ML20153C311

Trip Rept of 870302-13 Visit to Ussr by Us Govt Nuclear Safety Team

ML20153C311
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Issue date:	03/02/1987
From:	Schechter H NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
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JCCCNRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8805060205
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REPORT OF A TRIP TO THE U.S.S.R.

BY'A U.S. GOVERNMENT NUCLEAR SAFETY TEAM i I

l MARCH 2-13, 1987 l

(Compiled by H. 8. Schechter, NRC/GPA/IP, from various sources) l l

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Executive Sumary A meeting of nuclear safety delegations from the U.S. and the USSR was held in the Soviet Union from March 2 through March 13, 1987. Two days of discussions in Moscow were followed by site visits to Soviet nuclear facilities and a final wrap-up session in Moscow. A trip map is at Figure 1. At the conclusion of the visit a joint protocol sumarizing the visit was prepared and signed (Appendix A).

The U.S. delegation was headed by Comissioner Frederick M. Bernthal of the  :

Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) and the Soviet delegation by Andronik M.

Petrosyants, Chairman, USSR State Comittee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE).

The suggestion for such a meeting was first advanced by Comissioner Bernthal in the fall of 1985, but various factors delayed it to early 1987. The schedule of the trip and a brief description of the topics addressed at each place are given below.

1) March 2: Initial Plenary Meeting at GKAE, Moscow. The two teams met in l Roscow for a day of overall discussions to plan the delegation's visit, to discuss organizations, approaches and programs related to nuclear safety, and 'to explore areas of possible future cooperation. The U.S. i tea'n consisted of representatives of NRC, the Department of Energy (00E), l the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as a contract interpreter and a representative of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (Appendix B). The Soviet  ;

delegation included senior members of the GKAE, the State Comittee for i Supe: vision of Safety in the Nuclear Power Industry (GAEN), the new Ministry 1 of Atomic Power, the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, the Ministry of

. Health, and the State Comittee on Hydrology and Meteorology (Appendix C lists Soviet participants at the opening sessions and throughout the visit).

1 Agreement was raached on the agenda for the visit. A limit of three for the i Chernobyl plant visit was set by the Soviets, with the rest of the delegation to visit health officials in Kiev at that time. Topics explored during the meeting included: nuclear safety regulation policy and practice, aspects of safe power plant operation, safety research, and health care and environ-j mental protection. Each side described its activities and plans for improving these areas in the future. The Soviets showed serious interest in the topics and were open in the discussions; they appeared very interested in information on organization and functions of NRC for possible use in connecticn with their ongoing nuclear safety reorganization following Chernobyl; Chairman Petrosyants encouraged the team to provide a candid appraisal of the Soviet nuclear safety program on completing its visit and he expressed hope for new and enlarged cooperative efforts in nuclear safety with the US aftu an eight-year gap. l

2) March 3: Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE) in Moscow.

Dr. V. A. Legasov, Academician, First Deputy Director of the KIAE, presented an overview of KIAE, the research and development institute for all Soviet nuclear power plant types except fast reactors. In addition, the Institute performs research in plasma physics, material testing, nuclear physics, and isotope separation. Reactor fuel elements are tested at the Institute.

Comissioner Bernthal presented a copy of the NRC's Reactor Risk Reference t _ _ _ ._ . _ _ - -

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I j l Document (NUREG-1150) and the Chernoby1 factual report (NUREG-1250), and

! promised a copy of NRC's Chernobyl implications report when it is published.

The Soviet side described their work on new VVER designs, including an improved containment design and three separate safety trains for use in emergency situations, and highlighted inherently safe reactor designs for l district heating. They also indicated a continued interest in High Tempera- '

ture Gas Reactors (HTGRs) as part of their future energy mix. A brief tour of the materials test and research reactor at Kurchatov was also provided.

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3) March 5: Zaporozhiye Atomic Power Station. The site visit included a I tour of the control room, turbine hall, diesel generator building, and radiation monitoring areas of one of the VVER reactors. Discussions -

included operator training practices and operator qualifications, fire I protection, emergency planning, personnel fitness for duty, safety system design philosophy, and activities related to ensuring compliance with safety requirements.

4) March 6: Chernobyl Atomic Power Station. ThreD.S.delegationmembers (comissioner Bernthal, Mr. Denton, and Mr. Gavigan), the first U.S. Govern-ment representatives to do so, toured the control room of Unit 1 and tu: hine hall of Units 1 and 2, which were operating at full power of 1,000 MWe each, and also saw the sarcophagus over destroyed Unit 4 from a distance. They also saw an on-line system to monitor the status of key parameters within 1 the sarcophagus and heard a report on modifications made to the Chernobyl l reactors to improve their safety.

5) March 6: Ministry of Health of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (Kiev). In parallel with the above Chernobyl visit, the remaining U.S. delegates held discussions on radiation health and environmental effects of the Chernobyl accident and received a briefing on the medical program to provide health care to the population. The Soviet side was reasonably responsive but did not appear eager to embark on lengthy discu3sions. They stressed, among others, the following key points: ~1 mediate action was taken to prevent infectious disease; extensive water and food monitoring was done; with some exceptions, foods outside a 30 km exclusion zone were suitable for consumption; first-day evacuation of all known pregnant women prevented any subsequent ill effects on their newborn babies; there exists a possibility of some long-term health effects, but these would probably not be statistically demonstrable.

6) March 9: Izhora Heavy Components Production Plant (at Kolpino near j Leningrad). The delegation held discussions on Soviet metallurgy and j

manufacturing techniques for such items as reactor pressure vessels, steam generators, and coolant pump casings, and saw the equipment useo to fabri-cate such heavy components. The team was shown the completed reactor vessel for the first Cuban plant. It w;s noted that the vessel was constructed of circular forgings without longitudinal welds and with integral nozzles.

7) March 10: Atomenergoproyekt (Leningrad Division of the Scientific Research and Design Institute, Ministry of Nuclear Power, Moscow). The delegation met for about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> with specialists involved in the design of the nuclear power plant being provided by the USSR to Cuba and became acquainted with safety systems, containment, and radiation monitoring l

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devices. Significant points made by the Soviets were that the Cuban plant differs from the Finnish Loviisa plant as folleus: three identical, independent safety system trains (versus two for Loviisa); containment is a cylindrical steel-lined reinforced concrete shell with an internal bubbling-type vapor suppression passive steam condenser and passive and active sprinkler systems (versus an ice condenser system at Loviisa); and conven-tional, externally located recombiners, instead of hydrogen igniters, are planned for the Cuban plant.

8) March 11_:. _ All Union Scientific Institute for Operation of Atomic Power Plants (Moscow). The delegation exchanged vfews and experiences on the safe operation of nuclear power plants, including questions on abnormal-occurrences, maintenance factors, operator training aspects, and research directed at improving safety in plant operations.

9) March 12: 8eloyarsk Atomic power Station. The U.S. delegation toured.

the control room, turbine hall, and the reactor building of the BN-600 reactor and was given a comprehensive briefing on the design and operation of this fast-neutron breeder reactor installation.

10) March 13: Final Plenary Meetings at GXAE, Moscow,

11) March 14 The U.S. team departed Moscow for return trip to the U.S.

I The U.S. and Soviet sides agreed on a planned return visit by a Soviet safety l team to U.S. facilities in October or November 1987. The Soviets also obtained  ;

infomal U.S. agreement to include a visit to the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident i site. The U.S. side gave the Soviets candid conuents and observations on Soviet l safety programs and approaches observed during the visit. A final press conference was held during which questions were raised by the press and addressed by both i i sides.

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Overall, the U.S. delegation considered the visit successful in achieving the intended goals, including obtaining a good understanding of present and

planned Soviet safety programs as a basis for exploring possible future cooperation.

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I. Background on U.S.-USSR Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, i The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev June 21, 1973.

Unlike some of the other 11 bilateral agreements which established "detente" and were suspended, cancelled or allowed to expire due to the deterioration of  !

political relations, activities under the Atomic Energy Agreement continued '

because DOE made a convincing case that the U.S. stood to gain significant benefits under the Agreement. The Agreement was renewed in Juno 1983 and December 1985 and comes up for renewal again in 1988.

Starting in December 1975, within the setting of this existing cooperation.* i the NRC, in coordination with the Executive Branch, had discussed with I representatives of the USSR Ministry of Power and Flectrification (MPE) and 3 State Comittee on Utilization of Atomic Energy (GXAE) the possibility of cooperation on safety of light-water reactors.

The Soviets originally proposed that LWR safety issues be only one part of a larger LWR technology exchange agreement. The U.S. was reluctant to transfer 1 LWR technology on a government-to-governn.ent basis to the USSR because this technology was already within the private sector and because of concerns in the Executive Branch about the national security implications of full LWR technology trans fer. However, the U.S. accepted a limited e:: change in the field of safety 1 of land-based LWRs. I NRC discussed nuclear safety with the USSR during 1976-77 when the NRC participated in the U.S.-USSR Joint Comittee Meetings (JCM) on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. In February 1978, an NRC team, which included Victor Stello (currently NRC's Executive Director for Operations), visited the USSR where they held technical discussions and visited several facilities including (

, Teploelectroproyekt Institute, Kurchatov Institute, Dzherzhinskiy Institute. I Zhuk Scientific Research Station of the Gidroproyekt Institute, Izhora Manufactur-ing Plant, Leningrad Power Station, Novoyoronezh Power Station, and the Armenian Power Station.

In March-April 1978 a Soviet delegation visited the U.S. Discussions were held at NRC and Bechtel Corp., and the delegation visited the Idaho National Engineering Laboratories; Westinghouse Nuclear Company's Heavy Components Fabrication Plant in Tampa, Florida; Limerick Nuclear Power Station; and Peach l Bottom Nuclear Power Station. l The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought about a hiatus in further cooperation with the Soviets on nuclear safety matters.

On June 27, 1984 Fresident Reagan enunciated a new policy on scientific and  ;

cultural exchanges which encouraged federal agencies to consider expanding their level of activities with the Soviets. The policy on exchanges was in l support of improving comunications as part of U.S. foreign policy with the USSR. A major theme resulting from the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit  ;

was encouragement of further people-to-people exchanges. I

As a consequence of this policy development, in September 1985 Comissioner Bernthal initiated contact with the Soviets to explore the possibility of reopening discussions on nuclear safety matters. While by early 1986 the USSR approved "in principle" an NRC delegation visit to the USSR, the Chernobyl accident in April complicated the picture. Further encouragement of nuclear cooperation resulted from the Tokyo Sumit meeting in early May 1986, where President Reagan and the leaders of the U.K., France. West Gemany, Japan, Italy and Canada issued a statement criticizing the Soviets for not releasing more inf0mation on the Chernobyl accident and calling on them to provide infomation in response to requests from countries around the world. The statement also called for negotiation of an international convention requiring countries to report and exchange information in the event of nuclear emergencies or accidents.

The U.S. offered assistance to the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis, but the IAEA became the main forum for information exchange with the USSR related to the Chernobyl accident.

Separate from Comissioner Benthal's initiative, and within the context of JCM activities, the USSR Embassy in Washington fomally proposed on February 21, 1986 to DOE and State that the sixth JCM take place in the USSR. In April, just before the Cnernobyl accident, DOE discussed with the Embassy dates and a general agenda which included Fusion, Fundamental Properties of Matter, and Fast Breeder Reactors. Subsequently, DOE suggested adding LWR Safety, which was accepted by the USSR. Formal agreement to hold the sixth JCM was reached in June, and the JCM took place in August 1986.

While reactor safety was not on the initial Suviet list of discussion topics, and the Soviets have refused to accept most U.S. Government offers of assistance following Chernobyl, the accident has heightened their sensitivity to reactor safety. U.S. experience with the Three Mile Island (TMI) clean-up, extensive development of safety technology, and our safety philosophy and standards may be of significant interest to them. The Soviets can be expected to continue, however, to remain sensitive to activities that might embarrass them, such as information that shows significant cause for concern about the integrity of their nuclear power plants (although they obviously would want to know about such problems) or that may show significant adverse long-term health consequences from Chernobyl.

The NRC representative at the August 1986 JCM outlined NRC's roles and responsibilities and programs of international cooperation in nuclear safety.

He veaffirmed the interest of Comissioner Bernthal in leading a delegation to the USSR to visit Soviet nuclear facilities and discuss safety matters, and the Soviets agreed to extend an invitation, which followed shortly thereafter.

The U.S. nucTear safety team visit to the USSR took place March 2-13, 1987. 4 The remainder of this report describes the places visited, discussions held, and the views / opinions of the U.S. team members. Additional technical notes on some of the facilities visited were prepared by Jim Meyer of the delegation and are included at Appendix D.

II. Itinerary and Technical Subjects Covered.

The itinerary of the trip is discussed below. Because of poor weather conditions at several points along the way, there were some unavoidable delays and curtail-ments (including disruptions in sleeping schedules). All in all, however, the l . _ _ _ _ _ .- - - - - - - - - - - . -

Soviets made an exceptional effort to ensure that everything went off smoothly and that all planned visits took place. GKAE provided all transportation to and from airports and between meeting sites.

III.A. Initial Plenary Meeting On March 2. U.S. and Soviet nuclear safety and radiation health effects specialists met in Moscow to discuss organizations and programs in each country and to explore areas of possible future cooperation. Comissioner Frederick M. Bernthal of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission led the U.S. side and Chairman Andronik M.

Petrosyants of the State Comittee on Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE) was the Soviet delegation leader. The Soviet side was very well represented, with a number of senior attendees (Appendix C). The Soviets showed openness in discus-sions and serious interest in the topics discussed, particularly in seeking informa-tion on organization and functions of the NRC which they said could be useful as they reorganize their nuclear safety efforts in the wake of Chernobyl. Chairman Petrosyants expressed hope for new and enlarged cooperative efforts in nuclear safety with the U.S. after an eight-year gap, and asked for early U.S. proposals following up the August 1986 Joint Comittee discussions in the USSR on thermonuclear fusion, fundamental properties of matter, fast breeder reactors and nuclear safety.

The Soviets admitted they lagged the U.S. in selected nuclear safety areas and, as a result of Chernobyl, were seriously interested in improving their plant safety (apparently akin to the U.S. situation after the 1979 accident at TMI).

They asked for a candid delegation appraisal of their program and proposals for future cooperation upon the team's March 13 return from visits to various USSR plants and institutes. The Soviets also suggested holding further discussions on atmospheric transport of radioactivity and health effects of Chernobyl.

Chainnan Petrosyants also expressed a particular interest in NRC's role and responsibilities in the areas of security and safeguards, and these were described by the delegation.

Soviet representatives from the Ministry of Health, led by L. A. Buldakov, Deputy Director of the Biophysics Institute, outlined functions of their National Comittee on Radiation Protection and said they disagreed with some recommendations of the International Comittee on Radiation Protection (ICRP).

The Soviets believe radiation protection standards should be based not only on international recomendations but also on practical conditions in the USSR.

In a separate session with the delegation's radiation effects specialists, the Soviets expressed interest in a forthcoming DOE Task Force Report on Chernobyl Health Consequences. The Soviets were interested in future discussions in Moscow with U.S. experts on atmospheric transport of radioactivity and health consequences of Chernobyl. The delegation said it would explore the possibility of a visit by U.S. experts to discuss transport codes, compare U.S. calculations with USSR projections and discuss possible improvements in the projections by incorporation of added Chernobyl radiological data. The appropriate framework for any follow-up discussions in this area would be the U.S.-Soviet Atomic Energy Agreement.

, , , In view of U S concern about the safety of the Cuban reactors (expressed to the Soviets In. August at the Vienna meeting on the Chernobyl accident and also l on other occasions), the Soviets arranged for the delegation to discuss this matter during thJ scheduled March 10 visit to the Leningrad branch of the Moscow  ;

Institute responsible for their general VVER light water reactor plant design,  ;

since this branch had designed the Cuban plant.

From the discussions at the plenary meeting, it became obvicus that the USSR  !

has responded to the Chernobyl accident by extensive organizational and management  !

initiatives, az well as new technical directions. Ministries and Cosmittees  !

I have been reorganized, safety standards reviewed and modified, oversight functions I strengthened and R&D activities initiated for regulatory purposes. A major move i' is under way toward inherent and passive safety in reactor design. They are  !

studying a new containment design for future pressurized water reactors (VVERs).

They are also exploring the use of probabilistic risk assessment and the use.of probabilistic safety goals as an evaluation tool. Representatives of the Safety 1 Supervision Connittee showed considerable interest in any U.S. plans to change J containment designs. Many specific questions were asked about details of the organization and responsibilities of the NRC, in light of their ongoing examina-tion of the experiences of other countries and their relevance to the Soviets' reorganization in the wake of Chernobyl. For example, a new Ministry of Atomic )

Power was established to operate all nuclear power stations.

The Soviet group declined to discuss future epidemiological studies, indicating that infonnation on this subject would be presented at the May 1987 IAEA Meeting on Chernobyl Health Effects. i III.B. Kurchatov Institute i On Tuesday, March 3, the team visited the Xurchatov Institute. The Soviet side was headed by Mr. Legasov. (SovietattendeesareshownatAppendixC.) .

The Soviets described their work on new VVER designs and highlighted inherently safe reactor designs for district heating. The first district I heating plant is nearing completion in Gorkiy.* The new 1000 MWe VVER designs 4

will have redundancy of three separate channels' for injection of emergency cooling water and to provide for decay heat removal. The Soviets do not consider loss of all station AC power (station blackout) to be a credible accident and so had not designed against this possibility. They did indicate earlier problems with radiation embrittlement of pressure vessels in early 1 i

reactors (which could lead to pressurized thermal shock and cracking of I pressure vessels when cold emergency water is injected), but noted that this was solved by changing composition and location of welds and preheating j

emergency cooling water. Among other things, they also said they had decided not to use boric acid for control moderation in new designs, and showed high interest in U.S. acoustic emission techniques for monitoring cracking as it-develops during reactor operations.

The Soviets have considerable interest in High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) and expect this type to be an important part of their energy mix in the future.

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• As pointed out by delegation interpreter Lewin, a nuclear cogeneration plant I had been in operation for fifteen years near the Arctic town of Bilibino, and had supplied it with both electricity and hot water. A cogeneration plant is under construction near Xharkuv and one near Odessa.

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. The U.S. delegation passed to the Soviets copies of a recently published U.S.

factual report on the Chernobyl accident (NUREG-1250) and NRC's Reactor Risk ReferenceDocument(NUREG-1150). The final U.S. report on implications of the Chernobyl accident for the U.S. nuclear safety program was promised to the Soviets as soon as it was completed.

The delegation was given a brief tour of the older materials test and the re=earch reactor at Kurchatov, which is still being used extensively for safety research and for materials testing purposes, in contrast to the situation in the U.S., where not much work is now being done in this area.

During the discussions on environmental and health effects of radiation, the, Soviet side expressed considerable interest in the U.S. "Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability" (ARAC) and, in particular, the Lawrence Livennore Laboratory (LLL) study and transport codes for radiation dispersion us'ed following the Chernobyl accidant. The U.S. delegation initicily raised the possibility of establishing a new working group, aimed at supporting a visit by a Soviet team to LLL to review ARAC (possibly under the Bilateral Health Agreement); it was subsequently concluded, at the Embassy Science Counselor's advice, that this should more properly take place within the framework of the U.S.-USSR Atomic Energy Agreerrent. (Appendix D contains additional technical l material provided by J. Meyer.) '

III.C. Zaporozhiye Atomic Power Station  !

The next day, Wednesday, March 4, the delegation left Moscow to travel to the ' l Zaporozhiye atomic power station,* which is located around 30 or 40 miles south 1 of Zaporozhlye, near the town of Energodar. The weather was not good and the plane was diverted to Krivoy Rog. After a long bus trip and a midnight dinner, followed by two more hours of bus travel, the team arrived at Energodar at

. 3:00 a.m. March ~5. The Zaporozhiye plant tour began around 9:30 a.m. that morning. Th[

team was received by Plant Director Dr. Vladimir X. Bronnikov, (Sovietattendees are listed at Appendix C.) The site tour started with the turbine building of Unit 1, which appeared similar to U.S. PWR turbine buildings. Several technical features were noted by the team. In connection with fire protection, for instance, no halon or automatic actuation CO, system was in use. , Fire prot:ction seemed to be limited to traditional manuaT, hand held, fire extinguishers and some sprinkler systems. It was noted also that the Soviets had adhered here to their old approach in which the steam side of the plant was considered to be the more important one. They seem to have realized now that greater weight should be given to the reactor side of the plant. Other points visited during the walk-through included the radiation monitoring station, rad waste facility and the emergency diesel generators.

A more detailed description of technical specifications and issues discussed can be found in J. Meyer's June 15, 1987 Trip Notes at Appendix D. Some highlights of the information presented there have been

extracted and used in the body of this report.

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Following the walk-through, discussions were held on the following topics: j Training and qualifications of operators and management, H. Denton summarized U.S. practice. In reply to a question by D. Ross, the Soviets noted that they viewed use of simulators as essential. The USSR has had simulators for the VVER-440s and -1000s for quite some time, but not yet at this site. They expected to get them in the future.

The Soviets pointed out that operator licensing involves exams given every 1 two years by the State Comittee for Nuclear Power Safety Supervision to {

the station director, associate director, and chief engineers. These individuals in turn administer exams to the shift supervisors and SR0s/R0s  !

(unlike in the U.S. where individual plant operators, rather than just managers, are tested and then licensed by the NRC). In the area of diagnostics, j they have a lot of interest in acoustical emission detectors, which are still  ;

i in an experimental development stage there, and in noise analyzers and l plant analyzers. The Soviets observed that unlike the U.S. practice of fining the "company" (i.e., utility) they hold individuals responsible, 1 and individuals can be fired by the State Comittee for Nuclear Power Safety Supervision.

Other topics discussed included emergency planning, maintenance (Soviet practice requires each unit to be shut down for extensive maintenance for a three-month period after the first year, and then again for three

months every four years).

1 The NRC team believes that the basic safety philosophy followed in the latest 1

designs used at the plant was generally consistent with that practiced in many other countries. They had three independent safety trains (100 percent systems),

separated from each other, but little if any diversity among systems. They claimed high reliability for their diesel generators. It was noted that the 3

diesels were relatively close together. When asked about station blackout, they

! remarked that such an event was incredible, since offsite and diesel power will

not be lost simultaneously. They do not use Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) and do not consider accidents beyond design basis. Thus, severe accidents and j PRAs are new territory for them.

The control room appeared very orderly and quiet. The fire protection set-up appeared to be less advanced than that required in the U.S. Since operator examination is done at each plant, it differs from one plant to another (i.e.,

j 3 no standardized training and examination, no rigorous aoproach like job task l l

analysis, etc. is practiced in the USSR). As regards site security, the team was surprised by the absence of uniformed, armed guards on site (they did have a double fence and detection devices).

1 H. Denton suggested that the topic of operator training may be a good one to be followed up during the return visit to the U.S.

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It was interesting to learn that at the beginning of each day every operator has to pass a fitness-for-duty examination, which included blood pressure and possibly 3 other tests.

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III.D. Chernoby1 Atomic Power Station On March 6 Comissioner Bernthal, accompanied by H. Denton and F..Gavigan, visited the Chernobyl site. The weather in Kiev was cold and near blizzard conditions prevailed, with very high winds. Instead of the planned helicopter trip to the site, a minivan was used, which reduced the on-site time to around 3-31 hours. Considering the time out for lunch, only about one hour was left for the walk-through, which resulted in a rather limited tour of the facility.

The group toured the control room of Unit 1 and turbine hall of Units 1 and 2, which were operating at full power of 1,000 MWe each, and also saw the sarcophagus over destroyed Unit 4 from a distance. They also saw an on-line system to monitor the status of key parameters within the sarcophagus and heard a report on modifications made to the Chernobyl reactors to improve -

their safety.

The control room and turbine hall were clean and orderly, comparing favorably  ;

with the Zaporozhiye VVER plant visited the previous day. Wall coverings and l paint seemed fresh in a number of areas. A military atmosphere pervaded the site, with uniformed soldiers inside and outside the plant. A disciplined, l confident manner was exhibited by plant personnel. Unit 1 modifications since Chernobyl include new higher enriched fuel assemblies, a reactivity meter in the control room displaying inserted control rod equivalents, intensified administrative control on safety system bypass keys, and minimum control rod insertion distance. One of the main things they had done was place under lock and key one piece of the instrumentation that was jumped or overridden as a prelude to the accident. Now an operator would have to get this piece from the plant manager. All operators at the plant were replacements for those at the plant at the time of the accident, flown in from various other plants.

(Soviet plant personnel met are listed in Appendix C.)

The plant manager's office had a real-time computer / color TV system to monitor the status of key parameters of the sarcophagus for Unit 4 (e.g., temperature and gama dose rate). Unit 3 is expected to be restarted by the end of the year, with new fast-insertion control rods. Total radiation dosage absorbed by the team during the site visit was a negligible 5 mrem.

In response to inquiry, the Soviets stated unequivocally, both at Zaporozhiye-and Chernobyl, that they had no plans to reduce the education level of plant l operators below previous requirements for an engineering degree. This differs '

from infonnation obtained by an American Nuclear Society delegation during a December visit to the USSR.

III.E. Ukrainian Ministry of Health, Kiev Also, on March 6, the eight U.S. team members not visiting Chernobyl held two hours of discussions in Kiev at the Ukrainian Ministry of Health headquarters with a group of ten Soviet specialists in radiation effects (listed at Appendix C).

The Soviet team was headed by the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Health Care Anatoliy Kas'yanenko. The U.S. side was led by Dr. Ross, NRC Deputy Director of Research, and included health effects specialists R. Wood of DOE and R. Miller of NIH. The Soviets had representatives primarily from the Ukrainian Health Care Ministry and the newly established All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine of the USSR Academy 1

i of Medical Sciences. When fully organized, this new Center will contain threc  !

institutes: experimental radiation research, health physics, and long-term effects i studies. The Center is temporarily located near the Health Care Ministry in Kiev '

in scattered buildings.

III.F. Izhora Production Plant  !

l On March 9, the team visited the Izhora Heavy Components Production Plant.

Victor A. Kazakov, the chief engineer, led the tour. The Izhora plant has a long history and has evolved over the years into a large metal component manufacturing large primary and secondary facility employing componentsover for the30,000 people VVER-440, andinter VVER-10 alia, making, UOTrid NBB plants. They have a unique metallurgical capabilit equipment fabrication, including pressure vessels,steam y andgenerators facilities for andheavy coolant pump casings. They also have extensive design capabilities and a quality assurance program, including special non-destructive testing inspection techniques. The Soviets said they meet U.S. ASME code requirements, as well as those of 'the Soviet Union. They have developed forged pressure vessels wi.th no longitudinal welds and no circumferential welds in the reactor core region. Nozzles are an integral part of the vessel and require no welding. Tne plant has manufactured components for many foreign reactors. The Soviet State Comittee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety has inspectors at the plant to check production quality and certify items for installation. The plant has several large pieces of equipment, including electroslag welding and vacuum remelt refining furnaca, rolling mills, a very large Siemens forging press (with a 1150-ton crane), special X-ray equipment, and electron beam welding. The delegation toured the electroslag furnace, rolling mill,1200-ton press, and the pressure vessel finishing and assembly areas.

III.G. Atomenercoproyect, Leningrad On March 10 the Atomenergoaroyekt was visited. One of the key topics covered at this meeting was the cu)an reactor to be sited 8 km southwest of Cienfuegos (180 miles from the Florida Keys). The plant design generally resembles one equipped with an ice-condenser containment, but in this instance an elevated  !

bubble suppression pool replaces the ice. Technical details and specif.fcations for the plant are provided in J. Meyer's notes at Appendix D and the Soviet attendees are in Appendix C. General impressions of the team concerning this plant were as follows:

The plant's approach to safety appears similar to ours as regards design bases, containment requirements, redundancy in safety trains, etc.

Some possible problem areas could be

. lack of diversity in auxiliary feed and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

. lack of crossover capability (diesel in train A to pump in train B)

. no steam-driven auxiliary feed pumps

. less than adequate fire protection

. extent of continuing Soviet oversight after plant is turned over to the Cubans

i III.H. All-Union Scientific Institute, Moscow On March 11, the delegation had a useful meeting in Moscow at the All-Union Scientific Institute for Operation of Atomic Power Plants during which views were exchanged on the safe operation of nuclear plants, including assessment of abnormal occurrences, maintenance factors, and operator training and research  !

aimed at improving safety in plant operations. The Soviet side was led by Amen Abagyan, who noted that the Institute was set uo in 1979 (in response to the TMI accident) and is focused mainly on ensuring safety and economics in operations of Soviet nuclear plants, based 6n current plant experience, and on i

reconinending improvements and conducting associated research. l The Institute reports to the new Ministry of Atomic Power and prepares an annual report on abnormal occurrences for the Ministry. When the delegation requested a copy of this report, the response was that this is an internal report for the Minister. This Institute maintains a data bank on failure of components, and analyzes these failures, as well as plant operations in general, to make recon.-

mendations to improve safety and reliability and extend the plant's useful life.

They also develop improved diagnostics to assess operations, monitor metals, etc.,

to define safer operating regimes, seek to improve radiation safety and minimize worker exposure during plant maintenance.

The Institute has the only safety research office within the Ministry, but as a new organization they do not as yet have many test facilities. They have been organizing better training methods for operators, developing simulators and detemining the causes of, and lessons learned from, the Chernobyl accident.

The U.S. delegation (H. Denton and D. Ross) reviewed NRC's involvement in the above activities, including presenting NRC's program for systematically assessing plant performance over time and parallel research efforts. Other discussions centered on detailed training and qualification practices for nuclear plant personnel in the U.S. and USSR and the relationship between the U.S. Institute for Nuclear Power Operations and the NRC. (In many ways this Institute resembles INPO.) The Soviets also indicated a strong consnitment to the High Temperature Gas Reactor. They described their safety research philosophy as like that of the U.S. and their effort as similar to that at the Idaho National Engineering laboratory. The Institute also provides Soviet operating experience to the international community and receives foreign data in return. They indicated that they needed to do more in this area and, privately, said the problems were not technical, but organizational. (Soviet attendees are listed at Appendix C and J. Meyer's notes are at Appendix 0.)

III.I. Beloyarsk Atomic Power Station On March 12, the team visited the Beloyarsk Atomic Power Station. Mr. Saraev, Site Director, introduced the Soviet staff to the U.S. delegation. (The staff is listed at Appendix C.) The Soviets noted that the station has two older plants of1;he general RBMK-type design, with Unit 1 (100 MWe) shut down since 1981 and Unit 2.in operation at 160 MWe (previously 200 MWe) and planned to continue operation to 1990-94. The Soviets described the BN-600 plant in seine detail and provided a brochure describing the facility. They noted earlier 1

, problems with plant steam generator leaks and primary pump clutches which have been solved. The reactor is considered simple and stable, as well as easy to control and automate. Since 1982-83 it has had a capacity factor of 72-73 percent, with overall annual average since 1980 startup at 62 percent. The reactor operating cycle is 100 full power days, 20 days down, 100 up, 40 down and then the cycle repeats. Fuel lifetime is about 300 full power days. They have made improvements in going to the BN-800 version, which should come on line in about five years. Some decay heat removal tests have been conducted. The maximum fuel burn-up on the enriched metal-fuel has been 7.5 percent. As a result of Chernobyl, they are doing a seismic analysis which was not done in the original design stage. They said that the BN-600 has a negative void coefficient.

The lab director felt personally that the breeder would become economical by 1995-2000.

The group toured the BN-600 turbine rooms, control room and reactor building.

The rooms looked clean, neat and orderly. The control room had five operators, all with university degrees, and was using upgraded instnusentation to display plant operating conditions. It was quiet and laid out well. In the reactor building, the group could see the reactor top, fuel handling and maintenance fixtures, secondary pump motors and a bank of resistors to control primary pump coast down. The control room used the same fire protection approach that had been seen earlier at the Zaporozhiye station (i.e., lack of fire barriers and use of hand-held CO, extinguishers). The reactor building had banks of resistors but no fire detectors or fire suppressants in sight. Similarly, as at Zaporozhiye, in the areas visited there was a lack of evidence of wide-spread use of fire detectors or fire suppressants, compared to practices in U.S. plants. Additional details are provided in J. Meyer's notes (Appendix D).

III.J. Wrap-Up in Mo, scow

, On March 13, a Final Plenary Meetino took place at GKAE, Moscow. At this meeting, A. Petrosyants and B. Semenov from GKAE, V. Malyshev and V. Sidorenko j

from GAEN, and L. Voronin from the Ministry of Atomic Power went over the U.S. 1 draft protocol line by line to reach agreement with the U.S. side on a final text.

Mr. Malyshev was introduced good naturedly by the Soviets as the person with safety oversight and regulatory authority for their nuclear power. program (he had formerly been Director of the Beloyarsk plant). He did not participate much in the discussions after delivering his introductory remarks.

l The Soviets preferred not to include in the protocol a listing of areas for i future exploration until after the return Soviet visit to the U.S. has taken  !

place. After agreement on the protocol, Comissioner Bernthal sumarized overall U.S. team impressions on Soviet nuclear safety approaches along the following lines:

The general approach to safety in the latest Soviet PWRs is comparable to approaches in other countries, although differences in detail are to be expected.

Chernobyl appeared to be operating normally, with the entombment functioning as designed.- It was pointed out that fast-acting control rods had not been installed at the time of the visit, and that without overall containment, accident mitigation options were limited.

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The U.S. side noted that the medical treatment of the highly exposed Chernobyl individuals, and the use of environmental measurements to l improce atmospheric dispersion models were of considerable interest.

Fire protection techniques in the USSR seemed less extensive than those in the U.S.

In his remarks, Chairman Petrosyants stressed that their nuclear program would,  !

of course, continue undiminished. Other members of the Soviet delegation showed l considerable interest in the U.S. views during ensuing informal discussions. In l the final press conference, the scope of the U.S. Visit and key points of the  !

protocol were sumarized, and Comissioner Bernthal, in answer to questions, said Chernobyl 1 and 2 were operating nomally at 1000 MWe each and Soviet instrumenta-tion indicated radioactive emissions were very low from the sarcophagus over destroyed Unit 4. He said the Soviets have improved safety at Chernobyl by improving operator training, using new fuel, etc., but, while Chernobyl plants have a kind of compartment 311zation containment, they do not have a containment in the sense of U.S. reactors, and also do not as yet hen fast-acting control rods.

Chaiman Petrosyants stressed that the U.S. delegation had been given good access to Chernobyl and the situation there was absolutely normal, with the first two units at full capacity and the third unit being readied for operation in the last half of 1987. Construction of No. 5 had already resumed, and construction on No. 6 )

was not too far behind. The radiation situation, which was being monitored closely around Chernobyl and outside the exclusion zone, was normal. He noted that Chernobyl 1 and 2 are equipped with all devices to ensure safe operation, and pointed out that the accident was caused by wrong actions of personnel and that '

steps have been taken to avoid a repetition of such an event. The Soviets are sure of the safety of RBMK-type reactors and so keep constructing and operating 1 RBMKs including starting up Unit No. 3 soon and taking legal action against those responsible for Chernobyl. Chaiman Petrosyants also observed that there was nothing wrong with Soviet training procedures, although they are being improveo.

Questions at the press conference were mostly from Western reporters on the above matters, with no "political" questions or statements by the press or the Soviet officials en matters outside of the delegation's competence.

The team departed Moscow on March 14 for the return trip to the U.S.

Appendix A: Joint Protocol (w/o appendices)

Appendix 8: U.S. Participants Appendix C: Soviet Participants at .olenary Session and on Trip -

Appendix D: Technical Notes of J. Mep r I

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APPENDIX A .

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Protocol of U.S. - U.S.S.R. Nuclear Safety Discussions and,U.S., Delegation Visit to Soviet Nuclear Facilities March 2 - 13, 1987 The first meeting of nuclear safety delegations from the  !

1 U.S. and the U'.S.S.R., in accordance with the agreement reached I d .

at the meeting of the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Committee on l

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in August 1986, was held in I

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Moscow, U.S.S.R.,, from March 2 through March 13, 1987.

. The U.S. delegation was headed by Frederick M. Bernthal, ,

i Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, while the Soviet

'l .

delegation was headed an Andronik M. Petrosyants, Chairman

! of the U.S.S.R. State Committee for th,e Utilization of Atomic i

Energy. A list of the members of both delegations who l.

j participated in the meetings is appended hereto (Appendices -

1 1 and 2).

• I The delegates had a wide-ranging, useful exploration of

)i topics within the following four broad technical areas of mutual l interest with a view to determining areas of possible future .I i cooperation:

a) nuclear safety regulation policy and practice,.

b) aspects of safe power plant operation, d . c) safety research,

!;f, d) health care and environmental protection. .

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In discusciono in Moccow at the. State Committee for 4

Utili,sation of Atomic Energy each side described its activities 4

related to nuclear power safety matters and radiation health t

matters and outlined its programs for improving these areas in,the future. The U.S. delegation also visited the following

.. nuclear institutes and facilities in the U.S.S.R. to observe

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Soviet approaches to nuclear safety:

• I

1) The Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow. Here, the Soviet side described its work in new designs for the VVER-lOOO nuclear p.ower plant and highlighted work on passivelp safe reactor designs for district heating and on high temperature )

gas-cooled reactors.

2) The Zaporozhive Atomic Power Station. For the first time a

, U.S. delegation visited this plant, including a tour of the '

?.

a control room, turbine hall, diesel generator building, and 4

radiation monitoring areas of cne of the VVER-1000 reactors.

l' Discussions were held on such topics as operator training I

3 practices and operator qualifications, fire protection, emergency 4

1 planning, personnel fitness for duty, safety system design l philosophy and activities related to, ensuring compliance with 4

safety requirements. '

4 4 . 3) The chernobyl' Atomic Power Station (RBMK type reactors).

'I ; Three U.S. delegation members, the first U.S. Government repre-i 1 sentatives to do so, toured the control room of Unit 1 and turbine hall of Units 1 and 2, which were operating at full j i

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power of 1000 MW(o) ccch, and also saw the sarcophagus over destroyed Unit 4 from a distance.

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They also saw an on-line I system to monitor the status of key parameters within the sarcophagus and heard a report on modifications made to the Chernobyl' reactors to improve their safety.

4) The Ministry of Health of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Kiev.

Eight U.S. delegates held discussiens on radiation health and 1

environmental effects of the Chernobyl' accident and received .

a briefing on the medical program to provide health care to

,the population. '

5) The Izhora Nuclear *Ubmponents Production Plant at Kolpino, Near Leningrad.

The delegation held discussions on Soviet metallurgy and manufacturing techniques Yor such items as reactor pressure vessels, steam generators, and coolant' pump casings;

• saw the equipment used to fabricate such heavy equipment, and observed the finished reactor vessel for the first Cuban Nuclear Power Station.

6) The Leningrad Division of the Scientific Research and Design Institute, Ministry of Nuclear Power. The delegation met with Ci 4

) specialists involved in the design of the nuclear power plant j .being provided by the U.S.S.R. to Cuba and became acquainted with i( ' safety systems, containment and radiation monitoring.

7) The All-Union Scientific Institute for operation of Atomic

] Power Plants. Thy delegation exchanged views and experiences on 4h the safe operation of nuclear power plants, including questions

) on abnormal occurrences, maintenance factors, operator training

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aspects, and research directed at improving safety in plant e

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opcrations.

8) The Belovarsk Atomic -Power Station, with BN-600 Reactor,

f. The U;s. darlegation toured ths control room, turbine hall, j and the reactor building and was given a briefing, in detail, -

on the design and operation of this fast-neutron breeder h reactor installation. .

The two sides agreed to a reciproc.a1 visit to the U.S.

, by a Soviet nuclear safety delegation, to take place in October or November 1987. This will provide an opportunity

• for,further exchanges of views and safety experiences by the i two sides, and allow the Soviet delegation to visit several '

I corresponding nuclear facilities and institutions in the U.S.

l c.

The two sides will consider at that time how to proceed to l define topics and a framework for future cooperation on nuclear i ~

q safety matters. In the interim, planning for, and coordina' tion

.j-of, the Soviet visit to the U.S. and consideration of proposals 1

by both sides will be handled by correspondence between the 3

sides. The designated contact for the U.S. side is Mr. J. R. Shea of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and l~

4 for the U.S.S.R. side is Mr. G. N. Merkulov of the State j Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy.

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[i Friderick M. ' Bemthal Boris A. F

] For the U.S. For th6 U emenovM.

,S.S.

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l Moscow, March 13, 1987 '

I j Appendices *

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1. U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation j

2. U.S.S.R. Nuclear Safety Delegation '

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APPENDIX B .

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• e U.S. NUCLEAR SAFETY DELEGATION U.S. NRC Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal, Head of Delegation Mr. Kenneth D. Cohen, Executive Assistant to Commissioner Bernthal, USNRC Dr. James F. Meyer, Technical Assistant to Commissioner Bernthal, USNRC Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

• Regulation, USNRC Mr. James R. Shea, Director, Office of International Programs, USNRC Dr. Denwood F. Ross, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear .

Regulatory Research, USNRC Mr. Francis X. Gavigan, Director, Advanced Reactor Programs, Office of Nuclear Energy, USDOE Mr. Robert W. Barber, Director, Office of Nuclear Safety, USDOE Mr. Robert W. Wood, Director, Physical and Technological Research Division, USDOE Dr. Robert W. Miller, Chief, Clinical Epidemiology Branch, National Cancer Institute, USNIH -

, Dr. John C. Zimmerman, Science Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Moscow Dr. Joseph Lewin, Contract Interpreter e

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SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO PEETINGS IN MOSCOW MARCH ?, 1987 State Comittee for Ut11tration of Atomic Energy (GKAE) 1 Petrosyants. Andranik Felkonovich - Chairman

2. Semenov, Boris Alekseevich - Deputy Chairman

3. Erinakov, Nikolai Ivanovich, Chief Glavatomenergo 4

Belyaev, Anatolii Ivanovich, Deputy Chief Engineer, Glavatomenergo 5.

Efimov, Vladimir Viktorovich, Assistent to Chief of Glavatomenergo 6

Merkulov, Gennadii Nikolaevich, Chief of International Relations

• Department

7. Kazanov, Alexander Semyonovich, Deputy Chief of International Relations Desiertment

~ % 8. Seleznev, Valerii Sergeevich, Lead Engineer, International Relations Department

9. Lunin, Gleb Leonidovich, Chief of a Department of Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE)

10. Voznesenskii, Vsevolod Alexseevich, Deoartment Head, KIAE '

11. Asmolov, Vladimir Grigor'evich, Deputy Director of a Department of K!AE

12. Osmachkin, Vi.t,alli Serafimovich, Laboratory Chief at KIAE 13.

Cherkashev, Yurii Mikhailovich. Deputy Director, Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology 14 Biryukov, Gennadii Ignat'evich - Chief of a Department of the Experimental Design Burtau of Gidropress State Comittee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)

1. Malyshev, Vadim Mikhailovich, Chainnan (was unable to attend meeting due to

' ?. Sidorenko, Viktor Alekseevich - First Deputy illness)

Chainnan I

3. Lapshin, Alexander Leonidovich - Deputy Chairman 4

Kovalevich, Oleg Mikhailovich, Chief of Scientific Technical Directorate 5.

Khamara, Alexander Alexandrovich - Chief of Department of Foreign Relations ee****** C

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6 Gureev, Serget Alekseevich - Assistant to the Chairman 7.

Voronov, Alexander Vasil'evich, Lead Engineer of Department of Foreign Re,1ations Ministry of Atomic Power (Minatnevneron)

.1 Voronin, Leonid Mikhailovich - Deputy Minister

2. Prushinskii, Boris Yakovlevieh - Chief of Scientific-Technical Directorate i 3.

Nefedov, Gennadit Fedorovich - Chief of Foreign Relations Directorate 4

Larin, Evgenii Petrovich - Deputy Director, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Pcwer Stations Ministry of Health (Minsdrav)

1. Turovskii, Valentin Omitrievich - Deputy Chief of a Directorate

2. Avetisov, Grigorti Mikhailovich - Lab. Chief *

, 3. Pavlovskit. Oleg Anatol'evich - Lab. Chief 4

Buldakov, Leo A., - Deputy Director of Biophysics Institute State.Connittee on Hydrology A Meteorology (Goskomgidromet)

1. Kazakov, Yurii Efimovich - Chief of a Ofrectorate

2. Chelyukanov, Valerii Valentinovich

3. Petrov, Viktor Nikolaevich 1 4 Rovinskii, Felix Yakovlevich

5. Ukraintsey, Alexei Borisovich l I

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Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Eneray - March 3, 1987 V. A. Legasov Academician, First Deputy Director of the I. V. Kurchatov

~

Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE)

I. P. Ryazantsev Deputy Director of the VIAE, Director of the Department y of Research Reactors and Reactor Technology A . Protsenko 01. rector of Nuclear Reactor Division (NRO) of the K!AE' G. L. Lunin Division Head at NR0 V. A. Voznesensky Deputy Divisien Head at NRO Y. G. Asmolov Laboratory Head at NRD.

V. S. Osmachkin Laboratory Head at NR0 l A. Y. Stolyarevsky Laboratory Head at NRO A. K. Kalugin Division Head .it NRO V. F. Demin Senior Researcher of Reactors Division of the K!AE I.N.Sekolov ' ' Laboratory Head at NRO E. M. Nikitin Adviser of Director of KIAE U. M. Cherkashov Deputy Director of Scientific Research Institute of Power Technology G. I. Birjukov Chief of Department Design Bureau "Gidropress" N. S. Fill Chief of Department, '08" '

, N. V. Shary Deputy Chief of Department, "08" i A. N. Podshybyakin Leading designer, "08" l

ZAPOROZHIYE PLANT - MARCH 5, 1987 Dr. Vladimir Konstantinovich Bronnikov - Plant Director ,

Mr. Alexander X11menko.- Representative of International Department of Zapororh'ye District

'Mr. Ischenko - Chief Engineer of Plant Mr. Vladimirk - Chief of Plant Construction Mr. Victor Nikolaevich Krushel'nitskiy - Chief of Design Office of Soviet State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety l

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Chernobyl Plant - March 6, 1987 Umanyets Vladimir Panteleevich - Director of Plant No.1 Ignatenko Eugenio Ivanovich - Director General of Pcwer Production (Chief of Pcwer for the 30 km Zone For All Power-Producing Plants')

Ovcharod, Victor Petrovich - Chief of Dept. of Soviet

, State Connittee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety  :

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Asmolov - Deputy Director, Division of Nuclear Safety, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute (made presentation on Sarcophagus Display)

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Ministry of Health Care nf the Ukrainfan 55R. Tiev - March ,5.1987 1

Kas'yanenko, Anatolfy Mikhailovich - Deputy Minister of Health Care of the UkSSR 2.

Otroshchenko, Petr Grigor'evich - Deputy Minister of Health Care of the UkSSR

3. Kozlyuk. Vsevolod Matveeiich - Chief of the Main Administration of Occupational Health Aid of the Ministry of Health Care, UkSSR '

4 Shandala, Hintstry MikhailCare.

of Health Georgievich UtSSR - Chairman of the Science Council of the .

5.

Likhtarev,11'ya Aronovich - Dosimetry and Radiation Hygiene Departnent Head of the All-Union Center of Padiation Medicine of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR 6.

Rudney, Mikhail Ivanovich - Director of the Science Research Institute of Experimental Radiolog of the All-Union Center of Radiation Medicine of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR

7. Tron'ko, Nikolai Omitrievich, Onctor of the Kiev Octence Research Institute of Endocrinology -

. 8. Prisyazhnyuk, Anatolii Eystif'evich - Director of the Division of Prognostics and s*oordiration of the All-Union Center of Radiation Medicine of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR 9.

Spitsyn, Health, Grigorii UkSSR Yasil'evich - M.D., inspector of the Ministry of 10.. Petchenko, Health UkSSR Vasilii Philippovich - M.D., Inspector of the Ministry of I

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fr%ra Navy Equitment Production Plant. Kolpino. USSR l I!horsky I4Wod)

T4rCh 9, 1987 j i

I j 1. Victor A. Karakov - Chief Engineer ,

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"Atomenergoproyekt" - March 10,1987

[ Nuclear Power Design Organization - Branch of Elect,ri 1 Power Design Institute in Moscow (Teploelectroproyekt

1. V. P. Zaitsev - Director (Not present at Meeting)

~

2. V. V. Sobolev - Deputy Chief Engineer for NPS design

3. Vladimir Isich Sanovich - Chief Project Engineer (Cuba) 4 Yurit Heucolaevick Rezhmin - Chief NPS Specialist

. Ph.D. (Process Safety)

5. Malvina Arkad'evna Karaseva - Chief of the Group of Physicists, Ph.D. (Health Hiysics)

~ *

6. Lyudmila Vasil'evna Chubarkova-(Dosimetry) Radiation Monitoring Engineer

7. Oleg Nikolaevich Lakhanov - Containment Specialist Civil Engineer

8. Lidia Dimitrievna Kononova - Interpreter 9.

Vladimir Semenovich Zakharov - Information (Visitor) Director

10. Alexander Leonidovich Lapshin - Deputy Chairman, Soviet State Committee pn Supervision of Nuclear Plant Safety i

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I All Union Scientific Research Institute at nuclear Power stations -~ March 11, 1987

1. I Armen Artavazdovich Abagyan - General Of rector 1

2. Larin, Evgenii Petrovich - Deputy Director General

- )

3. Sergei Stepanovh Zyahrev - Deputy Division Director '

4 Valerii Victoravich Taratunin - Laboratory Chier

5. Gennadii Vladimiro.vich Tokinachev - Engineer

6. Bulat Iskanderovich Nigmatulin - Division Director

7. Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Volkov - Laboratory Chief 8

Stanislav Ivanovich Kochrev - Lead Engineer 3

9. Anartolii Timofeevich Pssevin - Group Leader

10. Valentin Nikolaevich Shpyakin - Division Director

. 11. Valentina Trofinovna Bogdanova - Deputy Division Director

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12. Vladimir Leonidovich Murygin - Engineer

13. Alexander Vseviolodovich - Engineer Interpreter 14 Vadim Alexandrovich Petrnv - Department Chief

15. Vladislov Anatol'evich Moiseitsey - Deputy Department Chief

16. Alexander Evgen'evich Kroshilin - Laboratory Chief

17. Leonid Pavlovich Khorm'yanov - Department Chief

18. Vladimir Alexandrovich Kremnev - Department Chief l

'19 . i Rarmik Apetovich Dovlatyan - Deputy Of rector of a Branch of the Institute 70 Sergei Gevorkovich Muradyan - Department Chief

21. Victor Markovich Imitriev - Division Ofrector O

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BN-600 (BELOYARSK) - MARCH 12. 19A7

1. Mr. Oleg Makarovitch Saraev, Director

2. Mr.*0shkanov - Chief Engineer

3. Pr. Valeriy Petrovitch Burkin - Deputy Director 4 Mr. Vylomov - Chief Engineer Assistant ,

5. Mr. Maltsev - Chief Engineer Assistant

6. Mr.,Tolstonogov - Reactor Department Superintendent -

7. Mr. Evseev - Department Manager

8. Mr. Rostislav Victorinovich Nikol'skii - Chief Insoector from GAEN (Soviet Safety Comittee) 'or breeder reactors e % g 8

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O APPENDIX D e

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Notes by J. Meyer, NRC on Visits to USSR Facilities, March, 1967

.I.V. KURCHATOV INSTITUTE OF ATOMIC ENERGY (KIAE)

- March 3,1987. Moscow I. Opening Comnents Dr. V.A. Legasov, Academician, First Deputy Director

'of the KIAE welcomed the delegation and presented an overview of KIAE. KIAE is the research and development institute for all Soviet nuclear power plant types except fast reactors.* In addition, the Institute performs research in plasma physics, material testing, .

nuclear physics', and isotope separation. Reactor fuel elements are tested at the Institute. Next year a large (inertial-confinement),,

fusion device, supplementing the small Tokamak already in operation, will be ready. After the overvier a film on Chernobyl was shown.

Cosmissioner Bernthal introhuced the delegation, presented a copy of the NRC's Chernobyl factual report (NUREG-1250), promised them a copy of HRC's Chernobyl implications report when it. is published and then proceeded with an outline of what he hoped would be discussed at the meeting. The items he included were VVER advances, district heating designs, and the HTGR.

l II. VVER, Present and Future The key points of interest were:  !

l .

A. General Status s

• It should be mentioned that the Physico-Technict Institute at Obninsk was originally the research and development institute for the pressure tube, graphite-moderated reactors. The Obninsk Institute is also the LMFBR research center in the USSR.

G

2-1 There are 43 VVERs worldwide, ranging in power level from 70 t+ 1500 MWe. (The 1500 MWe are under construction.)

2. The VVER is the main reactor in the Soviet Union.

3. Most of the VVER-1000s are in the Soviet Union.

i

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4. Most of the VVER-440s are in other socialist countries.

This year, a 1,000 MWe VVER will be started up in Bulgaria.

5. Size of the vessel is t major design constraint, as it must be transported by railway'. This has led to higher power densities (105 kw/1) th'an U.S. and French PWRs, but not much higher than modern U.S. PWRs.

6. Modern VVER vessels have no welds in the belt-region area of l the vessel and no vertical welds whatsoever. The VVER vessels have no lower-head penetrations.

i

7. VVER pressurizers are twice the size of U.S. pressurizers.

I

8. The VVERs use a zirconium /nfobium alloy for fuel assembly' structural material. Presently they have too much stainless steel in the core area but are learning to use more zirconium. .

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, 9. yVER burnups are typically 30,000 MWD /MT with some burnups g'ing o up to 40,000 MWD /MT.

l B. Safety Systems,

)

1. Three redundant and independent 100 percent safety trains in modern VVERs.

a. Three HPI systems

b. Three LPI. systems

2. Four Accumulators *

a. Two inject into two of four cold legs

b. Other two inject into other two of four hot legs

3. Containments in modern USSR VVER-1000s and VVER-1500s are prestressed large-drys with free volumes of 60,000'm3 6 3 (2.1x10 ft ) and design pressures of 5 ata absolute (59 psig)(they are tested to 5.8 atm absolute). The Soviets would not volunteer an estimated containment failure l

pressure. 1

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, 4. Accident Types analyzed: Their large guillotine pipe-break DhA requires ECCS response such that clad temperatures nevI exceed 1200*C, Other requirements are also similar to those of U.S. Vessel failure is not a DBA. They consider station blackout (theyesti.sateonehour.touncoverthecore),but .

consider loss of all ac as incredible--no PRA done.

C. Problemswi[thVVERs

1. For older plants vessel embrittlement and the potential for PTS is o'f concern. Effort to solve the PTS problem includes:

o

a. Reducing neutron fluence by fuel assembly modifications

, in periphery.

b. Heating injection water.

c. Developing new standards in purity of steels and welds. I i

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d. Modern vessel fabrication techniques will eliminate l

l unnecessary welds. .

2.

Problems in being able to acconnodate small break LOCAs.

They are looking at: ,

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,a . Yessel venting

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b. Stronger tubing from pressurizer [to quench tank]  !

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c. Upgrading bleed capability.

3. Boric Acid in reactor / primary loop: disadvantages of using boric' acid (including corrosion from leakage and condensation and positive reactivity coefficients) have led .;

Soviets to redesign future cores to eliminate use of boric acid and rely entirely on mechanical control rods for

{

power / reactivity control. I

4. Severe Accidents are being taken much more seriously since Chernobyl. They are considering core catchers, filtered vents, and additional hydrogen control for future VVERs.

D. U.S. Presentations

1. Harold Denton gave an overview of status of U.S. nuclear power and nuclear regulation, discussed standardization and g sunnarized the EPRI program. '

2. Denny Ross gave a detailed presentation of the RES program.

They had particular interest in: (1) our ability to detect crackgrowthbyacousticemissiondetection;(2)LOFTand

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6-

,- kF status; (3) codes and code verification; (4) vessel

[a'ilure experiments; (5) U.S. plans for anneeling of irradiated vessels; (6) how we resolved hydrogen burn problems in containments; and (7) our PTS rule.

j 3. Frank Gavican discussed the Advanced Reactor Program at 00E.

The Scviets were interested in costs and economics of the advanced concepts.

III. District Heating ,0r. I.N. Sokolov, Laboratory Head at Nuclear Reactor l

Division (NRD). gave the presentation on district heating. (Note reference 2 which was given the U.S. delegation and has since been l translated.)

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Saltentpointiwere:

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A. The Gorky units are under construe.cion. There will be two 500

Mw(th) plants which will provide district heating for 400,000 people. They are, of necessity, close to the cit and therefore safety requirements increase substantially. A similar station is

under construction at Voronezh.

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.B. Safety Design Approach Fuel melt probability must be very low.

.., In order to achieve this, the design must minimize human (operator) error and damage frbe external events.

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' 1. Natural circulatida cooling in primary loop and, under

. a$cident conditions, in thcondary loop minimizes human error problems.

2. Designed to acconnodtte external events such as aircraft crashes (20 tons at 700 km/hr) and external explosions 9

(loading of 0.5 kg/m- for ovie second).

3.. If vessel fails, an outer standby vessel surrounding the vessel can withstand the pressure. Reactor core will always be covered by water. The standby vessel (500 m3 volume) also serves to retain fission-products.

4. The containment is rein' forced concrete.

5. If there is a station blackout, core is coolable by natural

) circulation for five to seven days.

C. Design Characteristics: -

1. Temperatures:

I

a. Inlet, 130'C 1

b. Outlet, 208'C .

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c. Typical temperature for district heating,150'C

2. Pressure, 20 atmospheres (280 psig).

. 3. Noliqdid(boricacid) absorbers (boricacidaccumulator, ,

however). ,

4. Three circuits:

a. Primary with natural circulation

b. Primary / secondary heat exchanger in vessel ,

c., , Tertiary circuit provides district heating.

5. Core linear power density is 90 w/cm (average) and 280 w/cm peak (typical LWR value is 500 w/cm).

6. Fuel is 1.8 percent enriched.

7. Burnup is estimated to be about 16,000 MWD /MT. Six year fuel cycle with one-third refueled every two years.

8. Construction time is six years.

6

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~ 9. "Radiolysis of water is controlled by a 96 percent helium, 4 .

I' percent hydrogen cover gas.

IV. HTGRs

~

A. Various NTGR types are being developed ranging in power levels from 300 We to 1,000 We, The first will be operational in the

. mid-1990s. It will be 400 We with tennis ball-type fuel of 6.5 percent enrichment. Thefannedultimateoutputtemperaturewill be 950'C; this temperature will be approached in three stages starting at 650'C. The plant will have four loops. The metal components in the intermediate heat exchanger are made from a

, nickel alloy similar to 800 H Inconel. There are also some stainless steel components. For the 1000 We reactors, thers will be Drestressed concrete vessel (PCV) containments designed to three atm with a volume of 100,000 m3(3.5x106 ft), 3 By the year 2000, two HTRGs will be operating, one of which will be a 300 We modular design. The Soviets expect that HTGRs will be an important component of their nuclear energy mix in the 21st century. They eventually plan to operate HTGRs with a direct I

helium-driven turbine cycle.-

V. Tour p

Dr. E.P. Ryazantser led the tour of some of the KIAE facilitiesj including t$eir 40 MW MR reactor. Tests were being conducted under operating and accident conditions. The maximum thennal neutron flux (in a special trap) is 8x1014n/cm2 3,c, .

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NOTES ON VISIT TO THE ZAPOROZHIYE ATOMIC POWER STATION MARCH 4 AND 5, 1987

.I. Preliminaries The visit started with an approximately 5 km bus ride from the hotel (located in the city of Energedar--45,000 population--on the bank of the Kakovkha water reservoir.. adjacent to the site). Points made

. du' ring drive:

1970--year site development was started.

Site has 300 MWe of fossil fuel generating capacity -- burning

• coal and heavy oil which supplies district heating to the town.

The soil in the area is not usable for farming -- this is why (among others) site was picked.

II. Discussions (over breakfast)

Miscellaneous topics while dining:

I Seismic design of nuclear units 1 l

NSSS ,

9 MM BOP 7 MM

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-- (n Zaporozhfye area, seismic events are less than 4 m.

Probability estimates: 6 MM once in about 10,000 years; frequency 10'# / yr for 6 m.

o Operations: '

Five shifts with four operating (8hr) on a schedule of three days on and two days off -- for each unit.

Crew size is 32/ shift / unit.

There are supervisors for the reactor, turbine, electrical, I&C, chemistry and health physics. Most supervisors are per unit but chemistry and health physics are per site (presentlythreeunits).

1 There are three reactor operators per unit /per shift. The SR0/pos have technical degrees.

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The overall, reactor, a,nd turbine shift-supervisors are degreed engineers.

One climbs the ladder through the organization by education and seniority, s

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Eieryday, each operator is given a mini physical with checking of key parameters such as blood pressure (strict fitness for duty).

e III. At 9:36 a.m. the U.S. delegation met w'ith the Site Director, s

Dr. Vladimir X. Bronnikov. Pins were presented to the U.S. delegation and the tour was planned.

IV. Site Tour o Turbine building of Unit One First USSR 1000 MW(e) turbine Steam leakage was noticeable and acknowledged by Soviet staff.

Similar in design to U.S. PWR turbine buildings.

Discussion of fire protection: '

No halon or automatic actuation CO systems. Their fire 2

protection seemed to be limited to traditional manual (hand held) fire extinguishers and some sprinkler systems.

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DJscussion of safety philosophy: old approach was that the steam side of the plant was most important. Now they recognize that the reactor side is the most important.

o Control Room (Unit 1 operating' at 100' percent power)

-- Quiet'and orderly.

^ ^ --

Three separate and identical panels for the three safety systems".

Something resembling a Safety Parameter Display System

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(SPDS). A comment was made that SPDS would be of little )

he,lp in an emergency.

They have a remote shutdown panel.

All functions are automatic for shutdown. Operators only deal with consequences. For 30 minutes there is no operator interference with emergency actuations.

• I i

Bootstrap startup is possible on these VVER-1000s. I There were three SR0/R0s and one supervisor in the control room.

I.' Denton inquired about personnel exposure. They told him 200 man-rem / year is average.

o Radiation Monitoring Station o Radwaste Facility for whole station '

o Adjacent Buildinos Walkthru

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o Emergency Diesel Generators

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15 second start time Success criteria: two out of three starting up within 15 seconds.

Only need one diesel for one unit's emergency n< teds.

Each diesel: 5.6MW(e)

No cross over from one unit to another.

s V. Discussions in Conference Room (11:40a.m.)

Discussions foll' owed on a variety of subjects, the nost important being:

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Training and Qualifications of Operators and Management.

, Discussions continued from earlier session confinning degree requireirents for SR0s/R0s and for supervisors. Harold Denton sumarized U.S. practice. .

Mr. Denton inquired about the accuracy of some reports he had heard that the Soviets felt some of their facility staff were too well educated in that they might trust their own judgements, as opposed to following strict adherence to rules and  !

procedures. They replied that a well-educated staff would l

never have violated the rules / procedures as was done at i Chernobyl.

-- Simulators Denny Ross asked about simulators. The Soviets rep 1ied that they were essential and that they have had simulators for both the YYER-440s and the VVER-1,000s for some time, but not at the site. Eventually they plan to have simulators on site.

. Exams /"Licensing" The State Comittee for Safety (the i

USSR-NRC) gives exams to the facility director, associate director, and chief engineers. In turn then these '

facility / station directors administer exams to the shift j

{ 1 supervisors and SROJ/R0s with participation by the USSR-NRC. Harold Denton "explained the U.S. practice for testing / licensing, in which the individual plant operators,

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r$ther than plant managers, are licensed by NRC. The Soviets noted that every two years all personnel must be requalifted. If they fail, then they are tested more frequently.

l o Diagnostics The Soviets had a lot of interest in acoustical emission detectors as used in the U.S. on our BWRs and PWRs. The Soviets are still in an experimental stage'in developing these

' detectors which seem to work well in shutdown modes (they have some difficulty in getting a baseline). They also have interest in noise analyzers (they have them on their main coolant pumps) l and in plant analyzers. .

o Enforcement Practice Contrary to U.S. practice of fining the "company" the. Soviet practice is to hold individuals responsible.

The management and the USSR Nuclear Safety Oversight Comittee (GAEN) can fire personnel -- a chief engineer was fired by the GAEN but not at the Zaporozhtye station. They referred to our practice as "indirect" as opposed to their more direct approach.

I o Emergency Planning They hav,e made few changes on-site since Chernoby1; however, offsite the changes are more extensive --

principally better coordination with the local civil defense.

Regarding'the three EPZ zones:

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-- Zbne1isa3kmradiuszoneinwhichnonon-plantactivity is allowed.

Zone 2 is the evacuation zone and is 30 km in radius. This 30 km may be expanded to 50 km. In this zone there is constant monitoring of radioactivity.

Zone 3 is referred to as a "free zone". Plans are being made for this zone but nothing established yet. We assume

~

this is their food pathway zone,similar to the U.S. 50 mile i radius zone. When we asked about evacuation times they seid l

_ that they could not answer as that is the responsibility of the civil defense organization.

j Criteria for initiating evacuation are:

A release of I-131 which would result in 30 rem thyroid in children at 3 km or beyond, or -

If plant conditions are such that a release may result, yielding a 250 rem exposure at the site (3 km) boundary (anticipatory).

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o Mainte$ance Each unit is shut down after the first year for three months of extensive maintenance. Thereafter, each unit is shut down for extensive maintenance every four years.

o Miscellaneous Topics Other topics discussed briefly were: the U3SR exper.ience with horizontal steam generators, the U.S.

"single failure" criterion, and the utility of going to four safety trains.

o Closino Comments Connissioner Bernthal and Harold Denton, when asked what they thought of the station, responded that: .

-- The different practices of the Soviets are something that

, the U.S. wants to go back and think about.

l

-- We are impressed with their low-radiation exposure record  ;

i for workers.

-- We are also impressed with their "black board" control room, in which no safety-related systems were out of commission while the plant was in operation.

-- We didn't feel that their fire protection was as extensive as ours. *

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-- Odr safety philosophies seem quite similar.

- -- They should come to the U.S. to see the differences and similarities fqr themselves.

VI. Additional Points

• a Thisstationwilleventuallyhavesixunits(1through4at1,000 MWe and the last 2 at 1500 MWe, giving 7,000 MWe total). Units 1, 2, 8 3 ard operating and they plan to bring on one more each year, completing the process in January of 1990.

o All units have large-dry containment buildings. We did not get details of these containments at Zaporozhiye.

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l NOTES ON VVER-440 THE CUBAN REACTOR This portion of the report is divided into two major parts--a factual description of the 440 MWe VVER-type facility as, described by the Soviets

, on March 10 and a summary of staff opinions and concerns.

References:

1. "Nuclear Power Stations with VVER-440 Reactors," Atomenergoexport, Moscow USSR (report given to Commissioner'Iernthal on March 17,1987).

2. "Bubbling Depressurization System for Limiting the Consequences of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents in a Vacuum Concainment,"

IAEA-CN-39/116.

I. Factual Description l

I A. Construction Schedule Constructier is tall along (about 20 l percent completed) on the first unit which is due to connence power operation in 1990. Construction on Unit 2 will be paced by ,

i progress on Unit 1. Startup of Unit 2 is expected in 1992 or I i

1993. During the delegation's visie. ta the Izhora reactor ,

1 components production plant near Leningrad on March 9,1987, they saw the completed pressure vessel for the Unit 1 facility.

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-z-B. , Siting and External Event Considerations Tne station site is 8 m southwest of Cienfuegos (180 miles from the Florida Keys) in l l

what was described as a low-population area. Factors that were j

. included in the site selection were availability of transportation, population density and area seismic characteristics. The facility is designed to acconnodate 10,000 year-return-period tsunami, hurricane, tornado and earthquake.

Specifically:

1. Elevations to accommodate flooding are 15 m for turbine building and 17 m for reactor (and containment) building.

2. Designed for tornado wind speeds of 130 N/sec (293 '

~

miles /hr).

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3. Safe shutdown earthquake: 8 MM (0.2 to U.4g); operational basis earthquake 6 m (0.1 to 0/1g), a 0.01)er year return frequency.

C. Containment Building Design This unique design looks sor.ewhat

. like an ice-condenser containment but with an elevated bubbler i suppression pool replacing the ice. There are two major compartments. The lower one, containing the vessel and primary-system components, will be under a negative pressure (vacuum) during a design basis acefdent,thus Allowing only in-leakage while the upper compartment will be pressurized with a 4

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' desiop leak rate less than 1 percent per ' day. The containment is a reinforced concrete type, 45 m in diameter, with 1.5 m thick walls and a 8 m carbon-steel liner. The design pressure is 0.22 NPa (about 32 psig) with a 30-40 percent safety factor. The containment is designed to accomodate nine load combinations .

including: dead weight loads, equipment loads, and loads resulting from temperature effects (unequal heating),seisafe .

. events and external explosic,s (with a pressure loading of 0,3 Kg/per em2 ). Hydrogen control is limited to recombiners (e.g. no ignitors). The containment / siting design basis accident assumes a 10 percent core melt with instantaneous release into l the lower compartment of the containment. Structural analysis 1 assumes the combined loads of the DBA and a seismic event. l Injection. water is exhausted after 15 minutes. . Containment

• sprays', tioth passive and active. establish a negative pressure 0.08 NPa,4bsolute (about 12 ostd in about 29 minutes. This vacuum condition is conservatively estimated to last for three days (best estimate is 10 days). The radionuclide release path is through thh. bubbler suppression pool, into the upper containment where it is assumed to leak out at rates varying from 0.3 to 1,0 percent per day. The calculated dose at the site boundary of 2.5 l

Km (1.6 miles) is 15 REM thyroid and 1 REM whole body. During the DBA the control room is protected with a positive l overpressure HVAC system.

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! . . .4 D. ' Safety System Design TheECCSsystem(includinghighpressure inject' ion, low pressure injection, and residual heat removal) is comprised of three identical independent trains which are laid out with a 120* physical separation. Each train includes'an emergency diesel reismically qualified and especially designed for the humid Cubar, weather. The diesel reliability (95 percent) is consistent with worldwide standards. One of the three trains

. can be taken out of service for maintenance while the facility is at power, but only for three days. The three 100 percent capacity auxiliary feedwater systems are identical and have electrical-driven pumps. The ECCS system is designed to limit fuel clad temperatures to less than 1200*C (2192'F). A double-ended pipe rupture (500 mm pipe--20 in. diameter) is assumed for ECCS and containment loading design.

E. Radiation Monitoring All aspects of radiation monitoring are being incorporated into plant / site design and procedures rN (including personnel monitoring, offiste monitoring,

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environmentalmonitoring). Site monitoring includes 25 sampling stations located throughout a 25 KM (16 mile) zone. Measurements include air samplas, rain samples and gama dose and gama dose rate measurements. They wil1 have a boat for off-shore monitoring. Only long-lived radioisotopes are released during normal operation. Environmental monitoring includes the monitoring of wells, surface water, agriculture and animals. The program will comsnce a year or so before plant startup to

' 6 established background. They claia that the major s'ource of

• radionuclides will be from fission products, not activation of i

contaminants. The integrated dose at a nearby city is estimated at if person REM / year.

F. Miscellaneous Items 9

1.

They have problems with condenser vacuum design and therefore plant will not be as efficient as other VVER-440s. There is only one low-pressure turbine for each generator. There are two 9:nerators/ unit rated at 220 MW.

2.

Cubans will store spent fuel for 10 years at which time the Soviets will ship it back to USSR.

3.

The design and construction will conform to all applicable ASME codes and international standards.

4.

Training of Cuban'cperators will initially be in the Soviet \

l Union.*

4

!I. Cannents and Impressions A. Overall Impression?

On paper, their approach to safety appears to be quite similar to our approach. For example, in areas of design bases, containment requirements, redundancy in safety

• As pointed out by~.1, Lewin, in the past the Novoyoronezh NPP was the main test and operator training' site for PWRs for the US2R and other VVER countries.

M eewe e um .e +e-Q

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' trainis, external event requirements, siting requirements and offs 1[e' dose guidelines, their approach is similar although details differ and the details may be significant.

't

8. Possible Problem Areas .

1. Lack of diversity in their auxiliary facd and ECCS trains.

2. Lack of cross-over from one syttom to another (e.g. diesel

.4,ntrainAcan'tbeused.withpumpintrainB),

3. No steam-driven auxiliary feed pump.

Fire protection may be less than adequate.

5. Extent of Soviet oversight in construction, turnover to

- operation, operation itself, and training.

l No hydrogen igniters (only recombiners).  ;

6.

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7. No PRA planned and few design features tu accommodate a full-scale core melt..

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l C. Strong Features of Design l

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1. dood PTS characteristics (no welds in cylindrical portion of v'essel near core).

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2. Three safety trains are good feature if:

I a. no connon mode failure problem

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b. out-of-service time minimized. I 4

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3. Guideline values for offsite dose and health effects are low. .

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NOTES ON M'iETING WITH ALL-UNION SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTE i FOR AT0!!!C POWER STATIONS, MARCH 11,1987 (This institute, which reports to the Ministry of Atomic Power, was set up  ;

I after TMI. It has two major areas of responsibility: (1) improving i nuclearoperations(anIMPO-likefunction)and(2)conductingsafety

- i research in areas such as thennal hydraulics and PRAs.) .

l l

Dr. Annen Abagyan, General Director, welcomed the U.S. delegation and gave ,

an overview of the activities of the institute'--basically in elawn areas:

1. Tracking faVlure of components and establishing a failure data bank.

Based on this r~es( data from the bank, quantitative and probabilistic l anaipes am perfonned to predict lifetime of equipment.

Reconwendations on useful life are made to plants.

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2. Analyzing operations of nuclear power plants. They assist in directing startups and operations. They perform research into thermal hydraulic performance under steady-state, transient and accident I conditions. ,

3. Diagnostics. This area they deemed very important. Their diagnostics are directed'to monitoring conditions of metallic components and monitoring operational carameters to aid in better overall plant l

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0 perfonmence". Diagnostics are used to facilitate efficient and effective u5e of fuel (fuel reload, fuel handling).

4. Radiation safety. Their monitoring and control of radiation exposure

. has been deemed important ever since TMI and Chernobyl.

5. Water chemistry, Another taportant area with implications for .

radiation safety.

6. Maintenance. The,"ideology of maintenance practice" was mentioned but not much more was said on maintenance at this juncture.

. The remaining five items were more geared to future development of power stations.

7. Improved thermal efficiency at power stations.

8. Cooperating in developing safer reactors. They noted that they are young (institute is only five to six years old) and haven't developed as many "test stands" as they want for doing research on thermal hydraulics, valve operations and other plant hardware.

9. Operator training. They want to improve methods for training "SR0/R0-equivalent" operators.

10. Simulators. They are actively developing simulators.

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11. Lessons learned from Chernobyl. The causes of the Chernobyl accident and subsequint lessons learned have been reported in Vienna.

The institute is the only research office within the Atomic Power.'Wnistry and therefore they must respond quickly and effectively to nuclear power

' problans. - '

Coemisstoner Bernthal' introduced the U.S. delegation and gave some opening remarks about parallel activities in the U.S'. Harold Centon folleved with a presentation on related NRC activities including our SALP program,*

perfonnance indicator Drogram, reactor trip data and how we acconnodate and distribute information on operational occurrenc'es (e.g. abnormal occurrence reports). Denny Ross followed with a description of our research program. -

Frank Gavigan closed out this first portion of the meeting with a ,

description of what we've learned from the TN!-2 core recovery.

. Discussions followed on a variety of topics. Below are brief susmaries in 3 order of their occurrence at the meeting.

o Decommissioning. Denny Ross sumarized the U.S. deconsissioning program. .

I I o Data cathr ing. Every day certain categories of infonnation are passed ou to the ministry chrough the institute. On a monthly basis, infonnation on' occurrences (e.g. unplanned shutdowns) is presented to the ministry and is analyied for implicationse Once a year the plant

• Systerztic Assessment of Licensee Performance l

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4 chief engineers meet to develop measures to prevent recurrence of incidents. If problems originate with the "AEs" or designers or in the production line, the infonnation is passed on to them together

'ith w directions on how to eliminate problems in the future. The e

institute publishes an annual report on occurrences for use by the leaders of the ministry. When Harold' Denton asked for a copy of thit report, he was turned down. We were told that it is an internal docunent. This portion of the presentation was concluded with a description of their computer-aided failure assessment capability, o Future of thennal' hydraulics testing. In response to a question from Denny Ross, they described their plans for large-scale integral test facilities for PWR's, district heating plants and RBMXs. They will simulate transients, small-break t.0CAs and dynamic loads. in -

3 addition, they will have separate effects facilities to test fuels.

s critical flows, and steam generators, and will be developing mathematic models for the "close interlacing of theory and experiment."

o Operator training. Their fonner practice was to only train new recruits. Once the new management and engineers were graduated, they.

were out of sight and out of mind. Now the institute is insisting on a continuous program of training. They will track graduates and retrain them at special centers. They do not actually certify the SR0/R0-equival'ents . Their management is trained and the plant management, in turn, trains and certifies the reactor operators.

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Training is extensive. It begins two years pHor to startup and  ;

i simulatorsbeused. However, the training is not uniform; it varies from site to site. Harold Denton described U.S. training and dertification practice. '

o INP0. Questions arose regarding INP0'and IN'PO's relation to NRC.

INP0's emphasis on performance was contrasted to NRC's emphasis on safety.

1 o Maintenance practice. The Soviet goal for the percentage of preventive maintenance relative to corrective maintenance is 80 percent to 20 percent. There is regularly-scheduled maintenance with documentation on maintenance procedures. They have a requirement for '

emergency diesel down time-4hree days maximum. If the maintenance

, takes longere the plant is shut down.

o Future of advanced reactors. The Soviets made a strong statement on i

the HTGR, namely.that it will play a major role in the future of Soviet nuclear power. (NomentionwasmadeoftheLMFBRs.)

o SPDS. Harold Denton. asked if they were developing systems equivalent totheU.S.-safetyparameterdisp1py. system (SPDS). They said "yes,"

They are working on a predictive _ code capability which will be part of their SPDS.

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The meeting concluded with thanks from all parties and expressions of hope forfuturecoopefation.

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NOTES ON BELOYARSKAYA

• NUCLEAR POWER STATION, MARCH 12, 1987 f i

Reference:

"Beloyarskaya Nuclear Power Plant" (site / facility j description pamphlet)

Note: Since this site has been visited by other U.S. delegations over the past few years, this summary assumes a basic understanding of the three facilities at the Beloyarskaya site.

I. ~I#9roductions Mr. Saraev Site Director, introduced the Soviet staff to the U.S. I delegation and briefly described the facilities and plant status Unit 1 (QBMK) has been shut down since 1981, all fuel has been removed, and ,

decommissioning has started; Unit 2 (RBFK) was onerating at 160 MWe and will continue normal oper'ations until sometime between 1990 and 1994 when it too will be deconmissioned; Unit 3--the 8N-600--was operating that day at about 50 percent power). C9mmissioner Bernthal reciprocated, introducing the U.S. delegation and sunnarizing the U.S. interest in the Soviet LNR program. .

II. Key points regarding the BN-600 facility I .

o Facility was in the process of starting up followine a shutdown to remove a leaking fuel assembly. l 4

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o, BM-600 has three primary, three secondary and three tertiary f I

loopd, three steam generators each driving a 200 MW turbine, and two sodium-to-sodium heat exchangers per loop. The fuel is U 235, ranging from 21 to 35 percent enridwent while the blanket is depleted uranium (0.4 percent-U-2351 Because the fuel is enriche'd uranium (as opposed to Pu or mixed oxide) and the dimensions are relatively small, the Na-void coefficient is

)

negative'(andsmall). The maximum fuel burnup is 7.5 percent. l j

o When asked about whether or not it was easy to operate, the response was somewhat contradictory. On the one. hand the Soviets )

said it was simple to control and ' easy to run,espMially in the automatic mode, while on the other hand, they noted that the , f BN-600 had much more complicated auxiliary systems with resulting problems that were more significant than for an um. A further connent was that the BN-600 design was old (1970-71) and that the l BN-800 will be simpler and safer.

o They do not expect "connercialization" until the year 2000.

o When asked whether their activities were regulatmi from a safety ,

standpoint by the State Consittee for Supervision of Nuclear Powse Safety, the answers were somewhat ambivalent. They stated %et the inspectorate did supervise nuclear safety.

i "technical safety" (thermal and mechanical equipment), plant perfonnance and training. In response to the direct question of

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whether Malyshev has the authority to shut down BN-600, the reply was',"yes." There were no chances made to BN-600 as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

o- The two 08As are:

-- Loss of flow in one subassembly with subsequent failure of seven subassemblies. ,

-- Sodium leak and subsequent fire in "cleanup piping." 0xygen depletion putshre out.

o Failure / accident experience:

-- From initial startup, they have had 18 leaking fuel elements

~ ' and 11 actual fuel element failures where fuel was exposed.

-- They have never observed sodium leakage of the primary system and leaks in the secondary system have been minor (1 to 10 liters of sodium). Extinguishing of the resultant fires was no problem. All the concrete in the proximity of sodium systems is lined with stainless steel. Even if there is a sodium. concrete interaction, the concrete only loses

- strength down to 2 ca.

une e.es g.7 0 m _ _ _ ,

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o* There is virtually no seismic accommodation in the design. The l area.never sees seismic disturbances greater than 5 m .

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.o The integrated dose to workers is small (0.1 to 0.3 Rem / person /yr l and 10-15 man Ree total). l o Frank Gavigan reported on U.S. LMR research and development ,

including recent tests at FFTF and EBR-!!.

i o "Their reload cycle is as follows: 100 days of operation, 20 days shutdown for refueling (1/3 of core), then'100 more days of operation followed by 40 days shutdown for maintenance. For the last few years, their capacity factor has been 72-73 percent and the overall plant capacity factor is 62 percent. ,

o There are a number of safety advantages of the BNr.805 over the BM-600. In addition to the BN-800 having a simpler design in general, it will have a natural circulation capability in the primary and secondary loops, a 6 m seismic design requirement and tertiary Na/ air heat removal capability. (Note that the BN-600 primary loop has been tested for 50 percent power I removalbynaturalcirculation.)

l o The tour included the turbine building, the reactor building (there is no containment), and the control room. Observations

. 1 included:

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' 5 Turbine butiding was pretty clean. -

.. All four of the reactor operators in the control room had engineering degrees.

.. Very little fire protection observed.

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.. Seismic design was non-existent.

.. Radiation control procedures were pretty tax.

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