ML20072E402
| ML20072E402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1994 |
| From: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072E378 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9408220235 | |
| Download: ML20072E402 (215) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ . O i l i l 4 1 i I ATTACllMENT ) EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 l IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS } Revision C O
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O 9408220235 94080g DR ADOCK 05000321 PDR
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT ( IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISION INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS REVISION C P_42g Instruction Cover sheet (Aplication of Selection Criteria) Discard U1 Matrix page 4 of 14 Replace U2 Matrix page 6 of 14 Replace Cover sheet (U1 Improved Specifications) Discard 3.3-21 Replace 3.3-67 Replace 3.3-68A Add 3.8-7 Replace 3.8-19 Replace 3.8-39 Replace 5.0-1 Replace 5.0-3 Replace 5.0-19 Replace Cover sheet (Unit 1 Improved Bases) Discard B 3.3-67 Replace p B 3.3-201 through 3.3-205 Replace (with 6 sheets) ( B 3.8-3 Replace B 3.8-20A Replace B 3.8-37 Replace B 3.8-39 Replace B 3.8-77 Replace B 3.8-79 Replace B 3.8-87 Replace B 3.8-89 Replace Cover sheet (U1 CTS Markup & 00'.1)"' Discard CTS 3.2-23B (1 of 4) Replace CTS 3.2-49A (2 of 4) Replace CTS 3.9-4 (3 of 4) Replace CTS 3.9-4A (4 of 4) Replace 1 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 2 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 2A (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Add 3 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 4 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 5 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace fD d a. In replacing each CTS page, reference the upper right corner for appropriate ITS section. 1
A Revision C Insertion Instructions (continued) b Paae Instruction LU1 CTS Markup & DOC) continued CTS 3.9-2 (2 of 13) Replace CTS 3.9-6b (10 of 13) Replace 5 (DOC ITS 3.8.1) Replace 6 (DOC ITS 3.8.1) Replace 10 (DOC ITS 3.8.1) Replace CTS 3.9-3 (1 of 3) Replace 1 (DOC ITS 3.8.7) Replace 4 (DOC ITS 3.8.7) Replace INSERTS For ITS 5.1 Replace CTS 6-18 (8 of 10) Replace 4 (DOC ITS 5.6) Replace Cover sheet (U1 No Sio Hazards D' tion) Discard 2 (NSHD ITS 3.3.8.1) Discard 3 (NSHD ITS 3.3.8.1) Discard 12 (NSHD ITS 3.8.1) Discard Cover sheet (U2 Imorov9d Specifications) Discard 3.3-23 Replace 3.3-69 Replace , 3.3-70A ' O' 3.8-7 Add Replace 3.8-19 Replace 3.8-39 Replace 3.8-40A Replace 5.0-1 Replace 5.0-3 Replace 5.0-19 Replace Cover sheet (U2 Imoroved Bases) Discard B 3.3-67 Replace B 3.3-201 through 3.3-205 Replace (6 sheets) B 3.8-3 Replace B 3.8-21 Replace B 3.8-37 Replace B 3.8-39 Replace B 3.8-77 Replace B 3.8-79 Replace B 3.8-87 Replace B 3.8-89 Replace 2
l Revision C Insertion Instructions (continued) I l Paae Instruction Cover sheet (U2 CTS Markup & DOC)W Discard CTS 3/4 3-63 (1 of 3) Replace CTS 3/4 3-64 (2 of 3) Replace CTS 3/4 3-65 (3 of 3) Replace 1 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 1A (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Add 2 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 3 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 4 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace 5 (DOC ITS 3.3.8.1) Replace CTS 3/4 8-3 (3 of 11) Repl ace CTS 3/4 8-7 (9 of 11) Replace CTS 3/4 8-8 (10 of 11) Replace 4 (DOC ITS 3.8.1) Replace 5 (DOC ITS 3.8.1) Replace 8 (DOC ITS 3.8.1) Replace CTS 3/4 8-10 (1 of 2) Replace CTS 3/4 8-13 (2 of 2) Replace 2 (DOC ITS 3.8.7) Replace INSERT 1 for ITS 5.1 Replace CTS 3/4 8-7 (8 of 9) Replace CTS 3/4 3-54A (9 of 9) Replace ( 4 (DOC ITS 5.6) Discard Cover sheet (U2 No Sia Hazards D' tion) Discard 2 (NSHD 3.3.8.1) Discard 3 (NSHD 3.3.8.1) Discard 11 (NSHD 3.8.1) Replace 1 (NSHD 5.6) Replace Cover sheet (NUREG 1433 Comparison - Specs _1 Discard 3.3-21 Replace 3.3-73 Replace 3.3-75 Replace 3.8-5 Replace 3.8-17 Replace 3.8-37 Replace INSERT LOC 3.8.7 (U1 Version) Replace INSERT LOC 3.8.7 (U2 Version) Replace INSERT A/B 3.8.7 Replace 5.0-1 Replace INSERT B for NUREG 5.2.2 Replace 5.0-37 Replace
- a. In replacing each CTS page, reference the upper right corner for appropriate ITS section.
3
Revision C Insertion Instructions (continued) Paae Instruction Cover sheet (NUREG 1433 Comparison - Bases) Discard B 3.3-67 Replace B 3.3-219 Replace INSERT 1 3.3.8.1 Background Section Add (following p. B 3.3-219) INSERT 6 3.3.8.1 Background Section Add (following INSERT 1 3.3.8.1) INSERT 2 3.3.8.1 Applicable Safety Analysis Add (following INSERT 6 3.3.8.1) Section INSERT 3 3.3.8.1 Applicable Safety Analysis Add (following INSERT 2 3.3.8.1) Section B 3.3-221 Replace INSERT 4 3.3.8.1 Applicable Safety Analysis Add (following p. B 3.3-221) Section INSERT 5 3.3.8.1 Applicable Safety Analysis Add (following INSERT 4 3.3.8.1) Section B 3.3-223 Replace INSERT C ACTIONS Add (following B 3.3-223) INSERT A for proposed BASES B 3.3.8.1 Replace B 3.3-225 Replace B 3.8-3 Replace B 3.8-17 Replace B 3.8-31 Replace B 3.8-33 Replace C B 3.8-34 INSERT Ref B 3.8-77 Replace Replace B 3.8-79 Replace INSERT LOC 3.8.7-2 Replace B 3.8-87 Replace INSERT Table 3.8.7-1 (Unit 1) Discard INSERT Table 3.8.7-1 (continued) Discard (Unit I version) INSERT Table 3.8.7-1 (Unit 2) Discard INSERT Table 3.8.7-1 (continued) Discard (Unit 2 version) Cover sheet (NUREG 1433 J for Deviation) Discard Section 3.3 p.8 Replace Section 3.3 p.ll Replace , Section 3.3 p.12 Replace Section 3.8 p. 7 Replace Section 3.8 p. 78 Replace Section 5.0 p. 4 Replace 1 Section 5.0 p. 4A Replace l l 4 i 1
1 l APPLICATION OF SELECTION CRITERIA l l l i O 1 i l 4 O l l l l
% / "
b SUbt4ARY DISPOSITION MATRIX U PLANT HATCH UNIT 1 Retained / Current STS Criterion Unit 1 Rev. 4 New Unit 1 for 15 umber Title Number TS Number Inclusion Bases for Inclosion/ Exclusion I *II*I 3/4.2.H.4 Control Room Intake Radiation Monitors 3/4.3.7.1.5 3.3.7.1 Yes-3 Actuates to maintain control room habitability so that operation can continue from the control room following a DBA. 3/4.2.H.5 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor None Deleted No Deleted. See radiation monitoring technical change discus-sion for MSLRM. 3/4.2.I Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 3/4.3.4.1 3.3.4.1 3/4.3.4.2 3.3.4.2 3/4.2.I.1/2 ATWS-RPT 3/4.3.4.1 3.3.4.2 Yes-4 AIWS-RPT is being retained in accordance with the NRC Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements due to risk significance. 3/4.2.I.3 EOC-RPT 3/4.3.4.2 3.3.4.1 Yes-3 EOC-RPT aids the reactor scram in protecting fuel cladding integrity by ensuring the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during a load rejection or turbine trip transient. 3/4.2.J Monitors Leakage into the Drywell 3/4.4.3 3.4.5 Yes-1 Leak detection is used to indicate a significant abnormal condition of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. 3/4.2.K Provides Surveillance Information 3/4.3.7.5 3.3.3.1 Yes-3 RG 1.97 Type A and Category 1 variables retained. See Appendix A, Page 11 for full discussion of all variables. 3/4.2.L Degraded Ctetion voltage Protection Instrumentation 3/4.3.3.5 3/4.2.L.1 4.16kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay 3/4.3.3.5.1 3.3.8.1 Yes-3 Actuates DGs to mitigate consequences of a loss of offsite (Loss of Voltage Condition) power event. 3/4.2.L.2 4.16kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay 3/4.3.3.5.2 3.3.8.1 Yes-3 Actuates DGs to mitigate consequences cf degraded voltage (Degraded Voltage Condition) condition. 3/4.2.M Deleted in Amendment No. 186 3/4.2.N Arms Low Low Set S/RV System 3/4.4.2.1 3.3.6.3 Yes-3 Actuates LLS S/RVs, which are assumed to function in the 3/4.4.2.2 containment loading safety analysis. None Remote Shutdown System 3/4.3.7.4 3.3.3.2 Yes-4 Being added as directed by the NRC as it is a signifi:: ant contributor to risk reduction. None Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip Instrumentation 3/4.3.9 3.3.2.2 Yes-3 Acts to limit feedwater addition to the reactor vessel on feedwater controller f ailure consistent with safety analy-sis assumptions. Limits neutron flux peak and thermal transient to avoid fuel d= sage. REVISION C Page 4 of le
f% U SL?t4/JY DISPOSITION RATRIX PLANT HATCH UNIT 2 Current Unit 2 New Unit 2 Retained / Criterion TS Number Title TS Number for Inclusion Bases for Inclusion / Exclusion (a)(c) 3/4.3.6.10 Explosive Gas tbnitoring Instrumentation Relocated No See Appendix A. Page 11, 3/4.3.7 Turbine Overspeed Protection System Relocated No See Appendix A Page 12. 3/4.3.8 Degraded Station Voltage Protection Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3/4.3.8.1 4.16kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay 3.3.8.1 Yes-3 Actuates DGs to mitigate consequences of a loss of offsite (Loss of Voltase Condition) power event. 3/4.3.8.2 4.16kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay 3.3.6.1 Yes-3 Actuates DGs to mitigate consequences of degraded voltage (Degraded Voltage Condition) condition. l 3/4.3.9 Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation 3/4.3.9.1 ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 Yes-4 ATWS-RPT is being retained in accordance with the NRC Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements due to risk significance. 3/4.3.9.2 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System 3.3.4.1 Yes-3 EOC-RPT aids the reactor meram in protecting fuel cladding Instrumentation integrity by ensuring the fuel cladding integrity safety limit is not exceeded during a load rejection or turbine trip transient. None Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 Yes-3 Acts to limit feedwater addition to the reactor vessel on feedwater controller failure consistent with safety analy-sin asstunptions. Limits neutron flux peak and thermal transient to avoid fuel damage. 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM M 3/4.4.1 Recirculation System 3/4.4.1.1 Recirculation Loops 3.4.1 Yes-2 Recirculation loop flow is an initial conditicn in the safety analysis. 3/4.4.1.2 Jet Pumps 3.4.2 Yes-3 Jet pump operability is assumed in the LOCA analyses to assure adequate core reflood capability. s 3/4.4.1.3 Idle Recirculation Loop Startup 3.4.9 Yes-2 Establishes initial conditions to operation such that operation is prohibited in areas or at tenrporature rate changes that might cause undetected flaws to propagate, in
- turn challenging the reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity.
3/4.4.2 Safety / Relief Valves j 3/4.a.2.1 Safety / Relief Valves 3.3.6.3 Yes-3 A minismsa number of S/RVs is assumed in the safety analyses 3.4.3 to mitigate overpressure events. i 3/4.4.2.2 S/RV Low-Low Set Function 3.3.6.3 Yes-3 A minimum ntsober of S/RVs is assumed in the contaisunent loading safety analysis. REVISION C Page 6 of 14 I
O unir 11menovro 18casic^t seecivic^rious O l O l
Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------NOTE----------------------------------- -
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided feedwater and main turbine high water level trip capability is maintained. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.2.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 18 months Allowable Value shall be s 56.5 inches. SR 3.3.2.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 18 months including valve actuation. O v HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-21 REVISION A l
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION h 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.3.1 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS
NOTES------------------------------------
- 1. LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Restore required 30 days with one required channel to OPERABLE channel inoperable. status. B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A Specification 5.6.7. l not met. C. One or more Functions C.1 Restore all but one 7 days with two or more required channel to required channels OPERABLE status, inoperable. (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-22 REVISION [
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.8.1 The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, When the associated diesel generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources -- Shutdown." ACTIONS
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME O \s s A. One or more channels inoperable for A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status. I hour Functions 1 and 2. B. One or more channels B.1 Verify voltage on Once per hour l inoperable for associated 4.16 kV Function 3. bus is 2 3825 V. C. Required Action and C.1 Declare associated DG Immediately l associated Completion inoperable. Time not met. C_) HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-67 REVISION C ! l l
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE-------------------------------------
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function. l
- 2. When a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage channel is placed in an l inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours l SR 3.3.8.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 31 days l SR 3.3.8.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months l SR 3.3.8.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months l O HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-68 REVISION C
T' LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1
) Table 3.3.8.1 1 (page 1 of 1)
Q Loss of Power Instrunentation REQUIRED CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER BUS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
- a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 t 2800 V SR 3.3.8.1.3 j SR 3.3.8.1.4 l
- b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 5 6.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.4
- 2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)
- a. Bus Unde
- voltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 a 3280 V SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4
- b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 5 21.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.4
- 3. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Annunciation)
D a. Bus Undervoltage 1 SR 3.3.8.1.1 2 3825 V (~ SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 1 SR 3.3.8.1.2 5 60 seconds
- b. Time Delay SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 I
l HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-68A REVISION C 1 i
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7 days indicated power availability for each required offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.2 - - - ---- - - - -- -- - - - - - N O T E S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -
- 1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.5 satisfies this SR.
- 2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.
- 3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer. When modified start procedures are not used, the time, voltage, and frequency !
tolerances of SR 3.8.1.5.a must be met.
- 4. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 1 and synchronized to 4160 V bus IF for one periodic test, and the !
starting circuitry of Unit 2 and : synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F during the next periodic test. l l
- 5. DG loadings may include gradual loading !
as recommended by the manufacturer. '
- 6. I Starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.
(continued) 1 O HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-7 REVISION [/2
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.2 NOTES (continued)
- 7. Momentary transients outside the load .
range do not invalidate this test.
- 8. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.
Verify each DG: 31 days
- a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves steady state voltage 2 3740 V and s 4243 V and frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz; and
- b. Operates for 2 60 minutes at a load 2 1710 kW and s 2000 kW.
SR 3.8.1.3 Verify each day tank contains a 900 gallons 31 days of fuel oil. SR 3.8.1.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from 184 days i each day tank. l (continued) l l l O HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-8 REVISION
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 O O 1 O sucs unn 1 3.8 19 A atvisiong
AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown LC0 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. One qualified circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 1 Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems - Shutdown;"
- b. One Unit I diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one subsystem of the onsite Unit 1 Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8;
- c. One qualified circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 2 Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) needed to support the Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem required by LC0 3.6.4.3, "SGT System;" and
- d. One Unit 2 DG capable of supplying the Unit 2 SGT subsystem required by LC0 3.6.4.3.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. O HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-20 REVISION A
Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:
- 1. 4160 V essential buses IE, IF, and IG;
- 2. 600 V essential buses 1C and ID;
- 3. 120/208 V essential cabinets lA and IB;
- 4. 120/208 V instrument buses lA and IB;
- 5. 125/250 V DC station service buses lA and IB;
- 6. DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and
- b. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
System," and LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." O APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. O ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required Unit 7 days Unit 2 AC or DC 2 AC and DC electrical power subsystem (s) to distribution OPERABLE status. l subsystems inoperable. B. One or more (Unit 1 or B.1 Restore DG DC 12 hours swing bus) DG DC electrical power electrical power distribution AND distribution subsystem to OPERABLE subsystems inoperable. statu:: . 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-39 REVISION /
i l Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more (Unit 1 or C.1 Restore AC clectrical 8 hours swing bus) AC power distribution electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE AND distribution status. mbsystems inoperable. 16 hours from l discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a D. One Unit 1 station D.1 Restore Unit 1 2 hours service DC electrical station service DC power distribution electrical power AN_Q subsystem inoperable. distribution subsystem to OPERABLE 16 hours from status, discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a O E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, or D not met. E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours F. Two or more electrical F.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately power distribution subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function. O HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-40 REVISION
Responsibility 5.1 (O J 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.1.1 The Nuclear Plant General Manager shall provide direct executive oversight over all aspects of Plant Hatch. 5.1.2 The Assistant General Manager-Plant Operations (AGM-PO) shall be responsible for overall unit operation, except for the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program as described below and for delegation in writing of the succession of this responsibility during his absence. Certain plant support functions shall be the responsibility of the Assistant General Manager-Plant Support (AGM-PS). 5.1.3 The Nuclear Plant General Manager or his designee shall be responsible for the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and for the writing of the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report. l 5.1.4 Each of the individuals in Specification 5.1.1 through Specification 5.1.3 is responsible for the accuracy of the v procedures needed to implement his responsibilities. l 5.1.5 The Superintendent of Shift (SOS) shall be responsible for the control room command function. During any absence of the SOS from the control room while either unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, an l individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license l i shall be designated to assume the control room command function. I During any absence of the SOS from the control room while both I units are in MODE 4 or 5, an individual with an active SR0 license l or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. I l HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-1 REVISION
Organization 5.2 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.2 Organization 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Oraanizations Onsite and offsite organizations shall be established for unit operation and corporate management, respectively. The onsite and offsite organizations shall include the positions for activities affecting safety of the nuclear power plant.
- a. Lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shall be defined and established throughout highest management levels, intermediate levels, and all operating organization positions. These relationships shall be documented and updated, as appropriate, in organization charts, functional descriptions of departmental responsibilities and relationships, and job descriptions for key personnel positions, or in equivalent forms of documentation. These requirements shall be documented in the Plant Hatch Unit 1 updated FSAR;
- b. The Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations (AGM-P0) shall be responsible for overall safe operation of the plant and shall have control over those onsite activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant;
- c. The Vice President-Nuclear shall have corporate responsibility for overall plant nuclear safety and shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable performance of the staff in operating, maintaining, and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nuclear safety; and
- d. The individuals who train the operating staff, carry out health physics, or perform quality assurance fur.ctions may report to the appropriate onsite manager; however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.
5.2.2 Unit Staff
)
The unit staff organization shall include the following: l
- a. A total of three plant equipment operators (PE0s) for the l two units is required in all conditions. At least one of l
(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-2 l REVISIONf[ i
Organization 5.2 5.2 Organization 5.2.2 Unit Staff
- a. (continued) the required PE0s shall be assigned to each reactor containing fuel.
- b. At least one licensed Reactor Operator (RO) shall be present in the control room for each unit that contains fuel in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be !
present in the control room.
- c. The minimum shift crew composition shall be in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i). Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(1) and 5.2.2.a for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements. '
Q 1
- d. An individual qualified to implement radiation protection V procedures shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor.
The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours, in order to provide for unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required position,
- e. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety related functions.
Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a nominal 40 hour week while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:
- 1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight, excluding shift turnover time; f -~ s (continued)
HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-3 REVISION
Organization 5.2 5.2 Organization h 5.2.2 Unit Staff
- e. (continued)
- 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours in any 24 hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any 48 hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7 day period, all excluding shift turnover time;
- 3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time;
- 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a shift.
Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized by the AGM-P0, Assistant General Manager-Plant Support (AGM-PS), or by higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. Controls shall be included in the procedures .such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the AGM-P0, g AGM-PS, or designee to ensure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized.
- f. The Operations Manager shall hold an active or inactive SR0 license,
- g. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory technical support to the Shift Supervisor (SS) in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. In addition, the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift.
i i
- O 5.0-4 REVISION A HATCH UNIT 1 i --
Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) { l
- a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload ,$
cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:
- 1) Control Rod Block Instrumentation - Rod Block Monitor for Specification 3.3.2.1.
- 2) The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1.
- 3) The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.3.2.1.
- b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating !
limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by ' the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents: i
- 1) NEDE-24011-P-A, " General Electric Standard Application p
(j for Reactor Fuel," (applicable amendment specified in l the COLR).
- 2) " Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment No.157 to Facility Operating License DPR-57," dated September 12, 1988.
- c. The core operating limits shall be determined such that all specified acceptable fuel design limits will be met.
- d. The COLR, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.
5.6.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)
- a. RCS pressure and temperature limits for heatup, cooldown, low temperature operation, criticality, and hydrostatic te: ting as well as heatup anc cooldown rates shall be (continued) s HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-19 REVISION A
1 Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) h 5.6.6 Reactor Coplant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATVRE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)
- a. (continued) established and documented in the PTLR for LCO 3.4.9, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."
- b. The analytical methods used to determine the RCS pressure and temperature limits shall be determined in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99.
- c. The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluency period and for any revision or supplement thereto.
5.6.7 Post Accident Monitorina (PAM) Instrumentation Report l t When a report is required by LC0 3.3.3.1, " Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the w instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status. HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-20 REVISION
UNIT 1 IMPROVED BASES O O
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 I) v BASES l I LC0 12. RHR Service Water Flow (continued) primary indication used by the operator during an accident. l Therefore, the PAM specification deals specifically with I this portion of the instrument channel. APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES I and 2. These variables are related to the diagnosis and preplanned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1 and 2. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, plant conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is extremely low; therefore, PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require plant
, shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the pa.ssive \ function of the instruments, the operator's ability to diagnose an accident using alternative instruments and methods, and the low probability of an event requiring these instruments.
Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to PAM instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable PAM instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate Functions. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable PAM Function. (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-67 REVISION A
I PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) When one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channels (or, in the case of a function that has only one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval. B.1 If a channel has not been restored to OPERABLE status in 30 days, this Required Action specifies initiation of action in accordance with Specification 5.6.7, which requires a l written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions. 1 This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown ; requirement, since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of plant conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation. C.1 When one or more Functions have two or more required channels that are inoperable (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function), all but one channel in the Function should be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B3.3-6[6 REVISIONp
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 B 3.3 O) L INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources for energizing the various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components. The LOP instrumentation monitors the 4.16 kV emergency buses. Offsite power is the preferred source of power for the 4.16 kV emergency buses. If the monitors determine that insufficient power is available, the buses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DG) power sources. Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic. The voltage for each bus is monitored at two levels: 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage, however, only the Loss of Voltage Function is part of this LC0. The Loss of Voltage Function causes various bus transfers and Q b disconnects and is monitored by two undervoltage relays for each emergency bus, whose outputs are arranged in a two-aut-of-two logic configuration for all affected components except the DGs. The DG start logic configuration is one-out-of-two (Ref. 1). The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a LOP trip signal to the trip logic. Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP alarm instrumentation to provide an anticipatory alarm and the initiation of corrective measures to restore emergency bus voltages. The alarms are set higher than the LOP relays. The alarm setpoints are approximately midway between the calculated minimum expected voltage and the calculated minimum required voltage, based on the maximum expected operating; i.e., non-LOCA, load conditions. The alarm setpoints signify that adequate voltage is available for normal operations. The LOP anticipatory alarms provide a total time delay of 60 seconds to reduce the possibility of nuisance alarms, wh'ile permitting prompt detection of potential low voltage conditions. O) L (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-201 REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES h BACKGROUND Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has a dedicated low voltage (continued) annunciator fed by two relays and their associated time delays. The logic for the annunciation function is arranged in a one-out-of-two configuration. APPLICABLE The LOP instrumentation is required for Engineered Safety SAFETY ANALYSES, Features to function in any accident with a loss of offsite LCO, and power. The required channels of LOP instrumentation ensure APPLICABILITY that the ECCS and other assumed systems powered from the DGs, provide plant protection in the event of any of the ' Reference 2, 3, and 4 analyzed accidents in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. The initiation of the DGs on loss of offsite power, and subsequent initiation of the ECCS, ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. O (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-201A REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on the SAFETY ANALYSES, loss of offsite power during a loss of coolant accident. I LCO, and The diesel starting and loading times have been included in APPLICABILITY the delay time associated with each safety system component (continued) requiring DG supplied power following a loss of offsite power. The LOP alarm instrumentation is required to initiate manual actions to restore the 4.16 kV emergency bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. The required channels of LOP alarm instrumentation ensure the initiation of manual actions to protect the ECCS and other assumed systems from degraded voltage without initiating an unnecessary automatic disconnect from the preferred offsite power source. The occurrence of an undervoltage degraded voltage condition credits the manual actions to mitigate the condition and ensure plant safety is maintained. The LOP instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5), except that credit is taken for l manual actions. The OPERABILITY of the LOP instrumentation is dependent upon [, the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel \ Functions specified in Table 3.3.8.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per 4.16 kV emergency bus, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable procedures (nominal trip setpoint). The Allowable Values are specified for the 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Function. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected, based on engineering judgment, to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output and time delay at which an action should take place. The setpoints l are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., degraded voltage), and when the measured output value of the process (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-202 REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES
~
h APPLICABLE parameter exceeds the setpoint and time delay, the SAFETY ANALYSES, associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. l LCO, and APPLICABILITY The 4.16 kV undervoltage degraded voltage trip setpoints (continued) were determined in accordance with the NRC staff positions contained in an NRC letter dated June 2, 1977, except that manual actions are credited for restoring bus voltages or initiating a plant shutdown in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV. The undervoltage degraded voltage setpoint represents a point on the inverse time characteristic curve for the relay. The anticipatory alarm setpoints are approximately midway between the calculated minimum expected voltage and the calculated minimum required voltage, based on maximum expected operating; i.e., non-LOCA, conditions. The Specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on Function by Function basis.
- 1. 4.16 kV Emeraency Bus Undervoltaae (Loss of Voltaae)
Loss of voltage on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that offsite power may be completely lost to the respective emergency bus and is unable to supply sufficient power for I proper operation of the applicable equipment. Therefore, the power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite ; power to DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below I the Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Values (loss of voltage with a short time delay). This ensures that , adequate power will be available to the required equipment. j (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-202A REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1
- BASES APPLICABLE The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to SAFETY ANALYSES, prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough LCO, and to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.
APPLICABILITY The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide (continued) time for the offsite power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment. Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the DG function. (Two channels input to each of the three DGs.) Refer to LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs. ,
- 2. 4.16 kV Emeroency Bus Undervoltaae (Dearaded Voltaae)
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that, while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be O insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS Function. Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values (degraded voltage with a time delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment. The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough for the offsite power supply to usually recover. This minimizes the potential that short duration disturbances will adversely impact the availability of-the offsite power supply. Manual actions are credited in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV to restore bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. The range specified for manual actions indicates that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors; however, sufficient voltage for equipment at lower voltages required for LOCA conditions may not be available. (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-203 REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES h APPLICABLE Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded SAFETY ANALYSES, Voltage) Function per associated bus are only required to be LCO, and OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude (continued) the DG function. (Two channels input to each of the three emergency buses and DGs.) Refer to LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.
- 3. 4.16 kV Emeroency Bus Undervoltaae (Anticipatory Alarm)
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that, while offsite power is adequate for normal operating conditions, available power may be marginal for some equipment required for LOCA conditions. Therefore, the anticipatory alarms actuate when the 4.16 kV bus voltages approach the minimum required voltage for normal; i.e., non-LOCA conditions. This ensures that manual actions will be initiated to restore the bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. One channel of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Anticipatory Alarm) Function per associated bus are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE. (Two channels input to each of the three emergency buses.) . ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry iinc l the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for cach additional failure, with Completion Times based on inicial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation channel. i (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-203A REVISION C l l
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1
- D BASES
%.) ACTIONS L.1 With one or more channels of Function 1 or 2 inoperable, the I Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, only 1 hour is allowed to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action will result in a DG initiation. o) ( (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-2038 REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. L1 Each 4.16 kV bus has a dedicated annunciator fed by two relays and associated time delays in a one-out-of-two logic configuration. Only one relay and its associated time delay is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, the loss of the required relay or time delay renders Function 3 incapable of performing the intended function. Since the intended function is to alert personnel to a lowering voltage condition and the voltage reading is available for each bus on the control room front panels, the Required Action is verification of the voltage to be above the annunciator setpoint (nominal) hourly. M If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s). SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3). Functions 1 and 2 maintain DG initiation capability provided two DGs can be initiated by the Function. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-204 REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 . BASES SURVEILLANCE channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the REQUIREMENTS applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. (continued) SR 3.3.8.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation or a failure of annunciation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is defined for Function 3 to be a comparison of the annunciator status to the bus voltage and an annunciator test confirming the annunciator is capable of lighting and sounding. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure or an annunciator failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. Thus, performance of ['~ the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that undetected outright channel or annunciator failure is limited to 12 hours. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO. SR 3.3.8.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience with regard to channel 0PERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is a rare event. I i (Continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-204A REVISION C 1 j
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 ( BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1.3 I REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frequency is based upon the assumption of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. SR 3.3.8.1.4 I The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this (d,) Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 8.4.
- 2. FSAR, Section 4.8.
- 3. FSAR, Section 6.5.
- 4. FSAR, Chapter 14.
- 5. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
V /i HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-205 k REVISION [ _r
RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring BASES BACKGROUND RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency. This system protects the loads connected to the RPS bus against unacceptable voltage and frequency conditions (Ref.1) and forms an important part of the primary success path of the essential safety circuits. Some of the essential equipment powered from the RPS buses includes the RPS logic, scram solenoids, and
- various valve isolation logic (e.g., residual heat removal shutdown cooling).
RPS electric power monitoring assembly will detect any abnormal high or low voltage or low frequency condition in the outputs of the two MG sets or the alternate power supply and will de-energize its respective RPS bus, thereby causing all safety functions normally powered by this bus to de-energize. In the event of failure of an RPS Electric Power Monitoring System (e.g., both inseries electric power monitoring assemblies), the RPS loads may experience significant l effects from the unregulated power supply. Deviation from l the nominal conditions can potentially cause damage to the scram solenoids and other Class IE devices. l In the event of a low voltage condition, the scram solenoids can chatter and potentially lose their pneumatic control capability, resulting in a loss of primary scram action. In the event of an overvoltage condition for an extended period of time, the RPS logic relays and scram solenoids, as well as the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoids, may experience a voltage higher than their design voltage. If the overvoltage condition persists for an extended time period, it may cause equipment degradation and the loss of plant safety function. Two redundant Class lE circuit breakers are connected in series between each RPS bus and its MG set, and between each RPS bus and its alternate power supply. Each of these (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-206 REVISION A 1 1
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND A description of the Unit 2 onsite power sources is provided (continued) in the Bases for Unit 2 LCO 3.8.1. APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the , SAFETY ANALYSES FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Refs. 3 and 4, respectively) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide 4 sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability > to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling ! (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of: , a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.
1 . AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement . (Re f. 14) . l LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission i network and the onsite Unit 1 Class lE Distribution System and three separate and independent DGs (IA, IB, and IC) ensure availability of the. required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA. In addition, since some components required by Unit 1 are powered from Unit 2 sources (i.e., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System), one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 2 Class IE Distribution System, and one Unit 2 DG (2A or 2C), capable of supplying power to the required Unit 2 SGT subsystem, must also be OPERABLE. O V (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-3 REVISION [
,-m - w ._.- - - - , , , -. ,-n - , , - n, --, , , , .n~ , - - - - ~ - - , -
AC Sources - Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES O LC0 Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in (continued) the FSAR, and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. For the purpose of this LCO, each thit 1 offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disccanect to the respective IC and ID SATs, the IC and 10 transformers, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4.16 kV ESF buses. (However, for design purposes, the offsite circuit excludes the feeder breakers to each 4.16 kV ESF bus). Feeder breakers from each circuit to the IF ESF bus are required to be OPERABLE; however, only one feeder breaker per bus to the IE and IG ESF buses is required to be OPERABLE, but they must be from different SATs (e.g., IE feeder breaker from the IC SAT and the IG feeder breaker from the 10 SAT). With IE and 1G ESF buses both fed from one SAT (normal line up is both buses fed from ID SAT), both feeder breakers to each of these ESF buses are required to be OPERABLE. The Unit 2 offsite circuit also consists of the incoming breaker and disconnect to the 4.16 kV ESF buses required to be OPERABLE to provide power to the Unit 2 equipment required by LC0 3.6.4.3. Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated frequency and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions, such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient condition. Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. The AC sources must be separhte and independent (to the extent possible) (Ref.1) of other AC sources. For the DGs, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practical. A circuit may be connected to more than one ESF bus, with automatic transfer capability to the (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-4 REVISION A
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent l with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref.10). This Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing. (v3 (continued) l HATCH VNIT 1 B 3.8-20A REVISION [
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 /~T l Q BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 REQUIREMENTS l (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting I independence has not been compromised. Also, this l Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve l proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. For the purpose of this testing, ! the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with tne engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. It is permissible to place all three DGs l in test simultaneously, for the performance of this l Surveillance. ' The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref.10). This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the l DG during testing. SR 3.8.1.19 /7 With the exception of this Surveillance, all other () Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to the Unit 1 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required i Unit 2 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 2 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable l Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 i requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 Surveillance requirement. Two exceptions are noted to the Unit 2 SRs of ; LC0 3.8.1. SR 3.8.1.6 is excepted since only one Unit 2 I circuit is required by the Unit 1 Specification. Therefore, ' there is not necessarily a second circuit to transfer to. SR 3.8.1.18 is excepted since there is only one Unit 2 DG required by the Unit 1 Specification. Therefore, there are not necessarily multiple DGs for simultaneous start. , l The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also I governs performance of that SR for both Units. (G) (continued) l HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-37 REVISION A l
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES h I
)
l O REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
- 2. FSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.
(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-f( 38 REVISIONp
1 l l AC Sources-0perating i B 3.8.1 1 BASES REFERENCES 3. FSAR, Chapter 5. l l (continued)
- 4. FSAR, Chapter 6.
5 FSAR, Chapter 14. I
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 7. Generic Letter 84-15,
- 8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.
- 11. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.
- 12. IEEE Standard 387 - 1984.
- 13. IEEE Standard 308 - 1980.
- 14. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical
( Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993. l i O HATCH UNIT 1 B3.8_42[) REVISION [ l
AC Sources - Shutdoen B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating." APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:
- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an &
inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident. W In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Postulated worrt case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems. l (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 8 3.8-40 REVISION A 1
Battery Cell Parameters , B 3.8.6 ' g Q BASES SURVEILLANCE Table 3.8.6-1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that a cell voltage of 2,07 Y or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement. The Category C limit for float charging current is characteristic of a battery that is approaching a fully charged condition. The limit for each battery is specified in Reference 4. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 14.
- 3. 'IEEE Standard 450 - 1987.
- 4. Technical Requirements Manual.
r] 5. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical () Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993. O HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-77 REVISION A
=
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS h B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class 1E AC and DC electrical power distribution system is divided into redundant and independent AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems. The primary AC distribution system consists of three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses each having an offsite _ source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is normally connected to a normal source startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) (10). During a loss of the normal offsite power source to the 4.16 kV ESF buses, the alternate supply breaker from SAT 1C attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency DGs suppiy power to the 4.16 kV ESF buses. The secondary plant distribution system includes 600 VAC emergency buses 1C and ID and associated load centers, and transformers. g There are two independent 125/250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystems and three independent 125 VDC DG electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions. A description of the Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for Unit 2 LCO 3.8.7, " Distribution System-Operating." The list of required Unit 1 distribution buses is presented in LC0 3.8.7. l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYGES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to prcvide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-J4' '[h REVISION / l i
Distribution Systems - Operating e B 3.8.7 BASES APPLICABLE necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor SAFETY ANALYSES Coolant System, and containment design limits are not (continued) exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6 Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all 4
onsite AC electrical power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.
The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). O _ LCO The Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The required Unit 1 electrical power distribution subsystems listed in LCO 3.8.7 l ensure the availability of AC and DC electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA. Should one or more buses not lir,ted in LC0 3.8.7 become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LC0 3.8.7 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single MCC faults : open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-)6 ~79 REVISION [j u
1 l Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES LC0 Actions of the LCOs governing the individual loads would be (continued) entered. If however, one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LC0 3.8.7 (e.g., loss of a 4.16 kV ESF l bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4.16 kV ESF bus), the Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LC0 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4.16 kV ESF bus). In addition, since some components required by Unit I receive power through Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System), the Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE. Maintaining the Division 1 and 2 and swing bus AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The AC electrical power distribution subsystem requires the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger. 1 In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC and DC power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any . power distribution subsystem from propagating to the l redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a ' redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function (s). If any tie breakers are clesed, the electrical I power distribution subsystem which is not being powered from l its normal source (i.e., it is being powered from its redundant electrical power distribution subsystem) is considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. j l It does not, however, preclude redundant Class lE 4.16 kV -
- ESF buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit. l (continued)
HATCH UNIT 1 B3.8-J6'8C REVISIONf( i
l Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 ( BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3 0.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 14,
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 4. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993, O
HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-87 REVISION A
l Distribution Systems - Operating I B 3.8.7 BASES (continued) h l I l l 1 l l l O 1 O HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-K ? 7 REVISION -
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (continued) O 1 O g HATCH VNIT 1 8 3.8-WY1 REVISION /
Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown h BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, " Distribution Systems - Operating." APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transien.t analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analys.es and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:
- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
(. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3). (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-90 REVISION A
l /' UNIT 1 MARKUP OF CURRENT TECIINICAL k SPECIFICATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF CHANGES 1 i I l 1 (s l l l l O l
'. O O '
f" f c JB puset Mo 3.3.9.1 sd
,a 2., . e.s A ~
-TABLE +f-tf-LOP S \ -DEGRADEBSTATION-VOLTAGEPROTECTIOMINSTRUMENTATION d i
- h. i E 3 Action to be Taken y Required Operable Chennele Required
-Tdp4eeline- _. /~ 4 g If the Number of Required Operable Ref. No. Instrument ~
_leL <bi channese to Trio . A m - = W w k.<- j M .. chonnele le Not Met Lcts 3.3. 8. i t- c a 2.2.E i f Ah3 1 4.18 kw Emergoney Bue 2/9ue 2 greater then or aquel to 2800 tel ~ Undervoltage Reley volte. At 2000 volte time deley A & a 1 c_.lg c (toes of Voltoge wHI be less then or equel to Condition) 8.5 eso. 2 4.18 kw Emergoney Bus 219ue g/9ue 5 greater then or equel to 3280 tel Undervoltage Relay volte. At 3280 volte time deley (Oegraded voltage will be lees then or equel to CoruMtiord 21.5 eso. .
, p.md Lee %h 3 %)
( Nc :: rer. TAetr 2.: : b e. he assumn entheed vbf. No." le ordy so that e one-tMeeletioneNp een be Mehed tr b.tge.n steme in Towe h(12 end items in Tebie 4'.1-12. \ \ C_) f va%* TNe instrumentation le required to be operable during reootor startup power operation. and het shutdown. eps.1 ~2. M khe-d'M4 w.7) h.
. with tem number of_opeesw ohannele one I.ee then the required operable ehennese, aperation may proceed 7
@ $.1.
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"' " 2-2 =
g 2 o.2. on. instromern .hennes may 6. ino,.rew. for , io 8 heure to p.cform c. quired survomeno prior to-entering other m'"n'_ eations. , ( Acw C. d Q.-oyes L.) P
, a s_m.o.gm g i i' ~
- 3 C
- f
% ~ + g !,p
= _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ .____ __ -. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _---__________________a
h Ci d
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% -TABLE 4244--
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, ,' -9EGRADEOSTATION Vet.TAGE-PROTECT 40M1NSTRUMENTATION j E prepetsd LCP b che% 3 sg 3,3,g,,g . 2 "5 R 3 3, E, . g 3 l y SR 3.3.e>.t. t instrument Functionet Instrument Ref. No. Instrument Instrument Check Test Minemum Calibration
~
(el (b) Minimum Frequency Frequency Minimum Frequency 1 4.16 Kv Emergency Bue N/A Once/ month c.c ..'q . _L ., Undervoltage Relay (Loss of Voltage - - Condition) A @ "aa 1 2 4.18 Kw Emergency Bue N/A Once/ month Onoelopet. tin]e Undervoltage Refey ey_ ele J (Degraded Voltage i Condition) .C 3} G .p. a sw 2 a.s.i. b ,
$, NOTES FOR TABLE 4.2-12 o
ce. % enco.d -h,r. No. is oniy ro, @no. e th.tVi no e .w3..n t . eta.h.d i,. ..en it nwe 2.2. u . a aemein T.i 4 x 2. ^S t,. Surve.,,ene. o, me inetn,nentee n is -,e4 un. .ee to, steau no-e< -e . and Mt shuWwn. r o p ,s. d M A n g ( g g AAM1 N o, n 5 F> ii a t
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LIMITIlO CGOITIMS FGt OPERATIm SL5tVEIt1AfEI ItE11tinsanis 4.9.A.6. r-ruancy 250 Volt DC to 600 Volt de N cussica 4 CW .s AC Inverters (Continued) )
-f., ITs 3.5.1, Eccs- . ah.,, , b. Once every scheduled mfueling l O l- G At. 3.5- outage, the somgancy 250-volt DC/600-volt AC inverters shall be sdjected to a load test to i demonstrate operational readiness.J 3.9.A.7. Loaic Systems 4.9.A.7. Loaic Systems The following logic systaes The logic systems shall be tested in }
shall be operable: the manner and fra pency as follows:
- a. The casson accident signal a. Each division of the common
- logic system is operable. accident sipal logic systen shall be tested every scheduled refuel-ing outage to dammstrate that it will faction on actuation of the i l
ECCStoprovideanautomaticstartl J signal to all 3 diesel generators. i Each diesel generator shall operate on standby 2 5 minutes.
- b. The undervoltage reinys b.1. Once every 18 months and s@ porting system during shutdoun, the are operable. conditions o der which the edervoltage logic system is required shall be sies:1sted i
j with an undervoltage on each . I start bus to demonstrate j that the energency busses are 1 desnergized, and that the diesel l generators will start, mergize the y l O ' emergmqy busses with perunnently connected loads in s 12 seconds, energize the auto-connected 1 I I shutdown loads through the load I sequencer, operate for 1 5
~
minutes dile the diesle gener-ators are loaded with the shut-dem loads, and achieve and i maintain a steady-state voltage l of 4160
- 420 volts and a steady-state frequency of 60 i 1.2 Hz. The testing of the undervoltage logic shall .l also demonstrate the operability I of the 4160-volt load shedding and auto bus transfer circuits, and that the sesequent loading is '
! )
in accortlance with design requirements (i 105 of its ) j _ ions tshall test both thesign interval).fThe simula-degraded voltage and the loss
, <*oc" h.u ss'en - %"7.3.6 '\ A- of offsite power relays.
{ 4 ,'
' C6 7s G 1 rs : 3,g,i , )
Iw See k 3.E O HATm - LMIT I 3.9-4 Amendeant No. H, 48,88,178 344 l .. ..
6p. e'4:caMc.~ 3.3.6.1 SURVEIU ANCE REOUIREMENTS L1MITING.COPOITIONS FOR OPERATION e 3.9.A.7. Looie Systs (Continued) 4.9.A.7. Looic Systens (Continued) im
- 2. Deleted L
~
- 3. Deleted
- c. The camon accident signal c.1. Once every 18 months during logic systen, and undervolt- shutdown, each diesel generator age relays and supporting shall be demonstrated operable system are operable. by simulating a loss of offsite powerinconjunctionwith an accident test signal and verifying: de-energization I of the energency buses and load shedding from the mergency f buses; and the diesel starts t
on the auto-start signal with '% permanently connected loads in
$ 12 seconds, energizes the
( autcH:onnected shutdown
\ (emergency) loads through the
..~- --
~. ' N ' ' load sequencer, operates for 2 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with
! Ce e Mcm:% g C b, ** S enewy ads W achieves and maintains a
/ q
/ c
"- 2 rs : ?.E.1, ;~ # steady-state voltage of
/ g % 1:,, :, g 4160 420 volts and a
~~ steady-state frequency of l 60 s 1 1.2 Hz.
' l h 3.3.6.1.3 2. The undervoltage relays for the
,q %
start buses shall be calibrated
^3 ' 8 * * '4 11%for trip and reset
( ) voltagesfindThefsieahoment) Milf%%r*df
- 3. Verify, once per 18 months during shutdown, that all diesel generator trips, except i\ '
ine overspeed, low lube ( ( oi pressure, and generator k differential, are automatically I N - bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with an ECCS actuation signal. h (.) MTCH - UNIT 1 3.9-4a Amendnent M, 88, U8, 486,192 444
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ( ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION ALs,iNISTRATIVE A.1 Reformatting and renumbering requirements is in accordance with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433. As a result, the Technical Specifications should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable by plant operators as well as other users. During this reformatting and renumbering process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the Technical Specifications were made unless they were identified and justified. During this process, the listing of the various tables has been deleted since it is found in the Table of Contents at the beginning of the document. A new LCO statement has been added to I describe the channel requirements. A.2 The requirement for performing the Instrument Functional Test is included in the proposed SR 3.3.8.1.2. It is possible that the test would not be I able to be performed with an inoperable channel, and a plant shutdown would be required due to the inability to perform the required surveillance. However, this restriction on continued operation need not be specified as an Action (as is the case in existing Action a); it exists inherently as a result of the Instrument Functional Test requirement. In addition, the channel is not allowed to be placed in trip in the ITS (see comments M.2), thus this statement does not apply. Since no change in operation, requirements or intent is made, the proposed revision to eliminate a specific restriction of continued operation is considered (~')% t administrative. A.3 The Frequency of "once/ operating cycle" has been changed to "18 months". Since the current operating cycle is normally 18 months, this change is considered administrative. Also, the annual requirement to calibrate this instrument in the AC Sources specification (4.9. A.7.2.c) has been changed to 18 months, since this Frequency is already allowed in the Instrumentation Section (Table 4.1-12). As such, this change is considered administrative. TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 An additional Applicability has been added, requiring the instruments to be OPERABLE when the associated diesel generators (DGs) are required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown. This essentially adds a MODE 4 and 5 applicability when the DGs are required in these MODES. This is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433 and is an additional restriction on plant operation. M.2 The allowance to place the LOSP lock-out relay in trip has been changed to j require restoration of the entire channel. Placing the LOSP lock-out relay in trip does not result in all components affected by the channel receiving a trip signal. In addition, a finite Completion Time of I hour O G HATCH UNIT 1 1 REVISION C
- DISCUSSION OF CHANGES
( ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.2 (continued) has been provided to place an inoperable channel in trip. Currently, no Completion Time is provided. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433 and is an additional restriction on plant operation. M.3 An additional Surveillance Requirement has been added (proposed SR 3.3.8.1.4) to perform a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST (LSFT) once per 18 I months. This will ensure that the entire logic is functioning properly similar to the current LSFT already required for the ECCS instrumentation (LC0 3.3.5.1), which also provides a DG start signal. This is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433 and is an additional restriction on plant operation. M.4 To satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement, Hatch credits manual actions in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV. Entry into this range is annunciated. The range specified for manual actions indicates that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors; however, sufficient voltage for equipment required for LOCA conditions may not be , p available at lower voltages. The required channels of LOP annunciation instrumentation ensure the initiation of manral actions to protect the g ECCS and other assumed systems from degraded voltage without initiating an ' unnecessary automatic disconnect from the preferred offsite power source. The LOP anticipatory annunciators provide a total time delay of 60 seconds to reduce the possibility of nuisance annunciators while permitting prompt detection of potential low voltage conditions. Since Hatch takes credit : for the annunciators, they have been added to Table 3.3.8.1-1. Additionally, new LC0 CONDITION "B" addressing the annunciation Function ; has been added and the other CONDITIONS renumbered and amended as - necessary to account for the annunciation. Appropriate SRs are defined ! for the annunciator bus undervoltage relays and the associated time del ays . TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 System design and operational details have been relocated to the Bases and procedures. Trip setpoints are an operational detail that is not directly related to the operability of the instrumentation. The Allowable Value is the required limitation for these parameters and these values are retained in Table 3.3.8.1-1. Details relating to system design and operation (e.g., description of action of instrumentation) are also unnecessary in the LC0 and have been relocated to the Bases and procedures. The design features and system operation are also described in the FSAR. In ,
O O l l HATCH UNIT 1 2 REVISION C l l _. .__-__-_-___J
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE LA.1 (continued) addition, require;nents to record values during Surveillance Requirements has been relocated to plant procedures. Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the provisions of the proposed Bases Control Process described in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the FSAR and procedures will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
" Specific" L.1 An ACTION has been added (proposed ACTION C) to require declaring the DG inoperable (and taking the appropriate actions in the associated DG Specification) if a channel is not restored within 1 hour. Currently, the ACTIONS appear to require a Specification 3.0.3 entry, which would result in an immediate shutdown. Since Functions 1 and 2 instrumentation provide a start signal for the DGs (i.e., it supports DG OPERABILITY), the appropriate action would be to declare the DG inoperable. The current requirements are overly restrictive, in that if the diesel were inoperable for other reasons, a 72 hour restoration time is provided; yet currently f- if an instrument is inoperable but the diesel is otherwise fully OPERABLE, f an immediate shutdown is required. The ACTION also applies to Function 3 but would only be entered if both the annunciation and voltage indication were inoperable.
O HATCH UNIT 1 2A REVISION C
l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES O ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION O O HATCH UNIT 1 3 REVISION C
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES l O ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION l l l l O O HATCH UNIT 1 4 REVISION C
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES O- ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION O O HATCH UNIT 1 5 REVISION C
Spedkhs 3 M -
~ LIMITING C0f0fTIONS FOR OPEPATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.9.A.2. Standby AC Power Sucoly (Diesel Standby AC Power Suooly (Diesel A.
4.9.A.2. , fdDg,r,1 tors IA. 18. and 1(1 Generators lA. 18. and IC) (Continued) (Continued) (Pfor'5eJ
- I5
^
f.%as +e sr ).e l.2 Operabilit a. Ooerability e diesel rator itsel L ~~ its auxili ies am 1 Tachdieselgeneratorshall ope le. be manually started and SR'3 bl A loaded to demonstrate operational readinesse W d 4 2-) to 5R 3 tbt.2./
"% ?
,l ,
" , Q~Q
V L '\ k .k erify that each l 0 (5
-) ;
arts from antient y' ition/jgradually load ( ~ . .. s Ine vo m . tor to 1710-2000 kW** and operate for 2 60 g ,ge 4 4 o ts and a steady-state fmquency t, . l of 60
- 1.2 Hz will be
.maintainedsperifythepres- j M1i5Ediesel air start ; /*M IF *S' g-See G5w5# d _
Ck uy fw C1V receivers to be 2 225 pstg s '--puO5 2./[Atleastonceper184 days, 3 E *3' i" eo h +##* each diesel generator shall be started and verified (' M A to reach synchronous speed in .h -[g 512 seconds, loaded to an O > N g ,),f f, indicated 2250-2400 ide* for l 1A and IC and 2360-2425 kW** I ')repic el for 18 R 120'h conds,, operated for 1 60 minutes, ele 2 t,3 The test will verify the diesel generator will achieve and maintain a stead -state - voltage of 41 '20 volts l and a steady-state requency ( of 60
- 1.2 Rz.*
l I Ob W g42
*For the IB (swing) diesel, a single test will satisfy the requirements for Unit 1 Specification 4.9.A.2.a.1 and Unit 2 Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, with the diesel connected to one unit's emergency bus for one periodic q test and connected to the energency bus in the other unit during the next '
periodic test. A single 6-month (184-day) test for the IB diesel will satisfy the 4 "e requirements for Unit 1 Specification 4.9.A.2.a.2 and Unit 2 WM.N Specification 4.8.1.1.2.b. The 6-month test will be perfonned using Al fl\ l the starting circuitry and emergency bus from one unit. The next i 6-month test will be perfonned using the starting circuitry and l , emergency bus from the other unit.
. r/Al
** Momentary variations outside this band shall not invalidate the test.
<d.5 t ' l hok9 b 5 g3.s44 HATCH - UNIT 1 3.9-2 Amen &ent No. M, W,178
&& t '.
I
$ (ok.ce};y1 3 3,l re u e 4.9-1 OIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE un.ber of Failures In L st 20 Valid Tests
- Test Freauency .
\
11 At least once per i days. '
>2 At least once r 7 days.' '
_.1. _ l [ i
- . ;, j
\ .: c,
-( '
-. .'< 27 ,,
g , ( '1, b b ' ' I N A. s-
.,kh -
O
~
L Wra l
~ -
-- - .- a a- Es$
#-i.,i T jv
- f- .
- Criteria for determining number of f ailures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.)08, Revision 1 August 1977,except that only the last 20 tests are Nsed, and are determined on a per diesel basis.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.9-6b Amendment No. 147 v ; C to e : :, l
l i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTIN 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES - OPERATING O TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued) M.8 Deleted. M.9 Deleted. M.10 The existing tolerance for voltage ( 10%) is being restricted to -10%,
+2%. Reducing the allowable overvoltage is based on the acceptable overvoltage limits of equipment on the 600 V buses.
TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 The details of what constitutes OPERABILITY, system design and purpose, have been relocated to the Bases. The design features are also described in the FSAR. Thus, the LC0 has been written to tell what is needed, but not in excessive detail. Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the provisions of the proposed Bases Control Process in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the FSAR will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
( LA.2 This Surveillance has been deleted in the proposed Technical Specifications. Procedural controls on DG inspections recommended by the manufacturer are sufficient to ensure the DG receives the necessary inspections. Removal of this Surveillance from the Technical Specifications will have no effect on DG OPERABILITY. Changes to the procedures will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. LA.3 The specific component name of the single largest load need not be detailed within the Technical Specifications. The value of the load, as well as the component itself, are specifically detailed in the Bases, as well as the FSAR, Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the Bases Control Process described in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the FSAR are controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. The reference to the single largest load within the Technical Specifications is not necessary to adequately present the requirement. Similarly, the load value for the auto-connected loads is removed from the proposed Technical Specifications. Any change to the loads placed on the DG will be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 (a design change is required to change the loads). A V A HATCH UNIT 1 5 REVISI0fi
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES - OPERATING TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE (continued) LA.4 When the OPERABILITY of a system or component has been affected by repair, maintenance, or replacement of a component, post maintenance testing is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the system or component. Explicit post maintenance Surveillance Requirements have, therefore, been deleted from the Specifications. Entry into the applicable modes without performing this post maintenance testing also continues to be allowed as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.0.1. LA.5 The purpose of this SR is inherent in the manner in which the test is performed and is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.9 (load shedding) and SR 3.8.1.6 (auto bus transfer). Therefore, the description has been relocated to the Bases. Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the provision of the proposed Bases Control Process in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. LA.6 The diesel generator accelerated test frequency requirements are relocated in their current licensing bases form to plant procedures, leaving the Technical Specifications periodic surveillance frequency as 31 days. A pl ant procedure implements the current Technical Specifications requirements for accelerated test frequency, as well as the requirements and responsibilities for tracking emergency DG failures for the ["%) determination and reporting of reaching trigger values specified in NUMARC l 87-00. These requirements are more restrictive than those specified in l NUREG 1433. l
" Specific" i L.1 Note 2 to SR 3.8.1.2, Note I to SR 3.8.1.5 and the Note to SR 3.8.1.18 have been added to allow a prelube prior to starting the DG. DG starts without prior engine prelube create unnecessary engine wear, thereby reducing overall reliability. The engine prelube does not result in an enhanced start performance which could mask the engine's ability to start in accident conditions without a prelube. In addition, Note 2 and SR i 3.8.1.2 also allow a gradual OG warmup. This portion of the Note is allowed currently, because no startup time is specified in the current surveillance.
L.2 The intent of a requirement for staggered testing is to increase reliability of the component / system being tested. A number of studies have been performed which have demonstrated that staggered testing has negligible impact on component reliability. These analytical and subjective analyses have determined that staggered testing 1) is operationally difficult, 2) has negligible impact on component reliability, 3) is not as significant as initially thought, 4) has no impact on failure frequency, 5) introduces additional stress on components b such as DGs potentially causing increased component failure rates and component wearout, 6) results in reduced redundancy during testing, and 7) HATCH UNIT 1 6 REVISION
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES - OPERATING , O TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE l l (continued) L.10 The proposed Required Actions B.3.1 and B.3.2 provide an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of the OPERABLE DG- when a DG is declared l inoperable. This change is_ consistent with that approved on the River ' Bend Station docket (Amendment No. 64, dated 9/29/92). The intent of the actions is to confirm no common-mode failure has rendered more than one DG inoperable. This assurance can be ascertained in many cases by means other than the existing requirement for a DG start. If an assessment can determine no common-mode failure exists on the remaining OPERABLE DGs, the i proposal allows for not requiring an unnecessary DG start. Minimizing DG l starts is recommended to avoid unnecessary diesel wear, thereby enhancing i overall DG reliability (refer to Generic Letter 84-15). In addition, the requirement to load the DG has been deleted. Demonstrating the DG start capability is sufficient to provide the added assurance that the DG is still 0PERABLE. L.11 The proposed Required Actions A.2 and B.2 provide an allowance to avoid an immediate forced shutdown when a DG or offsite circuit is inoperable concurrent with a required " feature" (i.e., system, subsystem, component) i inoperability. This change is consistent with that approved on the River I Bend Station docket (Amendment No. 64, dated 9/29/92). With these l concurrent inoperabilities, certain events that are required by GDC 17 to O be capable of being mitigated, will not be able to be mitigated. - These events involve accidents which are coupled with a complete loss of all offsite or DG power. However, certain combinations of inoperable components may allow for satisfactory compensatory actions or have been justified for some allowed restoration time. By allowing " features" , associated with the inoperable offsite circuit DG to be declared inoperable, the appropriate ACTIONS can be taken. This can potentially eliminate unnecessary forced shutdowns, and the associated risk of plant transient, while maintaining ACTION provisions previously provided concerning the specific circumstances. O HATCH UNIT 1 1[ lO REVISION [
_$a Lab 3. E.'7 ' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.g. A.3. r 125/250 voltDCEmeroencyPowhe 4.9.A.3. ~125/250 Volt DC Eneroency Power' System (Plant Batteries 1 A and i_, System (Plant Batteries 1A and- ' ( b toth 125/250 voltplantbatteriesl a. Weekly Surveillance (1 A and 18) shall be operable and, ~Every week the specffic gravitD shall have an operable battery I m a nd_t he.yo i tage_oLt he_p uot_c e ] LG l charger and ventilation. system ! find ~oierall batteriioltage shall'
~
available for each. be measured and recorded. Each
~ l 125 volt battery shall have a r minimum tery terminalsof 105 volts at> the bat-to be considered i t operable. l
- b. Monthly Surveillance '
/ s Everymonthmeasurementsshallbe\f
/ep s. . \
Cc IL~nQ made of voltage of each cell to h I
"'**f' 4 Cna- e.s 6.- % the nearest 0.1 volt and the spe- !
A C n ~ cs % cific gravity of each cell. These ' rrs. d ,4 \ P S/ ,3)'E A measurements shall be recorded. '
'\- % sdb {
+4 s su,'.b. s Liquid level shall be checked ; !
( ,q,,,jjy, y l
)
(~ {c. Refuelino Outace Surveillance 1 Durir.g each scheduled refueling } outage, the batteries shall be subjected to a rated load dis-charge test. The specific gravity ;
/
and voltage of each cell shall be l ' determined af ter the discharge l and recorded. _ _.__ - -
- 4. Emeroency 4160 Volt Buses (1E. 4. Emeroency 4160 volt tuses (1E.
1F. and 161 1F. and 16) LCo M h The emergency 4160 volt _ buses (1E, 1F, and 16) shall be(Energ'15ed5and) The emergency 4160 volt buses (1E, 1F, and 16) shall bJe aiiihitiiFed ts' g operable. i s a. 'the extent thit they are shown to i b 3W be ready and capable of trans-
.mitting the emergency load.
l { g
- 5. Emeroency 600 Volt Buses (1C 5. Emeroency 600 Volt Buses (1C and 10) and 10) wc, g,7.a The emergency 600 volt buses (1C The emergency shallthey 600 volt buses beJmoriitsred 1C (h e toto be g :
.Q,ghM C a and 1D)rable. shall be(knir'gifed ahd)Q m and extent 10]ihat
~ ~ ~
are shown l m ,_ ' ready and capable of transmitting, g,#gd LCe M '7.b a A bc p.A . ,C Lec .@y.e 71 ,the emergency load. _ / g
- 6. Emeroenev 250 volt DC to 600 Volt 6. Emeroency 250 Volt DC to 600 volt 7
{
, AC Inverters AC Inverters The emergency 250 volt DC to 600 a. The emergency 250 volt DC/600 volt AC inverters shall bd ener- volt AC inverters shall be moni- l j gized and operable, tored to the extent that they are,
* )
[ shown to be ready and capable of i C transmittingtheemergencyload.) j
---~~-
' 1 Q /
/ s .- h s , 4 c 6ys
%. m ss 3.cr.\.:., & ^ %
l i
- 2. '5'.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.9-3 Amendment No. II, 48 1E3
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.7 - DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS-0PERATING A i V ADMINISTRATIVE A.1 The term " buses" has been changed to " subsystems" since the buses are grouped in this manner (e.g., 600 V IC receives power normally from 4160 V bus IE; thus, they are part of the same subsystem), No technical changes are made. A.2 This general paragraph has been deleted since it provides general guidance that is discussed in other parts of the Technical Specifications or Bases. , A.3 This requirement is being deleted since another ACTION (ACTION F) provides direction for various interrelationships between the Distribution buses. l The ACTION will require a shutdown if two 4160 V or two 600 V buses are concurrently inoperable. Therefore, this change is administrative. l A.4 The Unit 1 120/280 V essential cabinets and instrument buses governed by the definition of OPERABILITY for the Unit 1 equipment powered by these buses have been added to Specification 3.8.7. This is consistent with the implementation of the current Unit 2 licensing basis. TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Certain equipment needed to meet Unit I accident analysis is powered from the Unit 2 AC and DC Distribution System. Currently, the Unit 2 O V Distribution buses are required since the Unit I definition of OPERABILITY requires the necessary electrical power to be OPERABLE. To make the Technical Specifications more cser friendly, the Unit 2 required buses have been added, similar to the already required Unit 1 buses. Since Unit 2 buses are now described, the current LC0 and ACTIONS for Unit 1 buses have been modified to explicitly use the unit designator. An ACTION has also been provided (proposed ACTION A) to limit the out of service time of a Unit 2 bus to 7 days. This is consistent with the current time allowed in the individual system LC0. These changes, are administrative only; however, due to the addition of proposed ACTION F, an inoparable Unit 2 bus concurrent with an inoperable Unit I bus can result in a LC0 3.0.3 entry. Currently, an LC0 3.0.3 entry is not required when in this condition. J l' In addition, the Unit I station service DC distribution subsystems, which are governed by the definition of OPERABILITY for the Unit 1 equipment powered by these buses have also been moved here for clarity. Thus, proposed ACTION D has been provided to limit the out of service time for a Unit 1 Station Service DC distribution subsystem to 2 hours, consistent j with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.93. : In addition nother Completion Time (16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a) ,is added, as described in comment M.5, to establish a maximum time allowed to not meet the Unit 1 bus requirements. Also, SRs are now explicitly required for the Unit 1 DC and the Unit 2 AC and DC (' buses. Therefore, this change, is considered more restrictive on plant ( operations. C-l HATCH UNIT 1 1 REVISION'As
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.7 - DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS-0PERATING TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 The details relating to system design and purpose, and the meaning of "0PERABLE" (e.g. , " energized") have been relocated to the Bases. The design features and system operation are also described in the FSAR. l Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the provisions of the proposed Bases Control Process in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications.
Changes to the FSAR will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
" Specific" L.1 The time to reach MODE 4, Cold Shutdown, has been extended from 24 hours to 36 hours. This provides the necessary time to shut down and cool down the plant in a controlled and orderly manner that is within the capabilities of the unit, assuming the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This extra time reduces the potential for a unit upset that could challenge safety systems. This time is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433.
L.2 ACTION B has been added to provide a 12 hour restoration time, prior to requiring a unit shutdown, if a DG DC bus were inoperable. Currently, if rO the DG DC bus were inoperable, the associated DG and the offsite' circuit would be inoperable (due to loss of control power). This now requires an immediate shutdown. The new time, 12 hours, is consistent with the time provided in Regulatory Guide 1.93 and the BWR Standard Technical Specifications for when a DG and offsite circuit are concurrently inoperable. Another Completion Time (16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a) has been added, as described in comment M.5, to establish a maximum time allowed to not meet the Unit 1 bus requirements. This limits the total time of any Unit 1 bus inoperability to 16 hours. 1 4 O eA1Ce e m , 4
/6s eeI 19
l c INSERT 1 for ITS 5.1 1 C} The Superintendent of Shift (SOS) shall be responsible for the I control room command function. During any absence of the SOS from I the control room while either unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, an l ! individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. During any absence of the SOS from the control room while both units are in MODE 4 or 5, an individual with an active SRO license or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. C-l V HATCH UNIT 1
DMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS {pece cstY $b n $-~ $ 1 1 f ~ N 7 (SPECIALREPUK D . 2- Spec 1 rep h sube En the NRC Reaional Of D C Lwithibheti narin ei fi ard fa Rh ? Tubu- . in *I J fb221315pecia reports fo fire protecton equipmyt operat NTnance requ ements shal be submit y , as requ a , by th tre l Hazards Agalysis a its Append 8 requirements. - r5.10. RECORD RETENTION ( In addition to the applicable record retention requiremer.ts of Title 10, : Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated. Jce C/3M ' 6.10.1. The following records shall be retained for at least five years: ;
# C b e3 a. Records and logs of unit operation covering time interval 4cg at each power level.
b lO b. Records and logs of principal mainten'ance activities, inspections, ( . g g,/4 , - repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety,
- c. ALL REPORTABLE EVENTS submitted to the Commission.
- d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications,
- e. Records of changes made to the procedures required by Specification 6.8.1.
- f. Records of radioactive shipments,
- g. Records of sealed source.and fission detector leak tests and results,
- h. Records of annual physical inventory of all sealed source material of record.
6.10.2. The following records shall be retained for the duration of the unit Operating License:
- a. Records and drawing changes reflecting unit design modifi-cations made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report,
- b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers and assembly burnup histories.
s HATCH - UNIT 1 6-18 Aaendment No. 64, M3, 49,175 ldiu
.J
1 l l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES
] ITS: SECTION 5.6 - REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE I M.1 The current TS requirement in 6.9.1.5.b to submit an annual report for all challenges to safety / relief valves has been moved to proposed ITS 5.6.1.4 for monthly reports. Since the report is required on a monthly basis instead of the current annual basis, this change is more restrictive in nature.
) M.2 This change details the information to be included in the report. These details are necessary to assure the reports are provided with similar i content and format for comparison with other plants and with prior reports. M.3 A new report is required in conjunction with the changes described in Section 3.4 for the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature limits. In addition, requirements are included for methods used to determine such limits and for submitting the report to the NRC. TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 The details associated with CTS 6.9.1.1, 6.9.1.2, and 6.9.1.3, " Start-Up Report," are proposed to be relocated to the FSAR. The Start-Up Report provides the NRC a mechanism to review the appropriateness of licensee activities after-tne-fact, but provides no regulatory authority once the report is submitted (i.e., no requirement for NRC approval). The Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and the Startup Test Program provisions contained in the FSAR provide assurance the listed activities will be adequately performed and that appropriate corrective actions, if required, are taken. The placement of these CTS requirements in the FSAR also ensures that change control is performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
V HATCH UNIT 1 4 i REVISION [
I 1 l UNIT 2 IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l l
- \
1 l l i
)
1 i O O
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1-3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.3.1 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3'.3.3.1-1 ! shall be OPERABLE. l l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. l ACTIONS
-------------------NOTES------------------------------------ 1
- 1. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. l l
1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Restore required 30 days ! with one required channel to OPERABLE J channel inoperable, status. l B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action-in Immediately ' associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A Specification 5.6.7. l not met. C. One or more Functions C.1 Restore all but one 7 days with two or more required channel to required channels OPERABLE status. inoperable. , l l (continued) ! l I O ; HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-23 REVISION [
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Enter the Condition immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition C Table 3.3.3.1-1 for not met. the channel. E. As required by E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Required Action 0.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.3.1-1. F. As required by F.1 Initiate action in Immediately Required Action D.1 accordance with and referenced in Specification 5.6.8. Table 3.3.3.1-1. O 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------NOTES------------------------------------
- 1. These SRs apply to each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of 1
required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required j Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the other required i channel (s) in the associated Function is OPERABLE. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 31 days SR 3.3.3.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months i O HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-24 REVISION A
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 ( 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION l 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, When the associated diesel generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." ACTIONS ____..--------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME O A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to I hour U inoperable for OPERABLE status. Functions 1 and 2. l l B. One or more channels B.1 Verify voltage on Once per hour inoperable for associated 4.16 kV Function 3. bus is 2 3825 V. C. Required Action and C.1 Declare associated DG Immediately l associated Completion inoperable. Time not met. O HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-69 REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ________________________________..----NOTE-------------------------------------
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function.
- 2. When a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3).
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours l SR 3.3.8.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 31 days l SR 3.3.8.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.8.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months l l 9' HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-70 REVISION C 1 l
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 i Table 3.3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 1) V Loss of Power Instrianentation oma l REQUIRED l CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER BUS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
- a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 2 2800 V SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4
- b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 I SR 3.3.8.1.3 s 6.5 seconds l SR 3.3.8.1.4
- 2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Oegraded Voltage) j
- a. Bus Undervoltage 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 1 3280 V SR 3.3.8.1.3
$R 3.3.8.1.4
- b. Time Delay 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 5 21.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1.4
- 3. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Annuneietion) l\
I a. Bus Undervoltage 1 SR 3.3.8.1.1 2 3825 V SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 1 SR 3.3.8.1.2 5 60 seconds
- b. Time Delay SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 l
I 1 l i i O HATCH VNIT 2 3.3-70A REVISION C 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _d
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ( SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7 days indicated power availability for each required offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.2 -------------------NOTES------------------- 1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.5 satisfies this SR.
- 2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.
- 3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer.
When modified start procedures are not g used, the time, voltage, and frequency g lerances of SR 3.8.1.5.a must be
- 4. For the swing DG, a single test will satisfy this Surveillance for both units, using the starting circuitry of Unit 2 and synchronized to 4160 V bus 2F for one periodic test, and the starting circuitry of Unit I and synchronized to 4160 V bus IF during the next periodic test.
- 5. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
- 6. Starting transients above the upper !
voltage limit do not invalidate this test. (continued) v HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-Ji-[ REVISION [
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY h SR 3.8.1.2 NOTES (continued)
- 7. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.
- 8. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.
Verify each DG: 31 days
- a. Starts from standby conditions and achieves steady state voltage 2 3740 V and s 4243 V and frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz; and
- b. Operates for a 60 minutes at a load 2 1710 kW and s 2000 kW.
SR 3.8.1.3 Verify each day tank contains 2 900 gallons 31 days of fuel oil. SR 3.8.1.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from 184 days each day tank. (continued) O to HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-8 REVISION [ l
4 AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 i O O O c HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-19 REVISION
AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown l LC0 3.8.2 .The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. One qualified circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 2 Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems - Shutdown;"
- b. One Unit 2 diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one subsystem of the onsite Unit 2 Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8;
- c. One qualified circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 1 Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) needed to support the Unit 1 equipment required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.6.4.9, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
System-Refueling," LCO 3.7.4, " Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System," and LC0 3.7.5,
" Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System;" and
- d. One Unit 1 DG capable of supplying one subsystem of each of the Unit 1 equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.9, LC0 3.7.4, and LCO 3.7.5.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Unit I secondary containment. O HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-20 REVISION A
Battery Cell Parameters 3.8.6 (~, (/ Table 2.8.6-1 (page 1 of 2) Battery Ce'l Parameter Requirements CATEGORY A: CATEGORY B: CATEGORY C: _ LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS DESIGNATED PILOT CONNECTED CELL FOR EACH PARAMETER CELL CONNECTED CELL Electrolyte > Minimum level > Minimum level Above top of Level indication mark, indication mark, plates, and not and s % inch above and s % inch above overflowing maximum level maximum level indication mark (a) indication mark (a) Float Voltage 2 2.13 V 2 2.13 V > 2.07 V Float Charging (b) (b) (b) /7 Current U l (a) It is acceptable for the electrolyte level to temporarily increase above ; the specified maximum level during equalizing charges provided it is not ; overflowing. l (b) As applicable to each battery. , 1 l l 1 p : 'd HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-39 REVISION A
Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LC0 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE: I
- a. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution !
subsystems comprised of: !
- 1. 4160 V essential buses 2E, 2F, and 2G;
- 2. 600 V essential buses 2C and 2D; I
- 3. 120/208 V essential cabinets 2A and 2B; '
- 4. 120/208 V instrument buses 2A and 28; I I
- 5. 125/250 V DC station service buses 2A and 28;
- 6. DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and
- b. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.6.4.7, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
System-Operating," LC0 3.7.4, " Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System," LC0 3.7.5,
" Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System," and LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required Unit 7 days Unit 1 AC or DC 1 AC and DC electrical power subsystem (s) to distribution OPERABLE status. l subsystems inoperable. (continued) O 3.8-40 A HATCH UNIT 2 REVISION [ 1
Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 f) (_/ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more (Unit 2 or B.1 Restore DG DC 12 hours swing bus) DG DC electrical power electrical power distribution AND distribution subsystem to OPERABLE subsystems inoperable. status. 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a (continued) (3 G 1
)
i l 1 l i r
- U I HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-40 A REVISION [
Responsibility 5.1 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.1.1 The Nu. clear Plant General Manager shall provide direct executive oversight over all aspects of, Plant Hatch. 5.1.2 The Assistant General Manager-Plant Operations (AGM-P0) shall be responsible for overall unit operation, except for the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program as described below ( and for delegation in writing of the succession of this j responsibility during his absence. Certain plant support functions shall be the responsibility of the Assistant General Manager-Plant Support (AGM-PS). 5.1.3- The Nuclear Plant General Manager or his designee shall be responsible for the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and for the writing of the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report. l 5.1.4 Each of the individuals in Specification 5.1.1 through l O Specification 5.1.3 is responsible for the accuracy of the procedures needed to implement his responsibilities. 5.1.5 The Superintendent of Shift (S0S) shall be responsible for the control room command function. During any absence of the SOS from i the control room while either unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, an l individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. During any absence of the SOS from the control room while both units are in MODE 4 or 5, an individual with an active SR0 license or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume the i control room command function. 1 l O 5.0-1 b HATCH UNIT 2 REVISION [
Organization 5.2 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.2 Organization 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Oraanizations Onsite and offsite organizations shall be established for unit operation and corporate management, respectively. The onsite and offsite organizations shall include the positions for activities affecting safety of the nuclear power plant.
- a. Lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shall be defined and established throughout highest management levels, intermediate levels, and all operating organization positions. These relationships shall be documented and updated, as appropriatc, in organization charts, functional descriptions of departmental responsibilities and relationships, and job descriptions for key personnel positions, or in equivalent forms of documentation. These requirements shall be documented in the Plant Hatch Unit 2 FSAR;
- b. The Assistant General Manager-Plant Operations (AGM-P0) shall be responsible for overall safe operation of the plant and shall have control over those onsite activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant;
- c. The Vice President-Nuclear shall have corporate responsibility for overall plant nuclear safety and shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable performance of the staff in operating, maintaining, and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nucle u safety; and
- d. The individuals who train the operating staff, carry out health physics, or perform quality assurance functions may report to the appropriate onsite manager; however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.
5.2.2 Unit Staff The unit staff organization shall include the following:
- a. A total of three plant equipment operators (PE0s) for the two units is required in all conditions. At least one of (continued) g HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-2 REVISION [b
Organization 5.2 m (y 5.2 Organization 5.2.2 Unit Staff
- a. (continued) the required PE0s shall be assigned to each reactor containing fuel.
- b. At least one licensed Reactor Operator (RO) shall be present in the control room for each unit that contains fuel in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be present in the control room.
- c. The minimum shift crew composition shall be in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i). Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(1) and 5.2.2.a for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.
O d. An individual qualified to implement radiation protection V procedures shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor. The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours, in order to provide for unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required position.
- e. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety related functions.
Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a nominal 40 hour week while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:
- 1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight, excluding shift turnover time; O (continued)
HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-3 REVISION \ -
Organization 5.2 5.2 Organization 5.2.2 Unit Staff (continued)
- e. (continued)
- 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours in any 24 hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any 48 hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7 day period, all excluding shift turnover time;
- 3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time;
- 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis l and not for the entire staff on a shift.
Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized by the AGM-P0, Assistant General Manager-Plant Support (AGM-PS), or by higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. O Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the AGM-PO, AGM-PS, or designee to ensure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized,
- f. The Operations Manager shall hold an active or inactive SR0 license.
- g. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory technical support to the Shift Supervisor (SS) in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. In addition, the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift.
O HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-4 REVISION A
Reporting Requirements 5.6 ( ) 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)
- a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each
' reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:
- 1) Control Rod Block Instrumentation - Rod Block Monitor for Specification 3.3.2.1.
- 2) The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1.
- 3) The Nir.imum Critical Power Ratio for Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.3.2.1.
- b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:
- 1) NEDE-240ll-P-A, " General Electric Standard Applicatir,n
/3 for Reactor Fuel," (applicable amendment specified in
- l. \
the COLR).
- 2) " Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment Nos. 151 and 89 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5," dated January 22, 1988.
- c. The core operating limits shall be determined such that all specified acceptable fuel design limits will be met,
- d. The COLR, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.
5.6.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)
- a. RCS pressure and temperature limits for heatup, cooldown, low temperature operation, criticality, and hydrostatic testing as well as heatup and cooldown rates shall be (continued) l b l
l HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-19 . REVISION A
' Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)
- a. (continued) established and documented in the PTLR for LC0 3.4.9, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."
l b. The analytical methods used to determine the RCS pressure and temperature limits shall be determined in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99.
- c. The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluency period and for any revision or supplement thereto.
5.6.7 Post Accident Monitorina (PAM) Instrumentation Report When a report is required by LCO 3.3.3.1, " Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the g t instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status. O; HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-20 b REVISIONg l
__ m 4- an - --an6 ,,a,- - + , - ,-- a,A-_---,, e,- .J ,
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-a,-- _ .- a + - a UNIT 2 IMPROVED BASES i
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l PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 /'~N g BASES LCO 12 RHR Service Water Flow (continued)
. primary indication used by the operator during an accident.
Therefore, the PAM specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel. 1 APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LC0 is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. These variables are related to the diagnosis and preplanned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1 and 2. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, l plant conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is extremely low; therefore, PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. ACTIONS Note I has been added to the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS l fl even though the ACTIONS may eventually require plant t/ shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive function of the instruments, the operator's ability to diagnose an accident using alternative instruments and methods, and the low probability of an event requiring these i instruments. j i Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to l PAM instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial , entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable PAM instrumentation channels provide appropriate ]; compensatory measures for separate Functions. As such, a { Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry t for each inoperable PAM function. ! l l 1 (Continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-67 REVISION A l _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _]
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS A.d (continued) When one or more Functions have one required channel that is
' inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channels (or, in the case of a Function that has only one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.
fLd If a channel has not been restored to OPERABLE status in 30 days, this Required Action specifies initiation of action in accordance with Specification 5.6.7, which requires a l written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions. & This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown W , requirement, since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of plant conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation. C.d When one or more Functions have two or more required channels that are inoperable (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function), all but one channel in the Function should be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the l (continued) h HATCH UNIT 2 83.3-6ph REVISION [
l LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 , l ( B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 1 BASES , BACKGROUND Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources for energizing the i various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components. The LOP j instrumentation monitors the 4.16 kV emergency buses. Offsite power is the preferred source of power for the 4.16 kV emergency buses. If the monitors determine that insufficient power is available, the buses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DG) power sources. Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic. The voltage for each bus is monitored at two levels: 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage, however, only the Loss of Voltace Function is part of this LC0. The
/N Loss of Voltage Function causes various bus transfers and
() disconnects and is monitored by two undervoltage relays for each emergency bus, whose outputs are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic configuration for all affected components except the DGs. The DG start logic configuration is one-out-of-two (Ref. 1). The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a LOP trip signal to the trip logic. Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP alarm I instrumentation to provide an anticipatory alarm and the initiation of corrective measures to restore emergency bus voltages. The alarms are set higher than the LOP trip relays. The alarm setpoints are approximately midway between the calculated minimum expected voltage and the calculated minimum required voltage, based on the maximum ) expected operating; i.e., non-LOCA, load conditions. The ' alarm setpoints signify that adequate voltage is available for normal operations. The LOP anticipatory alarms provide a total time delay of 60 seconds to reduce the possibility (continued) l HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-201 REVISION C l
7 1
~
LOP instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND of nuisance alarms, while permitting prompt detection of (continued) potential low voltage conditions.
'Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has a dedicated low voltage annunciator fed by two relays and their associated time del ays . The logic for the annunciation function is arranged in a one-out-of-two configuration.
APPLICABLE The LOP instrumentation is required for Engineered Safety ~ SAFETY ANALYSES, Features to function in any accident with a loss of offsite LCO, and power. The required channels of LOP instrumentation ensure APPLICABILITY that the ECCS and other assumed systems powered from the DGs, provide plant protection in the event of any of the Reference 2, 3, and 4 analyzed accidents in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. The initiation of the DGs on loss of offsite power, and subsequent initiation of the ECCS, ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. O (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-201A REVISION C I
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1
- BASES APPLICABLE Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on SAFETY ANALYSES, the concurrent loss of offsite power during a loss of LCO, and coolant accident. The diesel starting and loading times APPLICABILITY have been included in the delay time associated with each (continued) safety system component requiring DG supplied power following a loss of offsite power.
The LOP alarm instrumentation is required to initiate manual actions to restore the 4.16 kV emergency bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. The required channels of LOP alarm instrumentation ensure the initiation of manual actions to protect the ECCS and other assumed systems from degraded voltage without initiating an unnecessary automatic disconnect from the preferred offsite power source. The occurrence of an undervoltage degraded voltage condition credits the manual actions to mitigate the condition and ensure plant safety is maintained. The LOP instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5), except that credit is taken for manual actions. p s The OPERABILITY of the LOP instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.8.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per 4.16 kV emergency bus, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable procedures (nominal trip setpoint). The Allowable Values are specified for the 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Function. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected, based on engineering judgment, to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output and time delay at which an action should take place. The setpoints l ( (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-202 REVISION C
LOP .nstrumentation j 8 3.3.8.1 i l BASES APPLICABLE are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., degraded SAFETY ANALYSES, voltage), and when the measured output value of the process LCO, and ' parameter exceeds the setpoint and time delay, the i APPLICABILITY associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. (continued) The 4.16 kV undervoltage degraded voltage trip setpoints were determined in accordance with the NRC staff positions contained in an NRC letter dated June 2, 1977, except that manual actions are credited for restoring bus voltages or initiating a plant shutdown in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV. The undervoltage degraded voltage setpoint represents a point on the inverse time characteristic curve for the relay. The anticipatory alarm setpoints are approximately midway between the calculated minimum expected voltage and the calculated minimum required voltage, based on maximum expected operating; i.e., non-LOCA, conditions. The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
- 1. 4.16 kV Emeraency Bus Undervoltaae (Loss of Voltaae)
Loss of voltage on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that offsite power may be completely lost to the respective emergency bus and is unable to supply sufficient power for proper operation of the applicable equipment. Therefore, the power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Values (loss of voltage with a short time delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-202A REVISION C
I LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 n y BASES APPLICABLE The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to SAFETY ANALYSES, prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough LCO, and to ensure that power is available to the required equipment. APPLICABILITY The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide (continued) time for the offsite power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment. Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the DG function. (Two channels input to each of the three DGs.) Refer to LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.
- 2. 4.16 kV Emeraency Bus Undervoltaae (Decraded Voltaael A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that, while offsite power may not be completely
/7 lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be V insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS function. Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values (degraded voltage with time delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment. The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough for the offsite power supply to usually recover. This minimizes the potential that short duration disturbances will adversely impact the availability of the offsite power supply. Manual actions are credited in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV to restore bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. The range specified for manual actions indicates that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors; however, sufficient voltage for equipment at lower voltages required for LOCA conditions may not be available. [ (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-203 REVISION C ; l 1
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES h APPLICABLE Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded SAFETY ANALYSES, Voltage) Function per associated bus are only required to LCO, and be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be APPLICABILITY OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can (continued) preclude the DG function. (Two channels input to each of the three emergency buses and DGs.) Refer to LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.
- 3. 4.16 kV Emeraency Bus Undervoltaae (Anticinatory Alarm)
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that, while offsite power is adequate for normal operating conditions, available power may be marginal for some equipment required for LOCA conditions. Therefore, the anticipatory alarms actuate when the 4.16 kV bus voltages approach the minimum required voltage for normal; i.e., non-LOCA, conditions. This ensures that manual actions will be initiated to restore the bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. One channel of the 4.16 kV emergency bus undervoltage (Anticipatory Alarm) function per the associated bus is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE. (Two channels input to each of the three emergency buses.) ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, component!, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to ba inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation channel. (continued) h HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-203A REVISION C
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 l BASES f]m j ACTIONS A_d With one or more channels of Function 1 or 2 inoperable, the i Tunction is not capable of performing the intended function. . Therefore, only 1 hour is allowed to restore the inoperable ' channel to OPERABLE status. The Required Action does not i allow placing a channel in trip since this action will l result in a DG initiation. I 1 I v
) (continued) i HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-203B REVISION C l
J
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES h ACTIONS L,1 (continued)
.The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The I hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
IL1 Each 4.16 kV bus has a dedicated annunciator fed by two relays and their associated time delays in a one-out-of-two logic configuration. Only one relay and its associated time delay is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, the loss of the required relay or time delay renders Function 3 incapable of performing the intended function. Since the intended function is to alert personnel to a lowering voltage condition and the voltage reading is available for each bus on the control room front panels, the Required Action is verification of the voltage to be above the annunciator setpoint (nominal) hourly. u O If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s). SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability (for Functions 1 and 2) and annunciation capability (for Function 3). Functions 1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 8 3.3-204 REVISION C
. . . .. . _ . -- .- . - = . - .
1 LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE and 2 maintain DG initiation capability provided two DGs can REQUIREMENTS be initiated by the Function. Upon completion of the I (continued) , Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. SR 3.3.8.1.1 I Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures ! that a gross failure of instrumentation or a failure of l annunciation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is defined for Function 3 to be a comparison of the annunciator status to the bus voltage and an annunciator test confirming the annunciator is capable of lighting and sounding. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure or an annunciator failure; thus, it.is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. Thus, performance _of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that undetected ottright channel or annunciator failure is limited to 12 hours. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays ! associated with channels required by the LCO. SR 3.3.8.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that.the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a , given Function in any 31 day interval is a rare event. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-204A REVISI'ON C I
l LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 l BASES l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1.3 l l REQUIREMENTS , A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument (continued) loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint . methodology. I The Frequency is based upon the assumption of the magnitude , of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. l l SR 3.3.8.1.4 I The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a . specific channel. The system functional testing performed in : LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to ! provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions. ' The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this O Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 8.3.1.
- 2. FSAR, Section 5.2.
- 3. FSAR, Section 6.3.
- 4. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 5. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical l Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993. j O -
l HATCH UNIT-2 B 3.3-205 REVISION C i i
RPS Electric Power Monitoring 8 3.3.8.2 l 1 8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring ) i BASES , BACKGROUND RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency. This system protects the loads connected to the RPS bus against unacceptable voltage and frequency conditions (Ref. 1) and forms an important part of the primary success path of the essential safety circuits. Some of the essential equipment powered from the RPS buses includes the RPS logic, scram solenoids, and various valve it.olation logic (e.g., residual heat removal shutdown cooling). RPS electric power monitoring assembly will detect any abnormal high or low voltage or low frequency condition in the outputs of the two MG sets or the alternate power supply and will de-energize its respective RPS bus, thereby causing all safety functions normally powered by this bus to de-energize. g In the event of failure of an RPS Electric Power Monitoring System (e.g., both inseries electric power monitoring i assemblies), the RPS loads may experience significant i effects from the unregulated power supply. Deviation from l the nominal conditions can potentially cause damage to the scram solenoids and other Class IE devices. In the event of a low voltage condition for an extended period of time, the scram solenoids can chatter and potentially lose their pneumatic control capability, resulting in a loss of primary scram action. In the event of an overvoltage condition, the RPS logic relays and scram solenoids, as well as the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoids, may experience a voltage higher than their design voltage. If the overvoltage condition persists for an extended time period, it may cause equipment degradation and the loss of plant safety function. Two redundant Class lE circuit breakers are connected in series between each RPS bus and its MG set, and between each RPS bus and its alternate power supply. Each of these (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3,3-206 REVISION A
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES I BACKGROUND b. 3100 kW - 2000 hours, (continued)
- c. 3250 kW - 300 hours, and
- d. 3500 kW - 30 minutes.
DG 1B has the following ratings:
- a. 2850 kW - 1000 hours, and
- b. 3250 kW - 168 hours. 1 A description of the Unit 1 onsite power sources is provided in the Bases for Unit 1 LC0 3.8.1.
! APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), asit.ne ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor O- Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not i exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and l Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and ! Section 3.6, Containment Systems. ! l The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is l consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.
AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 13). l O'd (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-3 REVISIONf$[3
1 f AC Sources - Operating l l B 3.8.1 1 1 I BASES (continued) h i i LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission I network and the onsite Unit 2 Class lE Distribution System and three separate and independent DGs (2A, 2C, and IB) l ensure availability of the required power to shut down the l reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after I an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA. In addition, since some components required by Unit 2 are powered from Unit I sources (i.e., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, Main Control Room Environmental Control l (MCREC) System, and Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System), one qualified circuit between tho offsite l transmission network and the onsite Unit 1 Class IE l Distribution System and one Unit 1 DG (1A or IC) must also j be OPERABLE. I Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR, and are part of the liceM,ing basis for the unit. Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. For the purpose of this LCO, each Unit 2 offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disconnect to the respective 2C and 2D SATs, the 2C and 2D transformers, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4.16 kV ESF buses. W (However, for design purposes, the offsite circuit excludes the feeder breakers to each 4.16 kV ESF bus). Feeder breakers from each circuit to the 2F ESF bus are required to be OPERABLE; however, only one feeder breaker per bus to the 2E and 2G ESF buses is required to be OPERABLE, but they must be from different SATs (e.g., 2E feeder breaker from the 2C SAT and the 2G feeder breaker from the 2D SAT). With 2E and 2G ESF buses both fed from one SAT (normal line up is both buses fed from 2D SAT), both feeder breakers to each of these ESF buses are required to be OPERABLE. The Unit 1 offsite circuit also consists of the incoming breaker and disconnect to the 4.16 kV ESF buses required to be OPERABLE to provide power to the Unit 1 equipment required by LC0 3.6.4.7, LC0 3.7.4, and LC0 3.7.5. Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated frequency and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These (continued) I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-4 REVISION A f
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Note 6 modifies the Surveillance by stating that starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test. Notes 7 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 8 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be l conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent l with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). This Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while I minimizing degradation resulting from testing. SR 3.8.1.3 A This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in j 5 s 1 the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is ! automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at 4 full load plus 10%. The actual amount required to meet the SR (900 gallons) will provide approximately 3.5 hours of DG operation at full load. The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and operators would be aware of any large uses of 1 fuel oil during this period. J SR 3.8.1.4 l Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil ] degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in i fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water j environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the ' fuel oil day tanks once every 184 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS . I (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-21 REVISION [ l
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES h SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the day tank inay come from condensation, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequency is based on l engineering judgment and has shown to be acceptable through i operating experience. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance. SR 3.8.1.5 This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of a " fast cold" start, synchronizing, and accepting a load more closely simulating accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, W while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source. SR 3.8.1.5 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage i and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4). l For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that i the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. (continued) h HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-22 REVISION A
AC Sources - Operating ; B 3.8.1 ' BASES SURVEILLANCE SR. 3.8.1.17 (continued) REQUIREMENTS electrical distribution system, and challenge safety
'sys tems . Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus.
Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3. SR 3.8.1.18 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this O Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. For the purpose of this testing, , the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, ! with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer j recommendations. It is permissible to place all three DGs i in test simultaneously, for the performance of this Surveillance. 1 The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. SR 3.8.1.19 With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to the Unit 2 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance is provided to , direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-37 REVISION A
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.19 REQUIREMENTS Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable IJnit 1 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit I requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 Surveillance requirement. Two exceptions are noted to the Unit 1 SRs of LC0 3.8.1. SR 3.8.1.6 is excepted since only one Unit I circuit is required by the Unit 2 Specification. Therefore, there is not necessarily a second circuit to transfer to. SR 3.8.1.18 is excepted since there is only one Unit 1 DG required by the Unit 2 Specification. Therefore, there are not necessarily multiple DGs for simultaneous start. The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units. O l 1 l l (continued) HATCH UNIT 2
.b B3.8-30'36 REVISION K l
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 l [ BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17. l 2. FSAR, Sections 8.2 and 8.3.
/G U. 3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.
- 4. FSAR, Chapter 6.
l
- 5. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 7. Generic Letter 84-15.
- 8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
I
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.
- 11. IEEE Standard 387 - 1984.
- 12. IEEE Standard 308 - 1980.
- 13. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
O HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-flT/ REVISION A
AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 , 1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown BASES , BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating." APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFEh ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Unit I secondary containment ensures that:
- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling W
accident. In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Postulated worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LC0 for required systems. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-40 REVISION A
Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 f BASES SURVEILLANCE Table 3.8.6-1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that a cell voltage of 2,07 Y or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement. The Category C limit for float charging current is characteristic of a battery that is approaching a fully charged condition. The limit for each battery is specified in Reference 4. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 15,
- 3. IEEE Standard 450 - 1987.
- 4. Technical Requirements Manual.
- 5. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical j Oi Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
HATCH UNIT 2 8 3.8-77 REVISION A 4
I Distribution Systems - Operating l B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class 1E AC and DC electrical power distribution system is divided into redundant and independent AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems. The primary AC distribution system consists of three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses each having an offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is normally connected to a normal source startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) (2D). During a loss of the normal offsite power t source to the 4.16 kV ESF buses, the alternate supply l breaker from SAT 2C attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency DGs supply power to the 4.16 kV ESF buses. The secondary plant distribution system includes 600 VAC emergency buses 2C and 20 and associated load centers, and transformers. There are two independent 125/250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystems and three independent 125 VDC DG electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions. A description of the Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for Unit 1 LC0 3.8.7, " Distribution System-Operating." The list of required Unit 2 distribution buses is presented in LC0 3.8.7. l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-84' 78 REVISION
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES APPLICABLE ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and SAFETY ANALYSES containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits (continued) are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6 Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC electrical power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.
The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). LCO The Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The required Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems listed in LC0 3.8.7 l ensure the availability of AC and DC electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA. Should one or more buses not listed in LCO 3.8.7 become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LC0 3.8.7 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single MCC faults open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B3.8,85'% REVISION [
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES h LC0 Actions of the LCOs governing the individual loads would be (continued) entered. If however, one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY bf a bus listed in LC0 3.8.7 (e.g., loss of a 4.16 kV ESF l bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4.16 kV ESF bus), the Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LC0 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4.16 kV ESF bus). In addition, since some components required by Unit 2 receive power through Unit 1 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System, and Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) l System), the Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution ! subsystems needed to support the required equipment must l also be OPERABLE. Maintaining the Division 1 and 2 and swing bus AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will
- not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.
l l The AC electrical power distribution subsystem requires the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical aower distribution subsystems require the associated auses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger. In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC and DC power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function (s). If any tie breakers are closed, the electrical power distribution subsystem which is not being powered from its normal source (i.e., it is being powered from its redundant electrical power distribution subsystem) is considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8- [ O REVISION
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 t BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS
-This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
I d 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 4. NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
l (3 V HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-87 REVISION A
Distribution Systems - Operating 8 3.8.7
. O l
0' I O HATCH UNIT 2 83.8-[6F3 REVISION [ a
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 O l l l i i O O HATCH UNIT 2 B3.8-)5'h[ REVISION
l l _ Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.7, " Distribution Systems - Operating." APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during ' MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the unit I secondary containment ensures that:
- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.
The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3), (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 8 3.8-90 REVISION A
l { UNIT 2 MARKUP OF CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF CHANGES I !O l l l
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.n INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.8 DEGRADED STATION VOLTAGE PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
%, LCo 3.2.6.\
A 3.3.8 shall be OPERkBLE.The de raded station voltage relay channels shown in Table 3.3.8-1
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APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3. f -t.4,1 2.J %hd% g ACTION: (kr 'a"." hith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the_. required _0PERABLE Ga hanfLelsdopefitTon may, proceeriintil p~eWirminpe 6f the next sthidulid l (p~d.a e s- nstrument funct[onal tenfpF6WdedJa't' rip-ngnal'Wpla'ced"in tfie'LDSP .b _ ek-lut relay-logic' Tor thETppTFcable inoperable channel. MQ P d --
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. A -k G . m mprior m.m to entering other applicable ACTI y _...a s SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.8 Each of the above required degraded station voltage relay channels . stL22.t.2 (O /
shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION,and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operation at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.8-1. sv, s.2.s.t.2 g C
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A*^**=,d. Value:. Q Ref. No, instrument Operable Regtni red To Trio _ v} _ t, g f , tal Qhanne_Is -Trie-Settine-c 2 1 8.16 8 kv Emergency Bus 2/Bais 2 us greater than or equel to 2800 volte Z Undervoltage Relay (Loss or Voltage At 2800 Volts time delay will be less then or equal to 6.5 sec. N Condition) , i 2 as.16 kv Emergency Btis 2/ Bus 2/ Bus greater than or equal to 3280 volts ! Undervoltage Relay - At 3280 volts time delay will be (Degraded Voltage less then or eatial to 21.5 sec. Condition) h .psed LOP F- i Q h
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Mer. No. Instrument SR 3.3.td.t.) Instrtiment Check 5p 3.2. E4.t 7_ Instrument Functional S E: 3. 3. 8. t . 3 ins t rtnsen t h Test Ministem Calibration tal Ib) Ministem Freauency F reattency n itinimum Frequency 3
--I 1 4.16 kv Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month Once/ opera t ing Undervoltage Relay cycle to (Loss of Voltage ^'
Condition) r ~ A.7 , s . 18 -=~WD 1 2 as .16 kv Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month [Once/ opera ting e Undervoltage Relay (Degraded voltage (M
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- 5. Surveillance or this Instrtementation is required during reactor startup, power operation, and hot L. shutdown. -
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l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION ADMINISTRATIVE A.1 The requirement for performing the Instrument Functional Test is included in proposed SR 3.3.8.1.2. It is possible that the test would not be able to be performed with an inoperable channel, and a plant shutdown would be l required due to the inability to perform the required surveillance. ' However, this restriction on continued operation need not be specified as an Action (as is the case in existing Action a); it exists inherently as a result of the Instrument Functional Test requirement. In addition, the channel is not allowed to be placed in trip in the ITS (see comment M.2), thus this statement does not apply. Since no change in operation, requirements or intent is made, the proposed revision to eliminate a specific restriction of continued operation is considered administrative. A.2 The Frequency of "once/ operating cycle" has been changed to "18 months". Since the current operating cycle is not really 18 months, this change is , considered administrative. , 1 l TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 An additional Applicability has been added, requiring the instruments to be OPERABLE when the associated diesel generators (DGs) are required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown. This essentially adds a MODE 4 and 5 Applicability when the DGs are required in these MODES. This is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433 and is an additional restriction on plant operation. M.2 The allowance to place the LOSP lock-out relay in trip has been changed to require restoration of the entire channel. Placing the LOSP lock-out relay in trip does not result in all components affected by the channel receiving a trip signal. In addition, a finite Completion Time of I hour has been provided to place an inoperable channel in trip. Currently, no Completion Time is provided. This change is an additional restriction on plant operation. M.3 An additional Surveillance Requirement has been added (proposed SR 3.3.8.1.4) to perform a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST (LSFT) once per 18 months. This will ensure that the entire logic is functioning properly similar to the current LSFT already required for the ECCS instrumentation (LC0 3.3.5.1), which also provides a DG start signal. This is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433 and is an additional restriction on plant operation. M.4 To satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement, Hatch credits manual actions in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV. Entry into this range HATCH UNIT 2 1 REVISION C
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.I - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION 1 TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued) is annunciated. The range specified for manual actions indicates that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors; however, sufficient voltage for equipment required for LOCA conditions may not be available at lower voltages. The required channels of LOP annunciation instrumentation ensure the initiation of manual actions- to protect the ECCS and other assumed systems from degraded voltage without initiating an unnecessary automatic disconnect from the preferred offsite power source. The LOP anticipatory annunciators provide a total time delay of 60 seconds to reduce the possibility of nuisance annunciators while permitting prompt detection of potential low voltage conditions. Since Hatch takes credit for the annunciators, they have been added to Table 3.3.8 I-1. Additionally, new LC0 CONDITION "B" addressing the annunciation Function has been added and the other CONDITIONS renumbered and amended as necessary to account for the annunciation. Appropriate SRs are defined for the annunciator bus undervoltage relays and the associated time delays. O. O HATCH UNIT 2 1A ' REVISION C
~ -, _ - . . . . .- -. ., . .. . - _ .
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER-INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE ,
" Generic" LA.1 System design and operational details have been relocated to the Bases and procedures. Trip setpoints are an operational detail that is not directly '
related to the operability of the instrumentation. The Allowable Value is the required limitation for the parameter and this value is retained in Table 3.3.8.1-1. Details relating to system design and operation (e.g., -l description of action of instrumentation) are also unnecessary in the LC0 and have been relocated to the Bases and procedures. The design features and system operation are also described in the FSAR. Changes to the Bases 1 will be controlled by the provisions of the proposed Bases Control Process described in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the FSAR and procedures will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
" Specific" L.1 An ACTION has been added (proposed ACTION C) to require declaring the DG I I inoperable and taking the appropriate actions in the associated DG j Specification if a channel is not restored within I hour. Currently, the 1 ACTIONS appear to require a Specification 3.0.3 entry, which would result i in an immediate shutdown. Since Functions 1 and 2 instrumentation provide O a start signal _ for the DGs (i.e., it supports DG OPERABILITY), the appropriate action would be to declare the DG inoperable. The current l
i requirements are overly restrictive, in that if the diesel were inoperable for other reasons, a 72 hour restoration time is provided; yet currently if an instrument is inoperable but the diesel is otherwise fully OPERABLE, an immediate shutdown is required. The ACTION also applies to Function 3 but would only be entered if both the annunciation and voltage indication were inoperable. l
'O HATCH UNIT 2 2 REVISION C
- = n m 1
l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE i D O HATCH VNIT 2 3 REVISION C
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE O l 1
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I HATCH UNIT 2 4 REVISION C l i
r's DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.8.1 - LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION () TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE l l l O e O HATCH UNIT 2 5 REVISION C
Sp-eq1%.b 3.8 1 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SVRVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution system shall be: g 3 g,q a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability, and g
'(' gg 3 8.t.6 b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months duri sh Fowybi~ transferring, manually and automatically, unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit. f ~~ w e
4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: L/\,
- a. In1accordance wifh the'frequencyapecified'in Table 4.83.1(2-1 Y L6 n M TAGGERED TEST BAM 5) 7 4.
5/f 3 81.3 1. Verifying the fuel level in the day fuel tanks-s uc ' 2. Verifying the fuel level in the plant fuel storage tank. q 3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and b tranlfars fuel from the storage system to the day tank.
- 4. Verifying that each diesel starts from ambient condition by
# 3'8'l 2. gradually loading the generator to 1710-2000 kW*,
and operating for 2 60 minutes, and maintains a steady-state voltage of 4160(f 420 volts and a steady-state-C 4 frequency of 60 1.2 Hz.** ' M8 Od8 is aligned t erifying t esel genera ovide WWL tandby power the associat emergency bus s. L-
, pg Nk
,g W34ll a
- Momentary variations outside this band shall not invalidate the test. Abk 7 WN
**For the IB (swing) diesel, a single test will satisfy the requirements N4 4 h2 sc u .t1 for Unit 1 Specification 4.9.A.2.a.1 and Unit 2 Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, with the diesel connected to one unit's emergency bus O for one periodic test and connected to the emergency bus in the other unit during the next periodic test.
HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. H , 83, 119
~bdll
5pec (LL g.e.; - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) T 8.1.1.4 Reports - All diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, shall be-reported to the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 or Specification 6.9.2 (as applicable. If the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests,- i on,a'per nuclear unit basis, is 2 7, the report shall be supplemented to foclude the additional /information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of-
~
' g atory Guide, 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977. J
(' s i j l t 6
/c!t I l I l i
o l l l l 4 HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-7 Amendment No. 86 j i'af tl
3.[ ~' gi , MOh 4LYlCd 3,ft / [ TABLE 4.8.1'i.2-1 DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE' ,
- l Num r of Failures In Test Frequency I-
. Last 20 Valid Tests *' - -
s At least once per 1 days-22 At least on er 7 days N \
/
/
/ '
x
' JUS!EP / j!
/ i
'l N .
.O /
/ ,
i l
/
/
/
/ l
/
s \ I
/ l "Cri ria for determining number of failures and number of valid l te s shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of l 1 gulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1,. August 1977, except that only the l l ast 20 tests are used and are detemined on a per diesel basis. l O
HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-8 A idment No. 83 10 of 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES-0PERATING O k/ TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued) M.5 The DG fuel oil day tanks are proposed to have a Surveillance for the checking for and removal of accumulated water (proposed SR 3.8.1.4). This added restriction provides assurance that water will not degrade the performance of the diesel engine. M.6 Deleted. M.7 De'eted. 1 M.8 The existing tolerance for voltage (t 10%) is being restricted to -10%, )
- +21 Reducing the allowable overvoltage is based on the acceptable overvoltage limits of equipment on the 600 V buses. i I
TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE l
" Gent LA.1 inis Surveillance has been deleted in the proposed Technical Specifications. Procedural controls on DG ;tandby alignment, and the definition of OPERABILITY are sufficient to ensure the DG remains aligned p
y to provide standby power. Removal of this Surveillance from the Technical Specifications will have no effect on DG OPERABILITY. Changes to the procedures will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. 1 LA,' This Surveillance has been deleted in the proposed Technical pecifications. Procedural controls on DG inspections recommended by the
.nanufacturer are sufficient to ensure the DG receives the necessary l inspections. Removal of this Surveillance from the Technical Specifications will have no effect on DG OPERABILITY. Changes to the procedures will be controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
l LA.3 The specific component name of the single largest load need not be ! detailed within the Technical Specifications. The value of the load, as i well as the component itself, are specifically detailed in the Bases, as ' well as the FSAR. Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the Bases l Control Process described in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the FSAR are controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. The reference to the l single largest load within the Technical Specifications is not necessary ! to adequately present the requirement. Similarly, the load value for the l auto-connected loads is removed from the proposed Technical Specifications. I t U HATCH UNIT 2 4 REVISION l
1 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES-0PERATING I \ v ' IECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE (continued) LA.3 (continued) ) Any change to the loads placed on the DG will be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 (a design is required to change the loads). Additionally, the voltage range to be maintained during this test is not detailed in the ITS. Any change to the voltage acceptance criteria for the DG will be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. LA.4 Any time the OPERABILITY of a system or component has been affected by repair, maintenance, or replacement of a component, post maintenance testing is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the system or component. Explicit post maintenance Surveillance Requirements have therefore been deleted from the Specifications. Entry into the applicable modes without performing this post maintenance testing also continues to be allowed as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.0.1. LA.5 The diesel generator accelerated test frequency requirements are relocated in their current licensing bases form to plant procedures, leaving the Technical Specifications periodic surveillance frequency as 31 days. A p plant procedure implements the requirements and responsibilities for y tracking emergency DG failures for the determination and reporting of reaching trigger values specified in NUMARC 87-00. These requirements are more restrictive than those specified in NUREG 1433.
" Specific" L.1 The requested deletion involves the requirement to start the DGs under degraded offsite power condition?. The normal Technical Specification surveillance testing schedule p.ovides adequate assurance that the OPERABLE DGs will be capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inoperability of an offsite AC source in no way affects the reliability of the OPERABLE DGs as previously demonstrated by their normal Technical Specification surveillance testing. In some circumstances, the inoperability of the AC sources will automatically start the associated DG. In these cases, the DG will already be supplying the safety bus. The reliability and availability of the DGs are not adversely affected solely as a result of the loss of offsite circuit (s) and the DG should not be required to be started if this condition exists.
Additionally, once the DG started to meet the existing ACTION, the DG manufacturer recommends loading that DG prior to a return to standby status. The most probable cause of an offsite AC source becoming inoperable is severe weather or an off-normal grid condition. Severe weather or other off-normal grid conditions can also cause the loss of a DG and leave its safety bus without AC power if the DG is tied to the offsite source when d it becomes inoperable. NRC Information Notice 84-69 warns against operating DGs tied to offsite power when the unit's AC sources are HATCH UNIT 2 5 REVISION i l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES-0PERATING p TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIE (continued) L.9 The limitation on the time to reach full DG load from a manual synchronization is proposed for deletion. DG loading should be done in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations to minimize wear on the engine. Additionally, placing a time limitation on the operator to accomplish this loading results in an increased potential for error and subsequent unavailability of the DG. The starting, loading, subsequent full load operation, and automatic start and loading testing required by other Technical Specification Surveillances is adequate to confirm the DG's capability without the 120-second loading requirement. In addition, for clarity, Note 2 has been added to this SR to specifically allow gradual loading. L.10 The proposed " hot restart" test (proposed SR 3.8.1.13) does not require the restart be a simulated loss of offsite power (auto-start signal). The
" hot restart" is proposed to simply be any start signal, as is required by the monthly test. Furthermore, the specific requirement to be automatically loaded with emergency loads is excessive; the DG has demonstrated its ability to power loads while " hot" (i.e., the 24 hour run). Additionally, the automatic loading is an unnecessary repetition of other SRs which confirm the DG ability to accept sequenced loads. DG loading following the hot restart is proposed to be controlled by plant fm procedures and appropriate manufacturer recommendations for loading V following any DG start. This revision allows greater flexibility in scheduling DG testing while not compromising any necessary demonstration of DG capability.
L.11 Deleted. l L.12 The current Specification 3.0.5 has been moved to LC0 3.8.1, in the form of Required Actions A.2, B.2, C.2, and D.1. These new Required Actions are essentially the same as the current 3.0.5, except for the newly provided Completion Times to perform the checks required by current 3.0.5, item (2), and proposed Required Actions A.2, B.2, C.2 and D.I. This new l l 1 1 O HATCH UNIT 2 8 REVISION \e
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS $p,fg4 A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING ( LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Meaual ryin.~.oh > ( Lco 3 6.7.Q 3.8.2.1 The following A.C. distribution Gstem busel, dnverter3)and M ch-ceneXtor (MONetsjshall be OPERABLEg oreameo opt n us,!.w e e n redenqanQ k W ) 7
- a. 4160 volt Essential Buses 2E, 2F, and 2G, ,
I
- b. 400 volt Essential Busey 2C and 20,
- c. 120/208 volt Essential Cabinds 2A and 28,
\ C ri . 120/208 volt Instrutnent. Buses 2A and 2B, and p4P*d 6 A.C ~ inverters 2R44-5002 and 2R44-5003. G uo 3 6 7 b % . A % W '3 f.)
APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3 ACTION: yy g
- a. With one of the inverters in 3.8.2.1.e inoperable, restore the inverter l OF to an OPERABLE status within a period not to exceed seven (7) consecutive days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. With one of the above required A.C. distribution (vitem buse I
h NW inoperable, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE status within 8 hours *or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in M (A"6(COLDSHUT00WNwithinthefollowing24 hours. g y,(.4 g# p.$et
'7
- c. Eith two or more of tneaooverequiredA.L.distributio(fystembuses]
or inverters inoperable, restore at least all except one of tne m inoperable buses and inverters to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be i Ml g1" 6 kW in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN P within the following 24 hours. J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
~
4.8.2.1 The above required A.C. distribution system buses (nd inverters) shall ***E "* b' be determined OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment
'g'7 ' o mu c a ted nnwe r%va! !aow i tv . ang
'b . At least once per 31 days by determining that the 250 volt DC/600 volt AC inverters 2R44-5002 and 2R44-5003 are OPERABLE by verifying inverter
{ output voltage of 600 volts + 5% while supplying their respective
~
1 buses. ne b % % 541 HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-10 Amendment No. 23, 36 JetL.
O Q)CC.\h(EC0 3 h ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 0.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
) I 9C M'[Cd IC' ,Lu @fMK y o W 7.:cc M ,4 -\ )
3.8.2.3 The followinFtivisions of the D.C. power system shall be OPERABLE: f.7.,c m . . - - - .
- a. DIVISION I consisting ofx125/250 volt D.C. bus No. ~
the ' 125/250-volt sYa'tt6n' battery'and 'at' least 2 full f {s ^~~
~
capacity charger g g - A ( -[ - ~ . - . ..,n-- bus No. 2B, thex Jph%
/ 7 b. ,
( DIVISION II125/250-volt consistingstitToIM ofL125/250-volt,0.C.,d fatTeryy an a't-ldast"2 full) fhfd ! g(, p14 m capacity chargersj __. p , \ ' APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 'and 3.' - /h SEl'I4fCCCh
! 0%lYltb (W lit l } [,ij. \
ACTION: p gg_ g fi p ith one of the above required divisions of the O.C. power systeminoperab Mh9
/
/
- hourstor be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in ~.
(~T B00 b COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. CLhcf /(., d-- [ i ((kVd hTrct4 F'k]; Ibu'6 cc1 fgm cp l! C ' ~ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS d6x O L P, 7<( (UC'N tcL3 f~ [] 4.8.2.3.1 Each of the above required divisions of the D.C. power system shall be determined OPERABLE at.least once_per 7 days by verifying - 3.[.h b l correct breaker alignment {r( ihdicated bowerja'v hla Q{i g / 4.8.2.3.2 Each station battery 'and associated chargers shall be demon- \ strated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
k; { 1. The electrolyte level of each pilot cell is between the
\ minimum and maximum level indication marks, l
-~~. _
' j
% / .J
\ 4pc i )
IT5: 3$(g ($d:nj+Csi / U MAmek6, m h M cn / HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-13 2 Of [
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES l ITS: SECTION 3.8.7 - DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS-0PERATING V TECHNICAL CHANGE - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 l (continued) now explicitly required for the Unit 1 buses. Therefore, this change, is considered more restrictive on plant operations. M.2 Current ACTION C of Specification 3.8.2.1 (AC Distribution-Operating) allows two buses to be inoperable for up to 2 hours prior to requiring a shutdown. Current practice is to enter this Action if two buses in different subsystems are inoperable. For example, if 4160 V 2E is deenergized, which results initially in the deenergization of 600 V 2C, 120/208 V essential cabinet 2A and 120/208 V Instrument bus 2A, only ACTION b is entered, and an 8 hour restoration time taken. This is because the cause of the inoperability is the 4160 V bus 2E, a single bus. ACTION C is entered if two or more buses in different subsystems are deenergized. Proposed ACTION F will require an LC0 3.0.3 entry if two or more buses in different subsystems are deenergized. In addition, ACTION F would tie the AC and DC Distribution Systems together, such that, if a loss of assumed safety function occurs, an LC0 3.0.3 entry is required. This ensures a shutdown is immediately commenced if sufficient electrical distribution subsystems to meet accident analysis are not available. m M.3 The proposed Completion Time has a limitation in addition to the 8 hour or 2 hour limit. This additional limit establishes a maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If an AC distribution subsystem is inoperable while, for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours since initial failure of the LC0 to restore the DC distribution system. Then, an AC subsystem could again become inoperable, and the DC distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely. Therefore, to preclude this situation and place an appropriate restriction on any such unusual situation, the additional Completion Time of "16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a" is proposed. TECHNICAL CHANGE - LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 The details relating to system design and purpose have been relocated to the Bases. The design features and system operation are also described in the FSAR. Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the provisions of l the proposed Bases Control Process in Chapter 5 of the Technical Specifications. Changes to the FSAR will be controlled by the provisions /O of 10 CFR 50.59.
V HATCH UNIT 2 2 REVISION h
1 l INSERT 1 for ITS 5.1 The Superintendent of Shift (SOS) shall be responsible for the control room command function. During any absence of the SOS from the control room while either unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, an l individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. i During any absence of the SOS from the control room while both {' units are in MODE 4 or 5, an individual with an active SRO license or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. D- ) i V I i l 1 i A U HATCH UNIT Z
)
I2eceNc4hh f El i s q , - ELECTRICAL-POWER SYSTEMS
\\ l l
RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.(Continued) -
\ ' s li s
N -., I
\ \
j s 4.8.1.1 Reports - All diesel generator failures, val.id or non-valid, f shall be ported to the Commission pursuant tos ic DK 50.7.2 or Specification
'6.9.2, as qplicable. If the number of failures in tne last 100' valid tests, !
onapernuctearunitbasis,is27,thereportshallbesupplementedto j include the additional informationirecommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide,1.108, Revision 1,,, August 1977. \ ' i
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E l O c A O L/ HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-7 Amendment No. 86' S44
n ( O,,. i O ( 1 d TABLE 3.3.6.4-1 (Continued) POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION I o i f e i the r the p rima ry o r seconda ry indication is inoperable, the torus tempera ture wil l be monitored at least Z Once per shirt to observe any unexplained tempe ra tu re increases which might be indicative or an open S/RV. l
- With both the primary and secondary monitoring channels or an S/RV inoperable. either verify that the S/RV is closed through monitoring the backup low low set logic position indicators (2821-N302 A-H and K-M) at least 5 once per shi f t or restore sufficient inoperable channels such that no more than one S/RV has both primary and C secondary channels inoperable within 7 days or be in at least Ito t shutdown within the next 12 hours.
-A m b) With the number or operable channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameters within 72 hours and:
- 1. e i the r re s to re the inoperable channel ( s) to operable status within 7 da: 'r the event, or
- 2. prepa re and submit a Specia l Report to NRC pursuant to Specification 6.* within 14 days following
((. 7 the event, outlining the action taken, the cause of the i nope ra b i l i ty, for restoring the system to operable status.
- 3. . the plans and schedule
/
c ') A channel contains two detectors: one for mid-range noble gas and one for high-range noble gas. Both detectors must be operable to consider the channel ope ra b l e , h, 1 m ~ bee Oiscussics or c Q 9,5 Qr 2 ITh 3. 3. 3.1, PAM L sfr - F 4 u, Y Id 3ec %a 3. 3 en 4 n O. ifm
~3 W
4 a m N, O ct I a z
'h ?
4
?
6 u,
4-._ l I ^ O UNIT 2 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION l l I l l l l O ! l j O n- - - -
N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION ITS: SECTION 3.8.1 - AC SOURCES - OPERATING L,ll CHANGE I Deleted. I i i l i i I i 4 O i i I l l l O V 2h HATCH UNIT 2 11 REVISION
i l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION ITS: SECTION 5.6 - REPORTING REQUIREMENTS There were no plant specific less restrictive changes identified for these Specifications. I I i i f i O ; i i
+
I l 6 i r 1 I HATCH UNIT 2 1 A REVISIONA
/
NUREG 1433 COMPARISON DOCUMENT - SPECIFICATIONS O I 1 l l i l l 1 I O ,
)
i
Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 r SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
...................................--NOTE-------- --------------------........
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided feedwater and main turbinejtrip capability is maintained.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . .. .,4.
. 3. ,.3. .f,7. g e g e g ;.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
./p' g .) _
SR 3.f2T~ ~Perfonn CHANNEL CHECXF--------- -24. hours -- SR 9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. (92}' days 3.3.2.2.(h {IL : (fh SR 3.3.2.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The ;{18Pmonths Allowable Value shall be s inches. q h* (55.Q)+d:'edy / $(o.5 -ataw - r Nj
.J SR 3.3.2.2.4, Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 4187 months including { valve tuation. ,
l l l 1 O BWR/4 STS 3.3 21 Rev. O, 09/28/92
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.3.1 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS
--......................._..........-NOTES-----------------------.------..---.
- 1. LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with one required A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE 30 days h channel inoperable, status. B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A Specri.fication not met, - 6 pb~f.t')SAr2:
'/
l b ~l '
-m h
~ (a il bu0
------.--NOTE.------9 C.1 Restore /one required 7 days C.[NotDppli dte ! channel to OPERABLE nmonitor] i status.
$(\';f[chhydr nels. \
f.d y...._.................I . One or more Functions with two9 required channels,j inoperable. tif /}R97 p,\ j (continued) < ! i i BWR/4 STS 3.3-22 Rev. O, 09/28/92 ; i l
\
l 'M i [MCREC) System Instrumentation -\ 3.3.7.1 * [')g n x
'x !
(* . Table 3.3.7.1 1 (page 1 of 1) f CMain control Room Envirorsesntal Controll system Instrunentation g /
\ ,
(
; APPLICA8tE CON 0ff!ONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED s ofMER CHANNELS FROM /
\ SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED. SURVE!LLANCE ' ' ALLOWABLE FUNCTION ' CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENit' VALUE
- 1. Reactor vessel water 1,2,3;tal [2] 8 st .3'3.7.1.1 1 ( 113) inches Level - Low Low Low, st ' 3.3.7.1.2 Level 1 s (SR 3.3.7.1.31 x / st 3.3.7.1.4
/ st 3.3.7.1.5 i i
- 2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 (21 8 st 3.3.7.1.1 5 (1.921 psig l st 3.3.7.1.2 I f' (SR 3.3. 7.1.3) 1 SR 3.3.7.1.4 st 3.3.7.1.5 j '
- 3. Main steam Line 1,2,3 [2 ..pe r 8 st 3.3.7.1.1 (1381% rated i F low - High Mst) s st 3.3.7.1.2 steem flow
/ x
[st 3.3.7.1.31 st 3.3.7.1.4 l> l
/
/ ', st 3.3.7.1.5 i
- 4. Refueling Floor Area 1,2, (11 C \t 3.3.7.1.1 s (201 aft /hr -
R adi at ion - H i gh SR. 3.3.7.1.2 I(f),(b)) st 3.3.7.1.4 O. ,
/ st 3Q.7.1.5
. ' ontrol R'IAf r Inte C
' Redi et t on - Mi 1'2,3, (a),(b)
U t1}i fEA
\-
52 st g, 3.3.7.1.1 3.3.7.1.2 3,3,7, g ,p (N]M' s9"#E g, Auch bk b( u,dt 0 %# ~ ' 3'3 W t.p, hre. L , I et, M.L.A e . 0 (a) During cosE ALTERAfl0Ns y operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. I (b) Duri movement of irradiated fuel essemblies in the. econdaryt contairunent. g_ ad W.?3 sGhl) udI * % Y'> w % na kwas (" " g , (F.M) gjic,AA
%AJ l
1 l 1 O BWR/4 STS 3.3-73 Rev. O, 09/28/92 1 4 m - --n, , . , . , - - - - ,sg..,, , _ , . - . - - . . . ~- , . , _ . _ ,
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. (yc,) vh ) APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, When the associated diesel generator is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, " AC Sources-Shutdown." ACTIONS
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME (de% c howel h, A. One or more channels A.1 Placc c h ar.cl lir 1 hour _ inoperable /-4cr tr_ip Oft % /4 0 u' [.0,,> Y L1r1( R x ; i 6 . d 2 . ' N jp.1 Q)RequiredActionand
%B
'1 associated Completion 7_
O)%.1 Declare associ ted Imediately
-dic:clMaratur 40G)'
(7 Time not met. inoperable. L l B. Om n uce d#nci. Li \Q r,c volkiccon Q c (,c h r p t h fc c accuMe,M.Krm) boar w + . 3. he is 2 ms v. I P.%y! P l BWR/4 STS 3.3-74 Rev. O, 09/28/92
l LOP Instrumentation l 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
.-...---------- C 2------......
' % ....................................N0T(e 1 Refer to Table 3.3.8.1 1 to determin Nhich SRs apply for each L6P d [c function. ..
- 2. When'a-channel-ii' place'd-in-an'inoperabfB' stat'u's solei'y for p'erfornance of required Surveillances, entry intonssociated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up..to 2 hours'provided the associated Function maintains-DG initiation capability
. . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .h. . . . .g. . .g. , . . (Q. . . . .T.9 ,,de;g
[ d itl diJM Acid.-f CA 04 (;/1 bild t ' (fo,- Tt arclio,i 3W T420 SURVEILLANCE FREQ(IEfici v- - ( SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perfonn CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours 9.s
~~
SR 3.3.8.1 [Peffonn CH NNIi. FUNCTIONAL TEST. 31 days SR 3.3.8.1. b Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. (187 months O o a ' n f Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. SR 3.3.8.li4 :{18F months C. .J-O BWR/4 STS- 3.3-75 Rev. O, 09/28/92
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 1 Table 3.3.8.1 1 (page 1 of 1) Loss of Power Instrunentation 9 REQUIRED CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE ALLOWA8LE . FUNCTION PER BUS REQUIREMENTS VALUE l
< 1. 4.16 kV Emergency sus Urdervottage .-
(Loss of Voltage)
- a. Bus Undervoltage 442[ , M 3.3.0. i . H tb2800 N = ; ; ; /A W l'
$4 3.3.8.1.2
$R 3.3.8.1.3 '
SR 3.3.8.1.4
- b. ilme Delay p2A (sa 3.3.8.1.21 st 3.3.8.1.3 2: wae = (.O St 3.3.8.1.4 s/6.5Qeconds
- 2. 4.16 kV Emergency sus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)
- a. aus undervettege W21.L/ P- LL O. ..M t (32801 Y w < 1.h'M._
st 3.3.8.1.2 s SR 3.3.8.1.3 { st 3.3.8.1.4 . _ . _ _ _ _ , _ .
- b. Time Delay -<42}" ($A 3.3.8.1.21 st 3.3.8.1.3 $
g(v. 35 l - ps21.51 seconds sa 3.3.8.1.4 'Y _,., ,
,)\ :
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---....._._._.___.. - - ~ - - - - .
! - a 3 41rV Emevemo Luc [ g 3 3 3. i . ( l 3M6V dvdef vctlanc hyurnr4 ion j
- l. %
sp 3. EE3.b.1N'.E 3 b, bK Rekiwilo., gp 3.3 3.l.4 . 0 ; i k b.he h ? 1 & 5.3.6 I 1 4 (d3 2mh ! g 3.3 S.l.a- t 4 y 3. 3. S. ' 4
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w __ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ - i i i J T).70 c w. 1 l l l BWR/4 STS 3.3-76 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l l t l
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued) REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION
-------REVIEWER'S NOTE------- /
FOne [ required] [automaticload i This Condition may be deleted if the unit design is such /
/
sequencer)\noperable. that any sequencer failure / mode will only affect the f ability of the associated
% power its respectiye',0G' n
safBty loads following a loss 1[q0 ofoffhstqower independent
. t with, a of, or coinciden'rt Design' Basis Eve F.1 Restore (required] 12] hours
[automaticload sequencer] to OPERABLE status. _N G. Required Action and G.1 8e in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion ion A, AND TimeofCondi)EP
~
8, C, D, -Eor] G.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours orF]"notmet. H. ' fire or more H.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Imediately [requi A ources inoperab r reas other n hl g ition E] . l W 3.o 1 i O 3.8-5 Rev. O, 09/28/92 BWR/4 STS
i l l AC Sourcos-Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7 days indicated power availability for each ;
}{ required}Nffsite circuit.
SR 3,8.1.2 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. Perfonnance of SR 3.8.1. satisfies this SR. g pq
- 2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.
- 3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to y synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer.
8 , When modified start procedures are not used, the time, voltage, and frequency tolerances of SR 3.8.1. must be met.
..~.
3,k 3m"+ T----.----------- --.---------. ---- D Verify eac DG* arts from standby ( 31 ( Csy 42::<ff.[ir, conditions and achieves steady state Tab 1:W. 1 g' voltage ef3740}'V and 5 PI cy af58.8}2-Nz and 5j{61.2Niz; W h l h (continued) l BWR/4 STS 3.8-6 Rev. O, 09/28/92
AC Sources-Operatinh 3.8.1 i I Table 3.8.1-1 '
/
\N Diesel Generator Test Schedule ,/,
\IN;LAST NUMB'ER 25 VALIO OF FAILURES (a)
TESTS FREQUE CY 53 31 days _ l / a4 - 7 days (b) (but a 24 hours)
/
i / l
; l
,/ '
(a) Criteria for detemining number of fa1 lures and valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory. Position' C.2.1 of Regulatory, Guide 1.9, Revision 3, where the number of , tests and failures is determined on a , per DG basis. , i
/
/
(b) This test frequency shall be maintained until se'ven consecutive failure free starts from standby gdonditions'and load,and run tests have been / perfomed. This is consistent with Regulatory Position [ ], of l Regulatory Guide 1.9,/ Revision 3. If, subsequent to the 7 failure free tests, 1 or more additional failures occur such that there are again 4
/' or more failures .in the last 25. tests,'the testing interval shall .again be reduced as noted above and maintained untils 7 consecutive failure free tests have been performed. \s ,
N / _ Note: If Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.9 is not' approved, the above i table will' be modified to be< consistent with the existing' version of
~
Regulatory Guide 1.108, GL,84-15, or other approved guillance. ~ i l /
,/ .
\
N
- l
- /\
-w A iq
't h 60 /
k ._W O 3.8-17 Rev. O, 09/28/92 BWR/4 STS
AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 i a M 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown UM b WA 1. LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electri power N NrIes sha OPERABLE: Co n M.44t&" GP 3
- a. One qualified ci uit etween the offsite ransmission network and the nsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.
h
" Distribution Systems-Shutdow "- g,
" supplying one b., Oney, diesel generator (DG) capable M4 1- civision of the nsite Class 1E AC electrical power 4 distribution su system (s)guired by LCO 3.8 u . e z. L& 1-
- f APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, u. + 2 I Durino movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the
@econdaryPtontainment.
(Ard i m _ m.m.3 g uo 3.s . 7. 3.8-18 Rev. O, 09/28/92 O BWR/4 STS l l
~
- - InHirte'rs-haEdown'\'L
~
3.8.8 h
, h] l k fl , ACTIONS -
l
\
) \
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETiONTIME I l \ f 1 'N s / A. (continued)N A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately l
! ' 'N restore [ required] /
\ inverters to OPERABLE
\N status.
l l
- i l j l N\ / !
~ i I N .
\
i, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS x f SURVEILLANCE s , FREQUENCY l l
\/ l SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage 7 days
[ frequency,] and alignments,tox[ required] ' 1 AC vital buses. \
\
\ .
/ \-
)
/
\, ~
i / \
! < \ !
l
\
/
i \ l \
! \1
- i i
\
/
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l I i l I
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l
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~ _ .:a l BWR/4 STS 3.8-37 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l
Distribution Systems-Operati
- 3. ,
P7 3.8 CTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 1 3.8 istribution Systems-Operating 1 -1 - LCO
.(F ((Divisiog 1] and [Div)fion 2) AC, DC, and AC vital bys']
gy (electrical power dijrtribution subsy,s ems shall be QPfRABLE.'
},
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. 6[] rcrp , h t A/B ACT~I'WI 2,x3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME x 4 f NiAC45d3 electrical O@Al Restore AC electrical 8 hours ( lQi One't ' power distribution v' power distribution Mq subsystem inoperable. subsystems to AND IP_\g ' OPg m.,~ OPERABLE status. gp . op 'o%) P-I5 16 hours from
/ discovery of T- . , . t fai fedo,. meet LCO
~n.w N- _
'B. One AC vital _ bus '
B.1 Restore AC vital bus J _hou W~ inoperable. - distributiV
~ N w subsystems to AND
{j Of7 - PERABLE_tstatus. x 16 hours from W ' N -discovery of
/ -ft~ ~
fal ure to meet
/
LCO
/
. One,;[ station service}8- A Ib h Restore,0C electrical 2 hours l
DT61ectrical power power di!rtTT5ution (~ distribution subsystem subsystems to AND j inoperable. OPERABLE status.
~
n...' u ai ^
) 16 hours from discovery of
/tt,:1 )\ kn e .s~nY hd 1 C[d failuredo Jneet lQ')\ A
..L L:47 LL.+ t.
" LCO N 61 c o .'(e c /3 (continued) b A r. c l- : s c e,p,, u ,
been - b 3.8-38 Rev. O, 09/28/92 BWR/4 STS n! 7,. ' f*"r n*c*e, It v e U
,, u y , , -
U e# 4 _f,, ,
i O INSERT LC0 3.8.7 (U1 VERSION) 1
~
The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power. distribution subsystemsI comprised of: 7 --
- 1. 4160 V Essential Buses lE, IF, and IG; ^
- 2. 600 V Essential Buses IC and ID; .
- 3. 120/208 V Essential Cabinets IA and IB; 120/208 V Instrument Buses lA and IB; 4.
- 5. 125/250 V DC Station Service Buses lA and 18;
- 6. DG DC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems; and (s
~
- b. Unit 2 AC and DC elec'tfical poweI distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
System," and LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating." (/ s_ HATCH UNIT 1
i j INSERT LCO 3.8.7 (U2 VERSION) 3 (O l 0 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Unit 2 AC and DC-electrical power distribution subsystemslcom' prised of: -
- 1. 4160 V Essential Buses 2E, 2F, and 2G;
- 2. 600 V Essential Buses 2C and 20; ,
- 3. 120/208 V Essential Cabinets 2A and 2B;
- 4. 120/208 V Instrument Buses 2A and 2B; -
- 5. 125/250 V DC Station Service Buses 2A and 28; N
- 6. DG DC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems; and '
- b. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LC0 3.6.4.7, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
~'; System," LC0 3.7.4, " Main Control Room Environmental (V Control (MCREC) System," LC0 3.7.5, " Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System," and LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources -
Operating." l n i HATCH UNIT 1 l
I 7 (' )
*' INSERT A/B 3.8.7 o.; t >-
( A. e or inore required u.2i ([Jnit rAC or DC c'c- c A.1 R_estore_requiredU 7 days e ectrical powerk(ish,-od sea (2/AC and'DC~ A subsystems inoperabl'e ; subsystem (s) te /C-\l' OPERABLE status.
. , , "'r B. One ni
'(5 hUhs'wknh B.1 Restore DG DC 12 hours electrical power wg bu JG DC electrical power distribution
~
distribution AND subsystems inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status. 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LC0 3.8.7.a ( O-HATCHUNITlj(umrz_
l Responsibility 5.1 l l' (h) 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ; 5.1 Responsibility 5.1.1 he [ Plant Superintendent] shall be responsible for overall unit i operation and shallNelegate in writing the succession to .this
' P,o a.
;_ - responsibility during'his absence.
x , 5I T erintendenth or his designee, in accordance with' INSErf g approved ' administrative procedures, shall approve prior to Ft implementation, each proposeds test or experiment and proposed changes and modifications to uni.t systems or equipment that affect ' uclear safety > j P.;.' G a p s r o s 1 5 ,\r ~ 99 Tb bh- @ bO) 5.1. TheMShift Super"isor (SS)] shall be responsible for the control
' m3 room comand function.A managemer(directive to this' fee ,
6hl N fsigned by th [hig(st leve(of corporaQ or siYessayn M ' \.sha l l'h.e i s sue anngan y to aR station pWsonnel.]During any absence oIW from the con' trol ro hile ,thq unit is in
,-p, 7 , MODE L 2. or 3. an individual wit = n!" Senior Reactor '
v
/ ' Operator (SRO)licenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrol room comand function. During any absence of the -[4frTTr'oiii~th
/ contrni room while tM unitsis in MODE 4 or 5, an individual with I
~\ / WilTOSRO license'or Fieactor Operator license shall be (d [ 'deTijnated to assume thE control room comand function.
/ --
e x .- /P, 2. Oh o c 1, n
% ,/ _ me ~~
bo4h (t M4C GO m / s_.'w %_
~.
g}lg p # Y. $ l ; 2 R S\ l d 1 1 1 ( G) l l BWR/4 STS 5.0-1 Rev. O, 09/28/92
Organization 5.2 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.2 Organization 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Oroanizations Onsite and offsite organizations shall be established for unit operation and corporate management, respectively. The onsite and offsite organizations shall include the positions for activities affecting safety of the nuclear power plant.
- a. Lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shall For uit ; orly be defined and established throughout highest management c
g# Dg levels, intermediate levels, and all operating organization t P.2. positions. These relationships shall be documented and U"I f I ) updated, as appropriate, in organization charts, functional F5AR descriptions of departmental responsibilities and r - relationships, and job descriptions for key personnel ll ' U'# 2 onlyh positions, or in equivalent forms of docume ation. These f/ ant #4rd fLh,'r2. requirements shall be documented in the "SAR '
- b. The Tlant-SuperintendcntD shall be responsible for overall Qskn safe operation of the plant and shall have control over
%. g. .a c,, ,n. i those onsite activities necessary for safe operation and r_ pu maintenance of the plant; mbc.,%as(mm.Ph op -
j'7 [c. TDer-::::cif%:!_;;rp0 rata execut4ve-poiBdopd shall have
/ corpoirate responsibility for overall plant nuclear safety Wu PrulJa gr- and shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable Nvc 6 performance of the staff in operating, maintaining, and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nuclear safety; and
- d. The individuals who train the operating staff, carry out health physics, or perform quality assurance functions may report to the appropriate onsite manager; however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.
5.2.2 Unit Staff Q) s 3dvh A J The unit staff organization shall7h as fo s:
- a. Eich on-duty shift-shall be composed of at least'the minimumh
, G P, I J shiftN rew composition'shown in Table 5.2:._2-11.
~
'N >
._ N lTNSE W 'B Alro a )) E. 2 . 2 c
_ (continued) BWR/4 STS 5.0-2 Rev. O, 09/28/92
INSERT B FOR NUREG 5.2.2 , a. A plantfequipment operapoE (PEO) sl[all be assigned to each
' eactpr containing fuef and an additional,PEO shall, lie //
2 assicfned for each cgrdrol roop'from whigh'a reactor'is ,/ opp ating/in MODE ,l', 2, or 3. With both units sh'utdown 'or j\ > defuele a total'of three'PEOs for the two units is- f(.A,_
, require,d',
d.
- c. "9 Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54 (m) (2) (i) and 5.2.2.a for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate
! unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided
/ immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew
.'~ .. composition t_o within the minimum requirements. _.
- O l VC. I';n s s h w s.t 30t?) (\ .d Ca .
. Y i- ( Vo d bt. I V) fr c ((34 - { 't. r ( g ( ,- ) l I, - : ( '- f () 3,. ..'_.. _ %_ _( g ,) l'g [,
T'[ k
..e . es .,
k % \cs \ C) , s C I L;f[(b(gig}[I3,c,((,k($ , (p,nu,c&Scuumeqw,iinaa i 1 C wd c\ o,1 M \c er. T ore 6 h
',-(<>u> vl O ,
s % w . e s e ,eaca J ._.__._.. es s t bh / ,
~__ _
P t c-HATCH. UNITS 1 AND 2 REVISION
I Reporting Requirements J b 5.; ) Reporting Requirements GfI m ( 5.^.P S=:id n:x rt;_f xtinnO
,_)
Da ndividua'l is for ch unit and the reparationM f.1 sub Qtal are des nated in he Technical S fications. N j [SpecialReportsshal.]besubmitt in accorda e with 10 CFR 50.41 ( within 1 e time period specified fo each repor
\
he follow 1 Special Reports shall be mitted: I ts water in the
- a. NCSnin MODE the even 2, or 3, anECCSihctuatedandin' a ecial Report shall be prepared >
a'hd submitted
' thin 90 day describingthecTecumstancesb(
the\ actuation an the total a umulated actuatibg cycles to datehThecurren value of the sage factor for each affected safety inj tion nozzle all be provided A this Qpecialheportwhene r its value e eeds 0.70. f w. fi
, _ __z_. .
, _ li
/ /'
I m-+ /[1xp' 25 demands, eriences four or morethese failures' and[ any n valid failuresdn-thelast' 1 - [f,3 37, ./experiencld-b that EDGiin-thaf timi period sha'll be reported withiiC30-days. Reports on EDG fai-lures shall / v- l
/ y'
_O - f includettherihformatio Nnomme'nded'in R 61atory Gu,itle 1.9, evisiiin 3, Regulatory PositidiNNE xisting Rpulator;y'.. -f
<] .
Guide 1.108-reporting-requirement T ,/ / ~~/
') When a oy) i s requi red by #^U' + ' ^- " - #
R 29
/ _ LCO 3.3cd3.1E Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) ,
M InstruiFentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned the cause of the alternate inoperability,method and the plans of monitoring,d an schedule for restor instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status. t (Y-47 s &c A u; A 3 Ar% C PA"0 ET-h V _ _ - - . _ O-BWR/4 STS 5.0-37 Rev. 0, 09/28/92
__ RecordRetentio) 5.10' 0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.10 cord Retention 5.10.1 Tegliowingrecordsshallberetainedfo at least 3 years:
- a. AY14icense Event Reports required by 10 R 50.73;
- b. Records 'of changes made to the procedures requ' ed by ;
Specificatlon 5.7.1.1; and i
\ l
- c. Records of radiba tive shipments. l l
5.10.2 The following records shall tained for at least 5 years:
- a. Records and logs of unit opergtion covering time intervals at each power level;
- b. Records and logs of principal maint nance activities-inspections, repair, and replacement f principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety;
- c. Re rds of surveillance activities, inspect ns, and cali r tions required by the Technical Specif ations (IS)
[andth Fire Protection Program];
- d. Records of s led source and fission detector leak ts and results; and
- e. Records of annual sical inventory of all sealed source material of record. ,
5.10.3 The following records shall be tained for the duration of the unit Operating License:
- a. Records and drawing changes ref ting unit design ifications made to systems and uipment described 'n the FS
- b. Records f new and irradiated fuel inven y, fuel transfers, nd assembly burnup histories;
\ c.
Records of ra 'areas; radiation contro tion exposure for all individua \ entering
, x
( G[',1 ) N -- m (continued) BWR/4 STS 5.0-38 Rev. O, 09/28/92
l l
"unec 1433 COMPARISON DOCUMENT - BASES O
l l 1 O O
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 ,O BASES LC0 (9 i JM Suppression Pool Water Temperature (continued)
~
that, there is a, group of sensors within a 30 ft line of sight.ofeacJyreliefva e discharge location, .} s
' }
Thus,sixgroupsofsensorsarpiufficient'tomonitoreach ! relief valve dis arge location. Each group of four sensors ! a
]h ' ], dMU< ^ -
-
- includes two sensors for nonnal suppression pool temperature The outputs for the PAM b, monitoring sensors ar (and two sensors recorded on fourfor PAM.
independent recorders ,in the ( cn '~ & M h' i control room (channels A and C are redundant to channels B i h and D,'respectively). All four of these recordirs must be / I OPERABLEtofurnishtwochannelsofPAMindi6ationforeach/
! o.f_theJelief_.valye _ discharge. loca@ ions.hese record ~ers'~
are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channels.
}
APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. p These variables are related to the diagnosis and preplanned (,) actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1 and 2. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, plant conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is extremely low; therefore, PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to the ACTIONS to_ exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require plant shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive function of the instruments, the operator's ability to diagnose an accident using alternative instruments and methods, and the low probability of an event requiring these instruments. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to PAM instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion
- Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered,
'b g c . p r. S subsequeny, subsystems, components, or variables expresi d 1n the Condition discovered to be inoperable or m
a V . (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-67 Rev. O, 09/28/92
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS not within limits, will not result in separate entry into (continued) the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Cor.dition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable PAM instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate Functions. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable PAM function. A.1 When one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channels (or, in the case of a Function that has only one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval. [P.b If a channel has not been restored to h 30 days, this Required Action speciff';0PERABLE s initiation of action status in in accordance with Specification 5..,.Lc_eSpc4*4-e e pris7 which requires a written report apprwed-by tk [u,dte
,\ rAe.ter-Gn.ni+m] to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions.
This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement, since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of plant conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation. C.1 Q ,agQ WhenoneormoreFunctionshavetwdrequiredchannelsthat are inoperable (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-68 Rev. O, 09/28/92
LOP Instrum:ntation B 3.3.8.1 [] ' B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION V B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation BASES i BACKGROUND Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources for energizing the various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components. The LOP instrumentation monitors the 4.16 kV emergency buses. Offsite power is the preferred source of power for the 4.16 kV emergency buses. If the monitors determine that insufficient power is available, the buses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DG) power sources. Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic. The voltage for each bus is monitored at two levels, which can be considered as two different undervoltage Functions: Loss of Voltage and 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Degraded Voltage. r" Each Function causes various bus transfers and disconnects. ( ); Each Function is monitored by two undervoltage relays for each emeroency bus, whose outputs are arranged in a wo-out-of-two logic configurationk(Ref. 1). The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that pdgg[A PD,s yr ,gsM ga compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel h r
% . * ,. . p# , output relay ' actuates,-which then outputs a LOP trip signal
#b .J to the trip logic
& # ,,y, -[(c W.B
~~
)
. Q .9 \ Q /
~g' l
~ APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,
-The LOP instrumentation is required for Engineered Safety Features to function in any accident with a loss of offsite j
~
LCO, and power. The required channels of LOP instrumentation ensure APPLICABILITY that the ECCS and other assumed systems powered from the DGs, provide plant protection in the event of any of the Reference 2, 3, and 4 analyzed accidents in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. The initiation of the DGs on loss of offsite power, and subsequent initiation of the ECCS, 4 ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below { the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. ] 1 l (l (continued) ! U j BWR/4 STS B 3.3-219 Rev. O, 09/28/92 ! l
LOP instrumentation ! B 3.3.8.1 BASES , (Cl',Y u ( i e@ APPLICABLE AccidentanalysescredittheloadingoftheDGbasedontheh 7 SAFETY ANALYSES, loss of offsite power during a loss of coolant accident. LCO, and The diesel starting and loading times have been included in C APPLICABILITY the delay time associated with each safety system component (continued) requi ring DG supplied power following_a. loss of_ of fsite_____.m\
/' power. tg4 t)'
(OW d. _W
~~'..
[\ - m s~n c hu m.,,r ent,3 c ]c, W fy p<.p,
'L The LOP instrume tio ~ ~ h iWih Criterion 3 of the NRC
[y,h wa Policy Statemen , pg, 5 ) ,p g t __\-) e The OPERABILITY of the LOP instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.8.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per 4.16 kV e3 emergency bus, with their setpoints within the specified / l g .Yo/s Allowable Values. A channel is inoperable if its actual l
.t
'N trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
NThe-ammW setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable D
, g eetpoint ,~ihcda'egy assumptions.
q The Allowable Values are specified for each Function in the ,
/ 3u Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint l@, j
'p 3r rtN calculations. ThenominalsetpointsareselecteQtoensure u that the setpoints do not exceed the ATiowable'value between
%[g@
CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal tr' __setpoint, but within the-Qpg
@b h j; rip setpoints are those pVty,
, Allowable Value, is acceptable. of' predetermined values of output at which an action should
. Py ," &
e qq.c. take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., degraded voltage), and wher; the h I di - measure 4 output value of the process parameter exceeds the, p cLe g ) g t @'n p) ) ,setfo'Inf, the associated device (e.g., trip wrK) changes - l
- state.gonaly W iimits are des j ved h um the iimiting i ") $ g gr N#. //valuesoftheproces4parametersvobtainedfrom-thesafety a /
{ / / analysts. The All6wab y Val d s are derived irom the s
,b $ analytic % tts correcp for calibratio'ndprocess, an'd-some of the9 n q,rument'erro The trip setp61 qts are then s- ,' f' M D de$ ermined accouitting for the r ining instruments errors ',
l g W, < (e.h drif t) . ,yTheN(ip setpoints erived in this man,ner
.c Q provide dequate protecRon because instrumentation
_ uncertai s, process effq ts, calibratto.n tolerances,
,p instrument rift, and . severe environment errors (for
/f channel's that must function in harsh environments as defined O'IN J
. by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for. -
../:
g&: m h (continued) l l BWR/4 STS B 3.3-220 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l l 1 I
INSERT I 3.3.8.1 Backaround Section [ Mc g { lf6,3 - g lg}
'Lir Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP alarm instrumentation to provide an anticipatory alarm and the initiation of corrective measures to restore emergency bus voltages. The alarms are set higher than the LOP trip rel ays. The alarm setpoints are approximately midway between the calculated minimum expected voltage and the calculated minimum required voltage, based on the maximum expected operating; i.e., non-LOCA, load conditions. The alarm-setpoints signify that adequate voltage is available for normal operations.
The LOP anticipatory alarms provide a total time delay of 60 seconds to reduce the possibility of nuisance alarms, while permitting prompt detection of potential low voltage conditions. O 4 um ,m u l i
g INSERT 6 3.3.8.1 Backaround Section ( j7Jr < P; 5 3 ~2 /'~ ;
, s J Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has a dedicated low voltage annunciator fed by two relays and their associated time delays. The logic for the annunciation function is arranged in a one-out-of-two configuration.
[- w U('\. l l l l J r (.(lliT zL /u o DID i 2-
I
-INSERT 2 3.3.8.1 Acolicable Safety Analysis Section(page B 3.3-220) !
The LOP alarm instrumentation is required to initiate manual actions to restore the 4.16 kV emergency bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. The required channels of LOP alarm instrumentation ensures the initiation of l manual actions to protect the ECCS and other assumed systems from degraded voltage without initiating an unnecessary automatic disconnect from the preferred offsite. power source. The occurrence of an undervoltage degraded voltage condition credits the manual actions to mitigate the condition and ensure plant safety is maintained. 1 O a l O l l UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 REVISION C ! l I _ - , . _ - ._ ~. _ .__ _ _. _ _
F INSERT 3 3.3.8.1AcolicableSafetyAnalysisSection[{d.Ck[.5'v'[) The 4.16 kV undervoltage degraded voltage trip setpoints were determined in accordance with the NRC staff positions contained in an NRC letter dated June 2,1977, except that manual actions are credited for restoring bus voltages or initiating a plant shutdown in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV. The undervoltage degraded voltage setpoint represents a point on the inverse time characteristic curve for the relay. The anticipatory alarm setpoints are approximately midway between the calculated minimum expected voltage and the calculated minimum required voltage, based on maximum expected operating; i.e., non-LOCA, conditions.
'\
/b\
O O am a w=
r i LOP Instrum:ntation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and SAFETY ANALYSES, Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by LCO, and Function basis. APPLICABILITY (continued) h LM
- 1. 4.16 kV Emeraency Bus Undervoltace (Loss of Voltaae)
Loss of voltage on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that offsite power may be completely lost to the respective emergency bus and is unable to supply sufficient power for , proper operation of the applicable equipmert. Therefore, the power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to DG power when the voltage on the bus drops-below the Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Values (loss of voltage with a short time delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment. The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that power is available j to the required equipment. Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of-Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the DG function. (Two channels input to each of the three DGs.) Refer to LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," and 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.
- 2. 4.16 kV Emeroency Bus Undervoltaae (Deoraded Voltaae)
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus ! indicates that, while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS function. Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from l offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus I drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values C (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-221 Rev. O, 09/28/92 4
1 l LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES l I i l APPLICABLE .
- 2. 4.16 kV Emeroency Bus Undervoltage (Deoraded Voltage) I SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY (degraded voltage with a time delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment. The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough b 7 to ensure that sufficient power is available to the = required [hN
' -Q M c%
WM equi per,t. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough ~ rJJi provideTiife~for the offsite powep~suppipio7 rec 6ver tof m
, g' .
v' , njo mal voltag3s, but short erlough to, ensure,that,suffic-ient (owerd ave 11able-n the rs' quired equipmefit.f 'j)
,b w a,w j% -6 any re % J Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded
+s ~ ,- . ,. c h pb4.3 L %t Au
'I Voltage) Function per associated bus are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE b d, Ast.&-en J to ensure that(Two no single instrument failure can preclude the channels input to each of the three l e<Le.mij ~ yad 4, , DG function.
!a m.l A q or % f emergency buses and DGs.) Refer to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 MLk 7._ ,- w,W for Applicability Bases for the DGs. gm
' ~ ~ ~ ~
s 'tEEi T A) m - 3., 6- MUT F
)
ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion ! {p.] Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent Dehs, subsystems, components, or variables C_ .W"y, c, expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or doJi not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial i entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate l Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation l channel. m A.1 <
~
P!70/ j .d.'or / ) -- With one or more channels of.' Functio noperable, the l Function is not capable of performing the intended function. A l Therefore, only 1 hour is allowed to restore the inoperable LQ. 1 (continued) l BWR/4 STS B 3.3-222 Rev. O, 09/28/92
INSERT 4 3.3.8.1AoolicableSafetyAnalysisSection(g)6( b 3.3- 2.22) Manual actions are credited in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV to restore bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown. The range specified for manual actions indicates that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors; however, sufficient voltage for equipment at lower voltages required for LOCA conditions may not be available. A o O O n,n w oou u
\
INSERT 5 3.3.8.1 Acolicable Safety Analysis Section(page B 3.3-222) ()
- 3. 4.16 kV Emeroencv Bus Undervoltaae (Anticipatory Alarmsl A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicated that, while offsite power is adequate for normal operating conditions, available power may be marginal for some equipment required for LOCA conditions. Therefore, the anticipatory alarms actuate when the 4.16 kV bus voltages approach the minimum required voltage for normal; i.e., non-LOCA, conditions. This ensures that manual actions will be initiated to restore the bus voltages or to initiate a plant shutdown.
One channel of the 4.16 kV emergency bus undervoltage (Anticipatory Alarm) function per the associated bus are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE. (Two channels input to each of the three emergency buses.) k o a 1
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 Q BASES LJ ACTIONS A.d (continued) channeltoOPERABLEstatus.Sftheinope ble channel f ce restored to OPE the ahlowable
.b l {obonutof service time, the $ABLE e annel mnst best'atus withi pla d in tte l
tri ed condition per Requi ed Actioh A.1. P1 ing the c inop able channel in trip uld conservatively ompen's4 te I for th inoperabiHty, resto capabili'ty to acco odatega
\ % "ny" y 4 single ilure (within s the LOP instrumentation), an allog
\ 4,0.3) aIW operation s
continud Alterna ly, if itxis not de ' red to i place the ch nelintbip(e.g., s in the Nase where
! PM # pel s the ch nelinkripwould sult in DG
;s kT Ne placing' initiat ion), Con ition B must be ent red and(rts Require gi,, c M' "' p Action ta' ken. f--
1 The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time gam'#
- to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The
~
i ' t y I hour Completio:j Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of 3 channels. 1 WE\]_O 9 m I b - .70) ps \pno1 .) ~~ f x V ~ If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable imediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s). SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for (sg performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated C Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to
- , 2' hours p~rovided the associated Function maintains DG
'TnTTaTTon~5Fa~birity:A Upon completion of the Surveillance, g / or expiration of the I hour allowance, the channel must be yTQ e9 / Q-g v
/ (continuee)
\bg)Mc6./'-
y 4 STS B 3.3-223 .. Rev. O, 09/28/92 NLen for hcmoc g'), y- u) aa am,uw Iccam i . k ~g
I h- hs $dh rl R,. - ~~_ ' ' ' x LOP Instrumentation 6~~~ CY f'. H e d o. 2 40Q be 6;yupc;do((y g-p o & [ y g ', B gg~w 3.3.8.1 BASES .- N'- M M " O d 0 b Ic N (or C il m yrj -k g ym gg g c g_ Ui (4 VM. or W} M i rd 6rd CDU M itQ~r~- ~x~ SURVEILLANCE re'tdrieTt'o OPERABilitatus oEihi'appliHble condition , enteredsand Required Actions taken.
~
REQUIREMENTS - I (continued) Ns > SR 3.3.8.1,'iN Id yc. ($p lugCtGMQ - f
\ x Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures 1
{ thatagrossfaiure_ofinstrumentationAhasnotoccurred. A l CHJNEL CHECK isjhjemparispn1f the parameter inTicated jonl
.one,thanhe1~to psimilar-parameter on other channeJsf' It 'sl I.
based on thyd'ssump}ich that instrument channels'monit I l t'the samegarameter'should read 4pproximately-tfie same- lue.
O i Significant ,dev'iations betiwe(n the instrument channfis coulc '
g,j -
l be' an indication of exces'sive instrument drif t in_oRo_f_theI I channels' or somettting_even_.more._1eriq.usf~A7HA~NNEL CHECK m
7 A "p__Wdetect. verifying grossthe _channelfailure4 instrumentation continues thus,toit operate is key properly to ,
f (t '
f t M g,3i
~ _ . _ _ _ - - _ . . , _ _ _
~/C\
' Ag,reenientfrfterijv6re determinyd'by t)e' plapt'stafff4aseh G Ah a combinati3n of the' channel inst Gment'uncertaintifs u' /
'ncluding_indtca t i o n in d re a da b i l i . O f a channel Ts outside the mat 5 criterTaTII may e'an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. Thus, perfomance of the CHANNEL failure is limited to 12CHECK hours. The ensures that undetectedw outr supplements less fomal, but more frequent, checks of channels during nomal operational use of the displays CHANNEL CHECK IM _.s associated with channels required by the LCO. SR 3.3.8.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is perfomed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perfom the v C(/-[]) intended function. [M%((b The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is a rare event. (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-224 Rev. O, 09/28/92
INSERT C ACTIONS (continued) (i ll, f, { ')j () Each 4.16 kV bus has a dedicated annunciator fed by two relays and their associated time delays in a one-out-of-two logic configuration. Only one , relay and its associated time delay is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, the loss of the required relay or time delay renders Function 3 incapable of performing the intended function. Since the intended function is to alert personnel to a lowering voltage condition and the voltage reading is available for each bus on the control room front panels, the Required Action is verification of the voltage to be above the annunciator setpoint (nominal) hourly. A l i l 1 I O
. . _ . . - . _ . _ . . . _ ~ . _ _ . ._ .-.. . - . _ . . . . __
INSERT A for orocosed BASES B 3 3.8.1 O ._1 6 nrt Z A4 Functior6maintaig DG initiation capability,,provided two DGs can be initiated by the Function. /
/, _
O
-O j
LOP Instrumsntation B 3.3.8.1 /^T BASES U SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1.3 REQUIREMENTS t' (continued) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel
\ '
responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations Measurement and setpeiiit error histei icel--- 4eteminaMen,s-musbbe-per-formed consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The-ehannel-shaLI.-be4ett-hg ' ealibrate&connstent-with-the~ assumptions-of-the setpoint mathede!egy.
' If the as found setpoint is not vQhin its required
.h j Al wable value i plant specific'
~
oi.nt' methodology may z/ be re ~ ed, g app e, if the his and all'other-- s
\_ pertinen infonnation in icate a need for the revision.
i I
. I')I '
s e ioniti all D J.aEEset coqsisten 'th the bssuftt ons the curr t pl t specific Ktpoint m hodology. N he Frequency is based upon the assumption of-m-6*wh ( LeeHtrrattoir ;r, tera' ' the dete="ation of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. (. v f(P i e SR 3.3.8.1.4 V The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the ; OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific A channel. The system functional testing performed in LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions. h] The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perfom this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the x 11,.A Surveillance were perfonned with the reactor at power.
'g(s dd'g Operating experience has shown these components usually pass pv M" M the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.
1 2M o.9 g
& ccAw tov REFERENCES 1. FSAR, 4- [ ];
t 8.T.h- + V 2 o n hf
.n 3 ie c.f1 o % 3. 4-1.g g (j
- p. 2. FSAR,Section(5.2P.
Q MIwy (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-225 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l
LOP instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES O
'" Y REFERENCES : 3. FSAR, Section 5.f6.3f*
(continued) f, 4 ; ., , - ,,
' 4. FSAR, Chapter {f{ g
/ _
-oxff /U9 9
l i l l l l l l 0 BWR/4 STS B 3.3-226 Rev. O, 09/28/92
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 !,w) BASES BACKGROUND DG 1B has the foUowing ratin - (continued) (% m. ,h pzg
- a. 2850 kW-tent %ticus f U~4Z s
- b. 3250 kW-168 hours. -- wl g u g r ,+~ ] T 4 ~u ] g f' : y { 7 %
a ,_ ,. . . -
" .J APPLICABLE The init 1 conditions of DBA and transie nalyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES FSAR, hap er 6hlRef7 a7FFChJpir assume
- u. a 1.
stemintrOPERAB . IT AC electricals}<-(Ref.j,HFces power so
,", t "f'" C ' "
W' are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of 1-.
.. J 4, ' 'P" 9 L itt ha r ) necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor c' f Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not
~- =
exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; w SectionJ3.4, Re c4or-- Coelant-System-(RCS)';' and Section 3.6, h .7_[".*.'.*Q>y q nn r,d
. Containment Systems.
(m,) NJ h The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is
)
0" 1,.i..... W.. consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident c , d analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the (*) ^J " unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident co - ions in the event of: PzL (%o ur s)
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite powerior all onsite AC Of2 ~ ,. b. A j worst case single failure.
Mn gg u;, , g hl LP ' b AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statementi JP u. L
- u. 6 L LC0 H Two qualified circuits tween Weoffsitetransmissfon fu network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution _ System and y three separate and independent DGs (2A, 2C, and IBb ens __ure availability of the required power t5'shUCdoFthe reactor ', ' ,
- and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated Fq DBA.j Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in
'# the FSAR, and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.
(h . U - (continued) 1 BWR/4 STS B 3.8-3 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1
- BASES LC0 additivu, [one required autumaL k lead-sequeneer er ENE-(continued)h. fin OPERABLE.] 1 tus-}-shah-be gg ,
Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintai ing tatea -
%i frequency and voltage, and accepting required 1 ads during 3" ,
- g. ) E'ach offsite ~
f2/o anaccident,whileconnectedtotheESFbuses.fecttothe rcuit consists of incoming breajar,.and d_iscon '
. respectiveY s an_d the respect'ive7ti_2pSATs, the(fC and 2Dftransformers, and cuit path incTuding feedirWeikers
~
to ~" '
'J N 4.16 kV ESF buses _.p Feeder breakers from each circuih W " a' , ' [' " '" $ _I\ gequi,ed te the IF ESF ous; nowever, if 2C 5A1 is connecte Fr 4 ) to ESF bus 2E (or 2G) and 20 SAT is connected to 2G '(or 2E) c4+ eJ the remaining breakers to 2E and 2G are not required.7 -
w . w. r .. ] . -
, ca aN kV U I Each
'~ spee (pG must beand and voltage, capable connecting of starting, accelerating to its respective ESFtobus rated W~ u
/
) ,
on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be [")jcapable of accepting required loads within the assumed
' w f4 h' capabilities are required to be met from a variety of loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These initial conditions, such as DG in standby with the engine
- g not JG_pDG in standby with the testengine mode at# -ambient conditiogandR-hv operating in narallel Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.
(, (Rc[ O The AC sources must be separate and independent (to the
-' extent possible)+of other AC sources. For the DGs, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the 4 extent practical. A circuit may be connected to more than rw one ESFAL wi
( ce A ciWUit
~
OPEFdli[}tfas.tStransfer E, and not violatecapability separationto the other A criteria. j circuit that is not connected to an ESF bus is required to g
, have OPERABLEr4estMransfer iiiterleck :chmi4wA,to t at least (9 (r
- s 7 '"
'"(' """"{( "'e. <8'"^" - ' '"'
D t'm "rw> W R g' " , V p APPLICABILITY The AC sources md requen M re required to be OPERkBLE in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that- l l (continued) l l BWR/4 STS B 3.8-4 Rev. O, 09/28/92 1
1 AC Sources-Operating ! B 3.8.1 l BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 and 8 (continued) REQUIREMENTS (see Note 3)of-SR-3dridI 'when a modified start procedure Ogg, as described above is used. If a mochfied start ' .ot used, thepecond starprequiremeKt f SR 3.8. .{' a'p b ko k_t. 6 e requires a 12 second start, it i 99
' cmJ fn.m,,o Since SR 3.8.1 ore h restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu
- of SR 3.8.1.2. This procedure is the intent of Note 1, ky(( m S M 1h m fUa i r i O i S ' 7- Ctbnsistent with Regulatory GuiaPM (Ref. 37;- The 184 d6y
'~
[Uf~C),g,f 7
- v. ' M Frequency . f at_SR 3.8.1. 7-i s-a-reducti ort-in-cold--test 4ng MOD # N cans 4+ tent-wi-th Ceneric Leiter e9-id (Hei. 7)?--These ?
5 . Frequenciegppvidfsajdequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY,g
- 1. i o t f gwhileminimizingdeTradationresultingfromtesting.
u_ . 7 ( 'l '
'~
- ~
. - %34p q.]
- '^
TH: Su veillance9verifies that the DGs are capable of
* ~ synchronizing and accepting 1 greater-than-er equal to thi j if [, mJ c , .m,
.m equhaleat of the-1nanmum-expected eccident 4eadn A Lj e.. % minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize l g ,, ,, .j,4, w engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG 4 e is connected to the offsite source. i
. [ c,,j,.t , , sn
- r. .o . e,aw .t)Although )$ h no power factor requirements are established by l i c, , 3 v, - , ~ * '
/ this SR, the DG is normally op}erated at a p'ower factorbetween c i
c ,. ,. . o
/
/ f design rating of the machine, whileA[1.0F-is an operational s
limitation,[to-suure circulating currents are inimbed}el , Ofl9 'Ihe Joad-ba.r.d i: provided +n avoid routine overinading-ofi j the-06-kout4ne-over-loading may result _in_more frequeht j OP3Vlrecommendatiens teardown-inspectiens
- in eum dance-wit-h-vendor.e in erder to-eairntain DG-DPERABILITT. /
Iha-normat-11-day-Frequency-for-thi-s-Survei-llance -(s'ee- / Tahlm_3_.8.1-14-is-consistent with. Regulatory-Guide ~1.9_ / (Ref.131.-
' ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~.- - -.
{m0VEl f+o > Qn v0 ss .in W)I . (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.8-17 Rev. O,09/28/92 l
- _, - - . _ _ . 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ ~ _. _ _ . .. -, -r. ,-
I
~
AC Sources-Operating
..- - -~
/p C4 b b'dt k 5dhC b(MiU6Je w B 3.8.1 l v' 'y 116 !iy
-{/(t r ials db'UdC NC BASES (([)_g(t1qS'SrCio<Vdhlc_ lim 4 d]D_J&m/.g&e]d is
~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS /p ,l l./ SR s - 3,8.4.3-(conti@
\').! Not - odifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel l engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual l loading, as recomended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are (h h i l g,g,,,)p.t i NoteModifiesthisSurveillancebystatingthatmomenth transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate ; l
> jyb .
this test. SimHarly, momentary power- factm f^ ryf' I above-the-Mait do-not invaMdate-the~ test. transients p i
/r j O'V '
.. 5 K l
O . Not 2 ) indicates that this Surveillance /shotthr be c on on y one DG at a time in order to avoid comon cause ! failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid i l perturbations . l t Note-49tipulates-a -prerequisite requirement. for_performafice; f- of this_SR._.A. successful-DG start-must-precede _.this test-to ! credit satisfactory performance. ' l SR 3.8.1. h @' This SR provides verification that th t evel l of fuel oil in the day tank {and caghe-mounted-tankfis at or above the
,7' N_ level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level l
'T is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is
( y, o ._i c. , .a selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour / v._,,4 L <- J _ of DG operation at full load plus 10%., 1t " J The 31 day frequency is adequate to ensure that a su'fficient f vi .,e , .4 Q . ..W supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are
" \],
s s g fa i ,, ,6 W provided and facH4tfoperators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period. l l l
- y. v q 1 SR 3.8.1s I/ - N l Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in I fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water Removal of water from the environmentinordertosurvive.Manksonceeveryf3Wdays fuel oil day {and engint mount-ed n l
eliminates the!necessary environment for bacterial survival. h, 7
\
(Continued) ' BWR/4 STS B 3.8-18 Rev. O, 09/28/92
i l AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 Om
*- BASES h
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1 ~ (continued) REQUIREMENT 6 43. ech = l d e th d dit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this .] i Aw Lt t.s.iA hReviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be delete t can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant spec
- c pg basis, hat performing the SR with the reactor in a of the restrict ODES can satisfy the following crite * , as :
applicable:
- a. Performance of SR will not r er any safety system or component operab ,
- b. Performance of the S 1 t cause perturbations to any of the electr' distribu ' n systems that could result in a c enge t'o steady s e operation or to plant saf systems; and
- c. P raance of the SR, or failure of the SR, ill not ause, or result in, an A00 with attendant cha e to plant safety systems.
c1 . SR 3.8.1 rIS' In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded. This Surveillance demon ates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1
, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is g, acceptable. This testin sequential, overlapping,gormay totalinclude steps any series so that the'ofentire yu^
, connection and loading sequence is verified. 3
. q ,t % ts.'. t' TheFrequencyof{18 f months es into consideration plant i conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is 9'h m. w) intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length ofy{-18 months 7 (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.8-31 Rev. O, 09/28/92
AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES O SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1 / (continued)~ REQUIREMENTS ,44 This SR is modified bytthr-ee Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during_ testing./ For f357% fh_e purpose Tf~this testing 7the DGs must~be started from 7 #. , s " ,-[standbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginecoolanta k
;? "e.u7 being continuously circulated and temperature maintained p.y \ consistent with manufacturer recommendations. [Tlie reason -
f" h for Note 2 is that perforiiiiWiifiFhurveiTTan~ce would remove L a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the M2 electrical distribution system, and7hallenge safety n II systems. Note-3-acknowledges-that" y gn unplanned events that satisfy this/redit may be taken for 4) g Q, ,n -
- ~ SR.y 5 SR 3.8.1@0'f This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are m, ..
startedsimultaneously.t - un g ydi h my The 10 year Frequency is consisten with the recomendations-of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref 3
' Regulator-y-Guide- 1.137-- (Ref r-40b, fpaeagraptr-2.b, paregraph and C.2.-f, This SR f3 is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing.fFo~r~the purpose of
%ftEINt'iiig~, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained Ni
- i is consistent with manufacturer " recomendations. ?0' "p e M f5 %
P f(y5gn a Q> '.%.% d.i. 2.':l. ?
+ ' " '] 3 V' " "
(S" b /f-Diese+-senerator-Test;8ehedule--
'/ ThfeG/test scheAdle/ (Table 3.8 A-1) implement / /
~
1 [the f recomendations'of
/{Ref.3). . Tie purposeRevision 34osched of this test Regulator e is toGuide pyo'v 1.9 ,i e
,/ timely test data to establish a confidence level associated with the' goal to maintain DG reliabil'ity at > 0 5 per test.
According to Re udtory Guide 1.'9 (Ref. , Revision 3,
~
/
[ DG unit shoul,d e tested at least once, ery 31 days,/,
- Whenever a DG has experienc'e,d 4 or mofe valid fai
' es in
'/ the last,25 valid tests /the maximtim time betw tests is
/ / / '
/ \, )
/ '
s (continued)
/
BWR/4 STS f B 3.8-32 Rev. O, 09/28/92
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 I l BASES i 1 l
/ SURVEILLANCE Diesel Generator Test Schedule (continued) l l REQUIREMENTS
/ < reduced to'7 days. Four failures in 25 valid tests is a i
, failure rate of 0.16, or the threshold of acceptable DG performance, and .hence may be ~an early indication of the -
/ ' degradation of,DG reliability. When considered'in the light of a long history of tests, however, 4 failures in the'last l
./25 valid tests may only be a statistically. probable / l f / distribution of random events.- Increasing the test t
,/ Frequency allows a.more timely accumulation of additional y test data upon which to base judgment of the reliability of C
/ the DG. The increased test Frequency must be maintained
/ antil seven consecutive failure free tests have been L --
/ - performed.
Q-p c(I he Frequency for accelerated . testing is 7 days ~, but ny'less than'24 hours. Therefore, the interval between tests"should A F/ TIT S be no less than 24 hours, and no'more than'7 days./A
-*FW"N ~
successful test at an interval'of less than 24 hours should be con,sidered an invalid teff and notjc'ount to rds th v' ' seven consecutive' failure 4ree star %. A te inte [(q j (excessof7daysconstitutesafailuretomeetSRs. in 1
- 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
O REFERENCES h2. FSAR,Sectiof) o., _ A 'w -
- . f
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93t u..;-
'.,_n,i, u
- '. e- n- [4. b FSAR,Chapterj{6}^
,,,.-2
$1 71 - i, j 5. FSAR, Chapter ,
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.9D {w % M % -
.-~
- 7. Generic Letter 84-15.
[ u.i' - t -4 8. 10 CFR 50, Aprendix A, GDC 18. ci , F. u & L, s t._,i.4e . .?- w . 4 (9.T" mQL. Regulatory
- i Guide 1.108]Ar y a- #
- TD ,_ '
105 Regulatory Guide 1.137. '
'L,qw i "
- 11. "."": : = .1 ,-- 1932.-
(continued) l BWR/4 STS B 3.8-33 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l
i l AC Sources-Operating C.l- [ y-- - --
- . B 3.8.1 Q G, r a jv: C
. ~..-...
~ ,_ ~ ;c.
>c s.) Q p - - 1 REFERE CES FSARrSection-[6d},
(cori inued) x k -12. j 13.-ASME-Boi-l er--and -P res s ureWes s el-Code rSecti on-X I? I ft.1 r-, .s j @ j(n-; IEEE Standard 308 f E G h N Waill uni}T- - - _ h ' b "(i!J5cfLT red 9 4 , O BWR/4 STS B 3.8-34 Rev. O, 09/28/92
INSERT Ref ) d"II 1 ' ' l3 NRC No. 93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical gg 3 . -,M p Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993. 1 4 O l i O flATCd Millf / l " b 3 8 ~NY I
~~ .,. .
/
Inverters-Shutdown
~
._. B 3.8.8 BASES I
l SURVEILLANCE. SR 3.8.8.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS N
' closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The , verif.ication of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrume'ntation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency t'akes into account the redundant capability of the i inverters and 'other indications available in the control
{ room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions. { 'x ( -s REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter [6] . 's
- 2. FSAR, Chapter [15].
s
\.
'N
/
s s f n. V BWR/4 STS B 3.8-77 Rev. O, 09/28/92
Distribution Systems-Operati B3
@m e B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS f
)
B 3.lf. V istribution Systems-Operating BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class IE AC and DC electrical power distrfibution system is divided into redundant and independent Act DCr-a4 AC vital b# electrical power distribution subsystems. ~ Of7 The primary AC distribution system consists of three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses each having an offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel "4t generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is nonnally bx connected to a normal source startup auxiliary transformer th 3., (SAT) (D') . During a loss of the normal offsite power
! source to the 4.16 kV ESF buses, the alternate supply <
LC 7 attempts to close. If all offsite
- u.
- 1 breaker sources arefromunavaSAT @ilable, the onsite emergency DGs sup power to the 4.16 kV ESF buses.
The secondary plant distribution system includes 600 VAC emergency buse (and 2(Pjand transformers. S &_ ~
~ "'1 u3' associated load centers, and hl i jThe40iy_AC vital buses 2YV1, 2YV2,~'2YV3,~ and 2YV4 are=S :
larranged ih~four-load groups and are normally-poiTeled from l
'DC. The alternate power'supplyJor-the' vital buses is a I p Class IE constant voltage source transformer powered from the same division-as'the associated inverte D and_its use i governed by -LCO 3.8.7, " Inverters-Operating." Each -
i constant Xoltage_ sour _cc_ transformer _is_ pow There are two independent 125/250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystems and three f' independent 125 VDC DG electrical power distribution l subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF ' h1 ~ functions. i w ,3 D l
'M - The list of all distribution buses is presented in
-Tabic C .0.9-1p Lco 3,8 7, . l
, u. , 7 APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design _ Basis Accident (DBA) and i SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR Chapterf6}(Ref.1) and l F5 yYteE are OPERABLE. Te ;
- Chapterp4.n5P(Ref. 2), assume , a
((l g l.s 5 a./ (_
% W 1
( bf kr. ,, (Continued) l BWR/4 STS B 3.8-78 Rev. O, 09/28/92
i Distribution Systems-Operatin B3.4' k BASES I APPLICABLE AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are design'ed SAFETY ANALYSES to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and (continued) reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ; ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and ! fN containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits e are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Saction 3.2, Power Distrioution Limits; bettion13.4, RCac-tGT CGGl6n% 7,5 Enmu,h. M (,a . , 5[ iccQ Sysnm (RCS$; and Section 3.6, ntainment Systems. [w bLv i% ( J E~ f-( d 4 The OPERABILITY of the AC DC nd AC " ital buP electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial ( hb j assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes y maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of: -
@ervrea 5)
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power #or all onsite AC electrical power,; and f2]o 0
Q b. Aj worst case single failure. p) W 5 The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statemen . ef.4 ) S/ r LCO
"'2 (The requiredt electrical power distribution subsystems listed
/tTt
~ ~~
'bi4ASWA44<MVensure the availability of AC, DC, and AC 1 7" {c6T% vitaldown bus theelectrical power for the systems required to shut reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after 4 pg .-"
i an anticJated _qperatiortaLocc.uttenceJO_0J or a postulated
% g
%.,+N . BAhThe4AC/DCM AC vit:1 --taw electrical'p'oler g
(,t N ,'-l d( h ibutil o s stems are required to be OPERABLE.
- -v YTJ.! ' {j. R (Maintainini trej[0Wision 1 and 2MC(Db[and Z~ AC " ital bus' y
c~d elictrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures [S' L' '-~k that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system ( or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will L.C' not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. t k~m pe - i d The ACCOnd AC_"itM 9 electrical power distribution subsystemp requirp the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. 44 (D i (-)- L. I -3 (continued) I i i BWR/4 STS B 3.8-79 Rev. O, 09/28/92
Distribution Systems-Operati B 3. . 1= BASES m
@4 $
v, 4 LC0 Q In adtfition, tie breakers between redundant safety related (continued)(O AC/DCy and -AC vit81 bus power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from prcpagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause en the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential 6,, ch ,s .ds safety function (s). If any tie breakers are closed, the
/ .
.. k g(s -af-fested redundent*' electrical power distribution subsystemsP
( fd.' ,v. $[o,.-
.. a
.. i ! are% considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, I
t e . pt a N safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant [
> 6, %,d.g,,J w.,
6 Class JE 4.16 kV ESF buses from being powered from the same ( ec m offsite circuit.
+ , . n . .. .++g -w w)
Q W - APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:
- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result w of A00s or abnonnal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained
,f v - -- in the event of a postulated DBA. / 3 c-A+D"s Electrical power distribution subsystem requirement or
/ $c., f, t c.s AC- ~l h MODES 4 andf 5 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8 yJV, ( . idu , UEtribution Systems-Shutdown." D
'l 5.y ... % . . ' u '- pW. pq (CSW ,r... .
@ MI uai M
ACTIONS
- C2 7 w .s %,a, Wit oneormorereqENed C buses, load centers, motor O w
,g control centers, or distribution panels in oneNdivisiom ff /
' Jc"' 3 inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution w w subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety
(o3 t
- functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it s
^ / I3 in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure.
N~ --- The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC O (Continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.8-80 Rev. O, 09/28/92
O \/ LC0 3.8.7-2 INSERT l 1 Should one or more buses not listed in LC0 3.8.7 become inoperabl.e due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in: LC.0 '3.8.7?(e.g., a breaker supplying a single MCC faults open), the individiril7oa'ds on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required -
', Actions of the LCOs governing .the-individual loads would be entered. However, A if' one or more of these buses ^become inoperable dueAo a failure also ' u El
'affecting the OPERABILITY of 'a' bur ^ listed in' LC0 3.8 7 (e.g. , loss of a 4.16
^
kV ESF bus), the Conditions and Required Actf6ns of'the LCO for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LCO 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; e.g7,s the 4.16 kV ESF bus).
.:2 1
1 en l HATCH UNIT 1 4 OGIl 1 l l
cgn&72It crfnn4E C@ ; gw2-ts',HOW'* tapT S I Chl) t Distribution Systems-Operatin , l B 3.8 ' (h 9
- -m ~ ' _,Ttf6ie . B 3.8.9,11page
%) " '_ .
,/ G 1 of l')' 7m
( /',/ AC and1)C / Electrical'
/ Power
/ Distr-ib'ution
/
Syste $- y < c f TYPE j / VOLTAGE IIVIS10Np# N J VISION 2]*
' AC's[fety {k160 V] ' [ESF Bus]'[NB01] ((ESF Bus] [NB02]
/ bus'es / / /
/ 'N -
[480V].' Load Centers / Load Cen'ters [/ 1/ h' ' ' [NG01, NG03]/
/
[NG02-( NG04]
/
,/ y
'/ N [480 V] Motor Control ' tor Control Centers Centers y
,'N s [NG01A,-NG011, [NG02A,NG02I,
/ 'N s NG018, NG03C, / NG028, NG04C, Ns NG031, NG03D}/ NG041, NG04D]
/ ~ /
,- [120 V] 'N'NDi stribyt' ion Distribution
- Pansls Panels
/ [jP(1,NP03] [NP02, NPO4]
f DC buses / Bus [NK01]'xfrom Bus [NK02] from (lj
, [125 V] / battery [NK11]Nnd battery [NK12] and 1 ,/ charger [NK21]\ charger [NK22]
Bus [NK03] from Bus [NK04] from
'/ battery [NK13] and batt'ery [NN14] and - l
! - charger [NK23] charge [NK24]
Distribution Distribution / Panels Panels 'N > h- [NK41, NK43, NK51] [NK42,NK44,NK52 ./ AC vital [120V] Bus [NN01] from Bus [NN02],f bee N' inverter [NN11] connected to bus inverter 4NN12] 4 nected to bus [NK 2dkO2]
'y' f u R03}~from Bus' [NN04] from /
inverter [NN13]NQnverter [NN14)' connected to bus
- . connected to bus
/ [NK03]
[N'K44}
, j
\ p .... -
y --- EacMdivisj..on}'of the AC and'0C electrical,. power distribution--system is l ivsubsystem.
/ g , . m Q j/ A L/
i f dya.np) BWR/4 STS B 3.8-87 Rev. O, 09/28/92
Distribution Systems-Shutd B 3.8 4 B 3.8 CTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS b B 3.8 6 ) Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES / BACKGROUND A description of the AC Cgand AC " ital btfelectrical h power di ribution system is provided in the Bases for 0 3.8 " Distribution Systems-Operating."
~
((p. sT.t gu.:e s h APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Desi Basis ~ a SAFETY ANALYSES .transienL lyses in the FSAR, Thapter (Ref.1) and u . n u.a i q /TESF) sys[tems are OPERABLE.haptd615} (Ref. 2)," 'fassume The Act0Crand AC vital buF d2- electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and P7 reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The OPERABILITY of the ACp d AC cital buf electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILI 2 " ' '"~ The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and ^ " electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and f5 ensures that: {_Q;, [edWd"U E'l
- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; n m.a .< s aA s% .( c..h ~& b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit ,
status; and l wa N I
,.; c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events (
u; postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent l draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement . _[. ( Be 3j $/ (continued) B 3.8-88 Rev. O, 09/28/92 BWR/4 STS
)
l O "unto 1433 COMPARISON DOCUMENT - JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION O o G
JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 ITS: SECTION 3.3 - INSTRUMENTATION ( PLANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES (continued) P.35 The additional limits have not been added since Plant Hatch licensing basis does not include these additional values. P.36 Deleted. P.37 The Applicability and Condition Statement D have been revised consistent with the actual LCO requirements (as shown in Required Actions D.2.1 and D 2.2 and in the Bases). P.38 A Note has been added providing allowances similar to those j in the current Plant Hatch TS. The current TS note allows ! the assemblies to be inoperable for 8 hours per month for 4 testing and maintenance. The proposed Note will allow the assemblies to be inoperable a maximum of 6 hours at a. time and then only for testing. This allowance is consistent
- with allowances provided in the other instrumentation TS.
1 Appropriate Bases changes have been made. P.39 Based on the Plant Hatch instrumentation logic design, the appropriate instrumentation logic, system operation and i O design description has been provided. P.40 This table has been deleted since it provides generic and . not plant specific types of information. The information i in the Table could be misleading as to which plant-specific analyses take credit for these channels to perform a function during accident and transient scenarios. P.41 These words have been added since all Functions do not have response times. P.42 This clarification has been added since the RPS is also required to be OPERABLE during conditions that are not MODES. f-s kJ HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 8 REVISION A
l 7 JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 i ITS: SECTION 3.3 - INSTRUMENTATION PLANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES (continued) P.62 This SR can be performed with the reactor at power, thus the words have been modified consistent with other similar SRs. . P.63 The proper basis for the Frequency has been provided. P.64 This discussion about analytical limits and the derivation of the Allowable Values and trip setpoints has been deleted since it does not apply to this Function. P.65 This sentence has been deleted to be consistent with NUREG change package BWR-18, Item C.37, which deleted this sentence from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION SR Bases in all applicable instrumentation Bases. P.66 Deleted. P.67 The Plant Hatch design for the DG start portion of the subject logic is one-out-of-two, while the rest of the affected components are two-out-of-two. Thus, if the t' ' channel is placed in trip as required by Required Action ( A.1, a DG initiation will occur. Since this is undesirable, the Required Action has been modified to require restoration of the channel, similar to other Required Actions where placing the channel in trip is not desired. Appropriate Bases changes have been made. P.68 The current Plant Hatch Surveillance Frequencies have been used. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Frequency has been changed from 92 days to the current Plant Hatch requirement of 7 days. Appropriate Bases changes have been made. HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 11 REVISIONf(x
JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 1 ITS: SECTION 3.3 - INSTRUMENTATION I PLANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES (continued) P.69 The Function 7.b SR requiring a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 92 days (NUREG SR 3.3.1.1.9) has been deleted. For Plant Hatch, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST has been extended to 18 months (see Discussion of change L.10 in ITS: Section 3.3.1.1). The current CHANNEL CALIBRATION is also required every 18 months (NUREG SR 3.3.1.1.13), and the definition of CHANNEL CALIBRATION includes the requirement to perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Therefore, repeating this requirement is unnecessary. P.70 To satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement, Hatch credits manual actions in the range of 78.8 to 92% of 4.16 kV. Entry into this range is annunciated. The range specified for manual actions indicates that sufficient power is available to the large ECCS motors; however, sufficient voltage for equipment required for LOCA conditions may not be available at lower voltages. The required channels of LOP annunciation instrumentation ensure the initiation of manual actions to protect the ECCS and other assumed systems from degraded voltage without initiating an unnecessary automatic disconnect from the preferred offsite power source. The LOP anticipatory annunciators provide a total time delay of 60 seconds to reduce (~Ns) the possibility of nuisance annunciators, while permitting prompt detection of potential low voltage conditions. Since Hatch takes credit for the annunciators, they have been added to Table 3.3.8.1-1. New LCO CONDITION B, addressing the annunciation Function, has been added, and the other CONDITIONS have been renumbered and amended as necessary to account for the annunciation. Appropriate SRs are defined for the annunciator bus undervoltage relays and the associated time delays. GENERIC APPROVED /PENDING CHANGES TO NUREG 1433 GP.1 Changed to be consistent with NUREG change package BWR-18, Items C.2, C.18, C.19, C.20, C.21, C.22, C.23, C.24, C.25, C.28, C.29, C.30, C.32, C.33, C.34, C.35, C.36, C.37, C.38, C.39, C.40, C.41, C.42, C.43, C.44, and C.45. GA.2 Change approved per package BWR-01A, Item C.1, 3/20/93. GP.3 Changed to be consistent with NUREG change package BWR-19, Items C.1, C.2, C.4, C.7, C.8, and C.9. GA.4 Change approved per package BWR-06 Item C 9, Revs. 2 and 3, 10/13/93.
- GA.5 Change approved per package NRC-02, Items C.15 and C.21, 5/20/93.
GP.6 Changed to be consistent with NUREG package BWOG-09, Item C.26. HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 12 REVISION C
l l l 1 JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 ( ITS: SECTION 3.8 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l PLANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES (continued) i P.37 The Frequency of this SR has been changed to 184 days. l This SR is not currently required by Plant Hatch TS, but is being performed per procedures every 184 days. This Frequency has been shown to be adequate. In addition, the storage tanks are above the ground water level, thus water should not " seep" into the tanks. The Bases Surveillance Frequency discussion has been modified to reflect the reason for the Frequency. P.38 The NUREG wording has been changed to incorporate the Plant Hatch design voltage requirements and reasons for these requirements. P.39 Changes were made for clarity and to utilize plant specific terminology, as well as to describe the manner in which Plant Hatch performs the tests (for SR 3.6.4.8 Bases change). In addition, the cell parameter limits are not necessarily chosen conservatively, thus this word has been deleted from the LCO section of the Bases for LCO 3.8.6). P.40 The bus list in LCO 3.8.7 is the current Hatch licensing ( basis for required electrical distribution subsystems in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Other buses, such as motor control centers (MCC) and distribution panels, which help comprise the AC and DC Distribution Systems were not listed in LCO 3.8.7, since the loss of electrical loads associated with these buses may not result in a complete loss of a redundant safety function necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition. Therefore, should one or more of these buses become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LCO 3.8.7 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single MCC faults open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditionc and Required Actions of the LCOs governing the individual loads would be entered. If however, one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LCO 3.8.7 (e.g., loss of a 4.16 kV ESF l bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4.16 kV ESF bus), the Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LCO 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4.16 kV ESF bus). 7- - l HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 fl REVISION j
g- JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 ( j ITS: SECTION 3.8 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS PLANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES P.41 (continued) the Markup of the Current Technical Specifications Section 3.8.4 M.1 (Unit 1) and M.3 (Unit 2), these surveillances are additional requirements, even without specific resistance values. , 1 Based on the above discussion, we believe the Hatch ITS proposed specification is appropriate. In summary, the NUREG values specified tend to be manufactures' values, not OPERABILITY values. The configuration of the batteries < will lead to several different values, not just three. Hatch CTS do not include these requirements, and we currently have procedures for performing battery inspections. P.42 The substitution of a modified performance discharge test for a service test may be helpful to gather additional data points for trending capacity as a battery nears its end of O t life, but before more frequent testing would normally be required. For this reason, this substitution should be allowed, though not required. Since the modified performance discharge test envelopes the duty cycle of the service test, thus making it a harsher test on the battery, it may be substituted for the service test at any time. (This is stated in the draft revision of IEEE-450.) Also, to simplify procedures, the use of a modified performance test may be substituted for the service test throughout the life of the battery. Design configuration controls should verify the continued enveloping of the service test duty cycle by that of the modified performance discharge test. P.43 The diesel generator accelerated test frequency requirements are relocated in their current licensing bases form to plant procedures. A plant procedure implements the current Technical Specifications requirements, as well as the requirements and responsibilities for tracking emergency DG failures for the determination and reporting of reaching trigger values specified in NUMARC 87-00. l These requirements are more restrictive than those i specified in NUREG 1433. l l HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 7B REVISION C i l
l l JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 () I ITS: SECTION 5.0 - ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PLANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES (continued) P.24 'The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 would have been applicable to the diesel fuel oil testing provisions if they had been left in the LCOs of Section 3.8. Since these Section 3.0 provisions are not generally applicable to Administrative Controls, then the applicability must be specifically stated in Section 5.0 provisions. P.25 The description of the entry conditions into the SFDP are clarified and generalized to assure that they include all possible required entry conditions. P.26 A clarification is added to include in the annual occupational radiation exposure report, only those other personnel for whom monitoring was required. This change does not modify the present intent of the NUREG. P.27 A clarification is added to the monthly operating report requirement to state that the safety / relief valves are those for " main steam." This change does not modify the present intent of the NUREG. P.28 The NUREG provides examples of safety analysis limits that are met as a result of ensuring that core operating limits are properly determined. The proposed change will replace these examples by stating that specified acceptable fuel design limits will be met. This change meets the intent of the present NUREG and ensures that all applicable limits are met. P.29 Reference to LCO 3.3.3.1 for Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation is all that is necessary to locate this special reporting requirement. P.30 Changes to be consistent with plant specific terminology. P.31 Changes to clarify the control room command function and shift crew composition for a dual unit plant with a common control room. P.32 A direct reference to 10 CFR 50.54 for determination 1of minimum shift crew composition is added. Without this i reference, ITS 5.2.2.b could be incorrectly construed to define these requirements. O HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 4 REVISION' C 1 --- , , , , , , , , , , , ~ , - - - - , , - ~ - ~ '"
p I l i () JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATION FROM NUREG 1433 ITS: SECTION 5.0 - ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ELANT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES (continued) P.33 The diesel generator accelerated test frequency requirements are relocated in their current licensing bases form to plant procedures. A plant procedure implements the current Technical Specifications requirements, as well as the requirements and responsibilities for tracking emergency DG failures for the determination and reporting of reaching trigger values specified in NUMARC 87-00. These requirements are more restrictive than those specified in NUREG 1433. GENERIC APPROVED /PENDING CHANGES TO NUREG 1433 GP.1 Changed to be consistent with NUREG change package BWOG-09, Items C.1 through C.17 and C.19 through C.25. GA.2 Change approved per package WOG-06, Items C.1, C.5, and C.7, 3/20/93. GA.3 Change approved per package BWR-06, Item C.7, 5/20/93. s GA.4 Change approved por package NRC-02, Item C.22, 5/20/93. O HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 [df/k REVISION h L}}