IR 05000298/2011007
| ML11133A168 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2011 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | O'Grady B J Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| References | |
| IR-11-007 | |
| Download: ML11133A168 (23) | |
Text
May 13, 2011
Mr. -Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 648A Ave Brownville, NE 68321
SUBJECT: COOPER NUCLEAR STATION NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/183 INSPECTION REPORT 05000298/2011007 On April 28, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station, using Temporary Instruction 2515/183, "Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 28, 2011, with Mr. D. Willis, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of your staf The objective of this inspection was to assess the adequacy of actions taken at Cooper Nuclear Station in response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station fuel damage even The results from this inspection, along with the results from similar inspections at other operating commercial nuclear plants in the United States, will be used to evaluate the United States to determine if additional regulatory actions are warrante All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this they are regulatory findings or violation Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate repor You are not required to respond to this lette In accordance with 10 CFR "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Nebraska Public Power District - 2 -
Sincerely,/RA/ Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-298 License: DRP-46
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000298/2011007
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc: w/
Enclosure:
Distribution via ListServ Nebraska Public Power District - 3 - Electronic distribution by RIV: Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov) Deputy Regional Administrator (Art.Howell@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov) DRP Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov) DRS Director (Tony.Vegel@nrc.gov) DRS Deputy Director (Vacant@nrc.gov) Senior Resident Inspector (Jeffrey.Josey@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (Michael.Chambers@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, DRP/C (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov) Project Engineer, DRP/C (Rayomand.Kumana@nrc.gov) CNS Administrative Assistant (Amy.Elam@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov) Project Manager (Lynnea.Wilkins@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov) RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov) Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov) NRR/DIRS/IRIB (Timothy.Kobetz@nrc.gov) Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov) Regional State Liaison (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov) NSIR/DRP/EP (Eric.Schrader@nrc.gov) OEMail Resource ROPreports RIV Executive Technical Assistant (Stephanie.Bush-Goddard@nrc.gov) DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov) R:\_REACTORS/TI-183/CNS2011007-TI-JJ.DOCX ADAMS ML ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials: VGG Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Non-publicly Available Sensitive SRI:DRP/C RI:DRP/ DRS/TSB D:DRP/C JJosey MLChambers EARuesch VGGaddy /RA-E/ /RA-E/ /RA/ /RA/ 05/11/2011 05/11/2011 05/11/2011 5/12/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000298 License: DRP-46 Report: 05000298/2011007 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Location: 72676 648A Ave Brownville, NE 68321 Dates: March 23 through April 28, 2011 Inspectors: J. Josey, Senior Resident Inspector M. Chambers, Resident Inspector Approved by: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000298/2011007, 03/23/2011 04/28/2011; Cooper Nuclear Station Temporary Instruction 2515/183 - Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Even This report covers an announced temporary instruction inspectio The inspection was conducted by resident and Region IV inspector operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 200 INSPECTION SCOPE The intent of the temporary instruction is to be a high-for events that may exceed the design basis for a plan The focus of the temporary instruction was on (1) design basis events, typically bounded by security threats; (2) assessing capability to mitigate station blackout conditions; (3) mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design; and (4) assessing the thordowns and inspections of important equipment needed to during seismic events possible for the sit If necessary, a more specific followup inspection will be performed at a later dat INSPECTION RESULTS The following table documents the NRC inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station performed in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/18 The numbering system in the table corresponds to the inspection items in the temporary instructio Enclosure 03.01 basis events, typically bounded by security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) and as required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh). Use Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guidelin If Inspection Procedure 71111.05T was recently performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of inspectio Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel poo The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to: Licensee Action Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment. a. Verify through test or inspection that equipment is available and functiona Active equipment shall be tested and passive equipment shall be walked down and inspecte It is not expected that permanently installed equipment that is tested under an existing regulatory testing program be reteste This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating strategies/equipment. The licensee reviewed its B.5.b commitments, severe accident management guidelines, and station-specific emergency operating procedures to ensure the basis for the actions to respond to and mitigate conditions that result from a beyond-design-basis even The licensee also verified the permanently installed passive plant systems through plant walkdowns and inspection, and conducted testing of temporary equipmen The licensee conducted these activities in accordance with current station procedures. Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness (e.g., observed a test, reviewed test results, discussed actions, reviewed records, etc.). The inspectors reviewed NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, the severe accident management guidelines, and station-specific emergency equipment necessary for the actions to respond to and mitigate conditions that result from a beyond design basis even The inspectors reviewed the most recent performance data and test records associated with special tools/additional equipment required to facilitate the credited strategie The inspectors independently performed walkdowns of passive equipment and verified that equipment was prestaged in accordance with station procedure The inspectors discussed testing, maintenance, storage, transport (where applicable), and training requirements for credited equipment with the license Additionally, the inspectors searched Enclosure program database for items that could impact the ability of the credited equipment to perform its intended function. Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. The licensee determined that it had previously identified all special tools and equipment required to facilitate the The licensee has an issue documented in Inspection Report 05000298/2010006, "Cooper Nuclear Station - NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report," dated March 17, 2011, which is relevant to this inspection scope: A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was indentified for monitor the performance of the emergency lighting system against the established performance criteri In response, the licensee revised the maintenance rule function associated with these emergency lights to include the required performance dat The inspectors determined that this revision will correct this issue and ensure that the emergency lights are appropriately monitore During inspections of fire hoses stored in the facilities warehouse, the licensee identified that two fire hoses did not have hydrostatic test dates marked on the These two hoses were replace Not all vendor recommended preventative maintenance items were being performed on the portable fire pum These issues were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Licensee Action (e.g., walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.) b. Verify through walkdowns or demonstration that procedures to implement the strategies associated with B.5.b and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) are in place The licenseeB.5.b and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) are on a periodic refresher training cycl The licensee verified through walkdowns or demonstrations that the station procedures to implement these beyond design basis coping strategies were in place and able to be performed as writte Enclosure and are executabl Licensees may choose not to connect or operate permanently installed equipment during this verificatio This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating strategies/equipment. Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewe Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended. The inspectors performed reviews of selected station emergency operating procedures and all of the severe accident management guideline procedures, in conjunction with walkdowns, to verify that the procedures were feasible and could be executed as written with the specified equipmen The inspectors also reviewed all of the documented results discrepancies and proposed enhancement The inspectors determined that the licensee had procedures in place, and that these procedures were effective, had current training associated with them, and could be implemented as written with available equipment and personnel. Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. The licensee has an issue documented in Inspection Report 05000298/2010006, "Cooper Nuclear Station - NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report," Dated March 17, 2011, that is relevant to this inspection scope: An apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," and Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," with a preliminary e that some steps contained in emergency procedures at Cooper Nuclear Station would work as written and the concurrent failure to assure that a condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Other licensee procedures that were reviewed were effective in ensuring that the desired actions could be accomplished with the specified equipmen The procedures were logically organized, clearly written, and could be performed by the most junior operato The licensee identified that some of the required equipment was not prestaged as specified by the procedure The equipment was located, and verified to be on han Also, there was no maintenance activity to inventory the required special tools to perform a manual drain of the scram discharge volum The correct tools were verified to be present and the Enclosure licensee initiated a recurring maintenance task to perform this inventor The licensee entered these deficiencies into the corrective action program. Licensee Action qualifications of operators and support staff. c. Verify the training and qualifications of operators and the support staff needed to implement the procedures and work instructions are current for activities related to B.5.b and severe accident management guidelines as required by 10 CFR 50.54 (hh). The licensee determined, although there is required training associated with B.5.b and severe accident management guidelines, there are no specific qualifications associated with B.5.b requirements or severe accident management guideline As such, the licensee performed a review of training documentation, lesson plans, and qualification matrices, to verify that key operations and support staff personnel needed to implement B.5.b procedures and work instructions are trained to implement these strategies. Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess training and qualifications of operators and support staff. The inspectors performed independent reviews of selected station lesson plans, qualification status, and training documentation to verify that required personnel were current in their trainin The inspectors performed walkdowns and discussions of selected strategies to ensure that the required personnel knew equipment locations, how to operate the equipment, and could complete the selected procedures as written. Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. procedures were effective and provide reasonable assurance that the desired actions could be accomplished by the most junior operato The licensee identified that the station had not established a continuing training activity associated with the severe accident management guidelines portable diesel generato The license determined that station operators were taught during initial qualification about the operation of this diesel, but this was not being done on a recurring Enclosure basi The licensee reviewed training documentation and conducted interviews walkdowns, and a test run of the diesel to verify that operators were familiar with the equipment's operation and the actions required to start the diese Licensee Action applicable agreements and contracts are in place. d. Verify that any applicable agreements and contracts are in place and are capable of meeting the conditions needed to mitigate the consequences of these event This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating strategies/equipment. The licensee verified through review that Letters of Agreement with state and local entities as required by NUREG 0645, "Emergency Support and Resources," were adequate and current. For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with offsite entities, describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and contracts are in place and current (e.g., confirm that offsite fire assistance agreement is in place and current). The inspectors reviewed a sampling of the Letters of Agreement that the licensee maintains with offsite organizations that deal with supporting the facility relative to the sites emergency plan. Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. During its review, the licensee identified that one Letter of Agreement had an end date of December 31, 201 The organization was immediately contacted, and the licensee verified through verbal agreement that the conditions of the Letter of Agreement were still in effect until a new signed agreement was in plac This issue was entered into the corrective action progra Enclosure Licensee Action Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems noted by the licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating strategy. e. Review any open corrective action documents to assess problems with mitigating strategy implementation identified by the license Assess the impact of the problem on the mitigating capability and the remaining capability that is not impacte The licensee has two issues documented in Inspection Report 05000298/2010006, "Cooper Nuclear Station - NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report," dated March 17, 2011, that are relevant to this inspection scope: An apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," and Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," with a preliminary white significance, was idene that some steps contained in emergency procedures at Cooper Nuclear Station would work as written and the concurrent failure to assure that a condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and correcte A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was indentified associated with the the established performance criteria. The licensee is capturing all items associated with its review of the Fukushima event in the corrective action program as individual condition report The licensee has identified the following discrepancies: current revision of the vendor manual for the portable fire pump not staged with the pump (CR-CNS-2011-2770), outdated copies of Missouri State and Atchison County emergency plans (CR-CNS-2011-2878), no maintenance activity to inventory the required special tools to perform a manual drain of the scram discharge instrument volume (CR-CNS-2011-2921), and other miscellaneous item The inspectors determined that none of the identified deficiencies would be expected to impact the success of any of the severe accident action Enclosure 03.02 mitigate station blackout conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating Current Power," and station design, is functional and vali Refer to Temporary Instruction 2515/120, "Inspection of Implementation of Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action Item A-22," as a guidelin It is not intended that Temporary Instruction 2515/120 be completely reinspecte The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to: Licensee Action equipment needed to mitigate a station blackout event. a. Verify through walkdowns and inspection that all required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and maintained. The licensee reviewed 10 CFR 50.63, Regulatory Guide 1.155, NUMARC 87-00, and the plant specific licensing basis, such as the Updated Safety Analysis Report, to ensure the basis for the actions for a station blackou As a result of Cooper Nuclear Station being credited as a battery only coping station, which does not credit AC power for the specified duration of the blackout event (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />), the sta safety related emergency batteries are required to have adequate capacity to support the calculated blackout loads for the required duration of the even Therefore, Cooper Nuclear Station does not need special tools or equipment to mitigate station blackout condition However, part of the severe accident management guidelines credits a portable diesel generator that is used as part of the beyond design basis coping strategy for dealing with blackout conditions that exceed the specified duration of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> While this diesel is part of the equipment described in Section 03.01 of this report, the licensee verified and tested this diesel as part of their station blackout verification proces This diesel constitutes a piece of special equipment that requires special tools to facilitate its operatio The licensee verified through walkdowns, document reviews, inspections, and testing of applicable equipment their ability to mitigate conditions that result from a station blackout even In addition, the licensee verified through inspections, walkdowns, testing, and equipment inventories that required equipment and components associated with the portable diesel generator credited in the severe accident management guidelines were in their designated locations and capable of performing their intended functio Enclosure Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useabl documented blackout coping strategy, and station-specific procedures to understand the implementation and required actions to facilitate the battery only blackout coping use the severe accident management guidelines portable diesel generato The inspectors walked down the emergency batteries and the portable diesel generator looking for material conditions/deficiencies that could call into question their abilities to function and to mitigate severe accident The inspectors also reviewed surveillance test data for the safety related batteries and test data from the 4-hour run of the portable diesel generato Additionally, the inspectors performed a search of the corrective action program database for condition reports that documented issues that could impact the operability/functionality of the batteries or portable diesel generator. Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. No operability/functionality concerns were identified during the inspectors, walkdowns or licensee identified that portable fans used as part of the severe action management guidelines response were not built correctly to allow transport; the fans required a change to the wheel orientation to allow them to be move The licensee further indentified that not all of the vendor recommended preventative maintenance items for the portable diesel generator were included in the preventative maintenance schedul These items were entered into the station corrective action progra Enclosure Licensee Action he capability to mitigate a station blackout event. b. Demonstrate through walkdowns that procedures for response to a station blackout are executable. The licensee performs routine surveillance testing on the safety related batteries to verify their ability to perform their intended functions, which includes a station blackout even The licensee also used station operators and electrical maintenance personnel to complete field walkdowns of their proceduralized blackout strategy as described in station Procedure 5.3, "Station Blackout." The licensee verified that the simulator-based training program incorporates scenarios which include station blackout. Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended. The inspectors reviewed the licensing basis for the plant as well as the documented coping strategy to verify that the facility was a battery only coping plan The inspectors verified evision, could be performed as written, and had been performed satisfactorily within the technical specification specified periodicit The inspectors verified that the operators had been trained periodically on station blackout actions in the plant simulator; the last training cycle was September 21, 2010, through October 29, 201 The inspectors also reviewed results -hour test run of the severe accident management guidelines portable diesel generator. Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. The licensee determined that Procedure 5.3, "Station Blackout," was achievable as written. correct revisions, could be performed as written, and had been performed satisfactorily within the periodicity required by technical specification Enclosure 03.03 flooding events required by station desig Refer to Inspection Procedure 71111.01, "Adverse Weather Protection," Section 02.04, "Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding," as a guidelin The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through walkdowns and inspections that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly stage These walkdowns and inspections shall include verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functiona Licensee Action flooding events. a. Verify through walkdowns and inspection that all required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and maintained. The licensee reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, to identify the licensing basis external flood level (903 feet mean sea level), critical structures potentially affected, barriers important to resisting the effects of external flooding, and general flood relief paths credited in the current design basi The review also identified the principal safety related structures required for safe shutdown which require protectio These structures include the reactor building, control building, intake structure, diesel generator building, controlled corridor, and the drywell and suppression chambe The licensee also verified that Surveillance Procedure 6.SUMP.601, which verifies the condition of the seals and proper functioning of the sump, was being performed once per operating cycle; it was last performed October 28, 200 This verification was done in regard to the Z sump, which contains equipment essential to the operation of the standby gas treatment system, and is below 903 feet mean sea leve The licensee also reviewed its current licensing basis for internal flooding relative to high and medium-energy line break During this review, the licensee determined the affected rooms, and then individually reviewed on a room-by-room basis the type of break, worst case break, flow rate, flood height and minimum height of essential equipment in the are The licensee then performed plant walkdowns and visual inspections to verify that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals were functional, and to look for apparent signs of degradatio The licensee also performs monthly walkdowns of areas of the reactor building to validate design conditions and in support of an update to the associated internal flooding calculation Enclosure Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useabl Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended. The inspectors performed independent reviews of the Updated Safety Analysis Report as well as the internal and external flooding calculations of recor The inspectors then performed independent walkdowns of external and internal doors, seals and penetration The inspectors observed the material condition of equipment used to detect and mitigate flooding condition maintenance program to ensure that installed flood mitigation equipment was being properly maintaine Additionally, the inspeaction program database for items that could impact the ability of the credited equipment to perform its intended functio Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Inspectors are closing Unresolved Item 05000298-2010005-06, "Failure to Update Flood Protection for Safety Related Buildings," in Inspection Report 05000298/201100 The inspectors will be documenting resolution of an issue associated with an internal flooding concern, the blocking of analyzed flow paths on the 903 foot elevation of the reactor building without proper prior analysis, in Inspection Report 05000298/201100 The licensee walkdowns identified minor material conditions that were entered into the corrective action program for resolution: however, none of these conditions would have prevented the barriers from functionin Enclosure 03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the lir the sit new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.g., entered it in to the corrective action program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns and inspections of important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures, and fire and flood response equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important functio Use Inspection Procedure 71111.21, "Component Design Basis Inspection," Appendix 3, "Component Walkdown Considerations," Licensee Action availability of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategie a. Verify through walkdowns that all required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and maintained. The licensee performed station walkdowns to inspect and assess the material condition/functionality of equipment important to safety needed to mitigate a flood or fire following a safe shutdown earthquak This included external visual inspection of associated pumps, diesels, motors, breakers, pipes, valves, tanks, intake structures, hoses, and fitting The material condition of surrounding seismic equipment and structures was also inspecte The surrounding nonseismic equipment and structures were walked down to determine if any systems, structures or components could fall on and damage credited equipmen Threview also assessed transportability of any credited portable equipment to ensure that the equipment can be readily transported to the desired locatio A vendor-supplied engineering report assessed the structural vulnerabilities identified during the plant walkdowns for seismicit The report also assessed plant equipment for survivability during a probable maximum floo The licensee also reviewed memoranda of understanding for outside assistance that were credited as contingency actions for events far beyond design basi The licensee assessed communication capabilities including on-site communication centers, equipment, communication lines and tower structures. Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useabl Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intende Enclosure The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report to determine the maximum external flood level for the site and requirements associated with combating fires and flood The inspectors also reviewed station procedures that provide guidance for responding to earthquakes, floods, fires, spent fuel pool casualties and severe accidents to identify plant equipment credited for mitigating these event The inspectors independently walked down to ensure it was available and usable, and to ensure that the procedures could be accomplished as writte These walkdowns included contingency response equipment, external doors, the walls of external buildings, the fire protection system pumps, and portions of the main fire heade Discuss general results including corrective actions by license Briefly summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of their review The licensee determined that because the station had not been designed and licensed to postulate a fire after a safe shutdown earthquake, the firefighting equipment outside of the essential structures was not required to meet Class 1 seismic standard Also, because Cooper Nuclear Station was not designed and licensed for internal or external flooding events resulting from a safe shutdown earthquake, these scenarios were considered to be beyond the design basis of the plan The licensee identified a potential vulnerability associated with its ability to position various contingency components during a site-wide flooddiesel generator would be challenged with the river at probable maximum flood level The licensee identified that the diesel fire pump batteries could be impacted during a probable maximum floo The administration building houses the technical support center and the operations support center but receives no flooding barriers per current side procedure The flooding of this building could hamper the execution of the emergency plan following a safe shutdown earthquake concurrent with a probable maximum flood even All of these issues have been entered into the station corrective action program for resolutio Enclosure EXIT MEETING SUMMARY The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Willis, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 28, 201 The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietar No proprietary information was identifie A-1 Attachment SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel J. Austin, Manager, System Engineering T. Barker, Manager, Quality Assurance J. Bebb, Manager, Security R. Beilke, Manager, Radiation Protection/Chemistry S. Brown, Manager, Maintenance D. Buman, Director of Engineering S. DeRosier, Supervisor, Operations Training L. Dewhirst, Manager, Corrective Action and Assessments J. Flaherty, Licensing Engineer T. Hottovy, Manager, Engineering Support G. Mace, Manager, Nuclear Asset D. Madsen, Licensing Engineer D. Montgomery, Manager, Emergency Preparedness M. Tackett, Assistant to General Manager of Plant Operations D. VanDerKamp, Licensing Manager D. Werner, Superintendent, Operations Training D. Willis, General Manager of Plant Operations A. Zaremba, Director Nuclear Safety Assurance LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspectio Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effor Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection repor .01 design basis events PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 5.9 SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidance 6 5.1 INCEDENT Site Emergency Incident 18 5.3 ALT-STRATEGY Alternate Core Cooling Mitigating Strategies 26 5.5 AIRCRAFT Aircraft Threat 20 2.4 FPC Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble 23 EOP SAG-1 SAG-1 Flow Chart 4 A-2 Attachment EOP SAG 2AB SAG-2A/B Flow Chart 3 EOP SAG 2CD SAG-2C/D Flow Chart 4 EOP SAG 2EF SAG-2E/F Flow Chart 4 EOP SAG 2G SAG-2G Flow Chart 2 CONDITION REPORTS CR-CNS-2011-2504 CR-CNS-2011-2714 CR-CNS-2011-2694 CR-CNS-2011-2727 CR-CNS-2011-2707 CR-CNS-2011-2778 CR-CNS-2011-2684 CR-CNS-2011-2776 CR-CNS-2011-2883 WORK ORDERS 4750942 4819277 4819377 4750583 5819634 4750584 03.02 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 5.3 SBO Station Blackout 23 0.4 Verification and Validation 52 CONDITION REPORTS CR-CNS-2011-2506 CR-CNS-2011-2826 CR-CNS-2011-3234 CR-CNS-2011-3221 CR-CNS-2011-3336 CR-CNS-2011-3235 CR-CNS-2011-2815 CR-CNS-2011-2701 CR-CNS-2011-3348 CR-CNS-2011-2169 CR-CNS-2011-3394 CR-CNS-2011-3419 CR-CNS-2011-3420 CR-CNS-2011-3535 WORK ORDERS 4750942 4819377 800000031734 MISCELLANOUS NUMBER TITLE DATE / REVISION INT008-03-06 Loss of Offsite Power/Steam Cooling 13 Black Plant Procedure Issue Date May 3, 2010 A-3 Attachment 03.03 required by station design PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 5.1FLOOD 0.16 Control of Doors 44 5.1BREAK Pipe Break Outside of Containment 11 6.FLOOD.601 Flood Door Gap Examination 2 7.0.11 Flood Control Barriers 14 2.2.18 4160V Auxiliary Power Distribution 135 0.27.1 Periodic Structural Inspection of Structures 5 CONDITION REPORTS CR-CNS-2011-3855 CR-CNS-2011-3854 CR-CNS-2011-3750 CR-CNS-2011-3715 CR-CNS-2011-2974 CR-CNS-2011-3849 CR-CNS-2011-3751 CR-CNS-2011-3903 CR-CNS-2011-3975 CALCULATIONS NEDC 91-069 NEDC 98-038 NEDC 91-128 NEDC 91-066 NEDC 91-024 NEDC 91-037 MISCELLANOUS NUMBER TITLE Engineering Evaluation 02-059 DCD-38 Internal Flooding 03.04 important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION Fire Hazard Analysis 5.4 POST-FIRE Post Fire Operational Information 39 5.4 FIRE-S/D Fire Induced Shutdown From Outside Control Room 41 5.1 QUAKE Earthquake 9 CONDITION REPORTS CR-CNS-2011-2508 A-4 Attachment MISCELLANOUS TITLE DATE Structural Vulnerability Assessment April 6, 2011