ML20071L583
| ML20071L583 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1994 |
| From: | Benavides G, Tony Brown, Dandini V, Susan Daniel, Darby J, Forester J, Kirk H, Miller S, Mitchell D, Staple B, Walsh B, Whitehead D, Yakle J SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES, INC., SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-L-1923 NUREG-CR-6143, NUREG-CR-6143-V02P1B, NUREG-CR-6143-V2P1B, SAND93-2440, NUDOCS 9408030170 | |
| Download: ML20071L583 (997) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:NUREG/CR-6143 SAND 93-2440 Vol. 2. Part IB Eva~ua': ion of Potentia: Severe Accic ents During Low Power anc S:autc own Caera~: ions a~: n , . . aranC Guz. :, L_ni~: _ Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Events for Plant Operational j State 5 During a Refueling Outage ! Main Report (Section 10) reparcJ by l D. Whitchead J.1)arby, J. Yakte. J. I orcster.11. Staple.
- 4. Miller. S I)aniel. T. Ilrown.14. Walsh. I1. Kir k.
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i I Omdia National Laboratories
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l 940B030170 940630 PDR ADOCK 05000416 P PDR
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i NUREG/CR-6143 SAND 93-2440 Vol. 2, Part IB i 1 Evaluation of Potential Severe Accidents During Low Power and Shutdown Operations at Grand Gulf, Unit 1 Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Events for Plant Operational State 5 During a Refueling Outage i l Main Report (Section 10) Manuscript Completed: April 1994 Date Published: June 1994 Prepared by D. Whitehead, J. Darby i, J. Yakle2, J. Forester 2, B. Staple, ! S. Miller 2, S. Daniel, T. Brown, B. Walshi,11. Kirk, D. Mitchell, V. Dandini, G. Benavides Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque. NM 87185 Prepared for Division of Safety Issue Resolution OITice of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 NRC FIN L1923 Science and Engineering Associates, Inc.,6100 Uptown lilvd. N.E., Albuquerque NM 87110 2 Science Applications International Corporation,2109 Air Park Road S. E., Albuquerque, NM 87106
l l l i Abstract During 1989 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The program consists of two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (Surry) and Sandia National Laboratories (Grand Gulf). The program objectives include assessing the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full i power operation and comparing the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences, and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program includes that of a Level-3 PRA. A phased approach was used in the Level-1 program. In Phase I the concept of plant operational states (POSs) was developed to allow the analysts to better represent the plant as it transitions from power operation to non power operation than was possible with the traditional Technical Specification divisions of Modes of Operation, nis phase consisted of a coarse screening analysis performed for all POSs. The otjective of the Phase I study was to identify potential vulnerable plant configu ations, to characterize (on a high, medium, or low basis) the potential core damage accident scenario frequencies, and to provide a foundation for a detailed Phase 2 analysis. In Phase 2 POS 5 (approximately Cold Shutdown as defined by Grand Gulf Technical Specifications) during a refueling f outage was selected as the plant configuration to be analyzed based on the results of the Phase i study. The scope of the level-1 study includes plant damage state analysis and uncertainty analysis and is documented in a multi-volume NUREG/CR report (i.e., NUREG/CR4143). The intemal events analysis is documented in Volume 2. Internal fire and intemal flood analyses are documenteo in Volumes 3 and 4, respectively. A separate study on seismic analysis, documented in Volume 5, was performed for the NRC by Future Resources Associates, Inc. The Level-2/3 study is documented in Volume 6, and a summary of the results for all analyses is documented in Volume 1. In the Phase 2 study, system models appli, able for POS 5 conditions, comprised of POS 5 on the way down to refueling and POS 5 on the way back up from refueling, were develooed and supporting thermal hydraulic analyses were performed to determine both the timing of the accidents and success criteria for systems. Initiating events that may occur during POS i 5 were identified and accident sequence event trees were developed and quantified. Surviving sequerees were examined for recovery potential, appropriate human recovery actions were incorporated into the sequence cut sets, and the sequences were then requantified. Those sequences surviving this preliminary recovery analysis were then reexamined during a
- time window" analysis. his time window analysis allows for a more detailed representation (i.e., a more realistic incorporation of the affects of the decrease in decay heat throughout the POS and a more time-specific incorporation of equipment j unavailabilities as the plant transitions from the beginning to the end of POS 5) of the potential accident sequences that could j occur while the plant is in POS 5. l 1
The mean core damage frequency of the Grand Gulf plant due to internal events for POS 5 during a refueling outage is l 1 2.0E-06 per year, and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 4.lE-07 and 5.4E-06 per year, respectively. This compares to the total core damage frequency of 4.0E-06 per year estimated in the NUREG-1150 study of full power operations. l Vol. 2, Part I iii NUREG/CR4143 l l
Contents Ac rony ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xlvi Fo rewo rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xlviii Acknowledge ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
- 1. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.1 Obj ecti ves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.2 Approach and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.3 R es ul ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.3.1 Insights into Plant Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.3.2 Insights Into Plant Operations. . . . . ..................... 13 1.3.3 Total Plant Model Results . . . . . . .... ................ 13 1.3.4 Results from Sequence Quantifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 13 1.4 General Conclusions ............ ..................... 1-7 References for Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... 1-8
- 2. Program Scope and Major Assumptions . . . . . ................... .... 2-1 2.1 Prog ram Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.2 M ajor Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 3. Selection and Characterization of POS 5 ............................. 3-1 3.1 Selection of POS 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.2 Characterization of POS 5 . . . . . . . ........................ 33 Re ferences for Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6
- 4. Analysis of Accident Initiating Events .............................. 41 4.1 Approach and Summary ................................ 4-1 4.2 Transient Initiating Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 4.2.1 Transients Common to All BWRs ........................... 4-1 4.2.2 Transients based on Grand Gul[ Support Systems .................... 4-7 4.3 LOCA Initiating Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11 4.4 Decay Heat Removal Challenges ..... ....................... 4 14 4.5 Special Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16 References for Section 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17 B ibliog raphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18 )
- 5. Success Criteria for POS 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.1 F unc* ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 5.1.1 Reactivity Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 ,
5.1.2 Level Control ................................... 5-2 ' 5.1.2.1 Level Control for Transients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 52 5.1.2.2 Level Control for LOCAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 5.1.3 Energ y Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 5.1.3.1 Energy Removal for Transients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 5.1.3.2 Energy Removal for LOCAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7 References for Section 5 . . . . ............................... 5-13
- 6. Event Tree Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 6-1 Generic Trees for Transients, POS 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 6.1 6.1.1 Generic Trees for Cold Shutdown, 0 psig . ....................... 61 !
6.1.1.1 Generic Functional Event Trees, POS 5 at 0 psig . .. ............. 6-2 I Vol. 2, Part I v NUREG/CR 6143
_I Contents (Continued)
.. 6-2 6.1.1.2 Generic System-Level Event Trees, POS 5 at 0 psig ... ...... ...
6-2 6.1.2 Generic Trees for Cold Shutdown,1000 psig .... .... ... .. .. 6-3 6.1.2.1 Generic Functional Event Trees, POS 5 at 1000 psig . . . . .... . 6-3 6.1.2.2 Generic System-Level Event Trees, POS 5 at 1000 psig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. .. . 6-3 6.2 Specific System-Level Event Trees for Transients .... .
.... 6-3 6.3 Specific System-Level Event T--e for LOCAs ....... .. ...
6-56 6.4 Event Tree Acronyms . . . . ......... .... . .. .
.......... ... 7-1
- 7. Plant Damage State Analysis .. ... . .......
.. ..... ..... .. 7-1 7.1 Purpose .. .. .. .... ...
........ .. 7-1 Approach .
7.2 .... ...... ...... .
....... 8-1
- 8. Systems Analysis . . . . . ... ...............
.......... .. 8-1 8.1 System Modeling Approach and Scope . ... ... .
8-1 8.2 Identification of Systems . . . . . . . . . .. ... ........ .....
... .... 8-1 8.3 High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) .... . . ....
8-1 8.3.1 IIPCS System Description ..... . . . . . .. 8-3 8.3.2 IIPCS System Interfaces and Dependencies . . .. . . ..
.. .. 8-3 8.3.3 HPCS Test and Maintenance ... . .. . . . .
HPCS Technical Specifications .. 8-3 8.3.4 ... . 8-8 8.3.5 HPCS logic Model . .... . .. . . . . .. HPCS Assumptions . .. ... 8-8 8.3.6 . . .... . ... . 8-9 8.3.7 IIPCS Operating Experience }. . . . .. .. . .. Control Rod Drive (CRD) System .. .. 8-9 8.4 .. . . . 8-9 8.4.1 CRD System Description . . ... . . . . .. . . . CRD Interfaces and Dependencies 8-11 8.4.2 .... . .. . .. . 8-11 8.4.3 CRD Test and Maintenance . . ... . .... . .... . . . CRD Technical Specifications . . 8-11 8.4.4 . . . . . . . . 8-11 8.4.5 CRD Logic Model . . . . . . . .. . . B-11 8.4.6 CRD Assumptions .... ... . ... .... . 8-13 8.4.7 CRD Operating Experience . .. . . . . . . . .
.... 8-13 8.5 Suppression Pool Makeup (SPMU) System . . . . .
SPMU Description .. .... 8-13 8.5.1 ..... . . .. .. . . SPMU Interfaces and Dependencies ..... 8-13 8.5.2 .. . . . .. .. 8-13 8.5.3 SPMU Test and Maintenance . . . . ...... . . . SPMU Technical Specifications . . 8-13 8.5.4 .. . ... . . SPMU legic Model . ... 8-16 8.5.5 . . .... . ... .. SPMU Assumptions . . . . . . . . 8-16 8.5.6 .... . .. . .... . SPMU Operating Experience . . 8-16 8.5.7 .. ...... . . . . . . Condensate (CDS) System . . .. .. 8-16 8.6 .. ... . .. . Condensate System Description . . . . 8-16 8.6.1 . .. . . . . Condensate Interfaces and Dependencies .. 8-16 8.6.2 .. . . . .... .. . Condensate System Test and Maintenance .. 8-16 8.6.3 . ... ... ..... . Condensate Technical Specifications 8-16 8.6.4 .. . . .. .. . . . Condensate Logic Model , .. .. 8-16 8.6.5 .. ... . .. .... . Condensate Assumptions 8-16 8.6.6 .. . ... .... . . .. Condensate Operating Experience 8-19 8.6.7 ... ... . . .. Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System . 8-19 8.7 . . . LPCS System Description 8-19 8.7.1 . . . ... . . LPCS Interfaces and Dependencies . 8-19 8.7.2 . . . . 8-22 8.7.3 LPCS Test and Maintenance . . . . . LPCS Technical Specifications 8-22 8.7.4 . vi Vol. 2, Part 1 NUREG/CR-6143 1 1
CententS (Centinued) 8.7.5 LPCS legic M odel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 22 8.7.6 LPCS Assu mptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22 8.7.7 LPCS Operating Experience ............................. 8-22 8.8 law Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System ....................... 8 23 8.8.1 LPCI System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23 8.8.2 LPCI Interfaces and Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 23 8.8.3 LPCI Test and M aintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23 8.8.4 LPCI Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26 8.8.5 LPCI legic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26 8.8.6 LPCI Assumptions ............................... . B-26 8.8.7 LPCI Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 27 8.9 Standby Service Water Cross-Tie (SSWXT) System ..................... 8-27 8.9.1 SSW Cross-Tie System Dercription .......................... 8 27 8.9.2 SSW Cross-Tie Interfaces and Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27 8.9.3 SSW Cross-Tie Ted and Maintenance ......................... 8-27 8.9.4 SSW Cross-Tie Technical !pecifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 8-27 8.9.5 SSW Cross-Tie Iegic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27 8.9.6 Assumptions in the SSW Cross-Tie Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-30 8.9.7 SSW Cross-Tie Operation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-30 8.10 Firewater (FW) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ .. 8-30 8.10.1 Firewater System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-30 8.10.2 Firewater Interfaces and Dependencies ........................ 8-30 8.10.3 Firewater Test and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 8-30 8.10.4 Firewater Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . ................. 8-32 8.10.5 Firewater Iegic Model .... .......................... 8-32 8.10.6 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-32 8.10.7 Fire Water Operation Experience .................. ........ 8-32 8.11 Residual Heat Removal: Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-32 8.11.1 SPC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-32 8.11.2 SPC interfaces and Dependencies ........................... 8-34 8.11.3 SPC Test and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-34 8.11.4 SPC Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 8-34 8.11.5 SPC Iegic M odel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-34 8.11.6 SPC Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ... 8 36 8.11.7 SPC Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-36 8.12 Residual Heat Removal: Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-36 8.12.1 SDC Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 8 36 8.12.2 SDC Interfaces and Dependencies .. ........... .......... 8-38 8.12.3 SDC Test and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-38 8.12.4 SDC Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-38 8.12.5 SDC logic Model .... ............................ 8-40 8.12.6 SDC Assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... 8 40 8.12.7 SDC System Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-40 8.13 Residual Heat Removal: Containment Spray (CS) System ................... 8-40 8.13.1 CS Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-40 8.13.2 CS System 1nterfaces and Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-41 8-41 8.13.3 CS Test and Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.13.4 CS Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-41 8.13.5 CS logic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 8-41 , 8.13.6 CS Assumptions .................................. 8-44 l 8.13.7 CS Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . . ... .... .... ...... 8-45 Containment Venting System (CVS) . . . . . . . ........ ..... 8-45 l 8.14 .... Vol. 2, Part I vii NUREG/CR-6143 l
.I
Contents (Continued) 8.14.1 CVS Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ B-45 8.14.2 CVS Interfaces and Dependencies ........... .......... .... 8-45 8.14.3 CVS Test and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 8-45 8.14.4 CVS Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 8-45 8.14.5 CVS 1.ogic Model ....... .... .. ........... ..... 8-45 8.14.6 CVS Assumptions . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. 8-45 8.14.7 CVS Operating Experience . ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .. 8-45 8.15 Emergency Power System (EPS) ................... .... . .. 8-45 8.15.1 EPS Description ..................... ..... ...... 8-45 8.15.2 EPS Interfaces and Dependencies ....................... .. 8-49 8.15.3 EPS Test and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ....... B-52 8.15.4 EPS Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . .. .............. 8-52 8.15.5 EPS Logic Models .................. ....... ... .. 8-52 8.15.6 EPS Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 8-53 8.15.7 EPS Operating Experience . . . . . .... ................ 8-53 8.16 Standby Service Water (SSW) System .... . . ..... . ..... .. 8-53 8.16.1 SSW System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ...... 8-53 8.16.2 SSW Interfaces and Dependencies .............. . . ... .. 8-56 8.16.3 SSW Test and Maintenance . . . . ... ........ . ... . 8 56 8.16.4 SSW Technical Specifications . ... .... . ... .. ... . 8-56 8.16.5 SSW Logic Model ... ...... ... .. .. . ... . 8-56 8.16.6 SSW Assumptions. ............. ........ . .... 8 56 8.16.7 SSW Operating Experience .......... ...... .. ... .... 8-56 8.17 Emergency Ventilating System (EVS) .. .. .... . ... .. .. ... 8-58 8.17.1 EVS Description . . . ......... ...... ..... ... . 8-58 8.17.2 EVS Interfaces and Dependencies . ... ... ..... .... .. ... 8-58 8.17.3 EVS Test and Maintenance . . . ........ .......... . .. 8-58 8.17.4 EVS Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . .... .... . ....... 8-62 8.17.5 EVS Logic Models ,....... . ....... .... .. 8-62 8.17.6 EVS Assumptions . . . . . . . . ... ... .... .. . . ... 8-62 8.17.7 EVS Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . .... ..... .... 8-62 8.18 Instrument Air System (IAS) . . . . ...... ..... ... ....... 842 8.18.1 IAS Description . ...... ..... ..... ... . . .. 8-62 . 8.18.2 IAS Interfaces and Dependencies ...... . ..... . ..... B-64 8.18.3 IAS Test and Maintenance ..... ........ ... .. ..... 8-64 8.18.4 IAS Technical Specifications ..... ........ ........ . . . 8-64 8.18.5 IAS Logic Model . . . .. .... . ... .. ............ 8-64 8.18.6 I AS Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ... . ... 8-64 8.18.7 IAS Operating Experience ............ ... .. . ... 844 8.19 Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) System . . . .... . ..... .... .... B-64 8.19.1 SGTS System Description ........... ... ..... . ..... 844 8.19.2 SGTS System Interfaces and Dependencies . ...... .... ......... 846 8.19.3 SGTS System Test and Maintenance .. . .. ........ .. . ... 849 8.19.4 SGTS System Technical Specifications ..... .... .... .... . . 8-69 8.19.5 SGTS System Logic Model . . . . . .. .. ..... ........ .,. 849 8.19.6 SGTS System Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... .... 8-69 8.20 Containment Isolation (Cl) System . . . . . . . . ........ . . ..... 8-69 8.20.1 Cl System Description . . .. ..... ..... .. .. . .. 8-69 8.20.2 Cl System Interfaces and Dependencies . .... .... .. . ... 8-69 8.20.3 CI System 1.ogic Model . . .. ........ . ..... .... 8-69 8.21 Hydrogen (H2) Ignitor System .. . . . ... .... .. .. 8-69 8.21.1 H2 Ignitor System Description . .. .. . . . ... .. . 8-69 NUREG/CR 6143 viii Vol. 2, Part 1
Contents (Continued) 8-69 8.21.2 H2 Ignitor System Interfaces and Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
........................ 8-69 8.21.3 H2. Ignitor System Logic Model . .
8-70 8.22 Alternate Decay Heat Removal (ADHR) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-70 8.22.1 ADHR System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-70 8.22.2 ADHR Interfaces and Dependencies .......................... 8-70 8.22.3 ADHR Test and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-70 8.22.4 ADHR Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-70 8.22.5 AD H R iegic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
......... 8-70 8.22.6 ADH R Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-73 8.22.7 ADHR Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . . . ................. 8-73 8.23 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System . . .......................
8-73 8.23.1 RWCU System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-73 8.23.2 RWCU Interfaces and Dependencies .......................... 8-73 8.23.3 RWCU Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-73 8.23.4 RWCU logic Model .......................... 8-73 8.23.5 RWCU Assumptions .. ............................. 8-76 8.23.6 RWCU Operating Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-76 Reactor Recirculation System (RRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ............ 8.24 8-76 8.24.1 RRS System Description . . . . .................... 8-76 8.24.2 RRS Interfaces and Dependencies ...........................
.... ............ 8-76 8.24.3 RRS Test and Maintenance . . . ...... 8-76 8.24.4 RRE Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......
8-79 8.24.5 RRS 1.ogic Model . . . . ... ...... ..... ..... 8-79 8.24.6 RRS Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.... 8-79 8.24.7 RRS Operating Experience . . . . ....................
.. .......... 8-79 8.25 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System ...........
........ ........ .. 8-79 8.25.1 CCW System Description ..... .
........... 8-81 8.25.2 CCW Interfaces and Dependencies ..... .... .
......... ... 8-81 8.25.3 CCW Test and Maintenance ..... 8-81 8.25.4 CCW Technical Specifications. . . ..... . ..............
.... 8-81 8.25.5 CCW Logic Model . . . . .. . . ...............
8-81 8.25.6 CCW Assumptions . ...............
............ 8-81 8.25.7 CCW Operation Experience. . . . .... .....
8-81 l 8.26 Plant Service Water (PSW) System ... .....
... .. 8-81 8.26.1 PSW System Description . . . .. ............. .
............ 8-83 8.26.2 PSW Interfaces and Dependencies ..... .. ... .
....... ......... 8-83 8.26.3 PSW Test and Maintenance . . . . . .. ...
.... 8-83 8.26.4 Technical Specifications . ........................
........ . 8-87 8.26.5 PSW logic Model ..... ....... ... ...
8-87 8.26.6 PSW Assumptions ........... . ... 8-87 8.26.7 PSW Operating Experience . ... . ... .................
....... ..... 8-87 8.27 Condensate and Refueling Water Storage and Transfer System (CRWST)
... ..... 8-87 8.27.1 CRWST System Description ............. .
8-87 8.27.2 CRWST Interfaces and Dependencies . . .......................
....... 8-89 8.27.3 CRWST legic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .
8-89 8.27.4 CRWST Technical Specifications ...... ....,. ...
......... 8-89 8.27.5 CRWST Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . ........
8-89 8.28 Safety Relief Valvea .. .. ... 8-89
... l 8.28.1 SRV Description . . . . . ...... ...... .. . .. .
8-89 ' 8.28.2 SRV Interfaces and Dependencies . .. .. . . ..
. .. . ..... 8-92 8.28.3 SRV Test and Maintenance
........ 8-92 8.28.4 SRV Tuhnical Specifications . . . . . . . . . .. ..
ix NUREGICR-6143 Vol. 2. Part 1
Contents (Continued) 8.28.5 SRV Logic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-92 8.28.6 SRV Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-92 8.29 Justification for Systems Not Modeled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-92 References for Section 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-94
- 9. Dependent Failure Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 9.1 Dependent Failure Analysis Assumptions and Limitations ........ .......... 9-1 9.2 Dependent Failure Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9-1 9.2.1 Review of Existing Dependent Failure Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 9.2.2 Common Cause Failure Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 References for Section 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
- 10. Human Reliability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 10-1 10.1 General Methodology and Scope ............................. 10-1 10.2 Pre-Accident Human Reliability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-2 ;
10.3 Post-Accident Human Reliability Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 10-2 ' 10.3.1 Incorporation of Post-Accident Human Actions into PRA Models .............. 10-2 10.3.2 Treatment of Dependencies and Non-Proceduralized Actions ..... .......... 10-3 10.3.3 Results of the Post-Accident Human Reliability Anal
................ 10-3 10.4 Recovery Actions Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ysis .
........ ......... 10-4 10.5 Time Windows. . . . . . . . . . .......................... 10-4 References for Section 10 ........ .............. ....... ... 10-5 L
- 11. Data Base Development .......... .... ...... ... ......... 11-1 11.1 Sources ofInformation for the Data Br.se . ... ....... .. ......... 11-1 11.2 Data from NUREG-1150 Analysis of Grand Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 11-1 11.3 Plant Specific and Generic Data . . ........... .............. 11-1 11.3.1 Initiating Events ........ ........... ............ 11-1 11.3.2 POS Change Initiating Events . . . . . .............. ..... .. 11-1 11.3.3 Frequency of POSs . . . . . . . . . . . .... . ........ . . . . 11-1 1 1.3.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . ... 11-1 11.3.3.2 Relative Time Spent in RFOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 11-32 11.3.3.3 Relative Times Spent in POSs During RFOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-32 !
11.3.3.4 Relative Times Spent in Power Dips Between RFOs . ... .......... Il 32 11.3.3.5 Relative Times Spent in POSs During Power Dips ..,. .. ......... 11 40 11.3.3.6 Merging of Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ...... 11-40 11.3.4 Maintenance Unavailabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-40 11.3.5 Top Event Fractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 11-40 11.3.5.1 PRESS - Fraction of Time Vessel is in Hydro Test (i.e., High Pressure) ........ 11-40 11.3.5.2 ISSDC -Initial Status of Shutdown Cooling in POSS: Fra: tion of Time ADHR Operating to Remove Decay Heat . . . . . . . . . .............. 11-44 11.3.5.3 ISSDB - Fraction of Time on RHR/SDC in POS 5 ...... .... ..... 11-44 11.3.5.4 ISADH - Fraction of Time on ADHR in POS 5 ........... ..... 11-44 11.3.5.5 ISSP -Initial status of SP in POS 5: With Water or Empty .... ..... .. 11-44 11.3.5.6 SPWLV - Fraction of Time Suppression Pool Water Level is 12'8* .... ... Il-45 11.3.5.7 ISMSV - Fraction of Time the MSIVs are Initially Open in POS 5 ......... I l-45 11.3.5.8 ISTRC - Fraction of Time Natural Recirculation is Possible ............. 11-46 11.3.5.9 ISTCT - Fraction of Time the Containment is Open and CTGOP - Fraction of Time the Containment is Open Low ............ .. ....... 11-46 11.3.6 Estimates for System Maintenance Unavailabilities ... ...... .. .. . 11-46 11.3.6.1 HPCS System Maintenance Unavailability. . . . . . . ... ..... .. 11-46 NUREG/CR-6143 x Vol. 2, Part 1
l Contents (Continued) 11.3.6.2 CDS System Maintenance Unavailability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-46 11.4 Data Changes Neca.sitated by the Time Window Analysis .................. 11-46 11-47 11.5 References for Section 11 ..............................
...... 12-1 l
- 12. Accident Sequence Quantification ........................
..... 12-1 i 12.1 General Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12.2 Point Estimate Results from the Quantification of Each IE Both Before and After Recovery . . . . 12-1
......... 12-1 12.2.1 T5D -loss of CCW ............... ......
12-2 12.2.2 T5 A - less of SSW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 12-2 12.2.3 TDB - Loss of IE 125 V DC Bus B 12-2 12.2.4 TIA - Loss of Instrument Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 12-2 12.2.5 TAB - Loss of IE 4160 V AC Bus B . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...... ... 12.2.6 .I2 - LOCA in Connected System (RHR) ............. ... ...... 12-2 12.2.7 ElB - Issolation of SDC loop B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ..... 12-2 12.2.8 E2B - Loss of SDC Loop B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 12-2
....... 12-2 12.2.9 E1D -Isolation of ADHRS . . .
.................... .. . ..... 12-3 ;
12.2.10 E2D - Loss of ADHRS 12-3 12.2.11 T5B . Loss of TBCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .... 12-3 12.2.12 T5C - Loss of PSW . . . . . . ..... ........ . 1; i 12.2.13 A5 - Large LOCA ................. ............... 12 3 r 12.2.14 S2H Small LOCA During Hydro . . . ..... .... ... . ..... 12.2.15 S3H Small-Small LOCA During Hydro ........... . ......... 12-3
...... 12-3 12.2.16 A5HY - Large LOCA During Hydro .. ....... ......
12-3 i 12.2.17 S1H.5 -Intermediate LOCA During Hydro ... .......... ...... . 12-4 ; 12.2.18 S2 Small LOCA . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... 12-4
............ ....... .... .... l 12.2.19 S3 Small-Small LOCA
.. 12-4 l 12.2.20 SI Intermediate LOCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
12-4 12.2.21 TIOP -Inadvertent Overpressurization (loss of RWCU) . . . . . . . . ..... l
- ..... 12-4 12.2.22 ElC -Isolation of RWCU During Hydro .................. i
... 12-4 1 12.2.23 E2C -loss of RWCU During Hydro . . ...... ..... ......
........ ............. 12-4 12.2.24 E2T -loss of SDC Common Suction Line 12-4 12.2.25 E2V -loss of Common Suction Line for ADHRS .
12-4 12.2.26 TLM -less of Makeup (CRD) .......... .. . .
.. .......... 12-5 12.2.27 EIT -Isolation of SDC Common Suction Line . . . . . . . 12-5 12.2.28 EIV -Isolation of Common Suction Line for ADHRS . . . . . . . 12-5 12.2.29 TlHP - Inadvertent Pressurization via Spurious HPCS Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.......... 12-5 12.2.30 TIOF -Inadvertent Overfill via LPCS or LPCI . . . . . . . . . . 12-5 12.2.31 TORV - Stuck Open Relief Valve .....................
.......... . 12-5 12.2.32 T1 - Loss of Offsite Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
.. 12-5 12.2.33 HI - Diversion to Suppression Pool via RHR ... ... ...... .
i
...... 12-5 i 12.2.34 TRIT - Loss of Recirculation Pump . . . . . . . . . .........
.......... 12 4 ;
12.3 Point Estimate Summary Results for Each IE Before the Time Window Analysis
.......... .. 12-6 12.4 Results from the Time Window Analysis .... .......
... . 12-6 12.5 Uncertainty Calculation Results for Each Sequence Surviving the Time Window Analysis
....... 12-6 12.5.1 Uncertainty Analysis Process . . . . . ...............
...... .... 12-7 12.5.2 Uncertainty Analysis Results ......... . ...
.... ..... .. ... ... 12-203 References for Section 12 ...........
.... .. . .. 13-1
- 13. Plant Damage State Analysis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13-1 13.1 Description of Plant Damage States .... .... .
.... 13-1 )
13.1.1 Plant Damage State PDSt-1 .............. .... . .
. . . 13-2 l 13.1.2 Plant Damage State PDSI-2 ..... ..... ..
l 1 xi NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2. Part 1
Contents (Continued) 13.1.3 Plant Damage State PDSI-3 ............................. 13-2 13.1.4 Plant Damage State PDSI-4 ............................. 13-2 13.1.5 Plant Damage State PDSI-5 ....................... ..... 13-2 13.1.6 Plant Damage state PDS2-1 ............................. 13-3 13.1.7 Plant Damage State PDS2-2 ............................. 13-3 13.1.8 Plant Damage State PDS2-3 ............................. 13-3 13.1.9 Plant Damage State PDS2-4 ............................. 13-3 13.1.10 Plant Damage State PDS2-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 13-3 13.1.11 Plant Damage state PDS2-6 ............................. 13-3 13.1.12 Plant Damage State PDS3-1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4 13.2 Plant Damage State Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
- 14. Results and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 14-1 14.1 Resul ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 14.1.1 Core Damage Frequency Characterization ........................ 14-1 14.1.2 Accident Sequence Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 14-1 14.1.2.1 AS Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 14-1 l 14.1.2.1.1 Sequence 02-06-01 27-W1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 14 1 14.1.2.1.2 Sequence 02-06-01-27-W2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 14-1 14.1.2.1.3 Sequence 02-06-01 W2 B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-4 14.1.2.1.4 Sequence 02-06-01-27-W3A . . . .. ............... 14-4 14.1.2.1.5 Sequence 06-06-01-27-W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..... 14-4 14.1.2.2 ASHY Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-4 14.1.2.2.1 Sequence 3-07-01-27.W3 A . . . .......... ... .... 14-4 14.1.2.3 EIT5H Sequence .............. ... ............. 14-4 14.1.2.3.1 Sequence 07-11-01-27-W2. . . . ........ ......... 14-4 14.1.2.4 E2TSH Sequence ....................... ........ 14-5 i
14.1.2.4.1 Sequence 04-11 27-W2. . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... 14-5 14.1.2.5 H1-5H Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . ....... 14-5 14.1.2.5.1 Sequence 03-01 01 27W1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5 14.1.2.5.2 Sequence 03-01-l l-01 27W2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 14-5 14.1.2.5.3 Sequence 03 5 0-2-W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5 14.1.2.6 J2-5 Sequences ........................... ' ..... 14-6 14.1.2.6.1 Sequence 2-01-l l-01-27-W2. . . . . . . . ........... 14-6 14.1.2.7 S I-5 Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-6 14.1.2.7.1 Sequence 02 06-01-27-W1. ...................... 14-6 , 14.1.2.7.2 Sequence 02-06-01 W2 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-6 14.1.2.7.3 Sequence 02-06-01 -2 7 W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-6 14.1.2.7.4 Sequence 06-06-01 27-W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-7 14.1.2. 8 S l H-5 Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ...... 14 7 14.1.2.8.1 Sequence 3-09-01-27-W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
..... 14-7 14.1.2.9 T1-5 Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 14-7 14.1.2.9.1 Sequence 3-14-WI A . . . . . . . . . . ......... ..... 14-7 14.1.2.9.2 Sequence 3-14-WIB . . . .
.................. . 14-7 14.1.2.9.3 Sequence 3- 14-W I C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-7 14.1.2.9.4 Sequence 3 14 Wl E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-8 14.1.2.9.5 Sequence 3-14-W2A . ..... ........... ...... 14-8 14.1.2.9.6 Sequence 3-14-W2B . . . . ... ................. 14-8 14.1.2.9.7 Sequence 3-14.W2C . . . . . . . . . . .. .... ....... 14-8 14.1.2.9.8 - Sequence 3-14 W2D . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 14-8 14.1.2.9.9 Sequence 3-14-W2E . . . . . ..... .... ....... 14-8 14.1.2.9.10 Sequence 5-15-W2B . . . . . . . . . . ............... 14-8 l
) NUREG/CR-6143 xii Vol. 2, Part 1 1
Contents (Continued) l 14.1.2.10 T5A511 Sequences ..................... ........ 14-9 14.1.2.10.1 Sequence 3-51 -3 5 W2 ........................ 14-9 14.1.3 Total Plant Model Results . . ............................ 14-9 14.2 Concl usi ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-9 14.2.1 Specific Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9 Volume 2, Part 2 Appendix A Definition and Characterization of Plant Operational States (POSs) and POS Change initiators A-1 Appendix B Summary of the Detailed Review of Selected Grand Gulf Procedures .......... B-1 Overview of Grand Gulf Power Plant ............ C-1 Appendix C .......... Appendix D Initiating Event Analysis fmm Screening Report ................... D-1 A pendix E Updated Success Criteria ....................... .... E-1 Ai pendix F Supporting Calculations . . . ................. ....... F-1 Appendis G Calculation of the Frequency and Recovery of LOSP Plus Recovery of LOSP/DG Failures .G1 Appendix }{ Event Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1 Volume 2, Part 3 1-1 Appendix 1 Fault Trees . . ............................. Miscellaneous Topics . . . . . . . . ............... ..... J-1 Appendix J Volume 2, Part 4 , Appendix K llEP Locator Files . . . ... . ..................... K1 Supporting Information for the Plant Damage State Analysis .............. L-1 Appendix L Appendix M Summary of Results from the Coarse Screening Analysis - Phase 1 A . . . . . . . . . . . M1 i { l xiii NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2, Part 1
LIST of Figures 1-1 Contribution to CDF by Initiating Event. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 1-4 1-2 Percent of CDF vs Timo Window. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. .... .. 1-5 1-3 Fractional Contribution to CDF by IE Group vs Time Window. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1-4 Percent of CDF and Percent of Time in Time Window vs Tune Wirdow. ............ .......... 1-6 3.1-1 POS vs Percent CDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................................... 3-2 3.1-2 Potentially High Frequency, Open Contamment, and Early Core Damage Sequences in POS 5 . . . . . . . . . 3-2 5.1 1 Grand Gulf Reactor Vessel Water Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............................. 53 6.1 1 Functional Tree: S DC 0 ps ig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 6.1-2 Functional Tree: Water Solid 0 psig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................6-5 - 6.1 3 Functional Tree: Overfil10 psig . . . . . . . . ............ .......................... 6-6 6.1-4 Functional Tree: SDC LOCA 0 psig. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... .... 6-7 6.1-5 Functional Tree: Steaming O ps ig. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8 6.1-6 Functional Tree: S DC in Hyrdo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... [
. 6-15 l
6.1-7 Functional Tree: Manual Depressurization in Hydro . ........ ... ........... . . . . . . . . 6- 16 6.1 8 Functional Tree: Auto Depressurization in Hydro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................6-17 6.1-9 Functional Tree: Overpressurization in Hydro . . . . ................. .................618 6.1-10 Functional Tree: Steam in Hydro ........... .... ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 19 6.2-1 El B5 H Tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ..... .. . ... .... ... 6-22 6.2-2 Elc.5 Tree .................... ..... 6.2 3
...... ... ............. .. . . . 6-23 eld 5H Tree ......................... ...... ........ ...... .... . .... 6-24 6.2-4 E I T5 H Tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................. .... . 6-25 6.2 5 EIV5H Tree ....... ............ .. . ........ ................ .. ... ..
. 6-26 6.2-6 E2B5H Tree .................... . ...... .......................... . . . . . 6-27 6.2-7 E2C-5 Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . ...
6.2-8
................. ....... .. . 6-28 E2D5H Tree ......... ........... ... .........................
..........629 6.2-9 E2T5H Tree
............... .............. . ....... ..... .. .......... . 6-30 6.2 10 E2V5H Tree. . . . . . . . . .... .......... ....... ........ ................. . 6 31 6.2 11 H1-5H Tree. ................ ... .. ....... .....
6.2-12
......................632 T 1 -5 T ree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... ..............6-33 6.2-13 T5A5H Tree ..'..................... .. ............. . ........... . . . . . 6 34 6.2-14 TSB5H Tree . ...... ............... ...
6.2 15
. ... ..... ..... .... . . . . . 6 35 T5C5H Tree ..... ........... .... ..
.... .. .. 6 36 6.2 16 T5 DS H Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . ... ................ . .. 6-37 6.2-17 TAB 5H Tree . . . . . . . . . ........ . .... .......................... ........ . 6 38 6.2-18 TDB5 H Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... .... . .... . .............
6.2-19
. . . 6 39 TIA5 H Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ........... . 6-40 6.2-20 TIH P5 Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . ... ... ............................ . 6-41 6.2-21 TIOF5 Tree . . . . . . . . . ........... .......
6.2-22
........ .......... ........... . 6-42 TIOP5 Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... ...... . ....................... . . . 6-43 6.2-23 TLM5H Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ...... .... ................... . . . . . 6-44 6.2-24 TORV5 Tree . . . . . . . . . . ...
6.2-25
........... ............ .... . . . . . . . . 6-4 5 TRPT5 Tree .............. ....
6.3 1 A5 Tree ........... ......... ...
... . . . . .... .... .. .. ....... . 6-46 6.3-2
.. .. . . .. ... ....... .. . . . . . . 6-4 7 AS H Y Tree . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 3
. . .. .. ...... . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 8 J2 5 Tree. .............. .. .................
6.3 4
... . . ... .. . 6-49 Sl-S Tree ... ........... . ........ .....
6.3-5 '
. .... .... . ... ........ . 6-50 S l H-5 Tree . . . . . . . . . ......
6.3-6 S2 5 Tree .................
... . ... ... . ..... . .... . . . 6-51 6.3-7 . 6 52 S2H-5 Tree .. .......... . .
6.3-8 S3-5 Tree ........ .....
.... .... . . . . . . 6 53
\
. .... ... . . .. .. . . .. ... . . . 6 54 .
r l NUREG/CR-6143 tiv Vol. 2, Part I l 4 5
List of Figures (Continued) 6.3 9 S 3 H-5 Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 5 8-4 8.3-1 HPCS System schematic ....................................................... 8-5 8.3 2 HPCS Deperxlency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6 8.3-3 System Actuation Deperxlency Diagram (Page 1 of 2) .................................... 87 8.3-3 System Actuation Dependency Diagram (Page 2 of 2) ................... ................ CRD System Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10 l 8.4-1 8.4-2 C RD Depeixlency Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12 8.5-1 S PMU System Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-14 SPM U Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 15 8.5-2 8- 17 8.6-1 Condensate System Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; 8.62 Condensate Dependency Diagram .... ...... ....................................8-18 Q.7 1 1.PCS System schematic ......................................................820 3.72 LPCS Dependency Diagmm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................................8-21 1.PCI System schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -2 4 8.8-1 3.8 2 LPCI Dependency Diagram ....... ........................................... 8-25 3.9 1 SSW Crosstie System Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-28
. . . 8-29 0.9-2 SSW Crosstie Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ..............
Firewater system schematic . . . . . . .. ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -3 1 1 0.10 1 . 8 33 2.11 1 SPC System schematic ............... ................. ...................
.............. 8-35 8.11-2 S PC Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .
) . . . . . . 8-37 8.12 1 SDC System schematic . . . . . . . . .. . ......... ......... ........ ..... . B-39 SDC Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. .................. 8.12-2 .......842 0.13 1 CS System schematic ..... ....... 0.13 2 CS Dependency Diagram . . . . ........ ............................. . . . . . . . . . . 8 -4 3 CVS System Schematic .. ......... ...... ... ... .....................8-46 3.14-1 ...
.. . 8-47 8.14-2 CVS Dependency Diagram ..... .... ................ .. ............. ,
............................. . . . . 8 48 8.15-1 EPS System Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
... .. .......... .... .......... . . . . 8 51 8.15-2 Diesel Generator Cross Tie Schematic. . . . . . .. 8 52 8.15-3 EPS Dependency Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ............... .. ............
SSW System Schematic (Page 1 of 2) . . . ......... ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -5 4 8.16 1 . . . . 8 55 SSW System Schematic (Page 2 of 2) 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ ....... 8.16 1 . 8-57 8.16 2 SSW Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................ 8.17 1 EVS System Schematic .(Page 1 of 2) . . . . . . . ................................. . . . . 8-59 EVS System Schematic .(Page 2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -60 8.17 1 .B-61 8.17-2 EVS Dependency Diagram .... ......
. . . 8-63 8.18-1 1AS System Schematic . . . . .......................... .. ..... .........
8.18 2 1AS Dependency Diagram ...................................................B-65
.................... . . . . 8-67 8.19 1 SOTS System schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . .... ....... ...
8.19 2 SOTS Dependency Diagram . . . . ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68
......... .................. . . 8 7) -
8.22 1 ADHR System Schematic . . . ................ ADHR Dependency Diagra.n ...................... .......... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 72 , 8.22 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 74 8.23 1 RWCU System Schematic ........... ................ ..........
. . . . 8 75 -
8.23 2 RWCU Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . ............ ....... ...............
............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-77 8.24-1 RRS System Diagram . . . . .. . ...... ... .
. 8-78 -
8.24-2 RRS Dependency Diagram . . . . ...... ..... ... .... ....... .. .............
. 8 80 8.2.51 CCW System Diagram . . . . . . . .. ............... . ........... .............
............... .... .......... . . . . . . . 8-8 2 8.25-2 CCW Dependency Diagram .... ....
.. 8-84 8.26-1 PSW System Schematic (Page 1 of 2) . . . . .
. ....... ....... 8-85 8.26-1 PSW System Schematic (Page 2 of 2) ........ .. ... .......... . 8-86 PSW Dependency Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... .... ... ........ . ...
8.26-2 ...... . . 8-88 8.27 1 CRWST System schematic . . . ....... ...
. 8-90 CRVU3T Dependency Diagram . . .. . .... . ....
8.27 2 xv NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2. Part 1 1
- ------- _ -__ .. __ , w--,- - -
List of Figures (Continued) 8.28-1 ADS A SRV System hwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-91 8.28-2 i ADS & SRV Dependency Diegram . ...............................................B-93 , 11.3.3-1 Overview o( Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 31 ; 11.3.3-2. Results of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 -42 144 Contra nd= to CDF by Initiating Event ............................................ 14-3 14 2 Percent of CDF ve Time Window ................................................ 14-3 14-3 Fractionel Contr#=*= to CDF by IE Group vs Time Window ............................ 14-10 14 4 i Percent of CDF nad Percent of Time in Time Window vs Time Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1410 i 4 l I i i l I L f i r i i i NUREG/CR-6143 xvi l Vol. 2. Part 1 .
.. m,.-_.w. ,- , . - - - - . - - - - - - . - . - , - - - -
LIST of Tables 4.1.1 Initiating Events for POSS . ..................................................... 42 4-4 4.1.2 Updated Initiating Events for All POS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... .. Success Criteria for Plant Operational State (POS) 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 5.1.1 Generic System-Leve Event Trees for Transients, POS 5 0 psig . ........... ............... 6-9 6.1.1 6.1.2 Generic System-Level Trea for Core Cooling, POS 5 0 psig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 12 6.1.3 Special Generic Eveny Trees, POS 5 0 psig ............ ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 12 6.1.4 Tree lnterfaces for POS S,0 psig' ..................... .. ............ ...... . . . 6-13 l 6.1.5 Generic System 4evel Event Trees for Transients, POS 51000 psig . . . . . . . ..................620 6.l.6 Generic Trees for Core Cooling, POS 51000 psig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,....... . . . . 6-20 Tree Interfaces for POS 5,1000 psig ....... ..... ............... .... . . .... 6-21 6.1.7 Plant Damage State Characteristics and Auributes . . . . ...... .. ..................... 7-3 7.1 8.2.1 Systems included in the Grarxl Gulf Study ...... .... .. .. . .................... 82 Shutdown Study Common Ceuse Events ... ... .. ....... 9-4 9.2.1 ... .... . ... Depenaent Failure Event Beta Factors and Probabilities . ......... ...... ...... . . . . 9-5 9.2.2 10.1.1.1 IIEP 1 Calculation ...... ... .... . ... . ... . ... . . ..... ... . . 10-6 10.1.1.2 Sequence Timing arxl Indications ........ ........ ...... ......... . . . . . . . . 10 7 10.1.1.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . .... ... .. .. ..... .... .... . . . . . . . . 10-8 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .... . . ....... . 10-9 10.1.1.4 . .. . . Operator Action Perfo mance Time . .. ......... ..... 10-9 10.1.1.5 . .... . . ... Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .... . . .... ..... . . . 10-10 10.1.1.6 .. ......
. .... 10 10 10.1.1.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .. .. . . .... .. ...
10.1.1.8 Post. Diagnosis Action-Typo identification .. ........... . . .... . . . . 10-11 Post Diagnosis Stress-level Identification . . . . . . . . ..... . .. .. ....... ... 10 11 10.1.1.9 .
... . ... ... .... . . . 10-12 10.1.1.10 Total HEP . . . ......... .... .... . . .
10.1.2.1 IIEP 2 Calculation ... .. . . ... . ... .. ..... . .......... .. 10-13
.... .. .... .... .... 10-14 10.1.2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . ..... ...... ....
10.1.2.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . .. ... . . . .......... .... ..... .. . 10-15 i 10.1.2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . .. .. ... . ... .. . . 10-15
.... ....... 10-16 10.1.2.5 Operator Action Performance Time . ... .... ..... . .. .
10-17 10.1.2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Actim . . . ... ........ .. ... ....... .. 10.1.2.7 Diagnosis Analysis ......... .....................................1017 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 11 RAP ............... . 10-18 , 10.1.2.8 Post-Diagnosis Stress-levelIdentificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP llRAP , . . . . .. ........ 10-18 l 10.1.2.9 Totai llEP . . .. ... . .. ..... .... .. 10-19 10.1.2.10 .... ...... .. . .. . . . 10.1.3.1 IIEP 3 Calculation . ........ ...... . ... . . .. .... . .... . . . . 10-20
... ...... . . .. 10-21 10.1.3.2 Sequence Tuning and Indications . . .... . . .. ... ,
......... 10-21 i 10.1.3.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . .. .... ... ............ . . .
.... .. .... 10-22 '
10.1.3.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ... .. .. .....
. . .. ... ... . 10 22 10.1.3.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . ..... ....... . .
.... ... .... 10-23 10.1.3.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . ......... .... .. .
Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . ......... . .... ...... . . . . . . . 10 23 10.1.3.7 . .. ..
. ... ... . . 10-24 10.1.3.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identificationper Step 10, 81 of ASEP IIRAP ..
Post. Diagnosis Stress. level Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP llRAP . . . . ... ..... . . 10 25 l 10.1.3.9
.. ... . . 10 26 l 10.1.3.10 Totai llEP . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... ......... . . .
IIEP 4 Calculation . . .. ...... ... .... . . .. ... . .. .. 10-27 10.1.4.1 .. ....
.. .. . . .. 10 28 10.1.4.2 Sequence Timing an! Indications . .. . .. . ..
. .. .... . 10 28 10.1.4.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . .. . . ... .
xvii NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2. Part 1
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.4.4 Time Available to Diagnose ard Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 29 10.1.4.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-29 10.1.4.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 30 10.1.4.7 Diagnosis Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-30 10.1.4.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 31 10.1.4.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress.bvel Identyication per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 31 10.1.4.10 Tot al 1I EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 2 10.1.5.1 HEP 5 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 3 i 10.1.5.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-34 ' 10.1.5.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-34 10.1.5.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-35 10.1.5.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 6 10.1.5.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 37 10.1.5.7 Diagnos is Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 7 10.1.5.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 38 10.1.5.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-38 10.1.5.10 Total H E P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 9 10.1.6.1 H EP 6 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...... . . . . 10-40 10.1.6.2 Sequence Timing and indications . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ............. ...... .. . . . 10-41 10.1.6.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . ............ ..... .................... . 10-41 10.1.6.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 2 10.1.6.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-42 10.1.6.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 3 10.1.6.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-43 10.1.6.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-44 10.1.6.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-44 10.1.6.10 Totai llEP . . . . . . . . . . ..................................................10-45 10.1.7.1 HEP 7 Calculation . .....................................................10-46 l 10.1.7.2 Sequence Timing ami Indications . . . . . . . . . . . ..................................10-47 10.1.7.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................ ...... 10-48 10.1.7.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ...... ............ . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 9 10.1.7.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . ................................1050 10.1.7.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-51 10.1.7.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ...............................10-51 10.1.7.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-52 10.1.7.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 52 10.1.7.10 Total HEP . . .........................................................10-53 10.1.8.1 HEP 8 Calculation ......................................................1054 10.1.8.10 Total HEP . . . . ... ...................................................10-55 10.1.9.1 H EP 9 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 6 10.1.9.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
................................1057 10.1.10.1 HEP 10 Calculation . ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5 8 10.1.10.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 59 10.1.10.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................... . . . . . . . . . 10 5 9 10.1.10.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ............... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-60 10.1.10.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-60 10.1.10.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-61 ;
10.1.10.7 Diagnosis Analysis ......................................................10-61 10.1.10.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-62 10.1.10.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress.bvel Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-62 10.1.10.10 Total HEP . . .. ........ ........... .................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-63 10.1.11.1 HEP 11 Calculation .
.............................................10-64 10.1.11.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-65 NUREG/CR 6143 xviii Vol. 2, Part 1
( 1 l
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.11.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. . 10-65 10.1.11.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . .............. ...... ... . .. 10-66 10.1.11.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . . . . . . . . . 10-67 10.1.11.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... .... . . . 10-68 10.1.11.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... . . . 10-68 10.1.11.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . .... . . . 10-69 10.1.11.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . .. ..... .. 10-69 10.1.11.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............................. . ..... 10-70 10.1.12.1 HEP 12 Calculation ....... ........ ............... ........ .. . . . . 10-71 10.1.12.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . .... ................. .... .... . . . . 10-72 10.1.12.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ........ . . . 10-72 i 10.1.12.4 Time Available to Diagnose ard Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . .. .............. .... 10-73 10.1.12.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-73 10.1.12.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .. ..... 10-74 10.1.12.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .... ... . 10-74 10.1.12.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Sicp 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. .. . . . . . 10-75 10.1.12.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress.LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ...... . . . 10-75 Totai ll EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . .. .. .. .. . . 10 76 i 10.1.12.10 . . HEP 13 Calculation ....... . .......... ....... ........ .... . ... ... 10 77 10.1.13.1 Sequence Timing and Irxlications ............ .. .... .. 10-78 10.1.13.2 ...... . . . Potential Operator Action . . . . . . ......... . ....... . .... . .. 10 78 10.1.13.3 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . .. .. . .. . ... 10 79 10.1.13.4 . .. Operator Action Performance Time . . .. . 10-80 10.1.13.5 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . .. .. .. 10 81 10.1.13.6 . ......... ... . . 10.1.13.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . ... . . . ... . . ....... . ... 10-81 Post. Diagnosis Action Type klentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . .. 10 82 10.1.13.8 10.1.13.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , . . . . . .. . 10-82 Total HEP . . . . .......... ....... ........... . .... . . ... . 10 83 10.1.13.10 10.1.14.1 HEP 14 Calculation .... .......... .. .. .. ...... ... ... . .. . . . 10-84 10.1.14.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. . .... . 10-85 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . .. ... . 10-85 10.1.14.3 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . ....... . .. ... .. . 10-86 10.1.14.4 . Operator Action Performance Time .. ..... . . .. .... . ... 10-87 10.1.14.5 .. . Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . .. . ...... .. .. . .. .. 10 88 10.1.14.6 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . ....................... . .. ... . .. 10-88 10.1.14.7 . Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ..... 10-89 10.1.14.8 . . 10.1.14.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress. level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. ..... . 10 89 , 10.1.14.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . ...... ... . .... .... .... .... ........ .... . 10-90 ' 10-91 10.1.15.1 HEP 15 Calculation . .... ..... ................... ... . . ... ..
... ... . ..... . .. 10-92 10.1.15.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . ........ ... .
10.1.15.3 Potential Operator Action . .. . ....... ...... ....... .. . . .. .. . . . 10-93 ; Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ... ... ....... ........ . . . 10-94 10.1.15.4 10.1.15.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time . . . . . ....... ... .... ... ...... . . . . . . 10-95 . 10-96 10.1.15 6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ....... .... ... . .. . .. . 10-96 10.1.15.7 Diagnosis Analyris . . . . . . .... ... .......... . ....... .. .. . . Post.Diaposis Action Type Identi5 cation per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , ..... . 10-97 10.1.15.8 Post. Diagnosis Stress-levelidentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , ... ... . . 10-97 10.1.15.9 10.1.15.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . .. ............ . .... .... . . . . ... . 10 98
.. .. 10-99 10.1.16.1 HEP 16 Calculation .. ............ ... ..... . ... .. .
10 100 10.1.16.2 Sequence Timing aralIndications . . ...... ..... .... . . . Potential Operator Action . . . .. .. . .. . 10-100 10.1.16.3 ..... . .. . .. 10.1.16.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ... ... . ... . 10-101 10-101 10.1.16.5 Operator Action Performance Time . .. ..... . . .. . .. . Vol. 2, Part 1 xix NUREG/CR-6143 l I
List of Tables (Continued) 10-102 10.1.16.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . .. . .. 10 102 10.1.16.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . ............................ .. . .. . Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .. 10 103 10.1.16.8 . Post-Diagnosis Stress.Levelidentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP IIRAP ... . . . . 10-103 10.1.16.9 10 104 10.1.16.10 Totai llEP . . . . . . . . . ................... .... ... ..... ... . . IIEP l7 Cs,1culation .. . .. ............. ............. ...... ... . . . . 10-105 10.1.17.1 10-106 10.1.17.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ... .... . 10-106 10.1.17.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . . . . Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ........ ....... . ... .. 10-107 10.1.17.4 Operator Action Pedormance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .. 10 108 10.1.17.5 10.1.17.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . .. 10 109 10-109 10.1.17.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .. .................... ........... . . . . . . Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP ....... 10 110 10.1.17.8 Post-Diagnosis Stress-levelIdentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP liRAP , . . . . 10-110 10.1. l~.? Total HEP . . . . . . .. . . .......... ...................... .... . 10-111 10.1.17.10 . HEP 18 Calculation . . . . ............... .......... .. . . . ... .. . 10 112 10.1.18.1 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . ... . ... . 10-113 10.1.18.2 Potential Cperator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . .. .. 10.! )3 10.1.18.3 . Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . ..... . . . . 10-114 10.1.18.4 10-114 10.1.18.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ... . . .. Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . ... . .. . ..... .. . .. . . 10-115 10.1.18.6 10-115 10.1.18.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .... . . .. . ... . Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 10-116 10.1.18.8 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP llRAP 10 116 10.1.18.9 . 10-117 10.1.18 10 Total HEP . . . . . . . ............... .. . .... . . . 10-118 10.1.19.1 HEP 19 Calculation . . .......... . ...... . ... . 10-118 10.1.19.2 Sequence Timing ami indications .......... .... .. .. 10-119 10.1.19.3 Potential Operator Action . ..... .. . .. . ... .. .. . . Time Available to Diagnose wi Pedorm the Task . . . . . .. . 10-119 10.1.19.4 . . . 10-120 10.1.19.5 Operator Action Performance Time .... . ...... .. ... . . 10-121 10.1.19.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . ... . . ..... .. . , 10-121 10.1.19.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . ........... ... ............. . . . Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP .. 10 122 10.1.19.8 . Port-Diagnosis Stress-levelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 10-122 10.1.19.9 . . 10-123 10.1.19.10 Total HEP . . . . . .. . . ....... ... .. . ... .. 10 124 10.1.20.1 HEP 20 Calculation ................... .. ... .. 10 125 10.1.20.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .. .... .. ... . . .. . 10 126 10.1.23.1 IIEP 23 Calculation . . . .... ... . ... . .. . . . . . . . . . 10-127 10.1.23.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . . .. .......... .. ....... . .. .. .. 10-128 10.1.25.1 HEP 25 Calculation . . .. .. ..... . .... .. ..... ..... 10-129 10.1.25.2 Sequence Timing aml Indications . . .... ........ . . . . . Potential Opemtor Action . . . .... . .. 10-129 10.1.25.3 . ... .. ............ .. . Time Available to Diagnose anl Perform tbo Task . . . . . . . .... . .. . 10-130 10.1.25.4 10-130 10.1.25.5 Operator Action Performance Time . .. ............ ..... .. ... . 10-131 10.1.25.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . ... .. . .... ... .. . .
.......... 10-131 10.1.25.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . ... ...... .. .... . .
Post-Diagnosis Action Typn Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . 10-132 10.1.25.8 Post-Diagno.is Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. 10-132 10.1.25.9 10.1.25.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . .... . ...... .. . .. .. . . . . 10-133 10-134 10.1.26.1 HEP 26 Calculation . . . .. ... . . ........ .... .. . . 10 135 10.1.26.2 Sequence Timing and lnlications . . . .... .. ................ . .. . .. Potential Operator Action . . . . . . ... 10-135 10.1.26.3 .... . . . .. . Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task 10-136 10.1.26.4 . . ... . xx Vol. 2, part ! NUREG/CR-6143
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.20.3 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-136 10.1.26.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 137 10.1.26.7 Dia gnosis Analy s is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 10-137 10.1.26.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-138 10.1.26.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . ... .. 10-138 10.1.26.10 TotalHEP........................................................ .. . 10-139 10.1.27.1 HEP 27 Calculation .................................................. .. 10-140 10.1.27.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . .........................................10-141 10.1.27.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10- 141 10.1.27.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-142 10.1.27.5 Operator Action Performance Tima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-142 10.1.27.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14 3 10.1.27.7 Dia gnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-143 10.1.27.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-144 10.1.27.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . ....... ... 10-144 10.1.27.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... ... 10-145 ' 10.1.28.1 HEP 28 Calculation ............................ ........ ...... . .. ... 10 146 10.1.28.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . .......... . ..... . .. ..... . 10-147 10.1.28.3 Potential Operator Action . . ..........................................10147 10.1.28.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . ............ .... ... 10-148 10.1.28.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . ............ . . ......... ... . 10 143 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . 10- 14 9 10.1.28.6 ...... .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ...... .... . . . . . 10- 14 9 10.1.28.7 10.1.28.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification . ................ ..... ........... . 10-150 Post-Diagnosis Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 10-150 10.1.28.9 .. .. . . 10.1.28.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ................ .. ... . . 10-151 10.1.29.1 HEP 29 Calculation ............................ ......... ... .. .. .... 10-152 10.1.29.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .......... . ............ .. .. . . .. . . 10-153 10.1.29.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ........... .... .. . 10-154 10.1.29.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . ..... ..... .. ....... .. . 10 155 10.1.29.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . ...... . .............. ...... . . ..... 10-155 10.1.29.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ..... .... .. 10-156 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . .................. ..... ... . .... .... 10-156 10.1.29.7 10.1.29.8 Post-Diagnosis Action-Type Identification . ................. .... .. . .. . . . . . 10-157 10.1.29.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-bvelIdentification . ...... .............. .. ..... . . . 10-157 10.1.29.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . . . . . . . 10-158 10.1.30.1 HEP 30 Calculation .......................... ........... .... . . . . . . . . 10-15 9 10.1.30.2 Sequence Timing and Irxlications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .......... .. . 10-160 10.1.30.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ..... . ...... .. 10-160 10.1.30.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . ........... .............. . 10-161 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . ................... ...... . .... 10-161 10.1.30.5 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . ............. 10-162 10.1.30.6 10.1.30.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. .. . . . . . 10-162 10.1.30.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification . . . ............. .... ... .. ......... 10-163 10.1.30.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress.bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-163 10.1.30.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ......... ............ . . . . . . 10 164 10.1.31.1 HEP 31 Calcula* ion .............. ............. ...... ........... .. 10-165 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. ......... . 10-166 10.1.31.2 .. 10.1.31.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .... ...... . ...... .. . 10-166 10.i.31.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . .... .... .. ..... .... ... 10-167 4 10.1.31.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 167 10.1.31.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . ........ ......... ...... ...... . 10-168
. 10-168 10.1.31.7 Diagnosis Arlalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vol. 2, Part I ui NUREG/CR-6143
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.31.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type IdentiScation per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 169 10.1.31.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, S.1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 169 10.1.31.10 TotalHEP............................................................ 10-170 10.1.33.1 HEP 33 Calcuhtion .......................................... .. ...... 10-171 10.1.33.10 TotalHEP........................................................... . 10-172 10.1.34.1 HEP 34 Calculation ................................................. .. . 10-173 10.1.34.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10- 17 4 10.1.35.1 HEP 35 Calculation ............................................ . . . . . . . . 10- 175 10.1.35.2 Sequence Timing and indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ... . 10 176 10.1.35.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... 10-176 10.1.35.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 177 10.1.35.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-177 10.1.35.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-178 10.1.35.7 Diagnosis Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 178 10.1.35.8 Post-D'agnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 10-179 10.1.35.9 Post Diagnosis Stress.l.evel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . ........ .. 10 179 10.1.35.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ............. . 10-180 10.1.37.1 HEP 37 Calculation ....... ...................................... . ... 10-181 10.1.37.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . ........... .... ......... . . 10-182 10.1.:t7.3 Potential Operator Action . ... ...... ...... ................. . . ..... . 10-182 10.1.37.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . ...... . ... .... .... . 10-183 10.1.37.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ .. ..... ... . 10-184 10.1.37.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 10-185 10.1.37.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ .. . . ... . ... 10-185 10.1.37.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ..... .. . . .. 10-186 10.1.37.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. .... . . 10-186 10.1.37.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . ................................ . .... ... . . . 10-187 10.1.38.1 HEP 38 Calculation ...................... ........... ... ..... .. ... 10-188 10.1.38.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . ....................................10-199 10.1.3F.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . ... ........ ......... . 10-190 10.1.38.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ............. ... . . . 10-191 10.1.38.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . . . 10-192 10.1.38.6 Diagno:is Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ...... 10-193 10.1.38.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................ ......... 10-193 10.1.38.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . .... . 10-194 10.1.38.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. . .. .. 10-194 10.1.38.10 Total HEP .................................................. ........ 10-195 10.1.39.1 HEP 39 Calculation .............. ........................ .. .... . . 10-196 10.1.39.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-197 10.1.39.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . .............................. .... .. . . 10-197 10.1.39.4 Time .Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ......... ..... . .. . .. . 10-198 i
10.1.39.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ............ . 1
.. 10 198 10.1.39.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .......... ...... .... . 10 199 10.1.39.7 Diagnosis Analysis . ............ ......... .... ..... ..... . . . . . 10-199 10.1.39.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .... . . 10-200 10.1.39.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP , . ......... .. 10-200 10.1.39.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... .... . ... . . 10 201 10.1.40.1 HEP 40 Calculation . .......................... .. ...... ...... . . 10-202 10.1.40.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . ....... .... ...... .... . .. .. 10-203 10.1.40.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. ... . ...... . 10-203 10.1.40.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . .. ... ...... .. . . 10-204 10.1.40.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . ... .. ......... . ... . ..... . 10-205 10.1.40.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . ... ... . .... . . .. ... . 10-206 NUREG/CR-6143 xxii Vol. 2, Part 1 1
1 l
1 List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.40.7 Diagno.is Analysis .....................................................10-206 10.1.40.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-207 10.1.40.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-207 10.1.40.10 Tota 1 H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-208 10.1.41.1 HEP 41 Calculation .............................................. . . . . . . 10-209 10.1.41.10 Tota 1 H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 210 10.1.42.1 HEP 42 Calculation .................................................. ... 10-211 10.1.42.2 Sequence Timing and Indications ............................................10-212 10.1.42.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-212 10.1.42.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 213 i 10.1.42.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-213 , 10.1.42.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-214 [ 10.1.42.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-214 l 10.1.42.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-215 1 10.1.42.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-215 i 10.1.42.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 216 10.1.46.1 HEP 46 Calculation .....................................................10-217 l" 10.1.46.2 Sequence Timing arxi ladications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-218 I 10.1.46.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-219 10.1.46.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-220 10.1.46.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-221 ' 10.1.46.6 D%nosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-222 10.1.46.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 22 2 l 10.1.46.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identificuion per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-223 . 10.1.46.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-223 l 10.1.46.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 2 4 l H EP 4 7 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-225 j 10.1.47.1 10.1.47.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-226 10.1.47.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-226 l 10.1.47.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-227 , 10.1.47.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-228 ; 10.1.47.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-229 ! 10.1.47.7 D iagnos is Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-229 l 10.1.47.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-230 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 10 230 i 10.1.47.9 10.1.47.10 Total H EP . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 31 i j 10.1.48.1 HEP 48 Calculation .....................................................10232 10.1.48.2 Sequence Timing and Indications ....................-........................10-233 3 10.1.48.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-233 10.1.48.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform tie Task . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . . 10-234 10.1.48.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-234 j 10.1.48.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 10-235 i 10.1.48.7 D iagnos is Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-235 10.1.48.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-236 i 10.1.48.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 10-236 10.1.48.10 Tota 1 H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23 7 10.1.49.1 IIEP 49 Calculation ....... 3............................................ . 10-238 i 10.1.49.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................................10-239 10.1.50.1 HEP 50 Calculation ...................................................... 10-240 ; 10.1.50.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-241 10.1.50.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-241 , 10.1.50.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-242 ; i 10.1.50.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 4 2 Vol. 2, Part 1 xF.i NUREG/CR-6143 1
List of Tables (Continued) ; 10.1.50.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... ....... .... . 10-243 10.1.50.7 D ia gnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24 3 ; 10.1.50.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP 21 RAP . . . . . . . ... ... 10-244 10.1.50.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress 4. eve Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . ... ..... .. 10 244 10.1.50.10 Total HEP . . . . . . ........... ...... .... .. ............... .... ..... 10-245 I 10.1.51.1 HEP 51 Calculation ......... .. .......... ..... .. . ...... ..... .. 10 246 10.! 51.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . ................. . ..... .. ... 10-247 10.1.51.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .... . . 10-247 10.1.51.4 Time Available to Diagrme and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . ... 10 248 10.1.51.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . ........................ .... .. .. ... 10 249 10.1.51.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . ................... . . .. ..... . 10-250 10.1.51.7 Dia gnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .. ... 10 250 10.1.51.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . ..... . 10-251 , 10.1.51.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .... . . 10 251 10.1.51.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . ..... . .. . ............ ..... . ...... . . 10 252 10.1.52.1 HEP 52 Calculation .......... .. .. ..... . .. ...... . .. ... .. ... 10 253 10.1.52.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .,.. . ....... ... .. .. ... ... . .. 10-254 10.1.52.3 Potential Operator Action . . .. . .... . .. . .. ......... ... . . . 10-254 10.1.52.4 Time Available to D;agnose and Perform the Task . . .. . . .. ... .. .. . 10-255 10.1.52.5 Operator Action Performance Time .. . ...... ... .... .. ... . .. 10-255 ! 10.1.52.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ...... . . .. .... .. .. .. . . 10-256 ; 10.1.52.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . ....... .. .. . .... ... .. .. . 10-256 ; 10.1.52.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. . ... . . 10 257 10.1.52.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP llRAP . . .... 10-257 I 10.1.52.10 Total HEP . . . . ... ...... ... ... .. . .......... . . . 10-258 ! 10.1.54.1 HEP 54 Calculation ...... . ........ ... ... . . . . ..... . . 10-259 - 10.I,54.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .. . .. ..... .. .. ... .... . ... . 10 260 10.1.54.3 Potential Op'erator Action . . . .. .. . ... . . ..... . . . . ... . . . 10 260 10.1.54.4 Time Available to Diagnose mal Perform the Task . . . ... .. . . .. .. . . . . 10-261 ; 10.1.54.5 Operator Action Performance Time .. .... .... ...... . .. ... . 10-261 10.1.54.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 62 l 10.1.54.7 Diagnosis Analysis ......................... ... .... .. . ....... . . 10 262 ; 10!.54.S Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . .. .... . 10-263 10.1.54.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP l
... . .. . 10 263 e 10.1.54.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . .. .... . ..... ....... ......... . . 10-264 10.1.56.1 HEP 56 Calculation . .. . ... ... . .... . .. .. ... . . . ... . . . 10-265 I 10.1.56.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . ...... . .. . .... .. ... ... . ... . 10 266 10.1.55.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . ................ ... .. ... . ..... 10-266 10.1.56.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . ........... . . . ..... . 10-267 l 10.1.56.5 Operator Ac* ion Performance Time . . . . ............ ...... .. .... .. ..... 10-267 10.1.56.6 Diagnosm Time for Opercor Action . . . . . . .. . ........ . . .. . . . . 10-268 !
10.1.56.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . ........... ..... ... ....... 10-268 10.1.56.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . .. ... . .. . 10 269 ! l 10.1.56.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress 4.evel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ,. . ..... . 10-269 10.1.56.10 Total HEP . . . . ..... .. . .. . .. . .... ........... . .. . 10-270 10.1.57.1 HEP 57 Calculation ..... ...... . . . . ... .... . ... . .. 10-271 1 10.1.57.2 Sequence Timing and Indications ... . ...... ... ... . . . .. 10-272 10.1.57.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . .. ... ... .... . .... . .. . 10-272 10.1.57.4 l Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . .. . . . 10 273 10.1.57.5 Operator Action Performance Time . ... .. . ... . , . .. . . 10-273 l 10.1.57.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . ............... . . . .. .... . 10-274 10.1.57.7 Diagnosia Analysis . . . . .. !
. . ... .. .. . .. ... . . .. 10-274 10.1.57.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10,8-1 of ASEP HRAP 10-275 NUREG/CR-6143 xxiv Vol. 2. Part I !
l l
LIST cf Tables (Continued) 10.1.57.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-L.evel Identification per Step 10,6-1 of ASEP llRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-275 10.1.57.10 Total lI EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-276 10.1.58.1 IIEP 58 Calculation .................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 77 1 10.1.58.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-278 ' 10.1.58.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 78 ! 10.1.58.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-279 I 10.1.58.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-270 i 10.1.58.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ . . . . . . . 10-280 10.1.58.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-280 10.1.58.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP IIRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !0-281 10.1.58.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 11 RAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 281 10.1.58.10 Total lIEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............................................10282 10.1.59.1 liEP 59 Calculation .....................................................10283 ) 10.1.59.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 10-284 10.1.59.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .... . . 10-284 10.1.59.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2 8 5 l 10.1.59.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ....... ... 10 286 10.1.59.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 87 10.1.59.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ......................... . . . . . . . . . 10-287 10.1.59.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP llRAP . .... . .. . . 10-288 l 10.1.59.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress.I.evel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP llRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8 8 ; 10.1.59.10 Totai llEP . . . . .. ........ ... ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 89 10.1.60,1 IIEP 60 Calculation ............ ............ . . .. . ..... . . . . . . . . 10 290 10.1.60.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . ........... ..... . ... ...... . . . 10-291 10.1.60.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. . ...... . . ... . 10 291 10.1.60.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Peiform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 10-292 10.1.60.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . .. ... . . . . .. ....... . . .. . . . 10-293 10.1.60.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ......... ......... ... . .... . . ..... . 10-294 10.140.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . ..F........................... ................ 10-294 , 10.1.60.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP liRAP ............. . . 10-295 10.1.60.9 Post-Diagnos;s Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 11 RAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-295 10.1.60.10 Total liEP . . . . . ........ ........... .. .. . .... . . . . . 10-296 10.1.61.1 IIEP 61 Calculation ............... ......... .. ..... . .... . . . . . . . . . . 10-297 10.1.61.2 Sequence Timing and Ialications . . ... .... ...... ........ ..... ...... ... 10-298 { 10.1.61.3 Potentiat Operator Action . . . . . . . . ............ ......... ... ... . . .. . . 10-298 10.1.61.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... ...... .. 10-299 , 10.1.61.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . ........... . .. . ...... ..... 10 299 10.1.61.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . ... ... ... .... ...... .. ... . .. . . 10-300 ' 10.1.61.7, Diagnosis Analysis . ... ........ ..... ...... ... . . . .. . ..... ... 10-300 ; 10.1.61.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-1.evelidentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 11 RAP . .... . . . . . . . . 10-301 10.1.61.10 Totai llEP . . . ......... .. ........... ...... .. ....... ..... . . 10-302 10.1.63.1 IIEP 63 Calculation . ........ . ..... .. ... .. . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . 10 303 10.1.63.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . ..... ... . . . .......... ........ . . . 10-304 i 13.1.63.3 Potential Operator Action . .. ... ........... . ... . .... . . . . . . . . . 10-304 c 10.1.63.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ... .... ........ ...... . . . . . . " 0-305 , 10.143.5 Operator Action Performance Time ................ ............. .. . . . . . . 10-306 10.1.63.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . .... .. . .. ... . . .. .. . . ... . . . 10-307 ; , 10.1.63.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. .. . . .. 10-307 ; 10.1.63.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP llRAP . . . . . . . . . . . 10-308 10.1.63.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10. 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . .. . . .... . 10-308 l 10.1.63.10 Totai ll EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ...... ... .... . . . . . .. .. 10 309 l 10.1.64.1 liEP 64 Cale.ilation .. ..... . .... .... . .. . . . . . . .. . 10-310 10.1.64.2 Sequence Timing and Irxlica* ions .... .. . . . .. . . . . ... 10 311 e Vol. 2. Part 1 xxv NUREG/CR-6143
-ie - -s .-w..we w.m_____
1 l l List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.64.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ..................... 10-311 10.1.64.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 10-312 10.1.64.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-312 10.1.64.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. . .. ... ..... 10-313 10.1.64.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 10-313 10.1.64.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . ...... ........ 10-314 10.1.64.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress.bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ....... ... .. 10-314 10.1.64.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-315 10 1.65.1 HEP 65 Calculation ............... .... ................................. 10-316 10.1.65.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-317 10.1.66.1 HEP 66 Calculation ....................... ................. .. ......... 10 318 10.1.66.2 Sequerce Thaing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 10-319 10.1.66.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . ..... ... .... .... . . . .... .... ... 10 319 10.1.66.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ...... 10-320 10.1.66.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . ..... 10-320 10.1.66.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... . . .... .. 10 321 10.1.66.7 Dia gnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ..... .. .......... 10-321 10.1.66.8 Post-Disgnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . 10 322 10.1.66.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . ... ..... . . 10-322 10.1.66.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .. ... 10-323 10.1.66.1 HEP 66 Calculation .................... . .......... ... . ... .. . . 10-324 10.1.66.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .... .. 10-325 10.1.66.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ... . . . ....... 10 325 10.1.66.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Tr.sk . . . . . . . . . . ...... . .... . . . . 10-326 10.1.66.5 Operator Action Performance Time ... .... ..... ....... . .... ... . ... 10-326 10.1.66.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . ...... ............ . .... ... .... . . 10-327 10.1.66.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . ....... .. ... ....... .. . . .... . . 10-327 10.1.66.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . ............. 10-328 10.1.66.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . 10-328 10.1.66.10 Tc.alHEP............ ............ . . ... ... ..... . . ............ 10-329 10.1.67.1 HEP 67 Calculation ..... ............... ..... ... .... . . ... . ..... 10-330 10.1.67.10 Total HEP . . . ........................ . .. ......... . . .. .... 10 331 10.1.68.1 HEP 68 Calculation ............................ ...... ... ............. 10-332 10.1.68.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . ....................... .......... . . 10-333 10.1.68.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ... ... ..... ...... 10-333 10.1.68.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ... ... .. ... . .... . ........ 10-334 10.1.68.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . ....... ...... ... . . .... ... .. 10-334 10.1.63.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . .. ...... . . .. ..... ... . 10 335 10.1.68.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... . . . ..... 10-335 10.1.68.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , . . . . ... .. .. 10-336 10.1.68.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-bvelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . ..... 10-336 10.1.68.10 Total HEP . . . . . ....... ............. .......... ... ... ...... . 10-337 10.1.69.1 HEP 69 Calculation ............................... .... . ..... . .. 10 338 10.1.69.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ... ..... . .. .. .. 10 339 10.1.69.3 Potential operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... ....... ... 10-339 10.1.69.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . ... .... ..... ... 10-340 10.1.69.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . ....... ..... . ..... . .... . . 10-340 10.1.69.6 Diagncsis Time for Operator Action . . . . .... . .. ..... ... . ... .... . 10-341 10.1.69.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... . .. . 10-341 10.1.69.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. .. . ..... 10-342 10.1.69.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-bvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . ..... 10-342 10.1.69.10 Total HEP . . . . .......... ... ............. .. . . ... . 10-343 10.1.70.1 HEP 70 Calculation .. .... ... .... .. . . . . .. 10-344 NUREG/CR-6143 xxvi Vol. 2. Part 1
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.70.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... 10-345 10.1.70.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 10-345 10.1.70.4 Time Available to Disgnose armi Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-346 10.1.70.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 10-346 10.1.70.6 Diagnosia Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 347 10.1.70.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .......... .. ... .. 10-347 10.1.70.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-348 10.1.70.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-348 , 10.1.70.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. 10-349 l 10.1.71.1 HEP 71 Calculation ............ .............................. .... ... 10-350 l 10.1.71.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 10-351 10.1.73.1 IIEP 73 Calculation ............................. ...... ................ 10-352 10.1.73.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 5 3 10.1.74.1 HEP 74 Calculation .................................... ............... 10-354 10.1.74.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. . 10-355 10.1.74.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . .......................................10-355 10.1.74.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ..... .. ,. ... .. . ..... . 10-356 10.1.74.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . .............. . ..... .... . 10-356 10.1.74.6 Diagnosis Time for Oper ator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 10-357 10.1.74.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . .................... .... .. .. ....... . 10-357 10.1.74.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. ......... . 10 358 10.1.74.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . ... .. . 10-358 , 10.1.74.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ... .. .. ... 10 359 10.1.75.1 HEP 75 Calculation ............................... ... .................. 10-360 10.1.75.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ..... . . .. . .... 10-361 10.1.75.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ... . ... .... .... . . 10-361 10.1.75.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . .... .. ... .. . ..... . 10-362 10.1.75.5 Operator Action Performance Time ..... ....... ..... .. ...... .... ... .. 10-362 10.1.75.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... ... 10-363 10.1.75.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ... . . . 10-363 10.1.75.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . ............ 10-364 10.1.75.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .... .. .. 10-364 10.1.75.10 Tot al H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 10-365 10.1.76.1 HEP 76 Calculation ............................... .. . ........... 10-366 10.1.76.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . ...... ... ............. ....... ... .. 10-367 10.1.76.3 Potential Operator Action . . ................. ....... .. .. . . .. . .. 10-367 10.1.76.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . ... ....... .. . .... ....... . 10-368 10.1.76.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ........ .. 10-368 10.1.76.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. ... 10 369 10.1.76.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... .. ... .. ...... . 10-369 10.1.76.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . .. . .... .. 10-370 10.1.76.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . .. .. . 10-370 10.1.76.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .... ..... .... . 10-371 10.1.77.1 HEP 77 Calculation ............................ ... . . . ... . .. 10-372 10.1.77.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-373 10.1.77.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......
.......... ... . .. . . . 10-373 10.1.77.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . .......... .. .. .... . 10-374 10.1.77.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time . . . ... .............. ..... ... .. ... . 10-374 10.1.77.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .. ..... .......... ... 10-375 10.1.77.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . ..... . 10-375 10.1.77.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . ..... . 10-376 ,
10.1.77.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identifice' ion per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. . ... ... . 10 376 10.1.77.10 Total HEP . . ... ........... . . .. .. ...... .. .. .. . 10-377 Vol. 2, Part 1 xxvii NUREG/CR-6143
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.78.1 liEP 78 Calculation ........,................ ............. . ............. 10-378 10.1.78.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . ...................................... 10-379 10.1.78.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-379 10.1.78.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... 10 380 10.1.78.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. ......... . 10-380 10.1.78.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .. ............ 10-381 10.1.78.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 10 381 10.1.78.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-382 10.1.78.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .. ........... 10-382 10.1.78.10 Totai llEP . . . ........................... .. ..... .... .. ..... ... 10-383 10.1.79.1 HEP 79 Calculation ................ ............... ......... ....... . 10-384 10.1.79.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 10-385 10.1.79.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 10-385 10.1.79.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ . 10 386 10.1.79.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . ...... ...................... ........... 10 386 10.1.79.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . ....... ........................... 10-387 10.1.79.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ...... ..... .. .. . . 10-387 10.1.79.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . ....... .. .. . 10-388 10.1.79.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . ... .. . . 10 388 10.1.79.10 Total HEP . . . . ........ ................... ........ ... ..... . . 10 389 10.1.80.1 HEP 80 Calculation ............. .... .... ....... ..... . . ........ 10-390 10.1.80.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . .... . .. ...... ... .... .. . 10-391 10.1.80.3 Potential Operator Action . . . .......... .................. ............... 10-391 10.1.80.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ..... ....... 10-392 10.1.80.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ..... ........... 10 393 10.1.80.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . ... ....... ... .. ...... ......... 10 394 10.1.80.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ............. ..... ...... 10-394 10.1.80.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . ............. 10 395 10.1.80.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP ................ 10-395 i 10.1.80.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . ................ .................... ... ....... 10-396 ! 10.1.81.1 HEP 81 Calculation ...... . ........ ...... ........... .......... . 10-397 , 10.1.81.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ...................... 10-398 l 10.1.82.1 HEP S2 Calculation ........... ............. .......... .. . ........... 10-399 10.1.82.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ ........ ..... 10-400 10.1.83.1 HEP 83 Calculation . ....................................... ............ 10-401 10.1.83.2 Sequence Timing and Indications ............................... ............. 10-402 10.1.83.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . ...... ......................... . . ..... 10-402 10.1.8'.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ................. ............... 10-403 10.1.83.5 Operator Action Performance Time . ... . ................ ........ .......... 10-403 10.1.83.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ... ...................................... 10-404 10.1.83.7 Diagnosis Analysis ............. .......................... . ..... ..... 10-404 10.1.83.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ... ... ........ 10-405 10.1.83.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identilbation per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . ....... 10-405 10.1.83.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...... ............... ....... 10-406 10.1.85.1 HEP 85 Calculation ... ...............................................10-407 10.1.85.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ........ .......... . 10-408 10.1.86.1 HEP 86 Calculation ........................................ . ........... 10-409 10.1.86.2 Sequence Timmg and indications ............ .... .......................... 10-410 10.1.86.3 Potential Operator action . . . .. ........... ............... ................ 10-410 10.1.86.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ........... .... . ...... .. . 10-411 10.1.86.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . ..... ...... . ....... .............. 10-411 10.1.86.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . .... ... ..... ..... ........ 10-412 10.1.86.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .... .. . .. . .. 10-412 NUREG/CR-6143 xxviii Vol. 2, Part 1
LIST of Tables (Continued) 10.1.86.8 Poet. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 413 10.1.86.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level klectification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-413 10.1.86.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i d-414 10.1.87.1 HEP 87 Calculation .....................................................10-415 10.1.87.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-416 10.1.87.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-416 10.1.87.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 417 , 10.1.87.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-417
- 10.1.87.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-418 l 101.87.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-418 l 10.1.87.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-419 !
10.1.87.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10419 l 10.1.87.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 20 , 10.1.88.1 li EP 8 8 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-421 10.1.88.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-422 , 10.1 88.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-42 2 10.1.88.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-423 , 10.1.88.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 423 l 10.1.88.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-424 l 10.1.88.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . .........................................10424 , 10.1.68.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-425 - ! 10.1.88.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-425 10.1.88.10 To tal H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 2 6 ; 10.1.89.1 HEP 89 Calculation .....................................................10-427 : 10.1.89.10 Tota 1 H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 2 8 !' 10.1.90.1 HEP 90 Calculation .....................................................10-429 10.1.90.2 Sequence Timing and Indiccions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-430 l 10.1.90.3 Potential Operator A: tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 30 - 10.1.97.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-431 . 10.1.90.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-431 : 10.1.90.6 Diagneais Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-432 ! 10.1.90.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 32 l 10.1.90.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-433 l 10.1.00.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-433 i 10.1.90.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 34 10.1.94.1 HEP 94 Calculation .....................................................10-435 10.1.94.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4 3 6 10.1.95.1 HEP 95 Calculation ....................................................10-437 10.1.95.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-438 j 10.1.95.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-438 7 , 10.1.95.4 Time Available to Diagnow and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-439 l J 10.1.95.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-439 10.1.95.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-440 i 10.1.95.7 D iagnosis Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 440 10.1.95.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-441 10.1.95.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-441 10.1.95.10 TotalHEP....................................................... . . . . 10-442 10.1.96.1 HEP 96 Calculation ........................................... .... . . . . 10-443 l 10.1.96.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .................................... . . . . . . 10-444 l 10.1.96 3 Potential operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-444 l 10.1.96 4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-445 10.1.96.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-445 10.1.96 6 Diagnosis T'me for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-446 i J l Vol. 2 Part I uix NUREG/CR-6143 ! i
I ist cf Tables (Continued) 10.1.96 7 D ia gn:)s is Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 10446 l 10.1.96.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-447 10.1.96.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress l.evel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10447 10.1.96.10 Tetal H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-44 8 10.1.99.1 HEP 99 Calculation ................................................ . . . . 10-449 10.1.99.10 Tota! HEP...................................................... ..... 10 450 10.1.100.1 H EP 100 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 451 10.1.100.10 Total H E P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 5 2 10.1.101.1 HEP 101 Calculation . . . . . . . . . ............................... . . . . . . . . . . . 10-453 ; 10.1.101.10 Totai ll EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................... ........... . 10-454 10.1.102.1 HEP 102 Calculation . . . . . . ......................................... ... 10-455 10.1.102.2 Sequence Timing ard indications . ....................... .. .............. . 10-456 10.1.102.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 10-456 10.1.102.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-457 10.1.102.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-457 10.1.102.6 Diagnosis Time for operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... . . . . 10-458 10.1.102.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................ . 10 458 10.1.102.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 5 9 10.1.102.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-1.evel Llentification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-459 10.1.102.10 Total HEP . . . . ............ . .. .. ..... .... ............ ... .. 10-460 10.1.103.1 H EP 103 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . ... ......... .. 10-461 10.1.103.2 Sequence Timing and indications . . . . . . . . . . .. ......... .... . .. .... ... 10462 10.1.103.3 Patential Operator Action . . . . . . . . .. .. ................... .... .. . . . . . 10-462 10.1.103.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . ................ .. . . . . . . . . . 10-463 10.1.103.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . ...... . ..... ..... ..... . . . . . . . . 10-463 10.1.103.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ..... ............................... . . 10-464 10.1.103.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 464 10.1.103.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-465 10.1.103.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identificationper Step 10, 81 of ASEP IIRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-465 10.1.103.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-466 10.1.104.1 HEP 104 Calculation . . . . . . ...........................................10-467 10.1.104.2 Sequence Timing and irxtications . ........................... .. ..... .. . . 10 468 10.1.104.3 Potential operator Action ... ........ ...................... .... . . . . . . 10468 10.1.104.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-469 10.1.104.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .............. .. 10-470 ' 10.1.104.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . .. .. ........ .. .. .... . 10-471 10.1.104.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . ................... . ............ .. ... .. 10-471 10.1.104.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 11 RAP . . . . . . ... ... . 10-472 10.1.104.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP 11 RAP .. ............ 10-472 10.1.104.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ................... .... . .. 10-473 10.1.105.1 HEP 105 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-474 t 10.1.105.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . ........... . ........ ..... .... 10475 ' 10.1.105.3 Potential operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-475 10.1.105.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . ....... .......... ..... 10-476 10.1.105.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . ....... ............ .... . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 477 10.1.105.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ... .. . .. 10-478 10.1.105.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . ... ....................... .... ........ ... 10-478 10.1.105.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . .. . .. .. . 10-479 10.1.105.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10. 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ..... .. . ... 10-479 10.1.105.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ .. . .. . . . . . . 10-4 8 0 10.1.106.1 HEP 106 Calculation . . . .... .......................... ............ . 10-481 ' 10.1.106.2 Sequence Timing and Irxlications . . . ........ .. ... .... .... .... .. . . . . . 10-482 10.1.106.3 Potential Operator Action . .... .. . ... .. . . .. . . .. .. ..... . . 10-482 NUREG/CR-6143 xxx Vol. 2. Part 1
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.106.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-483 10.1.106.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-484 10.1.106.6 Diagnosis Time for Opentor Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 85 10.1.106.7 Diagnosis Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-485 10.1.106.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . ........... .. 10-486 10.1.106.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-I.evelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 86 l 10.1.106.10 TotalHEP........................................................... . 10-487 ' 10.1.107.1 HEP 107 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-488 M_1.107.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-48 9 10.1.107.3 Poterial Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-489 10.1.107.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . 10-490 10.1.107.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-491 10.1.107.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 92 10.1.107.7 Diarsosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .. . 10-492 10.1.107.8 Poct Diagnosis Action Type klontification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-493 10.1.107.9 Post.D!agnosis Stress. Level identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-493 10.1.107.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 94 10.1.108.1 HEP 108 Calculation . . . . . ................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 95 10.1.108.2 Sequence Timing and Indica. ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . 10-496 10.1.108.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ..... . . . . 10-4% 10.1.108.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . 10-497 10.1.108.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ... . . . . . 10-498 10.1.108.6 Diagnosis Time for Oprator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 10-499 10.1.108.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . 10-499 10.1.108.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . .... . . . . . 10-500 10.1.108.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 500 10.1.108.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 01 10.1.109.1 HEP 109 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-502 10.1.109.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ..... ... 10-503 10.1.109.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . ............................ ..... . . . . 10-503 10.1.109.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...... .... 10 9 10.1.109.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . 10-E 10.1.109.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-506 10.1.109.7 Diagnos is Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-506 10.1.109.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP ............. 10-507 10.1.109.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress 4evelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . ...... .... . 10 507 10.1.109.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. ..... .. 10-508 10.1.110.1 HEP 110 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 09 10.1.110.10 Total HEP ................................................ .... ... 10-510 10.1.111.1 H EP 1 1 1 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 10-511 10.1 111.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . 10-512 10.1.111.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... .. . . . . . . . . 10-512 10.1.111.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ............. . .. ..... . . 10-513 10.1.111.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . . . 10 513 10.1.111.6 Diagnosis Time for Opernfor Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ......... .... 10 514 10.1.111.7 Diagnos is Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .......... . 10-514 10.1.111.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .... . . . . . . 10-515 10.1.111.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-levelidentification per Step 10, 3-1 of ASEP HRAP ... ....... .. 10-515 10.1.111.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .. . ... 10 516 10.1.113.1 HEP il3 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........... .... . . .. . . . . 10-517 10.1.113.2 S$quence Timing arxi lndications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .... . 10-518 10.1.113.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . . .. . . . . 10-518 10.1.113.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ...... . . ... . .. . 10-519 Vol. 2, Part I uxi NUREG/CR-6143
List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.113.5 Operator Action P.v ormance Time . . . .............................. . .. . 10-519 10.1.113.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . ......... ......... ..... . ... . .. 10-520 10.1.113.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... .... ... ... . ... 10-520 10.1.113.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP .. ... . . ... 10-521 10.1.113.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .. . . .. 10-521 10.1.113.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... .... .. .. . .. .. . . . 10-522 10.1.114.1 HEP 114 Calculation . . ....... .. . ............. ... -. .. .. . 10-523 10.1.114.2 Sequence Timing arxl Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . . .. . 10-524 10.1.114.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . ...... ..................... ... . . . . . 10-524 10.1.114.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . .... . . .. . .. . .. 10-525 10.1.114.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . ..... ... ..... .. . ...... 10-525 10.1.114.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .. . .... ... 10-526 10.1.114.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . ...... .. .... .................. . .. . . 10-526 > 10.1.114.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . .. . 10-527 10.1.114.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . ..... . 10-527 10.1.114.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . ........... ........... .. . ...... . . 10-528 l 10.1.115.1 HEP ll5 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... . . ... . . . . . . . 10-529 10.1.115.2 Sequence Timing and indications . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . 10-530 10.1.115.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .. . ... .. 10 530 10.1.115.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task ... . .... . . .. . 10-531 10.1.115.5 Operator Action Performance Time .. . . ... . ..... . . . .. . . 10-532 10.1.115.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . ... . ... .. . . ... . . 10-532 10.1.115.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . .. . .... ..... .. . . .. 10-533 10.1.115.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10. 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . 10-534 10.1.115.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. . . 10-534 10.1.115.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ........ . . . 10-535 , 10.1.116.1 HEP 116 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . ... . . . . . 10-536 10.1.116.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . ... . . ... ... . . . . 10-537 10.1.116.3 Potential Operator Action ......... .... .... . . .. ... . . . 10 537 10.1.116.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ... . . . . . . 10-538 10.1.116.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . .......... . ... . . 10-538 10.1.116.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . .. .. . .. . 10-539 10.1.116.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... ... .. . .. . . . 10-539 10.1.116.8 Post i. gnosis Action Type Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP llRAP , . . 10-540 10.1.116.9 Post.anagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , . . . ... 10-540 10.1.116.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . . ... . ................... .... .. ..... . .. . 10-541 10.1.117.1 HEP ll7 Calculation . . . . . . . . ....... . . .. . . . . . . . 10-542 10.1.117.2 Sequence Timing and Indications ..... . .. . . . . .. .. . . 10-543 10.1.117.3 Potential Operator Action . . .... .. . . ....... .... ... . .... . . 10-543 10.1.117.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .. ......... . .. ..... . . 10-544 10.1.I17.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . .. . .. . 10-544 10.1.117.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . ....... .... .. ..... .. .. . . 10-545 10.1.117.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . .... ... .... . ... ... .. .. .. . 10-545 10.1.117.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . ... . 10-546 10.1.117.9 Post Diagnosis Stress. level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . 10-546 10.1.117.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. ..... . .......... . . ... ...., . 10-547 10.1.118.1 HEP 118 Calculation . . . . . . . . . ....... . . .. ... . . ... . 10-548 10.1.118.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .. . .. ... . . .... . . . . 10-549 , 10.1.118.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ... . . . 10-549 10.1.118.4 Time Available to Diagnose aml Perform the Task . ... . . 10-550 10.1.118.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .. . .. . . 10-550 10.1.118.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . .. . . . . .. . . . 10 551 10.1.118.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. 10 551 i NUREG/CR-6143 xxxii Vol 2, Part I
1 List of Tables (Continued) 10.1.118.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . ............ 10 552 10.1.118.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . .. ......... 10-552 10.1.118.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................... 10-553 10.1.119.1 HEP 119 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ........... .......... . . . . 10-554 10.1.119.2 Seauence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . ...... ............. ............... 10-555 10.1.119.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . ... . . .... ......... .. .. . ... 10-555 10.1.119.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 10-556 10.1.119.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . .. ...... .. ......... ... . . 10-556 10.1.119.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ......... .. ... .......... .............. 10-557 10.l.119.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ................... ... . . .. .. 10-557 10.1.119.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . ... ... 10-558 10.1.119.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress.levelIdentificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. . ...... ... 10-558 10.1.119.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .... ......................... .... . 10-559 10.1.120.1 HEP 120 Calculation . . . ............................................10-560 10.1.120.2 Sequence Timing ami lndications . . . . . .. .......................... ... ..... 10-561 10.1.120.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . .. ... .. . .. ... .. . ........ .. 10-561 10.1.120.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .... .... ...... ......... . . 10-562 10.1.120.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . .. ...... . .. .. . . . 10-562 10.1.120.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . .... . .... .. . . ... ... .. ..... . 10 563 10.1.120.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . ... ..... . ........ .. . ..... ... . . 10-563 10.1.120.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .. 10-564 10.1.120.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10. 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . ............ . 10-564 10.1.120.10 Total HEP . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .... . ..... .. .. .. . . . 10-565 10.1.121.1 HEP 121 Calculation . . . . . .... . ... . ... ... . . ... . .. 10-566 10.1.121.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . .. . . . ... ... . .. . 10 567 10.1.121.3 Potential Operator Action . . . ... . ..... ..... ...... . ... . . . . . 10-567 10.1.121.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .. ...... ... ... .... .. . . . . 10-568 10.1.121.5 Operator Action Performance Time ..... .. .. ...... .... .. ... .... . 10-568 i 10.1.121.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Acti9 n . ........... . ..... ....... ...... ... 10-569 10.1.121.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . ... . ... .... ....... . . .. . . . . . 10-569 10.1.121.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . ........ . . 10-570 ' 10.1.121.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .... ..... . 10-570 10.1.121.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... ....... . .. ......... 10-571 10.1.122.1 HEP 122 Calculation . . .. .... .... ..... ... ....... .. . . . . . . . 10-572 , 10.1.122.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . .... ... . . . . . . ... ..... . .. 10-573 10.1.122.3 Potential Operator Action . . . ... ............ . .. ..... ........ 10-573 10.1.122.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . ......... . .. .. .. . . 10-574 10.1.122.5 Operator Action Performance Time ... . . . ... ....... . . ... .. . .. 10-574 10.1.122.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . ...... ... .... ...... . .... . . . . 10-575 10.1.122.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . ................. . ... ..... ......... ... .. 10-575 ' 10.1.122.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP ...... ........ 10-576 10.1.122.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . .. . . .. 10-576 i 10.1.122.10 Total H EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ....... . ........... . . . . . . 10-577 l 10.1.123.1 HEP 123 Calculation . . . ...... . . . .. .. ........ ... . .. . 10-578 10.1.123.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . ... .. . .... .. . 10-579 10.1.123.3 Potential Operator Action . .. .. . ... . ... . . .... ... ... . ... 10 579 10.1.123.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Pe form the Task .. ............. . . .. .. .. 10-580 10.1.123.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . ... . ...... .. . .. 10-580 l 10.1.123.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .... ...... .. ....... . ... .. ... .. 10-581 j 10.1.123.7 Diagnosis Arudysis . .. . ...... ... ... ... . .. .. . .. . 10-581 10.1.123.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ......... .. 10-582 10.1.123.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. ....... . 10-582 10.1.123.10 Total HEP . . . . ...... ... .. . ..... ... . ... ... 10-583 Vol. 2, Part 1 xxxiii NUREG/CR-6143
I LIST of Tables (Continued)' 10.1.124.1 H EP 124 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 84 10.1.124.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . ........................................10-585 10.1.124.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 10-585 10.1.124.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-586 i 10.1.124.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-586 10.1.124.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-587 10.1.124.7 Diagnosis Analysis ....................................... .............. 10-587 10.1.124.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-588 , 10.1.124.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-588 10.1.124.10 Total IIEP . . . . . . . . ..................................... .............. 10-589 10.1.125.1 H EP 125 Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 90 10.1.125.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . ......................................10-591 10.1.125.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . ...........................................10-591 ; 10.1.125.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-592 10.1.125.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 10-592 10.1.125.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . .. ....... .. ........................ 10 593 10.1.125.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . ..............................................10-593 10.1.125.8 Post. Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of AEEP HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-594 , 10.1.125.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress. Level Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEF HRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-594 10.1.125.10 Total liEP . . . . . . . . . . . ........... ................. .... .............. 10-595 10.1.I'6.1 HEP 126 Calculation . . . . ...i...... .. 10-596 10.2.1 Pre-Accident Human Actions and Trieir Mean IEPs . 10-598 10 3.1 TSDSH IIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-600 10.3.2 TSASH IEP/ SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE , 10-605 10.3.3 TDB5HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-607 10.3.4 TIASHIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-610 I 10 3.5 TAB 5H IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-615 10.3.6 J2 5 IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE. . . . 10-617 10.3.7 ElB5HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE 10-618 10.3.8 E2B5HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . .10-621 10.3.9 ElDSH HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . . .10-623 10310 E2D5H HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . .10-626 10.3.11 A5 IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-628 10.3.12 S2HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERFNCE . .10-629 10.3.13 S3H-S IEP/ SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . . .10-630 10.3.14 A511Y IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . . . . .10-630 10.3.15 S1H-5 iEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-630 10.3.16 S2-5 IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE 10-631 10.3.17 S3-5 IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-632 t 10.3.18 J2 5IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . . .10-633 10.3.19 TIOP5 IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . 10-634 10.3.20 E2C-5 iEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . .10-636 10.3 21 E2TSHIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE ,10-637 10.3.22 E2V5H HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . 10-639 : 10.3.23 TIM 5H HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . .10-640 f 10.3.24 ElT5H HEP / SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . 10-644 10.3.25 ElV5H HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . 10-649 10.3.26 TIHP5 HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . 10-652 10.3 27 TIOF5 IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . 10-655 10.3.28 TORV5 HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE , .10-658 M3.29 T!.5 HEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE 10-660 10.3.30 Hl.5HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE 10-666 10 3.31 TRPTS IEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE 10-669 l 1 NUREG/CR-6143 xxxiv Vol. 2, Part 1 l
l List of Tables (Continued) 10.3.32 E2V5HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE . . . .. . 10-675 10.3.33 TLM5HIEP SEQUENCE CROSS REFERENCE , .... . . . .. .. 10-679 10.4.1 Recovery Actions and 'Iheir Mean IEPs and Error Factors . . ... .10-683 10.5.2RI .1 IEP 2R1 Calculation . . . . . . .. . . .10-684 10.5.2RI.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 10-685 10.5.2R I.3 Potential Operator Action . . .. .... .10-685 10.5.2RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . .10-686 10.5.2RI.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . .... ... . 10-686 10.5.2RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . .. .10-687 10.5.2RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . .. . . .. .. .10-687 10.5.2RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .. 10-688 10.5.2RI .9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Levelldentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .10-688 10.5.2RI .10 TotallEP . . .l. . . . . . . . . .10-689 10.5.3R1.1 IEP 3RI Calculation . .. . . . . . . .10-690 10.5.3RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . . . 10-691 10.5.3RI .3 Potential Operator Action . .10-691 10.5.3RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . 10-692 10.5.3RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . .. . . . 10-692 10.5.3RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . 10-693 10.5.3R1.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . .. . .. . . .10-693 10.5.3RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . 10-694 10 5.3RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-694 10.5.3R1.10 Total IEP . . . . . .10-695 10.5.6R I .1 HEP 6R1 Calculation . , . . . .10-696 10.5.6RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications . .10-697 10.5.6RI.3 Potential Operator Action . 10-697 10.5.6RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .. 10-698 10.5.6R I .5 Operator Action Performance Time . . .10-698 , 10.5.6R1.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . 10-699 10.5.6RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . .10-699 ' 10.5.6R I .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . . 10 700 10.5.6R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .10-700 10.5.6RI.10 TotallEP . . . . .. . 10 701 10.5.10Rl .1 IEP 10R1 Calculation . . . . . .10-702 10.5.10RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . .. . 10-703 10.5.10RI.3 Potential Operator Action . .10-703 10.5.10RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . 10-704 10.5.10R I .5 Operator Action Performance Time . .. . . . . .. 10-704 10.5.10RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . .10-705 10.5.10RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . ,. . . .10 705 10.5.10RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-706 10.5.10R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . 10-706 10.5.10RI.10 TotalIEP . . . . .10 707 10.5.10R2.1 IEP 10R2 Calculation . . . . . 10-708 10.5.10R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . .10 709 10 5.10R2.3 PotentialOperator Action . . . 10-709 10.5.10R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task . . . .10-710 10.5.10R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . 10-710 10.5.10R2.6 Diagnosis rane for Operator Action . . . . 10-71I l 10 5.10R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10-711 10 5.10R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-712 10.5.10R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-712 10.5.10R2.10 TotalIEP .
.10-713 Vol. 2, Part 1 xxxv NUREG/CR-6143
List of Tables (Continued) 10.5.13RI.1 IEP 13R1 Calculation . . . . . . . . 10 714 10.5.13RI.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . .. . . . .10-715 10.5.13RI.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . .10-715 10.5.13RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose pnd Perform the Task .. .10-716 10.5.13RI.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . . . . . . . . 10-716 10.5.13RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .. . . . . . .10 717 10.5.13RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 717 10.5.13RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .10-718 10.5.13RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10 718 10.5.13RI.10 Total 1EP . .. . ... . .10-719 10.5.13R2.1 IEP 13R2 Calculation . . . . . . . .10 720 10.5.13R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . .. . . 10-721 10.5.13R2.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . . . .10 721 10 5.13R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .. .. . . . .. .10-722 10.5.13R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time .. .. . . . . 10-722 - 10 5.13R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .10-723 10.5.13R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . .10-723 10.5.13R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .10-724 10.5.13R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . .10-724 10.5.13R2.10 Total HEP . .. . . .10-725 10.5.14RI .1 IEP 14RI Calculation . .. . 10 726 10.5.14RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-727 10.5.14RI .3 Potential Operator Action . . . .10-727 10.5.14RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10-728 10.5.14RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-728 10.5.14RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . ,. . . . .10-729 10.5.14R1.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . .10 729 10,5.14RI .8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , . . 10-730 10.5.14R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HP.AP . 10 730 10.5.14RI .10 Total 1-EP . . . .10 731 10.5.16Rl .1 IEP 16RI Calculation . .
. .10-732 10.5.16RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . .10-733 10.5.16RI .3 Potential Operator Action . . .10-733 10.5.16R1.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . .10-734 10 5.16R1.5 Operator Action Performance Time . .10-734 10.5.16RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . .10 735 10.5.16RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . ... . . .10-735 10.5.16RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-l of ASEP HRAP .10 736 10.5.16R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . 10-736 10.5.16RI .10 TotalIEP . . . .10 737 10.5.16R2.1 1EP 16R2 Calculation . . .10-738 10.516R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . .10-739 10.5.16R2.3 Potential Operator Action . . .10-739 10 5.16R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-740 10 5.16R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . . .10 740 10.5.16R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . 10-741 10.516R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .
.10-741 10.5.16R2.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . .10-742 10.516R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-742 10.5.16R2.10 Total lEP . .10-743 10.5.16R3.1 IEP 16R3 Calculation . .
.10-744 10.516R3.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . .10-745 10.516R3 3 Potential Operator Action .10-745 NUREG/CR-6143 xxxvi Vol. 2 Part 1
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l 1 List of Tables (Continued) 10.5.16R3.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .. . . . . 10-746 10.5.16R3.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . .10 746 10.5.16R3.6 Diagr.osis Time for Operator Action . . . . . . . . . .. .10-747 10.5.16R3.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . ... . . . . . . .. .10-747 10.5.16R3.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identi6 cation per Step 10, 8 1 of ASEP HRAP .10-748 10.5.16R3.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identif cation per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .10-748 10.5.16R3.10 TotalIEP . .. . .. . . . . 10-749 10.5.18RI.1 IEP 18R1 Calculation . . . . . .. ... . .10-750 10.5.18RI .2 Sequence Timing andIndications . . . 10-751 10.5.18RI.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . .. . . . .10-751 10.5.18RI 4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . . . . .10-752 10.5.18RI.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . . 10-752 10.5.18RI 6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .. 10-753 10.5.18RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-753 10.5.18RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identifcation per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . ... 10-754 < 10.5.18R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identincation per Step 10, 8 1 of ASEP HRAP . .. . .10-754 10.5.18RI.10 Total HEP . . . , . . . .10-755 10.5.18RI .1 HEP 18R1 Calculation . . . . .10-756 10.5.18R1.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-757 10.5.18R1.3 Potential Operator Action . . . .10-757 10.518RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task .10-758 10.5.18RI.5 Operator Action Pedormance Time . .10-758 10.5.18R1.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .. .. .10-759 1 0.5.1 8111.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . .10-759 10.5.181'.l.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type IdentiScation per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . . . . 10-760 10.5.18R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level IdentiScation per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IMAP . . .10-760 10.5.18R t.10 TotallEP . . . . . . . . 10-761 10.5.18R3.1 IEP 18R3 Calculation . . . . . .10-762 10.5.18R3.2 Scquence Timing and Indications . .10-763 10.5.18R3.3 Potential Operator Action . . .10-763 10.5.18R3.4 Tin.e Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10-764 10.5.18R3.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time . . .10-764 10.5.18R3.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . 10-765 10.5.18R3.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . .10-765 10.5.18R3.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .. . . 10-766 , 10.5.18R3.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . .10-766 10.5.18R3.10 Total 1EP . . . 10-767 10.5.28RI.1 IEP 28R1 Calculation . . .10-768 , 10.5.28R1.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . 10-769 ) 10.5.28R1.3 Potential Operator Action . . . . .10-769 j 10.5.28RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Pedorm the Task . . . 10-770 ' 10.5.28RI.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-770 10.5.28RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .10-771 10.5.28R1.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . .10-771 10.5.28RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8 1 of ASEP HRAP .. . 10-772 10.5.28RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ,10-772 10.5.28RI.10 TotalIEP . . . .10-773 l 10 5.28R2.1 IEP 28R2 Calculation . . .10-774 ! 10.5 28R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indicatians . 10-775 10 5.28R2.3 Potential Operator Action . . 10-775 10.5.28R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task .10-776 10.5.28R2.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time .10-776 10.5.28R2 6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-777 Vol. 2. Part I uxvii NUREG/CR-6143
List of' Tables (Continued) 10.5.28R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .10-777 10.5.28R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . . . .10-778 10.5.28R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HPAP .10-778 10.5.28R2.10 TotallEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10-779 10 5.29RI.1 IEP 29RI Calculation . . . . . . . . . 10-780 10.5.29RI.2 Sequence Timing andIndications . . . .10-781 10.5.29RI.3 Potential Operator Action .
.10-781 10.5.29RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . 10-782 10.5.29RI.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time . . . . .10-782 10.5.29RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . 10-783 10.5.29RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . .10-783 10.5.29RI.8 Post Diagnosis Action-Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-784 10.5.29R1.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . . 10-784 10.5.29RI.10 TotalIEP . . . .... . . .10-785 10.5.29R2.1 IEP 29R2 Calculation . . . .10-786 10.5.29R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-787 10.5.29R2.3 Potential Operator Action . . . .10-787 10.5.29R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . .10-788 10.5.29R2.5 Operator Action Performance 'l %e .10-788 10.5.29R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . .10-789 10.5.29R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . - .10-789 10..'.29R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action-Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-790 10.5.29R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 1C, 8 1 of ASEP HRAP . 10-790 10.5.29R2.10 TotalIEP . . . . .10-791 10.5.35RI.1 IEP 35RI Calculation . . . . .10-792 10.5.35RI.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . .10-793 10.5.35R1.3 Potential Operator Action .10-793 10.5.35RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . 10-794 ,
10.5.35R1.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . .10-794 l 10.5.35RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . 10-795 l 10.5.35R1.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . .10-795 , l 10 5.35RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 1IRAP .10-796 10.5.35RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP ,10-796 10.5.35RI.10 TotalIEP . . .10-797 10.5.37RI.1 IEP 37RI Calculation . . . . . .10-798 10.5.37RI.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . .10-799 10.5.37RI .3 Potential Operator Action . .10-799 10.5.37RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-800 10.5.37RI.5 Operator Action Performance Time . . .10 801 i 10.5.37RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-802 10.5.37RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . .10-802 10.5.37RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . . .10-803 10.5.37RI .9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . .10-803 10.5.37RI.10 TotalIEP . . .10-804 10.5.37R2.1 1EP 37R2 Calculation . . . .10-805 10.5.37R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-806 10.5.37R2.3 Potential Operator Action .10-806 10.5 37R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-807 10.5.37R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time . .,. . .10-808 10.5.37R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . 10-809 10.5.37R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . .10-809 10.5.37R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . . 10 810 10.5.37R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .10-810 l NUREG/CR-6143 xxxviii Vol. 2, Part 1 l l l
1 List of Tables (Continued) 10.5.37R2.10 Total HEP . .. . . . . .10-811 10.5.37R3.1 IEP 37R3 Calculation . . . . .10 812 10.5.37R3.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . 10-813 10.5.37R3.3 Potential Operator Action . .10-813 10.5.37R3.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . ... .. 10-814 10.5.37R3.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-815 10.5.37R3.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . 10-816 10.5.37R3.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . .. .10-816 10.5.37R3.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-817 10.5.37R3.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-817 10.5.37R3.10 Total 1EP . . . .10 818 10.5.42RI .1 IEP 42R1 Calculation . . .10-819 10.5.42R1.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . .10-820 10.5.42RI.3 Potential Operator Action . .10-820 10.5.42RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10-821 10.5.42RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-821 10.5.42RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-822 10.5.42RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . 10-822 10.5.42RI.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-823 10 5.42RI.9 Post Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-823 10.5.42RI.10 TotalIEP . .10-824 10.5.42R2.1 IEP 42R2 Calculation . .10-825 10.5.42R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-826 10.5.42R2.3 Potential Operator Action .10-826 10.5.42R2.1 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10-827 10.5.42R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-821 10.5.42R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . 10-828 10.5.42R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10 828 10.5.42R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ,10-829 10.5.42R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-829 10.5.42R2.10 TotalIEP . . 10-830 10.5.49RI .1 HEP 49R1 Calculation . .10 831 10.5.49RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications ,
,10-832 10.5.49RI.3 PotentialOperator Action .10-832 10.5.49Rl .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . 10-833 10.5.49R1.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-833 10.5.49RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10-834 10.5.49RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action-Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP 10 835 10.5.49R1.9 Post Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10. 8-1 of ASEP 1IRAP . 10-835 10.5 49El.10 TotalIEP . . 10-836 10.5.50Rl.1 IEP 50R1 Calculation . .10-837 10.5.50RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . .10-838 10.5.50R I .3 Potential Operator Action . .10 838 10.5.50RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-839 10.5.50RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-839 10.5.50RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-840 10.5.50RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10-840 10.5.50RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP HRAP . 10-841 10.5.50RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identificauen per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-841 10.5.50R1.10 TotalIEP . .
.10-842 10.5.50R2.1 IEP 50R2 Calculation . .10 843 10 5.50R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-844 10.5.50R2.3 Potential Operator Action .10-844 I
Vol. 2, Part 1 xxxix NUREG/CR-6143 1
LIST of Tables (Continued) 10.5.50R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10-845 10.5.50R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-845 10.5.50R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . .10 846 10.5.50R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . .10-846 10.5.50R2.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP ,10-847 10.5.50R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-847 10.5.50R2.10 TotalIEP . . . . . . .10-848 10.5.50R3.1 IIEP 50R3 Calculation . .10-849 10.5.50R3.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . 10-850 10.5.50R3.3 Potential Operator Action .. . 10-850 10.5.50R3.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10-851 10 5.50R3.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-851 10.5.50R3.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .10-852 10.5.50R3.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . .10-852 10.5.50R3.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP ,10-853 10.5.50R3.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 1IRAP .10-853 10.5.50R3.10 TotalIIEP . .10-854 10.5.61 RI .1 !!EP 61R1 Calculation . 10-855 10.5.61 RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications . 10-856 10.5.61R 1.3 Potential Operator Action .10-856 10.5.61RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-857 10.5.61RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-857 10.5.61RI .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10 858 10.5.61RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10-858 10.5.61RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-859 10.5.61 R I .9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-859
- 10 5.61RI.10 TotalIEP . .10 860 10.5.64Rl .1 IEP 64RI Calculation . . 10-861 10.5.64RI .2 Sequence Timing and Indications 10-862 10.5.64 R I .3 Potential Operator Action .10-862 10.5.64RI .4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-863 10.5.64RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-863 10.5.64R I .6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10464 10.5.64RI .7 Diagnosis Analysis . . .10-864 10.5.64RI .8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-865 10.5.64R1.9 Post Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP 1IRAP .10 865 10 5.64RI.10 TotalIEP . .10-866 10.5.64R2.1 IIEP 64R2 Calculation . .10-867 10.5.64R2.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10 868 10.5 64R2.3 Potential Operator Action . 10-868 10.5.64R2.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-869 10.5.64R2.5 Operator Action Performance Time .10-869 10.5.64R2.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-870 10.5.64R2.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10-870 10.5.64R2.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP ,10 871 10.5.64R2.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . .10-871 10.5.64R2.10 TotalIEP , . .10 872 10.5.66RI .1 IEP 66R1 Calculation . 10 873 10.5.66RI.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-874 10.5.66RI .3 Potential Operator Action .10 874 10.5.66RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-875 10.5.66RI .5 Operator Action Performance Time 10 875 10.5.66R1.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-876 l
NUREG/CR-6143 x1 Vol. 2. Part I l l
List of Tables (Continued) 10.5.66RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . .10-876 10.5.66Rl.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-877 10.5.66RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . . 10-877 10.5 66R1.10 TotalIEP . . . , , .10-878 10.5.67R1.1 IIEP 67R1 Calculation . .
.10-879 Sequence Timing and Indications , 10-880 10.5.67RI.2 . . ..
10.5.67R1.3 Potential Operator Action .10-880 10.5.67RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-881 10.5.67RI.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time . .10-881 10.5.67RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10-882 , 10.5.67RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . .10-882 10.5.67RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-883 10.5.67RI.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Ixvel Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-883 10.5.67RI.10 TotalIEP . . . .
. . 10-884 10.5.102RI.1 IEP 102R1 Calculation . .
.10-885 10.5.102RI.2 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-886 ;
10.5.102RI.3 Potential Operator Action .10-886 10.5.102RI.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-887 10.5.102RI.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time .10-887 10.5.102RI.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .
.10-888 10.5.102RI 7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . 10-888 10.5.102RI.8 Post Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-889 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Levelidentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10 889 10.5.102RI .9 TotalIIEP . .10-890 10.5102RI.10 IEP 119R1 Calculation . .10 891 10.5.119RI.1 Sequence Timing and Indications .10-892 10.5.119RI .2 Potential Operator Action .10-892 10.5.119RI.3 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10-893 10.5.119RI.4 Operator Action Performance Time
.10-893 10.5.119RI.5 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .10 894 10.5.119R 1.6 Diagnosis Analysis . .10 894 10.5.119R1.7 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-895 10.5.119RI.8 Post Diagnosis Stress-Level Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP . 10-895 10.5.119R1.9
.10-896 10.5.119RI.10 TotalllEP . .
.10-897 10 5.123RI.1 IEP 123R1 Calculation . .
Sequence Timing and Indications
.10-898 ,
10.5.123RI.2 PotentialOperator Action .10-898 10 5.123R1.3 . Time Available to Diagnose ud Perfonn the Task .10-989 10 5.123RI.4
.10-989 10.5.123RI.5 Operator Action Performance Time Diagnosis Time for Operator Action .
.10 900 10.5.123RI.6 .
.10-900 ,
10 5.123RI.7 Diagnosis Analysis . Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10 901 10.5.123RI.8 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP .10-901 10.5.123R1.9
.10-902 10 5.123RI.10 TotaliIEP .
.10 903 105.127.1 IIEP 127 Calculation
.10-904 10.5.127.2 Sequence Timing and Indications
. 10-904 10.5.127.3 Potential Operator Action Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .10 905 10.5.127.4
.10 906 10 5.127.5 Operator Action Performance Time
.10 907 10 5.127 6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action .
I3-907 10.5.127.7 Diagnosis Analysis . Post-Diagnosis Action Typc Identification per Step 10, 81 of ASEP lliW .10-908 10.5 127.8 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Levei identification per Step 10, S-1 of ASF.P HRAP
.10-908 10.5.127.9 xli NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2, Pan !
List of Tables (Continued) 10.5.127.10 Total HEP . . . . . .10-909 10.5.128.1 HEP 128 Calculation . . . .10-910 10.5.128.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . .. . . .10-911 10.5.128.3 Potential Operator Action .. .
.10-911 10.5.128.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . . . 10-912 i 10.5.128.5 Operator Action Performance Time . .. . . .10-912 10.5.128.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . . . . .10-913 10.5.128.7 Diagnosis Analysis . . . . . .. . . .10-913 10.5.128.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP . .. . . 10-914 10.5.128.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-level Identificationper Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-914 l 10.5.128.10 TotallIEP . . . . .. . . . . . 10-915 10.5.129.1 HEP 129 Calculation . . . .10-916 10.5.129.2 Sequence Timing and Indications . . . . . 10-917 10.5.129.3 Potential Operator Action . .10-917 10.5.129.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task . .10 918 10.5.129.5 Operator Action Performance Time . .10-918 i 10.5.129.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . . .10-919 !
10 5.129.7 Diagnosis Analysis . .10-919 10.5.129.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10. 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-920 10.5.129.9 Post Diagnosis Stress LevelIdentification per Step 10, 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .10-920 , 10.5.129.10 Total HEP . . . 10-921
.i I1.2.1 Basic Events Used in LP&S Analysis , . . .Il-2 11.3.3-1 Defmitions of Plant Operational States Il 30 11.3.3 2 Durations of Fuel Cycles 2 Through 4 . .
.Il-33 11.3.3-3 Plant Operational State Changes During Refueling Outage 2 . .I1 33 11.3.3-4 Plant Operational State Changes During Refueling Outage 3 .Il-34 11.3.3-5 Plant Operational State Changes During Refueling Outage 4 . .I1-34 11.3.3-6 Durations of Plant Operational States During RFOs 2,3, and 4 11-35 1 11.3.3-7 Plant Operational State Changes During Unscheduled Power Dips That Go Below 15% for Fuel Cycle ! . .. 11 36 11.3.3-8 Plant Operational State Changes During Unscheduled Power Dips That Go Below 15% for Fuel Cycle 2 .
.Il-37 11.3.3-9 Plant Operational State Changes During Unscheduled E ver Dips That Go Below 15% for Fuel Cycle 3 .
.Il-37 i 11.3.3-10 Plant Operational State Changes During Unsci eduled Power Dips That Go Below 15% for Fuel Cycle 4 . .
. . Il 38 11.3.3-11 Non-RFO Time included in Analysis !l 39 11.3.3-12 Summary of SCRAMS . .I1 39 11.3.3 13 Summary of Controlled Shutdowns To Below 15% . Il-40 11.3.3 14 Durations of Contro!!ed Shutdown POSs .
.Il-41 I i1.3.3-15 Durations of SCRAM and Recovery POSs . . I l-41 11.3.3-16 Relative Times in POSs . Il 43 11.3.5-1 Time Vesselis in Hydro Test in POS 5 . . I l-43 11.3.5-2 Fraction of Time Vessel is in Hydro Test in POS S 11-43 I1.3.5 3 Time Plant is on ADHR to Remove Decay Heat . . I l-44 !
11.3.5-4 Fraction of Time Plant is on ADHR to Remove Decay Heat . I l-44 11.3.5-5 Time Spent With SP Water Level in Various States . . . . I l-45 11.3.5-6 Fraction of Time SP Water Level is Normal, Reduced, or Empty . . 11-45 11.3.5-7 Time Vessel Level is Sullicient for Natural Circulation in POS 5 . I l-48 11.3.5-8 Fraction of Tune Vessel Level is Sufficient for Natural Circulation in POS 5 . I l-48 11.3.6-1 As ailabilit>Nnavailability of HPCS During POS 5 . I l-48 11.3.6-2 Fraction of Time HPCS is Unavailable During POS 5 11-49 , NUREO/CR-6143 Alii Vol. 2 Part I
i l I List of Tables (Continued) 11.3.6-3 AvailabilityAJnavailability of CDS During POS S . . ... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 -4 9 11.3.6-4 Friction of Time CDS is Unavailable During POS S . .. .. . . .. . Il-49 11.4.1 Evert Values for Time Window Analysis . . . . . ... .. . . ... . . . Il 50 12.2.1 Results from Quantification of T5D Accident Sequences . . .. . .. . 12 8 12.2.2 Results from Quantification of TSA Accident Sequences . . . . .. . . 12-30 12.2.3 Results from Quantification of fDB Accident Sequences . . . ... . . 12 40 12.2.4 Results from Quantification of TIA Accident Sequences . . . ... . .. . . 12-45 12.2.5 Results from Quantification of TAB Accident Sequences ... . .. .. . . .12 55 12.2.6 Results'from Quantification of J2 Accident Sequences . . . .. ... . . . . 12 57 l 12.2.7 Results fmm Quantification of ElB Accident Sequences . . . .. . .12-69 12.2.8 Results from Quantification ofE2B Accident Sequences . . . . ... . .. .12-86 12.2.9 Results from Quantification of eld Accident Sequences . . . ....... . . .12 97 12.2.10 Results from Quantification of E2D Accident Sequences . . . . ... . . . .12 101 12.2.11 Results from Quantification cf TSB Accident Sequences . . . . .. .. .. . . .12 104 12.2.12 Results from Quantification of TSC Accident Sequences . . . . . .12 109 12.2.13 Results from Quantification of AS Accident Sequences . ... . . .12-113 12.2.14 Results from Quantification of S2H Accident Sequences . . . . 12-114 12.2.15 Results from Quantification of A5HY Accident Sequences .12-114 Results from Quantification of SlH 5 Accident Sequences .12-115 12.2.16 Results from Quantification of S2-5 Accident Sequences .12 115 12.2.17 Results from Quantification of S3-5 Accident Sequences .12-116 12.2.18 Results from Quantification of SI-5 Accident Sequences .12-116 12.2.19 . . . Results from Quantification of TIOP Accident Sequences . . .. .12-117 12.2.20 Results from Quantification of E2T Accident Sequences . .. . .. .12-118 12.2.21 Results from Quantification of E2V Accident Sequences . ... . . 12-123 12.2.22 12.2.23 Results from Quantification of TLM Accident Sequences .. . 12-126 Results from Quantification of ElT Accident Sequences . . .12-132 12.2.24 Results from Quantification of ElV Accident Sequences . . .12 145 12.2.25 Results from Quantification of TlHP Accident Sequences . .12-149 12.2.26 Results from Quantification of TIOF Accident Sequences . . . .12 150 12.2.27 12.2.28 Results from Quantification of Tl Accident Sequences . .. . . . 12-154 Results from Quantification of HI Accident Sequences . . .. . .12 169 12.2.29 Results from Quantification of TRPT Accident Sequences . . .12 178 12.2.30 Summary Results from Quantification of T5D Accident Sequences .12-184 12.3.1 Summary Results from Quantification of TSA Accident Sequences . . . .12 185 l 12.3.2 Summary Results from Quantification of TDB Accident Sequences . . . . .12 186 12.3.3
. . 12 187 12.3.4 Summary Results from Quantification of TIA Accident Sequences . . .
Summary Results from Quantification of TAB Accident Sequences . .12 188 12.3.5 Summary Results from Quantification of J2 Accident Sequences . .12 188 12.3.6 Summary Results from Quantification of ElB Accident Sequences . . . .12 189 , 12.3.7 Summary Results from Quantification of E2B Accident Sequences .
.12 189 I 12.3.8 Summary Results from Quantification of eld Accident Sequences . . . 12 190 l 12.3.9 '
Summary Results from Quantification of E2D Accident Sequences .. . .12-190 12.3.10
. .12-190 12.3.11 Summary Results from Quantification of TSB Accident Sequences
. 12-19!
Summary Results from Quantification of T5C Accider.t Sequences 12.3.12
. 12-191 Summary Results from Quantification of AS Acci<len Sequence. .
12.3.13
. . .12-191 12.3.14- Summary Results from Quantification of S2H Accident Sequences
.12-192 12.3.15 Summsry Results from Quantification of ASHY Accident Sequences . .
Summ:uy desults from Quantification of SlH 5 Accident Sequences . .
. 12-192 12.3.16
.12 192 12.3.17 Summary Rc.n.lts from Quantification of S2-5 Accident Seqvaces
, 12-193 12.3.18 Summsry Results from Quantification of SI-5 Accident Scquences
.12-193 12/119 Sununary Results from Quantifiestion of E2T Accident Sequences .
xliii NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2, Part I
LIST of Tables (Continued) 12.3.20 Summary Results from Quantification of E2V Accident Sequences . . . . . . . ..,12 193 12.3.21 Summary Results from Quantification of TLM Accident Sequences . . . . . 12 194 12.3.22 Summary Results from Quantification of ElT Accident Sequences . . . . . . . . . . .12-194 12.3.23 Summary Results from Quantification of ElV Accident Sequences . . . . . .. .12-195 13.3.24 Summary Results from Quantification of TI Accident Sequences . .,... ... .. .12 196 12.3.25 Summary Results from Quantification of HI Accident Sequences . . .. .. . . . 12-197 12.3.26 Summary Results from Quantification of TRPT Accident Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12197 12.3.27 Summary Results for All IEs Before Time Window Analysis . . . . . . . .. . .. .12 198 12.4.1 Results from the Time Window Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 12 200 12.5.1 Uncertamty Results for Sequences Surviving Recovery Analysis (Sample Size = 1000 and Sp = 12345) . .. ... . ... . .. . .. .12 201 ! 12.5.2 Point Estimate vs. Mean Core Damage Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-202 13.1 Plant Damage State Descriptions . . . . ... . . ... . 13 1 13.2 Plant Damage state Results . . . . . .. . .. .. . ... . . . . . . . .. . 13-5 14.1 Core Damage Frequency Information by Sequence ...............................14-2 : 14.2 Core Damage Frequency and Percentage of Total Frequency by Initiating Event .... . . . . . . . 14-3 14.3 AS Sequence 02 4-01 -2 7.W 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-12 14.4 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 024-01-27.W I . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 14- 12 14.5 AS Sequence 024-01-27.W2A . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ... .......... . . . . . 14 13 14.6 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 02-06-01-27-W2A . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . 14- 13 14.7 A5 Sequence 02-06-01 27.W2 B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 14 14.8 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 024-01 27-W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-14 14.9 AS Sequence 02-06-01 27.W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14- 15 14.10 Basic Event Importance Measures Summary for Sequence 024-01-27-W3A5 . . ......... 14-15 14.11 AS Sequence 064-01 27-W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-16 14.12 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 06-06-01 27-W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-16 14.13 ASHY Sequence 3-07-01 W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ......... . . . 14-17 14.14 Basic Event importance Measures for Sequence 3-07-01 27 W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 14-17 14.15 EIT5H Sequence 07-1101-27.W2 . . . . . . . . .............. . ..... . . . . . 14-18 14.16 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 07- 11 01 W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14 18 14.17 E2T5H Sequence 04-II-01-27-W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . .. .. 14-19 14.18 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 04-11 01-27.W2 . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . 14-19 14.19 H1-5H Sequence 03-01-Il-01 27WI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .. ..... . . . 14-20 14.20 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 03-01 11-27W1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2 0 14.21 Hl.5H Sequence 03 11 -01 27W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ........... 14-21 14.22 Basic Event importance Measures for Sequence 03-01-1101-27W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2 1 14.23 H1-5H Sequence 03 5 0-2 W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.24
. .. 14-22 Basic Event importance Measures for Sequence 03-01-50-2.W2 . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.?.2 14.25 J2-5 Sequence 2-01 11 01 -27.W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14.26
........ . . . 14-23 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 2-01-11-0127-W2 . ....... ...... . . 14-23 14.27 St-5 Sequence 02-06-01-27.W1 . . . . . . . .
........... ..................... . 14 24 14.28 Basic Event Importance Measures for Sequence 02 4-01 W1 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14.29
. .. . 14 24 SI-5 Sequence 02-06-01-27-W2A .. . . . ....................... ..... . ... 14-25 14.30 Basic Event Irnportance Measures for Squence 024-01-27-W2A . . . ................ 14-25 14.31 St-5 Sequence 024-01-27-W2B . . . . .................... .. .. . .. ... . 14 26 14.32 Basic Evert hnportance Measures Summary for Sequence 02-064127-W2B .. ... ..... 1d-26 14.33 St.5 Sequence 064-0127 W3A . . . .
14.34
.... .... ..... ... ..... ... ... . 14-?.7 Easic Event importance Summary for Sequence 06-06 01-27-W3A .. .. . .. ,... . 14-2,'
14.35 l 14.36 SlH 5 Swence 3 09-01 W3 A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-28 Basic Event importance Sxnmary for Sequence 3-09-01 27-W3A ..... .. ....... . 14-28 , 14.37 T15 Sequence 3-14.W1 A ........... ...... .... .. ........ .. .. . 14 29 NUREG/CR-6143 xliv Vol. 2, Part I
1 I LIST of Tables (Continued) 14.38 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 3-14-W1A ...................... . 14-29 l 14.39 T15 Sequence 314 W1B p.............................................1430 l 14.40 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 314 W1B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-30 l 14.41 T1 5 Sequence 3 14.W1C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-31 i l 14.42 Basic Event Impertance Su nmary for Sequence 3-14 W1C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-31 T1-5 Sequence 3-14-WlE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-32 l 14.43 ' 14.44 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 3-14 W1E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-32 14.45 T1 5 Sequence 3 14-W2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-33 14.46 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 314-W2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3 3 14.47 T1 5 tat-= 3-14-W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-34 14.48 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 3-14.W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-34 , 14.49 T1 5 Sequence 3 14-W2C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 35 Basic Event Importance Su= mary for Sequence 314-W2C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-35 { 14.50 14.51 TI 5 Sequence 3 14-W2D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 36 [ f 14.52 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 314.W2D ........................ 14-36 14.53 T1 5 Sequence 3-14-W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-37 . 14.54 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 314-W2E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-37 14.55 T1-5 Sequence 5- 15 W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-38 14.56 Basic Event Importance Summary for Sequence 515 W2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-38 , 14.57 T5 ASH Sequence 03-51 3 5-04-W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-39 14.58 Basic Event importance Summary for Sequence 03-51 35-04-W2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-39 14.59 Basic Event Importance Summary for Total Plant Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-40 I i i t
?
I i 1 i i i l I s xlv NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2. Part 1
LlSt of Acronyms ADHR Auxiliary Decay Heat Removal ADS Automatic Depressuruation System ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory BWR Boiling Water Reactor CCW Component Cooling Water CDS Condensate CI- Contamment Isolation CRD ControlRod Drive CRWST Condensate and Refueling Water Storage Transfer System CS Containment Spray CST Condensate Storage Tank CV Check Valves CVS Cmainment Venting System DBA Design Basis Accident DO Diesel Generator ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems ElIC Electro-Hydraulic Controller EHV Emergency Ventilation System ENSDC Enhanced Shutdown Cooling EPS Emergency Power System FCV Flow Control Valve FDW Feed Water System FW Fire Water HCU Hydraulic Control Unit HPCS High Pressure Core Sprey IAS Instrument Air System IRRAS Integrated Reliability and Risk Analysis System LCO Limiting Condition of Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSL Mean Sea Level MSR Moisture Separator Reheater NPSHA Net Positive Suction Head Available NPSHR Net Positive SuctionIIcad Required NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OC Operating Condition POS Plant Operating State PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSW Plant Service Water PWR Pressurned Water Reactor RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RES Research(Office ofNRC) RFPT Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbhse RHR Residual Heat removal RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RRS Reactor Recirculation System RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup System SDC Shutdown Cooling System (s) SGTS Standby Gas Treatment System i l NUREG/CR-6143 xlvi Vol. 2. Part I
List of Acronyms (Continued) SL Safety Limit t SLC Standby Liquid Control SP Suppression Pool SPC Suppression Pool Cooling SPMU Suppression PoolMakeup SPMU SuppressionPoolMakeup SR Surveillance Requirement SRV Safety Relief Valve SSWXT Standby Service Water Crosstic TBCW Turbine Building Cooling Water TBV Turbine Bypass Valve (s) UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 1
)
xlvii NUREG/CR-6143 Vol. 2. Part 1
.i
1 i Foreword (NUREG/CR-6143 and 6144) ' Low Power and Shutdown Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program i Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of severe accidents in nuclear power plarJs have considered initiating events potentially occurring only during full power operation. Some previous screening analyses that were performed for { other modes er operation suggested that risks during those modes were small relative to full power operation. However, more ; reem* studies and operational experience have implied that accidents during low power and shutdown could be significant ! contributors to risk. " During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low pnwer and shutdown operations. The program inchides two parallel projects performed by Brookhaven ! Nstional Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National laboratories (SNL), with the seismic analysis performed by Future Resources , Associates. Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) ard Grarul Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants I to be studied. i The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents due to internal events, internal fires, internal floods, ' arxl seirmic events initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program includes that of a level-3 PRA. r The results of the program are documented in two reports, NUREG/CR-6143 and 6144. The reports are organized as follows: For Grand Gulf: NUREG/CR-6143 - Evaluation of Potential Severe Accidents During Low Power and Shutdown Operations at Grand Gulf, Unit 1 Volume 1: Summary of Results ! Volume 2: Anaiy sis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Events for Plant Operational e State 5 During a Refueling Outage ; Pad 1: Main Report ; Part I A: Sections 1 9 i Part IB: Section 10 ! Part IC: Sections 11 - 14 i Part 2: Internal Events Apperxlices A to 11 ; Part 3: Internal Events Apperxlices I and J j Part 4: Internal Events Appendices K to M ; Volume 3: Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Intemal Fire Events for Plant l Operational State 5 During a Refueling Outage ; Volume 4: A.adysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Flooding Events for Plant i Operational State 5 During a Refueling Outage l Volume 5: Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Seismic Events for Plant Operational l State 5 During a Refueling Outege i Volume 6: Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks for Plant Operational State 5 During a Refueling Outage ; Part 1: Main Repod l Part 2: Suppoding MELCOR Calculations ! l t l I I l NUREG/CR-6143 xlviii Vol 2, Part 1 l
Foreword (Continued) For Surry: NUREG/CR 6144 - Evaluation of Potential Severe Accidents Durmg Low Power and Shutdown Operations at Surry Unit-1
. Volume 1: Summary of Results Volume 2: Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Events During Mid-loop Operations Part 1: Main Report Part 1A: Chapters 1 - 6 Part IB: Chapters 7 - 12 Part 2: Internal Events Appendices A to D Part 3: Internal Events Appendix E Past 3A: Sections E.1 - E.8 Part 3B: Sections E.9 l'.16 Part 4: Internal Events Appendices F to H Part 5: Irdernal Events Appendix 1 Volume 3: Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Fires During Mid loop Operations Part 1: Main Report Part 2: Appendices Volume 4: Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Floods During Mid-loop Operations Volume 5: Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Seismic Events During Mid-loop Operations Volume 6: Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks During Mid-loop Operations Part 1: Main Report Part 2: Appendices l
Vol. 2, Part 1 xlix NUREG/CR-6143
r Acknowledgements The authors wish to acknowledge the following for their contritutions to this study. The numerous individuals at the Grand Gulf site for their help in obtammng information that rnade this analysis possible. Richard C. Robinson, Jr. of the NRC for his support in @ia:n timely support from the IRRAS computer code developers. Kenneth Russell ofIdaho Nuclear Engineering Laboratory for his help in using IRRAS an:1 for providing excellent code support during the use ofIRRAS. Members of the Senior Consulting Group and the BWROO PRA Review Committee for their review an:1 suggested improvements to the project. Finally, to Ellen Walroth and Emily Preston for their secretarial support during the project. NUREG/CR4143 i Vol. 2, Part 1 J
10 Human Reliability Analysis This section of the report describes the Human situations such as LP&S, where procedures may Rdiability Analysis (HRA) performed for the detailed not be all encompassing, the results of study of POS 5. The general methodology used for interviews with operators and other plant conducting the HRA and determining the Human Error personnel become a critical aspect of the HRA. Probabilities (HEPs) for the identified human actions was the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program Human P.eliabilky Analysis Procedure (ASEP HRAP)[ Swain. 10.1 General Methodology and Scope 1987]. The ASEP HRAP was selected for several reasons: In general, the HRA data collection and analysis process (1) The HEPs obtained using the procedure are outlined in the ASEP HRAP was followed. As noted considered to be slightly conservative relative to above, however, the pre-accident human actions included those that would be obtained from other in the analysis used the sanu HEP values that were used methodologies such as THERP [ Swain and in the PRA of GGNS reported in NUREG/CR-4550, Guttman,1983]. Conservative HEP estimates Vol. 6, Rev.1. Thus, less emphasis was placed on j were considered desirable because existing HRA collecting information relevant to pre-accident human I methodologies have not explicitly considered the action quantification. Nevertheless, procedures related to impact of potentially unique performance control of work on plant equipment and facilities, influencing factors (PIFs) which might be protective tagging systems, outage organization, operative during low power and shutdown shutdown protection plans, and surveillance on shutdown (LP&S) conditions. related systems were obtained from GGNS and examined. (2) The ASEP HRAP was used in the full power PRA performed at the Grand Gulf Nuclear To obtain information relevant to analyzing the post-Station (GGNS) e.s part of NUREG/CR-1150 accident human actions, interviews with operators and [USNRC,1989]. By using the same other plant personnel were conducted over a two-day methodology in the present study, compt.risons period. Since the GGNS simulator was not capable of between related full power and LP&S HEPs simulating most of the relevant LP&S accident sequences may be possible. Such comparisons may provide investigated, several current or former GGNS operators insights regarding differences in operat I (individually or in one case a group of three) were behavior during the different modes of verbally presented with various relevant scenarios and operation, and in how the behavior should be asked how they (the control room crew) would respond quantified. In addition, the HEPs fur the pre- to the described situations. They were also asked what accident human actions used in the present study indications would be available to aid them in diagnosing were taken directly from the GGNS PRA the situation and which procedures (if any) would be [Drouin, et al.,1989). Thus, at least some relevant. While all the scenarios analyzed in the PRA degree of methodological internal consistency is could not be covered in the interviews, most of the maintained across the HEPs for the pre- and critica! operator actions analyzed were discussed with the post-accident tasks. operators. Follow-up information and additional data regarding operator actions and time requirements for (3) The ASEP HRAP is straightforward to use and specific operator actions (both inside and outside the has been shown to produce internally consistent control room), were obtained through telephone HEPs that appear to reflect at least the relative conversations with relevant plant personnel. potential of human failures in the nuclear power plant environment. Internal consistency would The generallevel of understanding conveyed by plant seem to be an important factor for the LMS personnel v.hout th: var:ous acMent scer2 rim was used domain, where a complete PRA has not by the HRA analyst in determining the HEPs. In most previously been performed. cases, information obtained from inteiviews was used in conjunction with ASEP HRAP Table 8-3 in determining (4) The procedure allows for straightforward whether the nominal (median) HEP or the upper or lower adjustments in HEPs as a function of the results bound value from the ASEP HRAP diagnosis model from interviews with plant personnel. In (Figure 8-1), should be used in estimating the HEP for a Vol. 2, Part 1 10-1 NUREG/CR-6143 I
HRA perticular diagnosis. In reme cases, it.terview results the same as those used in the NUREG/CR-4550 study of indicated that operators would simply not do some of the GGNS and the HEPs for those events were taken directly actions included in the event trees. For example, from NUREG/CR-4550, Vol. 6, Rev.l. Additional pre-operations personnel indicated that they would not open accident events added to the present study were the MSIVs for ' steaming" or " flooding' of the vessel quantified by using the highest value assigned to a unless there was a vacuum in the condenser. Since a comparable action identified in the NUREG/CR-4550. vacuum in the condenser was determined to be very Table 10.2.1 displays the pre-accident human errors used unlikely during POS 5, the relevant operator action was in the study and their failure probabilities. always assumed to fail. The pre-accident human actions consisted of In addition to interviews with operations personnel, instmmentation miscalibrations and failures in restoring outage management personnel and outage training systems after repair or maintenance. Detailed analyses i personnel were also interviewed to obtain information and modeling of potential misalignments of systems conceming general LP&S practices at GGNS, crew (errors of commission) that could lead to initiating events ! composition during LP&S, shift scheduling, and or latent system unavailabilities specific to the LP&S shutdown specific training. All of the relevant GGNS environment were not conducted in the present study. An Off-Nonnal Event Procedures (ONEPs), Emergency attempt was made, however, to include the contribution Procedures, and system stan-up procedures were of human induced initiating events in the overall provided by the plant and used in the analysis. While a initiating event frequencies (see Section 4). human factors analysis of the control room was not conducted, the llRA analyst for the present study had 10.3 Post-Accident Human Reliability previously participated in full power mode simulator exercises at GGNS and was familiar with the displays g),g and layout of the GGNS control room. 10.3.1 Incorporation of Post-Accident In deriving *he llEPs, the ASEP HRAP was in general Hurnan Actions into PRA Models closely adhered to. Basic human error probabilities for each human action event were determined with the In comparison with full power PRAs, the low decay heat methodology and adjusted according to the rules for levels present during LP&S conditions result in a applying the Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) relatively large number of ways by which cooling can be desenbed in the procedure. Deviations from the provided to the core. In addition, because less stringent prescribed methodology were taken only when it was felt requirements are imposed on operability by the technical that the LP&S environment created a situation that was specifications for shutdown conditions, the availability of not well fitted to the ASEP HRAP. For example, the plant systems is more difficult to specify. These aspects generally long-term scenarios studied under LP&S led to the use of ' generic
- event trees in performing the i conditions led the If RA analyst to rarely assess PRA. He use of generic event trees allows more or less
" extremely high' stress, even when the procedure may the same event trees to be used in representing the have called for it, e.g., more than two primary safety system and operator responses to all initiating events.
systems had fxiled (Table 8-1, Step 10f, ASEP HRAP). Instances where the procedure was not explicitly The resulting event trees, however, were somewhat more followed are discussed in the individual HEP calculation complex and lengthy, and contained more complex tables (Tables 10.1.1 through 10.1.126. operator diagnosis / action events than are typically found l in full power PRAs. In full power PRAs, many of the 10.2 Pre-Accident Iluman Reliability operator action events simply involve the manual initiation of a system that has failed to auto-initiate. For such events, the indications and related operator I diegnoses/ actions are approximately the same regardless Pre-accident human actions (i.e., those human action" of the accident scenario in which they occur. However, which occur before the start of an accident that can in the LP&S environment many of the potential operator interfere with the successful response to an initiating actions are not strictly proceduralized and not always event by rendering needed rystems unavailable), were explicitly covered in the Emergency Procedures. considered for all the systems analyzed in this study. Moreover, diagnosis and performance of many of the Most of the pre-accident actions used in this study were operator actions is dependent on the initiatur and on what NUREG/CR-6143 10-2 Vol. 2, Part I
HRA has occurred or failed to occur previously in the accident procedures, and on the basis of discussions with the sequence. Herefore, in order to accomplish a reasonably other analysts on the PRA team. Specific assumptions valid HRA analysis, it was necessary to do a sequence concerning dependence among actions andjudgements by sequence analysis of the human actions contained in regardir.g the potential success of non-proceduralized the event and fault trees and to attempt to account for the actions are documented in the individual HEP calculation d:pendencies among the different operator actions. tables (Tables 10.1.1 through 10.1.126). l l 10.3.2 Treatment of Dependencies and Non- 10.3.3 Results of the Post-Accident Human i Proceduralized Actions Reliability Analysis Several general guidelines were used in the treatment of Since generic event trees were used for the PRA, the non-proceduralized operator diagnoses / actions an'd operator actions ssked in the analysis of the accident dependencies across operator actions within an accident sequences for the different initiators were in general the scenario. The guidelines included the following: same. However, because the various initiators have differing impacts on the system and therefore the nature j (1) In general, credit was given for operators of the accident sequences, the HEP for the same operator correctly diagnosing and carrying out a non- action could vary across initiators. Furthermore, the proceduralized action if, on the basis of the site HEP for the same operator action could also vary within interviews, it wasjudged that the operators had a the analysis of a particular initiator as a function of the ; clear understanding of the event in question and of difierent system and operator successes and failures the requirements for responding to the event. occurring in the different sequences. Therefore, multiple HEPs were possible for a given operat< r action. (2) In most cases, credit would not be given for a non-proceduralized action if a critical human In order to document which particular HEP was used for action, clearly indicated by procedure, had failed a given operator action in a given sequence for a given in the sequence being analyzed and the pattern of initiator, Tables 10.3.1 through 10.3.31 was created. failures across the sequence suggested operator nese tables present for each initiator a listing of each of
" confusion". the operator actions included in the analysis, the associated HEP number, and a sequence locator file (3; In determining the requirements for a particular name, ne sequence locator file provides a brief operator diagnosis \ action, any logically necessary description of the sequence context in which the HEP human actions which had failed in earlier events was applied, identifies the relevant sequences, and lists were included in the subsequent event, e.g., the associated HEPs and error factors. The sequence manual system isolations necessary for success. locator files can be found in Appendix K.
(4) Complete or zero dependence across events in a The calculation and supporting rationale for each of the sequence was assigned as a function of the logical individual HEPs using the ASEP HRAP procedure is relationship between those events. For example, presented in Tables 10.1.1 through 10.1.126. Each HEP in a given human action event, it may have been is numbered. A simple listing (sorted by HEP number) possible for an operr. tor to use any of several of each of the post-accident human actions, its mean systems to respond to the problem. However, if HEP, and its associated error factor is presented in Table ' limited time was available for the event being 10.3.32. Identical information is presented in Table analyzed, credit for trying all the available 10.3.33, but the data is sorted alphanumerically by systems may not have been taken at that point. human action identifier. According to the ASEP , Therefere, any subsequent events which assumed I.' RAP, the HEPs obtai:ed nth the ASEP HRAP that a panicular system had or had not been used procedure are assumed to be median values from a would be set to succeed or fail accordingly. lognormal distribution. The median values were converted to means for use in the analysis using the The above guidelines often required subjective judgments following formula: on the part of the HRA analyst. Thesejudgments were bued on the impressions drawn from the interviews with plant personnel, on examinations of the relevant Mean = Median a exp lin Error Factorl'5.412 Vol. 2, Part i 10-3 NUREG/CR-6143 )
)
4 1 HRA 10.5 Time Windows j 10.4 Recovery Actions Analysis As part of the Time Window Analysis, the core damsge The recovery phase of a PRA analysis usually involves sequences surviving the recovery analysis discussed in j taking credit for human actions that restore or repair Section 10.4 were re-examined. His allowed for a more failed systems; or that involve the alignment of systems realistic modeling of the surviving POS 5 core damage , i that may be available to respond to the accident, but for sequences to account for the change in decay heat loads some reason were not included in the original analysis. experienced as the unit transitions from the beginning of For example, credit for use of the plant Fire Water POS 5 to the end of POS 5 during a refueling outage. It - System to provide makeup to the vessel is often not taken also made possible the relaxation of the original l j in the basic PRA analysis because of the complexity and assumptions regarding the unavailability of Train A length of time required to align the system in some ECCS equipment. These two aspects of the Time ! plants. Window Analysis required that the values asi.igned to the human actions be re-examined. ,
)
In the present analysis, while credit was taken for the
- traditional recovery actions such as restoration of LOSP, As a result of this re-examination, several of the HEP j a the nature of the event trees and the associated HRA calculations described in Section 10.3 were n
- vised. The f
. enalysis sometimes resulted in available systems or safety revised calculations are presented in the Section 10.5 l I related actions not being credited during the basic Tables. These tables use the same HEP number as the enalysis. Thus, where appropriate, credit for such original number given in Section 10.3, plus a revision systems and actions were applied to the surviving cut sets number to uniquely identify the updated HEP being during the recovery analysis. The recovery related described by the table. Thus, Table 10.5.2RI.1 is ] operator actions were quantified using the ASEP HRAP. revision one of Table 10.5.2.1, etc. < A list of the recovery actions, the associated mean HEPs ! j ond error factors, and the HEP calculation numbers are ; i presented in Table 10.4.1. He individual HEP i { calculations and the supporting rationale for each L ] recovery action are found in Tables 10.1.116 through !
- 10.1.126.
. ?
1 4 i I i - i , 1 ] l l ] NUREG/CR-6143 10-4 Vol. 2, Part 1 j l . J i 1 ;
1 l l HRA l References for Section 10 { [ Swain,1987] A.D. Swain, " Accident (USNRC,1989] USNRC, " Severe Accident Sequence Evaluation Risks: An Assessment for I Program Human Reliability Five U.S. Nuclear Power Analysis Procedure,' Plants," NUREG-1150, NUREG/CR-4772, June,1989. ; February,1987. ; [Detuin, et al.,1989] M.T. Drouin et al., [ Swain and Guttman,1983] A.D. Swain and H.E. " Analysis of Core Damage Guttman, ' Handbook of Frequency: Grand Gulf, , Human Reliability Analysis Unit 1 Internal Events," , with Emphasis on Nuclear NUREG/CR-4550, Power Plant Applications," SAND 86-2084, Vol. 6, ! i NUREG/CR-1278, Rev.1 Part 1, September, SAND 804200, August, 1989. L 1983. e l i P f I i l l l l Vol. 2, Part 1 10-5 NUREG/CR-6143
Z Table 10.1.1.1
- E HEP 1 Calculation en 9
n y Human Action Event (1) OPSDC (1) b Event Tree (s)(2) SDC ADH, TIA5H, ElB5H, E2B5H, TSD5H, E2T5H, S3-5, S3H-5 Initiators (3) TI, TAB 5H, TIASH, ElB5H, E2B5H, T5D5H, E2T5H, S3-5, S3H-5, TIOF5, TIHP5, TIOP5, TLM5H,TRPTS Sequence L.ocator Files (4) OPSDC.SDC, OPSDC. TAB, OPSDCSDC.TIA, OPSDC.E2Is, RESB.ElB, OPSDC.T5D, OPSDC.E2T, OISSLS35, OISSLS3H, OPSDC.TIF, OPSDC.TIH, OPSDC.TIO, OPSDC.TLM, OPSDC.TRP Event Description (5) OPSDC in this case represents the operator action to detect the loss of operating RHR/SDC loop (or ADHRS in the TAB 5H sequences) and enter the appropriate procedure (Inadequate Decay Heat Removal). Under some conditions, such as a LOSP with successful diesel generator start, the event also includes the simple operator action to attempt a restart of the previously operating SDC loop. Event Context (6) SDC was being provided by one train of RHR (or ADHRS). The other RHR/SDC loop is assumed Ei out for maintenance. If initially on RHR/SDC, ADHRS was not considered to be a viable option 6 for restoring SDC because it would be inadequate for cooling during the first 24 hours aft..r shutdown. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-III-1)
?
.N
?
;1
y
~
Tchle 10.1.1.2 Sequence Timing and Indications
$ Event / Occurrence Time (r ) Annunciator / Indication Comneds/
(of most inte:tst) Operato'r (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) Loss of operating O In most cases (pump trip, system isolation, loss of heat sink During shutdown, SDC is a primary RilR/SDC loop or loss (SSW), etc.) a loss of SDC will be alarmed. In addition, function and a major concern of the any form of SDC with a given events such as LOSP, loss of SSW, or loss of AC operators. Lw of SDC is covered loss of the AC bus. bus, operators are trained to know that SDC will isolate or during simulator training prior to each he rendered unavailable. outage. Furthermore, the ONEPs relevant to such events often note the loss of SDC. A loss of SDC will also be indicated by coolant temperature, flow, and discharge pressure changes. Operators are required by the plant to check reactor coolant temperature every 30 minutes at the chart recorder. E3 O Z C lc b a llo 0 >
y Table 10.1.1.3 po 7
- o Pbterdial Operator Actior.
8 s y Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Commentsi r of Event Abnormal Events Required to I%rform Source of Information
" Action and Procedures (1) (2) (4)
(3) A loss of SDC occurs as a random One 1. Retrieve and read relevant Complete dependence was assumed event or as a result of the initiating ONEP. between the control room event. OPSDC includes operator diagnosing the loss of SDC, actions to detect the loss of SDC, 2. For some scenarios, attempting a restart when enter ONEP for Inadequate Decay attempt restart of appropriate, and entering the Heat Removal and, in some cases, previously operating relevant ONEP. attempt a restart of the system RIIRISDC loop from That is, it was assumed that if a from the control room (e.g., a control room. (An attempt correct diagnosis was made, the LOSP with successful diesel to restart the previously evaluatal actions would be generator start). operating SDC system was performed This assumption of assumed to be an dependence was based on "immediate emergency discussions with plant personnel O action" per ASEP, Table regarding training and procedures
- 8-5, and was assumed to for a loss of SDC and on the fact always follow a correct that, in most cases, the operators diagosis of loss of SDC). need only enter the relevant procedures (also see column 3 of this table).
i l l I
?
?
2
y Tr.ble 10.1.1.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task I
$ Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / 4 (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perfonn the Identified Source of Information Act (r,) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5)
(2) (3) (4) Detect / 37 minutes 0 37 minutes _ SEA Calculation C90-492 Diagnose a A16 loss of SDC Table 10.1.1.5 Operator Action Performance Time Activities Location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (r,) Sourte of Information Time (T) Ti:ne (T,) y (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and Control Room -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read ONEP is read ONEP for Table 8-1. Step Sa) a conservative assurnption given the inadequate training the operators receive. Decay Heat However, the delay seenuxi consistent Removal with the " diversity of activities" ongoing during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent. l
- 2. Attempt restart Control Room -
I minute for travel & 1 minute of system if Panel manipulation time appmpriate - (ASEP Table 8-1, simply tum Step 5b) switch to start 3 O , N lC 6 E E w >
y Table 10.1.1.6 $ g Diagnosis Time for Operator Action > Q 5 y Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / I (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosas (T) Source of G) (3) (4) Information (5) Detect / Diagnose 37 minutes 6 minutes =31 minutes less of SDC Tahie li).1.1.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Comments / ' (1) Diagnose (3) (4) Source of Information G) (5) [o Detect / Diagnose Per ASEP Table 8-3, the lower N/A Median IIEP = 1E-4 loss of SDC would certainly be a " classic" o loss of SDC bound value from ASEP F gute Mean llEP = 8.5E-4 event in the LPS environment and operators at 8-1 for =31 minutes diagrasis GGNS receive substantial training an the time was assigned event. Interviews with operators indicated a good awareness of the relevant i>xlicators and a need to closely monitor the re".aant indicators. Thus, the criteria listed in Table 8-3 for the lower bound were met. o 2 _ _- , .-, , 7 -, - . , - - - , _ - - , . _ , . _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - - , _ _ . - - -
E Tabla 10.1.1.8 P Post-Diagnosis Action-Type Identification
?
a
~
Action Safety Systans Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Connnents (1) (2) Use EOP3, Well Operator Mist Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perfonn (5) (6) (3) Concurrent Tasks _ (4) N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' Actions assumed completely dependent with diagnosis (see Table 1-3 for rationale). l Table 10.1.1.9 _ Post-Diagnosis Shs-Level Identification o Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5)
.;/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' Actions assumed completely dependent with diagnosis (see Table 1-3 for rationale).
7. C M b 8 m r E
3 Table 10.1.1.10 % 5 Total IIEP > m 9 o
- c Action Original Independent Total IIEP EF Commentsi
{ w (1) Operator IIEP (IIEP ) Check / Correction IIEP (4) (5) Sourte of Information (6) (2)' OIEP ) (3)
- 1. Detect / Diagnose loss Diagnosis and N/A Median = IE-4 1 Since the relevant actions of SDC, attempt Actions: 0 were assumed to be restart of system if Mean = 8.5E-4 *immediate ur-.r.xy appropriate, enter Median = IE-4 actions
- and completely ONEP dependent with the Mean = 8.5E-4 diagnosis, credit for a second check was not given.
5 S P 2 3 e
a
< Tchle 10.!.2.1 P-HEP 2 Calcadation P
~c h Human Action Evmt (1) OPSDC (2)
Event Tree (s)(2) ADH, TIASH, eld 5H, E2D5h, T5D511 S3-5, S3-5H E2V5H, Initiators (3) TI, TIA5H., EID5H, E2D5H, TSD5H, S3-5, S3-5H R2V5H, TIOFS, T1HPS, TIOP5, TLMSH,TRPT5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPSDC. ADH, OPSDCADH.TIA, RESAD.EID, OPSDCADH.E2D, OPSDC.T5D, OISSLS35, OISSLS3H. OPSDC.E2V, OPSDC.TIF, OPSDC.TIH, OPSDC.TIO, OPSDC.TLM, OPSDC.TRP Event Description (5) OPSDC in this case includes the control room crew detecting the loss of the ADHRS, entering the inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP, and initiating a standby source of SDC (RHR(B)) per SOI 04-1-01-E12-1. Event Context (6) SDC was being provided by ADHRS, one train of RHR/SDC is in standby. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), Residual Heat Removal SOI (04 g Ol-E12-1) b z 8 a M i 5 e >
z $ Table 10.1.2.2 E Sequence Timing and Indications Fi
- c i Conansents/
O EvenUOccurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication 6perator (3) Source of (of most interest) Infernestion (1) Alerted (2) (4) 0 In most cases. (pump trip, system / valve During shutdown, SDC is a primary A loss of ADHRS (operating mode isolation, loss of heat sink, etc.) a loss of function and a major concern of the of SDC) operators. Loss of SDC is covered ADHRS will be alarmed, in addition, given certain initiators, operators are trained to know during simulator training prior to each ADHRS will isolate or be rendered unavailable. outage. Furthermore, ONEPS relevant to such events will usually note the h>ss of ADHRS; a loss of SDC will also be indicated by coolant temperature, flow, and discharge pressure changes. Operators are required by the plant to check reactor coolant temperatures every 30 9 E minutes at the chart recorder. b r E y 2
- 1
g Table 10.1.2.3 P lbiential Operator Action . P 2 [ Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Cm._.~.:.J of Event Abnonnal Events Required to Perform Sourre of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) A loss of ADlIRS occurs as a One 1. Enter ONEP for IDilR De RIIR/SDC initiation procedure random event, spurious isolatioti, also directs operators to place IPCI or as a result of the initiating 2. Start standby RilR/SDC loop per (C)in standby (follwing completion event. OPSDC in this case SOI Gt-i-01-E12-1 of o:her actions). While it is includes detecting the loss of assumed operators will follow ADilRS, entering IDilR ONEP, - Isolation of ADilRS procedures, the control rann can and initiating a standby source of includes opening breaker initiate SDC (B) prior to these steps SDC (RliR(B)) per procedure. outside control nmm per being completed. Placing LPCI (C) Step 5.15.2d in standby was assumed to be completely dependent with initiating RilR initiated from control RilR/SDC(B). nmm _o G Table 10.1.2.4 Time Available to Diagtmse and Perform the Task Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the identified Sourre of Information Act (T,) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate RilR/SDC (B) 37 minutes 0 37 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 A16 Z C x s x s E m h
Z Table 10.1.2.5 % E Operator Action Performance Time .. N El 8
- Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments /
h (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (r) Time (T,) Sourte of Infonnation w (3) (5) (4) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and read ONEP CR 5 minutes (Table 5 minutes See HEP I (OPSDC (1)), Table 1-5 for for IDHR _
8-1. Step SA) rationale.
- 2. Initiate RIIR/SDC (B) It was assumed that most (but not all)
(includes isolation of control room actions could occur in ADiiRS to prevent parallel with operator trip to open overpressurization oflow breaker (ASEP Table 8-1, Step 7). pressure piping and
~
placement of LPCl(C) in stanaby) CR - 5 minutes 5 minutes valve alignment y and system RHR (C) 14 minutes I minute 15 minutes Travel and performance time for g initiation from pump room, =25 minutes opening breaker was established on the control room basis of discussions with plant aux. bldg. p.momcl. open breaker outside CR as part of isolation of ADHRS O o E
< Tchte 10.1.2.6 E Diagnosis Time for Operator Action P
2 2 Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (r) Source of (2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to align and 37 minutes 25 minutes . 12 minutes initiate RilR/SDC (B) Table 10.1.2.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) IIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5)
@ Diagnose loss of Per ASEP Table 8-3, the lower N/A Median = 0.005 less of SDC would certainly be a " classic
- U SDC and need for bound value from Figure 8-1 Mean = 0.0133 event in the LPS environment and operators at standby SDC for 12 minutes diagnosis time GGNS receive substantial training on the was assigned event. Interviews with operators indicated a good awareness of the relevant indicators and a need to closely monitor the relevant indicators. Thus, the criteria listed in Table 8-3 for the lower bound were met.
2 C W b a M 0 >
Z Table 10.1.2.8 %
@ Pbst-Diagnosis ActionTypeIdentification 5 8 per Step 19, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP h Action Safety Systans Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynarnic or Connnents w Use EOPs, Well Operator Mint (1) (2) Step-by-Step Source ofInfonnation Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurred (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) - Align & N/A ONEPS clear and No Step-by-Step Actions are clearly defined Initiate well-designed in by pmcedure. RHRISDC regard to diagnosmg , (B) and initiating ' standby SDC Table 10.1.2.9 _ Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification 9, per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP co r Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase Moor Than Two Operator Stress Level Comnients/ (1) Aher IE in Safety Systenis Familiar (6) Source of infonnation (2) Larte LOCA Fail W/ 4 .s (7) i (3) (4) (5) t Align and N/A' N/A No* N/A Moderately High initiate . RHRISDC (B)
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 F(>r the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of rnore than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was exammed as a function of the context. Y a
.c,
.-~..-we#,.. . ~ . . . . ..---mm..s m . . . . .. , - - , . . . . , , . , . , . , , - - , . p_., ..,-.ry..we ---
- - , , .re-,. -.,mm,* e---p<,y--
l
< TaNe 19.1.2.10 E Total HEP 5 l
{ Action Original Independent TotalIIEP EF f'._ _ __ J (1) Operator HEP Clwck/Comcbon (4) (5) Sourte of Information (HEP ) HEP (6) ' (2)" (HEP) 0)
~
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.005 -
Med. Mean 10 Given the limited time Mean = 0.0133 0.005 0.0133 available for diagnosmg and conducting the actions (one of which wr.s outside control room), credit for a second l! check was not given.
- 2. Align and initiate standby Median = 0.02 -
0.02 ~0.032 5 Opening of the breaker is a SDC (RIIR/ SDC(B)). Mean = 0.032 0.025 0.046 to safety measure related to i The straightforward, isolating ADilR and its l conceptually integrated Total Median failure or delay would not ' 5 set of proceduralized ilEP= 0.025 prevent successful start of
$ actions (Steps 5.15.2 and SDC (B). Similarly, placing )
4.2.2.e) were assumed to Total Mean llEP LPCI(C)in standby, wluch ] be completely dependent. = 0.046 is subsequent to startmg j (See cori: nents in RilR/SDC(B)in the l Column 6 for additional procedure, will not affect l inform 6 son). initiation or operation of SDC(B). z h 8 s r
. s
~
r 1 Z :c E Table 10.1.3.1 $
$ HEP 3 Calculation a
lc Human Action Event (1) OPDHR (1) w Event Tree (s)(2) L LA,LP, LAP Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, TDB5H, T5DSH, ElB5H, EID5H E2DSH, EIT5H, EIV5H, TLM5H, TRPTS, TlHP5, TIOF5 Sequence Locator Files (4) OPDHR&.LP&, OPDHR&.TIA, OPDHR.TDB, OPDHRP.T5D, OPDHRP.ElB, OPDHRP.EID, OPDHRP.E2D, OPDHRLP.EIT, OPDHRLAP.EIV. OPDHR.TLM, OPDHR.TRP, OPDHR.TlH OPDHROP.TlH, OPDHR.TIF Event Description (5) OPDHR is the operator action to control vessel level in order to avoid a ' functional
- loss of SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the vessel. Hat is, even if SDC continues to operate, if vessel level becomes too low, a " disconnect
- between the core and dov.wes regions can occur. His will result in inadequate cooling of the core even though SDC continues to operate. He indications to the operators that the event is occurring can be subtle because temperature readings are apparently taken from the downcomer region, where the water being cooled by SDC is returned. Also, the vessel level would not be so low that any level alarms would sound. A loss of forced recirculation, or a loss of makeup (usually CRD) coupled with continued draindown, can lead to inadequate level. Only 10 minutes was allowed for the operator diagnosis and actions in OPDHR.
,o d
Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPDHR (1) calculation (HEP 3) are that RWCU auto-isolates (an LOSP occurs or IA is lost) or the initiator was a loss of forced recirculation, a loss of(CRD) makeup, or an inadvertent overfill of the vessel that had been stopped. It was assumed that with only a loss of forced recirculation or a loss of makeup occurring, the resulting alarms would immediately lead the operators to isolation of RWCU (letdown). In the case of a recent overfill that was stopped, it was assumed that the operators would be attending to level and that any following loss of forced recirculation or makeup windd also lead to an isolation of RWCU. App'icable Procedures (7) No specific procedures, but the inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1) would be relevant, as would the relevant SOls, e.g., RHR SOI(04-1-01-E12-1).
?
I 2 g.. - - . . ,--.-,m -- _- , _ . _ . _ - -. _ _ _ _ , _ _ . , , , , , , , , - , _ - _ , . . _ . . . , - -
< Table 10.1.3.2 E Sequence Timing and Indications 2
2
~
Event /Oc. u uou Time (T ) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Opera *le (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) TDilR caused by O As noted in Table 3-1, the indications for this event may be inadequate circulation subtle because vessel temperature readmgs could be between the core and the misleading and no level alarms would sound. However, in downcomer regions of all the sequences covered, CRD and/or forced recirculation the vessel. Level control is lost. These events will be alarmed and if the operators (makeup) is needed. are knowledgeable regarding the potential problem, these indications should suffice. Table 10.1.3.3 Pbtastial Operator Action 5 b Description Number of Activitis (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to INrform Sourte of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) A " functional" loss of SDC leads One The operators naxi to increase to IDilR. The operators need to RPV water level with any available diagnose the need and increase injection system. CRD (if vessel level. available), CDS, or an ECCS system are possible choices. Z C hO 8 llc 6 % E m N
4 ?
- 7. Table 19.1.3.4 :C
@ Tinse Available to Diagnone and Perfonn the Task $
8 s , Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maxienunt Time Available Cosamesetsl i (w (1) Operator Must Act (T,) is Aler1ted that Sympteen has Occurred (T,) to Perform the Identified Operator Activities (T,) Source of Infonnation (5) ) (2) (3) (4) T = The operators need to 10 minutes 0 10 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 I diagnose the need to A16 j increase level to avoid
- inadequate core i cooling.
Table 10.1.3.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time i Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / y (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T,) Source of Infonnation ea (3) (4) (5) (6) If available, increase CR - 2 minutes 2 minutes Note that travel and manipulation (performance) flow with CRD. If CRD times in the control room were determined using is not available and SDC Since more than ASEP Table is not being provided by one system may 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under the SDC(B), use CDS. need to tried,2 performance time column. Otherwise, use an ECCS minutes, rather system. than I minute The actions involved in initiating a makeup system Note. With only 10 min. was assumed for were assumed to be completely dependent. System available for OPDilR, if conducting the initiation would be proceduralized. CDS was asked and it activities. failed, credit was not taken for both CDS and an ECCS system. b s' 7 a
< Ttble 10.1.3.6 E- Diagnosis Thne for Operator Action P
2 l Action Maxhnum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Available (T,) Time !T,) to Diagnosis (T ) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) The operators need to 10 minutes 2 minutes 8 minutes diagnose the need to it crease level to avoid inadequate core cooling. Table 10.1.3.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalllEP Sourte of Infonnation _. (2) (4) (5)
?
is Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.15 The site interviews indicated that the provide makeup median value from Figure S-i operators are aware of the pmblem of concern for 8 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.40 and have a clear inAirdanding of the was assigned. requirements. However, with the potential subtlety of the indicators , the absence of any explicit procedures, and the time limitations, the lower bound diagnosis value was not assumed appropriate. Z C M a M % 6 Em s
z Table 18.1.3.8 % E 8 Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type ident Twntion per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP s R x i D Action Safety Systans Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dy-amic or Comments (1) (2) Use E0Ps Well Operator Must SteAy-Step Sourte ofInformation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate an N/A Interviews indicated No Dyruunic. injection that the operators system to were knowledgeable Given that the provide about the need for operators would
, makeup. the actions. have determme which system to start on their own and without much time, the actions h were assumed to M
be dynamic, per ASEP. I a
< Tr.ble 10.1.3.9 E Post-Diagnosis Stress-Ivel Identification P per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 2
a
~
Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Imel Comments / (1) After1E in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5)
~
Initiate an N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Seseral systems available injection High and substantial time before system to core damage. provide makeup.
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
?
Li z C h e 9 x
+ M I >
w w-__ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ - - - _ - - - * * * --t w r- - *__-- _ a_____ m -
Z Tcble 10.1.3.10 Z h Total HEP $ 8 fi y Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Censments/ g (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Seuree of
'd (HEP ) HEP ImrA (2)* (HEP) (6) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.15 -
'Med. Mean (10) 0.15 0.40 Mean = 0.40
- 2. Initiate an injection system to Med = 0.05 Credit for a second 0.05 0.081 ~11e error factcr
.L5)_
provide makeup and vessel level Mean = 0.081 check was not taken 0.20 0.48 (10) associated with the control. because of the time domment HEP was limitations. Total Median assigned. HEP = 0.20 Total Mean HEP 5 = 0.48 S S P O a
- m. - - . _ ,--.-- . , * , -. , - - . - - . ,-. _
y Tchle 10.1.4.1 P HEP 4 Calculation P ? i Human Action Event (1) LCMK (1) Event Tree (s)(2) L, LA, LP, LAP. TIOPS Initiators (3) TIOP5, TI-5, TRIrr5, TORV5, TIOFS, TIHPS, ElV5H, EITSH, E2C-5 Sequence locator Files (4) LCMK.TIO, OPDHRHYD.TIO, OPDHR&.LP&, OPDHRHYD LP, OPDHR.TRP, _OPDHRHYD.TRP, OPDHRHYD.TRV, OPDHR.TIF. OPDHR.TIH, OPDHROP.TIH, OPDHRLAP.ElV, OPDHR.EIV, OPDHR.EIT, OPDHRLP.EIT, OPDHRHYD.E2C Event Description (5) LCMK is the operator action to recognize that makeup is greater than letdown and control makeup. Event Context (6) The importat.t constants for the LCMK (1) calculation (HEP 4) is that letdown is isolated and therefore mskeup (CRD) needs to be controlled. In most cases, the operators hate initiated makeup (CRD) to avoid a loss of SDC created by a disconnect between the core and downcomer regions of the vessel. For the TIOP5 initiator, letdown (RWCU) has inadvertently isolated and the operators must control level. In both cases, overfill and overpressurization are of concern and the operators have 2.5 hours to realize that they need to control makeup. For HEP 4, makeup is always with CRD. Level cannot increase rapidly with CRD, relative to when makeup might be y provided with CDS or an ECCS system. Applicable Pzocedures (7) No specific procedures other than EP-2, RPV Control, Rev.19. Z h 8 s M % 0
z %
- @ Table 10.1.4.2 5 s Sw.-.c. Timi= and inacatio-i 5
M b EvenUOccurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication O Ceaune.ts/ ; (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2)
- (4) !
, letdown is isolated, O Inadvertent isolation or loss of RWCU will be alanned. In
~
l makeup is with CRD, some scenarios, the operators have isolated RWCU after it and operators need to failed or RWCU has auto-isolated. In all cases, level and ; control level. pressure will be increasing and optrators will have approximately 2.5 hours to realize the need to control level. I i
! f i
Table 10.1.4.3 I Pbtential Operator Action y. M Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / , of Event Abnormal Events Required to INriorm Source of Information r (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) t Letdown is isolated, makeup is One The operators simply need to , with CRD, and operators need to control flow rate and the 1 control level. accompanying level increase to avoid overpressurization. Makeup , is with CRD. i r i
< l 2
.i
-. ---.--.v.c...%, ,_,,..,-..-,e-,,,-...-.-, ..,,-.
_m _-..,. ~- m,_ -_...-,,..-..,,_.-....,,,,,..,---,_,m,r,v..,_-..,,- ,--,.-.,-t-,,...,c...
1 Table 10.1.4.4 9- Thne Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task , y
- Action Time by Winch Time at Which Operator Marinnen Timme Available CM
~
(1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Mone the Identified Soum ofInfonmation Operator Activities (T,) (5) Act (T) has Occumd (T) (2) 0) (4) i The operators need to 150 minutes 0 150 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 realize that makeup is A16 , greater than letdown and control level. i Table 10.1.4.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time Activities Imtion Travel Performance Total Action Conunents/ 5 Time (T,) Source of Information (1) (2) Time (T) Time (r) td 0) (4) (5) (6) Control flow and level CR - I minute I minute Nate that travel and manipulation (performance) times in the control room were ai.=m.e4 using with CRD. ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column. System control would be proceduralized. L i Z C N b
- s x r s
I i , t 2 Table 10.1.4.6 % j @ Diagnosis Tiene for Operator Action i m O 5
~
n , j
- Action Maximum Time t
~
Total Action Time Available b (1) Available (T" ) Canuments/ j 0 Time (T ) to Diagnosis (T) Sourte of 1 (2) (3) * (4) Inforunation (5) The operators neal to 150 minutes I minute Approx.149 minutes
- realize that makeup is greater than letdown and control level.
Table 10.1.4.7
- Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted /
t Comments / j (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Soorte of Information - o (2) (4) (5) Recognize that Per ASEP Table 8-3. the 3 Med. = 6.5E-5 The site interviews indicated that the makeup is greater median value from Figure 8-1 operators are aware of the problem of concern than letdown and for 149 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 5.0E-4 and have a clear understanding of the i control level. was arsigned. , requirements. No explicit procedures other : i than indicator based emergency procedures. i i l i 0 4 a l l I
Table 10.1.4.8 r Pest-06 4 Action Type Idenhfication per Step le, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP JJ I 3 Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Canunents (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tmb (4) Control N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-ctep level, that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions. Table 10.1.4.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP llRAP y Action T < 2h Retirc. Phase MoreThan Two Operator Shrss Level Comments / (1) AIterIE in Safety Systans Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Control N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Controlling level is a CRD to High straightforward operation of avoid which all operators are overpress- familiar. urization
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
l For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of raore than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of z extremely high stress. Each human action event was examineel as a function of the context. C W b 8 W
- 6 5 e
i
Z TENe 19.1.4.10 :E E Total HEP ~ 8 n
- c Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Co. .~2 h (1) OperatorIIEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of w
(IIEP ) HEP Information (2)' (IIEP,) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 6.5E-5 -
Med. Mean (10) 6.5E-5 5.0E-4 Mean = 5.0E-4
- 2. Control flow rate and level with Med. = 0.02 Credit fer a second 0004 0.01 f) Second chak HEPs CRD. Mean = 0.032 check was given 0.004 0.011 (5) are multiplied by the because of the additional original HEP for time with little else of Total Median HEP cach action.
concem. HEPs for = 0.004 failure to provide a The error factor second check were: Total Mean HEP associated with the 5 = 0.011 dominant HEPs was S Med. = .2 assigned. Mean = .323 o-
.N
-% . _ , .<,--e. ~ , _ - - ,- -._. ,,-
,,, ._ - ~ - - - = _. --
< Tr.ble 19.1,5.1 E HEP 5 Calculation P
I { Human Action Event (1) OPISV (17) Event Tree (s)(2) F,FP Initiators (3) TDB5H. TI-5, TLM5H. EIT5H Sequence Locator Files (4) ,OPFLDFR.TDB, OPFLDHY2.EP, OPFLDHYD.TLM, OPFLDLER.EIT, OPFLDLER.TLM, OPFLDRM.EIT, OPFLDRM.TLM, OPFLDRMH.TLM Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of vessellcontainment flooding when only 1 SRV can be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPFLD (HEP 28), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the multiple SRVs indicated by pmcedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPFLD succeeds and must occur in the same time period. Event Context (6) For the OPISV (17) calculation (HEP 5), OPECS or OPDHR have succeeded, but all ECCS systems have failed or are unavailable. Hus, the operators have attempted to do the correct actions, but the systems asked have failed or been unavailable. One option available to the 5 operators to provide level and core cooling is to flood the vessel / containment. SSWXT or FW are 8 systems that could (potentially) be used to flood. If vessel level is too low and not increasing, EP-2 calls out for alternate level control which will eventually lead the operators to flomling. The issue is whether the operators will initiate flooding with SSWXT if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPFLD succeeds. Applicable Procedures (7) ; Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19), RHR 501 l (04-1-01-E12-1, Step 6.10) z C e 9 i 5 0 >
z Table 10.1.5.2 * '
% Sew Timing and I=Ar=tious 5 8
a
- c Event / Occurrence Tinie (T*) Annemiciator/ Indication Comuments/
b (of unset interest) Operater (3) Somme of D (1) Alerted Inferumatise (2) (4) ECCS systems are not O in addition to numerous alarms and indications which available and core would already be present, reactor temperature (and in some cooling and makeup are cases pressure) will be increasing). The crew has been needed. The question is attempting to respond to existing problems and will be whether they will flood aware of the need to provide core cooling in some way. with only 1 SRV open. Low level alarms woulu likely to occur during this period. , The control room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of SRVs. Table 10.1.5.3 o Potential Operator Action I Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Sourte of Information j (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4)
- (3)
{ Operators are attempting to One - Check closed MSIVs It was assumed the SSWXT would
- respond to IDHR, but no ECCS -
Ensure that several (one in be the operators first choice for systems are available. this case) SRVs are open flooding and credit was not taken OPISV asks whether the operators - Align and initiate SSWXT for both SSWXT and FW in the I will attempt to flood if only 1 SRV - for flooding sequences covered by this HEP. can be opened. EP-2 directs
- several SRVs to be opened. The question is whether they will proceed with the initiation of flooding if they can get only 1
=-
SRV. M i 7
- 1 k --- -
< Tchle 10.1.$.4 ?- Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task V 7 1 C.- - M 2 Action Time by which Time at Which Maximum Time ~ (1) Operator Must Opera *or Available Source of Information Act (T,) % *rted that to Perfonn tiv (5) (2) hymptom Identified has Occurrul (T*) Operator (3) Activities (T,) , (4) Initiate containment 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C9CM92-01-A16 flooding with only i Note. Dere is clearly a dependency between SRV. His task must OPFLD and OPISV. Essentially they cortoitute the occur in the same same action, but an additional diagnosis is involved time frame allowed in OPISV. Since OPISV is asked only when for OPFLD. Hat OPFLD succeeds and must occur in the same time is, it must occur in period, it was decided that the llEP for OPISV the same 23 would be determined as if it were OPFLD (HEP 28 minutes. in this case), except for one difference. Five minutes y Functionally, less would be available for the diagnosis because of M OPISV is OPFLD, the time lost in responding to the failure to get except that only I several SRVs open. Operators would probably make SRV is available. several attempts to get one more SRV open and OPISV is asked would discuss proceeding with 1 SRV among each only when OPFLD other. He site interviews indicated the operators succeeds. would be likely to proceed with water solid operations even though only 1 SRV was available. b 8 Fi N 6 3: - b
Z Table 19.1.5.5 5 h Operator Action Ptrionnance Time 5 5c Activities Iecation Travd Perfon'ance Total Action Comments / h (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T,) Sourte ofInformation
- 0) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and read EP-2 CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to raneve and study EP-2 is a and apply to LP&S Table 8-1, Step conservative assumption given the training the context. Sa) operators receive. However,'the delay seemed consistent with the
- diversity of activities
- ongoing during LP&S and with the idea that some
- generalization
- of EP-2 to the LP&S context would be required.
- 2. Check closed M?!Vs CR -
I minute I minute De critical actions for flooding containment werejudged to be an integrated set of actions.
- 3. Make several attempts CR -
5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding to get the second SRV with flooding with only one SRV would be a j g open and discuss viable and likely option. He immediate objective l 6 proceeding with 1 SRV is to get some form of decay heat removal ! operating and flooding with 1 SRV would provide core cooling.
- 4. Ensure i SRVs open CR -
1 minute I minute Also note that per ASEP Table 8-1. Step Sb, a 1 min. travel and manipulation time was assumed for each action. l
- 4. Initiate SSWXT per CR -
I minutes I minute RHR SOI G8-1-01-E12-1, (per Table 8-1, 13 min. Total step 6.10. Requires 2 Step Sb valves to be opened. l 2
- 2 1
1
< Table 10.1.5.6 9- Ihagnosis T~une for Operator Action P
Action Maximten Time Total Action Time Available Comments /
~
(1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Sourte of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to flood 23 minutes 13 minutes 10 minutes with 1 SRV Table 10.1.5.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / _ Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) y Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.1 The site interviews indicated that the operators
$ flood with 1 SRV. median value fmm Figure 8-1 have a clear understanding of the needed for 10 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.27 response and the msary actions. Thus, per was assigned. ASEP HRAP, Table 8-3, the median diagnosis value would be appropriate.
Z C Oc 8 a
% =
r m E _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - --4 _ _ . . . _ _ - , - - - _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
l l Table 10.1.5.8 1 Z Post-Diagnosis. Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP $ , 5 n' EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Commarts
- n Action Safety Systems f
w (1) Failed (2) Use EOPs Well Designed EOPs Operator Must Perfonn Concurrent Step-by-Step (5) Source of Information (6)
- 0) Tmb (4)
Flood with i N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-Step SRV. that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. Table 10.1.5.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP 5
$ Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments /
Action T < 2h AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Sourte of Information (1) (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7)
- 0) (4) (5)
Fkol N/A' N/A No2 N/A Modcately Substantial time before cost Hir,n damage containment with SSWXT and 1 SRV open. At least unierately high stress was assumed for all events. For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of mere than two safety systems did not necessarilY lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. c e P I a _____m
< Tcble 10.1.5.10 E Total HEP l'
?
2 Action Original
~ In@-dent , Total HEP EF Comments /
(1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Sowre of (liEP ) IIEP Infonnation (2)' (HEP ) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.1 Med. Mean (10) 0.1 0.27 Mean = 0.27
- 2. Initiate vessel / containment Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second g32_ 0.037 f)_ The error factor flooding with SSWXT and I SRV Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.12 0.302 associated with the (10) open. because of the time dominant IIEP was limitations. Total Median assigned.
IIEP = 0.12 Total Mean HEP g = 0.302 I z C e 9 s
~
x l
- C z Table 10.1.6.1 HEP 6 Calcidation s 8
g Hn==a Action Event (1) OPECS (1)
- o Event Tree (s)(2) E,EA,EP,EX i
Initiators (3) TI, TIASH, TAB 5H. TDB5H, T5D5H, ElB5H, E2B5H, EID5H, E2DSH, TORV5, TRPTS, ElV5H, E2V5H. EIT5H, E2TSH, TIOFS, TlHP5, TLM5!i, TIOP5 Sequence I.ocator Files (4) OPECS&.EP, OPECSHY2.EP, OPECSHC CP, OPCSDCl2.EX, OPECSDC5.TIA OPECSDC9.TIA, OPECSHY2.TIA OPECSSDC. TAB, OPECSHYD.TDB, OPECSSDC.TDB, OPECS9.T5D, OPECSRTE.T5D, OPECSSDC.ElB, OPECSRTE.ElB OPECSsvC.I2B, OPECSRTE.EID, OPECSRTE.E2D, OPECSRTE.TRV, OPECSHYD.TRV, OPECSHY2.TRV, OPECSRTE.TRP, OPECSHYD.TRP, OPECSHY2.TRP, OPECSLTRP, OPECSLS.TRP, OPECSLP.TRP, OPECSSDC.TRP, OPECSADS.TRP, OPECSADH.TRP, OPECSHPR.TRP, OPECSAD2.EIV. OPECSADH.ElV, OPECSLS.EIV, OPECSLPE.ElV, OPECSADF.EIV. OPECSALA.ElV, OPECSHPR.ElV, OPECSAD2.E2V, OPECSADH.E2V, OPECSSDC.EIT, OPECSDCF.EIT, OPECSHPR.EIT, OPECSLPE.EIT, OPECSLS.EIT, OPECSSDC.E2T, OPECSHPR.E2T, OPRCSDC5.E2T OPECS ADH.TIF, OPECSSDC.TIF, OPECSLP.TIF, OPECSLTIF, OPECSADil.TIH, OPECSSDC.TlH, OPECSLP.T1H, OPECSLTlH OPECSADH.TIO, OPECSSDC.TIO, OPECSAD5.TIO, OPECSADH.TLM, OPECSSDC.TLM, OPECSADS.TLM, OPECSLTLM, OPECSLP.TLM, OPECSLHY.TLM, OPECSHYD.TLM E Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to go ECCS water solid and performing the relevant actions. A Event Context (6) De important constants for the OPECS (1) calculation (HEP 6) are that the control room has diagnosed the loss or inadequacy of SDC (e.g., OPSDC succeeds or OPDHR succeeds, but CDS fails), they have entered the ONEP for IDilR. they realize no normal means of SDC are available (RHR (A) assumed not available per refueling outage schedule). and they are aware of the need for level control. RWCU has been isolated. He ONEP directs the operators to go ECCS water solid (LPCI, HPCS, or both are available, depending on context). Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Do - eat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RHR SOi (04-1-01-E12-1), HPCS SOI (04-101-E22-1). b v 7 a w I
< Tchie 10.1.6.2 P-Sequence Timing and Indications 2 3 ~ Event / Occurrence Time (I' ) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) OperatEr (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) IDHR. Need for level O Control room is aware that normal SDC unavailable or contre'. and cooling. inadequate. loss of systems were alarmed. ONEP for IDHR directs the control room to use ECCS to go water solid in this context. ONEP has been entered. Reactor coolant temperature will be rising. Table 10.1.6.3 Potential Operator Action Description Numla of Activities (Tasks) Comments / o of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedurts (4) (3) No normal means of SDC, level One Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Where SDC(B) has failed, RIIR(B) control is needed IDHR ONEP assumed unavailable. It was also directs operators to go ECCS 1. - Check closed assumed that at least initially, a water solid. MSIVs low pressure injection system Ensure that two would be preferable to high SRVs are open pressure system. Increase RPV water level with LPCI is initiated from 04-1 any available E12-1, Step 5.4.2. injection system. In this context HPCS is initiated from 04-1 LPCI (C) was E22-1, Step 5.2. 7 C assumed first
$ choice if 9 available, then 9 HPCS. & x % N w >
z: Table 19.1.6.4 g
$ Time Available to Diagnee and 1%rform the Task >
8
- c Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available C_ --- / I E (1) Operator Mmt is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Infonnation U Operator Activities (r,)
Act (T) has Occurred (T) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 solid operation. A16 Table 10.1.6.5 Operator Action Performance Time Activities Location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T) Sourte of Information _ (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Check closed MSIVs CR -
I minute i minute ne three critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation were assumed to be completely dependent. They werejudged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions.
- 2. Ensure 2 SRVs open CR -
I minute I minute
- 3. Initiatu ECCS system CR -
I minute I minute (per Table 8-1, 3 min. Total Step Sb. a I min. travel and manipulation time was assunul for each action) P I a I 4 _. , - _.,,e -- -, s- m ,._ - - _ _ -_ - - - -
< Trale 10.1.6.6 E- Diagnosis Time for Operator Action P I 3 1 Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / ~ (1) Arailable (T,) Time (F,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to go ECCS 23 minutes 3 minutes 20 minutes water solid Table 10.1.6.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final HEP Sourte of Inforination (2) (4) (5) 5 b Diagnose need to go Per Table 8-3, the lower bound Med. = 0.001 For this event, the ONEP has already been ECCS water solid value from Figure 8-I for 20 Mean = 0.0027 retrieved and, on the basis of interviews, minutes diagnosis time was operators have a clear understanding of the assigned procedure and the requirements. level control and core cooling is an obvious need in this context and would fall into the ' classic" category, per ASEP. Z C Je b 8
- C w
e g- + ~ - +
- _ - __
l l z Table 10.1.6.8 % E m Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP s 9 n
? Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments
{ (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation w Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) Q) Tash (4) Initiate N/A Actions clearly No Step-by-Step ECCS specified by water solid procedura. operation. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. E t Table 10.1.6.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP l t
- Action T < 2h Recirc. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments /
l (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information l (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) i (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A No2 N/A Moderately Several systems available ECCS High and substantial time before water solid core damage
~
l At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. i f
.y 2
For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarilY Icad to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. 2
. - _ , _. - _ . , m - __
< Table 19.1.6.19 P-Total HEP ~a - h Acties Original *",- " - Total HEP EF Commaats/ (1) Operator HEP Cluck /Cometion (4) (5) Source ofInfonmaties (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)' (HEP) (3)
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.001 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.001 0.0027 Mean = 0.0027
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 ,ff.) The error factor assocuted per procedure. Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.021 0.035 (5) with the donunant HEP was because of the time assigned.
limitations and because failures or pin.m in closing MSIVs or opening 2 SRVs would 5 have to be considered h by operators in the same time period i.e., OPMSV and OPISV. Z C W G a D
Z Table 10.1,7,1 C E HEP 7 Calculation s 8 Fi Human Action Event (1) OPISV (1) 8 Event Tree (s)(2) E.EA,EP,EX Initiators (3) TI, TIASH, TAB 5H, TDB5H. T5D5H, ElB5H, E2B5H, eld 5H E2D5H TORV5, TRPT5, EIV5H, E2V5H, EIT5H, E2T5H, TIOF5, TIHP5, TLM5H, TIOPS Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECS&.EP, OPECSHY2.EP, OPECSHYD.EP, OPCSDCl2.EX, OPECSDCS.TIA OPECSDC9.TIA, OPECSSDC. TAB, OPECSHYD.TDB, OPECSSDC.TDB, OPECS9.T5D, OPECSRTE.T5D, OPECSSDC.ElB. OPECSRTE.ElB. OPECSSDC.E2B, OPECSRTE.EID, OPECSRTE.E2D, OPECSRTE.TRV, OPECSHYD.TRV, OPECSHY2.TRV, OPECSRTE.TRP, OPECSHYD.TRP, OPECSHY2.TRP, OPECSLTRP, OPECSL5.TRP, OPECSLP.TRP, OPECSSDC.TRP, OPECSADS.TRP, OPECSADH.TRP, OPECSHPR.TRP, OPECSAD2.ElV, OPECSADH.ElV, OPECSLS.ElV, OPECSLPE.EIV, OPECSADF.ElV, OPECSALA.EIV. OPECSHPR.EIV, OPECSAD2.E2V, OPECSADH.E2V, OPECSSDC.EIT, OPECSDCF.EIT, OPECSHPR.EIT, OPECSLPE.EIT, OPECSL5.EIT, OPECSSDC.E2T, OPECSilPR.E2T, OPRCSDC5.E2T, OPECSADH.TIF, OPECSSDC.TIF, OPECSLP.TIF, OPECSLTIF, OPECSADH.TIH, OPECSSDC.TIH, OPECSLP.TIH, OPECSLTIH, OPECS ADH.TIO, OPECSSDC.TIO, OPECSADS.TIO, OPECSADH.TLM, OPECSSDC.TLM, OPECSADS.TLM, g OPECSLTLM, OPECSLP.TLM, OPECSLHY.TLM, OPECSHYD.TLM b Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only I SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPECS (HEP 6', except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPISV (1) calculation (HEP 7) are that the control room has diagnosed the loss or inadequacy of SDC (e.g., OPSDC succeeds or OPDHR succeeds, but CDS fails), they have entered the ONEP for IDHR, they realize no normal means of SDC are available (RHR ( A) assumed not available per refueling outage schedule), and they have decided to initiate ECCS water solid operation as directed by procedure (OPECS stu:ceeds). The IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. The issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only I SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RHR SOI (M-t-01-E12-1), HPCS SOI (M-1-01-E22-1). I a e ~ ,. . . _ ,
. , , . --w
< Tame 10.1.7.2 E Sapmace T*n ning and 1=Ar=tions P
O 2
~
Event /Occumace Tirme (T*) Annunciator / Indication Cann==8ml ' (of smost ir_teret) Operator 0) Source of (1) Alerted Infonmation (2) (4) ; Deciding to proceed with O Control room is aware that normal SDC unavailable or
~ ECCS water solid inadequate. less of systems were alarmed ONEP for [
operation when only 1 IDHR directs the control room to use ECCS to go water ! SRV is available. Some solid in this context. ONEP has been entered and the , form of SDC is needed. operators have decided to initiate ECCS wcter solid l operation. Reactor coolant temperature will be rising. The control room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of valves. , 5 < h a i-v Z C 3c tm 9 n Oc 6 % E m N I _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - - . _ , - - - - - - - . - - . - _ - , - . _ . - . _ - - - - - - - . . - - _ , - ~ _ . . - - . . , - . . . _ - . ~ , _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
z % @ Table 10.1.7.3 s @ Potential Operator Action E
- c b Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
O of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) No normal means of SDC is- One Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Where SDC(B) has failed. RHR(B) available and level control is assumed unavailable. It was also needed. The IDHR ONEP directs 1. - Check closed assumed that at least initially, a the operators to initiate ECCS MSIVs low pressure injection system waL>r solid operation. Operators - Ensure that two would be preferable to high have decided to go water solid, but (one in this case) pressure system. only 1 SRV is available. The SRVs are open question is whether they will - Increase RPV LPCI is initiated from 04-1 proceed with the initiation of water water level with E12-1 Step 5.4.2. solid operation if they cannot any available match the ONEPs demand for 2 injection system. HPCS is initiated from 04-1 _ o SRVs in this context E22-1 Step 5.2. A LPCI (C) was assumed first choice if available, then , HPCS.
?
P T b
y Tr.ble 10.1.7.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task F [ Action Time by Time at Which Masimum Comments / (1) Which Operator Time Source of Operator is Alerted that Available to information M ust Symptom has Perform the (5) Act (T,) Occurred (T,) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activities (T" ) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 mmutes SEA Calculation C90-492-01-A16 solid operation with only I SRV available. Note. There is clearly a dependency between OPECS and
,This task must occur in OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but an the same time frame additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is allowed for OPECS. asked only when OPECS succeeds, it was decided that the That is, it must occur IIEP for OPISV would be determined as if it were OPECS.
in the same 23 minutes. except for one difference. Five minutes less svuld be Functionally. OPISV is available for the diagnosis because of the time lost in c OPECS, except that responding to the failure to get two SRVs open. It was only 1 SRV is assumed that the operators would make several attempts to available. OPISV is get the second SRV open and would discuss the problem asked only when among themselves before prawding. OPECS succeeds. Z C 8 e > ~ --
Z Table 10.1.7.5 Z E Operseer Action Perfornience Time 5 8 8-
- Activities Iecation Travel Performaance Total Action Conamnents/
h (1) (2) Tinse (I() Tinne (T) Time (T,) Soeste of Infer ===si==
- 0) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Qieck closed MSIVs CR -
I minute I minute The critical actions for instantang ECCS water solid operation were ====v==I to , be @y W . They were judged to be an integrased set of proceduralized actions.
- 2. Make several attempts to CR 5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that get the second SRV open proceeding with ECCS water solid and discuss proceeding operation with only one SRV would be a
! with 1 SRV viable and likely option. The i====liate ! obpective is to get some forma of decay t heat renioval operatag and instanting j water solid operation with 1 SRV would 5 Premie core cooling. I 8 3. Ensure i SRV open CR - 1 nunate I manute
- 4. Initiate ECCS system CR -
I nanuse I amute (per Table 8-1, 8 niin. Total Seep Sb, a l unin. action time travel and manipulation time was l assumed for each action) I i l 0
.N
- 2
~
l _ - ____ _ _ . - . . _ _ _ _ , _ . . . . _ _ . . - . . . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - ._. - _ . _ _. . . . _
g Tchie 10.1.7.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action I [ Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) 0) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 8 minutes 15 minutes , ECCS water solid operation with only 1 SRV open Table 10.1.7.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based A(justed / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Informat'wi g (2) (4) (5) Diagnose need to Per Table 8-3, the median Median = 0.03 Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding initiate ECCS water value frort Figure 8-1 for 15 Mean = 0.08 with ECCS water solid operation with only solid operation with minutes diagnosis time was one SRV would be a viable and likely option. only 1 SRV open assigned (EF= 10) The immediate objective is to get some form of decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling. C b Q f5 c 8 >
l Z Tcbie 10.1.7.8 E Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP s n y Action Safety Systans Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments g (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourre ofInformation w Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Except for No Step-by-Step Actions are proceduralized. ECCS proceeding with I water solid SRV, the actions are operation clearly specified by with 1 SRV procedure. available. Interviews indicated that the operators _ were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and _ requirements. o b I Table 10.1.7.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification pe-Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP i Action T < 2h Recire. Plutse More Than Two Operator Stress Leven Comments / (I) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A No2 N/A Moderately Several systems available ECCS liigh and substantial time before water solid core damage
, At least unierately high stress was assumed for all events.
c' 2
,5 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of (5 extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
g
~
Table 10.1.7.10 Total HEP P
?
3 Action Original Independent Total HEP EF CW (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Seura ofInfonnation (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)' (HEP,) 0)
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.03 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.03 0.08 Mean = 0.08
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 f)_ Since both IIEPs contribute as directed by procedure, Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.05 0.112 (10) to the total HEP, the largest except that only 1 SRV is because of the time of the two EFs was available. limitations and because Total Median assigned.
failures or problems in HEP = 0.05 closing MSIVs or attempting to get 2 Total Mean HEP
;ig SRVs open would have = 0.112 @ to be considered by operators in the <ame time period i.e.,
OPMSV and OPISV. i Z C b e 9 i 5 0 >
z Table 10.1.8.1 $ E HEP 8 Calculation 8 a
- C
;- lluman Action Event (1) OPHIS (1) w Event Tree (s)(2) E.EA,EP,EX,EAP.EAX Initiators (3) All Sequence lerator Files (4) OPHIS occurs in all files in which OPECS occurs (too numerous to list). OPillS follows OPECS in "E" type trees and is dependent on actions taken in OPECS.
Event Description (5) OPHIS is the operator action to use HPCS for ECCS water solid operation. Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPHIS (1) calculation (HEP 8) are that the operators have decided to initiate ECCS weter solid operation (OPECS succeeds). OPHIS must he accomplished in the same time period as OPECS and includes deciding to use IIPCS for water solid operation. Since OPHIS must be accomplishefin the same time perial as OPECS (23 minutes), it was decided that OPHis would succeed only when HPCS would be the only available system for ECCS water solid operation. In other words, credit was not taken for both LPCI ano llPCS in OPECS. It was decided that the time available for OPECS was inadequate to align both LPCI and HPCS and still y have " adequate" time for diagnosis. Thus, credit was taken for only one of the two systems in OPECS. A low T pressure system, i.e., LPCI, was assumed the system of choice, if available. If the accident sequence had rendered LPCI unavailable, then ilPCS was assumed the ECCS system of choice. When LPCI was available, credit for HPCS was taken elsewhere. OPlils was only asked when OPECS succeeded. OPillS was set to fail (1.0) when LPCI was potentially availal-le, but was set to succeed (0.0) when IIPCS was the only available ECCS system. Since detailed ASEP calculations were not required for llEP 8. Tables 8.2 through 8.9 were not included. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay lleat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RilR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1), ilPCS Sol (04-1-01-E22-1). Note. Tables 8.2 through 8.9 were unnecessary for llEP 8 and therefore were not included. 9 P I 2
< Tt,ble 10.1.8.10 9- Total HEP .
fJ 1 m E Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Comnients/
~
(i) Operator HEP Check /Correcten (4) (5) Sourte of Information
! (HEP ) HEP (6) i (2)' (HEP )
(3)a i Initiate ECCS water solid Med. = 0.0 or 1.0 - Med. = 0.0 or 1.0 ASEP Table 8-1 Step 12. operation with HPCS. Mean = 0.0 or 1.0 Mean = 0.0 or 1.0 Failure or success of OPHIS was determined by potential availablity of LPCI. See rationale under Event Context (6)in Table 8-1 (HEP 8).
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'd 4 i C
M 8 a W lI: i i g i e
, ..- ,- = ,..--- ,--. .- -- ,,- n.,-. ,-,...n .,--.-n,.,.. ..-,.-,~-,-..,.,-.,.-..-~,,,.----n... n,-,... . , - ,..c_ - _ - _ - _ - . . - .
'2:
Table 10.1,9.1 3: E HEP 9 Calculation 8 h a Human Action Event (1) OPMSV (1) C Event Tree (s)(2) E. EA, EP, EX, EAP, EAX, HPSWR Initiators (3) All Sequence Locator Files (4) OPMSV occurs in all files in which OPECS occurs (too numerous to list). OPMSV follows OPECS in *E" type trees. Event Description (5) OPMSV is the coerator action to close open MSIVs. Event Context (6) For the OPMSV (1) calculation (HEP 9),4.4 minutes were assumed available to close any open MSIVs and the actions were assumed to have to occur in parallel with OPECS. These assumptions were made to ensure that for OPMSV to be successful, it would have to occur prior to the initiation of an ECCS system for water solid operation in OPECS. If the MSIVs were open, flooding could begin to occur down the open steam lines very quickly when an ECCS system was initiated. Once flooding down open steam lines occurs, a different operator action (OPSOF) is called. Using the ASEP method (specifically, ASEP Figure 8-1) and assuming it would take a
~ minute to close any open MSIVs, the mean failure probability with only 3 min. diagnosis time is 1.0. Thus, in the "E" type trees, if the MSIVs were open, it was assumed that the operators would not close them before initiating y ECCS water solid operation. Since detailed ASEP calculations were not required for HEP 9, Tables 10.1.9.2 through 10.1.9.9 were not included.
Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RiiR SOI (04-1-OI-E12-1), HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1). Note. Tables 10.1.9.2 through 10.1.9.9 were unnecessary for HEP 9 and therefore they were not included. ( I b 2 (
, - . - _ , , c - . ,_ , . , . . - . . -- - - -, . . -
n i o t a
/m s
t r no ef ) min (6 mf oo Ce c r u o S F) 5 E( P E H)4 l 0 0 t a( 1 o 1 T = =
. n a
de e _ M M 0 1 _ P n 9. 1 IE i o . I t i 0 l n 1 a e n ) _ et d . io n .P P) hT c e pCI oE E0I I T dk e/ I ( _ I e nc _ h C _ P _ E _ l I ) aI n i gotr P*2 E(
) _
i r a rH '0 . 0 Oe( p 1 1
= =
O n d.e a e M M sS V I SCo Cil d s n MEge r i o) i nt t 1 c( giaaw t c, i A yi on.t r n a i nf o e r emi e t a _ s ot of r _ l es ye p . Cb s o 5 zCx aM0b
< 2- P ~ .
i g Table 10.1.10.1 *
- e HEP le Calculation
. 8 5 Fi Human Action Event (1) OPECS (2)
?, Event TWs)(2) E. HPSWR Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, TAB 5H, TSA5H, TDB5H, T5D5H, ElB5H, E2B5H, EIT5H, EIV5H. '
l E2T5H, TRPTS Sequence Description Files (4) OPECSI.HPR, OPCSDCI1.TIA, OPECSDC4. TAB, OPECSDC9. TAB, ; OPECSDC9.TDB, OPECSHPR.ElB. OPECSHPR.E2B, OPECSHPR.T5A, , OPECSHPR.T5D, OPECSHYD.HPR, OPECSHPR.EIT, OPECSHPR.EIV, OPECSHPR.E2T OPECSHPR.TRP Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) ne important constants for the OPECS (2) calculation (HEP 10) are that a LOSP has occurred and the Division I and 2 diesel generators have failed to start. The HPCS diesel is available. With the loss of both divisions of power, the operators would enter the ONEP y for Loss of AC Power. Any operating SDC system (RHR/SDC or ADHRS) would fail and l M the operators would be aware of the need for some form of SDC. With the loss of SDC, , the operators would need to enter the ONEP for IDHR. RWCU has been isolated. He r ONEP directs the operators to initiate ECCS water solid operation. Only HPCS would be available.
- Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-III-1, Rev.15), Loss of AC Power
- l ONEP (05-1-02-I-4, Rev. 20) 1
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a
~
i _ . . _ . _ . . _ , _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . . . _ . - . _ . , , . . . . - __. - _ , - . . . . _ _ . _ ~ , . . . _ . . . . _ . , ~ . - . , - - - _ , . - _ _ _ _ . , . . - _ . . . . . , . _ . .
f 1 Table 14.1.14.2 g
- w Timi.g di=ai,= =.
i ,u k Event /Oceurrente T~mme (T,) Ammuncimeer/1= die =aia= Ceummenest Operator 0) Source of (of snest interest) Infer ===43== (1) Alerted (q (2) IDHR. Need for level O Imes of syseeses weald be alarined. In the context of being control and cooling. in shutdown and the occurrence of a loss of AC power. operators would be aware of the need for some form of l' SDC. %e ONEP for IDHR directs the control room to use ECCS to go water solid in this context. De operators will l have to retneve and enter the IDHR ONEP. Reactor coolant - . - - ; will be rising. Talde 16.1.16.3 i Potentaal Opermeer Action
~
2-
'o Description Nusnber of Activities (Tasks) Comuments/
of Evest Abnormal Events Respaired to Perfona Soorte of InferW (2) Action and Procedures (4) (1) 0) Pe. IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) In the site interviews, the No normal means of SDC, level One--the loss of SDC is a result of control is needed, IDHR ONEP the loss of power. operators clearly indicated that
- 1. - Check closed HPCS would be initiated.
directs operators to initiate ECCS MSIVs. However, it is not exolicitiv called water solid operation.' HPCS is the
- Ensure that two by the viem.
only ECCS system available. SRVs are open.
- Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
2 in this context C
- HPCS is the only m ECCS system O
5 available. x 2 6 M
~ >
w
z Tchie 10.1.10.4 I E Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task E$ s s
? Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator
{ w (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom Afax. Time Available to IWTorm Identified Comments / Source of Information Act (T,) has Occurred (T,) (3) Operator Activities (5) (2) (T_) (4) Initiate ECCS water solid 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492-01-A16 operation. Table 10.I.10.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time Activities lecation Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time Time (T,)
' lime (T) Source of Infonnation (T ) (4) (5) (6)
(3)
- 1. Retrieve CR 5 minutes (Table 5 Minutes See IIEP 1 (OPSDC (I)), same table, for rationale.
and Read 8-1, Stg Sa) ONEP for IDHR
- 2. Check CR -
I minute 1 minute The three critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid closed operation were assumed to be completely dependent. They MSIVs werejudged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions.
- 3. Ensure 2 CR -
I minute i minute SRVs open
- 4. Initiate CR --
I minute I minute ECCS (per Table 8-1, 8 min. system Step 5b. a 1 min. Total travel and e ~ manipulation -" time was as: umed for each [ action)
, .- w - - - , -
< Table 14.1.19.6 b Diagnosis Tune for Opercier Action I Tune Available Comuments/
Action Maximusu Tune Total Action i to Diagnosis (T) Source of (1) Available(T* ) Tune (T*) (2) (3) (4) Infernistion (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 8 minutes 15 minutes ECCS water solid operation Table 10.1.10.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjuste:l/ Ccmments/ Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information (1)
- (2) (4) (S) o I
Per Table 8-3, the median Median = 0.04 The median value from Figure 8-1 (as Diagnose need to go ECCS water solid value from Figure 8-1 for 15 opposed to the lower bound value) was minutes diagnosis time was Mean = 0.106 selected because the amount of practice given assigned. the operators for a station blackout during LPS conditions was rd clear. In addition, HPCS is not explicitly called in the procedure. Z C M b a W Z dh M Z > w __=__
z Table 10.1.10.8 % E Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HR AP o h N lc Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or { w (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Designed EOPs Operator Must Step-by-Step Comments Source of Infonnation Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Actions clearly No Step-by-Step Clear procedures and HPCS ECCS specified by water solid is the only logical system procedure. available. operation. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. { E Table 10.1.10.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T <2h Recirc. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AflerIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/Sequenc- (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A No 2, the HPCS N/A Moderately HPCS is available and there ECCS generator has started High is substantial time before water solid core damage. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequerxes) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
?
l 0
- 2
< Tt.ble 19.1.10.19 E- Total HEP
-" l 2
2 Action Original Independent Totas HEP EF Comnients/ ;
~
(1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of Infonmation ; (HEP ) HEP (6) [ (2)' (HEP) (3)
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.04 - Med. Mean (10) 0.04 0.106 Mean = 0.106
- 2. Initiate ECCS wates solid Median = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 ,f5L 5 The error factor from the operation per procedure. Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.04 0.138 (10) dommant HEP was used.
because of the time limitations, the Total Median additional concerns llEP = 0.04 facing the control room, and because faihires or Total Mean liEP : problems in closing = u.i38
$ MSIVs or opening 2 i SRVs have to be considered by the operators in the same time period i.e..
OPMSV and OPISV. ; t 7 C W Q n W
*E w >
_. - .-,----- .. _ , -.- - ~ ~ - - - - - - . - - - - , - - - ~ ~ . . - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Z Tchle 10.1.11,1 % E m IIEP 11 Calculation s 9 n y Human Action Event (1) OPISV (2) e Event Tree (s) (2) E, llPSWR Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, TAB 5H, T5A5H, TDB5H, T5D5H, E185H, E2B5H, EIT5H EIV5H, E2T5H, 1 TRPT5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPECS&.HPR, OPCSDCll.TIA. OPECSDC4. TAB, OPECSDC9. TAB, OPECSSDC9.TDB, OPECSHPR.ElB, OPECSHPR.E2B, OPECSHPR.T5 A, OPECSiiPR.TSD, OPECSHYD.HPR, OPECSHPR.EIT, OPECSHPR.ElV, OPECSHPR.E2T, OPECSHPR.TRP Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only 1 SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPECS (IIEP 10), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds.
~
Event Context (6) He important constants for the OPISV (2) calculation (HEP 1I) are that a LOSP has occurred and c the Division 1 and 2 diesel generators have failed to start. He HPCS diesel is available. With the I loss of both divisions of power, the operators would enter the ONEP for less of AC Power. Any operating SDC system (RHR/SDC or ADilRS) would fail and the operators would be aware of the need for some form of SDC. With the h>ss of SDC, the operators would need to enter the ONEP for IDHR. RWCU has been isolated. He ONEP directs the operators to initiate ECCS water solid operation. Only HPCS would be available. He operators decide to initiate ECCS water solid operation as directed by procedure (OPECS succeeds). De IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. De issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1), HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1), less of AC Power ONEP (05-1-02-1-4, Rev. 20). l $ i .M
< Table 10.1.11.2 E- Sequence Timing and Indications P
?!
2 Event /Cwm.on Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication C-.w.d
~
(of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Informatiert (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with O Control room is aware that normal SDC unavailable or ECCS water solid inadequate. less of systems were alarr- d ONEP for operation when only i IDHR directs the control room to use ECCS to go water SRV is available. Some solid in this context. ONEP has been entered and the form of SDC is needed. operators have decided to initiate ECCS water solid operation. Reactor coolant temperature will be rising. The control room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of valves. Table 10.1.11.3 Potential Operator Action 5 Decription Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Soune of Inferuation (1) (2) Action and Procedurrs (4) (3) No normal means of SDC is One-the loss of SDC is a result of Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) In the site interviews, the available and level control is the loss of power. operators clearly indicated that needed. The IDHR ONEP directs 1. - Check closed HPCS would be initiated. the operators to initiate ECrS MSIVs However, it is not ewlicitly called water solid operation. Operators - Ensure that two by the IDHR ONEP. have decided to go water solid, but (one in this case) only I SRV is available. The SRVs are open HPCS is initiated from 04-1 question is whether they will - Increase RPV E22-1. Step 5.2. proceed with the initiation of water water level with solid operation if they cannot any available Z match the ONEPs demand for 2 injection system.
@ SRVs In this context, g HPCS was the g only available y system.
z = w >
wv Z Table 10.1.11.4 % E Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task $ 5 Pi y Action Time by Time at Which Maximum Comments / (1) Which Operator Time Source of
- Operator is Alerted that Available to infonnation Must Symptom has Perfonn the (5)
Act (T) Occurred (T,) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activities (T") (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 min. SEA Calculation C9(M92-01-A16. I solid operation with Note. Here is clearly a d iw.dency between OPECS and OPISV. only I SRV Essentially they connitute the same action, but an additional available. This task diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is asked only when must occur in the OPECS succeeds, it was decided that the HEP for OPISV would same time frame be determined as if it were OPECS (HEP 10), except for one allowed for OPECS. difference. Five minutes less would be available for the diagnosis 3at is, it must because of the time lost in responding to the failure to get two . C oc ur in the same SRVs open. Operators would probably make several attempts to o' 23 minutes. get one more SRV open and would discuss proceeding with 1 SRV Functionally, among each other. He median diagnosis value from ASEP was GPISV is OPECS, used because neither the use of HPCS nor proceeding with 1 SRV except that only I are explicitly called out in the IDHR ONEP. He site interviews SRV is available. indicated the operators would be likely to do both. He Loss of OPISV is asked AC Power ONEP clearly indicates the use of HPCS for injection. only when OPECS However, not sure how much practice is given for a station wcceeds. blackout during LPS. Hus, the lower bound diagnosis value was not used. o .N
- e b
l
< Tcble 10.1.11.5 E Operator Action Performance Time P
I i Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time fr) Time (r,) Sourte of Inform *Jon O) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and Read CR 5 minutes, 5 minutes See HEP 1 (OPSDC (1)), same table , for rationale.
ONEP for IDHR (ASEP Table 8- ' 1, Step Sa)
- 2. Check closed CR -
I minute I minute The critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid MSIVs operation were assumal to be completely dependent. They werejudged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions.
- 3. Make several CR -
5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding with attempts to get the ECCS water solid operation with only one SRV would second SRV open and be a viable and likely option. The immediate objective discuss proceeding is to get some form of decay heat removal operating g with 1 SRV and initiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would g provide core cooling.
- 4. Ensure 1 SRV CR --
I minute I minute open
- 5. Initiate ECCS CR -
I minute 1 tainute system (per Table 8-1, 13 min. Total Step Sb, a i min. action time travel and manipulation time was assumed for each action) z C X 8 6 % b
- C Z Table 10.1.11.6 Diagamis Time for Operator Action s E
Fi Time Available Comments / W Action Maximum Time Total Action Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of h (1) Available (T,) w (2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 13 minutes 10 minutes ECCS water solid operation with only I SRV open Table 10.1.11.7 Diagnmis Analysis Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / Action Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Sourre of fnformation (1)
- (2) (4) (5) o I
Per Table 8-3, the median Median = 0.1 Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding Diagnose need to value from Figure 8-1 for 10 Mean = 0.27 with ECCS water solid operation with only initiate ECCS water one SRV would be a viable and likely option. sohd operation with minutes diagnosis time was assigned (EF = 10) The immediate objective is to get some form only 1 SRV open of decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid operation with i SRV would provide core cooling. They also indicated HPCS would certainly be used. Y, F I
;1
g Table 10.1.11.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 7 [ Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Pttform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Except for No Step-by-Step Some fonn of SDC is ECCS proceeding with I clearly called for and HPCS water solid SRV, the actions are is the only available system. operation clearly specified by with 1 SRV procedure. available. Interviews indicated that the operators _ were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. o b Table 10.1.119 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Sourte of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A No', the HPCS N/A Moderately HPCS is available and there ECCS generator is nmning High is substantial time before water solid and the system is core damage available 7 c W ' g At least moderately high strers was assumed for all events. Pi
- For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of g p
- extremely high stress. Each hurr.2n action event was examined as a function of the context. >
t
Z Tchie 10.1.11.10 3: E TotalIEP s 8 8
? Action Original Independent TotalIIEP EF C--. .;J
{ w (1) Operator HEP (IIEP ) Check /Cometion IIEP (4) (5) Source of Information (6) (2)' (IIEP,) (3)
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.1 -
Med. Mean (10) O.1 0.27 Mean = 0.27
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 _L5)_ The EF from the dommant as directed by procedure, Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.05 0.302 (10) HEP was assigned.
except that only 1 SRV is because of the time
~
available. limitations and because Total Median failures or problems in HEP = 0.12 closing MSIVs or attempting to get 2 Total Mean IIEP 5 SRVs open would have = 0.302
@ to be considered by operators in the same time period i.e..
I OPMSV and OPISV. I 2
~
y Table 10.1.12.1 r IIEP 12 Calculation p 2 3 Human Action Event (1) OPSOF (1) Event Tree (s)(2) HPSWR Initiators (3) TI-5 TIASH, TAB 5H. TDB5H, ElB5H, E2B5H TSASH, T5D5H Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECS&.HPR, OPCSDCI1.TIA, OPECSDC4. TAB, OPECSDC9. TAB, OPECSDC9.TDB, OPECSHPR.ElB. OPECSHPR.E2B, OPECSHPR.T5A, OPECSHPR.T5D, OPECSHYD.HPR Event Description (5) OPSOF is the operator action to stop flooding through open main steam line(s). Event Context (6) For the OPSOF (1) calculation (HEP 12), some form of a loss of power has occurred and the diesel generator has failed to start (DVI-2 fails). HPCS is available and the operators have initiated ECCS water solid operation with HPCS. One or more of the MSIVs are open and water is running down the steam line(s). The operators must detect and terminate the floodmg. Applicable Procedures (7) All operators would understand the need to stop flooding down the steam line(s). The inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1472-111-1) instructs the operators to check closed any open MSIVs when initiating ECCS g water solid operation. z C M d a M e >
Z Table 10.1.12.2 :C E Sequence Timing and Indications s 8 8 y EvenUOccurrence Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comuments/ g (of most intered) Operator (3) Soorte of , w (1) Alerted Information , (2) (4) Undesired flooding O For the situation where level is being hwd for ECCS In the site intemews, operators through open MSIVs water solid operation, the IDHR ONEP instructs the umhcated they would definitely want caused by intentional operators to check closed any open MSIVs. With the to stop flooding through MSIVs. initiation of an injection additional time, operators may recall or recheck the need to system to increase level. close the MSIVs and would check status lights. For any case, level 7 and 8 alarms may cue the operators to check the position of MSIVs. Moreover, water flowing down the steam lines into the Turbine Bldg. may be noticed. Could get steam line drain valve alarms. l
- Table 10.1.12.3 Pbtential Operator Action i
- Description Number of Activitics (Tasks) Comunents/
of Event Ahnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Tiwa.m (4) 0) Operators are attempting to One The operators need to close increase level for water solid MSIVs. operation and would probably be i " bumping" HPCS to avoid rapid filling of the vessel. They inadvertently flood through open MSIVs. , 2
!J .
t 2
,,y__ , ,.,,--e,---_m--y..--.,.-,my_~.m. -w- . - . . ..*,w, , , , - . ~ , - - , ,y __.-.,,,w. _.r ._,,..,,._w-,,,,___,,,m.,._,.,,7, , . . - , , . , . -,-.,w. ., -y- . ,+~.#-m.- .m,,- - - , m,--- ,-
< Teble 10.1.12.4 E-Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task P
2 2 Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available
~ Comments /
(1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the identified Source of Information Act (T ) has Occurred (T) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Detect the flooding or 20 minutes 0 20 minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 the fact that the A16 MSIVs are open, and stop the flooding down the steam lines. Table 10.1.12.5 Operator Action Performance Time 3 Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / d (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T) Sourre of Information (3) (4) (5) (6) Chm MSIVs. Terminate CR - I minute I minutes Note that travel and manipulation (performance) or at least suspend times in the control room were determined using injection if necessary. ASEP Table 81, Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column. The actions involved in terminating injection and closing the open MSIVs were assumed to be completely dependent. Bumping ofIIPCS mayjust be temporarily halted to reduce level and close MSIVs. Z C lc b 8c E N m h
Z Table 10.1.12.6 : E Diagnosis Thne for Operator Action s m Q Fi y Action Maximum Time Toul Action Time Available Comments /
;- (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of " Information (2) (3) (4)
(5)
"Ihe operators need to 20 minutes I minute 19 minutes diagnose the flooding down the steam lines and the neal for its termination.
Table 10.1.12.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Commerta g (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Infr ation s u (2) (4) (5) Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.01 The site interviews indicated that the terminate flooding median value from Figure 8-1 operators would understand the need to stop down open MSIVs. for 19 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.027 the ikxxling through open MSIVs. was assigned. l l l l l C JJ 2 2
g
~~
Table 10.1.12.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP P
? - $ Action Safety Systems Faib EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments
, (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Information Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) Q) Teb (4) Close open N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-step MSIVs. that the operators Terminate were knowledgeable injection as about the need for needed. the actions. Table 10.1.12.9
- Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP U
Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Close open N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Actions are straightforward MSIVs. High and situation is not yet Terminate critical. injection as needed. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. Z 2
@ For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systera did not necessarily lead to an assumption of g extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
8 A Z
~b W u
w >
g Table 10.1.12.10 % TotalIIEP > e 5 Original Independent TotalIIEP EF Comments /
? Action (5) Source of
{ w (1) Operator IIEP (IIEP ) Check / Correction IIEP (4) Information (6) (2)' (IIEP,,) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.01 - Med. Mean (10) 0.01 0.027 Mean = 0.027 Credit for a smand O_S2 0.032 _{5), Second check IIEPs
- 2. Terminate injection system and Med. = 0.02 check was not given 0.03 0.06 (10) are multiplied by the clow open MSIVs. Mean = 0.032 because of the other original 11EP for potential concems of the Total Median each action.
operators, e.g., the loss IIEP = 0.03 of power, the failure of Since both IIEPs the diesel to start, the Total Mean 11EP made significant impact of the initiator = 0.06 contnbutions to the y etc. total HEP, the larger 3* of the two error factors was assigned. o P
?
2 f . . . . . . - - . .
g: Table 10.1.13.1 r-HEP 13 Calculation
.N c
h Human Action Event (1) OPECS (3) Event Tree (s)(2) EA,EAP Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, EID5H E2D5H j Sequence In.ator Files (4) OPECSEQ9.EAP. OPCADH21.TIA, OPECSAl2. eld. OPECSA07.E2D.. Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to go ECCS water solid at4 nerforming the relevant actions. Event Context (6) T* e important constants for the OPECS (3) calcularica (HEP 13) are that the contrd room has f:i:cd to Ungnose the loss of SDC in 37 minutes, e.g., OPSDC fails). Thus, they Ave failed to enter the ONEP for IDHR. Since 37 minutes have elapsed, the operators wouki be very likely to check temperature and pressure on the chart rxorders in the 23 minutes allowed for OPECS and they may receive additional alarms. However, the operators would have to retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP and RHR SOi, pe form a series of steps to isolate the ADHRS and align LPCI(C) or (B) for injection (mcluding a remote manual start y of LPCI(C) or (B)), per RHR SOI 04-1-01-EI2-1. Step 6.6 or 6.8 (" Abnormal d Operations"), and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-III-1, Rev.15), RHR SO' (04-1-01-E12-1,Rev.44) 2 C h Q N 30 6 b 4
Z Table 19.1.13.2 % E ha Timing and Indications N 8 n
?' Event / Occurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Comrnents/
{ w (of most interest) (1) Operator Alerted (3) Source of Information (2) (4) IDilR. Need for level O Loss of systems were alarmed and the operators should control and cooling. accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in this time period. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. Table 10.1.13.3 Potential Operator Action
.. Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Coraments/
j y of Event Ahnortnal Required to Perfonn Source cf Information i
" (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) l (2) (3) l No normal means One Per RIIR 501 (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from ADHR to it was assumed that at least of SDC, level RIIR C or RHR B initially, a low pressure injection I control and vessel system would be preferable to cooling is needed, 1. Secure ADilRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) high pressure systeni and LPCI is l referred to in IDHR ONEP. In IDilR ONEP 2. Align and start RHR C or B in LPCI male (steps 6.6.2.b, (1-directs operators to 5) and 6.6.2.c,d,e,f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and 6.8.2.c,d,e,f ) addition, the procedures for initiate ECCS water initiation of LPCI instruct the l
solid operation. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation operators to secure ADHRS, the HPCS procedures do not.
- 1. Check ckwed MSIVs l 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open
- 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if available, then HPCS. r P O 2 l
n i o - t a
/n s
t n no ef) nn5 uI ( mf oo - Ce t r u o S 3 3 e l d ), be l i a r T( at i v ense ks Adt i a e Ii v nei) T i e htc4 e T ta A( ht a mnr aot o s n nta s e o haxPp e r t u f a n W i P MtoO M 4. 3nd 3 2 1 a 1 e 9 so eg n 1 r i bia t om ato) TcDo rp , t pmT( e e Oyd S e l b htcar) r a ihu3 l i a h t c( A v WdeOc t t e ar s elea i T m i eA h n Ti s o ht s c iu hM) WrT( yo t t
)
2 s e bac( t u era mpe i n TO i m 3 2 S C n Cid . i) o El oo n 1 esi t t( c t A iae r r a ia t t e I n p wo g :- ". k _ o z 5aMie
Z Table 10.1.13.5 % 5 Operator Action Performance Thne $ Pi Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / Source of Information
? (1) (2) Time (T ) Time (T) Time (T ) (6)
E (3)'- (4) (5)
- i
. Since OPSDC CR -
5 minutes (Table 8-1 Step Sa) 5 minutes See HEP 1 (OPSDC (1)), same table, for ailed, operators rationale. till need to etrieve and read DHR ONEP and ! (HR SOI '
' Secure ADHR,
. CR - 1 - 5 minutes, but can be done in 0 minutes Also note that travel and manipulation er RHR SOI parallel with alignment and start of (g fuu-a) times in the control room rocedure (step LPCI (step 5 below). Thus, performance were determined using ASEP Table i.6.1 or 6.8.1) time not included. 8-I, Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column.
- i. Check closed CR -
I minute, but can be done in parallel 0 minutes Steps 3 and 4 are critical actions for 61SIVs with step 5 below. initiating ECCS water solid operation. Tbey g werejudged to be an integrated set of g proceduralized actions and were assumed to c) be completely dependent.
- l. Ensure 2 SRVs CR -
I minute, but in parallel with step 5 0 minutes pen below
- i. Align and CR -
15 minutes, travel and performance 15 minutes From the control room, the actions nitiate LPCI(C) time. Estimated on basis of discussions 20 minutes required to align and initiate LPCI(C) or
*r (B) per RHR with plant personnel. Total time (B)(and isolate ADHR and perform steps 3 iOI (step 6.6.2 for all and 4) would probably not require 15 min.
3r 6.8.2) actions. Thus, the obtained HEP may be overly conservative. However, given that the Note. The operators have failed to recognize a loss of
*rocedure directs SDC in 37 min. (OPSDC fails) and must i " remote manual perform a set of abnormal procedures to tart of LPCI isolate ADHR and align LPCI(C) or (B) in
+
ump. In the this context, the value used may not be
- riginal HEP overly conservative at all.
.alculation, this
! ction was
< troneously
?- t ssumed to, -
w eqmre a inp ( tutside the i (
- ontrol room.
I
Table 10.1.13.0 Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action P o k Action Maximtsu Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Avallable(T* ) Time (T*) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes , 20 minutes 3 minutes ECCS water solid operation. l Table 10.1.13.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skiil-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information g (2) (4) (5) I Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.4 initiate ECCS water median value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) solid operation and for 3 minutes diagnosis time determine what the was assigned. Given the failure Mean = 1.06 or 1.0 appropriate actions of OPSDC, in conjunction with should be. the need to perform
- abnormal operations
- from the RilR SOI, the lower bound was not judged to be appropriate.
V. C pd b es W 6 % E m h
Z Table 10.1.13.8 % h Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP N 8 y l Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Canments r (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourte of Information
- Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) Initiate Since diagnosis value is ECCS equal to a failure probability water solid of 1.0, the action HEPs are operation. irrelevant. Table 10.1.13.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP - Action T <2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / y (1) AIterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Sourte of Infonnation " Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (2) (3) (4) (5) Initiate Since diagnosis value is ECCS equal to a failure probability water solid of 1.0, the action llEPs are irrelevant. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. o
*o 5
1lI 3
=
i a e
=
t s=s e i e mf) min a (6 s f s a o Ce t r o o S F) ) ) E( 5 0 0 1 1 ( ( _ 0 1 P n E a e
=
H)4 P l a( M0 1 E l t l o T
. l d t a
e4 o M0 T n o 9 t it 1 nc e e 3P d r ),
- 1. E nrP P)
- 1. H e pCH oE HE0 -
9l e/ 1 at dk ( l eo I nce bTa h C T n P e v E i aH)* g0 l i n rP) 6 d1 e go E( 2 t 4 0 t a= r a i l rH 0 1 us Oe( p = = l ci s n a o O de a t c n g e oai M M Nd d i l o s _ r e t a w . n S er i)o Cu t 1 c( e Cd s E ec . A o e or n g t a p a i i er t n p i D I 1 2 pr P I3 Y5 zCbQdn6b
y Table 19.1.14.1 y
;is IIEP 14 Calculation >
U 8 iluman Action Event (1) OPECS F) O Event Tree (s)(2) EA,EAP Initiators (3) TI-5, TIA511 Sequence locator Files (4) OPECSEQ8.EAP, OPCADil20.TI A Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to go ECCS water solid and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) De important constants for the OPECS p) calculation (IIEP 14) are that the control room has successfully diagnosed the loss of ADHR (OPSDC succeeds) and have attempted to start SDC(B). SDC(B) fails to start. In some sequences a LOSP occurs, but the diesels successfully start and load in all cases. With the success of OPSDC, the operators have entered the ONEP for IDilR. To initiate ECCS water solid operation, the operators must perform (or ensure that they have been performed during OPSDC) a series of steps to isolate ADHR and align LPCI(C) or (B) for injection (including a remote manual start of y LPCI(C) or (B)), per RilR SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 Step 6.6 or 6.8 (" Abnormal Operations"), i' and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operlion per the IDHR ONEP. In aligning RHR/SDC(B) for SDC in this context, the procedures also instruct the operators to isolate- ADilR and place LPCI(C) on standby. Ilowever, given the failure of SDC(B) to start, there i= st least some probability that events may have precluded all steps being completed. Rus, at was conservatively assumed that the relevant actions would have to be carried-out in the time available for OPECS. Applicable Procedures p) Inadequate Decay lleat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-Ill-1, Rev.15), RHR 501 (04-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44) E F m
< Tcble 10.1.14.2 E-Sequence Timing and Indications 2
3
~
Event /C-.us Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Cm._- M (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted information (2) (4) IDHR. Need for level O Las of systems were alarmed and the operators are already control and cooling. sware of the loss of SDC. In addition, the operators should accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in this time period. Reactor pare and coolant temperature will be rising. Table 10.1.14.3 lbtentia* Operator Action y Description Number of Activitics (Tasks) Cm.... ..M u of Event Ahnormal Required to Perform Sourte of Information (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) (2) (3) No normal means of SDC, One It was assumed that at level con rol and vessel Per RHR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from ADHR to least initially, a low cooling is needed, IDHR RHR C or RilR B pressure injection system ONEP directs operators to would be preferable to initiate ECCS water solid 1. Secure ADilRS (step 6.6.2.s (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) high pressure system and operation. 2. Align and start RIIR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b (1- LPCI is referred to in
- 5) and 6.6.2.c,d,e,f or steps 6.8.2.b, (t-5) and 6.8.2.c,d.e,f ) IDHR ONEP. In addition, the procedures for Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation initiation of LPCI instruct the operators to secure
- 1. Check closed MSIVs ADHRS, the HPCS 7 procedures do not.
c 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open
$ 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
9 In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if 9 available, then HPCS. Em h
2 Table 10.1.14.4
~
E Time Available to Diagnme and Perfonn the Task s 6 si y 1 Action Time by Mhich Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / g (1) Operator Must is Alerted tinat Symptom to Perfonn the Identirml Source of Infonnation
'd Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5)
(2) (3) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C9(M9241-solid operation. A16 1 5 os O
*C b
m .,e , , - __ - -- - ~~ -.m , ~ - , _ . . _ , , _ - - - , , - - . , , ,- - , , , . -
f g Table 10.1.14.5
- Operator Action Performance Time e Conunentst E Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action (2) Time (T ) Source ofInfonnation - (1) Time (r') Time (T)
(3) (4) (5) * (6) CR 1 - 3 minutes, . O minutes Also note that travel and manipulation
- 1. Ensure that ADHR is -
secured per RHR S01 but can be done (performance) times in the control room in parallel with were determined using ASEPTable procedure (step 6.6.I or alignment and 8-1 Step Sb, and are gmuped under the 6.8.1) performance time column. start of LPCI (step 4 below). Hus, performance time not included. CR I minute, but can 0 minutes Steps 2 and 3 are critical actions for _
- 2. Check closed MSIVs -
be done in initiating ECCS water solid operation. parallel with step Dey were judged to be an integrated set 4 below. of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent. y 3. Ensure 2 SRVs open CR - I minute, but in 0 minutes 4 parallel with step 4 below 15 minutes, 15 minutes From the control room, the actions
- 4. Align and initiate LPCI CR -
(C) or (B) per RHR SOI travel and 15 mirses required to align and initiate LPCI(C) or performance Total time for (B), isolate ADHR, and perform steps 3 (step 6.6.2 or 6.8.2) and 4) would probably not require 15 time. Estimated all actions. on basis of min. Hus, the obtained HEP may be (Note. ne procedute directs a " remote manual discussions with somewhat conservative. (See comments plant personnel. in Column I, this table) start
- of LPCI pump. In the original HEP calculation, this action was erroneously assumed to require a trip outside the control room. Thus, the timing used in determining this llEP is likely to be 7
c somewhat conservative. y See comments in Column O 6) n 3: 5 e
Z Table 10.I.14.6 h Diagnosis Tane for Operator Action E s y Action Mari-uni Tune Total Action Tune Available Canaments/ g (1) Available fr,) Tunefr,) (2) 0) to DQd (T) Source of (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 15 minutes 8 minutes ECCS water solid oreration. Table 10.1.14.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Sourte of Infonnation g (2) (4) (5) h Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the lower Median = 0.02 For this event, the relevant ONEP has been initiate ECCS water bound value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) retrieved and the operators have performed solid operation and for 8 minutes diagnosis time correctly *e this point. On the basis of determine what the was assigned. Mean = 0.053 it.erviews, the operators have a clear appropriate actions understanding of the procedures and should be. requirements. Level control and core cooling are obvious needs in this context and the event wasjudged to fall into the " classic" category per ASEP. o 2 a 1
g: Tame 10.1.14.s ~ Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identdication per Step 10, TaWe 8-1 et ASEP HRAF
- P Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Trainisg, Individual Dynasmic or Casummenes
$ Use EOPs Wdt Operator Must Step 4y-Step Source ofInfanmatism (1) (2) Designed EOPs 1%rfons Concumnt (5) (6)
- 0) Tasks (4)
~
Initiate N/A Actions clearly No Sterby-step ECCS specified by water solid procedure. operation. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements.
~
o k Table 10.1.14.9 tht-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / Action T < 2h Recirc. Phase AfterIE in Safety Systans Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (1) (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) No No' N/A Moderately While a LOSP occurs at Initiate N/A' High some point in some ECCS sequences which use HEP water solid 14, the diesels successfully start and load in all cases. ,
- v. !
C lc g At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. Fi lc 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not nuessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was exammed as a function of the context. g
2 TnMe 10.1.14.10 :C
$ Total HEP 8 $
R Action Original " - N--- f ; Total HEP EF ranum-ear
- c (1) Operator HEP Cluck /Dorre=ction (4) (5) Sourte of Infor===*i-i (HEP ) HEP g (2)* (6)
(HEP) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.02 -
Med. Mean (10) Diagnose need to initiate ECCS - 0.02 0.053 Mean = 0.053 water solid operation and determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions One of the actions in Action I was originally Initiate ECCS water solid per assumed to take place procedure. outside the control room and in the time
- 1. Isolating ADilR and Median = 0.02 available, credit for a Med. Mean aligning LPCI(C) for (5) Since it is possible that most second check did not 0.02 0.032 of Action I would already myection were assumed to Mean = 0.032 seem appropriate. See be completely dependent. be accomplistal by the time comment in Column 6. OPECS was asked, credit
_ *ney constitute an o integrated set of for a second check would Ilowever, given that have been appropriate ifit 8 proceduralized actions. many of the OPECS had not been assumed that related actions were one of the actions was assurral to occur in performed outside the parallel with the action control room. outside the control room (and therefore a lot of Note. Total HEPs are the
- 2. OPECS actions time was assumed
-o 2 SRVs sum of the individual HEPs Median = 0.02 available for them), Med. Mean from the diagnosis and
-c k closed MSIVs (EF = 5) credit for a second 0.034 0.01 (51 actions. Second check HEPs
- start LPCI(C) check was given for 0.454 0.10 (10) are multiplied by the Mean = 0.032 accomplishmg those original HEP for thtt action.
(OPECS actions assumed actions. completely dependent) Total median Since both the diagnosis and Second check values for HEP = 0.044 action HEPs make action 2 were: significant contr;butions to Total mean HEP ?he Total HEP in this case, Median = 0.2 = 0.10 the larger of the two EFs (EF = 5) was assigned. Mean = .323 o p Mean = 0.323 2 a 1 g3-,, , y --
9- Table 14.1.15.1 ." HEP 15 C=Ind=eia= a !i ~ Human Action Event (1) OPISV (3) Event Tree (s)(2) EA,2AP Initiators (3) TI-5, TIA5H Sequence locator Files (4) OPECSEQ8.EAP, OPCADH20.TIA Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only 1 SRV can be openal and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPECS (HEP 14), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences whem OPECS succeed Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPISV (3) calculation (HEP 15) are that the control room has successfully diagnosed the loss of ADHR (OPSDC succeeds) and have attempted to start SDC(B). SDC(B) fails to start. In some sequences a LOSP occurs, but the diesels successfully start and load in all cases. With the success of OPSDC, the operators have entered the ONEP for IDHR. To initiate ECCS water solid operation, the operators 5 must perform (or ensure that they have been performed during OPSDC) a series of steps to isolate ADHR and
$ align LPCI(C) or (B) for injection (including a remote manual start of LPCI(C) or (B)), per RHR SOI 04-1 E12-1, Step 6.6 or 6.8 (* Abnormal Operations-), and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP. (See OPECS p), HEP 14, for more details on event context). The operators decide to initiate ECCS water solid operation as directed by procedure (OPECS succeeds). 'the IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. The issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds.
Applicable Procedures G) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-lp. HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1), Loss of AC Power ONEP (05-1-02-1-4, Rev. 20). - C a E s
'/
d Table 19.1.15.2 :
- e &,_s Timing and Indications s o
a
?' Event /Occumace Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Comments /
{ w (of most inemst) (1) Operator Alerted (3) Source of Information (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with O Control room is aware that normal SDC unavailable or ECCS water solid inadequate. Loss of systems were alarmed ONEP for operation when only i IDilR directs the control room to use ECCS to go water SRV is available. Some solid in this context. ONEP has been entered and the form of SDC is needed. operators have decided to initiate ECCS water solid operation. Reactor coolant temperature will be rising. The contml room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of the SRVs. 5 DJ .N
- C b
< Table 10.1.15.3 P- Potential Operator Action P c 5 Description Numlwr of Activities (Tasks) Conanents/ ~ of Event Abnonnal Events Required to Perfonn Sourte of Infonnation (1) (2) Action and Procedurts (4) (3) No normal means of SDC One Per RIIR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual It was assumed that at least initially, a is available and level realignment from ADliR to RIIR C or RIIR low pressare injection system would control is needed. The B be preferable to high pressure system IDHR ONEP directs the and LPCI is referred to in IDlIR operators to initiate ECCS 1. Secure ADilRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) ONEP. In addition, the procedures for water solid operation. or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) initiation of LOClirL4ruct the Operators have decided to 2. Align and start RiiR C or B in operators to secure ADlIRS, the go water solid, but only 1 LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b. (1-5) IIPCS procedures do not. SRV is available. "Ihe and 6.6.2.c,d,e,f or steps 6.8.2.b, question is whether they (1-5) and 6.8.2.c,d,e,f ) will proceed with the initiation of water solid Per IDlIR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate y operation if they cannat ECCS water solid operation 8 match the C NEPs demand for 2 SRVs 1. Check closed MSIVs
- 2. Ensure that two (one in this case)
SRVs are open
- 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection systeni. In this context i PCI(C) or (B) was assunwxl first choice if available, then IIPCS.
Z 8 s zm @ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - ~ - -
i Z Table 10.1.15.4 % E Time Available to Ihagnme and Perform the Task N 8 y Action Time by Time at Which Maximurr, C -~.:.J g (1) Which Operator Tirne Source of
" Operator is Alerted that Availalie to Information Met Symptom has Perform the 'J)
Act (T) Occurred (T,) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activitics (T,) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 min. SEA Calculation C90-492-OI-A16 solid operation with only 1 SRV available. Note. There is clearly a dependency between OPECS and This task must occur in OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but an the same time frame additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is allowed for OPECS. asked only when OPECS succeeds, it w3s decided that the "Ihat is, it must occur IIEP for OPISV would be determined as ifit were OPECS _ in the same 23 minutes. (llEP 14), except for one difference. It was assumed that y Fure !onally, OPISV is five minutes less would be available for the diagnosis
- the same as OPECS, because of the time lost in responding to the failure to get except that only I SRV two SRVs open. It was assumed that the operators would is available. OPISV is make severai ettempts to get the second SRV open and asked only when would discuss tre problem among themselves before OPECS succeeds. proceeding.
o 2
< Toble 10.1.15.5 P- Operator Action Performance Time
?
2 Activities Location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Cw...~.M
~ (1) (2) Time (r) Time (T) Time (r*) Sourte of Information (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Ensure that ADHR is secured per CR -
1 - 5 minutes. O minutes Also note that travel and manipulation RHR SOI procedure (step 6.6.1 or but can be done (performance) times in the control room 6.8.1) in parallel with were determined using ASEP Table alignment and 8-l Step 5b, and are grouped under the start of LPCI performance time column. (step 5 below). Thus, performance time not included.
- 2. Check closed MSIVs CR - 1 minute, but can 0 minute Steps 2, 3, and 4 are critical actions for be done in imtiating ECCS water solid operation.
parallel with step ney werejudged to be an integrated set 5 below. of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 3. Make several attempts to get the CR 5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that
- second SRV open and discuss proceeding with ECCS water solid proceeding with 1 SRV operation with only one SRV would be a 8 viable and likely option. The immediate objective is to get some form of decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling.
- 4. Ensure 1 SRV open CR - I minute, but in 0 minute parallel with step 5 below.
- 5. Align and initiate LPCI (C) or CR -
15 minutes. 15 minutes From the control room, the actions (B) per RilR SOI (step 6.6.2 or travel and 20 mmutes required to align and initiate LPCI(C) or 6.8.2) performance Total time for (B) (and isolate ADHR and perform time. Estimated all actions, steps 2 and 4) would probably not
. (Note. The procedure directs a on basis of require 15 min. Hus, the obtained HEP remote manual start" of LPCI discussions with may be somewhat conservative.
pump. In the original HEP plant personnel. calculation, this action was Z erroneously assumed to require a 5 trip outside the control room. Thus, E the timing used in determining this 9 HEP is likely to be somewhat G conwrvative. See comments in
$ Column 6) =
~
m s
i Z Tame 14.1.15.6 E E Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action $ 8 Action Maximnen Tune
~
Total Action Tune A6 Comunement
$ (1) AvssiaMe (r" ) Tune (T ) to Diagneais (T) Source of g (2) (3) * (4) InfoA w
(5) need to initiate 23 minutes 20 nunutes 3 minutes E water solid operation with only 1 SRV open Table 10.1.15.7 , Diagnosas Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based A4usted/ Canunents/ (1) (3) F1 I EP Source of Infernistion 5 Diagnose need to Per Table 8-3, the lower bound Median = 0.15 Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding 6 initiate FCCS water value from Figure 8-1 for 3 Mean = 0.40 with ECCS water solid operabon with only l
- solid operation with minutes diagnosis time was one SRV would be a viable and reasonable only I SRV open assigned. (EF= 10) opuon. He immediate obgective is to get some form of decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling.
t t T I
, , , . - - --,.---v -
r -- -, - - - - - --~ ~ - , - - - -
< Table 10.1.15.8 2- Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP P o g Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Conunents (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Ssurce of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) Q) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Except for No Stew-Step Some fonn of SDC is ECCS pmceeding with I clearly indicated and for the water solid SRV, the actions are most part the actions are operation clearly specified by proceduralized, with 1 SRV procedure. available. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. Y Table 10.1.15.9 $ Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T < 2h Recirc. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress lael Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large OCA I W (7) Initiate N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Several systems are ECCS High available and there is water solid substantial time before core damage. Although a LOSP occurs at some point in some sequences which use HEP 15, the diesels successfully start and load in all cases. Y ' d m At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
$ 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term saluences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of 8 extremely high stress. Each human actmn event was examined as a function of the context.
W b
z Table 10.1.15.10 %
$ Total HEP $
8 8 Action Original Independent Total HEP EF C -- ^J (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Sourte of Infonnation w (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)' (HEP)
- 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.15 -
Med. Mean
- (10) 0.15 0.4 Diagnose need to initiate ECCS Mean = 0.4 water solid operation and determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions One of the actions in Since it is possible that most Action I was originally of Action I would already initiate ECCS water solid as assumed to take place be accomplished by the time directed by procedure, except that outside the control room OPECS was asked, credit only 1 SRV is available. and in the time for a second check would available, credit for a have been appropriate ifit I. Isolating ADHR and Median = 0.02 second check did not Med. Mean aligning LPCI(C) for had not been assumed that Mean = 0.032 seem appropriate. See 0.02 0.032 (5) one of the actions was
- injection were assumed to comment in Column 6. performed outside the oo be completely dependent. control room.
Dey constitute an However, given that integrated set of many of the OPECS proceduralized actions. Note. Total HEPs are the related actions were sum of the individul HEPs assumed to occur in from the diagnosis end parallel with the action actions. Second chect !Eh
- 2. OPECS actions Median = 0.02 outside the control are multiplied by the
- open 2 SRVs (One in this (EF = 5) room, credit for a 0.004 0.01 5 original HEP for that action.
(5) case) second check was given 0.174 0.44 (10)
- check closed MSIVs Mean = 0.032 for accomplishing those Since both the diagnosis and
- start LPCI(C) actions. Total Median action HEPs make HEP = 0.17 significant contributions to (OPECS actions assumed Second check values for the Total HEP in this case, completely dependent) action 2 were: Total Mean HEP the larger of the two EFs
= 0.44 was assigned.
Median = 0.2 (EF = 5) Mean = .323 o O
, Table 10.1.16.1 P HEP 16 Calculation P _ Human Action Event (1) OPECS (8) Event Tree (s)(2) EA,EAP Initiators (3) TAB 5H, TDB5H, TSASH, EID5H, E2D5H. Sequence Description Files (4) OPECSADH. TAB, OPECSADH.TDB, OPECS3.T5A, OPECSADH.EID, OPECSADP.EID, OPECSADH.E2D Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the nealed actions. Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPECS (8) calculation (HEP 16) are that the operators have detected the loss of SDC (OPSDC succeeds), HPCS is the only available ECCS system, and ADHR may need to be isolated from the control room. Closing of the 8 or 9 valve from the control room is adequate to isolate ADHR. With the loss of SDC, the operators would need to enter the ONEP for IDHR. The ONEP directs the operators to initiate ECCS water solid operation. o g Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), llPCS SOI (04-1 E22-1, Rev. 44), Loss of AC Power ONEP (05-1-02-1-4, Rev. 20) 2 C h O 8 E s
Z Table 10.1.16.2 : E S%s Timing and Indications N 8 W 8 Event / Occurrence Tu' ne (T*) Annunciator / Indication Comments /
-f (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of w Alerted (1) Information (2) (4)
IDifR. Need for level O Ioss of systems would be alarmed. In the context of being control and core cooling. in shutdown the ope:ators would be aware of the need for some form of SDC and have already detected the loss of normal SDC systems and entered the IDHR ONEP. He ONEP for IDHR directs the control room to use ECCS to go water solid in this context. Reactor coolant temperature will be rising. Table 10.1.16.3 Potential Operator Action 8 Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of infonnation (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) 0) No normal means of SDC is One-the loss of SDC is a result of 1. Isolate ADHR from the control Isolation of ADHR is not directed available. The IDilR ONEP directs the initiator. room (if necessary) by closing 8 or by procedure in this context. operators to initiate ECCS water 9 valve. However, on the basis of solid operation. HPCS is the only interviews with operators, it was ECCS system available. 2. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1Jc) clear that they would be aware of the need to isolate the low pressure Check closed MSIVs. piping if necessary. In addition. Ensure that two SRVs are during the site interviews, the open. operators clearly indica *d that Increase RPV water level HPCS would be initiated. o with any available injection However, it is not exniicitly called
~
system. In this context by the procedure. HPCS is the only ECCS [ system assumed available.
g
~
Table 10.1.16.4 Tune Available to Diagnose and Perforni the Task e 5 Action Tune by Which Tune at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Conunents/
~
(1) Operator Mist is Alested that Symptom to Perfonn the Identified Sourte ofInfonnation Act (T) has Occurred U,) Operator Activities U,) (5) (2) 0) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA C=tmt='iaa C90 492 solid operation. A16 Table 10.1.16.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time Activities location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time U) Tune U ,) Source of Infonnation Q) (4) (5) (6) 5 1. Isolate ADilR fmm the control CR - 1 minute O minutes - if Per ASEP llRAP Table 8-1, Step Sb, a
~
room (in most cases this action action I min. travel and manipulation time was would already be accomplished by necessary, it assumed for each action. the time the operators reached this was assumed to point) be done in parallel with OPECS actions listed below
- 2. Cim:ck closed MSIVs CR -
I minute I minute The critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation were assumed to be conipletely dependent. They were judged to be an integrated set of actions.
- 3. Ensure 2 SRVs open CR -
I minute I minute
- 4. Initiate ECCS system (IIPCS) CR -
1 minute I minute 7 (per Table 8-1, 3 min. Total d Step Sb, a 1 min. time for actions I
$ travel and 9 manipulation Q time was 6 assumed for each x
{ action) g l
%M>
I m y d e r l eu l u g it ti o icS
/ n F olpt.
i f wsr sf o P nx t n o e xet o e oi Ai n ar t ea) n t t t mtr n5 o Ra o n oe mu o e n( i t a Ho s s l i c p is o CoSdI Jm L r Pi EeSh e
. o S hC t h Pi nt a t
t
- f)
. n5 I ( AeHeh muf u s r t s
wfo oa r c od d n f e eet oe Ce c eb s c si t r u l ud a e uoec epg r ga o vct t hyu s e S e r e nl a e nt d b sh e) i s auwt l b(a s T de s aR oemri l i i as m wHe d vrf o e r he1- Dl l vo4 ) An( T8Aa n e ci p t g ea s ni e hD t u To t i n m _ 0 /P 2 n dE i o teH) 1 7 t s 4 0 2 c ja( ul A 0 0 dn 0 r s o i 7 sy AM = n =
- 6. tar n 6l a a n 6 ep 1 i o ), 1 n i
de a e 1 O t cT 1 A M M 0 o r A (e 3() 0 1i s tam eos l 1 f ee i l bagn baim l oT s d T e e TTs t u Ti a s a n D B) - 3 i i s m ( o l l n g 3 i k a i S D e 0 m ), nr 2 s a T(T a ow i if d e mle) eI ub2 oe m8im - mia(l t s e r on) e e s t i x aa v t s e u g2 ht rius go u ia( l , MA i n FaD i 3i - F ng m 8 a 3 l e mi o d . b r 2 a Te u f sd-e t g . rl u i s e ani s e P vma t i a t in og i n oi d od t l i o i) t l o t 1 de os n 1 s c( o A e re nt i) t 1 c(
-e aret e an s wo A s o i o w nSta nS gC r gC a e a iCp iC DEo DE
; .8 #o N. 2 ZCx$5Whw g
;2
, Table 10.1.16.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identificata per Step 10, Tcble 8-1 of ASEP HRAP
.{
2 [ Action Safety Systans Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourte of Infonnstm Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) Q) Tub (4)
~
Initiate N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-Step ECCS that the operators water solid were knowledgeable operation. about the need for the actions and requirements. Initiation of ECCS water solid operation is clearly indicated by the IDHR ONEP g in this context. E ' w Table 10.1.16.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Sourte of Infonnation (2) I.arge LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7)
- 0) (4) (5)
Initiate N/A' N/A No* N/A Moderately HPCS is available and there ECCS High is substantial time before water solid core damage. Z j At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. m k x For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a fai:ure of more than two safety systems did not necely lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. S _ C x
3 Table 10.1.16.19 % 3E Total HEP $ 6 5 y Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Canum- h1
;- (1) Operator HEP Chak/Comction (4) (5) Sourre of Infore (HEP ) HEP (6)
(2)' (HEP) (3)
~
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.01 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.01 0.027 Mean = 0.027
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid Median = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 .fi)_ Since both the %-==is and operation per prucalure (includes Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.03 0.059 (10) action HEPs made isolating ADHR if necessary). because of the time significant contributions to limitations, additional Total Median the total HEP, the larger of concems which might HEP = 0.03 the two EPs was assigned.
be facing the operators as a function of the Total Mean HEP y specific initiators, and = 0.059 y because failures or problems in closing MSIVs or opening 2 SRVs have to be considered by the operators in the same time period i.e., OPMSV and OPISV. 2
. _ , _ - . - _ _ , . . _ _ . . . , _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ -m_._ _ . . _ . , . - . , __
< Table 10.1.17.1 E HEP 17 Ch o
Human Actxa Frent(1) OPECS (4) Event TrecM (2) EA Initiatm (3) TAB 5H TDB5H Sequenx Imator Files (4) - OPECADH5. TAB, OPECSADH.TDB Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to go ECCS water solid and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) "Ihe important constants for the OPECS (4) calculation (HEP 17) are that the control room has failed to diagnose the loss of SDC in 37 minutes, e.g., OPSDC fails). Thus, they have failed to enter the ONEP for IDHR. SDC (ADHR) has failed due to the loss of the only available AC or DC bus. Since 37 minutes have elapsed, the operators would be very likely to check temperature and pressure on t:x: chart recorders in the 23 minutes allowed for OPECS and they may receive additional alarms. Ilowever, the operators would have to _ retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP and HPCS SOI, isolate ADHR (not explicitly directed o by procedure to do so in this context), align IIPCS for injection per HPCS SOI M-t-OI-y E22-1, and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay liest Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), HPCS SOI (M-1 E22-1, Rev. 28) l 7. C tri O N Z E l l
Z Table 10.1.17.2 3: E Sequence Tinning and Indwations 5 8 8
- Event /Occumace T'une (T ) Annunciator /Indwation Comuments/
f w (of most intmst) (1) Operator Alented (3) Source of Infes==*ian (2) (4) IDHR. Need for level O Iess of systems were alarmed and the operators should , control and cooling. accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in , the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in this time period. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. Table 10.1.17.3
- Pbtential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
- of Event Abnormal Required to Perform Source of Information 2 (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) '
8 (2) (3) No normal means of SDC, One Isolate ADHR to prevent overpressurizing low pressure piping (not level control and vessel explicitly called by procedure) cooling is needed, IDilR ONEP directs operators to Per HPCS SOI (Step 5.2) Manual startup of HPCS system i.iitiate ECCS water solid Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation operation (not explicitly directed to use HPCS). 1. Check closed MSIVs
- 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open
- 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
In this context HPCS is the only available ECCS system o
.N 2
,, .-.e-
.e---.- , ,.n-., --w,, , - , - - - . . . . . - , , _ , ,n. ,n. , - - , . . , - ~ . . , - . , . - . ~ , , , - - . , , - - , ~ ~ , ~ .
,. ,,,w,,y, , ,.
C.C 1 n 0-o 2 i t 9 a 4-
/s m 0 t n 9 no ef) C mn5 n uI ( i o
mf t a oo l Ce c u c r l u a o C S A Eg S de ),
~
ir Md( Adt a n s ae i eIi v nei) da uhtc4 TtsA( n mr T e r e ot e s ht nf sr nr e t i e e u s m xPp a n r f o MtoO iM r e 3 2 4 P
- 7. n d 1 a I. e rm oae Meus t at rp ),
eg Mie e a pn( T TaDo Oyd S e t ht i c r) ar3 e h th c u( W Wdc h i t t eO a v are sa A el nA h e u n u Tis T 0 a t dn i i hM) WrT) yo(2 s b tac t( t e era s up n e i u n TO 3 m 2 r t e a n w.n o i) S o 1 Ci ta d( Cr A E ep teo i ad t i il no I s g~ . 5LO zh 8nl2 0 Il
z Table 10.1.17.5
$ Operator Action Performance Time >
B g Activities Location Travel- 1%rformance Total Action Comments / g (1) (2) Time (T,) Tune (T) Time (T,) Sourte of Information
.;. O) (4) (5) (6) w
- 1. Since OPSDC failed, CR -
5 minutes (Table 5 minutes See HEP 1 (OPSDC (1)), same table, e.a,is still need to 8-1, Step Sa) for rationale. retrieve and read IDHR _ ONEP and HPCS SOI
- 2. Isolate ADilR (not CR -
I minute I minute Given the failure of the operators to explicitly proceduralized) (Table 8-1 Step detect the loss of SDC in 37 min. and Key is to close the 8 or 9 Sb) the fact that isolating ADHR is not valve to prevent explicitly indicated by procedure, the emy, btion of the upper bound value for the diagnosis part low pressure piping of OPECS was used.
- 3. Check closed MSIVs CR -
I minute I minute Steps 3 and 4 are critical actions for 3 (Table 8-1, Step initiating ECCS water solid operation. g 5b) They werejudged to be an integrated set
= of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 4. Ensure 2 SRVs open CR -
I minute I minute (Fable 8-1, Step Sb)
- 5. Align and initiate HPCS CR -
I minute I minute The two critical steps required to start per IIPCS SOI (step 5.2). (Table 8-1, Step 9 minutes HPCS injection when it was in standby IIPCS is not explicitly 5b) Total time for werejudged to be completely dependent called by IDHR ONEP, all actions. but use of any available ECCS system is indicated o
.N 2
< Table 14.1.17.6 E Diagnosis Thee for Operidor Adion ~
Action Maxisnian Tinee Total Adion Tiene Available Cemennads/ (1) Available (T,) Timee (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Seura of (2) (3) (4) InfeA (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 9 minutes 14 minutes ECCS water solid operation. Table 14.1.17.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (I) Diagnose (3) Final HEP Soorte of Information g (2) (4) (5) Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3 the upper Med. = 0.4 initiate ECCS water bound value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) solid operation and for 14 minutes diagnosis time determine what the was assigned. Given the failure Mean = 1.06 or 1.0 ' appropriate actions of OPSDC, in conjunction with should be. the non-proceduralized aspects of the diagnosis, the upper bourd wasjudged to be appropriate. Z C b e 9 s x E m $
l y Table 10.1.17.8 y x Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP > m O Fi Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments { Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Information r (1) (2) w Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate Since diagnosis value is
- ECCS equal to a failure probability i
water solid of 1.0, the action HEPs are operation. irrelevant. Table 10.1.17.9 l Post-Diagnosis Stress-leel Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP l l Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Commentsi g a (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information 5 (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate Since diagnosis value is ECCS equal to a failure probability water solid of 1.0, the action HEPs are irrelevant.
' At least nxxlerately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high Stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. 2 O
?
a _ _ . . _ - . - - . - _ . _ ____m - _ _ , , - - _ ..m_.m .%. . , , . , - , , ,, .. _ _ , , _ _ , , _ ,, _, _ _ _ . , __ , __, ,
< Table 14.1.17.14 E Total HEP e
E Action Original ,_--"4 -- Total HEP EF cmem-emi i (I) Operator HEP CheddCometion (4) (5) Source of Infonmatina (HEP ) HEP (6) u (2)' (HEP,,)
- 0) '
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.4 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.4 1.0 e Mean = 1.06
- 2. Ir.itie.t- ECCS water solid Not calculated given Total HEP = 1.0 per procedure. diagnosis = 1.0 5'
O t e 4 4 C
;c m
i O ! 8
- c .
y lI: l g N
g Table 10.1.18.1 %
- c HEP 18 Calculation >
8 8 y Human Action Event (1) OPECS (9) b Event Tree (s)(2) E,EP Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, TDB5H, T5A5H, T5D5H ElB5H, E2B5H, EITSH, E2TSH, EIV5H, E2V511,110FS, TIHPS, TLMSH,TRPT5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPECSSDC8.SDC, OPECSLP4.EP, OPCSEL32.TIA, OPECSLP8.TIA, OPECSDC6.TIA, OPECSDCIO.TIA, OPECSLTDB, OPECS4.TSA, OPECLAP.T5D, OPECSLEP.TSD, OPECS10.T5D, OPECSDCO.ElB, OPECSDC6.E2B, OPECSDCF.EIT, OPECSDC5.E2T, OPECSADF.ElV, OPECSADS.E2V, OPECSLHY.'II.M, OPECSLP.TIF, OPECSLP.TlH OPECSLP.TLM, OPECSLP.TRP Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) De important constant for the OPECS (9) calculation (IIEP 18) is that the control room has failed to diagnose the loss of SDC. The failure to recognize the loss of SDC can occur in either of two contexts. De first context is that SDC(B) continues to run and the operators fail to recognize the need to provide level control to avoid a functional
,9 loss of SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the RPV (OPDiiR g fails). De inadequate circulation is due to a loss of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. RWCU has auto-isolated in these sequences. De second context is that SDC(B) fails and the operators initially fail to recognize the loss of SDC (OPSDC fails). Regardless, in both cases the E or EP tree is entered with the operators apparently unaware of the need for SDC. In OPECS (9) (llEP 18), the operators must recognize the loss of SDC and enter the IDHR ONEP. In either scenario, additional indicators would be present during the time allowed for OPECS. De IDHR ONEP directs the operators to initiate ECCS water solid operation (LPCI, ilPCS, or both are available, depending on context).
Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay lleat Removal ONEP (03-102-111-1), 7 RilR SOI (M-1-01-E12-1) HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1). O
~e b
~ ~ ' ' ' - - ' ' ' ' ' "
u._ _ . _ _ _ . . . . . . . .
< Table 10.1.18.2 2- Sequence Timing and Indications
-c 5 EvenUOccurrence Time (T ) Annunciator / Indication Comments /
(of most interest) Operatir (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) IDilR. Neal for level O In addition to numerous alarms and indications which contml and core cooling. would already be present, reactor temperature (and in some cases pressure) will be increasing). The crew is required to check the chart recorders every 30 minutes and with the additional time available for OPECS. these checks should occur. Furthermore, a low level alarm would also be likely , to occur during this period. The ONEP for IDHR directs the contml room to initiate ECCS to water solid operation in this contex:. Table 10.1.18.3 _ Potential Operator Action C Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnonnal Events Required to Perform Source of Inft.rmation (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) Inadequate decay heat removal. One Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Where SDC(B) has failed, RHR(B) The IDilR ONEP directs operators assumed un.tvailable. It was also to initiate ECCS water solid - Check closed MSIVs assumed that at least initially, a operation. - Ensure that two SRVs are low pressure injection system open would be preferable to high Increase RPV water level pressure system. In some with any available injection sequences, however, HPCS is the system. In this context choice due to the initiator, e.g., LPCI (C) was assumed TSA5H (loss of SSW). first choice if available, Z then HPCS. LPCI is initiated from 04-1 E E12-1, Step 5.4.2. E g HPCS is initiated from 04-1 W E22-1, Step 5.2. = b
g Table 10.1.18.4
;e Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task >
8 y Action Tune by Which Time at Which Opesitor Maximum Tune Available Comments / g (1) Operator Met is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Sourte ofInfonnation Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (r,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C90 492 { solid operation. A16 Table 10.1.18.5 Operator Action Performance Time Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T,) Source of Ir formation (3) (4) (5) (6) E 1. Retrieve and CR - 5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read ONEP is a conservative read ONEP for Table 8-1, Step assumption given t'ae training the operators receive. Inadequate Sa) However, the del my seemed consistent with the
- diversity of Decay Heat activities" ongoing during LPS, which snight delay control Removal room response to some extent.
- 2. Check CR -
I minute I minute The critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation closed MSIVs were assumed to be completely dependent. They were judged to be an integrated set of actions.
- 3. Ensure 2 CR -
I minute I minute Also note that per ASEP Table 8-1, Step 5b, a I min. travel SRVs open and manipulation time was assumed for each action.
- 4. Initiate CR -
I minute 1 minute ECCS system (per Table 8-1, 8 min. Total Step Sb o -
.N
*'d b
g Table 10.1.18.6 r Diagnosis Tirae for Operator Action Action Maximum Time Total Action Tirne Available C .__.3 (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to go ECCS 23 minutes 8 minutes 15 minutes water solid Table 10.1.18.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) 5 I;; Diagnose need to go Per ASEP Table 8-3. the Med. = 0.04 For this event, the operators have failed to ECCS watec solid median value from Figure 8-1 diagnose the loss of SDC in spite of several for 15 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.106 indications (OPSDC or OPDilR have failed). was assigned. Given these previous failures, it wasjudged that the lower bound diagnosis value would not be appropriate even though the site interviews indicated that the operators have a clear understanding of the procedure and the requirements.
*/
C M b s M % 6 E m h
Z Table 10.1.18.8 T E Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP s o 8 ' y Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Information Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Actions clearly No Step-by-Step ECCS specified by water solid procedure. operation. Interviews indicated that the operators
. were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements.
5 4. E Table 10.1.18.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A No2 N/A Moderately Several systems available ECCS liigh and substantial time before water solid core damage
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of
$, extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
*o b
I Table 10.1.18.10
-" TotalIEP 2
2
~
Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Commentsi (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of (HEP ) IEP Information (2)' (IEP) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.04 - Med. Mean (10) 0.04 0.106 Mean = 0.106
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid per Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 ,(D_ The error factor procedure. Mean = 0.032 ~ check was not given 0.06 0.138 (10) associated with the because of the time dominant HEP was limitations and because Total Median assigned.
failures or problems in HEP = 0.06 closing MSIVs or o opening 2 SRVs would Total Mean HEP C have to be considered = 0.138 by operators in the same time period i.e., OPMSV and OPISV. 2 C h e 9 x s
~
m
2 Table 10.1.19.1 % E HEP 19 Calculation . N 8 a y Human Action Event (1) XTIEB 5 Event Tree (s)(2) SDC, ADH, TIA5H, Initiators (3) TI-5, TIA5H Sequence Locator Files (4) OPXTIE.TI, OPXTIE.TIA Event Description (5) XTIEB is the operator action to cross-tie the HPCS diesel generator (DG3) to provide power to train 2 systems. Event Context (6) For the XTIEB calculation (HEP 19), a LOSP has occurred (and in some cases a loss of IA) and the backup diesel generator fails to start (DVI-2 fails). The HPCS system is unavailable and by procedure the operators are allowed to cross-tie DG3 to train 2. Applicable Procedures (7) Loss of AC Power ONEP (05-1-02-I-4) Table 10.1.19.2
? Sequence Timing and Indications m
Event / Occurrence Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) An LOSP with a failure O 'Ihe LOSP and the failure of the diesel to start will be In the site interviews the operators of DG 2 to start. HPCS clearly indicated. The unavailability of HPCS could be indicated that the cross-tie would be is unavailable. Operators determined in several ways. The less of AC Power the obvious choice. must diagnose and carry- ONEP, which will be entered, instructs the operators to out the actions to cross- perform the cross-tie if HPCS is unavailable. tie DG 3 to train 2. c. o b
g Table 10.1.19.3
~
Pbtential Operaar Actiu . Y Ntunber of Activitics (Tasks) Comments / Description of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perfonn Sourre of Infonnation (2) Action and Preceduits (4) (1) (3) An LOSP with a failure of DG,2 One 1ba operators need cross-tie DG 3 to start. HPCS is unavailable. to train 2 and add the new loads. Operators must diagnose and carry-out the actions to cross-tie DG 3 to train 2. , Table 10.1.19.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / g Action Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Information
.:. (1)
G has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (r,) (5) Act (T,) (2) (3) (4) 60 minutes 0 60 Mirr:tes SEA Calculation C90-492 The operators need to A16 diagnose the need to petform the cross-tie. Z C lc b s % b > b
2 Table 10.1.19.5 :C E Operator Action Perfonnance Tune I E $ a 3 y Activities Location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Comuments/ (1) (2) Tune (r,)
- Tune (T) Tune (T,) Source of Infonnation i
- 0) (4) (5) (6) l I . 1Perfonn the DG 3 to Outside CR 30 minutes 30 minutes On the basis of nuesurenuets taken at GGNS for train 2 cross-tie NUREGICR-4550, it was desernuned that the <
l actions outsule the control room would require approximately 30 minutes.
- Adding the new loads from the control room was determmed to require appromirnately 5 minutes.
Travel and performance times are grouped under the perfornmnce time column.
- 2. Add new loads CR -
5 minutes 5 minutes C G O o
.N 2
~
6 I
- - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - - , - - - . _ , - - - _- - , _ - - _.,- , _-.-__--,.~n-_---r ,-w.- , .n n - .- -,,,p w .v.m.,, ,,, ,,--,,way v.,r ww y - , - , we, w-
g Table 10.1.19.6 Diagnosis Thne for Operator Action P Action Maximen Time Total Action Time Available Comments / Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (1) (2) (3) (4) Information (5) De operators need to 60 minutes 35 minutes . Approx. 25 minutes diagnose the need to perform the cross-tie. Table 10.1.19.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-llased Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalllEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) 5 a M-d. = 0.02 De site interviews indicated that the tf Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the upper perform cross-tie. bound value from Figure 3-1 operators are aware of the problem of concem for 25 minute- diagnosis time Mean = 0.053 and have a clear understanding of the was assigned. requirements. He upper bound diagnosis value was used to stay consistent with NUREG/CR-4550 which indicated inadequate practice of the scenario. Z C W s W % 6 Z 5 w
Z Table 10.1.19.8 2 E Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step it, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP s 8 - Fi g Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individus1 Dynamic or Commments
.;- (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Soorte of Inform
" Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) Perform N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-step Piocedure is cross-tie that tlw. operators straightforward. and add were knowledgeable loads. about the need for the actions. Table 10.1.19.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 5' O Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Perform N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Substantial tirne before core cross-tie liigh darnage. and add loads. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. o 3 1 l
g TaWe 10.1.19.10 P Total HEP
." . t m
5 Action Original i- 4 --U Total HEP EF Pef Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Souree of (1) HEP Infor==*i== (HEP ) (2)* (6) (HEP) (3)
- l. Diagnc sis Med. = 0.02 - Med. Mean (10) 0.02 0.053 Mean = 0.053
- 2. Perform cross-tie Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second check was given 0.004 0.01 Second check HEPs Mean = 0.032 because of the criticality of the task. are multiplied by the HEPs for failure to provide a second original HEP for check were: each action.
l Med. = .2 o Mean = .323
- 3. Add loads Med. = 0.02 Given the pressing need to restore the 0.004 0.01 (5)_ Since both the Mean = 0.032 loads and the presence of procedures 0.028 0.073 (10) diagnosis and action to guide the restorations, credit for a HEPs made second check was given. HEPs for Total Median significant failure to provide a second check HEP = 0.028 contributions to the were: total HEP, the larger Total Mean HEP of the error factors Med. = .2 = 0.073 was assigned.
t Menn = .323
'/,
C W Q f3 x s W w l
Z Tr.ble 10.1.20.1 :C
@ HEP 20 Calculatiosi
! Ei s 3
- c Human Action Event (!) OPSDC(3) i h Event Tree (s)(2) SDC, ADH, TIASH, ElB5H E2B5H, eld 5H, E2D5H, TSD5H, S3-5, S3H-5, E2V5H, E2T5H Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, TSD5H, ElB5H, E2B5H, eld 5H. E2D5H EIT5H, ElV5H, S3-5, S3H-5, E2V5H, E2T5H, TIOFS, TIHP5, TIOPS TLM5H, TRPT5 Sequence 1.ocator Files (4) OPXTIE.TI, OPXTIE.TIA, OPSDC.E2B, OPSDC.T5D, RESB.ElB, RESAD.EID, OPSDCADH.E2D, OPSDC.TSD, RESC.EIT, RESC.EIV, OPSDC.E2T, OPSDC.E2V, OISSLS35, OISSLS3H, OPSDC.TIF, OPSDC.TlH, OPSDC.TIO, OPSDC.TLM, OPSDC.TRP Event Description (5) OPSDC in this case includes the control room crew diagnosing the loss of SDC, realizing that SDC(B) will auto-isolate on high pressure (135 psi) when the cross-tie of the HPCS diesel generator to train 2 is completed, and entering the Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP.
Event Context (6) For the OPSDC (3) 51culation (HEP 20), a LOSP has occurred and the available diesel generator (DG 2) has failed to start. IIPCS is unavailable and the operators are attempting to cross-tie DG 3 to train 2. SDC has been lost aW the operators must realize that SDC(B) will auto-isolate on high pressure when the cross-tie is completed _ and therefore will not be available. If the operators fail to make this diagnosis, they may fail to realize the need to o ent<r the IDilR ONEP and initiate ECCS water solid operation (OPECS). OPSDC and OPECS must occur more y or less in parallel with the cross-tie (XTIEB). Rus, a failure to make the correct diagnosis in OPSDC is assurned i to fail OPECS because the operators may waste the time available for initiating ECCS water solid operations if they assume SDC(B) will be available. OPSDC in this context constitutes a diagnosis action only and with the time available (37 min.), the ASEP method givi an llEP of 0.01. However, on the basis of the limited indicators available to the operators and on the results of the site interviews with the operators, the PRA/HRA analysts did not have much confidence in the validity of the obtained HEP. Based on *engineeringjudgment", a very conservative HEP of 0.6 was assigned for OPSDC in this caw. This value was basically a screening value and when the sequences asking XTIEB and OPSDC were quantified with this value, none survived. Thus, a more realistic value for OPSDC in this context was not needed
, Since the detailed ASEP calculations were not relevant for HEP 20. Tables 10.1.20.2 through 10.1.20.9 were not i included.
Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-020-111-1), Residual Heat Removal 501 (04-1-01-EI20-1) Note. Tables 10.1.20.2 through 10.1.20.9 were unnecessary for HEP 20 and therefore were not included. I
?
a
.._,u, _m.. .w,m.-- ,_ . -- ,._,.- ,,.e.,-.-..__ . ..,. -
m ,_. , _ ,_ . _ ,, _,__ . . , , , . ., . , - _ .- -,.. v ~. . -- ----. --- -
xN n i o t a
/n s
t n no ef) min (6 mf oo Cw L . F) 5 _ E( _ P 6 E I ) 0 _ 4 l t a( = o n T a e M - 0 n 1 t i o 0P nt e e c
- 2. E d r
- 1. H n r P )P )
0l 1 at e pCHI oE E0 e/ eo dk O l bT nc I e a h T C P l aI E) n 6 i i gt roE( P'2
)
0 r aI OerQ p = O na e M y0 e l n 2 l u o1 a ts0 v s1 e P i s ehE nl t I o ba r I n o) cTfon e a e i s ee t 1 c( aela m cS A s . n a o isi f hit ts a o n or t i n e en gh Cat i m. Dd r ogn6 S P faf i s 0 sf Oo1 a o
$P P 22 , 5$ xCW 6ssEm
- z: Table 10.1.23.1 I:
HEP 23 Calculation $ o 8 g Human Action Event (1) OPLEC, LCHPC (1), LC-LP (1) 3 Event Tree (s)(2) R,RA,RP, RAP Initiators (3) All transients Sequence locator Files (4) All files begmmng with OPLEC, e.g., OPLECRAP. eld Event Description (5) OPLEC is the operator action to initiate an ECCS system for refill to control level. LCHPC and LC-LP are operator actions to control HPCS or LP-CI, respectively, once they have been initiated in order to avoid overfill or overpressurization of RHR/SDC womts. Event Context (6) For the scenarios for which HEP 23 applies, OPLEC is completely dependent on OPDHR. OPDHR is the operator action to control level and OPLEC had to occur in the ume time period as OPDHR (10 minutes). If CDS was unavailable and OPDHR succeeded, then OPLEC pM3 (OPLEC set to 0). The assumption was that if CDS was not available, then the operators would attempt to use an ECCS system to control level. However, if CDS was available, it was assumed that the operators would attempt to use CDS to control level and OPLEC was set to fail (1.0). Credit was not taken in OPDHR-OPLEC for both CDS and a ECCS system. With only 10 minutes available y for the diagnosis and action, credit for the initiation of only one system was taken. i G l If OPLEC succeeded and the system used was HPCS, then LCHPC was asked. If LPCI was used, then LP-LC was asked. The question was whether the operators would in fact control level and not let the system overfill or overpressurize once they had initiated HPCS or LPCI to control level. LPHPC and LC-LP werejudged to be completely dependent on OPLEC in the sense that if OPLEC succeeded, then LPHPC or LC-LP would succeed Given that the operators had decided to use an ECCS system, it was assumed that they would control level. De operators are aware of the injection rates of the ECCS systems and it was assumed that they would not just walk , away and forget to control level after initiating one of these systems. Since detailed ASEP calculations were not required for HEP 23. Tables 10.1.23.2 through 10.1.23.9 were not included. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-III-1), RHR SOI (Gi-1-01-E12-1), HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1), EP-2 (RPV Control Rev.19). Note. Tables 10.1.23.2 through 10.1.23.9 were unnecessary for HEP 23 and therefore were not included. o Y
;F a , , ,-n -
r ---- - e . ~~ - , - - - - ,, ,-n- - ~ . . -n... - - -. - . . -- .- -- , - - -- - --. - ~-
< Table 14.1.23.14
.P-- Total HEP .N ? EF 2 Action Original Independent Total HEP Cam ==nemi
~
(1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Soute of Infor==*i== (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)* (HEP) 0) Initiate an ECCS system - If OPDHR succeeds and ASEP Table 8-1, Step 12. for level control CDS not asked, then (OPLEC) and control OPLEC = 0(success). See Event Context (6) in level to avoid overfill or If CDS was asked, then Table 23-1 (HEP 23). overpressurization OPLEC = 1.0(fails). (LPHPC a.M LP-LC). If OPLEC succeeds, the LPHPC or LC-LP succeeds (HEP = 0) i3 4 z C b Q 8 N 6 = e E
Table 10.1.25.1 ::: v. @ IIEP 25 Calculation $ 8 m
- c OPVNT lluman Action Event (1)
~ g Event Tree (s)(2) EC,ECP,EX,ECX,FCAC Initiators (3) All initiators (Transients and LOCAS) Sequence Locator Files (4) All files beginning with OPICT, e.g., OPICTE.EIT, with the exception of files labeled OPICFCAU, e.g., OPICTCAU.TIF Event Description (5) OPVNT is the operator action to vent containment. Event Context (6) For OPVNT (IIEP 25), the operators have successfully initiated ECCS water solid operation to prmide SDC. Ilowever, SPC and CS have failed and eventually containment pressure and temperature will begin to rise. The operators will need to vent to remove heat buildup in containment, if possible. As containment pressum increases, the operators will enter EP-3, (Containment Control) and venting will eventually be indicated. Note 1. Venting requires both trains of power and IA to be available. For sequences where this was not the case. OPVNT was assumed to fail (11EP = 1.0). 5 Note 2. In FCAC tree, OPVNT has 54 hours available. Since this exceeds the mission time of 24 hours, the
" relevant sequences did not need to be quantified any further.
Applicable Procedures (7) EP-3 (Containment Control),05-S-01-EP-2 (Attachment 13, Containment Venting), Inadequate Decay lleat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1). I -
.N 2
< Table 10.1.25.2 P--
Sequence Timing and Indications _a
?
2
~
Event / Occurrence Time [r*) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of mod interest) l Operator Q) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) Operators have initiatext O With the failure of SPC and CS under we solid ECCS water solid operation, the operators will be monitoring containment operation. Inadequate SP conditions. Containment temperature and pressure will be cooling resr:ts in heat monitored, along with SP and drywell temperature. 'Ihese buildue ;a containment, indicators will lead the operators to enter EP-3. leading to the need to vent containment. Table 10.1.25.3 Potential Operator Action
~
o.
@ Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
of Event Ahnormal Events Required to Perfonn Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) 0) With no SP cooiing or CS under One The operators will follow 05-S l water solid operation, containment EP-2 (Attachment 13, Containment l venting is needed to reduce Venting), which directs the temperature (beat buildup) in operators tojumper four relays to containment. defeat the vent path isolation interlocks (two are located in the main control room and two in the upper control room) and then open 6 valves from the main control room.
'Z C
Q iic 6 ::: b h
. .. . =. -. .
z Table 10.1.25.4 ::: Tune Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task y Q 8 Action Tune by Which Tune at Which Operator Maxienen Time Avail =Me Ceaumentst h 6, Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Pesform the IA-eirse d Source of Infor==*i== (1)
% has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (I',) (5)
" Act (T)
(2) (3) (4) De operators need to 11 hours Approxianately 1.5 to 2 hours 9 hours , SEA Calculation C90-492 diagnose the need to before indicators for entering A16 vent containment. EP-3 would be reached. Table 10.1.25.5 Operator Action PerformanceTune Activities Iacation Travel I%rformance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T ) Time (T,) Tune (T ) Source of Information (3) ' (4) (5) * (6) f 1. Jumpering relays and opening valves to Main and - - Travel and g vent. upper performance time was control conservatively Note. In scenarios where a LOCA signal rooms. estimated to be has occured, IA would have to be approximately one restored. It was assumed that if the hour (power is operators decided to vent in these available). scenarios, they would restore lA if neccessrry. More than adequate time Ihour would be available, in worse - 4 hours 4 hours The time assumed to be
- 2. Accomplish potential actions required case, actions 5 hours total action required for OPSPM and for dumping SPMU for SP cooling could be time SPMKP is very (OPSPM) and providing additional makeup required conservative. Given the either to SPMU or directly to the SP outside CR generally long time frame for OPVNT, OPSPM, and (SPMKP).
Note. De actions for OPSPM and SPMKP, substantial SPMKP had to be accomplished in the diagnosis time will be o, same time period as OPVNT. Hus, the available. g time estimated to be required for these events was subtracted from the time available for OPVNT [
....j _. . . ..
j il 1 2W> n e c n n o
/ c r tsf o f a n
e ea oi t eo ehl e n ht t c mcmE r o t mf e orea mur o of o i t a al hb g t o n ser C S In /m t s r d r e pd i no u a enade t ef ) min (5 ich t t s c mf dfnoer or
^
oo i s e d p Ce c r n wa ue r u o i e va wrH ea . S r el s e r c e )T t n a a s. t. l b(a s i t e ro ev i s t a .m l i i s ah r ;6-as s vo) An( 4 r u he pn ed q g o Toa i ea h 4 i miD . To t x O i p p n A /P o dE i t teI 5- 4-c sI ) A ul 4 E E r ja( 0 4 d n t o i s Ai F 4 3 6 ar 7 s = y = 5 e n 5l a n 2 p i o) 2 n d a
- 1. O t
cT ) 1 A e e 9 r 0 s M M 1 of A (e 3( e e l am t i 1 i eos l baim oT l bagn d T e TT s r Ti a s a s u D B) i s o - 3 ( o h l l n g 5 i k a S i D s e) m , 1 8- w a T(T i e r e e mle) h ui m ub2 t igt oes 3- ,Fi s mia( l t e r on) 8 mo s i xa a v u g2 a( le or gn MA s r l iai b f a a ed i u o FD Tu l s h P a r . 9 E vuod S nh e a n Ai4 rd ig t n Pe emfos r s a e t o vo dt n sd ot n o i e t i) t 1 c( s r - n d e em r . o) A t o het n i t 1 e ni n a t e c( a r e em s A et s n oo poi n nc ona e gt gt a n a n Dd i co ie Dv _ <- P2{ .?~~ ZCWmONW&Iw ll !ll -
Z Tame 10.1.25.8 m m Phst-Diagnosis Action Type le=hrication per Step 19, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP y ' t
~
O
+
75 1 ) g Action Safety Systans Failed EOPk, Training, Individual Dynmanic or Cenaments g (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Met Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation w Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) 1 0) Tasks (4) Jumper N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-step i relays and that the operators , open were knowledgeable Actions are 3 valves. about the need for proceduralized. Restore IA the actions. : if necessary. t I Table 10.1.25.9 9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Imel Identification per Step it, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP M Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Then Two Operator Stres Level Canaments/ j (1) Affter 1E in Safety Systens Faniiliar (6) Source of Inforniation (2) LarEe LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) j (3) (4) (5) Vent N/A' N/A No* N/A Moderately Substantial time available containment High before core damage. At least moderately high stress was assnmed for all events. For the LPS environment (usually long-term e-; -----w) a failure of more han two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was exammed as a function of the context. o e
.N N
a
, .-,.-%-- -,,- , w.., iwa _'...w-e.-, = m.,v . %y- % ,p , .c,..,,,_~- _ _ . ., , , _ . , , _ _ . _ _ , - . . _
..ve.w.~. -v, . .m,e--.,, , - , . -,- . . . _ . , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ .
< Ttbie 10.1.25.10 Total HEP N
3 Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Cef (1) Operator HEP Check /Comctuni (4) (5) Source of (HEP ) HEP Infoennation (2)' (HEP,) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 4.0E-5 -
Med. Mean (10) 4.0E-5 3.4E-4 Mean = 3.4E-4
- 2. Jumper relays, open valves, and Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.O N 0.01 f5L Second check HEPs restore IA if necessary. These Mean = 0.032 check was given 0.004 0.011 (5) are multiplied by the straightforward, proceduralized because of the time original HEP for actions were assumed to be available and the Total Median HEP cach action.
completely dependent. presence of feedback = 0.004 that would alert the The error factor y operators to any Total Mean HEP associated with the C; failures. HEPs for = 0.011 dominant HEPs was failure to provide a assigned. second check were: Med. = .2 Mean = .323 z C lc ac b e $
3 Table 10.1.26.1 x 3;; HEP 26 Calculation $ 6 a
- o Human Action Event (1) OPSPM and SPMUN 3 Event Tree (s)(2) EC, ECP, EX, and ECX for OPSPM. ECN, ECNP, and ECNPL for SPMUN.
Initiators (3) All initiators (Transients and LOCAS) Sequence locator Files (4) All files beginning with OPICT, e.g., OPICTE.EIT, with the exception of files labeled OPICTCAU, e.g., OPICfCAU.TIF and all files beginning with SPMUN, e.g. SPMUN.ECN. Event Description (5) OPSPM and SPMUN are the operator actions to dump SPMU to provide additional level and cooling to the SP. SPMUN applies to sequences where the SPMU dump must be accomplished without AC power. Event Context (6) For OPSPM and SPMUN (HEP 26), the operators have successfully initiated ECCS water solid operation to provide SDC or are steaming the vessel with HPCS. However, SPC and CS have failed and eventually the SP will need additional level and cooling. The operators will need to dump SPMU. As SP water level decreases, the operators will enter EP-3, (Containment Control) and an SPMU dump will be indic= tai In the sequences where SPMUN is asked, AC power is not available and the SPMU dump valves will have to be opened locally. Applicable Procalures (7) EP-3 (Containment Control), SPMU EOl (04-1-01-E30-1) p C u O e
.N a
_, . .- - . . . _ - , _ _ - _ _ -r_ - . ..
- 2. Table 10.1.26.2 P Sequence Thning and Indications k
EvenUC - .u.ce Time (T ) Annunciator / Indication Cw. ~.;d (of most interest) Operatir (3) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4)
. Operators have initiated O With the failure of SPC and CS under water solid operation ECCS water solid or steaming, the operators will be monitoring containment operation. Inadequate SP conditions. SP te%.usture will be increasing and level will cooling and SP level loss be dropping. Iow SP level will be alarmed. These results in the need to indicators will lead the operators to enter EP-3 and will dump SPMU. indicate the need to provide makeup to the SP.
Table 10.1.26.3 PotentialOperator Action
- Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
1 of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information d (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) With no SP cooling or CS under One The operators will follow EP-3 and On the basis of discussions with water solid operation or steaming, the SPMU SOI, which directs the plant persormel (by telephone), SPMU will be needed to provide operators to open two valves per conditions would not be so adverse adequate level and cooling to the train to initiate SPMU. Success that flow from the SPMU could SP. with one train is all that is needed. not be established manually in the During LPS, SPMU is isolated to time available. avoid an inadvertent dump. He operators will have to override the isolat on. Section 5.2 of the SPMU t SOI pavides the procedure. Without AC power, the operators will have to open two 30 in. valves manually using a handwheel 2: engagement lever. The valves are C located about 60 ft. above the SP. M Flow can be established within 10 9 minutes according to GGNS
@ personnel. Several hours would be 6 available. :::
5 E
I z Table 10.1.26.4 ::: Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task $ Q B Maxim:nn Time Available Comments /
- o Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator b (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptwn to f%rform the Identified Source ofInformation O Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Optrator Activities (r,) (5)
(2) (3) (4) The operators need to 1I hours Approximately 1.5 to 2 hours 9 hours SEA Calculation C90-492 diagnose the need to before indicators for entering A16 initiate SPM U. EP-3 would be reached. Table 10.1.26.5 Operator Action Pesformance Time Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2's Time (T,) Time (T,) Sourte of Information _ Time (T) o (3) (4) (5) (6)
~
w
- Outside co itrol Travel and Override SPMU isolation and - -
open valves. Will require room in Control performance time was closing of opened (red tagged) Bldg. for closing very conservatively breakers for I train. If no power breakers. The estimated to be is available, the operators will operators will approximately 4 have to manually open two have to enter hours, nis would be valves with the handwheel. containment to a *werst case
- manually open scenario.
SPMU valves. Total action time = 4 hours
.M l a t
< TaNe 10.1.26.6 P-Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action P Action Maximian Tune Total Action Tune AvailaMe Coenments/ (1) AvailaMe (T,) Time (T,) to Dignosis (r) Source of (2) 0) (4) Infonnation (5)
'ne operators need to 9 hours ,
4 hours Appmx. 5 hours diagnose the need initiate SPMU. l TaNe 10.1.26.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Commentsi (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Sourte of Information - (2) (4) (5) o ~ w Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 3.0E-5 Telephone conversations with plant personnel initiate SPMU. rnedian value fmm Figure 8-1 indicated that the operators would be aware of for 5 hours diagnosis time was Mean = 2.5E-4 the problem of concern and have a clear assigned. understanding of the requirements. The procedures are clear. Z C h O fic 6
- =
0 >
?
2 Table 10.1.26.8 :c j Post-lhagnosis Action Type Identification per Step le, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAF $ O Pi
- = Action Safety Systans Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynansic or C-1 b (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Mint Step-by-Step Sourto ofInfernantion ;
i O Designed EOPs 1%rfenn Concurred (5) (6) i
- 0) Tasks (4) i laitiate N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-step ,
SPMU. that the operators were knowledgeable Actions are ! about the need for proceduralized. the actions. , Table 10.1.26.9 ! Pbst-lhagnosis Sinss-Imel Identification per Step le, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP , Y
$ Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Icel Conunents/
(1) After IE in Safety Systans Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation l 1 (2) Larte LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) i
- 0) (4) (5) i Initiate SPMU N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Substantial time available High before core d===re.
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
I 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. a -->,,--.n,,,e, , - - - , -~,--.~rm me,, nw w --e --r--w,wm .----,y,.rnn.-n -m--- , , , - - ,,m. - , - - - . - . , , - - - . ,w-,w,- _ uw ,w.,- --e-,- --w.-, , . , . - , , , - , , - - - . - , - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I
< TaNe 10.1.26.14 E- Total HEP u
h Action Original ladependent Total HEP EF Commsents/ (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Seurre of (HEP ) HEP Infonnation (2)' (HEP) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 3.0E-5 -
Med. Mean' (30) 3.0E-5 2.5E-4 Mean = 2.5E-4
- 2. Override SPMU isolation and Med. - 0.02 Credit for a second 0.004 0.0104 _(5)_ Second check HEPs open valves fmm the control room Mean = 0.032 check was given 0.004 0.0106 (5) are multiplied by the or use handwheel to open valves because of the time original HEP for manually. available and the Total Median HEP each action.
presence of feedback = 0.004 that would alert the The error factor y operators to any Total Mean HEP associated with the C failures. HEPs for = 0.011 dominant HEP was failure to provide a assigned. second check were: Med. = .2 Mean = .323 Z C b O N lc 6 % ' 5 s
I Table 10.1.27.1 ::: z HEP 27 Calcuhtion f 9 0 liuman Action Event (1) SPMKP and SPMKN
~
g Event Tree (s)(2) EC, ECP, EX, and ECX for SPMKP. ECN. ECNP, ECNPL, and SNP for SPMKN. Initiators (3) All initiators (Transients and LOCAS) Sequence laator Files (4) All files beginning with OPICP, e.g., OPICPE.EIT, with the exception of files labeled OPICTCAU, e.g., OPICTCAU.TIF and all files beginning with SPMUN, e.g. SPMUN.ECN. SPMUN is also found in OPSTM.SNP. Event Description (5) SPMKP and SPMKN are the operator actions to provide makeup to SPMU (for dumping SPMU again to the SP) or directly to the SP, to compensate for boil off from the SP. SPMKN applies to sequences where the makeup from the CST must be obtamed without AC power. For SPMKP and SPMKN (llEP 27), the operators have successfully initiated ECCS water solid operation to Event Context (6) provide SDC or are steaming the vessel with IIPCS. However, SPC and CS have failed and eventually the SP will need additional level and cooling. The operators have already decided to initiate SPMU, but will need additional makeup eventually to compensate for boil off. If operators successfully diagnosed the need to dump SPMU (OPSPM or SPMUN succeeds), it was assumed that they would also be aware that additional makeup might be 5 needed. Thus, the diagnosis parts of SPMKP and SPMKN were assumed to be completely dependent on OPSPM I and SPMUN, respectively. In sequences where power and IA is lost (sort of the worst case), nitrogen tanks may be required to open 3 or 4 AOVs, e.g., AOV 47, AOV 131, AOV 130. XV 46 will have to be manually opened Note. In the SNP tree, when SPMKN is asked, steaming is occurring out the MSIVs and only 35 minutes would be available to accomplish SPMKN. His is insufficient time given that power is lost. Thus, in the SNP tree only. SPMUN is set to 1.0. Applicable Procedures (7) EP-3 (Containment Control), SPMU EOI (04-I-01-E30-1) o
.N
< Table 10.1.27.2 P-Sequence Thning and Indications
?2 ~ EvenUC- .oe Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) Operators have initiated O With the failure of SPC and CS under water solid operation ECCS water solid or steaming, the operators will be monitoring containment operation. Inadequate SP conditions. SP temperature will be increasmg and level will cooling and SP level loss be dropping. Low SP level will be alarmcxi. These results in the need to indicators will lead the operators to enter EP-3 and will dump SPMU. indicate the need to provide makeup to the SP. Once the operators have made the initial decision to dump SPM U, it was assumed that they would also realize the need to provide additional makeup for later. Moreover, if the SP began heating up and losing level again, the indicators as before would occur. B 4. 2 Table 10.1.27.3 Potential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Infonnation (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) With no SP cooling or CS under One The operators will have to open a water solid operation or steaming, series of valves to provide makeup additional makeup beyond a single from the CST to SPMU or to SPMU dump will be needed to provide the makeup directly to the provide adequate level and cooling SP. If power and IA are lost, to the SP. operators would have to use y nitrogen bottles to open several
- xs AOVs.
m O _ n
- x2 6
z Table 10.1.27.4 :::
$ Time,Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task $
6 8
- c Action Time by Which Time at %hich Operator Maximum Time Available Comments /
b (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Infonnation D has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) Act (T) (2) (3) (4) The operators need to 11 hours Approximately 1.5 to 2 hours 9 hours SEA Calculation C90-492 diagnose the need to before indicators for entering A16 initiate SPMU. EP-3 would be reached. Table 10.1.27.5 Operator Action PerformanceTime Activities Location Travel Penformance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Souste of Information _ Time (T) y (3) (4) (5) (6) In the worst case, the operators In some cases. - - Travel and would have to obtain nitrogen outside the performance time was bottles to open several AOVs. control room in very conservatively In most cases the valve openings the Aux. or estimated i s be required to obtain makeup to the Control Bldgs, approxirnately 4 SP from the CST could be done hours. In these from the control room. scenarios, there would be plenty of time to accomplish the necessary actions. Total action time = 4 hours Y h S ~ . .- -. , _
< Ttble 10.1.27.6 9- Diagnosas Time for Operator Action ?! 2 ~ Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available C-.mW (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) SPMKP and SPMKN were - - - In any case, diagnosis time assumed to be completely would be substantial and dependent on OPSPM and the diagnosis HEP would SPMUN, respectively. be negligible compared to Hus, diagnosis time is not the action HEP obtained relevant for the HEP with ASEP HRAP. calculation. . Table 10.1.27.7 Diagnosis Analysis f Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / 8 (1) Diagnose (3) Final HEP Source of Infonnation (2) (4) (5) SPMKP and Med. = 0 SPMKN were assumed to be Mean = 0 completely dependent on if OPSPM or SPMUN OPSPM and succeed, then the SPMUN, I diagnosis part of SPMKP respectively. Thus, or SPMKN will also diagnosis time is not succeed relevant for the HEP calculation. Z C Q N N 6 % b h
2 Table 10.1.27.8 m
$ Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP f
' o a Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training,
- = Individual Dynamic or Conunents b (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Souste of Ir. formation O Designed EOPs 1%rform Concurrent (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) Open N/A No explicit No Step-by-step valves to procedures, but once provide the decision was j additional made, the actions makeup for would be SPMU. straightforwant. I Table 10.1.27.9 _ Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP O
~
" l Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments /
(1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5)
- Open valves to N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Substantial time available provide High before core damage.
additional makeup for the SP.
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not n_ecessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the conte .t.
.N 2
[ l
< Tr.Ne 10.1.27.10 E- Total IEP N
2 Action Original Independent Total IEP EF Ca._..u.;s/
~
(1) Operator IEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of (IEP ) IEP Information (2)' (IEP,) (6) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0 Med. Mean 0 OPSPM or SPMUN has already 0 succeeded. 'Ihe diagnosis was Mean = 0 assumed to be completely dependent on these e-:-- +
- 2. Align valves to provide Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 _L5)_ De error factor associated with makeup from the CST to Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.02 0.032 (5) the dominant IIEP (only llEP SPMU or to the SP. because the additional in this case) was assigned.
makeup may not be Total Median IIEP If power is lost, some provided until late in the = 0.02 valves may need ;o be time available and there
;3 opened locally with the mat not be sufficient Total Mean HEP g hand wheel. If IA is lost, time to correct any = 0.032
- AOVs may need to be errors since many of the opened manually using activities may have nitrogen bottles to provide taken place outside the the
- air". control room.
Z C M O a W % 6 b
Table 10.1.28.1 ::: I z HEP 28 Calculation y 8 n
- o Human Action Event (1) OPFLD (1)
F,FP 3 Event Tree (s)(2) Initiators (3) All transients Sequence Locator Files (4) All files beginning with OPFLD, e.g., OPFLDE.EIT Event Description (5) OPFLD is the operator decirion and action to flood the vessel /contamment in order to pnmde some form of SDC. For the OPFLD (1) calculation (HEP 28) OPECS or OPDHR have ewhi, but all ECCS Event Context (6) systems have failed or are unavailable. 'Ihus, the operators have attempted to do the correct actions, but the systems asked have failed or been unavailable. One option available to the operators to provide level and core cooling is to flood the vessel / containment. SSWXT or FW are systems that could (potentially) be used to flood. If vessel level is too low and not increasing, EP-2 calls out for alternate level control which will eventually lead the operators to initiate flooding. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), EP-2 (RPV Cocuol, Rev.19), RHR 501 g ' (G4-1-01-E12-1, Step 6.10) s Y a
< Table 10.1.28J i P- Sequence T'aning and Indications
.N
.e =_-
E Event / Occurrence T~n ne (T*) Annew4.aar/ indication Conuments/
~
i (of most interest) Operator (3) Soorte of (1) Alerted Infonmation (2) (4) ECCS systems are not O In addition to numerous alarms and indications which availabic and core would already be present, reactor temperature (and in some cooling and makeup are cases pressure) will be increasing). The crew has been 6W. The question is attempting to respond to existing problems and will be whether will flood with aware of the need to provide core cooling in some way. i SSWXT or FW. 1.ow level alarms would likely to occur during this period. Table 10.1.28.3 4 Pbtential Operator Action o Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Conunents/ of Event Abnonnal Events Requierd to Perform Source of Infonnation 3 Action and Procedures (4) (1) (2) (3) Operators are attempting to One - Check closed MSIVs it was assumed the SSWXT would respond to IDHR, but no ECCS - Ensure that some SRVs be the operators first choice for ' are open flooding and credit was not taken systems are available. OPFLD asks whether the operators - Align and initiate SSWXT for both SSWXT an3 FW in the will attempt to flood with SSWXT for flooding sequences covered by this HEP. or FW. 1 4 C O d 30 x ,
- b. g t )
-._ - _ - - - - - . _ - - _ . . - - - - _ - . - - - _ - _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ - - - - _ _ . _ - . , - - - - w . - - - -e, - . - - - - - .-n- -- - __ - - - _ - - - ~ _ -
x Table 10.1.28.A :c m Time Available to Diagnme and Perform the Task y O 8 Action
- e Time by Widch Time at Which Operator Maximurn Time Available Co-.M h (1) Operator Mtst is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Information O Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5)
(2) (3) (4) Initiate flooding 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calc:dation C90492-Ol! A16 Table 10.1.28.5 Operator Action I%rformance Time Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T,) Source of Information
, (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and study EP-2 is a conservative read EP-2 and Table 8-1, Step assumption gisen the training the operators receive. apply to LP&S Sa) Ihmever, the delay seemed consistent with the
- diversity of context. activities" ongoing during LP&S and with the idea that some
" generalization" of EP-2 to the LP&S con. ext wouki be required.
- 2. Check CR -
I minute I minute The critical actions for flooding werejudgal to be an closed MSIVs integrated set of actions. l
- 3. Ensure some CR -
I minute I minute Also note that per ASEP Table 8-1 Step Sb, a 1 min. travel l SRVs are open and manipulation time was assumed for each action.
- 4. Initiate CR -
I minutes I minute j SSWXT per (per Table 8-1, 8 min. Total l RHR SOI GS- Step 5b l-01-E 12-1, e step 6.10.
- 2. Requires 2
.w valves to be ?
a "Pe"ed- \ ~
i < Table 14.1.28.6
.E Diagnosis Tune for Operaser Action t 9
~
- Il2 Tune Available Comunents/
- Action Maxionen Tisne Total Action
~
(1) Available (T,) T~mne (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) 0) (4) Infonnation I (5) Diagnose neeu to flood 23 minutes 8 minutes 15 minutes vessel / containment Table 10.1.28.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill. Based Ac[jinsted/ Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final HEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) Y Flooding in response to IDHR during LP&S j Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.04 flood mtxlian value fmm Figure 8-1 is not explicitly called out by procedure. for 15 minutes diagnosis time Meu = 0.106 Hoever, it is at least indirectly indicated in vessel / containment. was assigned. EP-2 and the site interviews indicated that l the operators have a clear understanding of the needed resportw and the necessary actior.s. 'Ihus, per ASEP HRAP, Table 8-3, the median diagnosis value would be appropnate. Z C N O a W 'I:
-4 5
E. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . _ _ __ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
z Table 10.1.28.8 ::: m Nt-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP y 9 - O Action Safety Systems EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments 8 (1) Failed Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Information 8 (2) Designed EOPs Perform Concunent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Flood N/A Actions are specified No Step-by-Step containment. by procedure. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. _? Table 10.1.28.9 8 ht-Diagnosis Sinss-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Flood with N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Several systems available and SSWXT. High substantial time before core damage At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. For the LPS enviroument (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
, - , . , , . , , . - - .~ , , . _ _ .n.
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) )
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2. 1 E I pC e/ I oE E3I ( - a nt . r s fs 0l 1 at dk ( oa ono eo Inc e f wei t s t l h i k ua bT C d c ai t T a e r e c m h e i Ccbl P l aI n E) 6 2 0 23 gt r o P'2 i ) 4 0 0 00 1 r aE( i I 0 0 0 Or( e p - = = O n n de. e a de a e M M MM T X WS S ht n i o i) w t 1 g c( n A i d o i s l o f s o e n g t a i i a i t D I n 1 2
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ll
Z Tab:e 14.1.29.1 -
@ HEP 29 Calculation 8 f n
- c Human Action Event (1) OPSTM (1) a 5 Event Tree (s)(2) S,SP,SNP Initiators (3) All transients and LOCAS Sequence locator Files (4)
All files beginning with OPSTM, e.g., OPSTMFD3.SP, with the exception of OPSTMHYD.ECN, OPSTMSNP.SNP, OPSTMSNP.EIT, OPSTM51.TIH, OPSTM51.TIF, OPSTM81.TIH, and OPSTM81.TIF. Event Description (5) OPSTM is the operator decision to initiate steaming of the core. Event Context (6) OPSTM (1) (HEP 29) applies in numerous sequences. It represents the operators decision to steam the vessel to provide core cooling when other actions they have taken have been unsuccessful. For example, in many sequences they have attempted to initiate ECCS water solid operation (OPECS succeeds), but the systems have failed. The critical aspect of HEP 29 is that the operators have demonstrated an awareness of the problem. While steaming of the vessel is a non-pmceduralized action, the operators will essentially be steaming the core by default at this point. They will need to B ensure I SRV is opened and eventually they will need to provide some form of makeup, which they h N have already been attempting to accomplish. Several systems may be used for steaming, e.g., l CRD, CDS, SSWXT, and FW. l Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-29-02-111-1) l l l l
?
w l l
<: Table 10.1.29.2
! ?- Sequesur Taming and Indicahons p I 7 3 Annunciator / Indication C-I
- Event /Oecurrence Tune (T,)
~
Operator 0) Som m of i (of anest interest) Alerted Inforum tion 4 (I) (2) (4) He operators have O Operators have been wh,.ang to respond to IDHR. Dus BWRs besacally Sanae by *==ng. l Dus, it is not an
- unusual
- response attempted to respond to they are aware that vessel temperature is going up. They IDHR. For any of are in fact steaming by default and need only open i SRV. to the proble a.
several reasons, their There are no particular indicators that specify steaming. l attempts have failed. Note. Even if'.he operators have e.g., ECCS fails. deculed not to go water solid with OPSTM asks whether or only 1 SRV available (OPISV fails in -i
- not the operators will E tree), they may still decide to steam t conwiously decide to with 1 SRV. If they initially fail to get steam the vessel. De 1 SRV open, it was assumed they could still decide to attempt steaming. ;
operators need to ensure that 1 SRV is open. l l _
?
t G
- i i
1 i C W tT1 k 9 = s. b 5
z Table 10.1.29.3 ::: Potential Operator Action O f B x Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / b of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Infonnation U (I) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) Previous attempts to provide SDC One Check open 1 SRV Complete dependence wu assumed have failed. The operators may ' between the control room decide to steam the vessel. consciously decidmg to steam the vessel and checking open 1 SRV. In most of the sequences in which this HEP is applied, the SRV is already open. 'Ihus, steaming is occurring by default. Interviews with operators indicated that they would not open MSIVs for steaming unless they had a vacuum y in the condenser. Cannot assume a vacuum exists in the condenser { during POS 5. Therefore, deciding to steam was assumed to entail ensuring that i SRV was open. o
.M *o s -- - . , .
] < Table 10.1.29.4 9- Tune Available to Diagnose and Perfem the Task m
E Action Tune by Which Tune at Which Operator Mawi=num Time AM Cet
~
Operator Must is Alerted that Symptesa to Perfona the Mameirmed Source of Infer-ahn (1) has Occumd (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) Act(T) (2) 0) (4) A decision 23 minutes 0 23 minutes SEA C=b=1% C90 492-029-
~
to steam is A16 all that is asked in this event. Table 10.1.29.5 Operator Action PerformanceTime Location Travel 1%rfonnance Total Action Comments / Y Activities (2) Time (T,) Time (r,) Source of Information
@ (1) Time (T)
O) (4) (5) (6)
- Initiation of a makeup system is not No action required. Contml Room - -
immediately required. Eventually Checking open 1 SRV makeup is required and system success was assumed to part of is asked later in the tree. the decision to steam. In most cases the necessary SRV is already open. Z C b O 8 W M b h
i Tchie 10.1.29.6 2: Diagnosis Time for Operator Action N O Pi y Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / g (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) Source of
" to Diagnosis (T)
(2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Consciously decide to 23 0 minutes 23 minutes . steam the vessel. 1 Table 10.I.29.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) (4) Source of Information (2) (5) f Decide to steam the Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, N/A Median = 0.G4 Interviews with oper.cors indicated a good M vessel. the upper bound value from awareness of the notion of steaming the ASEP Figure 8-1 for 23 Mean = 0.106 vessel. In fact, several operators indicated it minutes diagnosis time was would be preferable to flooding the vessel and assigned. more likely to be used. Ilowever, since it is not proceduralized ami apparently not covered specifically in training. it is not clear that all operators would consciously decide to steam. Thus, without additional information, per ASEP liRAP Table 8-3, the upper bound diagnosis value was indicated.
.N a
t
$ Table 10.1.29.8
~
Pest-Diagnosis Action-Type Id-h&atia= w 1
?!
1 Action Safety Sy*=== Failed EOPs, Training, - Individual Dyannnic or Ca===s= (1) (2) Use EOPs, wee Operator Must Step-by-Seep Source of Infor==eia= Designed EOP!s Perfonn (5) (6) (3) Concumnt Tasks (4) & N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' !
' Actions assumed completely a,~.. dent with diagnosis (see Table 10.1.29.3 for rationale). j l
Table 10.1.29.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identifu:stion 5
$ Action T < 2h Recirc. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Conunents/
(1) After IE in Safety Systenis Familiar (6) Sourte of Inforniation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/m"_.ae (7) (3) (4) (5) , N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' N/A' I .
' Actions assumed completely dependent with diagnosis (see Table 10.1.29.3 for rationale).
1 , W C - p r tT1 O , d W
& T ,
b h
- - - - - . , - . . . - . . - - . , - - , - - . . - - .- - - - - --, . < - - - - . - - - - - ---n-. . , , - ~ . - - - - - - - _ _ . - - - _ _ _ - _ .
i
- $ Tame 10.1.29.10 m
- E Total HEP g i e c
l $ Ah @ - - ^ Total HEP EF Comnuments/ (1) Opermeer HEP Cherkkomction O (4) (5) hmA , (HEF ) HEP j (6)
- (2)* (HEP) 0)
Decide to steam the Dugnosis and N/A Median = 0.04 10 vessel. Actions:
- Mean = 0.106 Median = 0.04 Mean = 0.106 l
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$ Tcbie 10.1.34.1 HEP 30 Calculation .[ ?
Human Action Event (1) OPSOF (2) Event Tree (s)(2) OF,OFP Initiators (3) All transients, Hi-5H, J2-5 Sequence laator Files (4) OPSOF.OFP, OPSOFFLD.OFP, OPSOF.T5A, OPSOF.TSD, OPSOF. TAB, OPSOF.TDB, OPSOF.TIA. OPSOF2.TIA OPSOF9.TIA. OPSOF.ElB, OPSOF.E2B, OPSOF.EIT, OPSOF2.EIT, OPSOF.E2T, OPSOF.EIV, OPSOF.E2V, OPSOF.TIF, OPSOF.TIH, OPSOF.TLM OPSOF.TRP, OPSOF.HIS, OPSOFJ2 Event Desenption (5) OPSOF is the operator action to stop flooding through open main steam line(s). Event Context (6) For the OPSOF (2) calculation (HEP 30), the operators have initiated some form of vessel injection, e.g., for water solid operation or flooding of containment, one or more of the MSIVs are open, and water is running down the steam line(s). De operators must detect the flooding, stop the injection system, and close the MSIVs. Applicable Procedures (7) All operators would understand the need to stop flooding down the steam line(s). He inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1) instructs the operators to check closed any open MSIVs when initiating ECCS y water solid operation. G w 2 C h C Ei c
& 2 b
l H _
Z % E Table 10.1.30.2 N 8 Sequence Timing and Indications 8
;c - Event / Occurrence Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments /
w (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) Undesired flooding O For the situation where level is being increased for ECCS In the site interviews, operators through open MSIVs water solid operation, the IDHR ONEP instructs the indicated they would definitely want j caused by intentional operators to check closed any open MSIVs. With the to stop flooding through MSIVs. initiation of an injection additional time, operators may recall or recheck the need to system to irerease level, close the MSIVs. For any case, Level 7 and 8 alarms may cue the operators to check the position of MSIVs. Moreover, water flowing down the steam lines into the l Turbine Bldg. may be noticed. Could get steam line drain valve alarms.
$ Table 10.1.30.3 8 Potential Operator Action
! Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnonnal Events Required to Perform Sourte of Infonnation (1) (2) Action and Pmcedures (4) (3) Operators are attempting to One The operators need to stop injection increase level and inadvertently and close MSIVs. flood down open MSIVs.
.M *C b
_ - _ _ _ _ -. v-
< Table 10.1.30.4 ~
Time Avoilable to Ihagnose and Perform the Task
?
3 Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximian Time Available Comments / (1) Operator Mist is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Information Act (T) has Occurred (r,) Operator Activities (r,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Detect the flooding or 20 minutes 0 20 minutes SEA Calculation C90-492-Ol-the fact that the A16 MSIVs are open, and stop the flooding. Table 10.1.30.5 Operator Action Performance Time
- Activities Iecation Travel Performance Total Action Comments /
2 (1) (2) Time (r') Time (T) Time (T*) Source of Infonnation S (3) (4) (5) (6) Terminate injection and CR - 2 minutes 2 minutes Note that travel and manipulation (performance) ckwe MSIVs. times in the contml room were determined using ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are gmuped under the performance time column. The actions involved in terminating injection and closing the open MSIVs were assumed to be completely dependent. It was assumed that a correct diagnosis would indicate that both actions should occur. Z C W m O 8 W 6 2 b N
Z Table 10.1.30.6 h Diagnosis Time for Operator Action h m O " B W Action Maximan Time Total Action Time Amlable Comments / h (1) Amlable (T,) Time (r,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of w Information (2) (3) (4) (5) The operators need to 20 minutes 2 minutes 18 minutes diagnose the flooding down the steam lines and the need for its termination. Table 10.1.30.7 Diagnosis Analysis Acti<m Failure to Skill-Based A (justed / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Mnal IIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) w Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.015 The site interviews indicated that the terminate flooding median value from Figure 8-1 operators would understand the need to stop down open MSIVs. for 18 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.04 the flooding through open MSIVs. was assigned. , o
.M a
m _ l N
g Table 10.1.30.8 r- Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP N 3 Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourte of Information Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Terminate N/A Interviews indicatal No Step-by-step injection that the operators and close were knowledgeable open about the need for MSIVs. the actions. Table 10.1.30.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP llRAP 5 a l 0 Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Terminate N/A' N/A No2 N/A Moderately Actions are straightforward injection and High and situation is not yet close open critical. MSIVs. At least moderately high she wa= assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. 7 C h O d lm 6 % w s
l Z Table 10.1.30.10 Total HF2 N O 8 g Action Original Independent Total IEP EF Comments / g (1) Operator IEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Sourte of w OEP) IEP Information (2)' QIEP ) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.015 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.015 0.M Mean = 0.M
- 2. Terminate injection system and Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.004 0.01 J5L 5 Second check HEPs close open MSIVs. Mean = 0.032 check was given 0.019 0.05 (10) are multiplied by the because once the original HEP for diagnosis was made, the Total Median each action.
operators would get ilEP = 0.019 clear feedback reganiing Since both HEPs the failure of any of the Total Mean HEP made significant y necessary actions and = 0.05 contributions to the 5 they would be attending total HEP, the larger to the indicators. of the two error factors was assigned. HEPs for failure to provide a second check were: Med. = .2 Mean = .323 2
- w. W
g Table 10.1.31,1 HEP 31 Calculation _ Human Action Event (1) RESB, RESAD, RESCS (1) Event Tree (s)(2) ElB5H EID5H, EIT5H. ElV5H Initiators (3) ElB5H EID5H. EIT5H, EIV5H Sequence Locator Files (4) RESB.ElB, RESAD.EID, RESC.EIT, RESC.EIV Event Description (5) RESB is the operator action to recognize the need and unisolate RHR/SDC loop B RESAD is the operator action to recognize the need and unisolate ADHR, and RESCS is the operator action to recognize need and unisolate the SDC common suction line. Event Context (6) IIEP 31 applies to sequences where the initiator leads to a loss of SDC that may be restorable, ne operators recognize the loss of SDC (OPSDC succeeds) and RESB, RESAD, and RESCS asks vdether the operators recognize the potential and attempt to restore the operating SDC system. Restoration may involve the simple opening of a valve that spuriously closed, e.g.,6,8 or 9 valve. This action must occur in the same time period as that allowed for OPSDC.
;3 Applicable Prucedures (7) None O
z C h O 8
- C e >
Z Table 10.1.31.2 h tn Sequence Timing and Indwations s n Pi y Event / Occurrence Time (r,) Annunciator /Indwation Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) A potentially restorable O In most cases (pump trip, system isolation, loss of heat sink loss of SDC occurs. (SSW), -A.) a loss of SDC will be alarmed. A loss of i SDC will also be indicated by coolant temperature, flow, and discharge pressure changes. Operators are required by I the plant to check reactor coolant temperature every 30 minutes at the chart recorder. A spurious valve closure will ! be indicated by a valve position light in the control room. l Table 10.1.31.3 Potential Operator Action
~
o 2. 8 Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) A potentially restorable loss of One Operators must determine where SDC occurs, e.g., spurious closure the isolation occurred by examining l of valve. valve positions on the control panel l ard unisolate. It was assumed that j the unisolation activities could ! require a trip outside the control l room and manual opening of the valves. l l 1
.N l *o 3
g TrAle 10.1.31.4 r Time Available to Diagnme and Ptrfonn the Task
.N 2
2
~
Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Information Act (T ) has Occurred (T*) Operator Activities (f" ) (5) (2)" (3) (4) The operaton need to 37 minutes 0 37 Minutes SEA Calculation C90492 diagnose the need to A16 unisolate SDC and perform required actions. Table 10.1.31.5 Operator Action Performance Time Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / g (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T,) Source of Information g (3) (4) (5) (6) w
- 1. After diagnosing the loss of CR -
5 minutes 5 minutes It was assumed that the operators could SDC, the operators will have scan the relevant control panels and to scan control room panels to identify the potential problem within 5 determine where the isolation minutes. occurred. This activity might be considered part of the Note that travel and manipulation diagnosis. However, it was (performance) times in the control room decided that the time that were determined using ASEP HRAP might be required for scanning Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under should be subtracted from the the performance time column. time available to decide what has happened and what must The scanning process was, however, be done. included as part of the diagnosis process and not considered an independent action. 2 Possibly - 15 minutes 15 minutes The time to unisolate SDC was estimated
% 2. Unisolate the SDC system. outside 20 minutes on basis of discussions with plant m control Total time for personnel. Since the unisolation could be 9 room actions. done from the CR in most cases, the Q assumption of 15 minutes represents a 6
- worse case
- scenario. :::
b H.
Z Table 10.1.31.6 E m Diagnosas Time for Operator Action h 9 o M Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Cw.-.;d h (1) Available (T,) Time (r,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of w (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose problem and the 37 minutes 20 minutes Approx.17 minutes need to attempt to unisolate SDC. Table 10.1.31.7
~
Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information g (2) (4) (5) 2. E Ciagnose neal to Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, Med. = 0.02 He site interviews indicated that the unisolate SDC the median value from Figure operators are aware of the problem of concem 8-1 for 17 minutes diagnosis Mean = 0.053 and have a clear understanding of the time was assigned. requirements. While no explicit procedures apply, the potential causes of an isolation of SDC are fairly straightforward and the possible actions would m:t be complicated, e.g., opening a valve. Hus, the median diagnosis value wasjudgal appropriate per ASEP HRAP, Table 8-3. o
.N 2
g Table 14.131.8 [ Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP ?? 3 Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Canunents (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Information Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Unisolate N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-step SDC by that the operators opcmng 6, were knowlalgeable 8 or 9 about the need for valve. the actions. Table 10.131.9 Post-Diagnosas Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP 5 L
$ Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments /
(1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Unisolate N/A' N/A No2 N/A Moderately Several systems available SDC by liigh and substantial time before opening 6, core damage. 8 or 9 valve. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of 7 c extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. e 9 6 = b h
y Table 10.1.31.10 :
- o Tota!IEP $
o 8 y Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Cornments/ g (1) Operator IEP Check /Cometion (4) (5) Source of (IEP ) IEP Inforn:ation (2)' (IEP,) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.02 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.02 0.053 Mean = 0.053
- 2. Unisolate SDC by opening 6, 8 Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 _(_5). Since both HEPs or 9 valve. Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.04 0.085 (10) made significant .
because of the limited contributions to the_ time and the possibility Total Median overall HEP, the that the action might HEP = 0.04 larger of the two take place outside the error factors was control. Total Mean HEP assigned. 5 = 0.085 G O O
.N 2
g
~
Table 10.1.33.1 HEP 33 Calculation E _ Human Action Event (1) OPFIE (2) Event Tree (s)(2) F FX,' FAX,FNP , Initiators (3) TI-5, TDB5H, T5 ASH, ElB5H, E2B5H Sequence In:ator Files (4) OPFLD.FNP, OPFLDADH.TDB, OPFLD.TSA, OPFLD.ElB, OPFLD.E2B Event Description (5) OPFLD is the operator decision and action to flood the vessel /contamment in order to provide some form of SDC. Event Context (6) For the OPFLD (2) calculation (HEP 33), OPECS, OPDHR, or at least OPSDC han succeeded. He problem in these sequences is that all ECCS systems are unavailable for one reason or an anothe , and SSWXT is unavailable also. Thus, in the flooding trees, FW is the only available system for flooding. However, on the basis of estimates to align the FW system for injection, it was concluded that the 23 minutes all' acd for OPFLD would be insufficient to complete the task. Herefore, OPFLD was set to I.0 (failure) in the relevant sequences. Since detailed ASEP HRAP calculations were not required for HEP 33. Tables 10.1.33.2 through 10.1.33.9 were not included. 5 Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19), and injection with Fire Protection Water System (05-S-01-EP2, ATTCH. 26). Note. Tables 10.1.33.2 through 10.1.33.9 were unnecessary for HEP 33 and therefore they were not included. 2 C b O 8 lc dh
~ %
w N I \
i r HRA 33 I U 8T !
?
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Table 10.1.34.1 N HEP 34 Calculation _ Human Action Event (1) OPMSV (2) Event Tree (s)(2) F Initiators (3) TI-5, TDB5H, TIASH Sequence locator Files (4) OPFLD.FP, OPFLDFR.TDB. OPFLD.TIA - Event Description (5) OPMSV is the operator action to close open MSIVs. Event Context (6) For the OPMSV (2) calculation (HEP 34), it was assumed that if the MSIVs were open and the operators failed to close them before initiating containment flooding (OPFLD success), then they would not close them until water started flowing down the steam lines. Since the action for the operators to stop flooding down the steam lines is asked in OPSOF, and OPMSV in these sequences must occur in the same time period as OPSOF, OPMSV was set to 1.0 (failure). Thus, the question of stopping flooding down the steam lines is addressed in OPSOF, as was intended. Since detailed ASEP HRAP calculations were not required for HEP 34, Tables 10.1.34.2 through 10.1.34.9 were not included. 5 Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), RHR SOI (M-1-01-E12-1), HPCS SOI (M-t-01-E22-1). Cf Note. Tables 10.1.34.2 through 10.1.34.9 were unnecessary for HEP 34 and therefore they were not included. l
\
l l C m l 0 4 N lc w >
2 Table 10.1.34.10 ::: E m Total HEP $ 9 o
- o Action Original Independent TotalIIEP EF Cet b (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Sourte ofInformation D (HEP ) HEP (6)
(2)' (HEP,) (3) Close any open MSIVs. Med. = 1.0 - Med. = 1.0 Mean = 1.0 Mean = 1.0 l
~~i a.
l i
~ .m 2
< Tc.ble 10.1.35.1 E- HEP 35 Calculatioit
- r 2.--i--
_ Human Action Event (1) OPDHR (2) Event Tree (s)(2) L.LA initiators (3) TSD5H. ElB5H. eld 5H E2D5H, EITSH, EIV5H Sequence locator Files (4) OPDHR.TDB, OPDHR.T5D, OPDHR.ElB, OPDHR.EID, OPDHR.E2D, OPDHR.EIT, OPDHR.EIV Event Description (5) OPDHR is the operator action to control vessel level in oniet b avoid a " functional" loss of SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the vessel. Dat is, even if SDC continues to operate, if vessel level becomes too low, a *discormt* between the core and downcomer regions can occur. His will result in inadequate cooling of the core even though SDC continues to operate. He indications to the operators that the event is occurring can be subtle because_ temperature readings are apparently taken from the downcomer region, where the water being cooled by SDC is returned. Also, the essel level wculd not be so low that any level alarms , 3, would sound. A loss of forced recirculation, or a loss of makeup (usually CRD) coupled with continued draindown. can lead to inadequate level. Only 10 minutes was allowed for the operator diagnosis and actions in OPDHR. ! Event Context (6) ne important constants for the OPDHR (2) calculation (HEP 35) are that RWCU has not been isolated by a LOSP or y loss of IA. Moreover, any losses of forced recirculation or CRD or RWCU are either artifacts of the initiator (e.g., a
~
g loss of CCW ) or are unrelated to the initiator and occur as random events. Applicable Procedures (7) No specific procedures, but the less of CCW ONEP (05-1-02-V-1, Rev. I1) and the Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ON".O sdS-1-02-Ill-1) would be relevant, as would the relevant SOls, e.g., RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1). Z C hQ N
=
x c
z lI: E $
@ Table 10.1.35.2 8 Sequence Timing and Indications
- =
1 b O Eventhm.oe Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most intertst) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4)
!NiR caused by O As noted in Table 35.1, the indications for this event may I snadequate circulation be subtle because vessel temperature readings could be I between the core and the misleading and no level alarms would sound. However, in downcomer regions of all the sequences covered CRD and/or forced recirculation the vessel. level control is lost. These events will be alarmed and if the operators ,
(makeup) is needed. are knowledgeable regardmg the potential problem, these indications should suffice.
- Table 10.1.35.3 $ I%tential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Co __ __ _.M of Event .ibnormal Events Required to Perforni Sourte of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4)
(3) A " functional" loss of SDC leads One The operators need to increase to IDHR. The operators need to RPV water level with any available diagnose the need and increase injection system. CRD (if vessel level. avariable), CDS, or an ECCS , system are possible choices.
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< Table 10.1.35.4 2- Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available C a = = = *=1 (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Suurre of Infonnation Act (T) has Occumd (T*) Operator Activities (T" ) (5)
(2) Q) (4) The operators need to 10 minutes 0 10 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 g diagnose the need to A16 increase level to avoid inadequate core , y cooling. Table 10.1.35.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time Activities Location Travel tirformance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Source of Information Time (T)
.: 0) (4) (5) (6)
$ 1. Isolate RWCU, and in 2 minutes Note that travel and manipulation (performance)
CR - 2 minutes some sequences the times in the control room were determined using operators may need to ASEP Table stop CRD, forced 81, Step Sb, and are grouped under the recirculation, and performance time column. RWCU.
- 2. If available, increase CR -
2 minutes 2 minutes The actions involved in initiating a makeup system flow with CRD. If CRD were assumed to be completely defendent. System is not available and SDC Since more than initiation would be proceduralized. is not being provided by one system may SDC(B), use CDS. need to tried,2 Otherwise, use an ECCS minutes, rather system. than I minute Note. With only 10 min. was assumed for z available for OPDilR, if conducting the c CDS was asked and it activities. E failed, credit was not Q taken for both CDS and an ECCS system. Q ::: 6 E 5
- 2: Table 10.1.35.6 :::
E Ihagnosis Time for Operator Action $ o 8
- = Action Maximun Time Total Action Time Available Comments /
h (1) Arailable (T,) Time (I') to Ihagnosis (T) Source of w (2) (3) Infonnation (4) (5) The operators need to 10 minutes 4 minutes 6 minutes diagnose the need to isolate RWCU snd increase level to avoid inadequate core cooling. Table 10.1.35.7 Diagnosis Analysis
- Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments /
2 (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Source of Information d (2) (4) (5) Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.2 The site interviews indicated that the isolate RWCU and median value from Figure 8-1 operators are aware of the pmblem of concern provide makeup. for 6 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.533 and have a clear understanding of the was assigned. requirements. However, with the potential j subtlety of the indicators, the absence of any explicit procedures, and the time limitations, the lower bound diagnosis value was not
, assumed appropriate.
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< Tthie 10.1.35.8 2- Post-Dugnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP o S Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training. Individual Dynamic or Comments ~ (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infor nation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrtnt (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Isolate N/A Interviews indicated No Dynamic. RWCU and that the operators initiate an were knowledgeable Given that the injection about the need for operators would system to the actions. have determme provide which systems to makeup. start and isolate on their own and without much time, the actions were assumed to be dynamic, per
? ASEP. ~
s C Table 10.1.35.9 Post. Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP l Action T <2h Retire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AllerIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate an N/A' N/A No* N/A Moderately Several systems available injection High and substantial time before system to core damage. provide 2 makeup. C
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
k:o 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of b extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. s 8
Z Table 19.1.35.10 ::: E. TotalIEP $ 8 w n Action Original Ir. a g r. A .-t. Total IEP EF Commesits/ b (I) Operator IEP Check /Correcimri (4) (5) Source of O (IEP ) IEP Infonnation (2)' (IEP) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.2 -
Med. Mean (10) O.2 0.533 Mean = 0.533
- 2. Isolate RWCU and in some Med. = 0.05 Credit for a second 0.05 0.081 (5) sequences stop CRD and forced Mean = 0.081 check was not taken recirculation. because of the time limitations.
- 3. Initiate an injection system to Med. = 0.05 Credit for a second 0.05 0.081 ,15)_ Since all the HEPs provide makeup and vessel level Mean = 0.081 check was not taken 0.30 0.695 (10) make significant
- control. because of the time contributions to the 9 limitations. Total Media . total HEP, the larger E HEP = 0.50 error factor was assignal.
Total Meu HEP
= 0.70 l
o
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_ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ .- , - , _ _ ,,. _ n .-
< Table 10.1.37.1 2- . HEP 37 Calculation 7 r 2 Human Action Event (1) OPECS (11) Event Tree (s)(2) E EA Initiators (3) T5D5H, TIOFS, TlHP5, TLM5H, TRPr5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPECSL32.TSD, OPECSLEA.T5D, OPECSLTIF, OPECSLTlH, OPECSLTLM, OPECSLTRP Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) ne important constants for the OPECS (11) calculation (HEP 37) are that SDC(B) or ADHR has continued to run and forced recirculation and/or CRD and/or RWCU are lost. RWCU must be manually isolated from the control room to stop draindown, i.e., no auto-isolation. He operators initially fail to diagnose the need for level control to avoid a functional loss of SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the RPV (OPDHR fails). He inadequate circulation is due to the
~ 1.4 of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. With SDC continuing to operate, ;;;; the operators failing to diagnose the functional loss of SDC and the need for level control ~
during the time for OPDHR, RWCU (letdown) needing to be isolated, and ADHR needing to be isolated in some sequences, OPECS is somewhat more demanding in these scenarios than in some others. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-102-111-1, Rev.15), RHR 501 (Gi-t-01-E12-1.Rev.44)
'2l C
b Q 8 zm g
2 Table 10.1.37.2 :z:
$ Sequence Timing and Indications %
8 N Event / Occurrence Time (T ) Annunciator /Indwation Comments /
$ (of most interest) Operato*r (3) Source of li;' (1) Alerted Information (2) (4)
IDHR. Need for level O Loss of systems were alarmed and the operators should control and cooling. accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in this time period as level decreases as a result of RWCU (letdown) not being isolated. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. However, the coolant temperature of the core may not be apparent since the sensors sample the water in the recirculation areas which are being cooled by SDC in this scenario. Table 10.1.37.3 Potential Operator Action h E Description Numher of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Required to Perform Source of (1) Events Action and Procedures Information (2) (3) (4) Due to the " functional
- loss One A. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop letdown. It was assumed that at of SDC, operators must least initially, a low enter the IDHR ONEP and B. Per RHR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from ADHR to pressure injection system diagnose the need to initiate RHR C or RHR B would be preferable to ECCS water solid high pressure system and operation. 1. Secure ADHRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) LPCI is referied to in
- 2. Align and start RHR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b, (1- IDHR ONEP. In addition,
- 5) and 6.6.2.c,d,e f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and 6.S.2.c,d,e.f ) the pmcedures for initiation of LPCI instruct C. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation the operators to secure ADHRS, the HPCS
- 1. Check closul MSIVs procedures do not.
l 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open
< 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if
. available, then HPCS.
W a
-- -- - - - - - - , . , - - - - , - - -- _ , - - - - , , - - _ _ - _ ,_ - w--
< Table 19.1.37.4 .E Tune Available to Diagnose and Perfona the Task N
k Action Tune by Which Tune at Which Operator Maxinnen Tune Available Commmental Operator Must is Alerted that Symptent to Perform the Identified Soorte of Infor-meiam (1) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (r,) (5) Act (T) (2) (3) (4) 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculabon C9(M9241- , Initiate ECCS water A16 solid operation. i 9
~~
m 48 i 1 r f C h O ' 8 W E b E e:
Z Table 10.1.37.5 ::: m Operator Action PerfonnanceTime y O 8 N Activities Location Travel Ptrformance Total Action C_. M (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T*) 8 Time (T) Source ofInformation a (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and read CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes ONEP for inadequate 5 minutes to retrieve and read the IDlIR ONEP is a Table 8-1. Step conservative assumption given the trummy the Decay IIeat Removal Sa) operators receive. Ilowever, the delay seemed consistent with the " diversity of activities
- ongoing during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent. In addition, in the present case the functional loss of SDC may be subtle and the needed response is not explicitly indicated in the IDilR ONEP. Thus, some " interpretation
- will be requimi.
- 2. Isolate letdown CR -
I minute I minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performance) (RWCU) times in the control room were determined using ASEP Table 8-1 Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column.
@ 3. Ensure that ADiiR CR -
1 - 3 minutes, O minutes isolating ADliR and aligning LPCI (action 6 below)
;;;; is secured per RiiR but when the werejudged to be an integrated set of actions and
- SOI procedure (step action is were assumed to be completely dependent. "Ihey are 6.6.!aro.ii.!) necessary, it was successive steps in a procedurt; specifically written to assumed to be cover switching from ADRS to LPCI (RIIR sol (04-done in parallel 1-01-E12-1, Step 6.6 or 6.8) with alignment and start of LPCI (action 6 below) and the other OPECS actions.
- 4. Check closed CR -
I minute 1 minute Steps 4 and 5 are critical actions for initiating ECCS MSIVs water solid operation. They werejudged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 5. Ensure 2 SRVs CR -
I minute I minute open
- 6. Align and initiate CR -
3 minutes - 3 minutes g LPCI(C) or (B) per includes time for 11 minutes RIIR sol (step 6.6.2 isolating ADliR (apprex.) Total F or 6.8.2) when required. time for all y actions. 1 - [
i i I Tobie 10.1.37.6
~
l Dugnosis Tune for Operator Action
- Action Maxirman Tune Total Action Tune Available Cet (1) Available (T,) Tm* ne (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of l Infor==d==
- (2) (3) (4)
(5) Dugnose need to initiate 23 minutes - 11 annutes 12 minutes ] ECCS water solid t ] operation. Table 19.1.37.7 " Diagnosis Analysis . Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comunents! (1) Diagnose (3) Final HEP Source of Information p (2) (4) (5) E w
! Diagnose need to Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, Median = 0.06 On the basis of the site interviews, it appaued initiate ECCS water the median value from Figure (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understandmg of
' solid operation in 8-1 for 12 minutes diagnosis this situahon and recognimd the requirenuets. context of a time was assigned. Mean = 0.16 However, given the failure of OPDHR, the t " functional
- loss of need to diagnose the need to isolate RWCU and the potentaal subtlety of the "funchonal* I 4
SDC and deternune what the appropnate loss of SDC without explicit prM=es, the actions should be. lower bound value for the diagnosis did not seem appropriate in this context. I i
'2-C 2
rn 1 4 e n E i zm c
$ Tchie 10.1.37.8 :::
g Pa,t-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP g a B [ Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must
" Step-by-Step Sourte of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
- 0) Tub (4)
Initiate N/A 'Ihe site interviews No Dynamic Given the limited amount of ECCS indicated that the water solid time for OPECS and the operators were operation. fact that some of the actions knowledgeable about are not explicitly procedure the need for the based, the operators actions and responses to the event were requirements. assumed to be dynamic per However, see ASEP HRAP Table 8-1, comments in Step 10, Items, a,b,c. Column 6 of this p table. a? e Table 10.1.37.9 Ibst-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source ofInformation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No2 N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid k At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. L
~
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of m extremely high stress. Fach human action event was examined as a function of the context. 5
-~~ ~ ' '
< Table 10.1.37.19 E- Total HEP W 21 3 Action Original L.agA-t . TotalIEP EF C (1) Operator HEP Check /Cometion (4) (5) Sourm of Infonnation (HEP ) HEP (6)
(2)' QEP,) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.06 -
Med. Mean ~ (10) Diagnose need to initiate ECCS 0.06 0.16 water solid operation and Mean = 0.16 determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions Given the number of Note. Total HEPs are the sum of actions and the limited the individual HEPs from the Median = 0.05 time available, credit Med. Mean diagnosis and actions.
- 1. Isolate RWCU (letdown).
0.081 l for second checks was 0.05 (5) Mean = 0.081 not given l
- 2. Isolating ADilR and aligning y LPCI(C) for injection were Median = 0.05 Med. Mean (5)
;;; assumed to be completely 0.05 0.081 dependent. Mean = 0.081
- 3. OPECS actions
- open 2 SRVs Median = 0.05 Med. Mean Since both the diagnosis and
- check closed MSIVs Mean = 0.081 0.05 0.081 (51 actions HEPs make significant 0.21 0.40 (10) contributions to the Total HEP in
- start LPCI(C) this case, the larger of the two EFs Total median was assigned.
HEP = 0.21 Total mean llEP
= 0.40 C
m O Pi W O >
Z Table 10.1.38.1 m E HEP 38 Calculation f E! n g Human Action Event (1) OPISV (6) 3 Event Trec(s)(2) E,EA Initiators (3) T5D5H TIOFS, TIHP5, TLM5H, TRl*T5 Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECSL32.T5D, OPECSLEA.T5D, OPECSLTIF, OPECSLTIH, OPECSLTLM, OPECSLTRP , Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only I SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decisions and actions as OPECS (HEP 37), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same time period. Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPISV (6) calculation (HEP 38) are that SDC(B) or ADHR has continued to run and forced recirculation and/or CRD and/or RWCU are lost. RWCU must be manually isolated from the control room to stop draindown, i.e., no auto-isolation. The operators
~ initially fail to diagnose the need for level control to avoid a functional loss of SDC caused by ~
inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the RPV (OPDHR fails). The inadequate circulation is due to the loss of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. With SDC continuing to operate, the operators failing to diagnose the functional loss of SDC and the need for level control during the time for OPDHR, RWCU (letdown) needing to be isolated, and ADHR needing to be isolated in some sequences, OPISV (OPECS) is somewhat more demanding in these scenarios than in some others. The IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. He issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only I SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS n-k Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay lleat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44) o 2
.a
l
< Tabic 10.1.38.2 E Sequence Timing and Indications ? ?
Event /Cuo. . oe Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most intered) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with O less of systems were alarmed and the operators should ECCS water solid accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in operation when only I the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in SRV is available. Some this time period as ievel decreases as a result of RWCU form of SDC is needed. (letdown) not being isolated. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. Ilowever, the coolant temperature of the core may not be apparent since the sensors sample the water in the recirculation areas which are being cooled by SDC in this scenario. The control room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of SRVs. 5 L E z C h O 8 W 2 E m
g Table 10.1.38.3 :c g Pbeential Operator Action
$ l O
F i >i Description Nisnber of f w of Event (1) Ahnennal Events Activities (Tasks) Required to Perfonn Action and Procedures Cesansends/ Source ofInformention (4) (2) (3) Due to the " functional
- loss One A. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop letdown. It was assumed that at ;
of SDC, operators have least initially, a low entered the IDHR ONEP B. Per RHR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from ADHR to pressure injection system and diagnosed the need to RHR C or RHR B would be preferable to initiate ECCS water solid high pressure system and operation, but only I SRV 1. Secure ADHRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) LPCIis referred to in is available. The question is 2. Align and start RHR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b, (1- IDHR ONEP. In addition, whether they will proceed 5) and 6.6.2.c,d,e.f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and 6.8.2.c,d,e,f) the procedures for with the initiation of water initiation of LPCIinstruct solid operation if they C. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation the operators to secure cannot match the ONEPs ADHRS, the HPCS _ demand for 2 SRVs 1. Check closed MSIVs procedures do not.
~
9 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open g 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system. In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if available, then HPCS. 4 i t ! ?- i P ! *U l l
I I
< Tcble 10.1.38.4 E- Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task .N Action Time by Thne at Mhich Maximum Comments /
(1) Which Operator Thne Source of Information Operator is Alerted that Available to (5) Must Symptom has Perform the Act (T) Occurred (r,) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activities (T" ) (4) initiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 min. SEA Calculation C90-492-01-A16 solid operation with Note. Here is clearly a dependency between OPECS and only 1 SRV OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but an available. This task additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is must occur in the asked only when OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same i same time frame time period, it was decided that the HEP for OPISV would be allowed for OPECS. determined as if it were OPECS (llEP 18 in this case), except nat is, it must for one difference. Five minutes less would be available for the
, Y occur in the same diagnosis because of the time lost in responding to the failure to 3 23 minutes. get two SRVs open. Operators would probably make several Functionally, attempts to get one more SRV open and would discuss OPISV is OPECS, proceeding with 1 SRV among each other. He site interviews except that only 1 indicated the operators would be likely to proceed with water SRV is available. solid operations even though only 1 SRV was available.
OPISV is asked However, given the earlier failures of the operators and the fact only when OPECS that proceeding with 1 SRV is not explicitly indicated by succeeds. procedure, the median diagnosis value from ASEP, Figure 8-1, rather than the lower bound value, was assigned. 2 c' b Q 8 T. g h 8 >
. ._ _,_ ~ --- _ -
i
- y. Table 10.1.38.5 :::
c Operator Action Performance Time ~ g E 9 Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / Q (1) (2) Time (T ) Time (T) Time (T ) Source of Information 4 (3) ' (4) (5) * (6)
$ 1. Retrieve and read ONEP CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP is a for inadequate Decay Heat Table 8-1. Step Sa) conservative assumpoon given the training the operators Removal receive. However, the delay seemed conststent with the
" diversity of activities" ongoing during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent. In addition, in the present case the functional loss of SDC may be subtle and the needed response is not explicitly i=& =wi m the IDHR -
ONEP. Thus, some " interpretation will be required.
- 2. Isolate letdown (RWCU) CR -
I minute I minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performance) times in the control room were determmed using ASEP Table 8-1,Ste colunm.p Sb, and are grouped under the performance time
- 3. Ensure that ADHR is CR -
1 - 3 minutes, but 0 minutes isolating ADHR and aligning LPCI (action 7 below) were secured per RHR S01 when the action is judged to be an integrated set of actions and were assumed to procedure (step 6.6.1 or necessary, it was be completely dependent. They are successive steps in a 6.8.1) assumed to be done procedure specihcally written to cover switching Trom ADRS in parallel wita to LPCI (RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1 Step 6.6 or 6.8) 9 alienment and start G
" of LPCI (action 7 below) and the other OPECS actions.
- 4. Check closed MSIVs CR -
I minute I minute Steps 4,5 and 6 are critical actions for initiating ECCS water sohd operation. They werejudged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 5. Make severai attempts to CR -
5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding with ECCS get the second SRV open water solid operation with only one SRV would be a viable and discuss proceeding with and likely option. ~lhe immediate objective is to get some iSRV form of decay heat removal operating and initiatmg water solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling.
- 6. Ensure i SRVs open CR -
I minute i minute
- 7. Align and initiate LPCI CR -
3 minutes - 3 minutes
.(C) or (B) per RHR SOI includes time for 16 mmutes (step 6.6.2 or 6.8.2) isolating ADHR (approx.) Total when required. time for all
< actions.
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w__ -- _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ -
< Table 10.1.38.6 2-Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . .N m E Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes , 16 minutes 7 c:inutes ECCS water solid operation. Table 10.1.38.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) p G w Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Median = 0.15 On the basis of the site interviews, it appeared proceed with ECCS median value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understanding of water solid for 7 minutes diagnosis time this situation and recognized the requirements. operation with only was assigned. Mean = 0.40 llowever, given the failure of OPDHR, the
! SRV open. need to diagnose the need te isolate RWCU, the potential subtlety of the " functional" loss of SDC without explicit procedures, and the fact that only 1 SRV opened, the lower bound value for the diagnosis did not seem appropriate in this context.
2 C O 8
- r. s
z Table 10.1.38.8 :
$ Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP $
E$ a
- = Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments b (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Afust Step-by-Step Sourte of Information U Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A The site interviews No Dynamic Given the limited amount of ECCS indicated that the time for OPISV and the fact water solid operators were that some of the actions are operation knowledgeable about not explicitly procedure with 1 SRV the need for the based, the operators available. actions and -sw to the event were requirements. assumed to be dynamic per However, see ASEP Table 8-1, Step 10, comments in items, a,b,c. Column 6 of this table. O
~
e Table 10.1.38.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP t Action T <2h Recire. Phase hfore Than Two Operator Striss Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No' N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
% 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of -" extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
o 3
< Tr.ble 10.1.38.10 -E Total IEP Ng 3l Actior. Original Operator IEP Independent Check / Correction TotalIEP EF Comments /
(1) (4) (5) Source of Information (IEP ) IEP (6) (2)' (IEP) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.15 -
Med. Mean (10) Diagnose need to mitiate ECCS 0.15 0.40 l water solid operation and Mean = 0.40 determine relevant actions l
- 2. Actions Given the nurnber of Note. Total llEPs are the sum of actions and the limited the individual }{EPs from the ,
- 1. Isolate RWCU (letdown). Median = 0.05 time available. credit Med. Mean diagnosis and actions. l for second checks was 0.05 0.081 (5)
Mean = 0.081 not given
- 2. Isolating ADHR and aligning y LPCI(C) for injection were Median = 0.05 Med. Mean (5) g assumed to be completely 0.05 0.081 dependent. Mean = 0.081
- 3. OPECS actions
- proceed with I open Median = 0.05 Med. Mean Since both the diagnosis and SRV Mean = 0.081 0.05 0.081 (51 actions llEPs make significant
-check closed MSIVs 0.30 0.64 (10) contributions to the Total llEP in
- start LPCI(C) this case, the larger of the two EFs Total median was assigned.
HEP = 0.30 Total mean HEP
= 0.64 Z
C m O 8 W 6 = a C
z Table 10.1.39.1 ::: E IIEP39 Calculation $ 8 Fi
- o Human Action Event (1) OPECS (12) 5 Event Tree (s)(2) E,EA Initiators (3) TSD5H EID5H, E2D5H Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECS.TSD, OPECS21.T5D, OPECSALB.EID, OPECSALB. E2D .
Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) h important constant for the OPECS (12) calculation (HEP 39) is that the operators have recognized a loss of SDC (OPSDC succeeds) in the context of the initiator. In some sequences, after recognizing the loss of SDC, SDC(B) is started. h operators then initially fail to diagnose (in 10 min.) a need for level control to avoid a functional loss of SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the RPV (OPDHR fails). W inadequate circulation is due to the loss of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. In other sequences, after recognizing the loss of SDC and y aligning SDC(B), SDC(B) fails to start. Regardless, in all the relevant sequences, the
*;; operators have been actively engaged in responding to the occurring pivues They must
- now diagnose the need to isolate RWCU and initiate ECCS water solid operation with LPCI (C) or (B) or HPCS. RWCU (letdown) does not auto-isolate in any of the relevant sequences. ADHR is isolated.
Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-III-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-
- 1. Rev. 44), HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1, Rev. 28), and in some cases, Loss of Component Cooling Water ONEP (05-1-02-VI, Rev. I1).
o
.M a
Me - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ - - _ . . .
< Table 10.1.39.2
?- &rs T~mning and Indicatices .N EventlOccurrence T*m ne (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comunents/ (of most interest) Operator (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Infor==tia= (2) (4) IDilR. Need for level O Less of systems were alarmed and the operators should control and cooling. accomplish periodic checks of temperature sad pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in this time period as level decreases as a result of RWCU (letdown) not being isolated. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. The IDHR ONEP has been entered due to the initial loss of SDC and operators should l be monitoring and considering the need for core cooling. Table 10.I.39.3 Ptdential Operator Action E ~
- Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
of Event Abnormal Required to Perfonn Source of Infonnation (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) (2) (3) Inadequate decay heat One A. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop letdomi. It was assumed that at removal. Operators have least initially, a low entered the IDHR ONEP. B. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) initiate ECCS water solid operation pressure injection system They must diagnose the would be preferable to need to initiate ECCS water 1. Check closed MSIVs high pressure system and solid operation. 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open LPCI is referred to in
- 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system. IDHR ONEP.
In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if available, then HPCS. Z C b O 8O b .C h
z Table 10.1.39.4 :::
$ Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task $
8 a
- o Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximtun Time Available Comments /
b (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Information O Act (T) has Occurred (T) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 solid operation. A16 Table 10.1.39.5 Operator Action Performance Time l Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T) Source of Infonnation _ (3) (4) (5) (6)
? ;;j 1. Isolate letdown CR -
1 minute I minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performance) (RWCU) times in the control room were determined using ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column.
- 2. Check closed CR -
I minute I minute Steps 2 and 3 are critical actions for initiating ECCS MSIVs water solid operation. They were judged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 3. Ensure 2 SRVs CR -
I minute I minute open
- 4. Initiate LPCI (C) CR -
I minute 1 minute Note. ADHR is isolated by procedure in attempting to or (B) or HPCS per 4 minutes align SDC(B). l
< SOls (approx.) Total
[ 2- time for all l l ." actions. 2 2 1 l l .- - . - , - . _ . . - , ,. _ _ ,
< Table 10.1.39.6 2.
Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action .N ? 3 Action Maximien Tune Total Action Time Available C_ :J (1) Available (T,) Time (r,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 4 minutes 19 minutes ECCS water solid operation. Table 10.1.39.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failuir to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Sourre of Information (2) (4) (5) 2 s Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Median = 0.01 On the basis of the site interviews, it appeami initiate ECCS water median value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understanding of solid operation and for 19 minutes diagnosis time this situation and recognized the igousumuts. determine what the was assigned. Mean = 0.026 However, given the failure of OPDHR in appropriate actions some sequences and the need to diagnose the should be. Includes need to isolate RWCU the lower bound value diagnosing need to for the diagnosis did not seem appropriate in isolate RWCU. this context. Z C O 8 /J & W b N
Z Table 10.1.39.8 lc Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of.ASEP HRAP $ O h EOPs, Trainingt, Individual Dynamic or Comuments
- = Action '
Safety Systems Failed b (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source ofInfor==ei== 0 Designed EOPs Pesfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks l (4) t . Initiate N/A The site interviews No Step-by-step ECCS indicated that the water solid operators were operation. knowledgeable about l ions requirements. ! - Table 10.1.39.9 8 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP l 8 t Action T < 2h Recirc. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Conenents/ After IE in Safety Systens Familiar (6) Source of Infonmation (1) (2) Large LOCA Fail W/&me (7) i (3) (4) (5) 2 Initiate N/A' No No N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid 1
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was exammed as a function of the context. I i
.N ,
I
,_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ . _ , - - .,m,_._... . . _ , , _ . _ . _ . . . . _ , , . , _ . _ _ , _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ ..._._._ _ ._.. _ __ .. .. _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - - . __
<: TaNe 10.1.39.10
" TotalIEP
?
3 Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Comments / (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of Infonnation (HEP ) IEP (6) (2)' (IEP) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.01 -
Med. Mean (10) Total HEPs are the sum of the Diagnose need to initiate 0.01 0.026 c individual HEPs from the diagnosis ECCS water solid operation Mean = 0.026 and actions. and determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions Given the number of In some sequences covered by these A. Isolate RWCU Median = 0.02 actions and the limited Med. Mean HEPs,-LPCI(C), (B), or HPCS is used (letdown), time available, credit 0.02 0.032 depending on the context. To be (5)
Mean = 0.032 for second checks was conservative in regards to the context not given differences, the initiation of the ECCS B. OPECS actions Median = 0.02 Med. Mean (5) system was treated as a separate action 5 - open 2 SRVs 0.02 0.032 from the other OPECS actions in
- check closed MSIVs Mean = 0.032 determining the total HEP.
C. Initiate LPCl(C), (B), Median = 0.02 Med. Mean Since both the diagnosis and actions orHPCS Mean = 0.032 OE 0.032 HEPs make significant contributions to 0.07 0.122 (.5.J 5 the Total HEP in this case, the larger (10) of the two EPs was assigned. Total median HEP = 0.07 Tetal mean HEP
= 0.12 II z
C h ct h r
- x b :o m _
l Z Table 10.1.4f.1 x HEP 40 CalcuLition ,$ E 6 a
- c l
Human Action Event (1) OPISV (7) bs 5 Event Tree (s)(2) E,EA Initiators (3) TSD5H,EID5H.E2D5H Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECS.T5D, OPECS21.T5D, OPECSALB.EID, OPECSALB. E2D Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only 1 SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decisions and actions as OPECS (llEP 39), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by j procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only m sequences where OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same time period. ! Event Context (6) ne important constant for the OPISV (7) calculation (HEP 40) is that the operators have recognized a loss of SDC (OPSDC succeeds) in *.he context of the initiator. In some +xs, after recognizing the loss of j SDC, SDC(B) is started. He operators then initially fail to diagnose (in 10 min.) a need for level control to l avoid a functional loss of SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the dcw,csmzi o regions of the RPV (OPDHR fails). He inadequate circulation is due to the loss of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. In other sequences, after recognizing the loss of SDC, the operators are unable M
" to get SDC(B) started. Regardless, in all the relevant sequences, the operators have been actively engaged in responding to the occurring problenss. Hey must now diagnose the need to isolate RWCU and initiate ECCS water solid operation with LPCI (C) or (B) or HPCS, but with only 1 SRV. RWCU (letdown) does not auto-isolate in any of the relevant sequences. ADilR is isolated. The IDHR ONEP directs the operators
( to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. He issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds i i Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-III-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44), HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1, Rev. 28), and in some cases, Loss of Component Cooling Water ONEP (05 02-VI, Rev. I1). o
.N ~
2
< Table 10.1.40.2 2.
% p ,. y ,,;,g ,,g m m ,,a;,,,
2* EvenuOcearrence Timme (T,) A ====r&=a=r/1=ar=ei== Ch ! (of most insenst) Operator 0) Seurte of i (1) Alerted Infarummenen (2) (4) ! Deciding to prne. I with O l. ass of systems were alanned and the operators should j ECCS water solid accomplish periodic checks of"wi and pressure in 1 operation when only I the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in ! SRV is available. Some 'his time pened as level A.a as a result of RWCU form of SDC is needed. (letdown) not being isolated. Reactor pressure and coolant
- temperature will be rising. De IDHR ONEP has been 2
entered due 'o the initial loss of SDC and operators should he monitoring and cuma.-g the need for core cooling. The control room receives feedback regarding the opening and closing of SRVs. i f Table 10.1.40.3 8 Pbtential Operator Action Descnphon Numhet of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Required to Phfonn Source of Infonnation (1) Events Action and n Ad o (4) (2) (3) Inadequate decay heat One A. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop letdown. It was assumed that at removal. Operators have least initially, a low entered the IDHR ONEP B. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) initiate ECCS water solid operation pressure injection system and diagnosed the need to would be preferable to initiate ECCS water solid 1. Check closed MSIVs high pressure system and operation, but only 1 SRV 2. Ensure that two SRVs ( l in this case) are open LPCI is referred to in is available. De question is 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system. IDHR ONEP. y whether they will proceed in this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if g with the initiation of water available, then HPCS. o solid operation if they 5 cannot match the ONEPs
$ demand for 2 SRVs. m 5 C
i Z Table 19.1.40.4 m Time Available to lhagnome r.nd Perform the Task $ O i ' 8
- u Tune by T~m ne at Which Maximum Comments /
Action b (1) Which Operator Tune Seura ofInformation O Operator is Alerted that Available to (5) i j Must Symptom has Perform the Occurnd (T,) Identified Act (T) i (2) (3) Operator
- Activities (T,)
(4) Initiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 nen. SEA Calculation C9(M92-01-A16 solid operation with Note. Here is clearly a am.i.sy between OPECS and only 1 SRV OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but an available. His task additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is l must occur in the ssked only when OPECS succeeds and nust occur in the same same time frame time period, it was decided that the HEP for OPISV would be allowed for OPECS. determined as if it were OPECS (HEP 18 in this case), except nat is, it must for one difference. Five minutes less would be available for the 9 occur in the same diagnosis because of the time lost in responding to the failure to g 23 minutes. get two SRVs open. Operators would prthbly make several Functionally, attempts to get one more SRV open and would discuss OPISV is OPECS, proceeding with 1 SRV among each other. De site interviews except that only 1 indicated the operators would be likely to proceed with water SRV is available. solid operations even though only I SRV was available. OPISV is asked However, given the earlier failures of the operators and the fact only when OPECS that proceeding with 1 SRV is not explicitly indicated by succeeds. procedure, the median diagnosis value from ASEP, Figure 8-1, rather than the lower bound value, was assigned. , l I
.N 2
a
,< n., -
e , - , 3e, ,-- , s+----s.- , , . _ , .,__.,.,,,, , . , , , _ , _ _ - , - , ,r. _ , . -. . , , ,.___,,,_,___,_,,_,....,-y , , . _ . , , , - , , , . - . . , , . . - --- ---.-. _ m_ _ -_
< Tcble 10.1.40.5 9-Operator Action Performance Tune F
u Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Conunentst (1) (2) Tune (T,) Tune (T) Tune (T,) Source of Information (3) (4) (5) (6) j 1. Isolate letdown CR - I minute 1 minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performacce)
- (RWCU) times in the control room were d.1.d using '
! ASEP Table 8-1 Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column. l 1
- 2. Check closed CR -
I minute 1 minute Steps 2,3, and 4 are critical actions for initiating j MSIVs ECCS watcr solid operation. They werejudged to be l an integrated set of proceduralized actions and were
- assumed to be w.,My 4 k t.
l 3. Make several CR - 5 minutes 5 minutes Operaters at GGNS indicated that proceeding with
- 5 attempts to get the ECCS water solid operation with only one SRV vmuld Q second SRV open and be a viable and likely option. The immediate objective
" discuss proceeding i is to get some form of decay heat removal operating with 1 SRV and initiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would '
provide core cooling.
- 4. Ensure 2 SRVs CR -
1 reinute I minute open
- 5. Initiate LPCI(C) CR -
I minute 1 minute or (B) or llPCS per 9 minutes
; SOls (approx.) Total tima for all actions.
Z C h O 8 M
& Z b $
Z Table 10.1.40.6 ::: E Ihagnous Time for Operator Action f m O F5 ! W Action F=timum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / i { w (1) 'silable (T,) (2) Time (T,) (3) to Diagnosis (T,) (4) Sourte of Information (5) Diagnose neul to initiate 23 minutes 9 minutes 14 minutes ECCS water solid l operation. Table 10.I.40.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill. Based Adjusted / Comments / Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Infonnation (1) (2) (4) (5) g h 8 Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Median = 0.08 On the basis of the site interviews, it appeared Diagnose need to median value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understanding of proceed with ECCS for 14 minutes diagnosis time this situation and recognized the n:quirements. water solid was assigned. Mean = 0.213 However, given the failure of OPDHR in operation with only some sequences, the need to diagnose the 1 SRV available and Note. Apparently an error need to isolate RWCU, and the failure to get determine what the was made in reading 2SRVs opened, the lower bound value for the appropriate actions Figure 8-1 in determining diagnosis did not seem appropriate in this should be. Includes the median HEP for 14 context. diagnosing need to isolate RWCU. minutes. Appproximately 0.05 would be a better
" reading
- of the median value from Figure 1.
Rus, the HEP for the diagnosis may be slightly
< conservative.
C a w __ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . . , .. - r - * *e-- -
< Table 10.1.40.8 E Iht-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP m
h Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Conunents (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourte of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A The site interviews No Step-by-step ECCS indicated that the water solid onerators were operation knowledgeable about with 1 SRV the need for the available, actions and requirements. o A Table 10.1.40.9 8 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP l l Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No* N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of g extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. O s b := c E
Z Table 10.1.40.10 c
% Total HEP $
8 a y Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Co=====ht g (I) Operator HEP Check /Correchen (4) (5) Sourre ofInfonnation (IEP ) IEP (6) (2)' (HEP,) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.08 -
Med. Mean (10) Total HEPs are the sum of the Diagnose need to proceed with 0.08 0.213 individual HEPs from the diagnosis ECCS water solid operation Mean = 0.213 and actions. and determine relevant actions (ISRV)
- 2. Actions Given the number of In some sequences covered by these A. Isolate RWCU Median = 0.02 actions, the problems Med. Mean HEPs, LPCI(C), (B), or HPCS is used (letdown). with the SRVs, and 0.02 0.032 (5) depending on the context. To be Mean = 0.032 the limited time conservative in regards to the context available, credit for differences, the initiation of the ECCS 9 B. OPECS actions Median = 0.02 second checks was not Med. Mean (5) system was treated as a separate action y - ensure i SRV open given 0.02 0.032 from the other OPECS actions in
- check closed MSIVs Mean = 0.032 determining the total HEP.
C. Initiate LPCI(C), (B), Median = 0.02 Med. Mean Since both the diagnosis and actions or HPCS Mean = 0.032 0.02 0.032 HEPs make significant contributions to 0.14 0.31 (3 the Total HEP in this case, the larger (10) of the two EFs was assigned. Total median HEP = 0.14 Total mean HEP
= 0.31 o ?
2
< Table 10.1.41.1 E- HEP 41 Calculation . P - .o. 3 Human Action Event (1) OPIS (1) _ Event Tree (s)(2) P,PP Initiators (3) All transients and LOCAS Sequence to.ator Files (4) Multiple files which begin with OPSTH, e.g., OPSTHSTM.ElB. Event Description (5) OPIS is the operator diagnosi a::d action to isolate SDC from overpressurization if the auto-isolation on pressure fails. OPIS (1) (HEP 41) applies in sequences where the operators have failed to perfor:n actions that are clearly indicated by procedure. For example, in most of the relevant sequences, the initiation of ECCS water solid operation would be clearly indica *ed by the context and by the IDHR ONEP, but the operators have faileil to attempt this action (OPECS fails). Since OPSTM is not a proceduralimi action, it was decided that if the operators had failed to follow procedure and therefore may not be aware of the problem, then credit could not be taken deciding to steam the vessel, which is not proceduralized and for which the amount of time available is limited. With the operators failing to steam at low pressure, steaming at high pressure is asked in the P tree. SDC should o auto-isolate at 135 psi. The operators action to isolate SDC if the auto-isolation fails (OPIS) must occur in the y same time period as OPSTM and given the previous pattern of operator actions, it is not clear that the operators would decide to isolate SDC at this point 'Ihus, OPIS was set to fail (1.0) in these sequences. Auto-isolation of SDC on low level is asked later in the tree. Since detailed ASEP HRAP calculations were not required for HEP 41, Tables 10.1.41.2 through 10.1.41.9 were not included. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1) Note. Tables 10.1.41.2 through 10.1.41.9 were --=y for HEP 41 and therefore they were not included. Z C b O N r
. E
g Tame 1s.1.41.1e m g Total HEP g e nr i yi Acdon Onginal % Total HEP EF Communist j r (1) Operator HEP CheddCorrection (4) (5) Source of Infor===#ia= (HEP ) HEP (6) i (2)' (HEP) 0) l Operator decision to Med. = 1.0 - Med. = 1.0 l solate SDC from
- overpressurization, after Mean = 1.0 Mean = 1.0 failing to follow clear prucedures in what appears to be an obvious situation.
Y l
- 1 ;
2
.N a
,,,,,<-n
.,, .. _ , . . , _ ,n.. . _ _ _ , , , - - _ . ,- .
< Table 10.1.42.1 E-HEP 42 Calculation
.~ ? 3 Human Action Event (1) OPSTH (1) Event Tree (s)(2) P.PP Initiators (3) All transients and LOCAS Sequence locator Files (4) All files beginning with OPSTH, e.g., OPSTHSRV.ElB Event Description (5) OPSTH is the operator decision and action to initiate steaming of the core at high pressure. Event Context (6) OPSTH (1) (HEP 42) represents & operator decision to steam the core at high pressure. OPSTH is asked in sequences where the operators have either failed to attempt to steam at low pressure (OPSTM fails) or attempted to steam at low pressure but could not get an SRV open in the relief mode. With the vessel
- bottled-up,* the operators can decide to steam at high pressure with 1 SRV on its safety set point. Steaming at high pressure would delay the core uncovering until SDC could be restored. 'the operators would have up to 4 hours to make the decision to steam at high pressure and provide makeup with CRD or HPCS. In cases where lA has isolated and CRD is the only available choice the operators would have to restone IA.
5 Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control), Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-42-02-111-1)
!$f C
b O 8 30 6 % b s
'z: Table 10.1.42.2 :::
. Sequence Timing and Indications y e
O EvenUOccurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Comments / 8 (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of 8 (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) Normal means of SDC O Low level 3 alarms will sound and temperature and BWRs basically operate by steammg are gone and a means of pressure will begin to increase. SDC is gone and should be and operators at GGNS indicated that preventing the core from alarmed. SRVs will open on their safety set points steammg at high pressure would be a uncovering is needed. eventually. Emergency Procedures, e.g. EP-2, indicate the viable option that wuuld provide time
'Ihe operators failed to need for level control. By providing makeup, the operators for determining and a!!eviating steam at low pressure will have a substantial amount of time for restoring SDC. existing problems.
and with no SRVs open, the operators will begin to steam at high pressure by default. They have 4 hours to provide makeup. o
$u Table 10.1.42.3 Potential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Sourte of Infonnation (1) (2) Action and Puncedures (4) (3) Normal SDC is gone and the One 1. In some cases letdown will have Site interviews with cperators operators have failed to steam at to be isolated. indicated that steaming at high low pressure. By providing pressure would be a viable option makeup they will steam the vessel 2. Start a high pressure injection when other means of SDC had at high pressure. system (CRD or llPCS). In some failed. Operators appeared to be cases, IA may have to be restored knowledgeable about the process to be able to use CRD. and the necessary actions. f y However, the process is not explicitly described in the relevant
, procedures.
N
~
g Tchle 10.1.42.4 Time Available to Diagnose and INrfonn the Task .N m 3 Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximian Time Available Comments / (1) Operator ".fust is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Information has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) Act CI) (2) (3) (4) Initiate 4 hours 0 4 hours SEA Calculation C90-492-042-steaming at A16 high pressure. Table 10.1.42.5 Operator Action PerformanceTime
- Activities Location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Comments / $ (1) (2) Time (T') Time (T,) Sourte of Infonnation Time (T)
C (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Isolate letdown (if CR or locally - Conservatively, I hour Performance time estimates includes necessary). Ihour any necessary travel time. Given the time available for OPSTH, time is not really an issue.
- 2. Initiate CRD or HPCS CR or possibly - Conservatively, I hour Restoring IA (if necessary) and starting perS01. outside CR if IA I hour CRD were assumed to be completely if IA has isolated, must be restored. dependent.
restoration will be required if CRD is to be used 2 C h O 8 llC m i b C
Z Table 10.1.42.6 - E El Diagnosis Time for Operator Action f 8 g Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / g (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of
" (2) Information (3) (4)
(5) Steam the vessel at high 4 hours 2 hours 2 hours pressure. Table 10.1.42.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) (4) Sourte of Information (2) (5) l y Decide to steam the Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, N/A Median = 0.002 Interviews with operators indicated a good g vessel at high the upper bound value from awareness of the notion of steaming the vessel pressure. ASEP HRAP Figure 8-1 for 2 Mean = 0.005 at high pressure. However, since it is not hours diagnosu time was proceduralized and apparently not covered assigned. specifically in training, it is not clear that all operators would decide to steam at high pressure. Nevertheless, in the particular sequences covered here, the operators are basically steaming at high pressure by default and need only provide makeup and isolate letdown. which would seem to be obvious. However, with no explicit procedures or training, per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, the upper bound diagnosis value was assigned. cI l
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\ - l 1
< Table 10.1.42.8 E Post-Ihagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP P
2 EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Cou--.:J Action Safety Systens Failed [ Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of (1) (2) Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) Infonnation (3) Tasks (6) (4)
~
N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-Step Start high pressure that the operators injection were knowledgeable system and about the need for isolate letdown the actions and if necessary. requirements. Table 10.1.42.9
- Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP h
% Stress Level Comments /
Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator in Safety Systmis Familiar (6) Sourre of (1) After IE Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence Information (2) (4) (5) (7) (3) Not N/A Moderately Substantial time before Start high N/A' N/A High core damage pressure injection system and isolate letdown if necessary.
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all even+s.
Z 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a t ilure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of g extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. g B lc u_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Z Table 19.1.42.19 :c Total HEP y O B g Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Con ====ht (1) Operator HEP Check /Cometion (4) Source of Infonnation w (5) (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)' (HEP) Q)
- 1. Decide to steam Median = 0.002 Med. Mean (10) vessel at high Mean = 0.005 0.002 0.005 pressure.
- 2. Isolate letdown if Median = 0.02 Credit for a second check was 0.004 0.01 (5) Second check flEPs are necessary. given because of the time multiplied by the Mean = 0.032 available. original HEP for each HEPs for failure to provide a action.
second check were: Med. = .2 o Mean = .323
.?
- 3. Initiate high Median = 0.02 Credit for a second check was 0.004 0.01 (_51 The error factor pressure injection given because of the time 0.01 0.025 asreinted with the (5) system (CRD or Mean = 0.032 available. dominant HEPs was HPCS). Includes HEPs for failure to provide a Total Median HEP -
assigned. unisolating IA if second check were: = 0.01 necessary. Med. = .2 Total Mean HEP l Mean = .323 = 0.025 o
.M 2 , , - , 2 -
y , - - -- e n , - ,-, , - - - - , - - n. - ,- + _ , - . - , - . . . , , , - - - , - - , , , - , - , - -,.
.E y Table 10.1.M.1 HEP M Calculation Hn==a Actma Event (1) OPECS (13) Event Tree (s)(2) EA initiators (3) - T5D5H Sequence Lear Files (4) OPECS22.T5D Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) The impc4 tant constants for the OPECS (13) calculation (HEP 46) are that the initiator is followed by a random loss of ADHR. The operators fail to diagnose the loss of SDC in the 37 minutes allowed for OPSDC (OPSDC fails). RWCU (letdown) must be manually isolated from the control room to stop draindown, i.e., no auto-isolation. The operators must diagnose the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation. ADHR will have to be isolated to prevent overpressurization of the low pressure piping. Since 37 minutes have g elapsed, the operators would be very likely to check temperature and pressure on the chart g recorders in the 23 minutes allowed for OPECS and they may receive additional alarms. 4 However, the operators would have to retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP and RHR SOI, isolate RWCU, perform a series of steps to isolate the ADilRS and align LPCI(C) or (B) for injection, and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44)
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Z C :::
$ p Table 10.1.46.2 7 9
n Sequence Tinting and Indwations 30 { EvenUCu .ou Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) IDilR. Need for level O Loss of systems were alarmed and the operators should control and cooling. accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in this time period as level decreases as a result of RWCU (letdown) not being isolated. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. However, the coolant temperature of the core may not be apparent since the sensors sample the water in the recirculation areas which are being cooled by SDC in this scenario. o
.N 2
.L Table 14.1.46.3 Paa=*ial Operator Action ha Description Number of Activities frasks) C====8af of Event Abnonnal Required in Perform Source of Infes==*ia=
(1) Events Action and Procedures (4) G) 0) _ A loss of CCW is follwed One A. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop letdown. It was assumed that at at some point by a random least initially, a low loss of ADHR. Operators B. Per RHR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from pressure injection system must enter the IDHR ONEP ADHR to RHR C or RHR B would be preferable to and diagnose the need to high pressure system and initiate ECCS water solid 1. Secure ADHRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.s (1-3) LPCIis referred to in
- 2. Align and start RHR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b, IDHR ONEP. In addition, operation.
(1 5) and 6.6.2.c,d,e,f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and the procedures for 6.8.2.c,d,e,f) initiation of LPCIinstruct the operators to secure ADHRS, the HPCS y C. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid procedures do not.
!3 operation e
- 1. Check closed MSIVs
- 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open
- 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system. In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if available, then HPCS.
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Table 10.1.46.5
'L Operator Action PerformanceTime .
~
Activities Imtion Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Source of Information Time (T) (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and read CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP is a ONEP for inadequate Table 8-1, Step Sa) conservative m es given the trumng the operators Decay Heat Removal receive. However, the delay seemed consistent with the
" diversity of activities
- ongoing during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent.
- 2. Isolate letdown CR -
I minute 1 minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performance) times in the control room were determined using ASEP (RWCU) - Table 8-1. Step Sb, and are grouped under the gu kmaw time column.
- 3. Ensure that ADHR is CR - 1 - 3 minutes, but 0 minutes Isolating ADHR and aligning LPCI (action 6 below) secured per RHR SOI when the action is werejudged to be an integrated set of actions and were o procedure (step 6.6.1 or necessary, it was assumed to be completely dependent. They are O 6.8.1) assumed to be successive steps in a procedure specifically written to
~
done in parallel cover switching from ADRS to LPCI (RHR SOI (04 with alignment and 01-E12-1, Step 6.6 or 6.8) start of LPCI (action 6 below) and the other OPECS actions.
- 4. Check closed MSIVs CR -
I minute 1 minute Steps 4 and 5 are critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation. They were judged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions and were assumul to be completely depecden.
- 5. Ensure 2 SRVs open CR -
I minute 1 minute
- 6. Align and initiate CR -
3 minutes - 3 minutes LPCI (C) or (B) per includes time for i1 minutes Z RHR sol (step 6.6.2 or isolating ADHR (approx.) Total 6.8.2) when required. time for all to actions. O Pi 30 % 6
E = E Table 10.1.46.6 y Diagnosis T~nne for Operator Action
- n 5 Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Caran=nt<I (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Soorte of (2) (3) (4) Information (5)
Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 1I minutes 12 minutes ECCS water solid _ operation. Table 10.1.46.7 Diagnosis Analysis l _ Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / l 9 (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information
$ (2) (4) (5)
Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Median = 0.08 On the basis of the site interviews, it appeared initiate ECCS water median value from Figure 3-1 (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understanding of solid operation for 12 minutes diagnosis time this situation and recognized the requirements. (after failing to do was assigned. Mean = 0.213 However, given the failure of OPSDC, the so in 37 minutes) need to diagnose the need to isolate RWCU, and determine what and the neal to isolate ADilR, the lower the appropriate bound value for the diagnosis did not seem actions should be. appropriate in this context. , S
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,u Table 10.1.46.8 y Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP
- s Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training. Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A The site interviews No Step-by-step ECCS indicated that the water solid operators were operation. knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. E h Table 10.1.46.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No2 N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid At least nxxlerately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of l
$ extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
b e 9 1 5 z Z W w > i _
Z :x: C :c E Table 10.1.46.10 TotalIIEP k
- n i
e Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Comments / (1) Operator IIEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source ofInformatum GIEP ) IIEP (6) (2)' GIEP ) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.08 -
Med. Mean (10) Diagnose need to initiate ECCS 0.08 0.213 water solid operation and Mean = 0.213 determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions Given the number of Note. Total HEPs are the sum of
- 1. Isolate RWCU (letdown). Median = 0.02 actions and the limited Med. Mean the individual HEPs from the time available, credit 0.02 0.032 diagnosis and actions.
- 2. Isolating ADHR and aligning Mean = 0.032 for second checks was (5) g LPCI(C) for injection were not given l
g assumed to be completely Median = 0.02 Med. Mean a dependent. 0.02 0.032 (5) ! Mean = 0.032 l
- 3. OPECS actions
! - open 2 SRVs Median = 0.02 Med. Mean
- check closed MSIVs Mean = 0.032 0.02 0.032
- start LPCI(C) 0.14 0.31 Since both the diagnosis and (51 actions HEPs make signif; cant Total median (10) contributions to the Total HEP in HEP = 0.14 this case, the larger of the two EFs was assigned.
Total mean HEP
= 0.31 l
o
;P a
I Table 10.1.47.1 F IIEP 47 Calculation 3' 2 Human Acton Event (1) OPISV (8) Event Tree (s)(2) EA Initiators (3) T5DSH Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECS22.T5D Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only 1 SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence. OPISV is the same decisions and actions as OPECS (HEP 46), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same time period. Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPISV (8) calculation (HEP 47) the initiator is followed by a random loss of ADHR. The operators fail to diagnose the loss of SDC in the 37 minates allowed for OPSDC _ (OPSDC fails). RWCU (letdown) must be manually isolated from the control room to stop draindown, y i.e., no auto-isolation. The operators must diagnose the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation g with only I SRV available. ADHR will have to be isolated to prevent overpressurization of the low pressure piping. Since 37 minutes have clapsed, the operators would be very likely to check temperature and pressure on the chart recorders in the 23 minutes allowed for OPECS and they may receive additional alarms. Ilowever, the operators would have to retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP and RHR sol, isolate RWCU, perform a series of steps to isolate the ADHRS and align LPCI(C) or (B) for injection, and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDIIR ONEP. The IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. The issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), RHR SO! (at-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44) b e 9 6 x b
z Table 10.1.47.2 %
@ Sequence Timing and Indications s 8
h Event 1 Occurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication Counments/ i (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of 8 (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with O Ioss of systems were alarmed and the operators should ECCS water solid accomplish periodic i: hecks of tem (mtum and pressure in operation when only I the new time available. A level 3 alarm may also occur in SRV is available. Some this time period as level decreases as a result of RWCU form of SDC is needed. (letdown) not being isolated. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. The control room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of SRVs. Table 10.1.47.3 Potential Operator Action c3 h Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / I$ of Event Ahnormal Required to Pesform Source of Information (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) (2) (3) A random h>ss of ADHR One A. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop letdown. It was assumed that at has occurred and operators least initially, a low have entered the IDHR B. Per RHR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from ADHR to pressure injection system ONEP. They have RHR C or RHR B would be preferable to diagnosed the need to high pressure system and initiate ECCS water solid I. Secure ADHRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) LPCI is referred to in operation, but only 1 SRV 2. Align and start RHR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b, (1- IDHR ONEP. In addition, is available. The question is 5) and 6.6.2.c,d.e.f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and 6.8.2.c,d,e,f ) the procedures for whether they will proceed initiation of LPCI instruct with the initiation of water C. Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation the operators to secure solid operation if they ADHRS, the HPCS cannot match the ONEPs 1. Check closed MSIVs pmcedures do not. demand for 2 SRVs 2. Ensure that two SRVs ( l in this case) are open p_ 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system. L In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if (5 available, then HPCS.
g Table 18.1.47.4 Time Available to Ihagnose and Ptrfonn the Task
.[
7
) Action (1)
Tune by Which Tune at Which Operator Maximien Tune Conuments/ Soorte of Inforniation Operator is Alerted that Available to (5) Must Synaptern has Tvifonn the Act (T) Occurred (T,) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activities (T,) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 min. SEA Calculation C90-492-Ol-A16 solid operation with Note. There is clearly a dependency between OPECS and i only I SRV OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but en i available. This task additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is must occur in the asked only when OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same same time frame time period, it was decided that the HEP for OPISV would be allowed for OPECS. determined as ifit were OPECS (HEP 46 in this case), except
- That is, it must for one difference. Five minutes less would be available for the
$ occur in the same diagnosis because of the time lost in responding to the failure to ti 23 minutes. get two SRVs open. Operators would probably make several Functionally, attempts to get one more SRV open and would discuss OPISV is OPECS, proceeding with 1 SRV among each other. He site interviews except that only I indicated the operators would be likely to proceed with water SRV is availab~r. solid operations even though only I SRV was available.
OPISV is asked However, given the earlier failures of the operators and the fact only when OPECS that proceeding with 1 SRV is not explicitly indicated by succeeds, procedure, the median diagnosis value from ASEP, Figure 8-1, rather than the lower bound value, was assigned. z C h O N W 0 $
Z Table 10.1.47.5 % Operator Action PerformanceTime s O 8 Activities Iecation Travel INrformance Total Action Comments /
$ (1) (2) Time U,) Time U) Time (T ) Source of Information g (3) (4) (5) * (6) w
- 1. Retrieve and read ONEP CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read the IDHR ONEP is a for inadequate Decay Heat Table 8-1, Step Sa) conservative assumption given the trammg the operators Removal receive. However, the delay seemed consistent with the
- diversity of activities" ongoirig during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent.
- 2. Isolate letdown (RWCU) CR -
I minute 1 minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performance) times in the control room were determined using ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time colunn.
- 3. Ensure that ADHR is CR - 1 - 3 minutes, but 0 minutes isolating ADHR and aligning LPCI (action 7 below) were secured per RI!R SOI when the action is judged to be an integrated set of actions and were assumed procedure (step 6.6.1 or hy, it was to be completely dependent. Hey are successive steps in a 6.8.1) assumed to be done procedure specifically written to cover switching from
- in parallel with ADRS to LPCI (RHR Sol (04-101-E12-1, Step 6.6 or 6.8) ? alignment and start d " of LPCI (action 7 below) and the other OPECS
- actions.
! 4. Check closed MSIVs CR - I minute 1 minute Steps 4,5 and 6 are critical actions for initiating ECCS l water solid operation. Hey werejudged to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 5. Make several attempts to CR -
5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indim~i that proceedmg with ECCS get the second SRV open water solid operation with only one SRV would be a viable and discuss procading and likely option. 'Ihe immediate objective is to get some wi th 1 SRV form of decay heat removal operating and inRiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling.
- 6. Ensure I SRVs open CR -
1 minute 1 minute
- 7. Align and initiate LPCI CR -
3 minutes -includes 3 minutes (C) or (B) per RHR SOI time for isolating 16 minutes g (step 6.6.2 or 6.8.2) ADHR when (approx.) Total r required. time for all
." actions. *0 E
, Table 10.1.47.6 r Diagnosis T~u ne for Operato Action Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments /
(1) Available fr,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 16 minutes 7 minutes . ECCS water solid l operation. I Table 10.1.47.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information g (2) (4) (5) b M Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Median = 0.18 On the basis of the site interviews, it appeareu proceed with ECCS median value fmm Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understanding of water solid for 7 minutes diagnosis time this siaation and recognized the requirements. operation with only was assigned. Mean = 0.479 Ilowever, given the failure of OPSDC, the
! SRV open. need to diagnose the need to isolate RWCU, ar.d the need to isolate ADilR, and the fact that only 1 SRV opened, the lower bound value for the diagnosis did not seem appropriate in this context.
7. C p n M 6
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Z Table 10.1.47.8 % E Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step it, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 5 8 a Dynamic or ('m y Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual g (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Mist Step-by-Step Source ofInfonmation
" Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6)
(3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A The site interviews No Step-by-step ECCS indicated that the water solid operators were operation knowledgeable about with 1 SRV the need for the available. actions and requirements. 5 Table 10.1.47.9 A
$ Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stass Level Cm.__.:.J AIter IE in Safety Systens Familiar (6) Sourte of Information (1)
(2) Laqte LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No2 N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. 9-
*o b
f g Table 19.1.47.10 Total HEP Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Comments / (1) Operator IEP Check /Correcti m (4) (5) Sourte of Information (IIEP ) IEP (6) (2)* (IEP) (3)
- l. Diagnosis Median = 0.18 -
Med. Mean (10) Diagnose need to initiate ECCS 0.18 0.479 water solid operation and Mean = 0.479 determine rele rant actions
- 2. Actions Given the number of Note. Total HEPs are the sum of
- 1. Isolate RWCU (letdown). Median = 0.02 - actions and the limited Med. Mean the individual HEPs from the time available, cralit 0.0r2 0.032 diagnosis and actions.
- 2. Isolating ADHR and aligning Mean = 0.032 , (5)
~
for second checks was LPCI(C) for injection were not given assumed to be completely Median = 0.02 Med. Mean o dependent. 0.02 0.032 (5) t!
~
Mean = 0.032
- 3. OPECS actions
- proceed with I open Median = 0.02 Med. Mean SRV Mean = 0.032 0.02 0.032
- check closed MSIVs 0.24 0.57 Since both the diagnosis and
- start LPCI(C) 5 (51 actions HEPs make significant Total median (10) contributions to the Total HEP in HEP = 0.24 this case, the larger of the two EFs was assigned.
Total mean HEP
= 0.57 Z
C b Q h M
~
i c 5
l Table 10.1.48.1 T T E IIEP 48 Calculation s 5 6 y Human Action Event (1) SDCUI (3) ! 5 Event Tree (s)(2) ADEP. ADEPP, ADEPS Initiators (3) TAB 5H, TDB5H Sequence Locator Files (4) SDCUI. TAB, SDCUI.TDB Event Description (5) SDCUI is the operator decision and actior b unisolate and use RHR/SDC or ADHR following depressurization during a HYDRO test. Event Context (6) SDCUI (3) (HEP 54) represents the operators daision and actions to provide SDC after depressurization during a HYDRO test. In the relevant scenarios, a DC or AC is lost and multiple systems isolate and will be need to be recovered before SDC can be started. Forced :ecirculation is lost and/or RWCU in the recirculation mode is lost. Either the operators depressurize the vessel or SRVs open on their safety set points and at least one fails to close, resulting in depressurization. SDC is needed and the operators have 8.7 hours to diagnose the need and align a ' normal means of SDC. RHR is not available, so operators will have to align ADHR. Prior to starting ADHR, however, the operators will have to cut into the IA system and manually open an air valve to restore IA, o unisolate PSW (requires opening 3 valves locally), ami restore TBCU (since on BOP, no local action required). The Loss of AC Power ONEP directs the operators to the Automatic isolatiions precedure (05-1-02-111-5) to h recover isolations. Applicable Prucedures (7) Loss of AC Power ONEP (05-1-02-1-4). Automatic Isolations (05-1-02-111-5), RHR 501 (04-1-01-E12-1), Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-48-02-111-1)
.O
I
-{ Table 10.1.48.2
." WTaming and InMas
?
$ hvait/Occerrence Ta* me (r,) Annunciator /ledication Commmunts/
(of niest interest) Operator Q) Soeste of (1) Alerted Infernistnos (2) (4) le of AC or DC bus O A loss of the buses will be alarmed. Bey will enter the In these scenanos, the need for SDC in llYDRO test. Loss of AC Power ONEP and IDHR ONEP. A loss of Depressuruntion of the will be clear. D1.Q systems related to cooling during POS 5 will also be the relevant actions would appear to vessel occurs and SDC alarmed. A stuck open SRV will also be indicated, as will be non-trivial, but inuch of it is is needed. the vessel pressure loss. proceduralized. t Table 19.1.48.3 Potential Operator Action
, $ Decription Number of Activities (Tasks) Conunents/
d of Event Abnonnal Everds Required to Perfonn Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4)
- 0) __
De vessel has depressurized One 1. Unisolate (A Alignment of SDC is a frequently during a llYDRO test after a loss 2. Unisolate PSW performed action during LP&S of AC or DC bus. De operators 3. Restore TBCW conditions. It is proceduralized. will need to provide a normal 4. Align and initiate an SDC De other actions will require means of SDC. Level is high system. sone operator thought and enough for natural recireplrtion, ! planning. The need for the ' but several systems will have to be restorations will be indicated by restored in order to provide SDC. procedure, but the operators may need to determine exactly which valves to open etc. Z C b Q 8 30 b Z O s
Z Table 10.1.48.4 I E Time Available to Ihagnose and Perfonn the Task @ S n Comments / y Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Sourre of Information Act (T,) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Accomplish 8.7 hours 0 8.7 hours SEA Calculation C90-492-048-necessary A16 actions to provide normal SDC. Table 10.1.48.5 Operator Action PerformanceTime
- Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments /
Source of information { u (1) (2) Time (T) (3) Time (T,) (4) Time (T,) (5) (6)
- 1. Unisolate IA Outside control -
2 hour 2 hour Travel and performance time estimates room _ Cut into are combined under the performance IA val *ze to time column. manually open. Performance times are conservative estimates based on discussions with the systems analysts.
- 2. Unisolate PSW Outside CR. -
2 hour 2 hour Open at least three valves locally.
- 3. Restore TBCW CR 1 minute 1 minutes CR 5 minutes 5 minutes Per ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb. a 1 min.
- 4. Align (unisolate) and -
travel and manipulation time was g start SDC system.
~ assumed for each action.
P a Yb 1 "
< Table 10.1.48.6 Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action k Action Maximean Tune
_ Total Action Tune Avitable Cassaments/ (1) Available (T" ) Time (T ) Source of to Diagnosis (T) (2) 0) * (4) Infor==eia= (5) Realize the need to make 8.7 hours Approx. 4 hours At les-t 4 hours necessary recoveries and initiate SDC. Table 10.1.48.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Conunents/ (1) Diagnose (3) (4) Sourre of Information
;;; (2) b (5) d Realize the need to Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, N/A Median = 4.0E-5 HYDRO tests are performed late in shutdown make necessary the median value from ASEP and the operators know SDC is needed if recoveries and HRAP Figure 8-1 for 4 hours Mean = 3.4E-4 depressurization occurs. Determining which initiate SDC. diagnosis time was assigned. systems to unisolate will be guided by the Loss of Power ONEP, but the operators may have to determme exactly how to go about doing the unisolations since the buses are lost.
- z C
W b a W dn Z b s
l Z Table 10.1.48.8 3: h Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP $
- 8 h
y Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynanucor Conuments g (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourte of Infonnation
'd Designed EOPs 1%rfonn Concurrent (5) (6) 2
- 0) Tasks (4)
Unisolate N/A Interviews indicated No StegM>y-Step or restore that the operators necessary were knowledgeable systems and about the need for startSDC. the actions and requirements. Table 10.1.48.9 g Post-Diagnosis Stress. Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP Oe Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / A6er IE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (1) (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7)
- 0) (4) (5)
Unisolate N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Substantial time before core High damage and several safety
- or restore necessary systems available.
systems and start SDC. At least moderately Ligh stress was assumed for all events. i For the LPS environment (usually long-term .v.as) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of i ( extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. 9
*o E
y , _ _ _ . _ . . - - _ , ._ . -4y - _ , . , - . _ . , . _ . . . , , , . . _ , . , . _ , , - _ __ , ,. , , . . _ _ , , _ . , _ . _...,,,__m, _ _ . . . _ , - _
[ l g
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Table 10.1.48.10 Total HEP ! k Action Original Independent _ Total HEP EF Comunents/ (1) Operator HEP Check /Cornetion (4) (5) Source of Inforniaties (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)' (HEP,) (3) i j l. Realize the Median = 4.0E-5 Med. Mean (30) M to snake 4.0E-5 3.4E-4 I necessary Mean = 3.4E-4 i recoveries and
- initiate normal means of SDC.
- 2. Unisolate IA Median = 0.02 Credit for a second check on each 0.004 0.01 (5) Second check IIEPs are the 4 sets of actions (actions 2 - 5) multiplied by the original
_ Mean = 0.032 was given. HEPs for failure to HEP for each action. o provide a second check were: O w Med. = .2 Mean = .323
- 3. Unisolate Median = 0.02 See above 0.004 0.01 (5)
PSW Mean = 0.032
- 4. Restore Median = 0.02 See above 0.004 0.01 1 (5)
TBCW Mean = 0.032
- 5. Align and Median = 0.02 See above 0.004 0.01 The error factor from the (5) start SDC 0.016 0.04 (5) dominant ilEPs was assigned.
system. Mean = 0.032 c- Total Median HEP
- c m = 0.016
- O 9 Total Mean HEP 6 = 0.04 3' b k
- - _ . _ _ . - ___ _.-- , - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - -. -.n - - - - - - - . . - ~ - , . - - - - - - -- . - . , - . + - - -,,----.,,--..r.-. -
Z Table 10.1.49.1 E IIEP 49 Calculation s 8 . 3 y Human Action Event (1) OPSTM (2) 0 Event Tree (s)(2) S SP, SNP Initiators (3) All transients and LOCAS Sequence taxator Files (4) All files beginning with OPSTE, e.g., OPSTE51.E2B and files OPSTMHYD.ECN, OPSTMSNP.SNP, and OPSTMSNP.EIT. Event Description (5) OPSTM is the operator decision to initiate steaming of the core. OPSTM (2) (HEP 49) applies in numerous sequences. It represents the operators decision to sta the vessel to provide core cooling when they have failed to perform actions that are clearly indicated by procedure. For example, in many sequences, the initiation of ECCS water solid operation would be indicated by the context and by the IDHR ONEP, but the operators have failed to attempt this action (OPECS fails). Since OPSTM is not a proceduralized action, it was decided that if the operators had failed to follow procedure and therefore may not be aware of the problem, then credit could not be taken deciding to steam the vessel, which is not proceduralized and for which the amount of time available is limited. Thus, OPSTM was set to fail (1.0) in these sequences. If o OPSTM fails, the P tree is entered and the question of the operators deciding to steam at high pressure is asked (OPSTH). Significant more time is available for this (OPSTH) operator decision and action, and credit is taken for l' h the operators doing something at this point. Since detailed ASEP HRAP calculations were not required for HEP
- 49. Tables 10.1.49.2 through 10.1.49.9 were not included.
j , Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Remova: ONEP (05-1-02-111-1) l j i Note. Tables 10.1.49.2 through 10.1.49.9 were unnecessary for HEP 49 and therefore they were not included. i l l I l l ! b y
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HRA l I nE 1* ii 4 x i x ?. q p i,a i e l N I,E
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2 e j i b x x E E 5 g e"ii g 10-239
Z Table 10.1.50.1 :C E HEP 5e Calculation 5 8 B {O Human Actma Event (1) OPECS (14) Event Tree (s)(2) E,EA,EP,EAP Initiators (3) TI-5 TIA5H, ElB5H, T5D5H, TRIT 5, TPRVS, EITSH, EIV5H Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECSLAP.EAP, OPECSHY2.EP, OPECSHYD.TIA. OPECSI.EA.TIA. OPECSLS.ElB, OPECSLPE. eld, OPECSHYD.TSD, OPECSHY2.TRP, OPECSIS.TRP, l OPECSHY2.TRV, OPECSLPE.EIT, OPECSLPE.ElV, OPECSL5.EIT, OPECSLS.EIV i i Event Dmription (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. ' l Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPECS (14) calculation (HEP 50) are that the operators j have recognimi a loss of SDC (OPSDC or SDCUI =M) in the context of the initiator i and have successfully started SDC(B). In some cases the operators have ressored an inadvertent isolation of SDC(B) (RESB succeeds). 'Ibe operators then initially fail to _ diagnose (in 10 min.) a need for level control to avoid a functional loss of SDC caused by i y inadequate circulation between the core and the downcoamer regions of the RPV (OPDHR g fails). The inadequate circulation is due to the loss of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. Regardless, in all the relevant sequences, the operators have been actively engaged in responding to the occurring pia.. ADHR has been isolated and RWCU has auto-isolated. The operators must diagnone the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation with I.PCI (C) or HPCS. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02111-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (04-I-01-E12-
- 1. Rev. 44), HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1, Rev. 28).
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. , . , _ . . . . _ _ _ , _ , , , , - . _ - . ,--.-.-._-,.._n ,-, , - . , m - . -, . - . _ _ , _. , _ _ . - -.. ._ __ __ . . . __ . ._ ___ _ _ _
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Table 10.1.50.2 Sequence Timing and Indic=tians l Event!Ou- ma Annunciator / Indication Comments / I Time (F) l (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information f (2) (4) IDHR. Need for O Loss of systems were alanned and the operators should initiation of ECCS water accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in solid operation. the new time available. Reactor pressure and coolant temperature will be rising. De IDHR ONEP has been entered due to the initial loss of SDC and operators should be monitoring and considering the need for core cooling. Table 10.1.50.3 Potential Operator Action 5 Comments / n Description Number of Activities (Tasks) 8 of Event Abnormal Required to Perform Source of Information (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) (2) (3) Inadequate decay heat One Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) initiate ECCS water solid operation it was assumed that at removal. Operators lu.m least initially, a low entered the IDilR ONEP. 1. Check closed MSIVs pressure injection system Hey must diagnose the 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open would be preferable to need to initiate ECCS water 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system. high pressure system and solid operation. In this context LPCI (C) assumed to be the first choice if LPCI is referred to in available, then HPCS. IDHR ONEP. s s 30
, 2 Table 10.1.50.4
- h T'une Av=HmW to Diagnose and Ftrfenn the Task 5 E
- Pi i y Action Timme by Which Timme at Which Operator Maximuun Timme AM Commmunds/
j (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Synop+.esa to Perfona the Identdied Source of Inforussion
- has Occurnd (T,)
Act (T) Operator Activities (T,) (5) j (2) (3) (4) , Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes O' ~ 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C9049241-solid operation. A16 i ) Table 10.1.50.5 Operator Action Ptrfonnance Tiene Activities Location Travel Perforniance Total Action Conussents/ ! (1) (2) Tune (T,) Tiene (T,) Time (T,) Source of Infonmotion
- p (3) (4) (5) (6)
] h 1. Check closal CR - I minute 1 minute Steps 1,2, and 3 are critical actions for initiatmg i MSIVs ECCS water solid operation. They werejudged to be
- an integrated set of proceduraliaed actions and were i assumai to be compiceely dependent.
- 3. Ensure 2 SRVs CR -
I minute I minute Also note that travel and manipulation (performance) j open times in the control room were decernuned insing ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under the p fo. + time coluren.
- 4. Initiate ECCS CR -
1 minute I minute Note. ADHR is isolated by iwC in attempting to system per SOls 3 minutes align SDC(B)in OPSDC. (approx.) Total time for all actions. o , P 1 *e i Q ,
, - -,-~,-..,--------e , ~ . , . . . . , _ , - - ~ . - . , - , - ,
. _ > , , , , - - ---+,._ _ - _.._ - -- - - - , - - - - - r 2 - --_ - -_
g Toble 10.1.50.6 Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action .[ 7 $ Action Maximtan Time Total Action Tune Available Comments / (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosas (T) Sourte of (2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 3 minutes _ 20 minutes ECCS water solid operation. Table 10.1.50.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final HEP Source of Information
;;;; (2) (4) (5)
I w Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Median = 0.01 On the basis of the site interviews, it appeared initiate ECCS water median value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10) that the operators had a clear understanding of solid operation and for 20 minutes diagnosis time this situation and recognized the requirements. determine what the was assigned. Mean = 0.027 However, given the operators failure to appropriate actions initially diagnose the need for level control should be. (OPDHR fails) and the fact that the
" functional
- loss of SDC in this case could be subtle in regards to detection, the lower bound value for the diagnosis did not seem appropriate in this context.
7 C hQ N 5 5
Z Table 10.1.50.8 - h Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEPIIRAP $ 8 y Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comrnents g (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A The site interviews No Sthby-step ECCS indicated that the water solid operators were operation. knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements.
~
o n Table 10.1.50.9 I Ibst-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AIterIE in Safety Systmis Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No' N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. ?--
- t!
b
I g Table 10.1.50.10 TotalIEP P I i Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Ca====ts/ (1) Operator IEP Check /Cometion (4) (5) Sourte of Infonnation (HEP ) IEP (6) (2)' (HEP) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.01 -
Med. Mean Total HEPs are'the sum of the Diagnose need to initiate 0.01 0.027 (10) individual HEPs from the diagnosis ECCS water solid operation Mean = 0.027 and actions. and determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions Given the the limited Since both the diagnosis and actmns time available, credit HEPs make signifwant contributions to Initiate ECCS water soild Median = 0.02 for second checks was Med. Mean tie Total HEP in this case, the larger operation per procedure not given. In addition, O_gl 0.032 (5) of the two EFs was assigned.
Mean = 0.032 failures or problems in 0.03 0.059 (10)
- open 2 SRVs closing MSIVs or o -check closed MSIVs opening two SRVs Total median y - initiate LPCI(C) or would have to be HEP = 0.03 HPCS considered by the operators in the same Total mean HEP time period. = 0.059 Z
C W b 8 i 5 8 >
Z TLble 10.1.51,1 3: E HEP 51 Calculation $ 8 a Human Action Event (1) OPISV (9) U Event Tree (s)(2) E,EA,EP,EAP Initiators (3) TI-5, TIASH, ElB5H, T5D5H TRPTS TPRV5, EIT5H, ElV5H Sequence Iecator Files (4) OPECSLAP.EAP, OPECSHY2.EP, OPECSHYD.TIA, OPECSLEA.TIA, OPECSL5.ElB, OPECSLPE. eld. OPECSHYD.TSD, OPECSHY2.TRP, OPECSLS.TRP, OPECSHY2.TRV, OPECSLPE.EIT, OPECSLPE.EIV OPECSLS.EIT, OPECSLS.ElV Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only I SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPECS (HEP 50), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPISV (9) calculation (HEP 51) are that the operators have recognized a loss of SDC (OPSDC or SDCUI succeeds) in the context of the initiator and have successfully started _ SDC(B). In some cases the operators have restored an inadvertent isolation of SDC(B) (RESB succeeds). 8 De operators then initially fail to diagnose (in 10 min.) a need for level control to avoid a functional loss of g SDC caused by inadequate circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the RPV (OPDHR fails). The inadequate circulation is due to the loss of CRD and/or RWCU and/or forced recirculation. Regardless, in all the relevant sequences, the operators have been actively engaged in responding to the occurring problems. ADHR has been isolated and RWCU has auto-isolated. De operators have decided to initiate ECCS water solid operation as directed by procedure (OPECS succeeds). The IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. The issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-!-02-III-1), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1) HPCS SOI (04-1 E22-1).
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_ . , _ , -- . - ~
. - _ _ _ _ _ _ a
I g Table 10.1.51.2
~
. Sequence Timing and Indir=*ians P _
l-Annunciator /I-Ae= tion em----mi _ Event /Occurnace Time (r*) Operator (3) Source of (of most interest) Informamena. . (1) Alerted (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with O loss of systems were alarmed and the operators should ECCS water solid accomplish periodic checks of te+,.im and pressure in operation when only I the new time available. Reactor pressure and coolant SRV is available. Some temperature will be rising. The IDHR ONEP has been form of SDC is needed. entered due to the initial loss of SDC and operators should be monitoring and considering the need for core cooling. The control room gets feedback regarding the opemng and closing of valves.
;5 Table 10.1.51.3 Potential Operator Action Number of Activities (Tasks) Commentst Description Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source o(Information of Event (2) Action and Procedures (4)
(1) (3) Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) It was assumed that at least imtially, a
- No normal means of SDC is One low pressure injection system would be l available and level control is
- 1. Check closed MSIVs preferable to high pressure system.
needed. The IDHR ONEP directs the operators to initiate ECCS 2. Ensure that two (one in this LPCI is referred to in IDHR ONEP. water solid operation. Operators case) SRVs are open
- 3. Increase RPV water level with LPCI is initiated from 04-1-01-E12-1, have decided to go water solid, but any available injection system. Step 5.4.2.
only 1 SRV is available. The question is whether they will In this context LPCI (C) was 7 assumed first choice if HPCS is initiated from 04-I-01-E22-1, c proceed with the initiation of water Step 5.2. available, then HPCS. E solid operation if they cannot 9 match the ONEPs demand for 2 9 SRVs 2: 6
Z Table 10.1.51.4 :C h Time Available to Diagnaw and Perform the Task $ 6 Fi
? Action Time by Time at Which Maximum Comments /
(1) Which Operator Time Source of Operator is Alerted that Available to Information M ust Symptom has Perform the (5) Act (T) Occurred (T,) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activities (T" ) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 minutes SEA Calculation C90-492-01-A16 solid operation with only 1 SRV available. Note. Here is clearly a dependency between OPECS and his task must occur in OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but an the same time frame additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is allowed for OPECS. asked only when OPECS succeeds, it was decided that the Hat is, it must occur llEP for OPISV would be determined as ifit were OPECS,
- in the same 23 minutes. except for one difference. Five minutes less would be $ Functionally, OPISV is available for the diagnosis because of the time lost in $$ OPECS, except that responding to the failure to get two SRVs open. It was only 1 SRV is assumed that the operators would make several attempts to available. OPISV is get the second SRV open and would discuss the problem asked only when among themselves before proceeding.
g OPECS succeeds. o
- 1 I
< Table 19.1.51.5 o ~
Operator Action Mormamre Tune
?
- Total Action Comments /
Activities 14 cation Travel Ptrformance (2) Tune (T,) Tune (r,) Source ofInformation (1) Tune (T) O) (4) (5) (6) 4
- 1. Check closed MSIVs CR - I minute I minute "Ihe critical actions for initiarmf ECCS
' water solid operation were assumed to be um,,L.dy dependent. They were judged to be an integrated set of i Mm.lized actions. i Make several attempts to CR 5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that 2. proceeding with ECCS water solid get the secomi SRV open , operation with only one SRV would be a and discuss proceeding viable and likely option. The immediate with 1 SRV obgective is to get some form of decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling. f Ensure 1 SRV open CR - I minute I minute 3. Initiate ECCS system CR - I minute I minute 4. (per Table 8-1, 8 min. Total Step Sb, a 1 min. action time travel and manipulation time was assumed for each ' action) Y. 8 8 M % b C e
Z Table 10.1.51.6 :C E Diagnosis Time for Operator Action 8 y Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / I (1) Available (T,) Time (r,) Source of
- to Diagnosis (T)
(2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose neal to initiate 23 minutes 8 minutes 15 minutes ECCS water solid operation with only 1 SRV open Table 10.1.51.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments /
;;; (1) Diagnose (3) Final llEP Source of Infonnation h
o (2) (4) (5) Diagnose need to Per Table 8-3, the median Median = 0.03 Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding initiate ECCS water value from Figure 8-1 for 15 Mean = 0.08 with ECCS water solid operation with only solid operation with minutes diagnosis time was one SRV would be a viable and likely option. only I SRV open assigned (EF= 10) The inunediate objective is to get some form of decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid operation with i SRV would provide core cooling. o
?
?
2
O
< Tabh 19.1.51.8 ~
Post-Diagnosis Action Type IdentExation per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP e Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comassants (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Except for No Step-by-Step Actions are proceduralized. ECCS proceeding with I water solid SRV, the actions are 1 operation clearly specified by with 1 SRV procedure. available. Interviews indicated that the cperators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. IA Table 10.1.51.9 Pbst-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level C e. w .LJ (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) i l (3) (4) (5) , Initiate N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Several systems available l ECCS High and substantial time before water solid core damage
'2:
' At least moderately high vress was assumed for all events.
El 2 For the LPS environment (uwally long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of 3 y extremely high stress. Each hunets action esent was examined as a function of the context. m h - - _ _ _ 1
y Table 10.1.51.10 g
- o Total IEP >
Pi y Action Original Independent ToulIEP EF Coenments/ (1) Operator IEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of Infonnation (IEP ) IEP (6) (2)' (IEP) 0)
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.03 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.03 0.08 Mean = 0.08
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 ML Since both IIEPs contribute as directed by procalure, Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.05 0.112 (10) to the total HEP, the largest except that only 1 SRV is because of the time of the two EFs was available. limitations and because Total Median assigned.
failures or problems in HEP = 0.05 closing MSIVs open _ would have to be Total Mean HEP
? considered by operators = 0.112 y in the same time period.
Other problems related to the initiator may also be requiring their attention. S
*C b
Table 10.1.52.1
~
HEP 52 caindamon P u H-- Action Event (1) SDCUI(1) Event Tree (s)(2) ADEP. ADEPP, ADEPS Initiators (3) TI-5 TRPT5, TIOPS, TLMSH, E2C-5 Sequence locator Files (4) SDCUI.ADP, SDCUI.TRP, SDCUI.TIO, SDCUI.TLM, SDCUI.E2C, SDCUI.TIA Event 1>scription (5) SDCUI is the operator decision and action to unisolate and use RHR/SDC or ADHR followmg 4 - Wia= during a HYDRO test. I6 Event Context (6) SDCUI (1) (HEP 52) represents the operators decision and actions to provide SDC after depressunzatmo during a HYDRO test. In the relevant scenarios, either forced recirculation is lost or RWCU in the recirculation mode is lost. Either the operators depressurize the vessel or SRVs open on their safety set points and at least cae fails to close, resulting in depressurization. SDC is needed ami the operators have 8.7 hours to diagnose the need and align a normal means of SDC. Applicable Procedures (7) RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1), Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-52-02-111-1) E w l 2 C N b a llC % 6 I m
- _ _ _ . _ - - - _ _ _ . - -----..--.-----------n
_ _ - - - -,. , - - ~ - , - - - , - - -
.-1 + , - -- -~~ - ~---:- ~ - - -, ,- , . - . , . - - - - - . _,
y Table 10.1.52.2 g g Sequence Timing and Indwations > Q n y EvenUOu-me Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) RWCU or forced O A loss of forced recirculation or RWCU will be alarmed. A recirculation is lost stuck open SRV will also be indicated, as will the vessel during e HYDRO test. pressure loss. Depressuriztion of the vessel occurs and SDC is needed. Table 10.1.52.3 p Pbtential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / , of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information I (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) ! The vessel has depressurized One Align an initiate an SDC system. Alignment of SDC is a frequently during a HYDRO test and the performed action during LP&S operators will need to pmvide a conditions. It is proceduralized. normal means of SDC. Level is high enough for natural i recirculation, so all that is needed for the these scenarios is SDC (RHR/SDC or ADHR). b a
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~
Tchie 10.1.52.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task
- Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximtsu Time Available Cm._.~.M (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Infonnation Act (T,) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5)
(2) (3) (4) Align and 8.7 hours 0 8.7 hours SEA Calculation C90 492-052-initiate an A16 SDC system. Table 10.1.52.5 Operator Action Performance Time g Actisities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / 6 (1) (2) Time (T') Time (T*) Source of Information Time (T) U (3) (4) (5) (6) Align (unisolate) and start Control Room - 5 minutes 5 minutes SDC system. 7. C e Pe r x 3 h
y Table 19.1.52.6
% I g Diagnosis T'une for Operator Action >
,s 9 n y Action Maximwn Tune Total Action Time AM Commments/ g (1) Available (T,)
" Tune (T) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) h (5)
Realize the need to initiate 8.7 hours 5 minutes At least 8 hours SDC. 4 Table 10.1.52.7 1 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Cn=====#=1 (I) Diagnose (3) (4) Seurte of Infonmation (2) (5) {e Decide to align and initiate SDC. Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, the median value from ASEP N/A Median = 2.0E-5 HYDRO tests are sfu.-J late in shutdown and the operators know SDC is needed if HRAP Figure 8-1 for 8 hours Mean = 1.7E-4 depressunzhon occurs. diagnosis time was assigned. t i
)
< l 2
< Table 10.1.52.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identifiertion per Step 10, Tr_bie 8-1 of ASEP HRAP
.N 7
3 Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comunents (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
- 0) Tasks (4)
Unisolate N/A Interviews indscated No Step-by-Step and start that the operators SDC. were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. Table 10.1.52.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP
]
U w Action T <2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress level Comments / (1) After IE in Safety Systens Familiar (6) Sourte of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/Os- (7)
- 0) (4) (5)
Unisolate N/A' FIA No2 N/A Moderately Substantial time before core and start High damage and several safety SDC. systems available. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. I For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not neceuarily lead to an assumption of l extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. Z C h O 8 lc k % e 5
z Table 10.1.52.10 :::: Q Total HEP f b ' h Action Original Independent TotalIIEP EF Comments / i (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source ofInfonnation 8 (HEP ) IIEP (6) (2)' (HEP,) (3)
~1. Diagnose need to Median = 2.0E-5 Med. Mean (30) align and start a 2.0E-5 1.7E-4 normal means of Mean = 1.7E-4 SDC.
- 2. Align and start Median = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.0008 0.0033 5 (5) Second check HEPs are SDC system. check and third check 8.2E-4 3.5E-3 (5) multiplied by the original HEP Mean = 0.032 was given. HEPs for for each action. 7hird check failure to provide a Total Median HEP HEPs are multiplied by the second and a third = 8.2E-4 mit obtained from applying g check were: the second check.
Q Total Mean HEP Med. = .2 = 3.5E-3 'Ihe error factor from the donunant HEP was assigned.
, Mean = .323 i
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~
Table 10.1.F.1 HEP 54 Calculation
;w -_.
h Human Action Event (1) SDCUI(2) Event Tree (s)(2) ADEP, ADEPP, ADEPS Initiators O) TSD5H. TORV5 Sequence in:ator Files (4r SDCUI.TSD, SDCUI.TRV Event Description (5) SDCUI is the operator decision and action to unisolate and use RHR/SDC or ADHR following depressurizatmo during a HYDRO test. Event Context (6) SDCUI (2) (HEP 54) represents the operators decision and actions to provide SDC after depressunzatmo during a HYDRO test. In the relevant scenarios, either forced recirculation is lost or RWCU in the recirculation mode is lost. Either the operators depressurize the vessel or SRVs open on their safety set points and at least one fails to close, resulting in depressurization. SDC is needed and the operators have 8.7 hours to diagnose the need and align a normal rneans of SDC. For some sequences the operators may also need to isolate RWCU and in others, an SDC valve may need to be opened locally. 5 Applicable Procedures (7) RHR 501 (04-1-01-E12-1), Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-54-02-111-1) tie Y. C m e 9 s x Z
. h
$ Table 10.L$4.2 g wr->ing w m6 m E o.
5 [ Event /Occumnce Tiene U,) Annunciator / Indication Commets/ g (of most interest) Operator 0) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) RWCU or forced O A loss of forced recircularma or RWCU will te alarunt. A recirculatmo is lost stuck open SRV will also be imika'~1, as will the vessel during a HYDRO test. pressure loss. Depressuriziion of the vessel occurs ci SDC is needed. In some cases, RWCU needs to be isolated. l l 5 Table 10.1.54.3 l Q Potential Operator Action o i Description Nurnber of Activities Rasks) Comments / l of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Informa6on i (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) ne vessel has depressurized One 1. Align an initiate an SDC system. Alignrnent of SDC is a frequently during a HYDRO test and the performed action during LP&S operators will need to provide a 2. Isolate RWCU conditions. It is proceduralized. normal means of SDC. Level is high enough for natural recirculation, so all that is needed for the these scenarios i4 SDC (RHRISDC or ADHR) and in some cases isolation of RWCU. o
.N 2
g
~
Tchie 10.1.54.4 Time Avnilable t2 Ihagnose cnd Perform the Task 2
~
Adion Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Commeats/ (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Sourte of Infonnation Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) 0) (4) I Align and 8.7 hours 0 8.7 hours SEA Calculation C9(M92-054-initiate an A16 SDC system and isolate RWCU. Table 10.1.54.5 Operator Action Performance Time ~ o A E Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T) Time (T*) Time (T*) Sourte of Information (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Align (unisolate) and Most of the time -
30 minute 30 minute Per ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, a i min. start SDC system. from the CR. travel and manipulation time was j Time for a trip assumed for each action. outside the CR l was included. l g
- 2. Isolate RWCU. CR -
I minutes I minutes 2 C O r x ' E w 5
Z Table 13.1.54.6
- Diagnosis Time for Operator Action h O -
Fi y Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (r) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Realize the need to initiate 8.7 hours 31 minutes At least 8 hours SDC and isolate RWCU. Taole 10.1.54.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Diagnosis Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) (4) Source of Information (2) (5) l - i 3 Decide to align and Per ASEP llRAP Table 8-3, N/A Median = 2.0E-5 HYDRO tests are performed late in shutdown
$ initiate SDC. the median value from ASEP and the operators know SDC is needed if HRAP Figure 8-1 for 8 hours Mean = 1.7E-4 depressuriztion occurs.
diagnosis time was assigned. l l t l l l l <
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a
~
< Table 19.1.54.8 y- Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 19, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP P
?
~
2 Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must SWy Step Sourte of Information Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Unisolate N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-Step
~
and start that the operators SDC and were knowledgeable isolate about the need for RWCU id the actions and necessary. requirements. Table 10.1.54.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP
?
M w Action T < 2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Unisolate N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Substantial time before core and start High damage and several safety SDC. systems available. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environmcat (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an Assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. Z C m O Nu s T b h
1 l Z Table 10.1.54.10 3: E Total IEP $ m 9 o y Action Original Independent TotalIIEP EF Comments /
;- (1) Operator IEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of Information l
l w (IEP ) IEP (6) I (2)' (IIEP) l (3)
- 1. Diagnose Median = 2.0E-5 Med. Mean (30) need to align 2.0E-5 1.7E-4 and start a Mean = 1.7E-4 normal means of SDC.
- 2. Isolate Median = 0.02 Credit for a second check and 0.0008 0.0033 (5) Second check IIEPs are RWCU (if third check was given. IIEPs multiplied by the original necessary) Mean = 0.032 for failure to provide a second 11EP for each action. Mini and a third check were: check HEPs are multiplied
~
Med. = .2 by the result obtained from applying the second check. M Mean = .323
- 3. Align and Median = 0.02 Credit for a second check and 0.0008 0.0033 (51 ne error factor from the start SDC third check was given. IIEPs 1.6E-3 6.8E-3 (5) dommant liEP was Mean = 0.032 for failure to provide a second assigned.
system. and a third check were: Total Median IIEP Med. = .2 = 1.6E-4 Mean = .323 Total Mean liEP
= 6.8E-3 c
.N a
< Table 10.1.M.1 E-HEP 56 Calculation 2 3 Human Action Event (1) RM-LT Event Tree (s)(2) L LA,LP, Initiators (3) All tran-icnts Sequence Imcator Files (4) RM-LT.ElB, RM-LT.TIO OPDHR&.LP&, OPDHR&.TIA, OPDHR.TDB, OPDHRP.TSD, OPDHRP.ElB, CPDHRP.EID, OPDHRP.E2D, OPDHRLP.EIT, OPDHRLAP.ElV, OPDHR.TIH, OPDHROP.TIH, OPDHR.TIF, OPDHR.TDB, OPDHR.T5D, OPDHR.EIB, OPDHR.EID, OPDHR.E2D, OPDHR.EIT, OPDHR.ElV, OPDHR&.LP&, OPDHR&.TIA, OPDHR.TDB, OPDHRP.TSD, OPDHRP.ElB OPDHRP.EID, OPDHRP.E2D, OPDHRLP.EIT, OPDHRLAP.EIV OPDHR.TLM, OPDHR.TRP, OPDHR.TIH, OPDHROP.TIH, OPDHR.TIF, OPDHRHYR.TIO, OPDHRHYR.TLM, OPDHRHYR.TRP, OPDHRHYR.TRV Event Description (5) RM-LT is the operator action to restore makeup in the long term after a loss of all makeup (RWCTJ) and letdown (CRD). 'The objective is to compensate for vessel leakage. The operators have 10 hours to provide makeup with an ECCS system. Event Context (6) For the RM-LT calculation (HEP 56), CRD is lost, but SDC and forced recirculation continues to run. OPDHR y nWe_ That is, the operators have isolated letdown (RWCU) and attempted to initiate CDS. However, CDS M " fails or is unavailable. With no makeup, the operators need to use an ECCS syem to provide makeup in the long term to compensate for vessel leakage. Operators have done everythmg correctly to this point. Applicable Procedures (7) No specific procedures, but the inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-HI-1) would be relevant, as would the relevant SOIs, e.g., RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1). 2 C b e 9 s x E . h
Z h Table 10.1.56.2 $ Sequence Timing and Indications Pi
;c
-J b Event / Occurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication C._--_-
O Operator (3) Source of (or most interest) Alerted Infonnation (1) (2) (4) Gradual loss oflevel due O Re operators have done everything correctly to this point to leakage. level control and are aware of the systems which have been lost and (makeup) is needed. isolated. De loss of CDS will be alarmed and the operators should check level numerous times over a 10 hour period. He situation clearly indicates the need to have some form of makeup available and to ensure level stays at the appropriate level. l Table 10.1.56.3 Potential Operator Action 9 9
& Comments /
Description Nurnber of Activities (Tasks) Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information of Event (2) Action and Procedures (4) (1) (3) Gradual loss oflevel due to One He operators need to increase leakage. level control (makeup)is RPV water level with an ECCS needed. system.
.N
- 1
< Table 10.1.56.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task
.N m *
$ Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximian TLne Available Comments /
(1) Operator Met is Alerted that Symptom to Perfonn the Identified Sourre of Infonnation Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) The' operators need to 10 hours ne loss of CDS (at time 0) 5 hours SEA Calculation C90-492 diagnose the need to will indicate the need for level A16 increase level to avoid control. level losses will be inadequate core indicated at least within 5 cooling. hours. Conservatively assumed 5 hours. Table 10.1.56.5 Operator Action Performance Time 5 b
$ Activities Location Travel Perfonnance Total Action Comments /
(1) (2) Time (T,) Sourre of Infonnation Time (T) Time (T,) (3) (4) (5) (6) Control level with an CR - 2 minute 2 minutes Note that travel and manipulation (performance) ECCS system. times in the control room were determined using ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column. De actions involved in initiating a makeup system { were assumed to be completely dependent. System initiation would be proceduralized. 2 C W m O N W 6
- c h
l w _ __ _ _ _ . ._ - - - . , . _ - . . . . - . . , .. _ . _ _ . _ . _ . - - _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Z Table 10.1.56.6 : E Diagnosis T'une for Operator Action 5 6 a Total Action Time Available Comments /
- c Action Maximasu Time b (1) Available(T" ) Time (T*) to Diagnosis (T) Source of 0 (2) (3) (4) Information (5)
"Ihe operators need to .5 hours 2 minutes Approx. 5 hours diagnose the need to increase level to avoid madequate core cooling.
Table 10.1.56.7 Diagnosis Analpis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments /
- (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information 8 (2) (4) (5)
E Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 3.0E-5 The site interviews indicated that the provide makeup median value from Figure 8-1 operators are aware of the problem of concem for 5 hours diagnosis time was Mean = 2.5E-4 and have a clear understanding of the i assigned. requirements. O
*o b
-- - - - - . ,, , v -
{ Table 19.1.56.8
.'u Post-Ihagnosis Action Type Identification per Step it, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP .
7* Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dyn==de or Comuments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Infonamenen Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6)
- 0) Tasks (4)
Initiate an N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-step injection that the operators system to were knowledgeable provide about the need for makeup. the actions. Table 10.1.56.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 5 a'J
$ Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Levd Comments /
(1) After IE in Safety Systens Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ba (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate an N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Several systems available injection High and substantial time befose system to core damage. provide makeup. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-teem sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumptma of
% extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
6 sc t 0 5
Z Table 10.1.56.10 Total HEP h E 8 8 Independent Total HEP EF Comments / y Action Original Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of (1) Operator HEP HEP Infonnation " (HEP ) (6) (2)" (HEP,) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 3.0E-5 - Med. Mean 3.0E- (30) 5 2.5E-4 Mean = 2.5E4 Credit for a second and 8.0E4 3.3E-3 _(51. Second and third
- 2. Initiate an injection system to I.: * . . o.02 a third check were 8.3E4 3.6E-3 (5) check HEPs are provide makeup and vessel level Mean = 0.032 given because of the multiplied with control. the original HEP substantial time Total Median HEP available with little else = 8.3E4 for each action.
of concern. The operators have done Total Mean The error factor associated with l everything correctly to HEP = 3.6E-3 _,'?, the docunant this point. g HEPs for failure to HEPs was provide a second and assigned. third check were: Med. = .2 Mean = .323
?
2 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ =________-_____-------------__----u--__--.m_ -
-f Tcble 10.1.57.1 HEP 57 Calculation I
Human Action Event (1) OPIS (2) _ Event Tree (s)(2) P,PP initiators (3) All transients and LOCAS
' .:quence Imator Files (4) Multiple files beginning with OPSTH, e.g., OPSTHSRV.PP -
Event Description (5) OPIS is the operator diagnosis and action to isolate SDC from overpressurization if the auto-isolation on pressure fails. Event Context (6) In the sequences relevant to OPIS (2) (HEP 57), the operators have been attempting to follow procedure, but for any of several reasons have not been successful. For example, in some sequences the operators attempt to initiate ; ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP (OPECS succeeds), but 2 SRVs fail to open. He operators ! either fail to open 1 SRV (OPISV) and proceed with going water solid or i SRV (ISRVB) fails to open and they can't go water solid. In either case, they did successfully diagnose the need to initiate water solid operation and tried to open two SRVs. With no SRVs open, the operators should be aware of the fact that pressure will be ._ going up. The low pressure piping needs to be isolated at 135 psi (auto isolation at 135 psi) and the operators C ,, should receive an alarm prior to 135 psi. In addition, if the auto-isolation fails, the operators should get an d isolation failure signal. Thus, in scenarios like this, where the operators are attempting to follow prtxedine, whether or not they consciously decide to steam at low pressure (OPSTM fails or succeeds), they should have some probability of realizing the need to manually isolate the low pressure piping (OPIS) if the auto-isolation fails (RHRIP). OPIS must be done in the same time period as OPSTM (23 minutes). SDC must be isolated if the operators decide to steam at high pressure (OPSTil). Note. In some sequences, SDC has been isolated (e.g., by the initiator) prior to entering the P tree where OPIS is asked. For these sequences, OPIS was set to succeed (0). Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control), Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-57-02-Ill-1)
)
l i z C M b a M & C b
$ Table 10.1.57.2 g y Sequence Timing and Indications >
9 o y Event / Occurrence Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication C w .M I (of most interest) Operator (3) Sourte of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) Normal means of SDC 5 minutes Vessel pressure will be increasing. 'Ihe low pressure piping When at full power, the Technical are gone and a rneans of needs to be isolated at 135 psi (auto-isolation at 135 psi) Specifications indicate that the low preventing the core from and the operators should receive an alarm prior to 135 psi. pressure piping should auto-isolate at uncovering is needed. In addition, if the auto-isolation fails, the operators should 135 psi. One option is to steam at get an isolation failure signal. SRVs will open on their high pressure. Ilowever, safety set points event'ully. with pressure increasing, the operators will need _. to ensure that SDC isolate.s to prevent overpressurizing the low g pressure system. b tJ Table 10.1.57.3 Potential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
- of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (I) (2) Action and hocedures (4)
(3) l Normal SDC is gone and pressure One Manually close valves to isolate Site interviews with operators is increasing. The operators need SDC low pressure piping. indicated that (at least for now) the to ensure SDC isolates to prevent auto-isolation of low pressure overpressurization. piping remams in place during l LP&S conditions and that the i o operators are aware of the
~
potential for ove pressurization of the low pressure piping. ( 5 l - - -.
.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ___ _ d
g Toble 10.1.57.4 Time Available to Diagnme and Morm the Task
.[
m 4
~. Action Tune by Which Time at Which Operator Max' unum Time Available Comments /
(1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Infonnation Act (T) has Occurved (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) 0) (4) hotate SDC 23 minutes 5 minutes 18 minutes SEA Calculation C90-492-057-ifit fails to (Auto-isolation signals may not A16 auto- occur right at the beginning of isolate. the time window. Signals should occur within the first 5 minutes). Tahle 10.1.57.5 Operator Action PerfonnanceTune g Activities location Travel Performance Total Actioe Comments / g (1) (2) Tune (T) Tune (T,) Tune (T,) Source of Information w 0) (4) (5) (6) ! Isolate SDC if auto- CR - I minute I minute Per ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, a 1 min. isolation fails. travel and manipulation time was assumed for each critical action. Z . C h O 8 lxt 6 % b L ,
l l
@ Tcbie 10.1.57.6 y y Diagnosis Time for Operator Action >
Q Fi y Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / g (1) Available (T" ) Time (T ) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) * (4) Infonnadon (5) Isolate SDC if auto- 18 minutes I minute 17 minutes isolation fails. l l Table 10.1.57.7 Diagnosis Analysis l i Action Failu-eto Skill. Based Diagnosis Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) (4) Source of Infonnation (2) (5) l 5 Per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, g3 Isolate SDC if auto- N/A Median = 0.02 Given the Technical Specifications for full l % isolation at 135 psi the median value from ASEP power, the fact that GGNS policy currently ! fails. HRAP Figure 8-1 for 17 Mean = 0.053 specifies that the auto-isolation remain in minutes diagnosis time was place during shutdown, and the staffs apparent assigned. awareness of the potential problem conveyed during the site interviews, per ASEP HRAP Table 8-3, the upper median . diagnosis value was assigned.
.N *u S
y --
, , - n --
g Table 10.1.57.8 Phst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEE IIRAP
.[
?
s Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments / (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) Information (3) Tasks (6) (4) Isolate SDC ' N/A Interviews indicated No Step-by-Step from the CR. that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. Table 10.1.57.9 5 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP llRAP b w Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) After 1E in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Sourre of (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence Information (3) (4) (5) (7) Isolate SDC. N/A' N/A No' N/A Moderately Substantial time before High core damage
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. Z C b Q b lC 6 % 5 m
Z :I: E Table 10.1.57.10 s
$ TotalIIEP n
M g Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Comments / i (1) Operator IIEP Ctxk/ Correction (4) (5) Source of Information OEP) IEP (6) (2)* QEP) 0)
- 1. Decide to isolate Mexlian = 0.02 Med. Mean SDC if auto. 0.02 0.053 (10) isolation on high Mean = 0.053 pressure fails.
- 2. Isolate SDC, Median = 0.02 Credit for a second check was 0.0 M 0.01 (5) Second check HEPs are given because of the 0.024 0.063 (10) multiplied by the Mean = 0.032 indications and because the original HEP for each control room has been Total median HEP action.
_ performing correctly in the = 0.024 9 relevant sequences. HEPs for The error factor y failure to provide a second Total mean HEP associated with the check were: = 0.063 dominant HEP was assigned. Med. = .2 Mean = .323 o a
, , e ,
_ . + . _ , __
$ Tcble 10.1.58.1 " HEP 58 Calculation P 7 Human Action Event OPDHR (3) (1) Event Tree (s) (2) L LP, . Initiators (3) TI-5, TSD5H, TLM5H, TRP'T5, TIOP5, TORV5, E2C-5 Sequence locator OPDHR&.LP&, OPDHR&.TIA. OPDHRHYD.TIA OPDHR.TDB, OPDHRP.T5D, OPDHRP.ElB, OPDHRP.EID, Files (4) OPDHRP.E2D, OPDHRLP.EIT, OPDHRLAP.ElV, OPDHR.TLM, OPDHR.TRP, OPDHR.TIH, OPDHROP.TlH. OPDHR.TIF, OPDHRHYD.E2C, OPDHRHYD.LP, OPDHRHYD.TIO, OPDHRHYD.TLM, OPDHRHYD.TRP, OPDHRHYD.TRV Event Description (5) OPDHR is the operator action to control vessel level in order to avoid a " functional" loss of SDC caused by inadequate , circulation between the core and the downcomer regions of the vessel. Hat is, evec if SDC continues to operate, if vessel level becomes too low, a " disconnect
- between the core and downcomer regions can occur. His will result in inadequate cooling of the core even though SDC continues to operate. The indications to the operators that the event is occurring can be subtle because temperature readings are apparently taken from the downcomer region, where the water being cooled by SDC g is retumed. Also, the vessel level would not be so low that any level alarms would sound. A loss of forced recirculation, or g a loss of makeup (usually CRD) coupled with continued draindown, can lead to inadequate level. Only 10 minutes was w allowed for the operator diagnosis and actions in OPDHR.
Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPDHR (3) calculation (HEP 58) are that the control was conducting a HYDRO test when the initiator occurred. He initiator directly impacts the systems that create the potential
- disconnect problem." An SRV opens on its safety set point and fails to close, resulting in vessel depressurization. The operators recognize the need for SDC and successfully initiate SDC(B) (SDCUI succeeds). RWCU assumed isolated or controlled. He operators had 8.7 hours to accomplish SDCUI. At this point the operators have done everything correctly and have had ample time to consider potential problems. With the recognized loss of SDC, the IDHR ONEP would be pulled. Given the previous events, the operators would be attending to level and related concerns.
Applicable Procedures No specific procedures, but the inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1) would be relevant, as would the (7) relevant SOls, e.g., RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1). 2 C
;c b
n Oc 6 Z E m N
z ::: C M x Table 10.1.58.2 > c Sequence Timm* g and Indications n x r EvenUC-oe Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication C ---- - kl
- (of most interist) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4)
IDHR caused by O As noted in Table 10.1.58.1, the indications for this event inadequate circulation may be subtle because vessel teirviame readings could be between the core and the misleading and no level alarms would sound. However, in downcomer regions of all the sequences covered, CRD and/or forced recirculation the vessel. Level control is lost. Rese events will be alarmed and if the operators (makeup) is needed. are knowledgeable regarding the potential problem, these indications should suffice. Moreover, given the previous events, operators will have had ample time to consider potential problems and relevant signals.
~
@* Table 10.1.58.3 Potential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perfonn Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) A " functional" loss of SDC leads One ne operators need to increase to IDHR. He operators need to RPV water level with any available diagnose the need and increase injection system. CRD (if vessel level. available), CDS, or an ECCS system are possible choices.
g
~
Table 10.1.58.4 Time Available to Diagnose and Perfonn the Task
$ Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available CJ (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Infonnation Act (T,) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5)
(2) (3) (4)
~
The operators need to 10 minutes 0 10 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-49241-ugnose the need to A16 increase level to avoid inadequate core cooling. Table 10.1.58.5 Operator Action PerfonnanceTime 5 Travel Performance Total Action Comments / h Activities Location Y (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Source of Information (1) Time (T) (3) (4) (5) (6) If available, increase CR - I minute 1 minute Note that travel and manipulation (performance) times in the control room were determined using flow with CRD. If CRD is not available and SDC ASEP Table is not being provided by 8-1, Step 5b, and are grouped under the SDC(B), use CDS. performance time column. Otherwise, use an ECCS The actions involvM in initiating a makeup system system. were assumed to be completely dependent. System Note. With only 10 min. available for OPDHR, if initiation would be proceduralized. CDS was asked and it failed, credit was not 7 taken for both CDS and g an ECCS system. a
;c x b s 8
[ Tcbie 10.1.58.6 % y Diagnosis Tirne for Operator Action s C Fi
$ Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments /
I (1) Available(T" ) Time (T ) Source of
" to Diagnosis (T)
(2) (3) * (4) Information (5) The operators need to 10 minutes 1 minutes 9 minutes diagnose the need to increase level to avoid inadequate core coohng. Table 10.1.58.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Sourre of Information 25 (2) (4) (5) M C Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the lower Med. = 0.01 The site interviews indicated that the provide makeup bound value from Figure 8-1 operators are aware of the problem of concem for 9 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.027 and have a clear understanding of the was assigned. requirements. 'The lower bound diagnosis value wasjudged appropriate in these scenarios because of the successes of the operators and the time available aller the initiator to consider potential problems that could arise. Essentially, more time is available because of the fact that they were in IIYDRO test. o 7 a
o
~
Table 10.1.58.8
-" Ibst-Diagnosis Action Type Idmtification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP e !i EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments Action Safety Systens Failed Use EOPs Well Operator Must SteAy-Step Source of Infonnation (1) (2)
Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
- 0) Tasks (4)
Interviews indicated No Dynamic. Initiate an N/A injection that the operators were knowledgeable Given that the system to provide about the need for yu.kn would the actions. have determine makeup. which system to start on their own, the actions were assumed to be dynamic, per I g ASEP. n 5 Table 10.1.58.9 Ibst-Diagnosis Stress-level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP More Than Two Operator Stress tevel Comments / Action T <2h Recire. Phase in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (1) After IE Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (2) (3) (4) (5) No 2 N/A Mcxlerately Several systems available Initiate an N/A' N/A High and substantial time before injection core damage. system to 7 provide C makeup. N
$ ' At least unierately high stress was assumed for all events.
g For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necewarily lead to an assumption of y ' g
;- extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
w
y Table 14.1.58.14
- n - Total HEP >
8 n [ Action Origmal Indepesident Total HEP EF Ceninsessts/ I (1) Operator HEP Ched/Cometion (4) (5) Source of (HEP ) HEP Infernistion (2)' (HEP,) (6) 0)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.01 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.01 0.027 Mean = 0.027
- 2. Initiate an injation system to Med. = 0.05 Cralit for a second 0.05 0.081 m Since both HEPs provide makeup and vessel level Mean = 0.081 check was not taken 0.06 0.108 (10) contribute to the total control. because of the time HEP, the larger error limitations. Total Median factor was assigned.
IIEP = 0.06 _ Total Mean liEP y = 0.108 O I 1 o e m b ~ -
~g Table 10.1.59.1 HEP 59 Calculation P
7 == Human Action Event (1) OPECS (15) Event Tree (s)(2) EA Initiators (3) ElDSH,ElV5H Sequence locator Files (4) OPECSALA.EID, OPCECSALA.EIV Event Desenption (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to go ECCS water solid and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) De important constants for the OPECS (15) calculation (HEP 59) are that the control room has successfully diagnosed the loss of ADHR (OPSDC succeeds) and have successfully restored ADHR (RESAD or RESCS succeeds). However, at some point in the scenario, forced recirculation and/or CRD are lost. RWCU continues to run and needs to be isolated to stop draindown. De operators fail to diagnose the need to provide level control to avoid a disconnect between the core and the downcomer which leads to a
- functional" loss of SDC (OPDHR fails). De operators need to diagnose the need to y isolate RWCU, isolate ADHR, and initiate ECCS water solid operation. Rus, the 5 operators must perform a series of steps to isolate RWCU, isolate ADHR, align LPCl(C) or (B) for injection (including a remote manual start of LPCI(C) or (B)), per RHR SOI M-1-Ol-E12-1. Step 6.6 or 6.8 (" Abnormal Operations"), and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP. In aligning LPCl(C) for injection in this context, the procedures instruct the operators to isolate ADHR.
Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (M-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44) 2: C Q
=
M I > w
y Ts.ble 10.1.57.2 %
- o S quence Timing and Indications >
o n
- c Event / Occurrence Time (T*) Annunciator / Indication cst,m:.J 8 (of most intestst) Operator (3) Sourre of C (1) Alerted Information (2) (4)
IDiiR. Need for 0 less of systems were alarmed and the operators have initiation of ECCS water already responded to the initial loss of SDC. With the solid operation to success of OPSDC, the IDliR ONEP would have been provide core cooling. entered. In addition, the operators should accomplish periodic checks of temperature and pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm could very likely occur during this time period. Reactor coolant temperatue will'oe rising and level would be dropping. w-Table 10.1.59.3 Potential Operator Action 5 h Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Required to Perform Source of Information (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) (2) (3) Due to the functional loss of One 1. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop draindown. It was assumed that at SDC, the normal means of least initially, a low SDC are inadequate. Imel 2. Per RilR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment from ADilR to pressure injation system control and vessel cooling is RIIR C or RIIR B would be preferable to needed. The IDilR ONEP high pressure system and directs operators to initiate A. Secure AD11RS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) LPCI is referred to in ECCS water solid B. Align and start RIIR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b, (1- IDilR ONEP. In addition, operation. 5) and 6.6.2.c,d,e f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and 6.8.2.c,d,e,f ) the procedures for initiation of LPCI instruct Per IDIIR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation the operators to secure ADIIRS, the llPCS
- 1. Check closed MSIVs procedures do not.
- 2. Ensure that two SRVs are open o_, 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
L in this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if available, then IIPCS. ( 5 t e
i l l fl. 1: Wh 1 n 4 i o 2 9 t a 4
/m s
t r 0 9 no ef) C min (5 n o mf oo i l t a Ce t u c r l a u C o S A6 E1 SA e b de l
),
l a fi T ii( at v ns Adte e i eI vi ks i mhtei) c4 a T tn A( T e mnr uot o s ht mfr a r t e i e e u n xPp a i n n f o MtoO M e r 3 2
. P 4.
9 d n 5 a r 1 es om 0 1 o t o at ), eg n rp bi a l pm(T e Oy TaDo cS J. ) ht t a . h th uQ i l e b l a WdeGu i t t a ars A v ele ha e i mA m Ti s i T 0 ht s i c u hM
% yo r )T(
)
2 s b ac ( t t e t era mpe in u TO i m 3 2 m r t e a n w.n i o) t 1 S o Ci t c( Ca r A E ep te o ida ili t I n os
<o[. ~c5 _ O v ZCWb8M&b f l
z 3 e Table 10.1.59.5 g g Operator Action Performance Thne 9 O Activities Location Travel Perfc mance Total Action Comments / g (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T ) Source of Information g Time (T)
- 0) (4) (5) * (6)
- 1. Isolate letdown (RWCU) CR -
I minute, but O minutes A'so note that travel and manipulation assumed done in (performance) times in the control room parallel with step we e determined using ASEP Table 8-1 Step 5 below. Sb, and are grouped under the performance time column.
- 2. Ensure that ADHR is secured CR -
1 - 3 minutes, O minutes i' per RHR 501 procedure (step 6.6.1 but can be done or 6.8.1) in parallel with alignment and start of LPCI (step 5 below). R us, l performance time I g not included. l h 3. Check closed MSIVs CR - I minute, but can 0 minutes Steps 3 and 4 are critical actions for be done in initiating ECCS water solid operation. Rey parallel with step werejudged to be an integrated set of 5 below. proceduralized actions and were assumed to be completely dependent.
- 4. Ensure 2 SRVs open CR -
1 minute, but in D minutes parallel with step 5 below
- 5. Align and initiate LPCI(C) or CR -
15 minutes, 15 minutes From the control room, the actions required (B) per RHR SOI (step 6.6.2 or travel and 15 minutes to isolate RWCU, align and initiate LPCI(C) 6.8.2) performance Total time for or (B), isolate ADHR, and perform steps 3 time. Estimated all actions. and 4 would probably not require 15 min. (Note. He procedure directs a on basis of Rus, the obtained HEP may be somewhat
" remote manual start" of LPCI discussions with conservative. (See comments in Column I, pump. In the original HEP plant personnel.
calculation, this action w,is this table). erroneously assumed to require a g trip outside the control room. Bus, F the timing used in determmmg this
-" HEP is likely to be somewhat
;P conservative. See comments in
{ Column 6)
~~y Toble 10.1.59.6 Diagwns Time for Operator Action L -
5 , Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Commems/ (1) Available (T,) Time (T) to Diagnosis (T) Sourte of (2) 0) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 15 minutes 8 minutes ECCS water solid operation. Table 10.1.59.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Commentsi (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Sourte of Infonnation 5 (2) (4) (5) u Diagnose need to Per ASEP llRAP Table 8-3, Median = 0.15 For this event, the relevant ONEP has been initiate ECCS wates the median value frorn Figure (EF= 10) retrieved and the operators have perfornwxi solid operation and 8-1 for 8 minutes diagnosis several correct actions. In addition, on the determine v hat the time was assigned. Mean = 0.40 basis of interviews, the operators have a clear appropriate actions understanding of the procedures and should be. requirements. liowever, in these sequences the operators initially fail to detect the
" functional loss of SDC and the indications for *he problem may be subtle. Moreover, the core /downcomer disconnect problem is not explicitly indicated in the IDilR ONEP procedure. Thus, use of the lower bound diagnosis value did not seem appropriate.
Z C 7J 8
? r E iii c >
Z % Table 10.1.59.8 Ibst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP N 9 - n ,
$ Action Safety Systens Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments I
(1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source c'Information Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6)
- 0) Teb (4)
Initiate N/A Actior- <-karly No Step-by-step ECCS sy' m ~ of water solid pr a <re. operation. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. Ei ce Table 10.1.59.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No2 N/A Moderately ECCS High water solid At least moderately high stress was assumed for all evente. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of
- e. extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context.
P I a 3 _-_ , - _ - - ,-
g Ttble 10.1.57.10 Total IIEP P 2
~
$ Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Comments /
(1) Operator IIEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Source of (IIEP ) IIEP Information (2)' (IIEP ) (6) 0) I. Diagnosis Median = 0.15 - Med. Mean (10) Diagnose need to initiate 0.15 0.40 ECCS water solid operation Mean = 0.40 and determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions One of the actions in Action B Note. Total HEPs are A. Isolate RWCU (letdown). Median = 0.02 (LPCI initiation) was originally Med. Mean the sum of the assumed to take place outside the 0.04% 0.01 (5) individual HEPs from Mean = .032 control room and in the time the diagnosis and B. Isolating ADilR and available, cralit for a second check actions. Second
_ aligning LPCI(C) for injection Median = 0.02 did not seem appropriate. See Med. Mean (5) check HEPs are O were assumed to be completely comment in Column 6. 0.02 0.032 multiplied by the g deper. dent. They constitute an Mean = 0.032 However, given that the isolation of original HEP for that inter, rated set of proceduraliral RWCU and many of the OPECS action. acti+ms. related actions were assumed to occur in parallel with the action Since both the C. OPECS actions outside the control room (and diagnosis and action
- open 2 SRVs therefore a lot of time was assumed Med. Mean HEPs make
- check closed MSIVs Median = 0.02 available for them), credit for a 0.001 0.01 (_51 significant
- start LPCI(C) second check was given for 0.178 0.45 (10) contnbutions to the Mean = 0.032 accomplishing those actions. Total HEP in this Total median case, the larger of Second check values for action 2 HEP = 0.178 the two EPs was were: assigned.
Total mean HEP Median = 0.2 = 0.45 Mean = 0.323 7 h 8 a
- c 6 %
% M w >
% Table 10.1.60.1 y y HEP 60 Calculation >
9 9 4 Human Action Event (1) OPISV (10) 0 Event Tree (s)(2) EA
~
Initiators (3) EID5H. ElV5H Sequence locator Files (4) OPECSALA.EID, OPCECSALA.EIV Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operators will proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only I SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2.SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPECS (HEP 59), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Event Context (6) De important constants for the OPISV (10) calculation (HEP 60) are that the control room has successfully diagnosed the loss of ADHR (OPSDC succeeds) and have successfully restored ADHR (RESAD or RESCS succeeds). However, at some point in the scenario, forced recirculation and/or CRD are lost. RWCU continues to run and needs to be isolated to stop draindown. He operators fail to diagnose the need to _ provide level control to avoid a disconnect between the core and the downcomer which leads to a ' functional
- y loss of SDC (OPDHR fails). He operators need to diagnose the need to isolate RWCU, isolate ADHR, and 8 initiate ECCS water solid operation. Hus, the operators must perform a series of steps to isolate RWCU, isolate ADHR, align LPCI(C) or (B) for injection (including a remote manual start of LPCI(C) or (B)), per RHR SOI 04-1-01-E12-1, Step 6.6 or 6.8 (" Abnormal Operations"), and perform the related actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation per the IDHR ONEP. The operators have decided to initiate ECCS water solid operation as directed by procedure (OPECS succeeds), but only 1 SRV will open. De IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when initiating ECCS water solid operation. He issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds.
Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1, Rev.15), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1, Rev. 44) o P 7 2
~
- 2. Table 10.1.60.2
." Sequence Timing and Indications p -
a Event /O- .ou Tune (T*)
~ Annunciator / Indication Comments /
(of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with 0 Loss of systems were alarmed and the operators have already ECCS water sohd operation regended to the initial loss of SDC. With the success of when only 1 SRV is OPSDC, the IDHR ONEP would have been entered. In , available. Some form of addition, the operators should accomplish periodic checks of SDC is needed. temperature and pressure in the new time available. A level 3 alarm could very likely occur during this time period. Reactor coolant temperature will be rising and level would be droppmg. He control room gets feedback regarding the opemng and closing of the SRVs. Table 10.I.60.3 g Ittential Operator Action
~
Description Nianber of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Required to Perform Source of Information (1) Events Action and Procedures (4) (2) (3) Due to the functional loss of One 1. Realize the need and isolate RWCU to stop draindown. It was assumed that at SDC, the normal means of least initially, a low SDC are inadequate. I.evel 2. Per RHR SOI (Step 6.6 or 6.8) Manual realignment fn>m ADHR to pressure injection system control and vessel cooling is RHR C or RHR B would be preferable to needed. He IDliR ONEP high pressure system and directs operators to initiate A. Secure ADHRS (step 6.6.2.a (1-3) or step 6.8.2.a (1-3) LPCI is referred to in ECCS water solid operation. B. Align and start RHR C or B in LPCI mode (steps 6.6.2.b, (1- IDHR ONEP. In addition. Operators have decided to go 5) and 6.6.2.c,d.e,f or steps 6.8.2.b, (1-5) and 6.8.2.c.d,e,f) the procedures for water solid, but only 1 SRV initiation of LPCI instruct is available. The question is Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Initiate ECCS water solid operation the operators to sa:ure y whether they will proceed ADHR.1, the HPCS
- o with the initiation of water 1. Check closed MSiVs procedures do not.
$ solid operation if they cannot 2. Ensure that two SRVs (in this case i SRV) are open B match the ONEPs demand 3. Increase RPV water level with any available injection system.
y for 2 SRVs. In this context LPCI (C) or (B) was assumed first choice if g g available, then HPCS. w g
l l @ Table 10.1.60.4 %
- c Tirne Available to Diagnose and INrform the Task >
E n
$ Action Time by Time at Which Maximten Comments /
I (1) Which Operator Time Souste of Operator is Alerted that Available to Infonnation Must Symptom has Perform the (5) Act (T) Occurred fr) Identified (2) (3) Operator Activities [F* ) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 min. SEA Calculation C90492-01-A16 solid operation with only 1 SRV available. Note. There is clearly a dependency between OPECS and This task must occur in OPISV. Essentially they constitute the same action, but an the same time frame additional diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is allowed for OPECS. asked only when OPECS succeeds, it was decided that the "Ihat is, it must occur HEP for OPISV would be determined as ifit were OPECS g in the same 23 minutes. (HEP 59), except for one difference. It was assumed that h Functionally, OPISV is five minutes less would be available for the diagnosis 0 the same as OPECS, because of the time lost in responding to the failure to get except that only 1 SRV two SRVs open. It was assumed that the operators would is available. OPISV is make several attempts to get the second SRV open and asked only when would discuss the problem among themselves before OPECS succeeds, proceeding.
.N "J *
' ' ~ ' ~- ~ - -
g-- T:.ble 10.1.60.5 Operator Action Performance Time
.N
{
~
Activities (1) Iecation (2) Travel Time (T') Perfonnance Action Total Comments / Sourre of Information (3) Time (T) (4) Time (T*) (6) (5)
- 1. Isolate letdown (RWCU) CR -
I minute, but 0 minutes Also note that travel and manipulation assumed done in (performance) times in the control room were
- parallel with step 6 determined using ASEP Table 8-1, Step 5b and telow, are grouped n=iar the performance time column.
- 2. Ensure that ADHR is secured CR -
1 - 3 minutes., but 0 minutes per RHR 501 procedure (step can be done in 6.6.1 or 6.8.1) parallel with alignment and start of LPCI (step 6 below). Thus, p-rformance time not included.
' 3. Check closed MSIVs CR -
I minute, but can be 0 minutes Steps 3,4, and 5 are critical actions for initiating i done in parallel with ECCS water solid operation. They were judged ! step 6 below. to be an integrated set of proceduralized actions l
;3 and were assumed to be completely dependent. I h
8 4. Make several attempts to get CR 5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding second SRV open and discuss proceeding with 1 SRV. with ECCS water solid operation with only one a SRV would be a viable and likely option. The immediate objective is to get some form of decay beat removal operatmg and initiating water solid operation with i SRV would provide core cooh,ng.
- 5. Ensure i SRV open CR --
I minute, but in 0 minutes parallel with step 6 below
- 6. Align and initiate LPCI (C) CR -
15 minutes, travel 15 minutes From the control room, the actions required to or (B) per RHR SOI (step 6.6.2 and performance 15 riunutes isolate RWCU, align and initiate LPCI(C) or or 6.8.2) time. Estimated on Total time (B), isolate ADHR, and perform steps 3 and 5 hasis of discussions for all would probably not stquire 15 min. Rus, the (Note. The procedure directs a with plant actions. obtained HEP may be somewhat conservative. remote manual start" of LPCI personnel. (See comments in Colunm 1, this table). pump. In the original HEP Z calculation, this action was E erroneously assumed to require m a trip outside the control room. O 'Itius, the timing used in o deternunmg this HEP is hkelv W to be somewhat conservative.' b- See comments in Column 6) U >
y Table 10.1.60.6 y
;c Diagnosis Time for Operator Action >
E5 8
;c Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments /
b (1) Available(T") Time (T*) to Diagreas (T) Source of 0 (2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 20 minutes 3 minutes ECCS water solid operation with only 1 SRV available. Table 10.1.60.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Source of Information 5 (2) (4) (5)
's a
Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the lower Median = 0.15 Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding initiate ECCS water bound value from Figure 8-1 (EF= 10; with ECCS water solid operation with only solid operation with for 3 minutes diagnosis time one SRV would be a viable and reasonable i SRV and was assigned. Mean = 0.40 option. The immediate objective is to get determine what the some form of decay heat removal operatmg appropriate actions and initiating water solid operation with I should be. SRV would provide core cocFng. T2 use of the lower bound diagnosis value is somewhat inconsistent with diagnosis HEPs selected in other similar contexts in this HRA analysis. However, the use of the median value would have prodi W an HEP of !.0, which wasjudged to be inappropriate given the successful operator actions in these
< scecarios and the the fact that the interviews
- 2. suggested that the opera *ars would be willing
,w to proceed with 1 SRV. Thus, the lower l bound value was assigned. , , - - ,,-. --- , . ~ , _ - _ - -
g Tr_ble 10.1.60.8 Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Tr.ble 3-1 of ASEP HRAP
.[
2' s Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Opaaie M r. Step-by-Step Source of Infonnation Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Except for No Step-by-step Some form of SDC is ECCS proceeding with I clearly indicated and for the water solid SRV, the actions are most part the actions are operation clearly specified by proceduralized. with I procedure. SRV. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and g requirements. b u Table 10.1.60.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Actior T <2h Retire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AIterIE in Safety Systens Familiar (6) Source of Infonnation (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' No No' N/A Moderately ECCS High 7 water solid C x ' y At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. g 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of y extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. E N w >
$ Table 10.1.60.10 g M TotalIEP >
(") - l 8 Action Original Independent TotalIEP EF Comments / ! [ Sourte of l I (1) OperatorIEP Check / Correction (4) (5) (IEP ) IEP Information j (2)' (IEP) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Median = 0.15 - Med. Mean (10)
Diagnose need to initiate 0.15 0.40 ECCS water solid operation Mean = 0.40 with 1 SRV and determine relevant actions
- 2. Actions One of the actions in Action B Note. Total HEPs are Median = 0.02 (LPCI initiation) was originally Med. Mean the sum of the A. Isolate RWCU (letdown).
assumed to take place outside the 0.0(M 0.01 (5) individual HEPs from Mean = .032 control room and in the time the diagnosis and available, credit for a second check actions. Secc,nd B. Isolating ADHR and Med. Mean (5) check HEPs are y aligning LPCI(C) for injectice Median = 0.02 did not seem appropriate. See 0.02 0.032 multiplied by the g were assumed to be completely comment in Column 6. Mean = 0.032 However, given that the isolation of original llEP for that dependent. They constitute an RWCU and many of the OPECS action. integrated set of proceduralized actions. related actions were assumed to occur in parallel with the action Since both the outside the control room (and diagnosis and action C. OPECS actions
- open 1 SRVs therefore a lot of time was assumed Med. Mean llEPs make Median = 0.02 available for them), credit for a 0.0(M 0.01 (51 significant
- check clomi MSIVs second check was given for 0.17s 0.45 (10) contributions to the
- start LPCl(C)
Mean = 0.032 accomplishing those actions. Total HEP in this Total median case, the larger of Second check values for action 2 HEP = 0.178 the two EFs was were: assigned. Total mean IIEP Median = 0.2 = 0.45 Mean = 0.323 o
=
**J b
-a - e w-- - - - ---- - -.- _ -
g
~
Table 10.1.61.1 HEP 61 Pair =1,tian !i _ limman Actma Event (1) OPECS (16) Event Tree (s)(2) E,EP Initiators (3) J2-5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPECS.J25 --
- Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes dingsmng the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actens.
Event Context (6) The important constants for the OPECS (16) calculation (liEP 61) are that a break in the SDC line has occurred outside contammmL MV 8 or 9 auto-isolates on low level (level 3), which results in isolation of the break and SDC. If LOSP also occurs, the diesels start and load (DVl-2 =-h). , Level 3 alarms (RPV level below 11.4) will cause the operators to enter EP-2, which will direct them to restore level. The RIIR pump trip alarm, and closure of MV 8 or 9 will indicate a loss of SDC and the cony = Ming IDilR to the operators. The operators will then enter the IDilR ONEP, which will instruct them to initiate ECCS water solid operation. 9 t$ Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay liest Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19), RiiR SOI (M-t-01-E12-1), llPCS SOI (M-1-01-E22-1). C h e 9 s x b
y Table 10.1.61.2 %
- = ba Timing and Indications El n Annunciator / Indication Comments /
[ EventlOccurrence Time (T,)
';' Operator (3) Source of (of most interest)
Alerted Infonnation (1) (2) (4) IDHR. Need for level O l_ow level 3 alarm, RHR pump trip alarm, and closure of - control and core cooling. MV 8 or 9. In addition, the crew is required to check the chart secorders (level, tempersture, pressure) every 30 minutes and with the additicent time available for OPECS, these checks should occur. The ONEP for IDHR directs the control room to initiate ECCS to water solid operation in this context.
]
Table 10.1.61.3 Pbtential Operator Action
~
o
$4
$ Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments /
Description of Event Ahnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (2) Action and Procedures (4) (1) l (3) One Per IDilR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) Where EDC(B) has failed, RHR(B) Inadequate decay heat removal. The IDHR ONEP directs operators assumed unavailable. It was also Check closed MSIVs assumed that at least initially, a to initiate ECCS water solid Ensure that two SRVs are low pressure injection system operation. open would be preferable to high
- Increase RPV water twel pressure system.
with any available injection system. In this context LPCI is initiated from 04-1 LPCI (C) was assumed E12-1, Step 5.4.2. first choice if available, then HPCS. HPCS is initiated from 04-1 < E22-1. Step 5.2. P-P
*o b
u_._ ._ .
-_ _z_.__ ____.__m._____m___ _ _ = - - _ _ _ _ . - -
_ .m m ---. = _ _ - _ _ - - -
~ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
{ Table 10.1.61.4
.;, Tirne Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task AN I Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator MaximumTime Available Comments /
(1) Operator Must is Alerted that Syraptom to Perfonn the Identified Source of Information Act (T) has Occurred (r,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 solid operation. A16 Table 10.1.61.5 Operator Action Performance Time i Activities I;xation Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Source of Information Time (T) g (3) (4) (5) (6) h
$ 1. Retrieve and CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read ONEP is a conservative j read ONEP for Table 8-1, Step assumption given the training the operators receive. i Inadequate Sa) flowever, the delay seemed consistent with the " diversity of Decay lleat activities" ongoing during LPS which might delay contrul Removal room response to some extent.
- 2. Check CR -
1 rmnute I minute The critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid operation closed MSIVs were assumed to be completely dependent. Hey were judged to be an integrated set of actions.
- 3. Ensure 2 CR -
I minute I minute Also note that per ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, a 1 min. travel SRVs open and manipulation time was assumed for each action.
- 4. Initiate CR -
I minute I minute ECCS system (per Table 8-1, 8 min. Total 7 Step Sb C lc O er Y e
- l Z
w ;c ' m -. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
! y Table 19.1.61.6 %
- o Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action i is
. n Canunents/
! ? Action Maximian Tune Total Action Tune Available to Diagnosis (r) Source of
$ (1) Available (T,) Tune (r)
Information (2) 0) (4) (5) Dqnose need to go ECCS 23 minutes 8 minutes 15 minutes water solid 1 Table 19.1.61.7 l Diagnosis Analysis j Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / l Diagnose (3) Final HEP Sourte of Information (1) , (2) (4) (5)
~
o
& The site interviews indicated that the j 8 Diagnose need to go Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 0.04 median value from Figure 8-1 operators have a clear understanding of the ECCS water solid for 15 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 0.106 procedure and the requirements.
was assigned. (See comments However, given the concems arising from the in Column 5 of this table). mmua of the LOCA, the median diagnosis j value from ASEP, Figure 8-1, rather than the lower bound wasjudged appropriate. i Note. Upon further review, given the indications present, the fact that the operators would have two diffemt procedures guiding
' them, and the operators t.nderstanding of the
' situation based on the site interviews, it was judged that the lower bound value would have i been more appropriate (per ASEP) in this instance. It was decided that where important, the resulting differnce in HEP value would be i [ considered during the recovery analysis. D a e -
,- . -e - -nr , ,---,---.,y---- -- ., - - _ , _ . , - , . . . . . _ . .. ..m.. .- ._ ~- - - - - - - -
~
Table 10.1.61.8 Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Tchle E-1 of ASEP IIRAP 2 Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source of Information Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A Actions clearly No Step-by-Step l ECCS specified by l water solid procedure. operation. Interviews indicated l that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements.
~
S
~
Table 10.1.61.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP llRAP Action T < 2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A Not N/A Moderately Several systems available ECCS liigh and substantial time before water solid ccre damage
' At ! east moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
Z g 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of g extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. Fi lc 6 lI: b
i I Table 10.1.61.10
$ Total HEP s-lc m
i 9 n , Action Original Independent Total IIEP EF Comments / i [ Sourte of I (1) Operator IIEP Check / Correction (4) (5) f (IIEP ) IIEP Information ! (2)' (IIEP ) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.Gt - Med. Mean (10) 0.04 0.106 s Mean = 0.106
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid per Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 15L The error factor precedure. Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.06 0.138 (10) associated with the because of the dominant ilEP was occurence of a LOCA, Total Median assigned.
the time limitations and HEP = 0.06 because failures or problems in closing Total Mean liEP i _ j o MSIVs or opening 2 = 0.138
,)
SRVs would have to be ! 3 considered by operators in the same time period. l l f l i i b P I
- 1
., , , __..,.,-r-- -------y . _ , _
, , , . _ _ . . . _ _ , . . _ , _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,_ _ . _ _ _ , . , _ . . . , . . .~ _ . ,- -
.._.a_ _. _ -.
f y
'Itbie 10.1.0.1 HEP O Calculation -
e E Human Action Event (1) OPISV (12) Fvent Tree (s)(2) E EA,EP Initiators (3) AS, SI-5, S2-5, S2H-5, HI-5H Sequence lecator Files (4) OPECSISO.A5, OPECSISO.S15 OPECSISO.S2-5, OPECSISO.S2H-5, OPECSISO,HIS Event Description (5) OPISV asks whether the operatorv 11 proceed with the initiation of ECCS water solid operation when only 1 SRV can be opened and the IDHR ONEP calls for 2 SRVs to be opened. In essence, OPISV is the same decision and actions as OPECS (HEP 64), except that only 1 SRV, rather than the two specified by procedure, will open. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same time period. Event Context (6) For the OPISV (12) calculation (HEP 63), either 1) a break in the feedwater line has occurred wtside containment and check valves isolate the break or 2) a diversion to the SP through RHR/SDC occurs. In either case, level 3 is reached (the feedwater lines are below level 3), MV 8 or 9 auto-isolates on low level, and the SDC pumps trip. Rus, SDC(B) or ADHR are lost. level 3 y alarms (RPV level below I1.4) will cause the operators to enter EP-2, which will direct them to 8 restore level. He RHR pump trip alarms and closure of MV 8 or 9 will indicate a loss of SDC and the corresponding IDHR to the operators. He operators will then enter the IDHR ONEP, which will instmet them to initiate ECCS water solid operation. LPCI(C) or (B) and HPCS are potentially available.De operators decide to initiate ECCS water solid operation as directed by procedure (OPECS succeeds). The IDHR ONEP directs the operators to open 2 SRVs when imtiating ECCS water solid operation. The issue is whether the operators will initiate ECCS water solid operation if only 1 SRV can be opened. OPISV is asked only in sequences where OPECS succeeds. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), EP-2 (RPV Control. Rev.19), RHR SOI (N-t-01-E12-1). HPCS SOI (N-1-01-E22-1), t C Q d
- c b >
e
y Table 10.1.O.2 I g Sequence Timing and Indications $- O - 8 y Event /Oum . u.a Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Conunants/ I (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Infonnation (2) (4) Deciding to proceed with O The ONEP for IDHR directs the control room to initiate ECCS water solid ECCS to water solid operation in this context. He control operation when only I room gets feedback regarding the opening and closing of SRV is available. Some SRVs. form of SDC is needed Table 10.1.O.3 Potential Operator Action l g Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / e of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perfonn Source of Information 2 (1) (2) Action and 1%cedures (4) (3) No normal means of SDC is One Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) It was also assumed that at least available and level control is initially, a low pressure injection needed. He IDHR ONEP directs - Check closed MSIVs system would be preferable to high the operators to initiate ECCS - Ensure that two (one in pressure system. water solid operation. Operators this case) SRVs are open ' have decided to go water solid, but - Increase RPV water level LPCI is initiated from 04-I only 1 SRV is available. He with any available injection E12-1. Step 5.4.2. question is whether they will system. In this context, proceed with the initiation of water LPCI(C) was assumed the solid operation if they cannot system of choice. HPCS HPCS is initiated from M-1 match the ONEPs demand for 2 would also be available. E22-1, Step 5.2. SRVs o
.U 2
o Table 19.1.63.4 Tone Available to Diagnose and INrform the Task
.[ *
?
.$ Action Tune by T'une at Which Maxismian Commsents/
(1) Which Operator Tune Source of Operator is Alerted that Available to Information M ust Symptosa has Ptrform the (5) Act (T) Occurmi (T,) Identified (2) 0) Operator - Activities (T" ) (4) taitiate ECCS water 23 min. O minutes 23 min. SEA Calculation C90-492-01-A16.- solid operation with only 1 SRV Note. There is clearly a dependency between OPECS and OPISV. available. This task Essentially they constitute the same action, but an additional must occur in the diagnosis is involved in OPISV. Since OPISV is asked only when same time frame OPECS succeeds and must occur in the same time period, it was allowed for OPECS. decided that the HEP for OPISV would be determined as if it That is, it must were OPECS (HEP 64 in this case), except for one difference g e occur in the same Five minutes less would be available for the diagnosis because of 8 23 minutes. the time lost in responding to the failure to get two SRVs open. Functionally, Operators would probably make several attempts to get one more OPISV is OPECS, SRV open and would discuss proceedmg with 1 SRV among each except that only 1 other. The site interviews indicated the operators would be likely SRV is available. to proceed with water solid operations even though only 1 SRV OPISV is asked was available. However, proceeding with 1 Si(V is n(4 indicated only when OPECS by procedure. M. Z C E e 9 6 si c
y Table 10.1.63.5 y
- c Operator Action Performance Time >
m Activities IAcation Travel Performance Total Action Comments / [ Source of Information (1) (2) Time Time (T) Time (T) (T ) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and CR 5 minutes, 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read ONEP is a conservative
' assumption given the training the operators receive.
. Read ONEP for (ASEP Table S-IDilR 1, Step Sa) However, the delay seemed consistent with the
- diversity of activities" ongoing during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent.
- 2. Check closed CR -
I minute I minute The critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid MSIVs operation were assumed to be completely dependent. They werejudged to be an integrated set of actions.
- 3. Make several CR 5 minutes 5 minutes Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding with ECCS attempts to get the water solid operation with only one SRV would be a viable 5 second SRV open and likely option. The immediate objective is to get some g and discuss form of decay heat removal operating and initiating water proceeding with I solid operation with 1 SRV would provide core cooling.
SRV. _
- 4. Ensure 1 SRV CR -
I minute I minute Also note that per ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, a 1 min. open travel and manipulation time was assumed for each action. ( h
- 5. Initiate ECCS CR -
2 minute 2 minute initiation of ECCS system would require some realigunwnt ;- system (includes 14 min. Total per SOI. These actions were assumed to be completely isolating letdown action time dependent. Isolation of RWCU is also included in this step. (RWCU) at some Even though RWCU continues to run in the non-LOSP point in non-LOSP sequences, letdown and makeup are still matched since sequences, see CRD also continues to run. Thus, no hurry onjsolation of Column 6, this RWCU. RWCU auto-isolates in the LOSP sequences. Table) o
.N 2
g
~
Table 10.1.0.6 D:agnosis Time for Operator Action I $ Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comnwsgst (1) Available (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to initiate 23 minutes 14 minutes 9 minutes . ECCS water solid operation with only I SRV "P" _ Table 10.1.63.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalllEP Source of Information 3 (2) (4) (5) bu Diagnose need to Per Table 8-3, the lower Med. = 0.018 Operators at GGNS indicated that proceeding with ECCS initiate ECCS water bound value from water solid operation with only one SRV would be a viable solid operation with Figure 8-1 for 9 minutes Mean = 0.0479 and likely option even though it is not explicitly called by only 1 SRV open diagnosis time was procedure. The immediate objective is to get some form of assigned. (See (EF= 10) decay heat removal operating and initiating water solid comments in Column 5 operation with I SRV would provide core cooling. Also, of this table). given that EP-2 directs the operators to start injection with ECCS, it becomes even mom unlikely that the operators would stop ECCS just because cannot get 2 SRVs. Given the indications present, the fact that the operators would have two different procedures guiding them, and the operators understanding of the situation based on the site z interviews, it wasjudged that the lower oound value was appropriate (per ASEP) in this instance. 6 ac 6 3: b
35 Table 10.1.63.8 I g Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP s 9_ o [ Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Conunents I (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourre of Information Designed EOPs Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tads (4) Initiate N/A Except for No Step-by-Step Some form of SDC is ECCS proceeding with I clearly called for and water solid SRV, the actions are indicated by procedure. operation clearly specified by with 1 SRV procedure. available. Interviews indicated , that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and g requirements. , 6 I 8 Table 10.1.63.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10. Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T < 2h Recin e. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Initiate N/A' N/A No2 N/A Moderately Several safety systems are ECCS liigh available and there is water solid substantial time before core damage
' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events.
f L ' For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two saf j systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of b extremely high stress. Each human action event was exammed as a function of the comext. !i
o
< Toble 19.1.63.10 Total HEP 7
_ Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Comments / (1) Operator HEP CheckICorrection (4) (5) Source of Infonnation (HEP ) HEP (6) (2)" (HEP ) (3)
- 1. Diagnose Med. = 0.018 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.018 0.048 Mean = 0.0479
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid Med. = 0.02 Cmlit for a secmd 0.02 0.032 15 1 Since both HEPs make as directed by procedure. Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0,038 0.08 (10) significant catributions to except that only 1 SRV is because of the the Total HEP, the larger available. occurrence of a LOCA, Total Median factor assigned.
and the time limitations. HEP = 0.038 _ Total Mean HEP o = 0.08 w S l l I Z C W Q n W db % b $
y Table 10.1.64.1 % lc . HEP 64 CW d=*ian > n {O Human Action Event (1) OPECS (17) E.EA,EP Event Tree (s)(2) Initiators (3) AS, SI-5, S2-5 S2H-5, Hi-5H Sequence Locator Files (4) OPECSISO. A5, OPECSISO. SIS, Ol'ECSISO.S2-5, OPECSISO.S2H-5, OPECSISO.HIS Event Description (5) OPECS is this case includes diagnosing the need to initiate ECCS water solid operation and performing the relevant actions. Event Context (6) For the OPECS (17) calculation (HEP 64), either 1) a break in the feedwater line has occurreci outside contamment and check valves isolate the break or 2) a diversion to the SP through
'RHR/SDC occurs. In either case, level 3 is reached (the feedwater lines are below level 3), MV 8 or 9 auto-isolates on low level, and the SDC pumps trip. Rus, SDC(B) or ADHR are lost. Level 3 alarms (RPV level below I1.4) will cause the operators to enter EP-2, which will direct them to restore level. He RHR pump trip alarms and closure of MV 8 or 9 will indicate a loss of SDC and
_ the corresponding IDHR to the operators. He operators will then enter the IDHR ONEP, which y will instruct them to initiate ECCS water solid operation. LPCI(C) or (B) and HPCS are potentially g available. Applicable Procedures (7) Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP (05-1-02-111-1), EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1). HPCS SOI (04-1-01-E22-1). l l l O O m b
--v. _ , - - ,
y 4
,f$, 'ej> (O v & q,9 9 i, 9 V IMAGE EVALUATION
<!y'A TEST TARGET (MT-3)
/ [A b,,,,Y g gf
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\//l'("y, '%h' lllll&s
+ <*
1.0 li a R p; m g_a l,l f "' hdO
!l 1.8 lu==a 1.25 1.4 1 1.6 4- -
150mm -- > d --- 6" > 4
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- r. m glLu m ru i
1.8 = 1.25 1.4 1.6 ! 1 4 150mm > i 4 6" > r /> 4 +- y. ,A ,v j ,! ,#h gh? 4,p.aa- < y o%x p p. V' ,/// +9 ,
- - . y < . ;s.a.AQs ,.
g Table !91.64.2 ~ AweTir Le andIndications "*5._ !i Event / Occurrence Tiene (T ) Annunciator / Indication Comuments/ OperateIr (3) Souree of (ofinest interest) Alerted Information (1) (2) (4) IDHR. Need for level O l Low level 3 alarm, RHR pump trip alarm, and closure of control and core cooling. MV 8 or 9. In additios, to crew ia required to check the chart recorders (level, teimwxalore, pressure) every 30 minutes and with the additional time available for OPECS, these checks should occur. He ONEP for IDHR directs the control room to initiate ECCS to water solid operation in this context. _ Table 10.1.64.3 Potential Operator Action ~ o e Comments / ~ Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Abnormal Events Required to Perform Sourre of Infu.ination of Event (2) Action and Procedures (4) (1) (3) One Per IDHR ONEP (Step 5.1.3c) It was also assumed that at least Inadequate decay heat removal. initia:ly, a low pressure injection The IDHR ONEP directs operators - Check closed MSIVs system would be preferable to high to initiate: ECCS water solid Ensure that two SRVs are pressure system. operatico. OPen Increase RPV water level LPCI is initiated from 04-101-with any available injection E12-1, Step 5.4.2. system. In this context LPCI (C) was assumed HPCS is initiated frr u 04-1 first choice if available. E22-1, Step 5.2. then HPCS. h - ?; O 8 % lC 6 ~ s e . w Z Table 14.1.64.4 Z E Tinie Available to Diagnose and Monn the Task ~ 5 E! 5 s'======8= 1 lc Action Tnne by Which Time at Which Operator Maxinium Tune Available b (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Sympteen to Monn the Identified Source of Infonnation 8 Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activities (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate ECCS water 23 minutes 0 23 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 solid operation. Aid Table 10.1.64.5 Operator Action Mormance' lune Activities Location Travel Performance rotal Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Time (T,) Source of information (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Retrieve and read CR -
5 minutes (ASEP 5 minutes 5 minutes to retrieve and read ONEP is a conservative G ONEP for inadequate Table 8-1, Step assumption given the traming the operators receive. Dway IIcat Removal 5a) flowever, the delay seemed consistent with the .
- diversity of activities
- ongoing during LPS, which might delay control room response to some extent.
- 2. Check closed CR -
1 minute I minute ne critical actions for initiating ECCS water solid MSIVs operation were assumed to be c<rnpletely dependent. Hey werejudged to be an integrated set of actions.
- 3. Ensure 2 SRVs CR -
I minute I minute Also note that per ASEP Table 8-1, Step Sb, a 1 min. open travel and manipulation time was assumed for each action.
- 4. Initiate ECCS CR -
2 minutes 2 minutes Initiation of ECCS system would require some system per Sol (per Table 8-1, 9 min. Total realignment per SOI. These actions were assumed to (includes isolating Step Sb be completely dependent. Isolation of RWCU is also letdown (RWCU) at included in this step. Even though RWCU continues to < some point in non- run in the non-LOSP sequences, letdown and makeup 9- LEAP sequences, see are still matched since CRD also continues to run. 9 Column 6, this Table) Hus, no hurry on isolation of RWCU. RWCU auto- ;p isolates in the LOSP sequences.
- t
- u g ~ Table 10.1.64.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . ? $ Action Maximian Time Total Action Time Available C- .~.:J (1) Available (T,) Time (Y,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to go ECCS. 23 minutes 9 minutes 14 minutes water solid Table 10.1.64.7 1,3agnosis Analysis i Adjusted / Comments / Action Failure to Skill-B3 sed j (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) B 6 C Diagnose need to go Per ASEP Table 8-3, the lower Med. = 0.004 He site interviews indicated that the ECCS water solid bound value from Figure 8-1 operators have a clear understanding of the for 14 minutes diagnosis time Me a = 0.0106 procedure and the requirements. was assigned. (See comments Moreover, given the numerous and clear in Column 5 of this table). indicators present and the fact that the operators w#ei have two different procedures guiding them, it was judged that the lower bound value would be appropriate (per ASEP) in this instance. < Z C M M s b _ T g Tr.ble 10.1.64.8
- e Pbst-Dugpusis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP 5 6
n y Action Safety Systems Failed EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments g (1) (2) Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Samrre of Infonnation '" Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Initiate N/A ' Actions clearly No Step-by-Step ECCS specified by water solid procedure. operation. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about_the need for the actions and requirements. 5 $f
- Table 10.1.64.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP llRAP Action T <2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress Level Comments /
(1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) 2 Initiate N/A' N/A No N/A Moderately Several systems available ECCS liigh and substantial time before water solid core damage ' At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of [ extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. 5' 2 2 _ I mn u E < Tchle 10.1.64.10 9. Total HEP p 2 s Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Commentsi (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (5) Sowre of (HEP ) HEP Information (2)' (HEP,,) (6) (3) ~
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 0.004 -
Med. Mean (10) 0.004 0.0106 Mean = 0.0106
- 2. Initiate ECCS water solid per Med. = 0.02 Credit for a second 0.02 0.032 (5) Since both IIEPs procedure. Mean = 0.032 check was not given 0.024 0.043 (10) make significant because of the contributions to the occurrence of a LOCA, Total Median Total llEP, the larger the time limitations and flEP = 0.024 ermr factor was baanse failures or assigned.
problems in closing Total Mean IIEP y MSIVs or opening 2 = 0.043 C; SRVs would have to be considered by operators in the same time period. Z C h C b lU b > l Z :x: fo Table 10.1.65.1 HEP 65 Calculation s Pi
- o g Human Action Event (1) OPSPM (2) w Event Trec(s)(2) ASIN, ASINH, SIHIN Initiators (3) AS, ASHY, StH-5 Sequence Locator Files (4) OPSPM. A5, OPSPM.AHY, OPSPM. Sill Event Description (5) OPSPM is the operator action to initiate SPMU.
Event Context (6) He context for OPSPM (2) is a large or intermediate LOCA. Reactor level has dropped rapidly and ECCS pumps are initiated automatically. He operators have only 13 min. to realize what is happening and initiate the SPMU dump before ECCS isolates on low SP level. Tne problem is that during LP&S, the SPMU system is made unavailable by opening the breakers for the SPMU valiTes and placing the mode switch in refuel etc. His is done to prevent an inadvertent dump of SPMU during the time people are likely to be inside containment. Thus, in the present context the operators are faced with a large or intermediate LOCA and will be required to perform an _ action outside the control room in the Auxiliary building. Operators will have to travel to one of % rooms to y close the relevant breakers (they dould be red tagged) and return the mode switch etc. to the ar,r priate position g in the control room. It wasjudged that in the context of a large or intermediate LOCA,13 min. would most likely be an insufficient amount of time to make the correct diagnosis and accomplish the actions. He instructions for dumping SPMU are not reached until very late in EP-2 and the procedures do not 'directly and immediately
- address the situation in the context of LP&S. Thus, the upper bound value from Table 8-1 of ASEP would have to be used. Even if it is generously assumed that the breakers could be closed in 5 min., 8 min. for the diagnosis produces an HEP of 1.0. Therefore, OPSPM was set to 1.0 (failure) in this situation. Since detailed ASEP calculations were not required for HEP 65, Tables 10.1.65.2 through 10.1.65.9 were not included.
Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control), SPMU Sol (04-1-01-E30-1) Note. Tables 10.1.65.2 through 10.1.65.9 were unnecessary for HEP 65 and therefore were not included. 9-T b TE n i o t a /m s t r no ) ef min (6 mf oo Ce c r u o S F) 5 E( P E l l ) l 4 0 a( 0 t 1 o 1 T = = . n d a e e M M 0 1 5P n E o
- 6. H 1 t i 0l nd e c 1 at eo hc T t
d i n e mE pCI E( P )) P 3 - I e/ I O T dk Inc e h C P l I E ) aI n i i go r P'2 t E( ) 0 0 r aI OerG p 1 1 = = O n
- d. e ae M M n
i o) t 1 U c( A M P S t e i a t i I n <S. u 7s o u 2e1a 2 zm ! Tcbie 10.1.66.1 , y HEP 66 Calculation > Q n - $ Human Action Event (1) OPFLL(1) zw Event Tree (s)(2) FAM, FS, Initiators (3) A5, A5HY, SI-5, SlH-5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPFLL A5, OPFLLAHY, OPFLL. SIS, OPFLL.S1H Event Description (5) OPFLL is the operator decision and action to inject into the vessel and flood containment following a LOCA in POS 5. Event Context (6) For the OPFLL (1) calculation (HEP 66), a large or intermediate LOCA inside containment has i occurred. The crew is initially on RHRISDC(B) or ADHRS for SDC. Since the most likely break i inside containment would be in the recirculation line, level 2 would be reached and ECCS would , auto-actuate in less than a minute from the break. It was calculated that the operaiors would be } unable to initiate SPMU prior to a too low SP water level (see HEP 65), resulting in the loss of ECCS. With reactor level dropping to 2/3 core height and low SP level signals, EP-2 instructs the operators to use any of several systems for injection / containment flooding and in this context, ~ SSWXT is the only option modeled (FW inadequate). With 38 minutes available prior to core damage, it is likely operators would determine the need for vessel / containment flooding with SSWXT. Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1, Step 6.10) t l l .N 2 - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ ~ _ - - - - ( y Ttble 10.1.H.2 4.s Timing cnd Indic:.tions I a j . Event / Occurrence T*mne (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted information j (2) (4) A large or intere:-diate G b addition to numerous alarms and indications of LOCA has occurred and decreasing level which would already be resent, reactor the 2CCS systems are temperature (and in some cases pressure) will be not available. Makeup is increasing). SP low level alarms would occur. needed and SSWXT is available for vessellcontainrrent flooding. _ Table 10.1.M.3 y Potential Operator Action W so Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Pe-form Source of Informatieri (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) A large or intermediate LOCA has One Open two valves from the SSWXT must be used. FW occurred and the ECCS systems CR to initiate SSWXT for inadequate and too long to align. are not available. Makeup is flooding needed and SSWXT is available 1 for vessel / containment flooding. 2 , C X m h i o W e >. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ . - . -. - ~ . . _ _ . __ _. - _ ____ ____ -__ _ _. _ _ - _ _ - Table 10.1.E.4 % y Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task N O 8 $ Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximian Tune Available Comments / % (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perfonn the Identified Sourte of Infor==*ian Act (T) has Occurred (T) Operator Activities (T,) (5) i (2) (3) (4) i Initiate flooding 38 minutea 0 38 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 i A16 i Table 10.1.M.5 , Operator Action Performance Time Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T) Tune (T) Source of Information g 0) (4) (5) (6) e *d I. Examine CR - 2 minutes 2 minutes EP-2 and RHR SOI
- 2. Initirte CR -
I minutes I minute SSWXT per (per Table 8-1, 3 min. Toul RHR SOI 04- Step Sh 1-Ol-E12-1, step 6.10. Requires 2 valves to oe opened. ' ?- e I a , - . . > - - . - - - - , - , --- - <+ - , . , . - , - .. _ , - - - , , ~ , , - . , , , . , . . . __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ . _ . - -2____y_, ,,.-+m.w-, m... n <--%_.,.1-v- -{ Table 10.1.66.6 Diagnosis Tune for Operator Action *U - E Actio. Maximum Time Total Action Time Available C&. _.:.J (1) Arailable (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnmis (T,) Somte of (2) (3) (4) Infonnation (5) Diagnose need to flood 38 minutes 3 minutes 35 minutes vessel / containment Table 10.1.66.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) Final IIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) o 6 U Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 7.0E-4 While a LOCA is certainly a *well flood median value from Figure 8-1 recognized classic event" and the site vessel / containment for 15 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 1.9E-3 interviews indicated that the operators have with SSWXT. was assigned. a clear understanding of the needed response and the necessary actions, the lower bound value for the diagnosis was not used because of the likely high stress levels and the fact that some selection of the relevant parts of EP-2 vmuld be required because they are in 4 shutdown. Thus, the median diagnosis va:ue from Figure 8-1 of ASEP HRAP was used. Z C W Q R W Z b U $ $ Table 10.1.66.8 % g Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP > Q 8 ~ $ Action Safety Systems EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Comments 'i' (1) Failed Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Sourte of information (2) Designed EOP3 Perform Concurrent (5) (6) (3) Tasks (4) Flood the N/A Actions are specified No Step-by-Step vessel / by procedure. containment. Interviews indicated that the operators were knowledgeable about the need for the actions and requirements. 5 Table 10.1.66.9 Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IIRAP Action T <2h Recirt. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Source of Information (2) Large LOCA Fail W/ Sequence (7) (3) (4) (5) Fhxxl with N/A' No Not N/A Extremely High SSWXT. At least moderately high stress was assumed for all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of , extremely high stress. Each human action event was exanuned as a function of the context. b P 2 2 . m - _ .- . ~ 5 TcNe 10.1.66.1e Totat HEP ~a E - Action Original Independent Total HEP EF Comnaents/ (1) Operator HEP Check / Correction (4) (9 Sourte of (HEP ) HEP Information (2)' (HEP,) , (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Med. = 7.0E-4 -
Med. Mean (10) Since all HEPs made significant 7.0E-4 1.9E-3 contributions to the total HEP, the Mean = 1.9E-3 largest error factor was assigned.
- 2. Initiate Med. = 0.05 Credit for second and 0.002 0.008 EL vessel / containment Mean = 0.081 third checks were given. 0.0027 0.01 (10) Given that the core could be flooding with See comments'in partially uncovered and SSWXT SSWXT. (values reflect Column 6. Total Median HEP may be all they have to prevent extremely high stress) Second and third check = 0.0027 core damage. Credit for second HEPs were: and third checks is appropriate.
_ Total Mean IIEP j y Med. = .2 = 0.01 Second check HEPs are multiplied U by the original HEP for each Mean = .323 action and third check HEP is multiplied by the result. Z C h e Pe a :c I - s s . . _ _ - - - - - . _ - -_--r,-- - - - - - v., ---w - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ . - - . . . - . - - _ h Table 10.1.M.1 HEP M Calculation N O Pi $ Human Action Event (1) OPFLL (1) I w FAM, FS, Event Tree (s)(2) Initiators (3) A5, A5HY, SI-5, SlH-5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPFLLAS, OPFLL AHY, OPFLL. SIS, OPFLL. Sill Event Description (5) OPFLL is the operator decision and action to inject into the vessel and flood containment following a LOCA in POS 5. Event Context (6) For the OPFLL (1) calculation (IIEP 66), a large or intermediate LOCA inside containment has occurred. The crew is initially on RilR/SDC(B) or ADHRS for SDC. Since the most likely break inside containment would be in the recirculation line, level 2 would be reached and ECCS would auto-actuate in less than a minute from the break. It was calculated that the operators would be unable to initiate SPMU prior to a too low SP water level (see HEP 65), resulting in the loss of ECCS. With reactor level dropping to 2/3 core height and low SP level signals, EP-2 instructs the operators to use any of several systems for injection / containment flooding and in this context, 8 SSWXT is the only option modeled (FW inadequate). With 38 minutes available prior to core % damage, it is likely operators would determine the need for vessel / containment flooding with SSWXT. Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19), RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1, Step 6.10) *C b [ Tchle 10.1.66.2 .;, Sequence Timing and Indications c 5 - Event / Occurrence Time (T,) Annunciator / Indication Comments / (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) A large or intermediate 0 In addition to numerous alarms and indications of LOCA has occurmi and decreasing level which would already be present, reactor the ECCS systems are temperature (and in some cases pressure) will be not available. Makeup is increasing). SP low level alarms would occur. needed and SSWXT is available for vessel / containment flooding. . Table 10.1.66.3 { !A Potential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Commentsl of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (1) (2) Action and PMures (4) (3) A large or intermediate LOCA has One Open two valves from 'he SSWXT must be used. FW occurred and the ECCS systems CR to initiate SSWXT for madaluate and too long to align. are not available. Makeup is flooding needed and SSWXT is available for vessel / containment flomling. Z C W b a W b 8 . 5 -a---- - - - . - - . - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - _--_---s - _ - - - _ _ - . - - - - - - , . - . _ - - - - - - - _ - - _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - , - , - _ . - - - - - . _ _ - - - - - - $ Table 10.1.66.4 y Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task O Fi $ Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / I (1) Operator Must is Alerted that Symptom to Perform the Identified Source of Infonnation Act (T) has Occurred (T,) Operator Activitia (T,) (5) (2) (3) (4) Initiate flooding 38 minutes 0 38 Minutes SEA Calculation C90-492 A16 Table 10.1.66.5 Operator Action Perfonnance Time Activities Location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Source of Information Time (T) g (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 1. Examine CR -
2 minutes 2 minutes EP-2 and RHR 501
- 2. Initiate CR -
1 minutes I minute SSWXT per (per Table 8-1, 3 min. Total RHR 50104- Step Sb l l-01-E12-1, step 6.10. Requires 2 i valves to be opened. l < b e 2 2 f .u Toble 10.1.66.6 Diagnosis Time for Operator Action . I a Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available Comments / (1) Arailable (T,) Time (T,) to Diagnosis (r) Source of (2) (3) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to flood 38 minutes 3 minutes 35 minutes vessel / containment Table 10.1.66.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comment, (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Sourre of Information (2) (4) (5) 5 e U Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 7.0E-4 While a LOCA is certaialy a *well flood median value from Figu:a 8-1 recognized classic event" and the site vessel / containment for 15 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 1.9E-3 interviews indicated that the operators have with SSWXT. was assigned. a clear understanding of the needed response and the necessary actions, the lower bound value for f - diagnosis was not used because of the likely high stress levels and the fact that some selection of the relevant parts of EP-2 would be required because they are in shutdown. Thus, the median diagnosis value from Figure 8-1 of ASEP HRAP was usal. Z C W 8 s W i E e > I r $ Table 18.1.66.8 g Post-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 19, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP - o - F5 . ; $ Action Safety Systens EOPs, Training, Individual Dynamic or Connnauts i I (1) Failed Use EOPs Well Operator Must Step-by-Step Source ofInfere l (2) Designed EOPs Perfonn Concurnnt (5) (6) l' (3) Tasks (4) l Flood the N/A Actions are specifi$l No Step-by-Step vessell by procedure, containment. Interviews indicated that the operators ! were knowledgeable l, about the need for the actions and requirements. ; ~ o @ Table 10.1.66.9 " Post-Diagnosis Stress-Level Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP HRAP i Action T <2h Recire. Phase More Than Two Operator Stress level Comments / (1) AfterIE in Safety Systems Familiar (6) Sourte of Infonnation (2) LarEe LOCA Fail W/S ,,a.ae (7) (3) (4) (5) 2 Flood with N/A' No No N/A Extremely High SSWXT. ' At least moderately high st ess was assumed fo. all events. 2 For the LPS environment (usually long-term sequences) a failure of more than two safety systems did not necessarily lead to an assumption of extremely high stress. Each human action event was examined as a function of the context. c T s ,,w_.3,,, , - .--_..w -, e- r _ e-, , v.--4....,,--ww--.,y ,,_.#c.- .s_- ,e-- r_ , ,- -:,---._,- , - - s_,. , m ._________m__-.-_..___.e- .,- = - , - - . , - - _--m_ - - - - , < Tame 10.1.66.19 E. L Total HEP m E Adien Origiant "",_ " --: Total HEP EF Ch (1) Operator HEP Check /Cometion (4) (5) Seurte of . (HEP ) HEP Infonmation (2)' (HEP) (6) (3)
- 1. Diagnosis Mal. = 7.0E-4 -
Med. Mean (10) Since all HEPs made significant , 7.0E-4 1.9E-3 contributions to the total HEP, the , Mean = 1.9E-3 largest error factor was assigned. 1 2. Initiate Med. = 0.05 Credit for second and 0.co2 0.00s . 5 15) vessel /consananwnt Mean = 0.081 thini checks were given. 0.0027 0.01 (10) Given that the core could be flooding with See comments in partially uncovered and SSWXT SSWXT. (values reflect Column 6. Total Median HEP- may be all they have to prevent extremely high stress) Second and third check = 0.0027 core damage. Credit for second HEPs were: and third checks is appropnate. Total Mean HEP 8 Med. = .2 = 0.01 Second check HEPs are multiplied 'd by the original HEP for each Mean = .323 action and third check HEP is multiplied by the result. 4 d f i C N Q N >1 6 = c g 4 w . - _ . _ - _ . _ _ _ . _--__--.---_---___- _- - . - -- ,- -- ..-,---.w- -~me- -w < . vr w . w -- - , -- ,w ---- ~ . _ - - - + - - - - - - - -- - - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ Z :C C :o y Table 10.1.67.1 > c IIEP 67 Calculation O - r ~ OPLDM (1) e g Human Action Event (1) Event Tree (s)(2) S2-5, S2-H5 Initiators (3) S2-5, S2-H5 Sequence locator Files (4) OPLDM.S25, OPLDM.52H Event Description (5) OPLDM is the operator acnon in response to a small LOCA (that cannot be isolated) to isolate letdown and increase makeup with CDS to match flow out the break. Action must be accomplished before SDC isolates on level
- 3. CRD is inadequate.
Event Context (6) The context for OPLDM (2) is a small LOCA that is not isolated. He operators need to isolate letdown and increase flow with CDS before level 3 isolation of SDC. CRD alone is inadequate because the flow may not match l break and in any case more makeup will be needed to provide adequate (natural) recirculation. Thus, makeup and l SDC are needed. He problem is that CDS injects through the feedwater line which is also the injection path for _ SDC(B). Tel phone interviews with plant personnel indicated that while there were no interlocks to prevent 8 injection with both systems, no one knew what the effect might be. Given no procedures or training for this and 8 very little time (15 minutes), the HEP for OPLDM was set to 1.0 (failure) in this situation. Level control with ECCS is asked later. Since detailed ASEP IIRAP calculations were not required for HEP 67 Tables 10.1.67.2 through 10.1.67.9 were not included. l Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control) l Note. Tables 10.1.67.2 throegh 10.1.67.9 were unawry for HEP 67 and therefore were not included. O ?
- 1 I
1 l % Table 10.1.67.10 p Total HEP ~ Action W nal h@ht MM (1) OperatorIEP Check /Correctson (4) 5) Sourte ormation (IIEP ) IEP {g (2)* (IIEP,) (3) Provide makeup with Med. = 1.0 - " CDS in response to an unisolated small LOCA. Mean = 1.0 Mean = 1.0 5 4 C b e n ? E = 6 n Table 10.1.68.1 $ HEP 68 Calculation g e n $ lluman Action Event (1) OP3RV (1) E w FS Event Tree (s)(2) Initiators (3) SI-5, SlH-5, S2-5, S2H-5, S3-5 Sequence 12rator Files (4) OPFLLSIS, OPFLLS1H, OPFLLS25 OPFLLS2H, OPFLL8.S25, OPFLL8.S2H Event Description (5) OPSRV is the operator decision and action to open at least i SRV for a medium or small LOCA. Event Context (6) For the OPSRV (1) calculation (HEP 68), a medium, small or small-small LOCA inside containment has occurred. For any of several reasons, ECCS is unavailable and per EP-2 the , i operamrs have initiated vessel / containment flooding (OPFLL succcals). In order to avoid rei ressurizing the vessel in the context of an intermediate or small LOCA and to facilitate _ containment flooding, the operators will need to ensure at least 1 SRV is open (OPSRV). Opening SRVs is indicated in several relevant places in EP-2 and operators have approximately 110 min. to diagnose and accomplish the action. In addition to the procedures, and given the accident, the operators will be carefully monitoring the critical teameters ruch pressure. g Applicable Procedures (7) EP-2 (RPV Control, Rev.19) h o .N *C b [ Table 10.1.68.2 .;, Sequence Timing and Indications [ Event / Cum.oe Time (T,) Annunciatornadicati5n Cornments/ (of most interest) Operator (3) Source of (1) Alerted Information (2) (4) A medium or small 0 Increasing pressure would be indicated and the operators LOCA has occurred, the are instructed to open SRVs in EP-2. ECCS systems are not available, and the operators have initiated vessel / containment flooding with SSWXT. Operators need to open at least i SRV to prevent pressurizing the vescel. O g Table 10.1.68.3 w Ibtential Operator Action Description Number of Activities (Tasks) Comments / of Event Abnormal Events Required to Perform Source of Information (1) (2) Action and Procedures (4) (3) A medium or small LOCA has One Open SRVs from the CR. occurred, the ECCS systems are not available, and the operators have initiated vessel / containment flooding with SSWXT. The operators need to open at least 1 7 SRV. C M b n M b x e g 1 - - --- [ Table 10.1.68.4 5 g Time Available to Diagnose and Perform the Task 0 Action Time by Which Time at Which Operator Maximum Time Available Comments / $ Source of Information I (1) Operator Must is Alented that Symptom to Perform the Identified Act (T,) has Occu Ted (T,) Operator Activitics (T,) (5) i (2) (3) (4) Open SRVs to prevent 1.9 hours O 1.9 hours SEA Calculation C90-492 vessel pressurization. A16 Table 10.1.68.5 Operator Action Performance Time Activities location Travel Performance Total Action Comments / (1) (2) Time (T,) Time (T,) Source of Information Time (T) (3) (4) (5) (6) 5 s % Open a. least 1 CR - 1 minute 1 minute SRV.. (per Table 8-I, I min. Total Step Sb o 1 F I a , ,- ,en . _ , , , - ,--,,,,----,n.-.- n-,, -- ,,-~,r , e, , . , . , , - , , - . . , . . , , , _ , - - -.-.m__,a,--n ..r. . - - ---ua... _ - - --i,---.. - , . ~ - - - - - - -.+--w , , . .--.---u---- Table 10.1.68.6 f Diagnosis Time for Operator Action .y r E - Action Maximum Time Total Action Time Available C....~.M (1) Available (T,) Time (r,) to Diagnosis (T) Source of (2) 0) (4) Information (5) Diagnose need to flood 1.9 hours I minute Approx. i10 minutes vessel / containment Table 10.1.68.7 Diagnosis Analysis Action Failure to Skill-Based Adjusted / Comments / (1) Diagnose (3) FinalIIEP Source of Information (2) (4) (5) ? w $ Diagnose need to Per ASEP Table 8-3, the Med. = 6.0E-5 He need to open an SRV would be obvious open at least i SRV median value from Figure 8-1 and it is indicated in EP-2. to avoid pressurizing for 110 minutes diagnosis time Mean = 5.lE-4 the vessel. was assigned. Z C h e 9 x e Im h $ Table 10.1.68.8 g Pbst-Diagnosis Action Type Identification per Step 10, Table 8-1 of ASEP IDLW Q ~ Fi $ Action Sa}}