ML042800350
| ML042800350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/2004 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3 |
| To: | |
| Lyon C, NRR/DLPM, 415-2296 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML042890017 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC MC3771 | |
| Download: ML042800350 (4) | |
Text
3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS APPLICABILITY Applies to Ihe OPERATING status of Engineered Safety Features and Auxiliary Systems.
OBJECTIVE To define those LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION that are necessary: (1) to remove decay heat from the core In emergency or normal shutdown situations, and (2) to remove heat from containment in normal OPERATING and emergency situations.
SPECIFICATIONS
- a. Accumulators
- 1. The reactor shall not be made critical unless the following conditions are satisfied, except for LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING and except as provided by TS 3.3.a.2.
A. Each accumulator Is pressurized to at least 700 psig and contains 1250 le+/- :
25 ftl of water with a boron concentration of at least 1900 ppm, and is not Isolated.
B. Accumulator Isolation valves Sl-20A and SI-20B shall be opened with their power breakers locked out at or before the Reactor Coolant System pressure exceeds 1000 psig.
- 2. During power operation or recovery from an inadvertent trip, the following conditions of inoperability may exist during the time Interval specified:
A. One accumulator may have a boron concentration < 1900 ppm for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
B. One accumulator may be Inoperable for a reason other than TS 3.3.a.2.A for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
If OPERABILITY Is not restored within the time specified, then within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action shall be Initiated to:
- Achieve HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- Achieve COLD SHUTDOWN within an additional 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Amendment No.- 17 TS 3.3-1 l
When the inoperable componeht is part of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Component Cooling Water (CCW) or Service Water (SW) Systems, the average Reactor Coolant System temperature (T...) will be maintained below 3500F through an alternate heat removal method.
The various alternate heat removal methods include the redundant RHR train and the steam generators.
Assuming the reactor has been OPERATING at full-rated power for at least 100days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.
Time After Shutdown Decay Heat, %of Rated Power 1 minute 4.5 30 minutes 2.0 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.62 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.96 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.62 Thus the requirement for core cooling In case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition Is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant accident during power operation. Putting the reactor In the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduces the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, and also allows more free access to some of the engineered safety features in order to effect repairs. Failure to complete repairs after placing the reactor Inthe HOT SHUTDOWN condition
' may be Indicative of need for major maintenance, and In such cases the reactor should therefore be placed in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition.
TS 3.3.a.2.B provides a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> completion time to restore an accumulator that is inoperable for a reason other than boron concentration. The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed to restore an Inoperable accumulator to operable status Is justified InWCAP-1 5049, Revision 1. (23 TS 3.3.b.5 provides protection from the possibility of one SI pump reaching runout condition I
during SI accumulator fill concurrent with a large break LOCA. With both trains of SI and both EDGs operable, the SI system will meet accident analysis.
(2) WCAP-15049-A, Rev. 1, "Risk-lnformed Evaluation of an Extension to Accumulator Completion Times," April 1999. I Amendment No. 178 TS B3.3-2
The containment cooling function is provided by two systems: containment fancoll units and containment spray systems. The containment fancoil units and containment spray system protect containment integrity by limiting the temperature and pressure that could be experienced following a Design Basis Accident. The Limiting Design Basis accidents relative to containment integrity are the loss-of-coolant accident and steam line break. During normal operation, the fancoil units are required to remove heat lost from equipment and piping within the containment.° In the event of the Design Basis Accident, either of the following combinations will provide sufficient cooling to limit containment pressure to less than design values: four fancoil units or two fancoil units plus one containment spray pump. (4)
In addition to heat removal, the containment spray system Is also effective in scrubbing fission products from the containment atmosphere. Therefore, a minimum of one train of containment spray is required to remain OPERABLE In order to scavenge Iodine fission products from the containment atmosphere and ensure their retention In the containment sump water. (5)(6)
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Is added to the spray solution for pH adjustment by means of the spray additive system. The resulting alkaline pH of the spray enhances the ability of the spray to scavenge iodine fission products from the containment atmosphere. The NaOH added In the spray also ensures an alkaline pH for the solution recirculated In the containment sump.
The alkaline pH of the containment sump water Inhibits the volatility of Iodine and minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to the sump fluid. Test data has shown that no significant stress corrosion cracking will occur provided the pH Is adjusted within 2 days following the Design Basis Accident. ' )l A minimum of 300 gallons of not less than 30% by weight of NaOH solution Is sufficient to adjust the pH of the spray solution adequately. The additive will still be considered available whether It Is contained In the spray additive tank or the containment spray system piping and Refueling Water Storage Tank due to an Inadvertent opening of the spray additive valves (Cl-1001A and Cl-i 001 B).
(3) USAR Section 6.3 (4) USAR Section 6.4 (s)USAR Section 6.4.3 (6) USAR Section 14.3.5
' USAR Section 6.4 (8) Westinghouse Chemistry Manual SIP 5-1, Rev. 2, dated 3177, Section 4.
Amendment No. 178 TS B3.3-3
The spray additive system may be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The containment spray system would still be available and would remove some Iodine from the containment atmosphere In the event of a Design Basis Accident. The 72-hour completion time takes Into account the containment spray system capabilities and the low probability of the worst case Design Basis Accident occurring during this period.
One component cooling water pump together with one component cooling heat exchanger can accommodate the heat removal load either following a loss-of-coolant accident or during normal plant shutdown. If, during the post-accident phase, the component cooling water supply were lost, core and containment cooling could be maintained until repairs were effected. t9) I A total of four service water pumps are Installed and a minimum of two are required to operate during the postulated loss-of-coolant accident.d') The service water valves In the redundant l safeguards headers have to be OPERABLE In order for the components that they supply to be considered OPERABLE.
The various trains of equipment referred to in the specifications are separated by their power supplies (i.e.: Si Pump 1A, RHR Pump 1A and Valve SI-4A, etc.). Shared piping and valves are considered to be common to both trains of the systems.
t USAR Section 9.3
'°USAR Section 9.6 Amendment No. 178 TS B3.3-4