ML20072B120
| ML20072B120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1983 |
| From: | Bomberger C, Vito D FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | Clemenson F NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A965 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-08088, TAC-08089, TAC-8088, TAC-8089, TER-C5506-399-4, TER-C5506-399-400-DR, NUDOCS 8302090307 | |
| Download: ML20072B120 (38) | |
Text
. . _ . - . . 1.
. (DRAFT) i
, , ENCLOSURE 1 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (c .1.0)
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-250/251 FRC PROJECT C5506
, NRC TAC NO. 08088/08089 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 l NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81 130 FRC TASKS 399/400 Preparedby Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger/ D. J. Vito 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: F. Clemenson ;
1 January 6, 1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use. of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. ,
~
1 l
XA Copy Has Been Sent to PDR sA -
l Franidin Research Center g,.+**d'
..g Af . A D.ivision
. , _of-Th.e _ -Franklin~ . , Inst,itute an -
eO
-- , - - .n. .- . - ., -.,_.n . - - , , , . . - . _ , ,.,..,__,.,.,n,--._ ,m,n.__,n ,,r
TER-C5506-399/400 .
l l
CONTENTS Section Title Page i
f 3
1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALUATION 4 f . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 21 3 CO!CLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 i 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling . . . . . . 25 4
3.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 26 i
4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
]
t 3
1 .
i .
r !
- I
. i l
i
. l
. t I
l f
1
- 1 i
l s
iii ,
4
!!Ubu Frank!!n Research Center ,
A Ome.on of The Franean insende
TER-C5506-399/400 t
i 1
FOREWORD ,
i This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission (Office of
]
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical l' assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The I technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by
- the NRC.
t Mr. I. H. Sargent, Mr. C. Bomberger, and Mr. D. Vito contributed to the
- technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTIC Services, Inc.
1 ,
I 1
4 I
l t
. e i
1 4
],
d E 4 7
i 1
i-v i A .
dd:JFrankHn Research Center
. At>m o at m r u n w ,
a i
TERK:5506-399/400 i
- 1. INTRODUCTION ,
l iI 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEN
- This technical evaluation report documents the an independent review of
[ general load handling policy and procedures at the Florida Power and Light fI Company's Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. This evaluation was performed with the N following objectives:
,o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Ioads at Nuclear Power Plants" (1],
- - Section 5.1.1 7
o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of l NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.
1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND i
1 Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear j_ Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power
+-
plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary
?
4 changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by i
the NBC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting
, information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
l' The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy
- Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation l was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating
. plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not
}_ adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should he upgraded. ,
2 , -
Q In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff ]
s i, developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective i I
using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the
- - objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in <
r NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at '
h' , i k.
[
g ~~,
nklinch Center Resear ;
l- ;
3 - -
}
i . .
- TER-C5506-399/400 ,
l nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of ,
failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. 'Ihe second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might ,
result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in j addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate 4 that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.
Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines, based on defense-J in-depth, was to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The .
intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following: .
o define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 :
i-
, of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be h initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGRCUND .
l On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to^ Florida Power and li Light Company (FPL), the Licensee for the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4,
[
requesting that the Licensee review provisions for the handling and control of I 1:
heavy loads at the Turkey Point plant, evaluate these provisions with respect [
t UC FranMn Research Center f A Cw.on of The Franse.n innsame '
. . . . . }
_. - _. . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ ~ . . . . _ . . . . _ -
. 1
" ~
b TER-C5506-399/400 -
to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.
On September 4,1981, FPL provided its response [4] to this request.
Additional information was provided in a submittal on November 12, 1981 [5].
In response to a telephone conference call involving FPL, the NBC, and the reviewer on February 12, 1982, the Licensee provided a subsequent response on August 10, 1982 [6]. This final TER is based on information provided in References 4, 5, and 6.
s e i
i i
i I
i r
l l
i Sb) Franidin Research Center I A w orn.Frenen m !
5 TFJK5506-399/400 .
- 2. EVALUATIOE*AND RECOMMENDATIONS i
i g This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at the Turkey Point plant with respect to NRC staff guidelines l provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the j general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee-provided information is summarised and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. Rose conclusions are summarised in
- Table 2.1.
i 2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES i
The NBC has established seven general guidelines to provide the defense-in-depth appropriate for the safe handling of heavy loads. They are I
identified under the following topics in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612: ,
o Guideline 1 - Safe Icad Paths i
o Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures
^
- o Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training l o Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices o Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed) l o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testieg, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane D'esign.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling
, systems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity,of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. .
2.1.1 CverheadHeavvheadHandlineSystems
- a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee conducted a review of all overhead handling systems at the Turkey Point plant to determine which overhead handling systems are subject to a
bu Franklin Research Center l A Cheesen of The Frena 6n eruumme
_ ... - , . . _ . _ .- m . . . _ _ _ _ . _ , . . __ _ ..m. _ . _ _ . . m.
e U.i .
L;5'
> Table 3.1 Turkey tolat teilte 3 and 4/asunr.G-9613 compliance Metsis 3
lategia Interia 5b teelght estdeline S estdeline 6 Geldeline 1 Measure I seeeemse 6 E3 or culdeline I Guideline 3 caldeline 3 Ouldeline 4 Creme operator Special IJ f ting Cres-a - 1est Techalcel special h to, sleevy laede Capacity este imod Stonal _ J ethe procedures Tr eintne Devices slines and inspectlen crane s+sig spectflcettone attentlen P -- -- C P - C
{N 1. Desctor
''~'
185/35 -- --
lp' a
tha lt e 3 a 4 C
C -
{ ~ - -
peactor Miselle 60 P C ==
shlalde C -- C -- -- - C Pressertset 25 6 P --
Miselle Shielde C - ~~ -- -- -- C Polet Crane e F --
Imed Stoch e ,
peactos vessel 57.S P C -- tsC = -- -- -- C I need .
tn I gyper 43 P C -- Inc - - -- -- C
- laternate
- -- C p asc --
- 3. Fuel Cent 195/15 -- -- r crane Spent ruel 25 P C - WC ~~ == -- tsc -
Shipping Cent e
-- -- -- asc --
i psel Cast 4.0 P C s- --
Csene lead block
-- - C y asc --
- 3. Deel pool 3 -- -- P Delthead Demor all '
s ruel pool 1.5 -- C = - C - -- suc --
tm Bulkheed o e i 8
Gao C a Lloensee action complies with esupeG-9613 estdel8me.
4 sec - Licensee action does not comply witan asumeG-0613 esteellne. $
N
-- = But applicable.
h -
y = Licensee eclian pestielly complies with IsunsG-4613. O O
i 9
9
t l
- 1
(
e
~
c:-
8 3 7
>m EU
,a 5b -
e.n al p$$
e Table 3.1 acont.)
-S fpR wei#t es coldellae 1 estdellae 2 estdellae 3 estdeline 4 estdellae S Geldeline 6 eeldeline 7 late,8.
Isoseuse 1 inte,8.
seseemse 6
% Cepecity safe laed Crane ogwtetor Special Lifting Csene . Test Techalcel Special aseavy inade of*an d Petha procedures Tr elaine Devices SIlgL and Inspectless W e Deelen Speelfleetlene Attention
- 4. Tusblae stS/35 P C P sec C C P ..
Centry Cranee.
entte 3 & 4 ,
S. Intake 2S P C P tec C C p 5tructere k
i Gentry Csene -
S. a esting rump 8 .- C P -- C C y -
Ohnetello
- 1. Safety 5 .. C y - C C y Injection rump Isomosell e
- 8. Desin Stee. 1 --
C P - C C y Platform tunorell 4
. ti i a i
in O
Ub 8
sa g ..
N .
s O
O e
o .
i TER-C5506-399/400 this review. The Licensee identifik the following overhead handling systems as those from which a load drop could result in damage to plant safe shutdown l
} or decay heat removal systems, taking no credit for interlocks, technical i t-specifications, operating procedures, detailed structural analysis, or system )
] ;
j redundancy: I
! o charging pump monorails t
j o safety injection pump monorails o main steam platform monorails lj
- o turbine gantry cranes J
o reactor polar cranes.
]
j o fuel pool bulkhead monorail o spent fue1 cask crane o intake structure bridge crane.
The Licensee has excluded the following load handling devices from NUREG-0612 compliance becausa the devices are used during refueling operations and
] do not hand,le loads weighing more than one spent fuel assembly with a handling
- tools 1
o reactor cavity manipulator crane j o fuel transfer machine j o spent fuel bridge crane.
- j. The Licensee also provided a tabulation of load handling systems for 1,
j which they have determined by inspection that there is sufficient physical 1
i separation between any load impact point and any safety-related component.
i i b. Evaluation and Conclusion .
i The Licensee's conclusions concerning those load handling devices subject
]
to the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 are consistent with the NBC objectives I of improving load handling safety and reliability. !
1 i l 2.1.2 Safe Ioad Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0 612, Section 5.1.l(1)]
I l " Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated I A dd?) Frank!!n Research Center a em .e m ramen v 4
._-,..-._._.....m, , , _ - - .__.__.._.r+
=c -
~
TFJt-C5506-399/400 .
l fuel in the reactor vessel and *in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe ;
shutdown equipment. S e path should follow, to the ext,ent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. Rose load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative i procedures approved by the plant safety review committee." .
- a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions
. The Licensee has stated that " safe load path areas" have been defined for the turbine gantry cranes, reactor polar cranes, spent fuel cask crane, and intake structure bridge crane. Rose safe load path areas and restricted zones were developed by the FPL Power Plant Engineering Department. Safe load path drawings indicate certain areas where the handling of loads greater than 1760 poEnds is restricted. In some areas, the handling of loads greater than 5 tons is restricted. The bases for these restrictions are the different ;
l capabilities of the structures in the area to withstand a dropped load and the ,
. potential for damage to irradiated fuel and safe shutdown equipment. -
FPL has indicated that no safe load path areas have been provided for the remaining load handling systems tabulated in Section'2.1.1. These systems' l
have been determined to be exempt from these requirements on the basis of several crane-specific considerations.
o The reactor cavity manipulator crane, fuel transfer machine, and spent ,
fuel bridge crane do not handle loads weighing more than one fuel ;
assembly plus a handling tool. The consequences of a fuel handling '
accident have been evaluated and determined to be acceptable in the Turkey Point Final Safety Analysis Report. !
o me fuel pool bulkhead, charging pump, safety injection pump, and main steam platform monorail physically restrict load handling to a single l path. In the first three cases, special precautions and instructions i will be provided to meet the intent of the Rafe load path requirement.
In the case of the charging and safety injection pumps, for example,
, handling heavy loads over operating pumps, when required for safe shutdown, will be forbidden. The main steam platform monorails handle only safety-related valves which can be removed only when.the plant is shut down and their safety function is not required.
l 1
i A
bu Frank!In Research Center A Dween of The hensma insamme
-y. ,_ _
I d
, TER-C5506-399/400 l
- FPL does not agree that marking the safe load paths on the floors or structures is a practical or necessary means of informing th'e operator of the safe areas. S e sketches which are readily available to the operator at tne j hoist controls are easy to understand and serve the same purpose as floor I
markings. Also, floor markings can be obstructed by equipment and are not .
~
feasible in certain areas (e.g., the refueling pool) .
Plant Maintenance Procedure 0736 " Heavy Ioad Handling" requires written alternatives for deviations from the safe load paths. These alternatives are approved by the Maintenance Superintendent. The Plant Nuclear Safety Review
, Committee (PNSC) approved this procedure and has delegated this authority to l the Maintenance Superintendent. The Maintenance Superintendent is a member of
- the PNSC and is responsible for all maintenance activities at the nuclear power plant. It is FPL's judgment that the individual filling this senior maintenance position can determine when a safe load path variation requires full review by the PNSC, and as a member of that group he would bring the situation to the attention of that group.
- b. Evaluation i Safe load paths at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are not consistent with the guidan e, in Section 5.1.1(1) of NUREG-0612. A review of the Licensee's response and sketches indicates that areas have been established in which the movement of heavy loads is restricted or excluded; however, specific pathways
- for the movement of loads, as specified in Guideline 1, have not been l designated. _
The use of exclusion areas is reasonable where the size and number of potentially hazardous impact areas is relatively small ecmpared to the overall coverage of the handling device, such as in the turbine buildir3g, the auxiliary building, and the intake structure. However, even though exclusion areas may be acceptable, the areas should restrict movement of all heavy loads, taking no credit for structural analyses.
i Furthermore, inside containment, it is not apparent that all paths in areas other than the restricted areas noted are equally desirable for heavy l
4 i l
bd 4Frank o 5n.Resear.ch
.t n. r m Center J;
_ _ _ . - - ._ _ _ J
4 TER-C5506-399/400 ,
j load movement considering the objective to minimize passage over safe shutdown 1
equipment and to use structural members where feasible. The' intent of j NUREG-0612 is to provide the crane operator with load paths established on the basis of an engineering review, which avoid important equipnerif. to the extent
, practical, and which provide fairly detailed directions for load movement by ,
the operators.
The Licensee's position concerning safe load paths for the reactor cavity manipulator crane, the fuel transfer machine, the setnt fuel bridge.' crace, and ,
~ '
l various other monorails is consistent with the guidance in NUREG-0612. ,
l Ioad path visual aids should be provided to crane, operators so that the i
operators can concentrate on movement of the load. These visual aids are used I
j to clearly identify those areas where movement of heavy loads will occur.
] Alternative methods of providing visual aids such as matchmarking-the crane, j identifying physical boundaries, or the use of dedicated load handling ~ "
supervisors are possible approaches which provide operator assistance l
j equivalent to floor markings.
The handling of load path deviations meets the intent of Guideline 1 l because the authority to approve deviations is vested' in a designated member of the plant safety review committee.
i i
- c. Conclusion and Recommendations 2
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 partially comply with Guideline 1 of j NUREG-0 612. In order to fully comply, the Licensee should complete the j following actions: !
. U j o Provide safe load paths for major heavy loads handled inside p containment.
I o Provide visual aids to identify safe load paths and restricted areas.
} 2.1.3 Lead Handlino Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2)]
) " Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for
! heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to
- irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equip
- nent. At a minimum, procedures
- should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.
j These procedures should includes identificacion of required equigsent; 10 1 A ,
I 3
$Id Frank!in Research Center A Cm af The Frennan hemame
,,- - . , - ,_- ,. ,,,-.. ,- ,, ,l ,,,---,n, ,-.. N, -~m--,,ee- "l
, TER-C5506-399/400 -
inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining i the safe path; and other special precautions."
- a. Sunnary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that Plant Maintenance Procedure .0736, " Heavy
- Ioad Handling," governs'overall load handling operations in the plant.
Special procedures have.been prepared for those loads which are handled periodically over the reactor vessel. These procedures identify the required equipment; the inspection and acceptance criteria required before movement of the load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load;
{' and the load path and any special precautions. These special procedures lacludes ~
,i
} o reactor missile shields ;
1 l o reactor vessel head o upper internals -
i l
i o spent fuel shipping casks .'
] o pressurizer missile shields.
i 1
j b. Evaluation 4
j Loa'd handling procedures used at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 meet the l- intent of Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG-0612. Specific procedures have been developed for the major loads, and a generic procedure covers the remaining 1 li J
Icad hndling events. Further, the Licensee's statements indicate that the
!i procedures contain the information identified in Section 5.1.1(2) of
] NUREG-0612.
l i .
j c. Conclusion ,
i l j~ Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 comply with Guideline 2 of NUREG-0612.
- 2.1.4 Crane Oeerator Traininq (Guideline 3, NUREG-0 612, Section 5.1.l(3)1 !
! " Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in i accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [7]."
! ~
NU Franklin Research Center l A Cwne.en of The Fm inseeme ;
. . - . - . .- _.._...___...,,_._._.?_.
-f E*% ? q [- ' , $ ;: j l* l.l;ll ~ {.l [.{-[_6 l % ll.\ l
.[
-;;;; ty '
s;;. N nq q ',
, s ,
~
TER-C550 6-399/400 .
~., .
- a. Summarv of Licensee Gtatements a.kd delusions
,.~ ,
'[
The Licensee has stated th5t a traising g(c,qtam in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976 has been developed and that _the coSpany physical for nee employees meets or exceeds the physical red 21remeYts of the ANSI standard. .The followingexceptionstotheANSIstandahdhave'beentaMk 3 * +-
,i ~ o <
- 1. Eye test of 20/40 in both vtyes for new en.ployess,will be required.
m v
- 2. The crane deadman switch,' insda$1 of the mainline. disconnect, will be used to secure power because of the power req 2ieements of the crane motor heaters. _ ;*y --
, , - y
- 3. Only those controls necessary for crane operation will be tested ;,'
before beginning a new shift. ,,,_ s
, ~
- 4. At shift change, the upper limit device will be tested'Jnder no load
' unless a lead is hanging from the hook aD shift change or unless no crane operation in' the area of the upper-limit is anticipated.
- 5. Safety during maintenance work,on cranes will be in accordance with the. plant clearance procedures. .
- b. Evaluation Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 substantially comply'with Section.5.1.l(3) of 1
NUREG-0612 since a program has been develcro which is generally consistent with ANSI B3 0.2-1976, Chapter 2-3. The exceptions in eye testing, crane power disconnecting, controls testing, safety during maintenance, and upper limit switch testing are not considered to;cssult in a substantial deviation from the intent of NUREG-0612. The eye testing and safety during maintenance requirements of ANSI B30.2 are intended to provide a baselir.e for all operatcrs which is satisfied by FPEL program requirements. Fu r,th er , disconnecting power at the deadman switch so that main power will still be available to the motor heaters while crane motien is secured is an acceptable_ alternative. Shift testing of only thos crr.ne centrols necessary for crane operation is satisfactory with the understanding that testing is conitored to ensure proper implementation. Similarly, hile it is apparent that upper limit switch testing is inappropriate with an attached Icad or when lifts at
.the lower extreme of hook travel are planned, specific definition is required as to when upper limit switch testing is necessary.
Mu Franidin Research Center A Crvtason cd The Fransen insaame i
~. -
- -o -
a TER-C5506-399/400 l ', - i
- c. Conclusion and Recommendations Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 partially comply with Guideline 3. The !
Licensee should modify existing crane operating procedures to ensure that j upper limit switch. testing will be performed if the hook is unloaded at the beginning of a shif t AND if load movements above the midpoint of total hook , travel are anticipated during the following shift. i
~ !
2.1.5 Soecial Lif ting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(411 ' O "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI P N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers ! Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [6]. i This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry ! heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain e inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material l requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor l
' - stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined i
- maximum static and dynamic loads tha't could be imparted on the handling {
device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is l in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the I stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device." ; I
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has contacted the Turkey Point NSSS vendor to review the
_ design of the reactor vessel internals and head lifting rigs, load cell, load ! cell linkage, and the reactor coolant pump motor lifting rig to determine the acceptability of these components to the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 as supple ented by NC.tEG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4) .
- b. Evaluation Insufficient information has been provided to allow a determination of, compliance with respect to Guideline 4. The Licensee should provide an evaluation concerning compliance with ANSI N14.6 for all special lifting devices. Further, in performing their evaluation, the Licensee should address the i=positic,n of static and dynamic loads when assessing design stresses.
.1' Frank!!n Research Center A CWeen of The Freeman Insensen
/
__ _ _ _. _ ._ _ _ . ___ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _. a
m l TER-C5506-399/400 , The intent of Guideline 4, in addition to determining that special lifting devices have been designed and fabricated in a manner consistent with high reliability, is also to make certain that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that these devices are inspected, tested, and maintained so as to ensure continued reliability. Guidance for a program to support the goal is , contained in Section 5 of ANSI N14.6. FPL has provided no information addressing these issues.
- c. ' Conclusion and Recommendations .
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 do'not satisfy Guideline 4 of NUREG-0612. The Licensee should implement an acceptance and continuing compliance testing program for special lifting devices in accordance with Section 5.0 of ANSI N14. 6-1978 prior to the next use of these devices. Further, the Licensee should provide a design comparison of the special lifting designs relative to the criteria in ANSI N14.6-1978. 2.1.6 Liftina Devices (Not Seecially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(5)1
" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and .
used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [9] . However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The ratiing identified on the l sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum 1 static and dynamic' load. Where this restricts slings to use on only I certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions ,
The Licensee has stated that the program for sling use and maintenance at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 meets the requirements of ANSI B30.9. Sling selection is not based on dynamic loading, and it is presumed that sufficient l margin is present from the 5:1 safety factor. In any event, the hoisting speeds at Turkey Point are relatively slow and any contribution from a dynamic j effect would be insignificant. Further, the rated capacity is marked on the j slings. These slings are inspected yearly by an outside contractor, and worn
- slings are replaced.
i
- 1 &
- i dhJ Franklin Research Center 1 w armem m j . . .
TER-C5506-399/400
- b. Evaluation The program for sling selection and maintenance at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 meets the intent of Section 5.1.1(5) of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensees confirmation of compliance with ANSI B30.9-1971. .
l
- c. Conclusion
, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 comply with Guideline 5 of NUREG-C612.
f 2.1.7 Cranes (Insoection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0 612, ! Section 5.1.l(6)1 [ f "1he crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with f Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, with the ! exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use l where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for I periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane : inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during , refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the ; inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their ; us e) . " i
- a. Summary of Licensee Statement and Conclusion The Licensee has stated that the Turkey Point crane inspection, testing 4 and maintenance program ccmplies with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 with I the exception that tests and inspections are -performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection t and test or where the frequency of crane use is less than the specified r inspection and test frequency. . !
- b. Evaluation and Conclusien Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 comply with Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensee's confirmation of compliance with ANSI B30.2-1976 with the !
exceptions allowed for in Section 5.1.1(6) of NUREG-0612. A
'.branidin Research Center
4 TER-C5506-399/400 . i
- Crane Design (Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(711 2.1.8
- "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and
, guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry -
i Cranes, ' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [10]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CHAA-70
- - may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the
- specification is satisfied."
i i a. S_ummary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions "The overhead traveling bridge cranes listed in Table 1 of this report are designed to the Electric Overhead Crane Institute Specification 61. l 'Specifi.catio.ns for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' (EOCI $61) and the j applicable ANSI safety standards in effect at the time of the manufacture i of the cranes. These specifications and standards are the predecessors of { CMAA #70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 now in effect and are similar. l The primary difference between the EOCI $61 and CMAA #70 specifications i are changes in the design of bridge girders. These changes reflected in
- the CMAA $70 specification allow the use of higher allowable stresses for the better grade materials available today and also provide new design '
formulas. These changes are a result of advancements in the state of the art of girder structural design, allowing the use of lighter, more - efficient structures and do not increase the conservativeness of the design from the older EOCI 9 61 specification." , 1 {' b. Evaluation l Cranes at the Turkey Point plant satisfy, to a considerable extent, the l i criteria of Guideline 7, since the cranes were procured to accepted industrial l l standards at the time of manufacture. However, FPL did not specificially } address the more restrictive design requirements imposed by CMAA-70, which h could affect the crane's ability to safely handle a heavy load A comparison of the recommendations of CMAA-70 with those of EOCI-61 and j has identified several areas where revisions incorporated into CMAA-70 may affect crane safety and should therefore be evaluated to determine if the l l ! intent of NUREG-0612 is met. l l
. 1. Impact allowance. CMAA-70, Section 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane i
l design calculations include an impact allowance of 0.5% of the load per foot
- per minute of hoisting speed but not less than 15%. BOCI-61 specifies only a i
i I MT%.t FrankCn
- n. rr Research a w. C. enter
l TER-C5506-399/400 . minimum allowance of 15%. Consequently, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impac'tallowance applied under ECCI-61' will be less than that required by CMAA-70. This variation is not expected to be of consequence for the overhead cranes subject to this review since these cranes, in general, operate with hoist speeds below 30 feet ! per minute, most commonly in the range of 3 to 10 feet per minute.
- 2. Torsional forces. CMAA-70, Section 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting
- moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance l between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and the l i
girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. ECCI-61 states that such moments are to be calculated with reference to girder center of gravity. For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box section or I-beam girders commonly used in cranes subject to this review), the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements. Such is not the case for nonsymmet-rical girder sections (e.g., channels) .
- 3. Longitudinal stiffeners. CMAA-70, Section 3.3.3.1 specifies (1) the maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ' ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and s
minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. ECCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. Requirements of CMAA-70 represent a codification of girder design practice, and they are expected to be equivalent to design standards employed in cranes built to EOCI-61 specifications. i
- 4. Allowable comcressive stress. CMLA-70, Section 3.3.3.1.3 identifies f
allowable compressive stresses to be approximately 50% of yiela strength of the recommended structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38. Allowable compressive stresses decrease linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38. ECCI-61 provides a similar method ' for calculating allowable compressive stresses except that the allowable j, stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only after the b/c ratio t 4 i j i
$UU Frank!!n Research Center A Cmeen of The Fransen anesame
- . - , - , - - - , - . - - - - . - , - . - . . , . . _ . . , . --+
TER-C5506-399/400 - exceeds 41. Consequently, structu al members with b/c ratios in the general i range of 38 to 52 designed under ECCI-61 will allow a slightly higher
- compressive stress than those designed under. CNAA-70. Bis variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since b/c
!' ratios of structural members are expected to be less than 38. ,
- 5. Fatique considerations. CMAA-70, Section 3.3.3.1.3 provides
- substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable j
s str,ess ranges for various structural :aembers in joints under repeated loads. {. EOCI-61 does not address fatigue failure. Se requirements of CMRA-70 are not
- expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since the cranes are not generally subjected to frequent loads at or near design
- j. conditions (CMAA-70 provides allowable stress ranges for loading cycles in j excess of 20,000) and are not generally subjected to stress reversal (CMAA-70 1
f allowable stress range is reduced to below the basic allowable stress for only 4 l a limited number of joint configurations) . j - j 6. Hoist rope requirements. CMAA-70, Section 4.2.1 requires that the j capacity load plus the bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope not ) exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. ECCI-61 requires that the 1 i 1 rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of ) the published rope breaking strength. We effect on crane safety margins of this variation depends on the ratio of the weights of the load block and the
- rated load.
i . 7. Drum design. CMAA-70, Section 4.4.1 requires that the drum be 1 l designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. ECCI-61 requires only that the drum be designad to withstand maximum load bending -and crushing j loads with no stipulation that these loads be combined. Bis variation is not l expected to be of consequence since the requirements of CMAA-7"O represent the i f- codification of good engineering practice which should have been incorporated i in cranes built to ECCI-61 specifications although a specific requirement was not contained in EOCI-61.
- 8. Drum design. CMAA-70, Section 4.4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth and pitch. ECCI-61 provides no similar guidance. S e recommen-i
! ud!! Franklin Research Center
- 4 w. n. r en m.m.=
J
- _ _ _ - _ . - _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _. -____..__.-._._w
l . a TER-C5506-399/400 . dations in CMAA-70 constitute a codification of good engineering practice with 5 regard to reeving stability and reduction of rope wear and are not expected to differ substantially from practices employed in the design of cranes subject to this review and built to EOCI-61 specifications.
- 9. . Gear desien. CMAA-70, Section 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower-1
,_ rating be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-61 provides I no ,similar guidance. The recommendations in CMAA-70 constitute a codification 3 [ of good engineering practice for gear design and are not expected to differ substantially from the practices employed in the design of cranes subject to j this review and built to EOCI-61 specifications. i j 10. Bridge" brake design. CMAA-70, Section 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge j- brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations. A cab-on-trolley control l arrangement is not expected for cranes subject to this review.
- 11. Hoist brake design. CMAA-70, Section 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when,used with a method of control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque.
EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of control brake employed. { This variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this ! l review since mechanical load brakes were typically specified for cranes i procured when EOCI-61 was the standard. The addition of a holding brake i i safety-margin in conjunction with electric control braking is a codification
)
i of good engineering practice. Some manufacturers provide holding brakes rated ! at up to 150% of hoist motor torque when used with electrical " control braking systems. '
! 12. Bumpers and stops. CMAA-70, Section 4.12 provides substantial l 1
i I guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. No 4 similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61. This variation is not expected to be 1 l 1
@.lU Franklin Research Center j Aa .# n. rr.am.
1.--..-- --..- --.----_
_ _ . ~ . . i TER-C5506-399/400 - of significance for cranes subject to this review since these cranes are not i expected to be operated under load at substantial bridge or trolley speed near j- the end of travel. Further, the guidance of CMlWL-70 constitutes the codifi- ) cation of good engineering practice and will be expected to be satisfied by 1 equivalent requirements for cranes procured according to EOCI-61.
. 13. Static control systems. CMAA-70, Section 5.4.6 provides substantial E ! guidance for the use of static control systems. ECCI-61 provides guidance for li magnetic control systems only. This variation is not expected to be of h consequence because magnetic control systems were generally employed in cranes j~ designed when ECCI-61 was in effect and the static control requirements identified in CMAA-70 constitute a codification of the same good engineering practice that would have been used in the design of static control systems in j cranes built to EOCI-61 specifications.
f l'4 . Restart erotection. CMAA-70, Section 5.6.2 requires that cranes not l- equipped with spring return controllers or momentary contact push buttons be. provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and j will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is ), brought to the OFF position. No similar guidance is provided in ECCI-61. . 1 s This vari'ation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this i 1 review since they are generally designed with spring-return controllers or i: momentary-contact push buttons. . I' i
- c. Conclusion i' Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 substantially comply with Guideline 7 on the basis of compliance with EOCI-61 requirements. However,~ insufficient
- j. information has been made available to verify that the 'following CMAA-70 l requirertents have been satisfied for overhead electrical travelling cranes- '
~
subject to this review. The Licensee should make this information available j. or p;cvide suitable justification for cencluding that the requirements of l CMAA-70 have been satisfied by equivalent means. 1 ; i 1. Boist lif ting speeds do not exceed 30 feet per minute. ! i j 2. Nonsymmetrical girder sections were not used in crane construction. - l l i, _nklin Rese_ arch._ . Center
.,, .,,y -7. ,-.-..m -
..---,--_-y, -
. , g- y y--,w- ---g-mm,-.+-y,.,-#,-,y*w,.,&,,,,e w g mm.---.,w.-mwy ,w,--$
'.~ - , ...
-)
I TER-C5506-399/400 j- 3. Any longitudinal stiffeners in use conform to the requirements of 3 CMAA-70, and allowable h/t ratios in box girders using these l stiffeners do not exceed ratios specified in CMAA-70. t
- l. 4. Girders with b/c ratios in excess of 38 were not used.
i ! 5. Fatigue failure was considered in crane design and the number of design loading cycles at or near rated load is less than 20,000 cycles. ) 6. Maximum crane load weight, plus the weight of the bottom block,
- 1. . divided by the number of parts of rope does not exceed 20% of the
! manufacturers' published breaking strength. j 7. Drum design calculations were based on the combination of crushing ! and bending loads.
- 8. Drum groove depth and pitch conform to the recommendations of CMAA-70.
i l 9. Gear horsepower ratings were based on design allowables and . I calculation methodology equivalent to that incorporated in CMAA-70. i i 10. A cab-control, cab-on-trolley configuration was not used. j 11. Mechanical load brakes or hoist' holding brakes with torque ratings of 1 4 approximately 125% of the hoist motor torque were used. , 1
- 12. Crane operation under load near the end of bridge or trolley travel is not allowed or is compensated for by bumpers and stops which ,
satisfy the intent of CMAA-70. - 1- 13 . Any static control systems in use conform to the requirements of I ! CMAA-70. l } i. ! 14. Controllers in use are the spring-return or momentary-contact [ pushbutton type or are equipped with a device which disconnects all j motors on power failure and will not permit restart until .the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. . l 2.2 INTERIM PROIECTION HEASURES , j The NIC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented ! at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy l loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to 1 j reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core j or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of 3 J nklin Research Center { A Osween of The Framen innemme
l
*, I TER-C5506-399/400 -
, Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (InspectEion, Testing, and i ! Maintenance) . The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria: ! I l
- l. Heavy load technical specifications
! 2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core. Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection I
- measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
2.2.1 Technical Seecifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, f Section 5.3 (1)]
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof
! overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include
- a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, j ' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard l Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation
- of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
j. j a. Evaluation
; Review of available information indicates that Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 1
i do not have the necessary technical specification. Technical Specification i 3.10-2 prohibits movement of the spent fuel cask over the spent fuel pool and further specifies that only one spent fuel assembly may be handled at any one time over the core or the spent fuel pool. However, no specification exists j' to prohibit movement of routine heavy loads over the spent fuel pool, i j Therefore, the Licensee should implement a new specification or revise a { existing specifications to meet the intent of this Interim Protection Measure. V .
- b. Conclusion and Recommendation ,
4 { Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 do not comply with Interim Protection Measure [ j 1. The Licensee should implement new or revise existing technical f ) specifications to comply with the interim measure. l i I' i ( 4 nk!In Research Center A Dnmen of The Frennan anse:me
.... . ~
. o
- TER-C5506-399/400
- 2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3(2)-5.3(511 .
" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handling pec edures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] ...
can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of (NUREG-0612]." '
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
- b. Evaluations, ' Conclusions, and Recommendations The evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (6)]
"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g. ,, hand signais, conduct .of operations, and content of procedures."
- a. Su:m::ary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that a review of procedures, equipment, and personnel used in load handling operations over the core has been conducted, and that these operations have been addressed in their Administrative Procedure 0736, " Heavy Load Handling."
_nklin Research_ _ .Center
l l
. TER-C5506-399/400
- 6. Evaluation and Conclusion '
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 comply with Interim Protection Measure 6. 6 1 A i s i a a 1 1 d 4
! e o
9 t I t i , . ll . j' . ll v t .' . . . . FI m
TER-C5506-3'99/400 . l
. . , , .. l
- 3. CONCLUSION '
)
j- ! 4 L This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation f. ! contained in Section 2 concerning individual NBC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. 1 , F Overall conclusions and recosamended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are 4 provided with respect to both general provisions ~for load handling f (NUREG4612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for
- interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .
i 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING i l' The NBC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for j handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment j required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these ! guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have ! developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not } carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant t l conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator ]- training', handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed 1 j in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at Turkey Point j Units 3 and 4 can be expected to be conducted in a reliable manner generally )- consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines. f There are several areas, however, that require additional licensee action to ensure that the overall intent of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 is satisfied. ll )
~
o FPL should develop and employ safe load paths or load handling l j ] corridors within containment that avoid, to the extent practical, the ' I carrying of heavy loads over equipment provided for plant shutdown or j decay heat removal. 1 1 } : _nWin Rese_ arch._
. Center 1
a -- - - . _. __
._. w., . .. .-- r - "'
i . TER-C5506-399/400' o FPL should provide suitabik'vi's'ual aids to assist the crane operator and ensure that loads follow designated load paths while remaining outside of exclusion areas. Reasonable alternatives to the floor ) marking requirement of Guideline 1 should be based on the principle ' k that the operator should not have to rely on memory or the reading of
.a procedure while operating a loaded crane and moving substantial
. distance. o Specify, in crane operating procedures, the specific criteria to be used by supervisors to determine if a pre-shift upper limit switch
- 1. test is required.
l-
,o Develop a program consistent with ANSI N14.6-1976 Section 5.0 to i maintain the ensurance of reliability of special lifting devices.
o Complete the assessment of the design of special lifting devices in ', comparison with sections of ANSI N14.6-1978 affecting device load handling reliability. (' mis work has been contracted; results are { , expected by February 1983.)
- o Complete the design review of electrical overhead travelling cranes j, within the scope of NUREG-0612 to determine their equivalence, in j , matters related to load handling reliability, to cranes designed and
{, fabricated in accordance with CMAA-70. (FPL has agreed to perform
- this review; the contracted review was expected to commence by November 1982. No estimated completion date was provided by the i Licensee.)
- i
! 3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION i 4- . The NBC staff has established certain measures (NUREG-0612, Sectiort 5.3) that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of l heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit {'- the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with j Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load h handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component .? failure. Evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that n additional Licensee action is required in several areas to comply with these i '. l l' dh) Franklin Research Center A Quesen of The Freruen Innsassa j . . . . d _ . _ _ _ - . , . . _ . . . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ .- _ . . - . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . ~ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . . . . , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - _ , . . .
.., l I
TE M 5506-399/400 , Interi:n Protection Measures. Licensee actions for safe load paths and crane operator training have been previously addressed in Section 3.1 of this evaluation. Further Licensee action necessary for compliance includes the following items o FPL should implement new or revise existing technical specifications - i.o prohibit movement of any heavy load over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool. b i l , . i I A 0000 Franklin Research Center A Osas.en of 1he Fm memune
TER-C5506-399/400 ,
- 4. REFERENCES
- l. NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants"
.,' NBC, July 1980
- 2. V. Stallo, Jr. (NRC)
Letter to all Licensees
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel
- NBC, May 17, 1978 t
r . j 3. NRC Letter to FPL
Subject:
Request for Review of Heavy Load Handling at St. Lucie Unit 1 1 December 22, 1980 1
- 4. R. E. Uhrig (FPL) i Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) i
Subject:
Interim Actions for Control of Heavy ,'oads September 4,1981
- 5. R. E. Uhrig (FPL) r Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) j
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads i November 12, 1981 , 1 i 6. R. E. Uhrig (FPL) 1 Letter to S. A. Varga 4 Subject Control of Heavy Loads l Draft Technical Evaluation Report August 10, 1982 1 ! 7. ANSI B30.2-1976 j' " Overhead and Gantry Cranes" 4
- 8. ANSI N14.6-1978 ,
" Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials"
! 9. ANSI B30.9-1971 . i " Slings" 1-
- 10. CMAA-70 l
) " Specifications for Electric overhead Traveling Cranes" ) i D i 1 I nklin Resestc h Center l
. .n.r .
,,yayy.,99,--v+---,-,-y- -,y---*
, . . . 1
,, ENCLOSURE 2 ADDITIONAL INFORMkTION REQUIRED FROM TURREY POINT UNITS 3 AE 4
! 1.a. REcomEleATION/OPEN ITEM Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) should develop and use sefe load paths or corridors within containment that avoid, to the extent practical, the movement of heavy loads over equipment provided for plant shutdown or decay heat removal. ,
- b. EVALUATION CRITERIA
, The general guidelines of NUREG-0612 require that specific safe load paths be defined to control movement of heavy loads to avoid irradiated fuel and equipment needed for safe shutdown. Se intent of this guideline is to l
identify the best or most preferable load path based upon analysis by engineer- l ing staff familiar with overall plant arrangement and then to incorporate these paths into plant procedures and drawings. Formal determination of the load path in this manner would avoid ad hoc load path decisions made on the handling floor by crane operators not familiar with plant equipment or. system , functions.
- c. DISCUSSION FPL states that safe load paths and restricted zones have been developed which restrict the movement of heavy loads at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
Certain areas have been established where the handling of loads greater than ! 1760 lb is restricted; in other areas, the handling of loads greater than 5 tons is restricted on the basis of the structure's ability to withstand a dropped load. Se Licensee further states that marking safe load paths is not practical or necessary; sketches are readily available.to the operator and serve the same purpose as these markings. A review of the Licensee's response and sketches indicates that areas have been established in whit:h the movement - of heavy loads is restricted or excluded; however, specif.ic pathways for the movement of loads, as delineated in NUREG-0612, have 'not been designated. S e use of exclusion areas is reasonable where the size and number of potentially hazardous impact, areas is relatively small compared to the overall ] coverage of the handling device, such as in the turbine building, the 1 1 dJ' uu' FrankHn Research Center Alasumen W The Fawuen Inamane l
auxiliary building, and the intake structure. However, even though exclusion - I areas may be acceptable, the areas :shdold restrict movement of all heavy loads, rather than categorize the loads into different groups, and should take no credit for structural analyses. Furthermore, inside containment, it is not apparent that all paths in areas other than the restricted areas noted are equally desirable for heavy load movement considering the objective to minimise passage over safe abutdown equipment and to use structural members where feasible. 'the intent of NUREG-0612 is to provide the crane operator with load paths established on the basis of an engineering review, which avoid important equipment to the extent practical, and which provide fairly detailed directions for load movement by the operators. l 1 l e e 9 e A 'hbranklin Research Center A Dammen of The Fransen ansamme
~ - --
I i
. . . l 2 . a.' RECOMMENDATION /OPDI ITEM FPL should provide suitable Yigual' aids to assist the crane operator and ensure that loads follow designated load paths while remaining outside of exclusion areas. .
- b. EVALUATION CR?TERIA To ensure compliance and avoid unnecessary distractions to crane
- operators while controlling suspended loads (e.g., trying to reach procedureal steps or drawings with the book under load) , NUREG-0612 requires that safe load paths be marked on the floors. Due to the number of load paths as well as contamination control methods, several licensees have argued against such markings; previously, it has been acceptable to use other appropriate visual aids in lieu of permanent markings to accomplish the same purpose. Such visual aids may consist of tape, pylons, rope, crane bench'uarks, or use of a crane supervisor / signalman (with responsibilities delineated in appropriate l
procedures) to direct the crane operator along the designated load path,
- c. DISCUSSION l
Visual aids snould be provided which identify safe load paths for crane operators so that the operators can concentrate on movement of the load. These visual aids are used to clearly identify those areas where movement of ! heavy loads will occur. Alternative methods of providing visual aids such as matchmarking the crane, identifying physical boundaries, or the use of dedicated load handling supervisors (with responsibilities clearly defined in appropriate procedures) are possible approaches which provide operator assistance equivalent to floor markings. , l
\
l \ l [ p. ~ l i Ubdu Franklin Research Center l j A Chuman af The Frauen summan
c g; l 3.a. RECOMME1 CATION /OPEN ITEM i The Licensee should specify,'in crane operating procedures, the specific l criteria to be used by supervisors to determine whether a pre-shif t upper limit switch test is required.
- b. EVALUATION CRITERIA i
NUREG-0612 requirements, as stated by criteria contained in ANSI
- j i
B30.2-1976, specify that "all limit switches should be checked, without a load ! on the hook, at the beginning of each work shift." l
.' l
- c. DISCUSSION The Licensee has stated that at shif t change, the upper limit device will be tested under "no load" conditions unless a load is hanging from the hook at shift change or unless no crane operation in the area of the upper limit is anticipated.
It is noted that shift testing of only those crane controls necessary for crane operation is satisfactory with the understanding that testing is monitored to ensure proper implementation. Similarly, while it is apparent that upper limit switch testing is inappropriate with an attached load or when lifts at the lower extreme df hook travel are planned, specific definition is required as to when upper limit switch testing is necessary. s I I A Okamen af The Fransen bemans
-___,-l
~
5- , ..,. 4.a. RECGOIE1 CATION /OPEN ITEM
- FPLshouldassessspecial1heing'devicestodeterminecompliancewith I
the requirements of ANSI M14.6-1978. Such an assessment should include verification of design adequacy, as well as implementation of programs that ensure continuing compliance with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 5.
- b. EVALUATION CRITERIA .
The general guidelines of NWtEG4612 specify that special lifting devices used to carry heavy loads should satisfy the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978. In., order to determine if the devices are in compliance or whether equivalence with the standard may be established, the licensee, as a minimum, should demonstrate that the following issues have been adequately addressed for each device identified: o adequacy of design (i.e., stress design factors, quality assurance, fabrication controls) e o proof of workmanship and mechanical integrity (initial load test) o programs to assure continuing compliance (a test and inspection program which complies with ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 5). i {
! c. DISCUSSION .
i FPL has stated that the original vendor is reviewing the design of the Turkey Point reactor vessel internals and head lifting rigs, the load cell and
; load cell linkage, and the reactor coolant pump motor lifting rig to determine ;
the acceptability of these devices. ition this review is completed, the ! Licensee should provide their evaluation regarding compliance for all special l lifting devices. In performing this evaluation, the Licensee should address the imposition of static and dynamic loads when assessing desicin stresses. 1 l Further, in addition to determining that special lifting devices have been designed and fabricated in a manner consistent with high reliability, the . intent of the NUREG guideline is to make certair. that , appropriate steps are taken to ensure that these devices are inspected, tested, and maintained so as to ensure continued reliability. Guidance for a program to support this goal { is contained in Section 5 of SNSI N14.6-1978. FPL has provided no information f addressing these issues. I i
~'~
h ._ A Dhaman af The Pressen himanse I
-,r,,. - , .---- - , - . , - - -----,,,.,,--,,,y. - , - , ,-y,---:. ,,,,, ,. - g ._.,g, y pm m w.e m ,w-9..,,w,y,-
i l
- 5 .0, RECOMMEIGATION/OPEN ITM FPL should complete the desi,gn review of electrical overhead traveling
~
cranes within the scope of NUREG-0612 to determine their equivalence, in l matters related to load handling reliability, to cranes designed and fabricated in accordance with CM4A-70.
- h. EVALUATION CRITERIA t
The general guidelines of NUREG-0612 require that the design of cranes meet the criteria of ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70, " Specifications for Overhead Tr,aveling Cranes." Cranes owned by most licensees were built to EOCI-61, the i foterunner of CMAA-70. A detailed comparison has been performed to identify differences between CMAA-70 and EOCI-61 which may affect load handling reliability and safety. To demonstrate the equivalence of cranes built to EOCI-61 with the added requirements of CMhA-70, licensees were requested to evaluate compliance with those items identified for their individual cranes.
- c. DISCUSSION FPL states that cranes at Turkey Point were designed to EOCI-61; however, FPL has not addressed the more restrictive design requirements imposed by CMAA-70, which could affect the crane's ability to safely handle a heavy load. Werefore, the Licensee should perform a detailed comparison of those differences previously provided to the Licensee for overhead traveling cranes subject to compliance with NUREG-0612.
00 d Franklin Research Center A Chemen J The Preams m
.. .. -...~--n-- - - . - - - - - -
"e* gg e
. 6.a. RECCMMENDATION/OPEN ITEM
.. .. -l, FPL should implement new, or Eevise existing, technical specifications to 1
- prohibit movement of any heavy loads over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel )
, pool. i l b. EVALUATION CRITERIA i j Interim protection measures of NUREG-0612 require that licenses ok operating reactors without a single-failure-proof overhead crane be revised to j include a technical specification which prohibits movement of any heavy load { over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool. i j c. DISCUSSION 4 Review of available Turkey Point information indicates that the required specification has not been implemented. hchnical Specification 3.10-2 f prohibits movement of' the spent fuel cask over the spent fuel pool but does i not address routine heavy loads. Therefore, the Licensee should revise this specification or implement a new technical specification to comply with NUREG-0612. e ] I . i f i
\
f 1
\
{
~
a-i . i 1 i 1 i l 1 1 4 dbd Franklin Research Center A Chuan of The Feuei tuumme e
. . _ _ .___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _.-. _ ._.}}