ML20080Q513
| ML20080Q513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1983 |
| From: | Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | Singh A NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345B360 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-08088, TAC-8088, TER-C5506-399-4, TER-C5506-399-400, NUDOCS 8310130238 | |
| Download: ML20080Q513 (27) | |
Text
e TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 NRC DOCKET NO.
50-250/251 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO.
08088/08089 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 N RC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASKS 399/400 i
l Prepared by i
Franklin Research Center Author:
C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:
I. H. Sargent f
i, Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:
A. Singh October 10, 1983 v
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
, responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.
Prepared by:
Reviewed by:
Approved by:
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Principal AuthM NGybup Le[ der Dep'artment D[recth
'o['*/83 Date:
/d l'* / U Date: # # ~' -83 Date:
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XA Copy Has BeesSent to PDR Frankhn Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute i
The Benstmn Frankhn Park.sy. PMa. Pa 19103 (215)448 1000 l
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i TER-C5506-399/400 CONTENTS Ssction Title Page 1
INTRODUCTION.
1 1.1 Purpose of Review 1
1.2 Generic Background.
1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background 2
2 EVALUATION 4
2.1 General Guidelines.
4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures.
18 3
CONCLUSION 21 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling 21 a
3.2 Interim Protection Measures.
21 4
REFERENCES 23 i
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TER-CS506-399/400 FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center undar a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical azaistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions.
The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.
Mr.
I. H. Sargent and Mr. C. Bomberger contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.
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TER-C5506-399/400 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents the an independent review of ganaral load handling policy and procedures at the Florida Power and Light Corpany's Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:
o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],
i l
Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.
1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary chtnges in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued b'y tha NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Lctds at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not i
l adtquately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be l
upgraded.
i In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at l.
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TER-C5506-399/400 nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which thty are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to snsure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in cddition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crcne) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.
Accrptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to snrure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small.
The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:
o define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load j
handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable i
operation of the handling system.
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Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 l
of NURSG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be l
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initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
l.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Florida Power and I
Light Company (FPL), the Licensee for the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, l
requesting that the Licensee review provisions for the handling and control of heavy loads at the Turkey Point plant, evaluate these provisions with respect f
to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to l
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TER-C5506-399/400 be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.
On Saptember 4, 1981, FPL provided its response [4] to this request.
Additional information was provided in a submittal on November 12, 1981 [5].
In response to a telephone conference call involving FPL, the NRC, and the reviswer on February 12, 1982, the Licensee provided subsequent responses on August 10,1982 [6], March 15,1983 [7], and August 15, 1983 [8].
This final TER is based on information provided in these references.
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I TER-C5506-399/400 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at the Turkey Point plant with respect to NRC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the I
gsnaral guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.
In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licenses-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional tction where appropriate, is presented.
These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.
h 2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines to provide the dafsnse-in-depth appropriate for the safe handling of heavy loads. They are idsntified under the foll'owing topics in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed)
Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)
Guideline 7 - Crane Design.
l These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling eystems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vascel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.
2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee conducted a review of all overhead handling systems at the Turkey Point plant to determine which overhead handling systems are subject to #122, U$0 &anWir1 esearch Center R
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= to Weight Interim Interim h'$
or Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 Measure 1 Measure 6 Capacity safe lead Crane operator Specist Lifting Crane - Test Technical Special 9h Heavy Loads (tonal Pathe Procedures Trainina Deelces Sling s and Inspection Crane Design Specifications Attention s*A Ea 1.
Reactor 135/35 C
C C
C 8 ?.
Polar Crane 4
Unite 3 & 4 Reactor Missile 60 R
C C
C Shields Pressuriser 25.6 R
C C
C Missile Shielde Pular Crane 6
R C
C Load Block Reactor vesset 57.5 R
C R
C m
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Upper 42 R
C R
C Internale 2.
Fuel Cask 105/15 C
C C
R Crane Spent Fuel 25 R
C R
Shipping Cask Fuel Cask 4.8 R
C R
Crane Load j
stock 4
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Fuel Fool 3
C C
C R
N Bulkhead Monore11 Fuel Fool 1.5 C
C R
Bulkhead Om I
Las C = Licensee action complies with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
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W R = Licensee has proposed modifications or revisions which, when leptemented, will comply with NUREG-0412.
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Meight Interim Interin or Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 Measure 1 Measure 6 Capacity Safe Load Crane Operator Special Lifting Crane - Test Technical Special Heavy Loads (tons)
Paths Procedures Traintne Devices
$ lines and Inspection Crane Design Specifications Attention C
C C
4.
Turbine 145/35 R
C C
Gantry Cranes, Units 3 & 4 5.
Intake 25 R
C C
C C
C Structure l
Gantry Crane C
C C
6.
Charging Pump 5
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Monorails 7.
Safety 5
C C
C C
C Injection rump Manorait 4.
C C
C C
C Platform Monora11
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I TER-C5506-399/400 this review.
The Licensee identified the following overhead handling systems as those from which a load drop could result in damage to plant safe shutdown or decay heat removal systems, taking no credit for interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, detailed structural analysis, or system redundancy:
4 o charging pump monorails o safety injection pump monorails o main steam platform monorails o turbine gantry cranes o reactor polar cranes o fuel pool bulkhead monorail o spent fuel cask crane o intake structure bridge crane.
The Licensee excluded the following load handling devices from NUREG-0612 compliance because the devices are used during refueling operations and do not hEndle' loads weighing more tha'n one spent fuel assembly with a handling tools o reactor cavity manipulator crane o fuel transfer machine o spent fuel bridge crane.
The Licensee also provided a tabulation of load handling systems for which they have determined by inspection that there is sufficient physical asparation between any load impact point and any safety-related component.
b.
Evaluation and Conclusion The Licensee's conclusions concerning those load handling devices subject to the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 are consistent with the NRC objectives of improving load handling safety and reliability.
2.1.2 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(1) ]
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated d
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fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment.
The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths I
should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
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a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states that individual safe load paths will be developed for I
major loads which are routinely carried along the same route each time they are moved.
These paths will be indicated on the load path sketches for use by tha crane operators.
For other loads that do not use the same route each tiso, it is the Licensee's opinion that the engineering review, which datermined the exclusionary load paths, provides assurance that required safe shutdown and decay heat removal equipment will not be affected by an incident associated with the movement of heavy loads. An example of this exception t-would be for reactor coolant pump motors, which are moved to open areas in the containment for maintenance. Because they could be taken to several different I
locations depending on other scheduled work, it would be confusing and i
impractical to try to establish a certain single load path for these loads.
Tha exclusion areas sketches will protect the necessary equipment during the l
movcment of these loads.
l Turkey Point procedures require the use of a signalman to direct'the crane operator.
The procedures will be reviewed to ensure that the signalman's responsibilities are clearly delineated.
Plant Maintenance Procedure 0736, " Heavy Load Handling," requires written alternatives for deviations from the safe load paths which are approved by the Maintenance Superintendent.
The Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee (P SC) approved this procedure and has delegated this authority to the Maintenance Suparintendent.
The Maintenance Superintendent is a member of the PNSC and is responsible for all maintenance activities at the nuclear power plant.
It is FPL's judgment that the individual filling this senior maintenance position P,--%
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TER-C5506-399/400 can determine when a safe load path variation requires full review by the PNSC, and as a member of that group he would bring the situation to the attention of that group.
b.
Evaluation The Licensee's commitment to develop individual load paths for major loads is consistent with the criteria of Guideline 1.
Further, it is agreed that individual load paths need not be developed for lif ts that are infrequently performed or for minor lifts. The Licensee's proposed action of obssrving exclusion areas developed on the basis of engineering review when carrying these limited loads is a reasonable alternative.
Use of a signalman whose duties are clearly defined in procedures will provide a suitable visual aid to the crane operator to ensure that load paths cre properly followed.
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The handling of load path deviations meets the intent of Guideline 1
- I b:cause the authority to approve deviations is vested in a designated member of the plant safety review committee.
I c.
Conclusion and Recommendations i
When implemented, safe load paths at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will have i
been developed in a manner consistent with Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612.
2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2)]
i
" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.
These procedures should include:
identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that Plant Maintenance Procedure 0736, " Heavy Load Handling," governs overall load handling operations in the plant. I b)fs7$ s Franklin Research Center ll - - -
--- A Dmeaan of The. Frank 6n.we. _ _ -.. _., _ _ _... _ _
TER-C5506-399/400 Sp:cial procedures have been prepared for those loads which are handled pariodically over the reactor vessel.
These procedures identify the required cquipment; the inspection and acceptance criteria required before movement of tha load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; cnd the load path and any special precautions. These special procedures includes o reactor missile shields o reactor vessel head o upper internals o spent fuel shipping casks o pressurizer missile shields.
b.
Evaluation Load handling procedures used at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 meet the intant of Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612. Specific procedures have been davaloped 'for the major loads, and a generic procedure covers the remaining load handling events. Further, the Licensee's statements indicate that the procedures contain the information identified in Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612.
c.
Conclusion l
l Procedures in use at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are in accordance with the criteria of Guideline 2 of NUREG-0612.
I 2.1.4 Crane Operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)]
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" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [9]."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that a training program in accordance with ANSI l
B30.2-1976 has been developed and that the company physical for new employees t ter
TER-C5506-399/400 racts or exceeds the physical requirements of the ANSI standard. The following exceptions to the ANSI standard have been taken:
1.
Eye test of 20/40 in both eyes for new employees will be required.
2.
The crane deadman switch, instead of the mainline disconnect, will be used to secure power because of the power requirements of the crane motor heaters.
3.
Only those controls necessary for crane operation will be tested before beginning a new shift.
4.
At shift change, the upper limit device will be tested under no load unless a load is hanging from the hook at shift change or unless no crane operation in the area of the upper limit is anticipated.
Turkey Point procedures will be revised to provide the specific criteria to be used by supervisors to determine whether a pre-shif t upper limit switch test is required.
5.
Safety during maintenance work on cranes will be in accordance with the plant clearance procedures.
b.
E#aluation Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 substantially comply with Section 5.1.l(3) of NUREG-0612 since a program has been developed which is generally consistent with ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-3.
The exceptions in eye testing, crane power ditconnecting, controls testing, safety during maintenance, and upper limit cwitch testing are not considered to result in a substantial aeviation from th2 intent of NUREG-0612. The eye testing and safety during maintenance rcquirements of ANSI B30.2 are intended to provide a baseline for all op;rators which is satisfied by FP&L program requirements. Further, disconnecting power at the deadman switch so that main power will still be tvailable to the motor heaters while crane motion is secured is an acceptable cltsrnative.
Shift testing of only those crane controls necessary for crane op; ration is satisfactory with the understanding that testing is monitored to enrure proper implementation..Similarly, it is apparent that upper limit twitch testing is inappropriate with an attached load or when lifts at the low:r extreme of hook travel are planned.
Licensee-proposed procedure revisions which identify when upper limit switch testing is necessary are consistent with this requirement. f%
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l TER-C5506-399/400 c.
Conclusion and Recommendations Crane operator qualification and training at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 is parformed in a manner consistent with that prescribed by Guideline 3.
2.1.5 Special Lif ting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4))
~
"Special lif ting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [10].
This standard should apply to all special lif ting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above.
For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.
In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling f
device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee identified the following lif ting devices to be subject to compliance with this guideline:
o reactor vessel head lift rig o internals lift rig o load cell and load cell linkage o reactor coolant pump motor lift sling.
The design criteria for these devices are unknown by the Licensee because stress reports and design specifications were not documented when the devices wara fabricated. However, the quality of these devices can be somewhat dstarmined f rom the vendor (Westinghouse), who defined design, fabrication, and quality assurance requirements on detailed manufacturer's drawings and purchase order documents, in addition to issuing field assembly and operating instructions.
A detailed comparison has been performed by the Licensee between these dsvices and the criteria of AI.9I N14.6-1978. A critical items list and a stress analysis has been prepared for each device.
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TER-C5506-399/400 specification and surface inspections have been reviewed and details of nondastructive examination (NDE) performed on critical welds are available f rom the vendor.
Stress analysis of the lifting devices indicates that, with one exception (ths internals lif t rig engaging screw), all tensile and shear stresses meet tha design criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 3.2.1.1.
The exception noted 10 net expected to be of consequence since the load of concern (the upper intsrnals) is less than half the weight for which this device was designed (lowsr internals), and the resultant stresses are therefore well above the ANSI requirement.
Therefore, regarding design, fabrication, and quality control, it is the Licansee's conclusion that these devices are generally in agreement with the ANSI N14.6-1978 requirements.
The Licensee also notes that these lif ting devices are not in strict compliance with ANSI requirements for acceptance testing, maintenance, and varification of continuing compliance. The following are summaries of the Licsnsee's response and proposed recommendations for those items noted to be in noncompliance:
1.
Operating procedures should be reviewed to verify that the procedures contain appropriate consideration of ANSI N14.6-1978, Sections 5.1.3 through 5.1.8.
These sections contain requirements for scheduled j
periodic testing, marking, repair, testing, and use.
l 2.
The head lift rig was initially load tested and inspected at assembly to approximately 100 percent of the rated load. The internals lift rig and reactor coolant pump motor lif t sling were not required to be load tested.
3.
For periodic testing, the Licensee states that since a 150 percent load test is very impractical to perform, the recommended approach is to perform a minimum of NDE.
This NDE will primarily consist of a visual inspection of each device and its welds prior to use, and a visual inspection while holding the load slightly above the supports for 10 minutes. NDE will not be performed annually because:
o access to the welds for surface examination is difficult (i.e.,
rigs are in containment, contamination on rigs) nklin Rese_ arch C_ enter
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TER-C5506-399/400 o all tensile and shear stresses in the welds are well within the allowable stress o items that are welded remain assembled and cannot be misused o performance of NDE would require removal of contaminated paint, repainting, and cleanup of contaminated areas.
It is recommended that periodic NDE of critical welds and parts be performed once every ten years as part of the inservice inspection outage.
l b.
Evaluation Although it cannot be determined that the specific requirements of ; JI N14.6-1978 for component design and fabrication have been satisfied for these t
davices, it is evident from available Licensee documentation that these dsvices were designed and fabricated in a manner that provides load handling reliability consistent with that of the ANSI standard.
Although not currently in compliance with criteria for assuring.
continuing compliance, recommended actions by the Licensee are consistent with l
tha intent of ANSI N14.6-1978 based upon load tests to 100% of the load of 1
j concern, relatively simple designs of the devices, and fabrication records of all critical welds.. In addition, a lift of the lower internals constitutes a l
150% load test of the internals lif t rig for the heavy load of concern (upper intsrnals).
Deferral of surface NDE of critical welds to periods which coincide with the inservice inspection interval is also consistent based upon tha limited and controlled usage of these devices.
l l
c.
Conclusion and Recommendations The design, testing, and continued use of special lifting devices at i
l Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will provide a degree of load handling reliability I
consistent with Guideline 4 when the proposed Licensee actions have been implemented.
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2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(5))
" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [11].
However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load.
The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to tF ' cranes with which they may be used."
l' O.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that the program for sling use and maintenance at j
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 meets the requirements of ANSI B30.9.
Sling celtction is not based on dynamic loading, and it is presumed that sufficient i
cargin is present from the 5:1 safety factor.
In any event, the hoisting spseds at the Turkey Point plant are relatively slow and any contribution from l
l a dynamic effect would be insignificant. Further, the rated capacity is r
cerked on the slings. These slings are inspected yearly by an outside ccntractor, and worn slings are replaced.
i b.
Evaluation The program for sling selection and maintenance at Turkey Point Units 3 L
l and 4 meets the intent of Section 5.1.l(5) of NUREG-0612 based on the Licznsee's confirmation of compliance with ANSI B30.9-1971.
l c.
Conclusion Installation and use of slings at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 is performed l
in a manner consistent with Guideline 5.
l 1
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2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, l
Section 5.1.1(6)]
l "The crane should Oe inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use
! l
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TER-C5506-399/400 where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation.
ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such crenes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."
y in a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions gy, CK The Licensee has stated that the Turkey Point crane inspection, testing, Li' and maintenance program complies with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 with fo the exception that tests and inspections are performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test or where the frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency.
b.
Evaluation and* Conclusion Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 is performed in accordance with Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensee's confirmation of compliance with ANSI B30.2-1976 with the exceptions b.
allowed in Section 5.1.1(6) of NUREG-0612.
2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(7)]
cr st "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry re Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling cr Cranes' [12]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the yg specification is satisfied."
in a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions c.
The following cranes are considered by the Licensee to fall within the scope of Guideline 7:
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TER-C5506-399/400 o reactor building polar' crane o fuel cask crane o intake structure crane o turbine gantry crane.
These cranes were originally designed to the Electric Overhead Crane Inntitute Specification 61 (EOCI-61) and the applicable ANSI safety standards in effect at the time of manufacture.
The Licensee has also performed an svaluation of existing crane design with the more restrictive criteria of CMAA-70.
Based upon information received from the crane manufacturer, the Lictnsee states that Units 3 and 4 cranes comply with CMAA-70 criteria for the following items:
o impact allowance o drum design o torsional forces o bridge brake design o allowable compressive stresses o hoist brake design o fatigue considerations o static control systems o hoist rope requirements o longitudinal stiffeners o bumpers and stops o gear design o restart protection b.
Evaluation Cranes at the Turkey Point plant satisfy, to a considerable extent, the criteria of Guideline 7, since the cranes were procured to accepted industrial standards at the time of manufacture.
In addition, FPL has addressed the more restrictive design requirements imposed by CMAA-70 which could affect the crane's ability to handle a heavy load safely. All cranes now comply with or will be modified to comply with CMAA-70 in accordance with the Licensee's indspendent determination.
c.
Conclusion Design of cranes at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 is consistent with the criteria of NUREG-0612, Guideline 7.
nklin Res,earch Center
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2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy lords will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or rpent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance).
The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:
1.
Heavy load technical specifications 2.
Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection mnasures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1) ]
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-f ailure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2,
' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
w c.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee will submit a technical specification to prohibit movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool.
b.
Evaluation and Conclusion Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will comply with Interim Protection Measure 1 whtn the new technical specification has been implemented.
. nklin Research Center
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TER-C5506-399/400 2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3(2)-5.3(5)]
" Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]...
can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of [NUREG-0612]."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
b.
Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations The evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3,
.2.1.,4, and 2.1.7.
2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3(6)}
"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools.
This special review should include the following for these loads:
(1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lif ting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."
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Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions i
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The Licensee has stated that a review of procedures, equipment, and personnel used in load handling operations over the core has been conducted, l
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TER-C5506-399/400 and that these operations have been addressed in their Administrative Procedure 0736, " Heavy Load Handling."
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Evaluation and Conclusion
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1 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 comply with Interim Protection Measure 6.
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A Dmman of The Franen Insumste
TER-C5506-399/400 3.
CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an ov;rall evaluation of heavy load handling at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
Ovsrall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3).
3.1 GEN?.RAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for htndling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fusl, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment rcquired for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have d;valoped and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load trtvel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not c rried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment in;pection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 can be expected to be conducted in a reliable manner generally consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.
3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION The NRC ataff has established certain measures (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of h2avy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete.
Specified nascures includes the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit As UNb ranklin Research Center i
A bwson d Dw Framm hsade t
e TER-C5506-399/400 tha handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load h ndling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and rpecial lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure.
Evaluation of in%:mation provided by the Licensee indicates that ths Licensee complies with the staff's measures for interim protection.
_ P=m 00hd Franklin Research Center A % on as m r,.,* n m.m.
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REFERENCES 1.
NU REG-0 61?., " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980 2.
V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)
Letter to all Lices.aees
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, May 17, 1978 j
3.
NRC Letter to FPL
Subject:
Request for Review of Heavy Load Handling at St. Lucie Unit 1 December 22, 1980 4.
R. E. Uhrig (FPL)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject:
Interim Actions for Control of Heavy Loads September 4, 1981 5.
R. E. Uhrig (FPL)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads November 12, 1981 6.
R. E. Uhrig (FFL)
Letter to S. A. Varga (NRC)
Subj ect: Control of Heavy Loads, Draft Technical Evaluation Report August 10, 1982 7.
R. E. Uhrig (FPL)
Letter to S. Varga (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads March 15, 1983 8.
R. E. Uhrig (FPL)
Letter to S. Varga (NRC)
Subj ect: Cont'rol of Heavy Loads August 15, 1983 9.
" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" 10.
" Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" nklin Research Center
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" Slings" l
12.
CMAA-70
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" l
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