The team identified a Green noncited violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because the licensee failed to ensure that Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for the NK11 and NK14 safety-related batteries established limits that met the design requirements. Specifically, until questioned by the team the licensee failed to determine the required design value needed to assure plant safety as requested in Callaway Action Request 200706561. The licensee determined that 69 micro-ohms should be the actual allowed inter-cell voltage limit to meet the design requirements versus an allowed Technical Specification limit of 150 micro-ohms. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the failure to ensure that the NK11 and NK14 safety-related batteries would remain
operable if all the inter-cell connections measured 150 micro-ohms as allowed by Technical Specification
Surveillance Requirements 3.8.4.2 and 3.8.4.5. This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of maintenance and testing and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, \\\\\\\"Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,\\\\\\\" the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because the licensee failed to evaluate in a timely manner relevant internal and external operating experience
P.2(a) (Section 4OA2.e)
