. Nuc. Power Dept. concern. CI has no further information and has expressed this as a generic concern.
SQM-6-013-002 Concern: An itemized list for the proper size voltage, amperage, and type of bulbs and fuses needs to be available to operations for all equipment under their control. Nuclear Power concern. Anonymous concern.
SQP-6-010-001 Concern: While working at Sequoyah in 1973 on electrical lines, switch box controlling these lines was only tagged. To ensure personnel safety, CI feels that the switch boxes should have been locked and the ;
electrician working on the electrical lines should have the key to the lock on the switch box. CI has no additional information.
Construction department concern. '
IK-85-022-001 '
l l Concern: Operators at Sequoyah should show more concern and exercise more caution when tagging out valves. While removing test Conn and installing blind flg at RC Pap #2, operators started filling sys while craft was still working. This occurred in September 1984. Namas are )
known.
IN-85-933-001 l
l Concern: TVA's program of placing degreed engineers as Senior Reactor Operators with only 20 months of plant experience will reduce the level of reactor operating safety by having individuals in charge who do not know how to react to and resolve the practical problems that will be encountored during operations. Operations concern. CI has no further information.
- IN-85-933-010 Concern
- TVA should continue and expand its already established program I of having experienced operatloas personnel get college degrees to be l licensed as senior reactor operators rather than implementing its more i recent plant of making SRO's out of degreed engineers who will have no lR3 :
actual hands-on plant operating experience. Details known to QTC; I withheld to maintain confidentiality. No further information may be 1 released. Nuclear Power Concern. I i
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Revision 3 XX-85-007-002 Concern: Sequoyah - Leak in April 1983 in unit 2 reactor was due to 1 management's (name known) desired to break time records (179 days IR3 on line). Result was contamination of 500-600 gallons. CI has no I 1.
further information. I Informal interviews with cognizant individuals and reviews of applicable procedures and documents were conducted during the investigation of each concern.
III. Findings i
i The findings of this investigation are listed below in the same order the individual concerns are listed in the previous section. Refer to the previous section for the wording of each section. Concern SQP-5-003-001 and SQP-5-005-002 were satisfactorily addressed in Nuclear Safety Review Staff report I-85-137-SQN. This NSRS report substantiated that a contaminated water spill did occur as described,
' but did not substantiate that any effort had been made to cover up the incident. Administration Instructionn AI-30, AI-3 and Naintenance Instruction MI-10.46, procedures applicable to the incident, were found to be sufficient and warranted no necessary revisions. The concera did l identify a questionable practice utilized by shift operations personnel of allowing maintenance workers to manipulate valves without proper supervision or the issuance of an operating permit while performing certain test procedures. While this practice in no way caused the incident, plant management did issue oral instructions to all shift lR1 engineers to insure the practice was discontinued for all future related work.
i i
Unit' operator and hecith physics daily journals documented the incident in a menner sufficient to preclude any question of a plant cover up attempt.
Concern II-85-067-001 was adequately addressed by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff report I-85-862-SQN. Because the concern was so generalized in nature, containing no specifics relating to the alleged prob;em, the NSRS committee utilized a wide range of reports to accurately document unit 1 performance during 1983, consisting of:
l (1) NRC Systematic Assessment on Licensee Performance (SALP reports) l from July 1, 1981 to Nay 31, 1985.
(2) NRC Regulatory violations as documented in I&E inspection reports.
(3) License Event Reports (LER's) '
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Revision 3 (4) Monthly operating reports submitted by Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to l NRC and, (5) Interviews with individuals cognizant of unit 1 operations during the time period stated. c Section III of the NSRS report details the comnitte9's findings lR1 relating to each category listed above. The investigation revealed:
(1) No specific problems associated with the operation of unit 1 that wero disregarded by plant management.
(2).Noindividualswhohadanyknowledgeofsuchproblems.
(3) Several instances of the unit being taken off line or dropped to
~
- a reduced power level for maintenance to be performed.
l (4) A reduction of LER's for 1983 relative to 1982.
(5) SALP appraisals reflecting an overall improvement in plant operation. (See NSRS report references). The NSRS investigating committee could find no instances in the covered data to l substantiate the concern.
1 Concern SQM-6-013-002 appears to be more a matter of convenience than a safety concern. All interviewed Assistant Shift Engineers indicated that an itemized list of fuse and light bulb sizes would be helpful, but was not absolutely necessary for continued unit operations. The
. plant operations superintendent affirmed that work plans are currently being written to add updated fuse descriptions to each fuse location throughout the plant, as well as to have fuse descriptions added to the ~
Operating Instruction Power Availability Checklists. These i requirements should alleviate the need for a separate itemized checklist. A computerized list of fuses for plant equipment is i
presently available in the Main Control Room. Interviews with Assistant Shift Engineers have indicated that enough information is presently available to allow for correct fuse identification, although several different references frequently neod to be utilized to make this determination. When work plans 120-20, 120-52, 120-57, 120-58, 120-65 and 121-52 involving fuse identification and replacement are completed and precise fuse descriptions are included in operation instructions, fuse identification should then prove to be a relatively simple procedure for operations personnel.
Concern SQP-6-010-001 references an alleged tagging incident which occurred during the early construction phase of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The main point of concern appears to be a dissatisfaction with the method utilized to clear high voltage lines for work.
1 Page 4 of 10
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Revision 3 l
A review of the Clearance Procedure Administrative Instruction AI-3 was conducted to determine current clearance methods covering such work.
In particular AI-3 part 5.2.1.2 specifically applies to conditions !
referred to in the concern. All Motor Operated Disconnects (MOD's) and Airbreak Switches are required to be mechanically locked in the open l position and visually checked to insure a positive opening in the l circuit before a clearance is issued. AI-3 section 10 gives guidance l for placing safety grounds to further insure safe working conditions during such conditions. Part 5.3.4 includes a note requiring the individual receiving the clearance to insure himself all equipment is properly isolated and tagged before allowing work to proceed. While the evaluation was unable to reveal any facts directly related to the
' described 1973 incident, it did conclude that present instructions covering the clearance procedure are effective in insuring safe working lR1 conditions on equipment. All assistant shift engineers, shift engineers, and plant maintenance personnel interviewed demonstrated familiarity IR1 with AI-3. Sufficient safeguards are presently required by AI-3 so as to i invalidate any necessity to allow a maintenance worker to personally retain a key to ensure his safety.
i Concern II-85-022-001 describes an alleged incident where operators began to fill system piping before test work was completed. The concern implies that the system was tagged for the test work, t
A review of the September 1984 Unit Operator and Assistant Shift I j Engineers daily journals for both units revealed no such incident as l having occurred. On September 11, 1984, Surveillance Instruction 1 SI 166.10 was performed on a unit. This instruction requires the i !
l removal of blind flanges and installati?n of test flanges to test check l !
valve leak rates in system 63 (Safety Injection System). The i SI requires that an isolation valve be closed during flange replacement. I This' work is very similar to that described in the concern. Interviews l with a mechanical maintenance foreman and assistant shift engineers l revealed that the flange removal work is conducted via a maintenance IR1
)
request. No tagging is involved. The cognizant ASE/UO is made aware of l ,
i the work in progress by being required to sign and authorize the SI ano l MR for work to begin. Interviews with malitenance individuals involved l l !
in this particular SI revealed no problent which could have resulted in (
the complaint being filed. A further review of all Maintenance Requests l i and associated paperwork covering blind flange work conducted on both l
! units during September 1984 revealed no notes or entries detailing any j I such incident as the one described. A review of all September 1984 l l Hold Orders issued by both units revealed none issued specifically for l
{ RC Pump #2.
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Revision 3 During interviews with Craft General Foremen and Operations personnel I regarding the expressed concern, The following information relating to lR1 flange removal / replacement work was expressed by several individuals. l Flange removal and replacement work somatimes involves isolating i sections of piping containing no vents or drains necessary for i depressurizing or draining the piping prior to work being initiated. I Piping layout configuration can sometimes cause piping sections to- 1 remain filled even when drains and vents are available. Foremen l responsible for the work are notified by operations of such conditions l before being placed on the clearance. Isolated piping, even when lR1 properly drained and vented, could possibly become refilled during l maintenance due to leaking isolation valves. Also, as the clearance. I procedure clearly states, the presence of a clearance tag does not I insure that equipment is tagged and ready for work to begin. Although I no evidence exists to substantiate such an assumption, a failure of a i maintenance worker to fully understand any or all points listed above l could understandably have resulted in the filing of the concern as I stated.
I Based on the information contained in the concern as written, this I investigation could neither confirm or disprove the occurrence of the lR1 described incident . No. documented evidence could be found implicating l l operations personnel in a tagging discrepancy. l Concerns IN-85-933-001 and IN-85-933-010 were investigated adequately lR3 by a Genoric Concern Task Force report dated April 26, 1986 entitled SRO/ Engineers Lack Plant Experience. This committee conducted interviews with knowledgeable individuals and reviewed the following documents:
- 1. Manager Licensing and Developsont Program, Junb l985.
- 2. NUREG 0737 Enclosure 1. Item A.
- 3. TVA Program Manual, Ed 0202.05, Nuclear Plant Operator Training Program, March 1985.
An analysis of the above training documents, in conjunction with the )
lR1 1 personnel interviews, led the committee to conclude the following i regarding the concern:
- 1. TVA's program to license degreed engineers meets or exceeds federal !
licensing requirements.
- 2. The degreed engineers are required to pass the same NRC administered exam as non-degreed personnel, and
- 3. Plant management wculd not jeopardize plant safety by placing an SRO in a line supervisory function if his/her capabilities were in IR1 question.
Page 6 of 10
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Revision 3 As a result of these findings, the committee did not validate the concern. Should the training program be adhered to properly, unqualified candidates would be eliminated through the various stages when necessary. There presently exists no verifiable reason to suspect reactor safety will ever be jeopardized as a result of this program.
Concern XX-85-007-002 references to a unit 2 reactor leak which was due I to management's desire to break time records which resulted in lR3 contamination of 500-600 gallons. Further information revealed this l 1eak to be in the steam generator. The NSRS Report (I-85-372-SQN) was I reviewed for its adequacy and completeness in answering this concern. l The findings from that report are as follows: lR3 Sequoyah unit 2 Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.4.6.2.C - Limits primary to secondary leakage to 500 gallons por day through any one 1
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steam generator. If this leakage rate is exceeded, the unit must be I shut down and be in cold shutdown condition within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. l The records reviewed in this investigation revealed that in early IR3 May 1983 (not April as stated), the unit 2 No. 3 steam generator l experienced a through wall tube leak. This resulted in leakage of reactor coolant into the secondary side of the steam generator.
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The unit continued to operate until the reactor tripped as the result I of the loss of a feed pump on July 18, 1983. The leakage at that time l
=
vas approximately 311 gallons per day. l The plant operational event report issued the day following detection IR3 of the tube leak stated deurrent plans are to continue normal operation l until scheduled refueling outage." Since the technical specification i primary to secondary tube leakage limit of 500 gallons per day was never' l exceeded, continued operation did not present a safety concern. Economic I considerations dictated that the unit continue to operate until the l scheduled August 5, 1983, refueling outage if possible. l The leakage rate was monitored frequently during this time and did not IR3 exceed the NRC approved tecnnical specification limit. The leakage was l calculated to be 553 gallons per day on July 19, 1983, after the unit I had tripped; however, this was later determined to be an erroneous l calculation because the unit was in a transient condition. For I calculations of this nature to provide accurate results, the data must i be taken when the unit is operating in a stable condition for several I days, which was not the case after the trip. However, Potential l Reportable Occurrence (PRO) Report No. 2-83-71 was initiated. During l discussions between plant management, Westinghouse, and NRC, they agreed l l that the leakage calculation was not valid and that the more accurate l l
determination of leakage was that made just prior to the trip. l Therefore, technical specification limits had not been exceeded and it l l
was determined that the event did not require a formal report to the i I NRC.
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Rsvision 3 During subsequent inspections of the steam generator to determine the IR3 location and cause of the leakage, it was determined that the leakage I resulted from a piece of loose metal rubbing against the tubes and I subsequently wearing a hole through the tube wall. This metal piece I had inadvertently been left in the steam generator after a modification I had been made on the secondary side. This prompted a thorough l examination of all generators and retrieval of any loose or foreign I material. l
Conclusions:
The portion of concern SQP-5-003-001 describing a contaminated water spill caused by an electrician operating a valve was substantiated. This incident revealed circumstances where involved operations personnel failed to follow established practices, although this failure did not directly cause the incident. Plant management has issued verbal instructions to operations directing them to discontinue the practice. The incident was properly documented and no indication of a plant cover up attempt was substantiated.
No further actions are necessary regarding this incident.
Concern SQP-5-003-002 was not substantiated. The specific exemple stated in the concern was not found to be caused by a failure to follow specific procedures in the workplan. No evidence was found that management / supervision directed work to be performed in violation of lR1 procedures.
Concern XX-85-067-001 was not substantiated by the NSRS investigation.
An analysis of unit 1 ouerations date for 1983 failed to identify any IR1 specific problems wh!;a could have prompted the concern. The investigation concluded that no action was necessary regarding the concern.
Interviews with knowledgeable individuals involved with concern SQM-6-013-002 revealed that a fuse / bulb list was more of a convenience item rather than a necessity. Plant management indicated that sufficient modifications and procedure revisions were currently in progress to l
insure the correction of any fuse problems presently identified at Sequoyah.
i No additional actions are necessary regarding this concern.
Based on the findings of this report this concern is not valid. lR2 l
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Revision 3 An investigation of concern SQP-6-010-001 could not substantiate the concern. Present procedures provide adequate safety for work involving high voltage lines. The procedure was reviewed and found to be IR2 adequate. The procedure does require disconnects and air break I switches to be both locked and tagged in the open position. No l further action is necessary regarding this concern. l Investigation of concern XX-85-022-001 failed to reveal any definite I incident involving operational tagging inadequacies or discrepancies I during September 1984, therefore this concern is deemed not valid. lR2 Concerns IN-85-933-001 and IN-85-933-010 deal with conditions that could IR3 result from an ineffective degreed engineer operator training program.
The SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) adequately investigated the new training program, compared it to the current operator training.
program, and concluded that the requirements for successful completion exceeded the minimum requirements established by NRC. Based on the.
apparent quality of the training program and the multiple examination
- process, the GCTF determined the concern to be not valid.
Concern IX-85-007-002 is determined by the NSRS Report (I-85-372-SQN) lR3 to be not valid and concurred with by this report for the following I reasons: (from NSRS report) l No objective evidence was found during the investigation that IR3 indicated that a record run time was the main consideration for I continued operation. '
l 1
The leak was not caused by management actions or lack of, but by IR3 movement of a loose metal piece rubbing against the tubes. l The leakage never exceeded 500 gallons per day. lR3 j
- This evaluation concurs with all of the above listed conclusions of the NSRS and GCTF reports. All of the concerns addressed in this report, based on the findings, are not safety-related.
IV. Root Cause ,
! Of the seven concerns included in this evaluation, one was substantiated.
i The one incident appears to be an isolated case. On this basis, root cause was not determined.
- V. Generic Applicability 1
l I
Concern SQP-5-003-001 is restricted to a specific operational event that allegedly occurred at SQN. No generic applicability.
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Revision 3 Concern XX-85-067-001 described specific management decisions at SQN.
No generic applicability.
Concern SQM-6-013-002 appears more of a convenience item for operations personnel than a concern. Could be helpful at all plant sites.
Concern SQP-6-010-001 deals with alleged clearance procedure inadequacios. TVA clearance procedures are standardized system wide.
'g ,
This concern was not substantiated and should have no effect on other j sites.
5 Concern KX-85-022-001 refers to a specific event at SQN. No generic
. applicability.
1 H
j Concern IN-85-933-001 addresses programs that could impact SRO experience levels at all nuclear plant sites.
3 Concern XX-85-007-002 refers to a SQN specific event, therefore there lR3 h is no generic applicability.
I VI. References
- 1. Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-137-SQN.
- 2. SQN Administrative Instruction AI-30, A7, " Nuclear Plant Method of Operation," dated July 18, 1984.
- 3. SQN Administrative Instruction AI-3, R 31. " Clearance Procedure "
dated June 27, 1986.
1 Jy 4. Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-862-SQN. lR1
- 5. SQN Surveillance Instruction SI-166.10. R20. " Accumulator / Injection Primary and Secondary Check Valve Integrity," dated j October 23, 1985.
o q 6. Generic Task Force Report SRO/ Engineers Lack Plant Experience dated I, April 26, 1986.
- 7. Unit Operator Daily Journal, unit 2, September 11, 1984.
- 8. Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-372-SQN. IR3 p
VII. Immediate or Long-term Corrective Action L Workplans 120-20, 120-52, 120-57, 120-58, 120-65, 121-52 are still outstanding. Sequoyah indicated that the physical work was complete I and the drawings are currently being up dated. This item is scheduled IR1 to be completed before startup (CATD NO. 31001-SQN-01). l l
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i REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE -
FREQUENCY - REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER CNP - ISSS - RHM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUNTIME-12)
RUN DATE - 10 LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: OP PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SUBCATEGORY: 31001 OPERATIONS PROGRAM / PROCEDURE,S INADEQUATE
~
S GENERIC KEYHORD A H APPL QTC/NSRS P KEYHORD B SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION S CONCERN KEYHORD C CONCERN KEYWORD D NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R DESCRIPTION IN 933-001 OP 31001 N HBN. NNYN NS TVA'S PROGRAM OF PLACING DEGREED ENG QUALIFICATION T50153 REPORT INEERS AS SENIOR REACTOR OPERATORS H PONER
- ITH ONLY 20 MONTHS OF PLANT EXPERIEN OPERATIONS CE HILL REDUCE THE LEVEL OF REATOR 0 GENERAL PERATING SAFETY BY HAVING INDIVIDUAL S IN CHARGE HHO DO NOT KNOH HOW TO R EACT TO AND RESOLVE THE PRACTICAL PR OBLEMS THAT HILL BE ENCOUNTERED DURI HG OPERATIONS. OPERATIONS CONCERN.
CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO
- FOLLON UP REQUIRED.
IN 933-010 OP 31001 N HBN NNYH NS TVA SHOULD CONTINUE AND EXPAND ITS A TRAINING T50265 REPORT LREADY ESTABLISHED PROGRAM OF HAVING QUALIFICATION
- EXPERIENCED OPERATIONS PERSONNEL GE OPERATIONS T COLLEGE DEGREES TO BE LICENSED AS EMPLOYEES SENIOR REACTOR OPERATORS RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTING ITS MORE RECENT PLANT
- 0F MAKING SRO'S OUT OF DEGREED ENGIN l EERS HHO HILL HAVE NO ACTUAL HANDS-0 N PLANT OPERATING EXPERIENCE. DETAI LS KNDHN TO QTCt HITHHELD TO MAINTAI i
~ N CONFIDENTIALITY. NO FURTHER INFOR l MATION MAY BE RELEASED. NUCLEAR POW ER CONCERN.
31001 N SQN. NNYN AN ITEMIZED LIST FOR THE PROPER SIZE PERSONNEL FEELING SQM-86-013-002 OP VOLTAGE, AMPERAGE, AND TYPE OF BULB PROGRAMMATIC T50268 REPORT S AND FUSES NEEDS TO BE AVAILABLE TO ELECTRICAL OPERATIONS FOR ALL EQUIPMENT UNDER EQUIPMENT
- THEIR CONTROL. NUCLEAR P0HER CONCER N. ANONYMOUS CONCERN.
SQP-85-003-001 OP 31001 N SQN. NNNN I-85-137-SQN SS SEQUOYAH - ON THE EVENING OF 12-9-85 NONCONFORMANCE T50227 K-FORM , AN ELECTRICIAN OPERATED A VALVE IN CORRECTIVE ACTI THE UNIT 2 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM PIPING WITHOUT A UNIT OPERATOP. PRESENT. TH VALVES
-- IS CAUSED A SPILL (UNKNOWN AMOUNT) 0
- F HHAT THE CI DESCRIBED AS " REACTOR GRADE" (HIGHLY RADI0 ACTIVE) HATER IN TO THE ROOM. THE SPILL HAS SECURED BY A HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIAN HHO H
- APPENED TO BE IN THE AREA. CI STATE D THAT IT HAS ALLEGED THAT A UNIT OP ERATOR HAD TOLD THE ELECTRICIAN TO G
- 0 AND SEPARATE THE VALVE, AND THAT U a-MIT OPERATORS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED
i EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN D AT E -
ONP - ISSS - RHM LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: CP PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SUBCATEGORY: 31001 OPERATIONS PROGRAM / PROCEDURES INADEQUATE
" KEYHORD A S GENERIC KEYHORD B H APPL QTC/NSRS P '
CONCERN KEYHORD C CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION S KEYHORD i CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R DESCRIPTION
, NUMBER SS SEQUOYAH - CI EXPRESSED THAT MANAGEM NONCONFORMANCE SQP-85-003-002 MP 71000 S SQN. NNNN I-85-139-SQN PROCEDURES OP 31001 K-FORM ENT/ SUPERVISION HAVE AN ATTITUDE OF T50227 "' HURRY UP AND GET THE JOB DONE" IN GENERAL AN EFFORT TO GET THE PLANT ON LINE. GENERAL CI FEELS THAT PROCEDURES ARE NOT BE ING FOLLOHED IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOMPL ISH HORK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND
, EVIDENCED THIS BY THE RADI0 ACTIVE H ATER SPILL HHICH OCCURRED ON 12-9-85
, AND ADDRESSED IN THIS FILE, CONCER N 001. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATI0
, N, AND IS ANONYMOUS.
HHILE HORKING AT SEQUOYAH IN 1973 ON SAFETY PROGRAM SQP-86-010-001 OP 31001 S SQN' YYYY ELECTRICAL LINES, THE SWITCH BOX C0 SAFETY CONDI' T50272 SF 90603 K-FORM CONSTRUCTI
, NTROLLING THESE LINES HAS ONLY TAGGE EMPLOYEE D. TO ENHANCE PERSONNEL SAFETY, CI FEELS THAT THE SHITCH BOXES SHOULD H AVE BEEN LOCKED AND THE ELECTRICIAN
, HORKING ON THE ELECTRICAL LINES SHOU LD HAVE THE KEY TO THE LOCK ON THE S HITCH BOX. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INF ORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT C
, ONCERN.
NS SEQUOYAH - LEAK IN APRIL 1983 IN UNI HEALTH PHYSICS XX 007-002 MP 70603 S SQN NNNN I-85-372-SQN SAFETY CONDI
31001 K-FORM T 2 REACTOR HAS DUE TO MANAGEMENT'S
, T50086
' ~
OP (NAME KNOHN) DESIRE TO BREAK TIME RE OPERATIONS CORDS (179 DAYS ON LINE). RESULT HA RADIATIO S CONTAMINATION OF 500-600 GALLONS.
CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.
NS OPERATORS AT SEQUDYAH SHOULD SHON MD CORRECTIVE ACT XX 022-001 OP 31001 N SQM - NNNN RE CONCERN & EXERCISE MORE CAUTION H IDENTIFICATI T50039 K-FORM OPERATIONS a HEN TAGGING OUT VALVES. HHILE REMOV VALVES
, ING TEST CONN & INSTALLING BLIND FLG 3 RC PMP 82, OPERATORS STARTED FILLI
"" NG SYS HHILE CRAFT HAS STILL HORKING
. THIS OCCURRED IN SEPTEMBER 1984.
, HAMES ARE KN0HN P
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REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE .-
P FREQUENCY - REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR P0HER RUN TIME -
ONP - ISSS - RHM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE -
LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: OP PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SUBCATEGORY: 31001 OPERATIONS PROGRAM / PROCEDURES INADEQUATE S GENERIC KEYHORD A H APPL QTC/NSRS P KEYHORD B
, CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION S CONCERN KEYHORD C D HUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R DESCRIPTION KEYWORD XX 067-001 OP 31001 M SQN+ NNNN I-85-862-SQN NS SEQUOYAH - SMALL PROBLEMS IN PLANT 0 NONCONFORMANCE T50194 K-FORM PERATION HERE DISREGARDED (1983), AN CORRECTIVE A
> D THE PLANT (UNIT 1) HAS KEPT OPERAT OPERATIONS ING AS IF IN A RACE, HHICH RESULTED GENERAL IN BIGGER PROBLEMS. NUC. P0HER DEPT
' . CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORM i
9 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY OP SUBCATEGORY 31001 h
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