05000483/FIN-2008003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Resulted in an Inoperable ECCS |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, after an inadequate surveillance procedure resulted in the licensee failing to maintain the emergency core cooling system full of water as required per Technical Specification 3.5.2. On May 21, 2008, Callaway Plant engineering discovered that a section of the cold leg recirculation piping, specifically the discharge of the residual heat removal pumps to the safety injection pumps, contained 6.6 cubic feet of air. Callaway monthly surveillance Procedure OSP-SA-00003, Emergency Core Cooling Flow Path Verification and Venting, had a purpose to: Verify the ECCS is full of water, in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.3. The monthly verification and vent procedure was not comprehensive enough to ensure all the emergency core cooling system was full of water. This finding was more than minor because it was similar to Example 3e of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and met the Not Minor If, criteria because the failure to meet the licensees administrative requirement for allowable void fraction impacted the ability of the Train A safety injection system to function upon initiation of high-pressure recirculation. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone procedure quality attribute. Using the Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that this finding should be evaluated using the Phase 2 process described in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. As described in Section III, of Appendix A, given that the presolved table did not contain a suitable target or surrogate for this finding, the senior reactor analyst used the risk-informed notebook to evaluate the significance of this finding affecting only high-pressure recirculation as very low risk significance (Green). This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that a single vent valve was sufficient to vent the affected line rather than assuming that an additional installed valve was not necessary to completely fill, vent, and test the line H.1(b) |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2008003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra D Dumbacher V Gaddy J Groom |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2008003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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