ML20140B598
| ML20140B598 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1981 |
| From: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109140258 | |
| Download: ML20140B598 (97) | |
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3-- ----------------:- Docket Nos.
4 In the astter of: : 50-369 5 Duke Power Company 4 50-370 6 (William B. McGuire Nuclear a 7 Station, Units 1 and 2 :
8-- ---------------- 4 9 Sth Floor Hearing Room 10 East-West Towers 11 4350 East-West Highway 12 Bethesda, Maryland 13 Thursday, Sept. 10, 1981 14 Hearing in the above-entitled matter commenced at -
15 9 : 3 0 a. . a . , pursuant to notice.
16 BEFORE:
17 ALAN ROSENTHAL, Chairman, 18 Atomic Safety C Licensing Appeal Board.
19 DR. JOHN BUCK, Member.
20 MS. CHRISTINE KOHL, Member.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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l 1 APPE ARANCES:
I 2 For the Licensee, Duke Power Companys 3 MICHAEL ..C GARRY, ESO.
4 Deveboise & Liberman 5 1200 17th Street Northwest 6 Washington, D.C. 20036 7 -and-8 ALBERT CARR, E50
) 9 MALCOLM PHILLIPS, ESO.
10 Duke Power Compani 11 P.O. Box 33189 l 12 Charlotte, North Carolina 28 242.
13 I
i 14 For the NRC Staffa 15 JOSEPH SCINTO, ESO.
16 EDWARD KETCHEN, ESO.
17 Office of tha Executive Legal Director 18 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
l 19 W a shing ton , D.C.
! 20 21 For the Intervenor CESG 22 JESSE L. RILEY 23 Carolina Environmental Study Group 24 85u Henley Place 25 Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 i
ALDERSON REPORDNG COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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,1 1
3-4 .
O co"'t"ts :
2 3 Oral Argument of s Pages l0 4 5
JESSE L. RILEY, on behalf of the Intervenor CESG 8
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- 6 7 MTCHAEL MC GARRY, on behalf of the 44 i
! 8 Licensee, Duke Power Company i
9 i
10 JOSEPH SCINTO, on behalf of the 64 l
l 11 NRC Staff I
12 13 Rebuttal argument of a l 14 JESSE L. RILEY, on behalf of the 86 i
15 Intervenor, CESG 16 17 18 19 ,
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ALDERSON REPORTINC COMPANY,iNC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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5 O ' raocreo xos 2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHALa This Board is hearing oral 3 argument this morning on the appeal of the Carolina 4 Environmental Study Group f rom the Licensing Board's April 5 18, 1979 initial decision, and May 26, 1981 supplemental 6 initial decision in this operating license proceeding >
7 involving the McGuire Nuclear Facility.
8 In the latter decision, the Board authorized the 9 issuance of operating licenses f or both units of the 10 f acility.
11 The argument is governed by the terms of our 12 August 24 order. As provided therein, each side has been 13 allotted a total of one hour for the presentation of O
\- 14 argumen t.
15 If it so desires, the Appellant may reserve a 16 portion of its time for rebuttal. Any such rebuttal must be 17 confined to mittats raised or discussed during the 18 A ppellee 's a rguments.
19 In other words, the Appellant may not use the 20 rebuttal to press entirely new points.
21 With that, I will call upon representatives of the 22 parties to identify themselves formally for the record, and 23 I will start with M r. Riley .
() 24 MR. RILEY4 Jesse ?iley, speaking for the Carolina 25 Environmental Study Group.
O ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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() 1 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. Riley.
2 Mr. McGarry?
3 MR. MC GARRY: Michael McGarry, representing Duke 4 Power Company. Seated at counsel table with me is Mr.
5 Albert Carr and Mr. Malcolm Phillips.
6 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. McGarry.
7 Mr. Scinto?
8 MR. SCINTO: On behalf of the Regulatory Staff, I 9 am Joseph Scinto. My business address is Bethesda, Maryland.
10 With me is Edward K' tchen, also from the Office of Executive 11 Legal Director.
12 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHALs Mr. Scin to, can I assume 13 correctly that the Applicant and the Staf f will decide their O 14 time equally?
15 MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman, though we don't 16 consider ourselves on the same side as the Applicant --
17 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, you are clearly on the 18 same side.
19 MR. SCINTO: -- we assumed that's what you meant, 20 and we will be dividing our time. The Applicant will go 21 first and the Staf f will follow, dividing the time.
22 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL4 Very good.
23 I might say that at least in Appellant parlance,
() 24 parties whose positions are basically the same constitute 25 ene side, however you might regard your relationship to the l
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! 2 All right, M r. Riley, you can proceed.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGirJIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
8 1 ORAL ARGUMENT BY JESSE L. RILEY, ON BEHALF OF
[
2 CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP.
3 MR. RILEY: Members of the Appeal Board, the first O 4 thing about which Carolina Environmental Study Group would 5 complain in the decision was the imposition of the credible 6 accident burden which was placed on it by a prior Commission 7 o rder.
8 We fesi that fairness and reasonableness on the 9 credible accident matter are not embodied in the current to practice of the Commission, and we f eel tha t it's a very 11 obvious matter, as stated in the exceptions taken by 12 Gilinsky and Bradford to the supplemental initial decision.
13 Ordinary people would be incapable of arriving at the
( 14 position that a credible accident did have to be 15 demonstrated.
16 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Are you complaining about 17 something that the Licensing Board did, or something that 18 the Commission did?
19 MR. RILEY: Something that the Licensing Boa rd 20 did, because it is part of a hierarchical study. It felt 21 th a t the guidelines had been set forth by the Commission and 22 it must abide by them.
l l 23 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, you must agree tha t the
() 24 Licensing Board is bound by Commission directives, would you 25 not ?
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ALDEPSON REPORTING CoH2ANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASH:NGToN, D C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
9 1 MR. RILEY : I would not.
2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL4 You would not?
3 MR. RILEY: I would not. I would say if the king 4 has no clothes, somebody must take responsibility for saying 5 that the king has no clothes.
6 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, now, that may be so, 7 M r. Rile y, but in our system of jurisprudence -- and this is 8 true in the courts, and it is, I would suggest, also true 9 within the f ramework of the administrative adjudicatory to process, the lower tribunals -- in the case of the 11 Commission, Licensing and Appeal Boards -- are obliged to 12 comply with directives they receive from the Commission.
13 Now, if you are dissatisfied with those 14 directives, it seems to me that the only place where you can 15 ventilate that dissatisf action is with the Commission itself.
16 MR. RILEY: I would say not necessarily so.
17 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHALs Well, you explain to me on 18 wha t basis you conclude tha t a Licensing Board or an Appeal 19 Board is free to disregard the directions of the Commission 20 itself, the ultimate authority within this agency.
21 MR. RILEY4 I say that when circumstances arise 22 when it is damaging to the role of the agency itself to 23 follow a directive which was put in position by, as I 24 recall, a majority of two, on the mattar of the decision 25 involved, a very vigorously dissenting minority of two, it t
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. 0.C 20024 (202) 554 2345
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() 1may not be proper, but I think it is prudent. I think it is 2 very unf ortunate if the NRC is perceived publicly like an 3 ostrich sticking its head in the sand.
4 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Was it three to two, or two 5 to two?
6 MR. RILEY: I don 't know whether Mr. Kennedy was 7 still on the Commission at that time. l 8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHALs Would that make a difference, 9 supposing that this,' instead of being a 2-2 split -- and I 10 might agree with you, if a four-member Commission were 11 divided equally, that there would be no binding directives 12 but assume that this action was taken by a Commission by a 13 vote of 3-2.
14 Ms. Kohl has just called my attention to what 15 appears to be the source of your complaint, which was the 16 Commission's May 16, 1980 memorandum and order in Three Mile 17 Island 1, and it does appear that those were five 18 Commissioner s. Mr. Kennedy did indeed participate. So I 19 would like you to f ocus on how,'in your judgment, we are 20 f ree to disregard a Commission determination which hac ... c e e l
21 Commissioners at that time voting in favor of it.
l 22 MR. RILEY: I did not say that you were free, Mr.
23 Chairman. But, nevertheless, I feel that free or not, there
() 24 comes a point when a part of a hierarchical structure which 25 is below the very top, must in the interest of preserving ii v
l ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC. ,
1 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) $54 2345
11 1 the integrity and f unctionality of that structure, challenge 2 what has been done at the top.
3 Now, one thing that would lean in that direction O 4 is that there were only four members on the Commission at 5 the time of the June 29th, 1981 confirmation of the 6 supplemental initial decision. Two of those vigorously
- 7 excepted.
i 8 In that context, I would say there is some 9 encouragement.
10 I would also point out there are two different 11 members on the Commission than there were a t the time of the 12 decision that Ms. Kohl referred to.
13 This is a change of climate, and there may be a 14 g rea ter receptivi ty. However that may be, I do believe it 15 is a basically ertoneous decision, and it must be 18 challenged. It might be less embarrassing to have that 17 decision thrown out within the NRC, than to get in the D.C.
, 18 Circuit.
19 MS. KOHL: Mr. Riley, isn't again the proper time 20 to make these arguments, and the proper place, before the 21 Commission itself ? Assuming that this Appeal Board affirms 2; the decision of the Licensing Board, you will have i 23 opportunity to press those arguments before the l
24 Commissioners themselves, and they may very well on that 25 point be persuaded.
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ALDERSoN REPORTING OoMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHtNGToN, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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(') 1 MR. RILEY: I think this is fairly observed. I 2 did not realize that we would have the right of appeal In past actions in which we have l
{} 3 before the Commission.
4 been involved, the final action was that of the Appeal Board.
5 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You have a right to file a 6 petition f or review with the Commission. Whether the 7 Commission would grsnt that petition would remain to be 8 seen, but at least you would have the opportunity, as Ms.
9 Kohl has observed, to present to the Commission by way of to petition for review the basis for your belief that the Three 11 Mil e Island decision was erroneous and should be 12 reconsidered .
13 MR. RILEY: Thank you.
O 14 I still will affirm that in my opinion as a humble 15 citizen of this country, that if a practice appears to an 16 element in a hierarchy to be undesirable in terms of the 17 public interest, the law then calls for the assistance of l 18 that particular body and so forth -- that it is not
- 19 ill-conceived for it to make assertions in that direction.
20 But this is really simply scene-setting for the 21 argument I wish to make in the matter. To make clear how 22 absurd this requirement for credibility is, the Atomic 23 Energy Commission itself has, from very early days, and n
ss 24 certainly as pursued by the NRC, recognized that LOCAs are 25 possible. A very large part of all the safety analyses deal O
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AYE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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j I with the question of what do you do if this unexpected event 2 happens.
3 So I don't think there is any credibility at all 4 about the loss-of-coolant accidents, la rge and small. We 5 haven't had too many, but we have had some. We are all .
l 6 f amiliar with the breakage of valve pipes in the real i 1
7 world. Indeed, we experienced several such things.
8 With respect to the matter of core exposure, Three 9 Mile Island made it very apparent that it can occur. The 10 emergency core cooling system was designed for an absolute 11 minimum of core exposure, if at all. It failed to work, for 12 several reasons, but operator intervention was probably the 13 primary one.
- 14 MS. KOHLS M r. Riley, how do you respond to the 15 arguments that what happened at Three Mile Island cannot 16 happen at McGuire because there have been various 17 modifications in the personnel and organizational structure 18 a t McGuire, there have been equipment modifica tions, 19 training has been upgraded and so forth. Items have been 20 addressed that arguably would preclude a recurrence of the 21 TMI even t.
22 MR. RILEY: Ms. Kohl, I feel that the Applicant 23 s et up a straw man proceeding to demolish it. I think the
() 24 Board wore blinders in not recognizing this was a straw can 25 that was being dealt with.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
14 1 In other words, to assume that only one possible 2 tyre of accident could occur at McGuire, one that could be 3 dealt with by that means, was extremely artificial and is 4 seriots error of the Board to not declare.
5 Is that responsive to your question?
6 MS. KOHLS Not entirely. Just before I 7 interrupted you, you stated tha t your belief was that u operator error or intervention was a significant factor in 9 the TMI accident.
10 MR. RILEY: That's right.
11 MS. KOHL: Focus, please, on that particular 12 aspect and how the Applicant asserts the operator training, 13 personnel changes are such now that it couldn't happen at 14 McGuire.
15 MR. RILEY: If I may, I would like to not pursue 16 that elemen t of discussion, and you will see why, and I 17 think be satisfied with my answer.
18 There are two components to an emergency core
( 19 cooling systema passive components, accumulators which act 20 under accumulations of gases; and active components that are 21 driven by motors, largely electric motors -- in this case, 22 exclusively electric motors. Pumps and fans require 23 electrical power to operate.
24 It is not at all incredible tha t a power outage l
25 could occur. In fact, in the Northeast we have seen two l
O ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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15 1 such major power outages within the last 10 to 15 years. It 2 was almost scandalous back in 1972 when the Atomic Energy i
3 Commission investigated diesel start-up for plants and found 4 that in 22 instances, there was not adequate performance on 5 the part of the generator.
6 In other words, it is entirely credible to disable 7 an emergency core cooling system in a way that operator 8 intervention is totally irrelevant.
9 MS. KOHL: Was this matter relating to 10 loss-of-power within the scope of the contentions that you 11 raised in the reopened preceeding?
12 HR. RILEY: I would say it was, yes, because if I 13 may read Contention 1, it stated that the Licensee had not 14 demonstrated in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident at 15 McGuire that substantial quantities of hydrogen will not be 16 generated. And this has to do with failure of the emergency 17 core cooling system.
18 DR. BUCK: I'm sorry, Mr. Riley, but newhere in 19 there have you mentioned the failure of emergency core 20 cooling system because of failure of power or failure of the 21 diesel generators or some other f ailure of power. At least 22 I don't recall you ever mentioning that.
23 MR. RILEY: May I call to your attention, Dr.
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V 24 Euck, the f act that after a very lengthy voir dire, which 25 was participated in by the Applicant and Staff, the Eoard O
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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() 1 decided that I was not to be used as a wi tn e ss . And, very 2 interestingly, it was the sole decision of that sort in 3 which it was announced -- not by the legal member of the 4 Board, but by the environmental member of the Board, who, I 5 might say, engaged in a very vigorous discussion with his 6 colleagues on this matter off the record.
7 ES. KOHLS What's that go to do with the scope of 8 your contention on whether or not the issue that you raised 9 related to the ECCS and the loss of power?
10 ER. RILEY: I'm responding to Dr. Buck's question.
11 The answer is that bound into the record you will 12 find tha t testimony, and you will find that I take up this 13 very matter of AC outages.
O 14 Now our second complaint is that a series of 15 procadural matters , rulings by the Board, were made which 16 kept us from responding to the case that an accident is 17 credible .
18 DR. BUCK May I ask what the exhibit was, or wha t l 19it was that concerned power outages, specifically?
l 20 MR. RILEY: Well, the underlying assumption in 21 Exhibit 40 and 40-A, and also excluded Exhibit 59, is 22 f ailure of an ECCS, and what the MARCH code would project in 23 that case in the rate of hydrogen evolution --
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() 24 DR. BUCKS Let's keep on the power situation that 25 we 're talking about.
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ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 bRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
17 1 MR. RILEY: I'm saying for the ECCS not to 2 operate, the basic underlying assumption is that you had no 3 power.
L 4 DR. BUCKS I'm not sure that was the case, but I 5 don 't know exactly what that exhibit said. But what vac the 6 reason for ref using that exhibit?
7 MR. RILEY: Exhibit 40-A was accepted. In its 8 decision the Board felt the preponderance of other evidence 9 weighed against it, and so it did not accept it, in guiding i 10 it to its decision.
11 DR. BUCK: Was that not your expertise that they 12 were questioning at that pcrticular point?
13 MR. RILEY: C. .. , they did question my expertise. I 14 did not get in the record in any way.
15 What I'm saying is that ny prefiled testimony 16 discusses this question and develops means by which power 17 outages can keep the ECCS f rom operating.
18 DR. BUCK: Your prefiled testimony?
19 MR. RILEY Yes, which is part of the record.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let's go back a moment. My 20 i
21 impression was, Mr. Riley -- and you can correct me if I'm 22 wrong -- that when you sought on June 9, 1980 the reopening 23 of the record, your motion was in terms of the Three Mile' 24 Island accident. It was based upon tha t.
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25 Further, when the Board granted the motion on O
V ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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() 1 November 25, 1980 and accepted four additional contentions 2 of yours for litigation, it s:Id by way of justification f or
{} 3 this action, CESG's proposed contentions related to the 4 matter of hydrogen generation control arising out of the 5 Three Mile Islani-2 acciden t, may well shed significant 6 light upon key safety findings which are required to be made 7 before operation of McGuire Units 1 and 2 could be 8 authorized.
9 Now I certainly take that as a clarification on 10 the part of the Board that it construed your motion as being 11 founded upon the Three Mile Island accident, and being 12 addressed to it, and in any event, as clearly indicating the 13 Board 's action -- that is, that it was granting your motion O 14 and reopening the record and allowing these contentions in 15 the context of the Three Mile Island accident.
16 Now, in that circumstance, I don't understand how 17 you can complain about the failure of the Board to have 18 considered other accident scenarios such as power outages 19 which, as must be readily conceded, had no relationship at 20 all to what transpired at Three Mile Island.
21 So I'd like you to focus on your motion on the way 22 the Board acted on that motion in reopening the record and 23 tell me how I can infer from that, that the Board was
() 24 opening it up on power outages or anything else apart from 25 the Three Mile Island accident scenario.
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AliERSOP . SLPoRTING COMPANY,INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
19 1 MS. KOHL: And aJso your amended motion in August 2 of that. year, I believe, ties the matter to the TMI accident.
f 3 MR. RILEY: That is precisely what I was going to V In the August 15th filing, we specifically refer 4 refer to.
5 to power outages as a cause for disabling the ECCS. It is 6 not in a contention, but it is in the argument.
7 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But that was when? That was 8 in August of 1980; is that correct?
9 MR.~BILEY: That is right, sir.
10 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And when did the Board reopen 11 the record? In November?
12 MR. RILEY. Right.
13 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Didn't it clearly indicate in 14 that order that it was reoperiing it on the matter of 15 hydrogen generation control arising out of the Three Mile 16 Island-2 sceident?
17 MR. RILEY: I think it's a legitimate matter to is say how narrowly are we going to interpret the phrase "Three 19 Mile Island accident."
20 Now my interpretation is consistent with our 21 Contention 1, which was introduced, I Delieve, in a slightly 22 dif feren t form by Mr. Sholly, and modified by Dr. Buck. The 23 language in that is completely general. It doecn't talk 24 about mechanisms by which hydrogen is generated. It talks 25 about tha question of whether or not it's been demonstrated O
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() 1 that hydrogen will not be generated. That's item 1.
2 But item 2 is thiss In the initial decision on 3 the Catawba Plant, which was written by Mr. Paglin, it made 4 the statement the Hearing Board is not an umpire, not a 5 ref eree calling balls and strikes between opponents. It has 6 an active duty on its own to assure the project will be 7 inh erently sa."e , that it will meet the besic intentions of 8 the Commission.
9 Similar language has been used as an Appeal Board to ruling which I'm sure you are f amiliar with, though I can't 11 give the specific cite.
12 So viewed, if it is aa observed matter, to make an 13 extremely narrow interpretation of what happened at Three 14 Mile Island; namely, that operators concerned about having a 15 plant go solid , did things to keep the plan t from going 16 solid, which made marginal performance of the emergency core 17 cooling system. That's an extremely specific situation for 18 m e .
19 The Three Mile Island accident was this: A core 20 was exposed . Hydrogen was generated. The hyd rogen 21 combusted, and when it combusted, it developed a high 22 pressure, whicli if it had occurred in the McGuire 1 23 con tainment , would have brought a peak of about 58 psi,
() 24 according to both the licensee's calculations and my own.
25 Now tnat, as far as I am concerned, is the Three O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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() 1 Mile Island accident.
2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHALa All right. Well, now, let me 3 ask you this 4 Are you claiming that some of these other types of 5 accidents which you say the Licensing Board should have 6 considered, would have presented a greater hydrogen control 7 problem than would result from a LOCA of the strict TMI 8 variety?
9 MR. RILEYs I am.
10 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And is there a basis in the 11 record for that assertion?
12 MR. RILEY: There is. In Exhibit 40 and 40-A.
13 40- A is the final version of the Sandia Report dealing with 14 hydrogen release in the context of the Sequoyah Plant, which 15 was commissioned by the NRC Staff. That was authenticated 16 b y the presence of Dr. Berman, who was a witness in the 17 proceeding , and who had a coordinating or supervisory role 18 in the f ormation of that report.
19 This evidence, as I say, was downgraded because of 20 a preponderance of other material, which I feel was a 21 serious error on the part of the Board .
22 I also complain that the Board excluded our 23 Exhibit 59. Exhibit 59 was a parallel study by Brookhaven
() 24 National Laboratory.
25 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Now if I may stop you at that O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, l
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
22 1 points What kind of accident are yo u claiming would produce 2 a greater hydrogen control problem than would result from 3 the TMI LOCA? What specific accident scenario do you have 4 in mind, and on what basis are you claiming from these 5 documents that you referred to, that there would be a 6 greater hydrogen control problem?
7 HR. RILEY: Any loss-of-coolant accident that 8 released reactor coolant at a rate equal to or greater than 9 that that occurred at THI, in the absence of the active 10 component of the emergency core cooling system, which active 11 component could be removed either by intervention on the 12 part of operators, by damage to the equipment itself so it 13 would not function, by loss of AC power.
14 DR. BUCK: Are you talking about quantity of 15 hydrogen or rate of hydrogen release?
16 MR. RILEY: I was talking about the possibility of 17 hydrogen release at all.
18 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Im addressing the matter of 19 g re at e r --
l 20 DR. BUCK: We re talking about something greater l
21 than the Three Mile Island.
l 22 MR. RILEY: Equa1 to or greater than.
l 23 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, I want it greater than, O 24 beceuse if it eaue1 to, then rou re confrented with the 25 Board's determinations with regard to the Three Mile Island ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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()
I type LOCA, aren't you?
2 MR. RILEY: In the Three Mile Island LOCA, there 3 was partial operation of the emergency core cooling system.
4 The pumps were throttled down. A t all times there was one 5 pump or another running, though not necesscrily the full 6 complement of pumps.
7 Ihis made for a relatively slow rate of core 8 exposure than would have occurred in the so-called 52D 9 accident.
10 I'm saying that any accident from S2D on up the 11 scale, in terms of intermediate or large-sired pipe breaks, 12 would cause a much more rapid core exposure, much more rapid 13 hyd rogen evolution .
O 14 DR. BUCKS You were talking about an exhibit.
15 'iha t figures are given in the exhibit that say greater 16 release, greater rate of release of hydrogen?
17 HR. RILEY: If you will refer to Exhibit 59 --
18 DR. BUCKS You said they gave something that was 19 greater than TMI. Can you quote me the figures in masses of 20 hydrogen or rate of hydrogen evolution?
21 HR. RILEY: I can.
22 I'm quoting f rom a received exhibit at this i
23 point. It's Exhib..: 40-A.
() 24 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL4 You offered this into 25 evidence and it was not accepted?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
i 24
() 1 MR. RILEY It was accepted.
2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: This was accepted, so it's 3 actually an exhibit in the record?
4 MR. RILEY: That's right. And confirmatory 5 exhibits that were even more powerful were no t acce pted .
6 CHAIRMAd ROSENTHAL: And it's exhibit number what?
7 HR. RILEY4 40-A.
8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAls 40-A.
9 MR. RILEY: If you will refer to Figure 31 in that 10 e xhibit, which is titled "Sequoyah S2D Test," in other 11 words, this is the S2D accident. The ordinate scale is 12 pressure in containment volume No. 1 in psia -- that's 13 pounds per square inch absolute -- and if you'will look at O 14 that graph at a time somewhere between 90 and 100 minutes, 15 you will see a pressure peak and it says of 130 psi.
16 DR. BUCKS What's that got to do with volume 17 released at Three Mile Island?
18 MR. RILEY: I'm sorry, sir. I misread your 19 ques tion . You were asking me what volume, what was 20 released . You were not asking me what pressure developed.
21 DR. BUCK 4 I'm talking about the amount of 22 hydrogen release or the rate of release.
23 MR. RILEY4 All right. The sa,e material is given (O 24 in the same report. I will get to it in just a moment.
(_/
25 That is given in Figure 22. The title for that one is ALDERSoN REPoRflNG COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202; 554-2345
25 O i ret 1 araresea ce er tioa ror teree-ereex toca troe ^8 -
2 And what it shows is --
That's a large break. This is Q
V 3 DR. BUCKS 4 dif ferent from the Three Mile Island break, which was a 5 small break.
6 MR. RILEY: But there is some material which I 7 vill give you momentarily. The total mass of hydrogen in 8 pounds which was released at time of approximately 22-1/2, 3
9 23 minutes, is about 2.15 x 10 pounds.
10 Now, if I may have a moment, I will try to get the 11 information on the S2D. That is give.n in Figure 17, and the 12 same amount of hydrogen is released in the small-break 13 sequence. The time of the release, however, is different.
O 14 It occurs it a little more than 90 minutes out.
15 Now these items of data were excluded from --
16 DR. BUCK What was the volume?
17 MR. RILEY: 2.15 -- slightly more than that -- x 3
18 10 pounds.
19 DR. BUCKS In both cases?
20 MR. RILEY: Yes.
l 21 DR. BUCK: So all we're talking about here is the 22 time of release?
23 HR. RILEY: That's right. That's the difference 24 between the two cares.
25 DR. BUCK: All right. Thank you.
O ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGlNIA AVE, S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
26 MR. RILEY: This level of hydrogen release was not
(]) 1 2 considered in the judgment because it was decided to stop p 3 the consideration of this type of accident, 75 percent LJ 4 metal-water reaction. Core slump is estimated to occur in 5 the vicinity of C0 percent metal-water reaction, and th e re 6 are some uncertainties about exactly how the event would go.
7 For this reason, this was not made a substantive 8 consideration in the record. However, the record does 9 discuss it.
10 Are there any outstanding questions?
11 DR. BUCK: All right, now, what's the problem in 12 the difference in the rate?
13 HR. RILEY: If you have a slow reaction, there is O
k- 14 time f or operators to recover f rom, I'm sure, their initial 15 disturbance, panic, what-have-you, analyze the situation.
16 Apparently the operators at TMI-1, after a little 17 consideration, were able to tell what had happened to TMI-2, 18 a nd were able to say, "We should close the block valve, 19 berause the PORY is stuck."
20 In the TMI sequence, which went slower than the 21 S2D sequence, there was time for such consideration before 22 the maximum amount of hydrogen could be released.
23 If there were a large-break LOCA, absent the
() 24 performance of the dynamic component of the emergency core 25 cooling system, there would be very little time and it would O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINTA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
27
, 1 all be over in 20 minutes.
2 DR. BUCK: I'm sorry, maybe I misunderstood your 3 figures here. You said on Figure 22, which was the large 4 break --
5 MR. RILEY: Yes.
3 6 DR. BUCKS -- you had 2.15 x 10 pounds in what 7 period of time?
8 MR. RILEY: I'll check it again. In less than 25 9 or approxima tely 22, 23 minutes.
10 DR. BUCK: And what was the S2D?
11 MR. RILEY: The S2D was on the order of 90 to 95 12 minutes.
13 DR. BUCK: That was Three Mile Island, S2D?
14 MR. RILEY: No. S2D is not a proper 15 representation of Threa Mile Island. S2D is the nearest 16 case in the MARCH code to Three Mile Island. Three Mile 17 Island occurred at a much slower rate, because there was 18 partial ECCS operation.
19 DR. BUCK: So, in other words, you have considered j
20 a greater accident than Three Mile Island?
21 MR. RILEY: That is correct.
22 DR. BUCK: Okay. Thank you.
I 23 MS. KOHL 4 But not as grea t as you would have 24 preferred?
25 MR. RILEYa If it is credible than a major pipe O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W, WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
l 28 l
l
() 1 break can occur, and it was not ICCS, release all possible l
2 hydrogen f rom metal-water reaction in less than 25 minutes, l
' ~
3 that, it would seem to me, is the responsibility of the NRC 4 to guard against. That is the case to be dealt with, among 5others.
6 The point about accidents, Judge Kohl, is that you 7 can 't pick and choose the one that you hope will happen to 8 def end against. There is a great multiplicity of things 9 that go wrong. It's like in driving an automobile. You 10 can 't pre-cognize what specific traffic situation will place 11 you in jeopardy at some future time. The result is it's 12 well to be prepared for the full spectrum.
13 MS. KOHL: How do you respond to the Applicant's 14 arguments that they are well prepared, that they have made 15 certain modifications in their procedures and equipment to 16 preclude the occurrence of the TM1 or greater event?
1 17 MR. RILEY: They don't claim to preclude the 18 occurrence of greater event. What they have done is put up 19 a strong case for handling a small break. That is all they 20 claim , and the blindness of the Hearing Board in not 21 requiring them to deal with the larger breaks was absolutely 22 a matter of astonishment to me. I could hardly credit it.
23 Staff is concerned about these things. The NBC has a
() 24 degraded core rulemaking projected. We don 't know when it 25 will be complete. It's pretty f ar in the f uture; perhaps i
D x_/
ALDERSoN REPoRTINJ COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
29 g 1 1983, perhaps 1985.
2 These are parts of the McGuire record. Now, not 3 until that degraded core rulemaking has been done, and done 4 competently and with integrity, will we know whether there 5 are means of preventing or mitigating these accidents.
6 Until that time, we are gambling.
7 DR. BUCKa Mr. Riley, is it not true that the 8 training that is put through with the operators following 9 the Three Mile Island, the new instrumentation that was put 10 in following Three Mile Island, all are aimed at detecting 11 low levels in the core,- extra steam pressures, loss of 12 steam, dry-out of the steam generator? Don 't these same 13 things happe n whethe r you ha ve a small break or a large 9 14 break . If the opera tors ar . the instrumentation is such 15 that it detects these earlier, are you then not taking care 16 o f the larger accidents as well as the smaller one?
17 MR. RILEY: No, sir. What you are doing is 18 getting excellent information on the state of aff airs inside 19 the reactor coolant system.
20 DR. BUCK: Isn't that what you need?
21 R. RILEY: No, sir. If you don't have electrical 22 power, it avails you nought.
23 DR. BUCK: Wait a minute. You're going back to 24 something e n tirely different here. We started out with a 25 large loss-of-coolant accident. Now you're bringing in an O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
30
() 1 additional factor here of loss of power, which I'm sorry, I 2 don 't find in the contentions anywhere that were brought up.
3 MR. RILEY: To have hydrogen be generated, the 4 emergency core cooling must fail. This is an absolutely 5 basic requirement to generate hydrogen. There is no point 6 in talking about hydrogen if you assume that the emergency 7 core cooling system is operating properly. Inherent in the 8 situation is that you've had a f ailure of the ECCS, if 9 you 're going to talk hydrogen.
10 DR. BUCK: Is that necessarily loss of power?
11 MR. RILEY: No, sir, but it's not necessarily 12 operator intervention, either. This is my point. The 13 number of pathways by which you can lose function of the 14 emergency core cooling system --
15 DR. BUCK: Isn't that exactly wha t the new 16 ir.strumentation and new operrtor training is set to do, to 17 detect those?
18 ER. RILEY: No, sir. To detect, yes; but to 19 correct , no.
20 Let us consider a very straightfoiward case.
21 You 've had a tornado, your trunk line is down, you've lost 22 outside power. Something vent wrong and your diesel 23 generators won 't start. You've had a la rge LOCA. What can
() 24 you do? Nothing. You're helpless. You see wha' che gauges 25 and dials are reporting is going c:n, but you can't do O
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,lHC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
31 1 anithing about it.
[}
2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You have to have the 3 combination of a tornado, a failure of the diesel O 4 generators, and a LOCA, and all those three things have to 5 occur independently, simultaneously; is that true?
6 MR. RILEY: Not necessarily independently, but 7 simultaneously.
8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, wait a minute. You 're 9 suggesting a tornado would bring on the failure of the 10 diesel generators?
11 MR. RILEY: No, I'm not suggesting that.
12 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Then they are independent.
13 A t the same time, you have to have three extraordinary 14 events occurring; the tornado, the failure of the diesel 15 generato rs, and the LOCA; is that righ t ? All the three 16 things have to occur at ':he same time?
17 MR. RILEY: You said three extraordinary events.
18 I would like to differ. Failures of diesels to start are 19 rather ordinary events. You are down to two extraordinary 20 events.
21 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. But those two 22 extraordinary events have to occur with a third event that 23 m ay not be appropriate 1" characterized as extraordinary, but
() 24 nonetheless is not an every-day occurrence, I assume.
25 ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
32 1 MR. RILEY: What you've got is a low probability event.
(~)
V 2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Very low probability, isn't it?
3 MR. RILEY: Consider one that has a high probability.
() 4 That is, you're carrying very heavy currents in the control e 5 room for operating the system. You've burned out a major M
9
@ 6 electrical element of your system. That's not extraordinary, R
$ 7 because in fact it happened at Applicant's plant during the
- g .
] 8 testing approximately a year ago. For something over an hour, d
o; 9 there was a blackout in that plant.
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g 10 DR. BUCK: I don't understand you carrying very heavy E
11 currents in your control system.
h I don't understand. What are B
12 you talking about?
d 5
13 MR. RILEY: Your control room currents pass through h 14 it. The current for operating a series of electromechanical g 15 devices, and for the heaters and steam generators. And the
=
g' 16 pressurizers. That's a lot of current.
W
'7 d DR. BUCK. Well, what's that got to do with the --
5 M 18 I'm sorry, I don't understand what your point is, sir.
P 19 MR. RILEY: I'm saying that if your electrica] supply h
n 20 system, which is sort of a focal point, burns out --
21 DR. BUCK: Which electrical supply system are you 22 talking about?
7s O
23 : MR. RILEY: For all the AC components within the i
24 containment, the AC components that are involved.
7S V
25l DR. BUCK: You're talking about not only the plant ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
33 I generator, but the outside power as well?
() 2 MR. RILEY: The outside power. The plant and diesel 3 power flow through one central point. They have to be, to get
() 4 to all these devices. They are electrically operated.
5 DR. BUCK:
g And if you're saying if that one point 4
@ 6 fails?
R E 7 MR. RILEY: If that one point fails, you've got a s
j 8 problem.
O 9
~
z DR. BUCK: Where do you get the information these o .
10 h are all fed through one point? Are there not duplicata circuits?
=
II 5 MR. RILEY: It's rather apparent tha.t if Applicant B
fO I2 lost power, as it did for over an hour, there had to be a 13
()g central point. As I understand it, the thing that happened was l 14 they had something like a short in the heavy duty heaters in C 15 h the pressurizer, and this led to the accident.
m E I0 DR. BUCK: Are you saying that McGuire is set up in A
I7 just such a fashion? Is that one of your contentions, that h
z
{ 18 the McGuire Plant is set up such that you can have a single failure P
19 g of the power system that would knock everything out?
n 20 MR. RILEY: I am saying essentially that, yes, sir.
21 DR. BUCK: Where do you get that information, that 2
that is a single circuit operation for all the power in the l plant? Is that in the FSAR? Is that in the SER anywhere?
h 24 7.m asking, sir, for a direct quotc , because this is r-)
v 25 l contrary to all the regulations that the plant is set up under,
, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
34 I that you have a single source, single connectior, in the plant
() 2 for all your power supplies .
3 MR. RILEY: My only assertion, sir, is that I believe
() 4 that's true and verifiable, that for a period of over an hour 5
g the plant was blacked out during testing.
9 6
@ Now that's the proof-of-the-pudding sort of thing.
R S 7 It doesn' t give a mechanism, but it says it did happen.
N j 8 DR. BUCK: We're talking about the McGuire plant d
0; 9 in its present set-up?
z o
b 10 g MR. RILEY: Its present set-up, I cannot say.
=
B II DR. BUCK: Okay.
- hank you.
$ I2 MR. RILEY: Now whether there is a central electrical 5
13
(]) fz failure -- and this is to your question, Judge Rosenthal -- I 14 think you have got the invitation for LOCA to happen through s
j= 15 an overpressure event. If you have lost all your means of g 16 control and you are not taking energy out of the system, I think W
I7 it's a very squeaky situation.
h m
{ 18 Now it really seems to me an extraordinary burden to P
19 g place on Intervenor, though, to anticipate every one of the types e
20 of events which could cause this type of failure in the system.
2I It seems to me much more the proper activity of the Commission to i
22 provide that sort of blanket situation that would keep the event 23 from happening. This I have addressed and you will find in my I 24 files that I raised the matter of inerting the plant, rather f"'
\- ,
25 i than of using an igniter system, rather than relying on the means ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
35 1 that are presently in place, to increase reactor safety.
DR. BUCK:
(]) 2 Wasn't inerting considered during the 3 hearing?
4 MR. RILEY: The inerting was perhaps very lightly
(])
e 5 considered.
3 N
6 DR. BUCK: There was testimony given on inerting of N 7 various kinds?
8 8 MR. RILEY: I'm not really sure. It was not given, as N
d
= 9 I recall, by certainly ourselves. I don't believe the Staff i
10 touched on it for McGuire. I know the previous correspondence
.h b 11 with the Applicant -- it was made clear to us they were concerned B
c 12 about the possible unfavorable effects oh personnel who would E
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^ d 13 have to be inside the containment something like once a week.
a x- =
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b
! 15 Present testimony on the various kinds of hydrogen mitigation?
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.- 16 MR. RILEY: I think they probably did touch on inerting ,
B A
g 17 I'm not sure of that point.
5 M 18 DR. BUCK: Thank you.
5 E 19 MR. RILEY : Inerting is discussed. It is not being A
20 considered. Mitigation is being considered.
21 MS. KOHL: What's your precise objection to the 22 igniter system?
23 MR. RILEY: The fact the matter has not been thought 24 through. We have pointed out a mechanism for the release of 25j hydrogen so rich that it would not be combustible. For bydrogen l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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36 1 to burn, there has to be a certain amount of oxygen or air present ,
() 2 This mechanism, I think, was taken seriously. If you would be 3 so kind as to review the transcript of the public meeting (G
_j 4 before the Commission on June 24th.
5 To recount the matter, I was met by Mr. Denton before g
9 j 6 the meeting. I expressed a concern I had about the possibility R
$ 7 of forming hydrogen high concentrations. He introduced me to E
$ 8 Mr. Mattson, with whom I discussed the matter.
d o; 9 Mr. Mattson, before the meeting, said he did not z
o
@ 10 understand my mechanism. At the meeting I asked, after responding E
11 to the questions that had been phrased by Commissioner Gilinsky, h
3 y 12 if I might add to the related point, that it was important to 5
13 know when to turn off the igniter system. I was given permission
(]) m 5 I4 to address this. I did.
E 15
{= Applicant's counsel asked for a 30-second break to y 16 confer with its people. Mr. Mattson, who was seated next to me, W
U" 17 leaned over and said, "I understand your point now. " And you will E
18
{ find in that public record a statement by Mr. Mattson in which P
g 19 he int'.icates that we have added to his views, and what can n
20 happen in the event of hydrogen release.
21 If you do not mind a somewhat technical discussion, I
("'., 22 will be glad to present that mechanism at this point.
V 23 - CHAIRMAN ROSENTRAL: I would remind you, you have 24 about 15 minutes, and if you wish to save some of your time 25 for rebuttal, you may wish to keep that in mind.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1 37 l
1 MR. RILEY : Yes. Thank you, Judge Rosenthal.
() 2 DR. BUCK: Well, on the record of the hearing itself, 3 I believe you referred to Dr. Berman's papers and his concern i
4
(]) about the lack of burning or the sudden burning in the upper g 5 plenum of the ice chamber.
N h 6 MR. RILEY: That is correct.
R 2 7 DR. BUCK: Is that what you're referring to in 2
j 8 connection with the Commission hearing?
O c; 9 MR. RILEY: No, sir. I am saying' that within the z
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$ 10 conceivable spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents, that the
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$ 11 volume of steam release in many will be so great that it will 3
(5 12 keep the air-circulating system from effectively pushing through s
j 13 60,000 cubic feet of air per minute. Too much back pressure.
_ m m
5 14 Certainly under these conditions, the ice condenser will strip jz 15 the steam and essentially pure hydrogen will rise through the j 16 ice condenser.
A b^ 17 DR. BUCK: Isn't that why they place igniters in the 5
$ 18 ice condenser?
A 19
{n MR. RILEY: Yes, but the hydrogen won't burn. You 70 can't burn hydrogen absent air, enough air.
21 DR. BUCK: But this is above the steam level?
22 MR. RILEY: This is above the steam level, but 23 4 there would be no air getting in there. The cell supply inside 24 the ice condenser, when you have such a rapid flux that your 25 air pumps can't put any air inside the lower chamber, is going to be i
- ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. l
38 I just hydrogen.
2 DR. BUCK: Where in the record is it shown that there 3 will not be enough circulation?
O 4 MR. R1tEY: f you w111 reed my firdines of fect, p 5 you will find this is in quantitative detail. I discuss the E
j 6 maximum flow rate of steam and hydrogen generation, the rate at R
$ 7 which the air return pumps operate.
A j 8 DR. BUCK: Well, where does this come out in the d
0; 9 hearing itself?
?
@ 10 MR. RILEY: This is one of the things we were 3
Il complaining about. I was not permitted to testify. My testimony is Y I2 was rejected. I'm saying that we were kept from making our case.
Ei 13 I'm saying that I was a reasonably credible witness, and that as x
g 14 in the past when I have testified, the Board could have decided j=
15 the weight to give my testimony.
gj 16 The fact that it was totally refused did not give w
17 them any opportunity to see if --
h =
{c: 18 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: It was totally refused on the i-19 basis that you were not qualified as an expert; is that correct?
g n
20 MR. RILEY: Let me tell you the specific basis. I was 21 asked by Applicant's counsel if I could quote a certain section 22 of the code dealing with structures, metal structures. I could a .
23 ' not.
i 24 I was asked about another section of the code. I 25 f couldn't quote it, ei ther. This made it clear tha I was not an i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
39 I expert in structural engineering.
( 2 A review of my testimony makes it absolutely transparen 3 that I didn't claim to be a structural engineer. I gave no
( 4 structural engineering testimony.
5 The second item. The Applicant brought in some very y
9
@ 6 prestigious witnesses on hydrogen combustion; the dean of the R
S 7 whole area, Mr. Lewis, was one of their witnesses.
N
$ 8 It was said that my knowledge of the matter of d
c; 9 combustion, which is appreciable because I am a chemist, I z
e 10 p) have conducted tests with the ignition of combustible mixtures,
=
II
$ was not that of Dr. Lewis. I completely agree.
3 fc I2 What Dr. Cole said in dismissing me as a witness was
()a m 13 that all matters such as this could be testified to by other 14 witnesses, and the Board would make it a real point to make sure m
15 that there were no blind spots lef t that I might have represented.
.}
=
E I6 I was not permitted to address accident credibility.
W I7 Now the question of how an Intervenor can qualify as a h
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{ 18 witness, if he has to deal with the spectrum of events which, P
19 when Applicant or Staff introduce their witnesses, are broken up g
n 20 into smaller parts --
2I DR. BUCK: Do you have a statement of your expertise 22 Q
(s in combustion in the record?
23 MR. RILEY: Yes.
i ,
24 i
(')
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DR. BUCK: What did that involve? l
\
25 l MR. RILEY: I investigated two explosions for my i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
40 1
corporate employer.
( DR. BUCK: What kind of explosions were these?
3 MR. RILEY: The first explosion was a chemical 4
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(_ explosion in which a concentration of prechloric acid and e 5 g hydrous magnesium perchlorite, which had strongly absorbed some a
3 6
butene, spontaneously reacted and blew apart a laboratory.
E
- The second case was one in which in a presumably safe N
9 8 9 mixing situation, where methylene chloride vapors and methanol ,
O 6 9 j vapors were present with air, occurred.
c H 10
@ Now, the problem there was that air wasn't supposed to
=
E 11 g be used. In setting up that process, we in the research depart-d 12
$ ment specified that inert gas should be used. To keep production
=
() E going, air had been used instead. Consequently, there was an 14 y accident.
=
9 15 G The third thing that I did not mention was voir-dired,
=
2 16 g because I forgot about it, at one time we were interested in d 17 a putting electrical compon nts -- what are called the extrusion
=
5 18
= cabinets for producing acetate yarn, where we used a flammable 19 y solid. It was a matter of investigating what sort of electrical 20 potentials would be necessary to set of f this combustible mixture.
21 D R. BUCK: These are all chemical mixtures that were 22 used in the plant that you worked in; is that correct?
{}
23 !
! MR. RILEY: That's correct.
i 24 i
/"T ! DR. BUCK: Thank you.
\-)
I 25 ' CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You now have 10 minutes.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I di I MR. RILEY: Well, perhaps it would be well to 2
recapitulate what I think are the most important points.
3 One is that the Applicant was permitted to set up a f 4 very limited case to make its proof, and the Board read it as if 5
y a satisfactory demonstration of that very limited case covered a
$ 0 the full spectrum of accidents.
R
" 7 That brings up the question of accident credibility.
A j 8 The Board apparently found there were no other credible accidents.
d 6 9
, Our complaint is that to get any testimony on this score, I 10 g would have had to have been used as a witness. I was excluded fron
=
II 5 that.
5 y 12 All the documents, NRC documants, NASC documents, 5
Oi' contract research documents, which led to my position on thit 14 matter were excluded as exhibits because I was no longer a witness, le j= 15 and I feel that this completely gutted our case; that we couldn't ij 16 state why accidents weren' t credible. We couldn't state why the
- o I7 Applicant's mitigation scheme looked foolish to us.
.h
=
IO b I was frankly offended by the fact that the Licensing i:
19 g Board in its supplemental initial decision did not even address n
20 the mechanism by which we pointed out how hydrogen can concentrate 21 at non-ignitable levels, because it is so low in density, rises 22 to the dome, and there through a diffusion process, mixing with 23 air, spontaneously but slowly, developed not only an ignitable 24 mixture, but in part a detonable mixture. And the ignoring of 25 ' this very straightforward chemical testimony, I think, was grave ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
42 I and serious error, because certainly within the rules of the NRC
() 2 and within the rules of the federal courts, credible scientific 3 testimony, if it is reputable, telongs in the racord.
() 4 We were told by the Hearing Board, all right, you 5
y can' t make your case through your witness; you can make your n
3 0 case through your findings of fact.
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=
E 7 We did make our case through our findings of fact.
E 8 5 They were disregarded.
d 9 I will save the remaining time, sir, for rebuttal.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. Riley.
II The Board will take a 10-minute recess, following I2 which it will hear from the Applicant.
h
=
()a m 13 (Recess.)
.T.3 5 I4 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right, back on the record.
15
{= Mr. McGarry, before you start, Mr. Riley, I think g 16 I understood you to say at the very end of your argument that i
C 17
$ the Licensing Board had indicated to you that while it was not
=
M 18
_ prepared to allow you to make an evidentiary case on certain s
19 8 matters, that you were free to present your case on those matters n
20 through your proposed findings.
MR. RILEY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: If I understood you correctly,
(~}
V 3
I would appreciate it when your rebuttal comes about, if you could l
bring my attention to precisely where in the record the Licensing
)
25 1
! Board made that statement. j ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l
43 43 l
I MR. RILEY: Judge Rosenthal, in the absence of O 2 ha 1ng a t,,nscrigt, m1,he z ,,,,1,e es,, 1,,,,,,,1,, ,, ,,
3 earliest convenience?
4 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, you certainly may, in letter 5 form, after you return to North Carolina.
@ 6 MR. RILEY: Thank you.
Et b 7 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But I'm just curious as to s
[ 8 where the Licensing Board had made that statement. <
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~ 9 All right, Mr. McGarry, you may proceed.
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1 i 44 dd l
I ORAL APGUMENT OF MICHAEL MC GARRY, ON BEHALF OF N, X 2 THE LICENSEE, DUKE POWER COMPANY.
3 MR. MC GARRY: Thank you.
() 4 I do have some prepared remarks, but as a result 5 of the presentation of Mr. Riley, I believe I would like to g
e
@ 6 deviate from those in thc. first instance.
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$ 7 Mr. Riley's argument before this Board is similar s
j 8 to CESG's argument contained in its brief, and as we pointed G
c; 9 out in our brief, it is an argument that is devoid of factual z
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g 10 basis, E
11 Mr. Riley went on at length to explain a loss of ECCS 3
g 12 scenario deriving from a loss of power. That scenario is E
y 13 premised upon 100 percent speculation and allegation, and is
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m 3
- 14 100 percent devoid of any record support.
2 15 An examination of Mr. Riley's prefiled testimony,
=
j 16 which I have ir, my hand, disclose 'bsolutely no discussion of M
17 l ,f a loss-of-power scenario as described by Mr. Riley to this Board
=
{ 18 today.
P 19 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did he raise that at all below?
m l 5 20 MR. MC GARRY: In two instances , Judge Rosenthal:
21 In the testimeny he makes reference to the loss of 1
22 ECCS. Again, he assumes no ECCS. What he fails to do is tell l () 23 , the Licensing Board or tell this Board how that ECCS will indeed I l 24 fail. That is the touchstone of the argument that he has l l ( !
25 ' advanced to this Board today, that ECCS will fail.
Ai_DERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. ,
45 45 I As Mr. Riley rightfully points out, to get the O 2 hydrogen, you muse have che fa11ere of EccS. what is the 3 mechanism for the failure of ECCS?
4 We discussed at the hearing the Three Mile Island-2 5 accident, where in ECCS did not fail, where indeed operated g
a 3 6 when called upon, but wherein the ECCS was premately terminated.
R
$ 7 That was the special circumstances that gave rise to the reopening a
j 8 when we were talking about ECCS failure.
c)
- 9 It was incumbent upon us at that juncture to
$ 10 demonstrate that sucn premature termination would not occur at E
11 McGuira.
is y 12 We maintain that the record exhaustively supports 5
13 the Licensing Board's finding that indeed the ECCS will not be l$ 14 prematurely terminated in a TMI-2 type event.
j= 15 So, to recapitulate our position, the arguments j 16 advanced today, while on their surface appealing and interesting, as f
z 17 were never advanced in an evidentiary form in the record at the
} 18 Board below.
E g I9 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: In your judgment, did Mr. Riley n
20 have opportunity to advance them below?
l 2I MR. MC GARRY: I maintain that Mr. Riley -- the 22 Applicant maintains that Mr. Riley had an opportunity to advance O
23 l the loss-of-power scenario bulow at a particular point in time.
24 That particular point in time being when he roved to reopen the f,
i 25 proceeding.
j l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
l 46 db 1
What were the special circumstances associated with
() 2 the loss-of-power scenario that were peculiar to McGuire, that 3 warranted the Board's reopening of the record?
() 4 He did not make that case. The case he made was that e 5 TMI-2 happened, and doggone it, can the McGuire containment N
8 6 withstand a TMI-2 accident?
e 7 CHAIRM.sN ROSENTHAL: What would you have done if he A
E 8 had sought to reopen the record on other than a TMI scenario? I u
d d 9 would suppose you would have said these aren' t newly-discovered i ~
10 facts, and endeavored to employ a rather rigid test on record h
E 5 11 reopening.
3 d 12 MR. MC GARRY: That's correct.
E 13 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So you're saying, I take it, in CE) b :
E 14 actuality, not that he didn't attempt to do it as much as you d
=
2 15 would say he wasn't entitled to do it?
E 16 MR. MC GARRY: That's our position. We would have 3.
A d 17 taken that position if he had moved to reopen, because we felt 5
- 5 18 there was nothing new with respect to loss cf power as the
=
b E 19 scenario we've been talking about today. There was nothing new 20 about that. If Mr. Riley had a concern about loss of power, he 21 could have raised that six years ago. He didn't raise it, never 22 raised it at the operating license proceeding.
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s 23 ; MS. KOHL: What about his argument that he raised it l 24 in the amended motion?
I ('_/'T i
25 ; MR. MC GARRY: We have examined that, Judge Kohl, and i
i 1
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. !
47 47 1 that pleading has about half a paragraph reference to again an 1
2 assumed failure of ECCS.
3 There is no demonstration of what are the new facts that give rise to a loss-of-power scenario.
{} 4 e 5 I will be quite candid with the Board that we had a b
d 6 loss-of-power witness ready to testify at this hearing. We were e
7 waiting for Mr. Riley to put on the case. I maintained he a wouldn' t be able to put on the case because he couldn' t satisfy d
d 9 the reopening standard, but even assuming he could, that would i
$ 10 have been a Licensing Board decision to let him pursue a loss-of-i 5 11 power scenario. And it was incumbent upon him to provide at d 12 least a threshold demonstration that loss of power was a credible 2
c g3 j 13 scenario.
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E 14 There was reference today made to NRC's requirement to s
! 15 that diesel start-up five years ago and 21 failed.
s
.* 16 That was never set forth. The fact that Mr. Riley was incompetent 3
A d 17 to testify in that regard in no way precluded CESG from making l
s 5 18 that case. There are many more fish in the sea than Mr. Rile y .
5 E 19 They didn ' t make that case .
A 20 We were prepared, I state to this Board, to refute 21 that case and clearly demonstrate, as it is set forth in the FSAR, 22 which indeed is evidence in this record, that we do have the
()
23 , redundant capability to assure that station blackout is a remote 24 possibility.
25 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did you have this witness that I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
48 48' 1 you referred to available to testify at the hearing? Is that
- correct?
3 MR. MC GARRY: Yes.
4l CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Why that, if your position was 5 that wasn' t an issue that was properly in the prcceeding at all?
e A
6 It seems to me that yJur having this witness available cuts 7 against your insistence that Mr. Riley hadn't raised this issue s
8 8 properly.
N 6
9 MR. MC GARRY: That witness was there available 10 pursuant to the oft-used phrase "out of an abundance of caution."
E E 11 We would have strenuously objected to it, as we did throughout d 12 thic hearing and throughout the pleading stage, that it was E
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p d 13 not the proper subject. But when you get in a hearing, a lot of bS things happen and you better be ready. We were ready if indeed E 14 Y
z i 9 15 Mr. Riley could have put on that case. He didn't put on the E
.. 16 case.
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I d 17 ( Therc is just no question about it, an examination N
$ 18 of the record clearly reflects that no such case was made.
5 CHAIRMAN ROSENTIJAL: Or attempted to be made?
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5 19 20 MR. MC GARRY: Yes. I have Mr. Riley's testimony 21 right in front of me. I read it as soon as I heard him make
, 22 this statement, that if he were permitted to testify, he could 23 have provcn a loss of coolant - a loss-of-power accident.
I 24 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And so you are telling us that fm O
25 l the Board's determinations with regard to his qualifications or I
l ALDERSON REPOR);NG COMPANY, INC.
49 49 1 lack of qualifications has nothing to do with this area?
() 2 MR. MC GARRY: Not this particular matter, no, sir.
3 Turning to the matter of his qualifications. I remember 4
(]) .the day well. It was my daughter's birthday, March the 3rd --
5 March the 5th.
g 9
@ 6 (Laughter.)
i R 7 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm glad you remembered that.
M 8 8 MR. MC GARRY: Give or take a couple of days.
O c; 9 D R. BUCK: Which daughter are you talking about?
2 o
y 10 MR. MC GARRY: That's right. Thank you, Dr. Buck.
E 11 My older daughter.
I I2 (Laughter . )
5
() 13 On that day we conducted extensive voir dire examination l$ 14 of Mr. Riley. We don't want this Board to be misled, und I'm g 15 sure it will not be, because this Board, in past practice, we x
g' 16 have found to do their homework and dotted every i and crossed A
17 every t; and having read that voir dire will realize that the
=
IO Licensing Board didn't turn on the fact that Mr. Riley wasn't h
P 19 able to quote two passages from the ASME Code.
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20 We voir-dired Mr. Riley for more than several hours, 21 and that voir dire examination boiled down to, quite frankly, if we're 22 getting into it, the basis for his ability. to discuss structural fS V
23 materia.~. was premised upon his building of model airplanes.
l 24 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We tells us this morning that k_.%) .
25 ' he never claimed to be a structural engineer.
I ,
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i i I . _ _ . _ _ _
so 50 1 1 MR. MC GARRY: Let me move on, then, to hydrogen 2 combustion. We'll accept that admission.
3 With respect to hydrogen combustion, as pointed out in 4 our brief, we asked very limited questions, because the hydrogen e 5 combustion voir dire came after the structural integrity, and I A
n s 6 think by that tirae it was fairly apparent of the depth of Mr.
m 9
8 7 Riley's ability to tes tify. And there on page 40 and 41 of our 7.
8 8 brief, we asked Mr. Riley:
N 0
c 9 " Ques tion: Mr. Riley, have you had extensive i
h 10 academic professional training in combustion, flame E
E 11 and explosive theories?
a r5 12 " Answer: When you say extensive, do you mean 3c y 13 to say that I have taken whole courses dedicated to
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l$ 14 those subjects?
2 15 " Question: Yes, sir.
50 g 16 " Answer: I have not.
- r5 l @ 17 " Question: Over the course of your professional
! :a l :::
$ 18 employment, have you been principally involved on a 5
routine basis in research activities concerning
}5 19 20 combus tion, flame and explosions?
l 21 " Answer: No, I have not."
l 22 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Riley referred this morning l l 23! in response to a question by Dr. Buck to his experience in the 24 area of combustion in the course of his employment, and I think 25 , he gave three examples, the last one of which I chink he
! I' l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
51 51 1 indicated was not included in the voir dire because he hadn't
() 2 recalled it.
3 Now what do you have to say about that experience in
() 4 terms of this qualification?
g 5 MR. MC GARRY: We have found in the course of our O
3 6 litigation with Mr. Riley that he is an expert on many things, R
$ 7 and that he always has some amazing experience, on need for s
j 8 power, on solar power.
d 0; 9 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That may really be, but that's z
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@ 10 not responsive to my question, Mr. McGarry. He's referred to E
11 two specific exposures, if I may put it that way, during the 3
y 12 course of his employment that he indicated are included in the 5
a 3 13 record,
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z 5 14 I'm not interested now in what Mr. Riley may have 15 claimed in the past daout his expertise in this area of the need g 16 for power.
. A g 17 I would like you to focus on the experiences to which 5
M 18 Mr. Riley has referred, and tell me why they did not stand as l 19 sufficient qualification.
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20 MR. MC GARRY: We would view those experiences, if 1
21 indeed they exist -- strike that.
22 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, I would hope so.
J 23j MR. MC GARRY: They exist. They are limited in nature, l
24 have limited application. The key is the question I asked him, 25 I "Over the course of your professional employment, have you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. l
52 52 I been principally involved on a routine basis in research
() 2 activities concerning combustion, flame and explosions? Answer:
3 No." That wasn' t his job.
() 4 He may have investigated a chemical fire, he may even g 5 have investigated two chemical fires, but his employment wasn't an N
@ 6 employment where he was routinely involved in research activities R
$ 7 concerning combustion, flame and explosions.
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j 8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do you think that's a necessary d
=; 9 condition precedent to testify in one of these proceedings, 3
that your principal vocational activity has to be directed to h10
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II the subject matter at hand?
3 Y I2 MR. MC GARRY: No, Judge Rosenthal. I think you have
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a 13 to have either the educational experience or the practical
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5 I4 experience, one or the other, and I'd say based on these j= 15 questions , he didn ' t have either one.
j 16 Now he 's indicated some examination of two chemical M
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$ 18 discussed at the hearing.
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A 19 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So you are suggesting there is g
n 20 no relationship between the fires he investigated and the subject 21 at hand?
22 MR. MC GARRY: Absolutely. Yes, sir.
23 t MS. KOHL: Mr. Riley essentially conceded this 24 morni' - that he may not be an expert in these various fields
(-)
,a 25( but the Licensing Board should have nonetheless accepted his ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
_,. . _ , _. _ _ _ _ _ -~ _ . . ._- , __
53 ;
53 I testimony and given it an appropriate amount of weight, in light
() 2 of his various experiences. What would have been wrong with that l
3 approach?
() 4 MR. MC GARRY : Mr. Riley was proffering himself as 5 an expert, to give expert testimony to this Board. We maintain, y
e
@ 6 as I have just said to Judge Rosenthal, Judge Kohl, that to be C
S 7 accepted as an es:nert, you have to have a certain background.
A j 8 And why? Because you're providing information to a Board that d
- 9 that Board doesn't have or couldn't readily obtain. Where what
?
@ 10 Mr. Riley's tes timony in essence is, is a conglomeration of his E
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y 12 read, that's traditionally been --
5 13 - MS. KOHL:
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But in your view, there would be absolutely 5 I4 no value whatsoever in pursuing the matters raised in this 15
{= testimony?
y 16 MR. MC GARRY: Given the nature of the voir dire W
I7 and the extensive voir dire that did take place, it was clear h
5 18 that while perhaps cosmetically appealing, some of the words 3
E g I9 contained in this testimony, that he really didn't have the n
20 necessary background to support these --
2I CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: When you say nececsary background, 22 if I can pursue Ms. Kohl's question about the Board taking it ,
23 l for what it might be worth, given the limitations of Mr. Riley's
/~ 2# experience, this is not a jury trial. The Board its&lf consists
(>T I 25 of two scientifically trained individuals. Why wouldn't it have l
0 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
54 54 1
been the appropriate course for the Board to have taken Mr.
(} 2 Riley's testimony on the basis of the fact that he, Mr. Riley, 3 is technically trained himself, has had some exposure to chemical 4 fires or whatever, and then attach the amount of weight to that
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e 5 testimony, as little or great as might seem warranted?
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6 MR. MC GARRY: I can't state to you that that's not h
R 8- 7 one approach that could have been taken. I submit that that K
8 8 Board was listening there in Charlotte, North Carolina, they N
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= 9 were conductirq that hearing, and they are extended a great deal i
h 10 of discretion when they condt ct that kraring. They were there E
5 11 and heard that voir dire, and I submit anybody that heard the S
d 12 voir dire and looked at the testimony -- they had to make a c
w d 13 determination. They called a recess and discussed this matter.
5 l E 14 CHAIRMAN ROS2NTHAL: They've got a let of discretion, N
m 2 15 I would agree, but what are the standards? Does the individual, 5
g' 16 for example, have to have a degree? If so, does it have to be a w
d 17 master's or doctorate in the particular field? And if he or she E
$ 18 doesn't possess whatever the educational requirement that you
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! 19 l might see, then does there have to be a certain level of vocational 3
n 20 experience? What is it?
21 MR. MC GARRY: I would think a rule of reason would 22 Prevail here, Judge Rosenthal, and I would think there has to be O
V 23 7ome threshold demonstration that this individual can make a 24 meaningful contribution to the proceeding. I think that's how l
25 the Licensing Board approached it, and then heard this voir dire ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
55 55 l and saw this e.xamination and saw the prefiled testimony, and in s
i 2 their judgment determined that Mr. Riley jus t wasn ' t --
3 DR. BUCK: What was done with these exhibits? Were
() 4 they ;xamined at all, or cross-examined on, or anything of this 5 nature? Were these all new exhibits that were just ignored, or g
4 3 6 what?
R b 7 MR. MC GARRY: We maintain, Dr. Buck, that these 3
j 8 exhibits which were identified -- the ones I'm referring to are d
- 9 the exhibits Mr. Riley identified as the underlying basis of 3
$ 10 his testimony. I believe it's Nos. 42 through 58, in that range.
E II
$ DR. BUCK: Some 16 exhibits?
3 N I2 MR. MC GARRY: Yes. And those exhibits, since Mr.
E 13 O5 =
x 14 Riley's testimony was not received, these exhibits weren't 5 received; but that's not to say thac the subject matter of these 5
j= 15 exhibits wasn' t discussed throughout the course of this hearing.
j
. 16 Our brief makes reference to where in the record the subject A
i d I7 matter of each one of those was discussed.
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18 f
C CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What do you mean by subject g matter? Actually what was said on those exhibits, or just in 20 the totally different context of the subject that happened to be 21 covered?
s 22 MR. MC GARRY: I think it's the latter. I don't want 23 ,
to mislead the Board in sayi ng, all right, here's Exhibit 2, let's I
24 talk about that. That wasn't the context.
j 25 l CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But nobody focused at all, I take l \
l I'
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56 56 I
it, during the course of the hearing on any of the disclosures 2
or conclusions contained in those exhibits?
3 DR. BUCK : What I'm asking is, was there any cross-
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4 examination of any kind on a particular exhibit?
5 y MR. MC GARRY: Oh, yes. I believe that many of the 9
j 6 i exhibits were used by Mr. Riley as the basis for his cross-R
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5 7 examination of Applicant and Staff witnesses. Just stepping s
b 8 aside and looking at both the Brookhaven and Sandia Reports, d
9
. you could follow that as a. roadmap for Mr. Riley's cross-10 examination of our witnesses and the Staff witnesses.
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II 5 Mr. Riley, of course, is the individual to answer that, 3
d 12 E but we would maintain that again the subject matter of these
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(,') j" 13 exhibits was indeed exhaustibly discussed.
m I4 f= DR. BUCK: What you're saying is he used them for C 15 b cross-examination, though he was not allowed to testify as far
=
g 16 as those particular exhibits were concerned?
w I7 MR. MC GARRY: That's right, because he didn't h
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IO l measure up to that threshold, standard of reasonableness, I s
19 8 guess is how I would characterize it.
n 20
! If I can just have a minute.
l 21 Let me just pursue this point, because I have a l
(} feeling that it's troubling this Board, and I don't want to --
23l I will spend all my time on this point, if necessary.
24 If Mr. Riley had been permitted to testify, again to 25 get into the scenarios that would be beyond the scenario discussed i
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
57 $7 1
at the hearing, that is a scenario to give rise to greater
{} 2 hydrogen, there would have had to have been a demonstration of 3 the failure of the ECCS.
() 4 His testimony doesn't speak to that point. It assumes e 5 the failure of ECCS. The exhibits don't speak to that point.
U 6 Some of the exhibits assume the failure of ECCS. So, to make 7 the argument that Mr. Riley is making to this Board, it is whether s
8 8 or not he was permitted to testify, or whether or not these n
d d 9 exhibits were admitted into evidence is totally irrelevant, because Y
10 it doesn't address the matter he is addressing.
E 5 11 We have set forth in our brief the history of the c 12 case, and I know the Board is well familiar with the history of Os s
!E 13 the case. We have talked about burden. In this particular E 14 instance, .'e assumed the initiative. We put on the case. We d
u E 15 assumed a Three Mile Island-2 type of accident could occur _
E
- 16 at McGuire, for the sake of this proceeding. But then we went I a
M d 17 on.
5 M 18 As Judge Kohl pointed out, we demonstrated that 5
because of actions taken subsequent to the accident in terms
{5 19 20 of Procedures, personnel, equipment and training, that premature 21 termination of ECCS was remote; i.e., incredible event.
22 The Staff supported that position, the Licensing
() !
23 ! Board adopted that position.
24 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I take it your position is you 25 l did not have any burden of establishing that the failure of the ECCS '
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
58 58 i was an incredible event?
l
() 2 MR. MC GARRY: That's right, Judge Rosenthal.
3 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You say that the burden was on 4 Mr. Riley to establish that it was a credible event?
e 5 MR. MC GARRY: I say he has a threshold burden to 3
N 6 make that demonstration.
R R 7 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The burden of going forward, at E
8 8 least?
N d
= 9 MR. MC GARRY: Exactly. And then it would fall on i
10 our shoulders, since we are the Applicant, now Licensee, to i
h E
5 11 demonstrate that scenario, because absent that requirement, one d 12 could say, well, why don't we put on a showing of loss of power, 3
=
13 of missiles, of stud bolts?
E 14 Under Mr. Rilay's theory, without the burden of U
x 2 15 going forward being met, we would have the burden of putting on 5
16 37 accidents.
E i 17 I CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I take it, then , from what you 5
$ 18 are saying, your case is really a very simple one, and that is
=
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" that Mr. Riley's whole house of cards rests on the foundation 19 8
1 n
20 of an assumed ECCS failure. He had the burden of going forward 21 to show that if failure was a credible event, he didn' t assume 22 that burden; ergo, his house of cards falls.
I 23 , Is that really the essence of what you're telling us?
24 MR. MC GARRY: Yes, sir. And we would maintain that 1
25 I the evidence which is contained in the FSAR and the SER clearly l
\
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
59 l 59 I demonstrates the ECCS has been designed to the regulations aml O 2 gresumee to se egeras1e.
3 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You are further, I take it, m
4 Q telling us that even if Mr. Riley had been permitted to testify 5 and sponsor documents on the matters in which he was found g
e'
@ 6 unqualified, that that would not have affected this basic GT
$ 7 proposition?
! E j 8 MR. MC GARRY: Absolutely correct.
O c; 9 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm just trying to make sure I z
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- G 10 understand your position.
.E 11 So you're saying, therefore, that in the final is y 12 analysis, if it was error at all to exclude those exhibits and E
a 13 to exclude his testimony, it was harmless?
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$ 14 MR. MC GARRY: That's correct.
l Y l
y 15 MS. KOHL: As to the various modifications in
=
j 16 procedures and equipment that you referred to earlier, l
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b^ 17 i are any of those captured in the tech specs, or is there any 5
18 other formalization of them?
h P
19 MR. MC GARRY: I believe that is the case, and I think l g t n 20 particularly with respect to procedures, they are '.ncluded in the 21 tech specs, yes.
n 22 MS. KOHL: What about the commitment to install a l
l tj 23 reactor vessel level measurement system?
24 MR. MC GARRY: We have committed to it, and it will be 25 installed. It's in the license.
ALDERSON REFORTING COMPANY,INC.
60 60 1 DR. BUCK: Do you know how to do that?
() 2 MR. MC GARRY: Not me. I don't know my daughter's 3 birthday.
() A (Laughter. )
g 5 DR. BUCK: Let's forget about that for a moment. I'd 9
@ 6 like to ask what your position is on this hydrogen mitigation.
R
{ 7 MR. MC GARRY: Yes, sir..
E l 8 DR. BUCK: As I understand the little bit of testimony d
d 9 that I have managed to get through here, that there is still
$ 10 some question about the hydrogen mitigation, the location of the E
g 11 igniters and this sort of thing.
B y 12 Mr. Riley has brought up the problem of possible 5
/~ 13 lack of circulation. I think the problem was also brought up u's
! 14 about a concentration of hydrogen in the dome, for example, or 2 15 in the upper part, the upper plenum of the ice condenser which, s
g 16 if it built up too rapidly and then ignited, might cause explosion s e
d 17 or something of this nature. I think Dr. Berman was the one s
$ 18 that perhaps brought this thiaa up.
5 19 Can you tell me what the position is at the present l
1
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20 time of Duke and the Staff as to what is 'ceing done to resolve 21 some of these, shall we say, questions on the hydrogen mitigation?
fw 22 MR. MC GARRY: Yes, Dr. Buck. Let me just say we
\~)
! 23 , are engaged in active study of this matter. We are committed to e 24 come back tc the Commission on the 31st of January, 1982 with the
! k3) ,
! 25 results of our study. We are working very closely with the NRC ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
61 61 1 and other members .f industry who have sir';ar plants.
Let me also say that in the record we presented -- I
(}) 2 3 keep using the word " exhaustive," but doggone it, it was
(} 4 exhaustive testimony -- with respect to the questions raised by e 5 Dr. Berman, Dr. Berman was raising questions of Dr. John Lee of A
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$ 6 McHale University, e
7 Also there were discussions of steam inerting.
8 Mr. Riley did characterize it correctly. We had d
d 9 the dean of this area, Dr. Lewis, and his associate, Mr. Carowitz, i
h 10 and those two gentlemen alone, I think, have 85 years of E
5 11 experience in flames and hydrogen phenomenology.
3 d 12 The record refleats that we presented a very 3
a (s d. 13 knowledgeable panel. We wanted to know what was going to happen.
\]E E 14 When TMI occurred, we wanted to learn from TMI. We brought U
z 2 15 this panel together. We're talking to these panels, and some 5
16 of these people, before this case ever came about, and we think 3
W d 17 that these individuals were the individuals who could best tell 5
M 18 us what would happen in a what-if situation at McGuire.
=
H E 19 The record is replete that the hyd* ogen, Dr. Buck, 5
20 just isn' t going to burn in the dome, due ta the upper plenum 21 igniters. There will be a continuous burn of that hydrogen, ,
j 22 and the upper plenum igniters are located below the dome.
23 , DR. BUCK: Does this require the knowledge of i
l 24 recirculation fans, which you've got some sort of fans in the
() :
25 l dome, if I recall it, to create a turbulence up there -- will i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
62 62 1 this condition of proper igniting occur even though those fans
() 2 might fail?
3 MR. MC GARRY: We have looked at various scenarios.
{} 4 You've got the fans, you've got sprays, you've got other fans e 5 that you've mentioned. The best situation is that all these 2
n d 6 pieces of equipment work, but the record reflects sensitivity e
R R 7 analysis that considers various components not working, and I n
8 8 think the fans -- <e would like the fans to work.
N d
= 9 I must say that the matter raised by Mr. Riley with i
h 10 respect to this stagnation and no air, daat was not a matter E
5 11 that was raised at the hearing. It was argument mado today.
B d 12 DR. BUCK: Let me ask one other scenario, and perhaps E
=
gSy 13 the Staff will tell us more about the requirements being put on
(/ m E 14 as far as shutting the igniters off, and then having to reignite ---
a 2 15 the possibility that it would then be reignited after there have 5
..- 16 been pockets of hydrogen formed somewhere.
M d 17 This was a scenario brought up, I think, by Dr. Berman, 5
M 18 again. But are there going to be procedures, tech specs, and
=
H E 19 that sort of thing, for when you shut off the igniters and when 8
20 you light them, and so on?
.4 21 MR. MC GARRY: I believe they are. This is a matter 22 under consideration, but I know at Sequoyah, we discussed it 23 with the Commission when they called the parties up before them.
l 24 There are certain procedures that would be directed towards 25 I a termination of the igniters but, of course, the basic premise I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC. .
, - . . . ~ _ _ _ _ _ .
63 -
g3 1 at Duke is to make sure that when they're cut off, that the
, () 2 problem has been resolved so that you don' t get into any further 3 problems.
() 4 I'd like to make one point, Dr. Buck, before I leave e 5 this, and that is with respect to igniters, as you point out, 9
3 6 there is this continuing research. We are continuing to examine R
$ 7 exactly what is the appropriate location of these igniters.
A l 8 We have placed them at specific points, but upon examination, we d
- c; 9 might want to move these igniters.
z c
g 10 DR. BUCK: You are presently putting them about E
11 halfway up the ice condenser and in the upper plenum?
h k
p 12 MR. MC GARRY: Yes. We Day want to move them around, 5
i 13 but we will advise the Board and the parties if we do so. But tha;
({}
14
$ no means means titat it won' t work as described. We are just
[= 15 fine-tuning the equipment.
y 16 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Your time has expired.
M -
d 17 MR. MC GARRY: Thank you.
13 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. McGarry.
- 19 g Mr. Scinto.
5 20 MR. MC GARRY: Judge Rosenthal, I know this is 21 improper, but it will take 15 seconds, but to respond to Dr.
22
{'] Bik's question about the fans.
23 l Both Dr. Lewis and McHale testified that even if the 24 fans weren't working, the igniters would ntill work.
1 25 j Thank you.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
I XXXXXXXX 64 64 1 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOSEPH SCINTO, ,0N BEHALF
() 2 OF THE NRC STAFF.
p 3 MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman and members of the Board, (G) 4 the Staff position in this case is quite straightforward.
e 5 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
3 I hope it's always straight-9
@ 6 forward.
R
$ 7 MR. SCINTO: We believe that the issue in this case j 8 in the reopening proceeding is a very narrow limited issue. It d
d 9 is limited to a narrow range of sequences. A reopened proceeding --
Y Z
10 the scope of a reopened proce ling is defined by the motion to g 11 reopen.
E g 12 MS. KOHL: Was it properly so limited? That's the i
5.
(~') y 13 essence of Mr. Riley's argument, as I unders tand it,. that the s- =
l$ 14 Board went too far in limiting it, and thereby precluded the 2 15 consideration of these important points.
t 5
l 16 MR. SCINTO: If the motion to reopen in fact gave
]
l d l
l d 17 substantial new evidence which would meet the reopening standards 5
l M 18 which are set forth in the briefs, and the Board did not permit g
19 introduction of evidence on that matter, then it would have been 5
20 limited, it would have been excessively limited.
21 But fundamentally on anmotion to reopen, it is the f3 22 person who moves to reopen who defines the scope of the proceeding.
V 23! Now we believe that a careful review of Mr. Riley 's l
m 24 motion to reopen indeed offered and asserted that he had l
l I
l 25 { substantial new evidence warranting reopening of this record, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l I
65 65 I
based on the occurrence of hydrogen during the course of the TMI accident.
Now that motion to reopen described the TMI accident.
() #
It described it an an accident in which ECCS was interfered with 3 by the operators.
3 6 3 We believe that there was no suggestion in that E
pleading that in my mind reaches the level of substantial new N
2 8 n evidence warranting reopening this record with respect to any d
6 9 g matter relating to large-break LOCAs.
e H 10 j CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Scinto, are you telling us
=
that actually the only issue then that the Licensing Board had h
d 12 z before it was whether the Applicant here had taken the appropriate c
() E 14 measures to ensure that the kind of operator error that occurred d at Three Mile Island might be repeated?
k 9 15 G MR. SCINTO: That's not the only issue, but it x
T 16 j g clearly is the first step in that sequence.
! CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Suppose the Applicant had
=
5 18
- suf ficiently demonstrated that that Three Mile Island problem 19 j stemmed from turning off of the ECCS, and now we have, through 20 operator training or whatever, provided reasonable assurance 21 that that will not happen at McGuire; what else would there be against that background to be tried?
[}
23 MR. SCINTO: Against that background on that reopened
(} 25 motion? Nothing. If the Applicant had demonstrated that it had precluded operator intervention with ECCS as a f ramework for ECCS l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
66 66 I
interference with ECCS flow. That was the only issue raised 2
by the motion to reopen, that is the only source of hydrogen 3
for which the hydrogen generation subsequent steps were framed 4
in this motion to reopen.
3 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So you're saying that as to the a
j 6 other possibilities that would be left to the Staff, given the it
" 7 fact that an operating license proceeding is confined to issues N
2 8 5 put in controversy, unless the Board, exercising its d
9
]"- controversial sua sponte authority, raises additional issues?
S 10 j MR. SCINTO: Yes. And, in fact, in this case, there
=
E 11 g is a lot of, I think, confusion in the record because a great 12 5 deal of the Staf f information in this record in fact goes
~-
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(,/ g 13 substantially beyond the limited sequence, which was an issue E 14 g in this proceeding. The Staff's evidence in this proceeding z
derived from the work the Staf f is otherwise doing on hydrogen 16 g generation.
F 17 d The Staff's work on hydrogen generation is not x
$ 18
_ limitea to small-break LOCA sequences. They are, as we testified, 19
) in our mind the most likely sequences, the ones we have focused 20 on first. But we have also asked our consultants -- Brookhaven, 21 Exhibit 59 -- to look at large-break LOCAs and the occurrence 22
(]) of hydrogen during large-break LOCA sequences. They are 23l described in Exhibit 59 as AB sequences, I believe.
24 l
() l We asked them to look at sequences in loss of power, f and they are described in Exhibit 59 as TMLB' sequences. Those i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
67 67 I are in addttion to small-break LOCA sequences.
2 .'he Staff's work in this regard is across-the-board.
3 Ne have, with respect to the ice condenser facilities, O 4 the firee 11 censed ice cendenser feci11eies, fe1e thee with e 5 respect to what we believe are the more likely small-break LOCA 6
j 6 sequences, we believe that it is appropriate to provide mitigation R
$ 7 systems for the generation of hydrogen, should it occur, to j 8 compensate for their smaller size and their lower design pressure d
=; 9 than large dry containments, such as that at T11I.
2 O
g 10 DR. BUCK: Let me ask 'ou one more question about II
$ what the Staf f is doing about that. We had a notification s short is 9$ 12 time ago about the fact that apparently you're having trouble 5
(] m 13 with the PORV, the pilot-operated valve.
5 I4 MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir.
I
., 15 DR. BUCK: What was the significance of that, as g" 16 far as McGuire was concerned, and what's being done about it?
s N 17 l MR. SCINTO: I specifically requested the Staff to 5
{ 18 advise me of that yesterday, and in response to what I anticipated h 19 g
5 might be a question, the Staff told me yesterday that they hate 20 not yet completed describing the significant document which our 2I Board not:ification indicated would be following.
22 However, the Staff indicated to me they do not feel 23 the particular test failure was of serious safety significance.
24 Had they felt it to be, we certainly would have informed you 25{ much more promptly and much more vigorously. As you note in the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
68 OO I footnote in your decision on the stay motion, if we do feel that
() 2 there's a serious safety problem.
3 DR. BUCK: Was this a closing failure or what, do you i
() 4 know?
e 5 MR. SCINTO: It's my understanding it was a failure h
@ 6 to open completely.
R b 7 DR. BUCK: Open or close completely?
N
$ 8 MR. SCINTO: I may be wrong, Dr. Buck, it was my d
c; 9 understanding that it was a failure to open completely.
z o
@ 10 DR. BUCK: Do they know what caused the failure yet?
II MR. SCINTO: They are in the process -- yesterday's 3
g 12 discussion was a discussion of the Staff preparing an affidavit 5
, 13 to respond to the TMI Board's eequest for information as to how m
5 I4 come we notified the McGuire Board, but not the TMI Board, vnd a .
g 15 what is the significance. In yesterday afternoon's discussion z
~
g 16 with the Staff, they were working on that affidavit. I think A
17 they have some information, I just don't have it.
,f z
{C 18 DR. BUCK: What you're saying is the Staff is on top 19
$ of it and you'll keep us informed of it?
n l 20 MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir.
2I l DR. BUCK: Thank you.
22 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Scinto, waat, if any, weight l fs b 23 , should be attached to the observations of Commissioners Gilinsky 24 and Bradford in connection with the immediate-effectiveness 25 review which was conducted by the Commission?
l 1
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l
69 09 1
) I recognize that Commissioners Bradford and
() 2 Gilinsky were not a majority of the Commission, or speaking 3 for a majority of four Commissioners, but they were rather
() 4 critical, were they not, of the Licensing Board's decision?
e 5 Mr. Riley has relied on some of those criticisms.
b 6 Do you think we should simply ignore them, or what should we do?
R g 7 MR. SCINTO: No, sir.
E 8 8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, I think that since N
d d 9 Commissioner Gilinsky and Commissioner Bradford might read that Y
$ 10 argument, that was probably a very wise response.
E 5 11 (Laughter.)
d 12 But you then therefore go forward and tell me what 3=
(} 13 we should do with it.
14 MR. SCINTO: They should be accorded due weight.
2 15 (Laughter.)
g 16 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I will now ask you for a bill of M
i 17 ' particulars on the word "due."
$ 18 (Laughter.)
5 MR. SCINTO: There are two aspects that I think are
}5 19 l
i 20 in the dissenting comments of the two Commissioners. One had 21 to do with the burden of proof standard. I think C E i s 22 Commissioners did not have the benefit, of course, of the I ,)
23 Staff's brief to this Appeal Board. They may now have, and they i
3 24l may now recognize what we believe to be the circumstances in this 25 - case, that although the Board, in its supplemental initial l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
70 7Q I decision, indicated that it thought the Intervenors had a burden 2 of establishing some threshold level, indeed in this case no 3 burden was imposed on the Intervenors.
O 4 The Applicant took and sustained the burden of 5 demonstrating that with respect to the sequence of accidents y
c?
@ 6 involved in the reopened proceeding, there is no critical accident R
=
S 7 sequence involving the generation of hydrogen damage to containmenu j 8 as a result of the combustion of such hydrogen and offset t.J ci 9 releases in Part 100.
z 10 The Applicant took that burden and sustained it. So
=
II
$ no burden was indeed imposed on the Intervenors in this case is 12
{= with respect to that.
0i' The eerden withresgece to other eccident seeuences le b I4 not a burden derived from the Commission decision in the TMI
.j 15 case. It is the burden derived from the motion to reopen.
e ij 16 A motion to reopen is limited to the scope of the us I7 I issdes raised in that motion, and the Commission, in the Diablo h
i IO Canyon decision earlier this spring, which we cite in the brief, i:
19 8 made it very clear that there is to be a fairly substantial degree 1
20 of identification precisely of what it is that is at issue in 21 this proceeding. They are supposed to raise substantial new 22 evidence, not simply contentions.
23 That was the bul. den, that was the limitation of issues i
24 in this proceeding.
25 i So with respect to the comments they made --
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
71 ]{
I CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How would they have satisfied 2 that burden? Would they have been entitled to have come in 3 and made a prima facie showing that there were other credible rm 4
(_) accident sequences apart from the precise Three Mile Island 5
j j sequence?
I 9
0 h MR. SCINTO: They would not have needed to show a R
" 7 prima facie showing. They would have needed to make the case 3
i a n for reopening.
O
^
9 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: C2uld they have done that on
].
e H 10 y anything other than the Three Mile Island sequence? What I'm
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MR. SCINTO: Could they have? They should have tried.
13 I
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(}f CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What I'm getting at, is given E 14 l
g the fact this is a motion to reopen an already closed record --
m I'
b MR. SCINTO: Yea, sir. .
= t d Ib CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: -- and the standards that have W
I7 been laid down which govern reopening of records, as you see it, h
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$ 18 would they have been entitled to have tried to get into the e
19 8 reopened proceeding anything other than the Three Mile Island n
20 sequence?
MR. SCINTO: At the time of their motion to reopen --
l l
{} CHAIRMAN ROSE'ITHAL: That's what I'm talking about.
l 23 l MR. SCINTO: -- they would have been entitled to try l
to get a reopening on this, on the basis of anything they asserted
[]}
95
' ! was substantial new evidence.
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
72 72 I For example, had they believed that the discussions
( 2 at the Appeal Board in the St. Lucie proceeding gave grounds of 3 allegation of substantial new evidence that was relevant to l () 4 McGuire, they could have raised the question of offsite power 5 problems, total loss-of-power problems that the Appeal Board j
3
$ 0 discussed in St. Lucie. Had they been able to establish somehow that R
S 7 that was substantial new evidence with respect to McGuire.
A j 8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How could that be substantial d
- 9 new evidence?
~.
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10 The evidence on the line.
- MR. SCINT0:
=
!3 II CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Wouldn' t you have come in and I2 fc argued that evidence was just as available to them a year or two 13
(}f years sarlier, as it would have been to people in St. Lucie?
$ 14 g What I'm really trying to get is whether you're z
j x 15 handing, after the fact, a rubber sandwich.--
j 16 (Laughter.)
A h I7 l -- to Mr. Riley.
=
{ 18 MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman, if you're suggesting that E
19 it would be impossible for anybody to show substantial new 3
n 20 evidence to raise an issue of loss of onsite power, I cannot II I'm a good enough lawyer to find agree that it's impossible.
/~T '2 evidence around.
V 23 , CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Nothing is impossible. But you 24
('T
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would agree that in order, at least, to avoid a stout objection 25; J ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
s 73 73 I from the Staff, based upon an assertion that the standards for
() 2 reopening had not been met, Mr. Riley would have been required 3 to make a fairly substantial case for the proposition that
(') 4 whatever scenario it was he was trying to throw into the hopper, 5 was one which he should not nave anticipated when the McGuire n
3 6 record was first being developed?
R S 7 MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir. I believe our standa.rds for y 8 reopening are rather specific, and they do require a showing of d
d 9 some substantial new evidence that meets the reopening standard.
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g 'O CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: In any event, in this case, Mr.
E_
II 5 Riley didn't endeavor to, as you said, put into the hopper any-3 f
c I2 thing other than the Three Mile Island sequence?
() m 13 MR. SCINTO: No, sir. And I don't think he intended 5 to at that time. I think the subsequent scenarios came out of a jz 15 lot of the evidence we were working on, a lot of the evidence I0 km the Staff is working on, and our frank disclosure of a number of I7 areas in which we haven' t fully developed what we want with h
5 IO
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D respect to hydrogen control.
I g CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did he mention this offsite n
20 power business in his amended motion?
2I MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman, I was looking at the 22 amended motion at the time he uentioned it, and I find in the (3
! (_/
23 ' amended motion only the following sentence that mentions loss of l
24 r's
\s' power at all, and that is -- you may recall at the time this 25
-l motion was filed, there had already been filed some motion -- I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. I
74 74 I can't remember the details -- requesting some authority for fuel
() 2 load or something like that, and this motion also discusses 3 some of the Applicant's assertions in its prior documents.
() 4 In response, on page 12, it says :
5 " Contrary to Applicant's assumption that there g
9
@ 6 will be no subatantial hydrogen re.'. ease at McGuire, R
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E 7 let us consider the possibility that there is. An 3
- 8 M operator may have forgotten his training in regard d
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9 to TMI-2 matters, or may have failed to comprehend.
z O
10 (A passing score is a flat average of 70 points h
=
II 5 in 100.) Or the plant may have lost both trans-3 12 mission line and emergency power simultaneously E
13 with the LOCA. Or both units of the low pressure
(])
3 14 2 safety injection system failed during a LOCA.
C 15 g Assure that the hydrogen release is the same as s
E Ib l at TMI-2 when ignition occurs . '
M f Then it goes on from there.
=
$ 18
_ I submit that statement does not constitute substantial P
19 8 new evidence with respect to the loss of offsite power that would n
20 have warranted reopening this proceeding.
I CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you agree with the Applicant that in any event, Mr. Riley had the burden of going 23 ' forward on the proposition that there was some mechanism for the 24 failure of the ECCS?
25 ! MR. SCINTO: M;' . Chairman, as you will note from our ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
75 75 I
brief, we avoid dealing with that question because we think it
() 2 is a reopening issue. But the answer to your question is no, 3
we do not agree with the Applicant.
/~T 4
(,/ CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. Will you tell me why 3 you disagree with the Applicant? We may have to get to that 3 6
{ question, and I'm interested in the Staff's views on it.
E MR. SCINTO: The issue on hydrogen control derived n
2 8 n from the Three Mile Island proceeding. In the Three Mile Island d
9 j proceeding, the Licensing Board below found that the Intervenor O
H 10 j had made a prima facie showing under 2.758, on the basis of
=
Staff documents, that the rule in 50.44 would not accomplish its d 12
& intended purpose, I believe.
=
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h Commission had two questions; one, of whether to waive the rule; z
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=
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litigated.
M 18
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19 g decision by the Commission, concluded it was not appropriate to 20 waive 50.44 in that case.
But nonetheless, notwithstanding 50.44, the matter 1
22
/~ of hydrogen generation and control in excess of the limits of V}
23 l 50.44 could be litigated on the Part 100.
I 24 i
{} They went on to describe how it is done. That is, you 25 5 may litigate the question of whether or not there is a credible ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
1 76 76 I accident scenario involving the generation of hydrogen, its
() 2 combustion, damage to containment and subsequen release in 3 excess of the limits of Part 100.
() 4 I do not recall in either the majority decision or s 5 the dissenting decision at that time a reference to burden of 0
@ 6 proof. If that were the only decision we were dealing with, R
$ 7 the decision itself indicates that this is a matter litigable s
j 8 under Part 100.
d q 9 For all of my background in this, it is always the
@ 10 Applicant who has the burden of demonstrating compliance with 11 our regulations.
B N I2 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That may well be so. You've ;
= i
(} 13 lost me somewhere along the line.
I4 As I understood the Applicant's argument, it was h
15 that the Three Mile Island accident itself, which is what the
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N 17 failure of the ECCS itself. It was brought about by operator E
u 18 error, and if -- excuse me, take out "if" s
P "s 19 The second,as I understand, string to the Applicant's n
20 bow was that the necessary underlying premise of the Intervenor's 21 position here is a failure of the ECCS system.
22
{} Now the Applicant says the matter of the operator 23 l error putting the SCCS out, is taken care of. Maybe it is; maybe 24 it isn' t on this record, but we'll assume it is .
25 l Therefore, the underlying premise of the Intervenor's i
I f
! ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
77 77 1 argument is failure of the ECCS system in a real sense as opposed
() 2 l to it being turned off prematurely. And if that is the premise 3 on which the argument rests, then it's the Intervenor's burden
() 4 of showing that the ECCS failure is credible.
e 5 Now I don't know how the -- I think that's the j 6 Applicant's basic argument, and what's wrong with it?
R
$ 7 MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman, had the reopened motion s
j 8 raised the issue of ECCS failure in any other way than operator d
q 9 intervention, and the Board had found that that was -- that
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@ 10 there was substantial new evidence warranting meeting the reopening E
11 standards with respect to anything else, I don't see that that S
y 12 would have been Intervenor's burden.
5 13 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Wait a minute. You mean you're h 14 assuming that the Intervenor was able to point, as a basis for jx 15 reopening, to a failure of an ECCS system. Obviously I think if g 16 the Intervenor were able to do that, the burden would be on the w
d 17 Applicant.
$ 18 But I'm now assuming -- maybe what you're really P
g 19 saying is that you don't get to this problem because in no n
20 circumstance can this question be raised on reopening in the 21 absence of a showing that there is evidence, new evidence, to the s
22 effect that the ECCS system might fail?
\_
23l MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir, that is the point, that's our f
w 24 argument.
_]
25 I CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I asked you to assume -- maybe I l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l
4 78 78 I didn't make myself clear enough -- I want you to assume that
) 2 we conclude, contrary to your position, that the issue of a 3 non-TMI sequence is properly in the case.
() 4 Would it then be Mr. Riley's burden, as you see it, 5 on that issue, to go forward on the proposition that the y
9 3 6 failure of the ECCS system is credible?
R E 7 MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman, I will describe the a
j 8 burden differently. I think if, for example, this were a d
9 simple contention case rather than a reopening case, an Intervenor
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10 nonetheless has a burden of articulating exactly what it is h
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3 I2 I don' t think we have ever accepted a contention h
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() m along the lines that an Applicant -- that there are credible I4 l= accidents that aren't considered, period.
15
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I7 ' At least in that case , we knew we were talking about bio-h case.
E IO mass.
A 19 No, I'm assuming that the 8 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
n 20 contention, as you put it, is that the ECCS system will fail, 21 and flowing from that will be A, B and C consequences.
22 The question I asked you is assuming that contention
('N
(_/
23 l is admitted to the proceeding, does the Intervenor have the 24 burden of going forward on the proposition that the ECCS failure 25 i is a credible event?
f ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1 79 79 i MR. SCINTO: Mr. Chairman, I think that contention O 2 would have been improperly admitted; bu' had it been admitted, 3 no, I don't think he would have had the burden.
) 4 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The burden would have been on g 5 the Applicant to establish that the failure of the ECCS was 0
3 6 incredible?
R
$ 7 MR. SCINTO: The burden on the Applicant is to 3
j 8 establish that he meets the requirements of the Commission's d
d 9 regulations. If the Licensing Board had admitted that contention, Y
$ 10 it would have been an improperly-admitted contention, but the E
~
j 11 burden of establishing of meeting the Commission's regulations a
j 12 is on the Licensee.
5
{ 13 There was another point in the Commission decision h 14 that perhaps you're getting at. The other point I think raised 2 15 there was the concern or position by the Commission that the j 16 Board's finding that operator intervention with ECCS was A
(( 17 I incredible, and concequently you could not generate hydrogen
$ 18 in excess of 50.44 limits. I am not sure that they have
=
H 3 19 thoroughly reviewed the record as they would on an appeal.
n 20 I think the Applicant established in this case by 21 substantial evidence that he had taken a lot of steps since i
L 22 the TMI accident to assure that operator intervention would not 23 , occur.
l l 24 -I don' t think that CESG of fered any evidence to refute l n)
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25 , that. I don' t believe they make here an argument which is a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
80 80 I reasonable refutation. Their argument is simply that hydrogen 2 did occur at TMI, and that ignores the entire first portion of 3 this case, which was focused on the changes made since TMI to
() 4 preclude that.
5 Now I think we point out in our brief that the Staf f g
n
$ 0 position in this case was not the same as the Applicant's on this R
E 7 question. The Staff felt that the changes since TMI indeed s
[ 8 had made the occurrence of operator intervention highly unlikely, d
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II 5 mitigation system -- that there be a mitigation system, and that B
12 overall, that the overall sequence considering both the I
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15
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19 l g that overall sequence was not credible. That was the position of
- n 20 the Staff.
2I The Board concluded that it had sufficient evidence 22
, {} on the operator intervention so that it can conclude tnat that 23 alone was not credible.
24
(} That's a tough judgment to make, but we believe that l 25 l even if the Appeal Board should not agree with that, the record ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
81 81 1 in this case simply sustains the finding that, one, the occurrance
(~sj 2 of operator intervention is highly unlikely; and secondly, that u
3 with this mitigation system, the capability of this mitigation 4 system to burn hydrogen safely, that overall this plant -- there
(])
e 5 is no credible accident scenario, and this plant can be safely E
n 6 operated with respect to the generation of hydrogen of a TMI-type 7 accident. There is reasonable assurance that this plant can be s
- j 8 operated safely.
d c 9 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Your time has expired.
i h 10 MR. SCINTO: This information will come to the Board.
3 5 11 The Staff is in the process -- and this addresses the question B
o 12 Dr. Buck raised to the Applicant -- of sending to the Board E
Q d 13 another Board notification. It relates to some hydrogen research O5 E work that has been going on since the hearing.
w 14 2 15 DR. BUCK: I was about to ask that before : let you sit 5
.- 16 down. Dr. Berman was your witness. He had some different ideas a
M g 17 from the rent of your witnesses.
5 M 18 MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir.
M e
E 19 DR. BUCK: And it concerned primarily hydrogen in the 20 top of the plerum, in the ice cooler. Is that what this is going 21 to be about?
22 MR. SCINTO: They touch on it, yes, sir. They touch b')
on the elements of Dr. Berman 's concern. First, we had more work 23 24 done on the Livermore fogging test, and additional tests. They
! )
25 I still --
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
82 82 1 DR. BUCK: This is the steam inerting level?
() 2 MR. SCINTO: It's steam inerting in the lower 3 compartments. The result of the two anomalies test, even though
(} 4 the steam proportion should have been such that they were not.
e 5 There have been some more tests to determine the E
N 6 phenomenon, and they still have not been able to determine it as a 7 result of these tests.
8 In a number of additional tests which are set forth d
d 9 therein, there is no indication of a sharp rising pressure to i
$ 10 indicate combustion.
F.
5 11 Nevertheless, there was an indication that there s
d 12 had been an elimination of hydrogen. It's felt that that perhaps 3
a might be a limited recombination or something of that type.
{} 13 The report also contains the information that since E 14 U
z o 15 the McGuire proceeding, the classic modeling has been revised 5
to provide a separate node for the upper plenum. In the.model J 16 2
l g 17 that is described in this record, the upper plenum and the --
5
$ 18 DR. BUCK: You mean the analysis itself?
I :
i H t
19 MR. SCINTO: That was done for Sequoyah, and that 20 analysis was submitted on the dates in this document which will 21 be coming, and that indicates in all instances in the Sequoyah 22 analysis all the burns were at the upper plenum.
23 ; We do believe that this supports the overall record of
~ 24I basically the description given by Dr. Lewis on how the upper
-] l plenum igniters would work.
25 l i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
83 83 j DR. BUCK: This does not change at the moment,
() 2 then, your location of having some igniters lower down?
3 MR. S CINTO : No, sir.
() 4 DR. BUCK: Okay. Fine.
e 5 MS. KOHL: Mr. Scinto, I would like to explore one E
N
$ 6 Point further.
e 7 Going back to your prior discussion with Judge 8 Rosenthal about the separate statement of Commissioners Gilinsky d
d 9 and Bradford, based on what you said a little while ago, I i
S to gather that the Staff's position isn't entirely inconsistent e
E y 11 with the views expressed by Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford.
s d 12 In other words, I read.into their comments a E
c
("T s/ g d 13 skepticism about whether or not this additional operator i E 14 training and equipment modification are indeed adequate to w
- b l
! 15 prevent a recurrence of dhe TMI situation.
~
16 You characterized the Staff's position being that 3
A 17 you weren' t willing to go as far as either the Licensee or the 6
5
! M 18 Licensing Board on that point, and you couldn' t quantify whether l =
E 19 or not that was true, and you preferred to rest your position A
20 or your views on the hydrogen mitigation system.
21 Isr.' t that somewhat consistent with the views of l
22 the two Commissioners?
J 23 MR. SCINTO: I'd rather characterize it by saying I l l O 24 I think if the Commissioners had the opportunity to see the full
\-) l 25 i exposition of the Staff's position that I hope I've been able to ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
84 84 I give to the Appeal Board, their views would not be inconsistent
( 2 with the position the Staff took in this proceeding.
3 MS. KOHL: But as to the adequacy of the additional
() 4 operator training and various modifications that were taken as a 5 result of the TMI experience, you're not as confident as the h 6 Licensee, as I understand your argument this morning, that you R
S 7 can't conclude that there are 100 percent guarantees there that s
j 8 that won't happen?
d
- 9 MR. SCINTO
- I don't think anybody deals with 100 2
e g 10 percent, but the Applicant had witnesses willing to assert it II 5 was their professional opinion that operator intervention was k
I I2 an incredible occurrence. We had no Staff witnesses say that.
5 13 Our witness, Dr. Ross, indicated specifically our s
5 m
m g
14 feeling that we had substantially improved it, and the chance of G
15 operator intervention was very low, was based on our h
m j 16 qualitative understanding of what we had been doing since TMI, M
I7 but we did not have a quantitative basis upon which to assert h
=
{ 18 how low this had been.
P 19 We did not separate this case into two separate pieces.
g n
20 We wanted to deal with it on the basis of an overall system, 21 one that has both igniters and improved operator performance.
22
{} With respect to igniters alone, the record, I think, 23 l makes it very clear that work on igniters and hydrogen mitigation
/~T 24 is at the outset now -- there 's a lot more work to do. There are V
25 l a lot more scenarios we want covered and looked at in some depth.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
85 OE j I think we would not be very happy if all we had
(} 2 were igniters and no improvement in operator performance.
3 DR. BUCKt Mr. Scinto, I think maybe you are gcing a 4 little far here. I hope since TMI you have done more than just
[}
e 5 Operator training. Has there not been a lot of instrumentation R
N 6 changes and that sort of that, that have been put into effect?
g 7 MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir. And I'm using it almost in a r 8 shorthand that this case developed. It was the operator training d
e 9 portion of the case was one in which there was a lot of instru-i 10 mentation discussion, technical competence, changes in operating h
E 5 11 procedures.
3 d 12 DR. BUCK: What I'm getting at is that it just hasn't E
c d 13 been training at McGuire that vou are talking about. McGuire m
( =
E 14 has fulfilled the TMI requirements of changes in instrumentation w
b
! 15 and procedures; is that correct?
- 16 MR. SCINTO: They have fulfilled those which are 3
M 17 presently operative, yes, sir.
=
$ 18 DR. BUCK: I realize the Staff changes those every day,
=
H
[ 19 but that's all right.
x n
20 MR. SCINTO: Yes, sir.
21 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. Scinto.
22 Mr. Riley, you have approximately 10 minutes for G
V rebuttal.
23
() 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
86 86 XXXXXXX j REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JESSE L. RILEY, ON BEHALF
, f 2 OF CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP.
3 MR. RILEY: The word " credibility"was used quite a
] 4 bit in this case. Credibility varies with the individual, e 5 the individual's capacity to conceptualize the act that is to E
N 6 be considered credible or incredible. It basically has to do 7 with believability.
8 When we are asked to produce evidence about an event d
d 9 that has not occurred yet, obviously it's an impossibility.
2i s
c 10 on the other hand, it is credible that. =ach an even' 35 5 11 can occur.
3 d 12 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How do you determine that?
E
=
d 13 MR. RILEY: You don't. You can only determine things
]5 E 14 that have happened. The fact is in the past. When we read d
! 15 the Staff 's affidavits about almost any matter, they will 16 project things that are in the future. Their language specifies 3
as -
t; 17 very c]early that it hasn't happened yet, but then when we read 5
$ 18 the supporting brief by the Staff or Licensee's counsel, these H
E 19 very things are referred to as fact. There has been a subtle 20 transition depending upon who did the writing.
21 I would like to refer to a letter to Mr. Parker 22 of Duke Power Company from Robert Tedesco, dated July 21.
23 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Of what year?
24 MR. RILEY: This year.
O CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
25 I I take it that's not in this ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I 87 87 1 record?
() 2 MR. RILEY: That's not in this record.
3 It has to do with a request for information on hydrogen
() 4 control. I would like to particularly call your attention to e 5 page 3, questions under 6(h) which clearly affect the type of M.
@ 6 concern that I had in several instances with respect to hydrogen R
$ 7 concentration. The language is:
M
[ 8 " Discuss the potential for preferential flow d
9 to the ice bed, maldistribution during various z
o
@ 10 accidents. What is the probability of a consequence 11 of a break release piping adjacent to lower doors, B
12 of a hydrogen steam release to one or two bays of E
13 the ice condenser rather than from mixing in the
/-]s
\_ m y
l 14 lower containment, and discuss the possible effects E
15
{x of partitioning the ice bed model to the circum-
~
_j 16 ferential direction, as well as modeling the e
1 -
g 17 lower compartment in several volumes."
$ 18 And the following, page 4, under 7 (c) (III) :
g I9 " Provide the results of analyses to determine n
20 if the ef fect of various hydrogen combustion assumptions 21 considering the following:
1 22 "The use of different combustion assumptions O 23 in separate regions of the containment."
24 This is the very matter I sought to raise.
25 MS. KOHL: Then doesn't it reflect that the Staff is ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
88 88 I overseeing the --
O
\~) 2 MR. RILEY: The Staff is picking it up, as I read it, 3 that's correct, but it's a rather late date to do it. Until the 4 returns are in, I don't think the plant should operate until they S 5 are.
O
@ 6 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Riley, I would really like G
$ 7 you to address, if you would, the insistence of Mr. Scinto s
j 8 that this case is governed by standards applicable to reopening, d
C 9 that in order to get this record reopened, you had to stablish 2,
o
@ 10 the existence of new developments warranting such reopening; that 11 the only new development that had been raised was the Three 3
12 Mile Island event; and accordingly under established principles, I
=
() m 13 that this reopening was confined by the Licensing Board, and 5 I4 properly so, to the Three Mile Island sequence. And in the g 15 operating license proceeding, again what the Board considers is
=
g 16 it's not the umpire calling balls and strikes. That was in a A
d 17 quite different context. But it considers the issues which are
{ 18 properly placed before it.
P g 19 So all these other matters you are concerned with, n
20 they may well be matters which the Staff should be concerned 21 with -- apparently as to some of them, they are concerned with 22 them, but they have no proper place in tnis adjudication, and all
(])
23 l that was before it was the Three Mile Island sequence.
24 Now tell me succinctly, because this may be a pivotal
(^)T i
25 ; point in how we come out on a lot of your arguments, why the Staff I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
~. .
89 89 I is wrong about that.
A 2
MR. RILEY: With respect to anticipating that, I would 3
like first to quote from our August 15th, 1980 filing in which
() 4 the Board considered suf ficient to reopen the case. That 5
j certainly should tell us what we were thinking and what the Board 9
5 0
- considered as credible in our case.
e b
5 7 i I'll briefly quote from page 12.
M 8 8 a "The accident at TMI-2 happened at a slow rate.
d 9
]. A major LOCA would not."
E 10 j That's a clear indication that we weren't confining
=
!3 ourselves to a TMI-2 LOCA. I continue.
d 12 z "Can this Board, or any board, make a finding c
l
() I that the person assigned to respond to the unusual l m I4 l h will always be genius enough to cope promptly and
=
l C 15 b effectively? Or, will this Board be required to,
=
? 16 3 in effect, find that, contrary to the sense of s
I section 2.3.8 of NUREG-0585, no new type of serious 2
$ accident in a nuclear plant will occur?"
e 19 8 We are talking about new types of accidents.
n 0
Continuing:
21 "This goes to the heart of Applicant's bases I
() 23 for requesting authorization to load fuel and conduct low power tests. K.S. Canady's affidavit i
() I in support of Applicant's July 9, 1970 filing relies 25 on meeting regulation 10 CFR 50.44 (p. 1) , following i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
90 90 I certain administration procedures regarding ECCS,
() 2 supplementing instrumenta tio . retraining operators, 3 and meeting other TMI-2 instigated requirements.
() 4 The Applicant and the Commission are ready to deal 5
y with the last serious accident. There is no basis 4
j 6 for assurance that they will be able to deal with R
C S 7 the next one."
s j 8 rem talking about new experience here.
d c} 9 Then Mr. Scinto quite correctly read the following 2
o g 10 paragraph, which is:
II
$ "Or the plant may have lost both transmission 3
g 12 line and emergency power simultaneously with the 9
13 LOCA."
(}g l 6 I4 We are considering here the sequence of things by j g 15 which ECCS could be lost.
t
=
d I0 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Are you familiar with the W
I7 standards that have been laid down for reopening?
\
h
=
l
}
E 18 MR. RILEY: Perhaps not in as a technical sense
, P 19 g as the present company. Yes.
n 0 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, it's supposed to be, in order l
2I for a Board to reopen the record -
22 MR. RILEY: If I may interject, sir, it should be 23 l timely; have safety significance; and conceivably change the 24 outcome of the previous hearing.
t
(-)S 25 ;i CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: It has to be a new development or l
ALDERSON REFORTING COMPANY, INC.
1
91 9;
I newly discovered development.
O
( 2 Now what, apart from the Three Mile Island sequence 3
itself, was newly discovered?
() 4 MR. RILEY: I see your point, sir, and my .esponse is 5
g this:
a 3 6 e The requirement is not a proper requirement; that a R
7 person who is trained in analytically considering scientific N
9 8 M and technical matters can apprehend and project occurrences d
9
}". before they happen which are relevant. And I point out that c
H 10 g the AEC has done this from Day One, being concerned with LOCAs.
=
s II No LOCAs had happened, yet years of work had been put into how
" 12 E to deal with a LOCA if it happens.
=
() 13 I would like to now read something from the testimony 3 14
@ which was rejected, and going to page 11 -- no, I'm sorry, to C 15 b paragraph ll(f) which is on page 5.
=
E I0 "Each of the exercises performed by" --
M I7 MS. KOHL: Excuse me. What document is that?
j h E
$ MR. RILEY: Testimony bound into the record, but not s
19 8 received by myself.
.3 20 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: This is your testimony, the 21 testimony of yourself that was proffered and not accepted?
22
() MR. RILEY: Exactly.
, CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can you tell me where --
4 I')
'o MR. RILEY: It's in the transcript following page 3870.
25 MS. KOHL: Does this bear an exhibit number?
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
__ _ - ___ _ ._ _ . _ ._. _ ___ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - ~ . _
92 92.
I M2. RILEY: I don't believe it received an ed.ibit 2 number.
3 MS. KOHL: It wasn' t identified by exhibit number?
,, 4 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, it was testimony.
5 MR. RILEY: Reading paragraph marked (f).
g
@ 6 "Each of the exercises performed by Duke, the R
" 7 NRC, or consultants assumes an inoperative ECCS. All s
] 8 that is necessary to realize this assumption is the d
?
@ 10 many multiple failure paths that can lead to the 3
II h loss of AC power.
s j 12 "1. Electrical fire in control room switching 5
Oi m I3 seer.
5 I4 "2. Burnout of specific transformers.
15
{
"3. Loss of .ank power and a coincident y 16 failure of the diesel electric generators to us N I7 l start.
{ 18 "4. Failure of both pressure injection pumps.
i:
19 A seismic event causir.g aberrant performance" --
l g "S.
l 20 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But you knew all of this years 21 What was the event or the study or whatever ago, didn't you?
O that first raised this as a possible matter of concern?
24 CHAIRMAN ROSENTdAL: Well, TMI, as far as I was aware, 25 I didn ' t involve a f ailure of power, did it?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
93 93 I
MR. RILEY: The power wasn't supplied to the powers.
tO (j 2 It showed what could happen in a plant. It showed the safety 3
systems in place could be and were defeated by the operators.
r~5 4
(_) But it made very real and tangible that hydrogen could be released 5
j in excess of 50.44. It could be combusted and develop very 9
3 6 e considerable pressure, and because we have a thin shell contain-R
- 7 ment -- in fact, four of them within 17 miles of the center of s
8 8 a Charlotte -- I am mighty concerned.
d
~ 9 7-Well, from this same filing, going to paragraph 15, o
H 10 j or section 15, which I should say is very lengthy --
=
E 11 g CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, your time is about expired, d 12 3 so you've got a minute or two left.
c d 13
(/~N) g MR. RILEY: Well, may I then suggest --
E 14 W CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yca don' t need to read to us 9 15 g material that is, even though not in the record officially,
? 16 y nonetheless is included in the transcripts.
w MR. RILEY: These are a series of projections
=
5 18
- initiated by what we just discussed. It's on page 9, the last 19 8 long paragraph.
l In the findings, again we address this matter at page l
l 21 11, Sections 1, 2, 3, i, 6 and 7, are all germane in this matter.
22
> With respect to PORV failure, to answer your question,
, A-
! 23
. the PORV closed three seconds late. This was where it f ailed 24
(}
i to meet the standards.
I
' 25 With regard to the new evidence question, the really I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
94 94 1 key thing here is additional analytical thought. An event set
) 2 off an analytical thought, and the statements of the findings 3 of this analytical thought we wish to introduce as evidence
/'s
(_) 4 and present in our findings. I think this is a key and critical l
5 matter. We can't talk about an event that has happened, but we -
g 9
@ 6 are concerned because an evelit that can happen, just as Staff R
$ 7 largely has done, we have introduced some analytical thought M
] 8 which they have not done, which we say does not support a d
q 9 reliance on the mitigative means that Mr. Scinto has been referring z
c g 10 to.
_E 11 We believe it is defective, and the plant should not a
p 12 operate, if we only have those two things to depend, as at 5
13 present we do.
I m
! 5 14 I believe that's it.
. u r 15 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
w l e g 16 MR. MC GARRY: I would like to ask the Board's A
l N 17 indulgence for 30 seconds, but I think it's an important point,
{ 18 and I would like to clarify our position, so there is no mis-P
{5 19 understanding. May I be given 30 seconds?
20 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right, you have 30 seconds 21 for clarification.
22 MR. MC GARRY: Simply for clarification.
\ (~s}
m l 23 l I want the record to reflect that we are not at odds l
/~N 24 with the Staf f witit respect to burden. Make no mistake about it,
() :
25 the burden of persuasion is upon the Licensee and the Applicant. j i
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
( - - - ~ . _ _ . - . - . . - . _ - _ _ - _ - . . - - - .-. - . - . . - - . . - - - - . . . - - -
95 95 I We maintain the burden of specification of what is at 2 issue is on the Intervenor, and we maintain that burden of 3 specification has not been met.
O 4 whenx vou.
5 CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. On behalf of the y
9
@ 6 entire Board, I wish to thank the representatives of the various R
$ 7 parties for their helpful presentations, and the appeal of A
j 8 the Carolina Environmental Study Group will stand submitted.
d i 0
9i (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., tne hearing was
@ 10 concluded.)
E 5 11 is c 12 3
=
13 * * * * * * *
- l l 14 2 15 g 16 us 6 17
$ 18 l
E 19 .
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R 20 21 0 23 24 l O 25 I
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'i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
-_-.. _-. - - _ , . . . . _ . - . - ~ . - . - . . ~ . . . - _ . . - _ - - - _ _ - . _ - . - . , , . , - . . .
1 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the l E ') l
- Nb .
in the matter of: Duke Power Company (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
- Date of Proceeding: sentembor 10 1981 1
Docket liumber: 50-369 and 50-370
? lace of Proceeding: noekonan Marv1and were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Coccission. , -
Ann Riley Official Reporter (Typed)
'Ob m
_$11,)
Official Reporter (Signature)
}l
'r3 0