05000483/FIN-2008005-07
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Terminate Refueling Water Storage Tank Recirculation Results in Inadvertent Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Inventory |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a, Procedures, for the failure to close Valve BNV0002 during a fill of the spent fuel pool resulting in approximately 2000 gallons of water being inadvertently transferred from the spent fuel pool to the refueling water storage tank. On November 7, 2008, Procedure OTN-EC-00001 was performed to add makeup water to the spent fuel pool. Prior to performing the evolution, operations briefed that the refueling water storage tank was on recirculation and that this alignment needed to be secured prior to performing a fill of the spent fuel pool. Following termination of the refueling water storage tank recirculation lineup and after a fill of the spent fuel pool was initiated, the control room received annunciator RWST Lev HILO. The crew recognized that an inadvertent transfer of spent fuel pool water to the refueling water storage tank was in progress and directed that Valves ECV0076 and BNV0002 be closed. It was later discovered that poor communication between operators on the status of Valve BNV0002 resulted in the refueling water storage tank remaining on recirculation during the fill operation. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of human performance and affects the associated cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or releases. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the spent fuel pool. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200811692. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because operations personnel failed to effectively communicate work status to the control room H.3(b) (Section 40A3) |
| Site: | Callaway  |
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| Report | IR 05000483/2008005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson D Dumbacher R Kopriva D Stearns J Adams V Gaddy J Groom |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2008005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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