ML19260C675

Requests Commission Deny Util Request for Extension of Cp. Public Hearing Must Be Held.Mark II Containment Safety Questionable.Long Piles Should Be Used in Foundation. Contentions & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19260C675
Person / Time
Site:	Bailly
Issue date:	12/20/1979
From:	Mezo C, Olszanski M UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8001080286
Download: ML19260C675 (14)

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NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC ) DOCKET No. 50-367 SERVICE COMPANY (Bailly )

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PETITION TO DENY PERMIT PETITIONERS, Local 1010 of the United Steelworkers of America repre-sents approximately 19,000 steelworkers at the Inland Steel Indiana Harbor Works in East Chicao, Indiana, an area that has a concentration of operating and proposed nuclear power plants. For reasons of Safety, Economics, and jobs, some of which are enumerated below, Petitioners request the Commission Denv the reauest of the Northern Indiana Public Service Company for an extension of their construction permit for the Bailly generating station, Nuclear-1.

Petitioners are convinced that Bailly Nuclear 1 would have disastrous consequences for the residents of this area.

A hearing must be held, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S2239 on the proposed construction permit extension, At that hearing, Petitioners will present evidence on certain contentions to be proposed are rele-vant to such proceedings because:

1 Each contention to be discussed reaises signigicant new hazard considerations regarding the Bailly nuclear power plant;

2. The contentions to be raised are ones which were not, and could not have been considered at the initial construction permit proceeding:

. 3. The contentions to be raised are cues which must be 1702 295 8001080 C!EiC5 9

. . resolved in order "to provide reasonable assurance that the general type of reactor proposed could be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public." Power Reactor Develocment Corcoration

v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.C. 396, 409-410, 81 S. Ct. 1529, 1536 (1961).

4. With regard to each of these issues, there has been no finding or assurance by the staff or by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety that specific problems which we raise will be resolved by the reactor venders prior to the operating license hearing at Bailly.

5. The contentions to be raised are ones which may not be capable of resolution during construction by the reactor vendors.

RESERVATION Petitioners reserve the right to amend, modify and add to or delite the contentions stated herein.

CONTENTIONS

1. General Electric Mark II Containment: Subsequent to the issuance to the Bailly construction permit serious questions about the safety of the Mark II containment system came to public attention. The problems with the Mark II containment are acknowledged by the Commission as being both serious (see e.g. NUREG 0410, NRC Program for Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants, Report to Congress ,

January 1, 1978. Task Action Plan, Task Number A-8 at pages 1-2, Task

1. A finding by the staff and'the ACRS that an issue is capable of 1702 296

- - ~3-resolution during construction is necessary in order to defer a particul significant safety and environmental question until the operating licens Georgia Power Company (Alvin W. Vogtle, Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-291 NRC i/2 404 (1975).

Number Action Plan, Task Number A-39 at page 2) and unresolved " Summary of Meeting held on February 16,17, 1977, to discuss the Mark II Containment Pool Dynamic Load Program" dated April 18, 1977 at page 4.

The staff acknowledges that Mark II questions are both important and unresolved (see Brief for Respondent's United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the United States of America (pages 8-11, 28-29, 34-38) filed in Porter County Chapter et al. v. NRC and U.S.A., D.C. Cir.

filed June 14, 1978.) The Mark II containment question is both a significant safety issue and one which may not be capable of resolution during construction.

2. The Installation of Short Pilines: The Applicant, the Northern Indiana Public Service Company ("NIPSCO") proposes to install short pilings foundations fcr Class I - safety structures at the Bailly plant. The original design proposed by NIPSCO for Bailly and approved by the Commission contemplated that the plant would be built on a foundation of piles driven to bed rock or the layer of glacial till immediately above bed rock ("long piles" . ) The present construc-tion permit authorized the applicant only to drive long piles. NIPSCO now proposes a significant change in the major safety feature-altering the foundation design for all Class I - structures. The design of the foundation and the length of foundation piles for Class I structures are major safety features of Bailly shich would directly affect the public health and safety and are issues which would not be capable of resolution during construction. The short pilings 1702 297

proposal has not been considered in public hearings, nor could it have been bacause it was not proposed by NIPSCO until after public hearings were concluded and the original construction permit was granted.

3. Post Accident Monitorina: The Bailly plant design is inadequate because it lacks sufficient post accident monitoring capabilities in order to inform plant operators of what has happened following a nuclear accident. Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1-97 which governs post accident monitoring has not been taken into account by NIPSCO in the design of the Bailly plant. The inadequacies in post accident monitoring are amply demonstrated at Three Mile Island.when the operator of the plant did not know what was taking place in the core of the containment and did not know accident conditions outside of the plant. This is a significant issue which may not be capable of resolution during construction and is one which has not been con-sidered before in the Bailly proceeding. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety as recently as May 16, 1979 has acknowledged the importance of post accident monitoring.

4. Class IX Accidents: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Plants) Docket No. STN 50-437, 8 N.R.C. 194 (1978) decided for the first time that Class IX accidents are a proper subject for consideration in the NRC staff's environmental statements. Although the Commission limited its decision to floating nuclear power plants the Three Mile Island in-cident and Bailly's proximity to major urban areas and a national lake shore makes it particularly appropriate for Class IX consider-1702 298

. ation. Class IX consideration has not been given to the Bailly nuclear plant and is not an issue which is capable of resolution during construction of the plant.

5. Unresolved Generic Safety Issues: The NRC in NUREG 0410 and NUREG 0471 and Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2) 6 NRC 760 (1977) list numerous generic safety issues which have not yet been resolved. In addition, General Electric, the reactor vendor for Bailly, has prepared a report (the Reed Report) identifying inter alia 27 safety related items which need improvement in General Electric boiling water reactors. The Report's existence was not made known to the public until after the issuance of the Bailly construction permit and it was net even until 1976 that NRC employees were allowed to see the report. At that time they were permitted to examine it only in G.E. 's offices and in the presence of G.G. officials. In February of 1979 Chariman Hendrie in a letter to Congress stated that the notes of these two employees identifying the 27 issues is somehow disappeared. G.E. has historically resisted releasing this report and it has only recently in the Black Fox case that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has been permitted to review the report.

The failure of the staff in NIPSCO to adequately assess the impact of these unresolved safety issues is to permit the plant to be built with many potential deficiencies which may endanger the health and safety of the public, enable NIPSCO to backfit upon the resolution the safety issues to the more lenient back fitting standards the NRC imposes upon plants under construction rather than the more stringent back fitting requirements imposed upon plants not going through the 1702 299

licensing process, certain of the generic safety issues may not be capable of resolution of back fitting.

6. Anticipated Transie'nt Without Scran ( ATWS) : 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix A criterion 20 requests that the emergency protection systems in a reactor be designed to automatically initiate the opera-tion of certain safety systems to assure that field design limits are never exceeded due to certain anticipated occurrences during operation.

Several times a year in the U.S. a reactor will fail to scram when the field design limit is exceeded. ATWS has been shown by WASH 1400 (the Rasmussen Report) to be a major cause of accidents in boiling water reactors and that boiling water rec.ctors are more susceptable to ATWS than pressurized water reactors. The Mark II reactor will not survive many of the proposed ATWS scenarios thus potentially resulting in a core melt or a containment failure. NUREG 0460 calls for several possible solutions to the problem of ATWS. It is critical that the design and construction of the Bailly plant be capable of accommodating any of the possible solutions proposed to meet the ATWS requirement. This issue is not dealt with in the construction permit proceeding and may not be capable of resolution during construc-tion.

7. ALARA: Events at Three Mile Island indicated great problems of worker exposure in attempting to mitigate the effects of the less-than-Class IX accident. This was especially evident in sucn systems as the hydrogen recombiners, primary loop sampling system and liquid and gas waste storage in the auxilary building. NIPSCO has not dealt with this factor in the construction permit proceeding 1702 300

and it is a problem which may be' incapable for resolution during construction.

8. Spent Fuel Pool Size: In view of the lack of alternative storage and disposal facilities for spent fuel it is important to allow sufficient size for the spent fuel pool without the artifical mech-anism of dense storage. Mark II reactors require spent fuel storage in the containment vessel and therefore adequate space in the contain-ment must be provided for spent fuel storage. This is a problem not dealt with in the construction permit and if the containment is im-properly designed, will be incapable of resolution during construction.

9. Nuclear System Material Failures: Operating history of boiling water reactors since the issuance.of the construction permit for Bailly indicate numerous problems regarding the adequacy of boiling water reactor designs with reference to pipe cracks, sparger cracks and control rod failure. 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix A, criteria 14, 30, and 31 require an applicant to demonstrate the adequacy of material selection and control to avoid such problems. No such demo-stration has been made by NIPSCO and because these are design problems they will be incapable of resolution during construction.

10. Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore:

A. The impact and effect on the validity of the construction permit of Public Law 94-549, regarding expansion of the Indiana Dur,as National Lakeshore has not been addressed in the context of the hearing. P.L.94-549 amends the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore 1702 301

enabling legislation 80 Stat. 1309, 16 U.S.X. Sec. 460 et sec. by requiring the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a study and issue a report by July 1, 1977 on the area II-A, the NIPSCO " green belt" the land adjacent to the boundaries of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. .The objectives of the study are as follows: " (a) preser-vation of the remaining dunes, wetlands, native vegetation, and animal life within the area; (b) preservation and restoration of the water-sheds of Cowles Bog and its assosciated wetlands; (c) appropriate public access to and use of lands within the area; (d) protection of the area and the adjacent lakeshore from degradation caused by all' forms of construction, pollution, or other adverse impacts including, but not linited to the discharge of wastes and any excessive sub-surface irrigation of water; and (e) the economic consequences to the utility and its customers of acquisition of such area." (Public Law 94-549, S19, 1976).

B. Adverse Impacts On Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore:

Recent studies on the impact of the construction and opera-tion of the Bailly plant on the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore con-ducted by scientists of the National Park Service concluded that the Bailly plant will exacerbate the harm currently being caused to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore from the operation of the fossil fuel plant on the same site. In addition, discussions held in connection with these studies resulted in recommendations for the review and possible improvement of the monitoring program on the Bailly plant construction, and mitigation of damage done to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore by the Bailly plant.

These significant new facts and evidentiary developments on 1702 302

an issue of vital environmental importance require that the Commission revise its Final Environmental Statement, re-analyze the cost-benefit conclusion on the issuance of the, construction permit for the Bailly plant, and re-analyze its comparison of the costs and benefits of the permit issuance to the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.

11. Escalatine Cost of Construction: As of November 10, 1978, the cost of construction of the Bailly plmat was estimated by NIPSCO to be approximately $850,000,000 exclusive of fuel costs and fuel enrichment costs. (NIPSCO Quarterly Report to DOE, November 10, 1978). The current estimates of the cost of constructing the Bailly plant are more than triple the estimated costs upon which the AEC made its decision to authorize the construction permit.

A change of this magnitude in a significant factor (the cost of construction) in the cost-benefit analysis requires that the Commission re-analyze its prior cost-benefit conclusion on the issuance of a construction permit for the Bailly plant. It also requires that the Commission re-analyze its comparison of the cost and benefits of that permit issuance to the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.

12. Enerav Conservation As An Alternative Under NEPA: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, recognized in Aeschliman v. NRC, f. 2d  ; 9 NRC 1289 that in order to comply with the mandatee of NEPA, energy conservation as a clear alternative to a nuclear power plant must be considered by the NRC.

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The Supreme Court in reversing the Court of Appeals de-cision Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. NRDC, reasoned that though energy conservation was an increasingly important con-sideration the obligation of the Commission is to explore those alter-natives known at the appropriate time.

The Commission's obligations under NEPA, as determined by the Aeschliman and Vermont Yankee decisions, require that the energy commission which was not considered at the initial hearing stage must now be analyzed. This issue was not considered during the construc-tion permit.

The main objection of Local 1010 to Bailly I is the proposed site of the Reactor. Bailly I would be built directly adjacent to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, and Lake Michigan, which is the only source od drinking water for the City of Chicago, which is withing 20 miles of the site.

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Even more significantly, in the view of our Union, the Bethlehem Steel Burna llarbor Plant which employs about 5800 of our members, is within 700 feet of the site. This facility, the most modern Basic Steel Plant in the Country, has an average Iron making capacity of about 12,000 tons per day. The evacuation plan for this plant suggests that several thousand employees could be quickly evacuated through two (2) exits onto highway U.S.12. The Plant presently operates on staggered shifts, to relieve traffic congestion. In spite of this, severe traffic jams are being experienced by Employces leaving the Plant at shift changes.

This prob 1cm is a8gravated in winter by snow and icy roads; in summe by the huge volume of traffic added by visitors to the Dunes National Park.

USWA Local 6787, representing the Bethlehem Employees, has voted to Institute Legal Proceedings concerning the lack of an adequate evacuation plan.

Evacuation is complicated by the fact that the Coke-Ovens, Blast Furnaces, Basic Oxygen Furnaces, and other fabilities at the Plant require several days to shut down without destruction of this equipment.

Were Bethlehem unable to maintain a crew of several hundred people to shut down these units properly, or should all the employees evacuate the Plant due to an emergency at Bailly I, the permanent loss of naillions of dollars in Steelmaking facilities would be inevitable.

In addition, United States Steel's Gary Works, which employs about 19,000 USWA members of Loca 1014 and Local 1066, is within 8 miles of Bailly I.

Midwest Steel, Division of National Steel, which employs about 1100 USWA members of Local 6103, is within 2 miles of Bailly I.

Inland Stecl's Indiana Harbor Works, which employs about 18,000 USWA members of Local 1010, is within 16 miles of Bailly I.

Jones and Laughlin's Indiana Harbor Works, (formerly Youngstown Sheet & Tube), which employs about 8000 USWA members of Local 1011' is also within 16 miles of Bailly I.

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The United States Steel'. South Chicago Works, which employes about 7,000 USWA members of Local 65, is about 20 miles from Bailly I.

The Northern Indiana Public Service Company employs approximately 4100 USWA members of Local 12775, Local 3300 and Local 19796, some of whom would be employed at Bailly I, and most of whom live within 15 miles of the site.

Ignoring the many small Locals within 20 miles of the Bailly I site, over 43,300 USWA members work within this 20 mile limit.

The largest concenation of Basic Steelmaking capacity in this Country lies within 10 to 20 miles of Bailly I. Loss of even a part of this Steelmaking capacity due to accident or improper evacuation could cripple the Nation's steel industry.

Local 1010, United Steelworkers of America is therefore strong-ly opposed to construction of Bai ?. y I. The risk, to the jobs; health and lives of our members and their families, as well as all the other residents of Northwest Indiana and Northeast Illinois, far out weighs any possible benefits to be derived from construction of Bailly I.

/ Local 1010 urges the Commission to deny NIPSCO'S request for ex-tension of the permit to construct Bailly Nuclear I. PETITIONERS URGE THAT NO CONSTRUCTION OF ANY NUCLEAR PLANT BE APPROVED AT THIS SITE.

DATED DECEMBER 20, 1979 Respectfully Submitted

/ M Clifford4Mezo, A c t in g'.} r e s id e n t U .mr M ,

Milde 01szanski, Chiirgan Environmental Committee Local 1010 United Steelworkers of America 3703 Euclid Avenue East Chicago, Indiana 46312 1702 306 e

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: )

NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC ) DOCKET NO. 50-367 SERVICE COMPANY (Bailly )

Generating Station, )

Nuclear-I )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE' I hereby certify that I have served copies of the PETITION TO DENY PERMIT, DECEMEER 20, 1979, upon each of the following persons by deposit in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, this 20th day of December, 1979:

Joseph Hendric Richard Kennedy Chairman Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cormission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Peter Bradford Victor Gilinsky Commissioner Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 John Ahearne Director of Nuclear Reactor Commissioner Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission . Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Samuel J. Chilk Chief Public Proceedings Secretary of the Commission Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Of fice of the Secretary of Commission the Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss Washington, D.C. 20555 William H. Eichhorn, Esq. Jack R. Newman, Esq.

Eichhorn, Morrow & Eichhorn Newman, Reis & Axelrad 5243 Hohman Avenue 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Hammond, Indiana 46320 Washington, D.C. 20036 1702 307

Guy H. Cunningham, III James L. Kelley Assistant Chief Hearing Acting Genreal Counsel Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dean Hansell Steven C. Goldberg Assistant Attorney General Counsel for the NRC 188 West Randolph Street Regulatory Staff Chicago, Illinois 60601 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard L. Robbins Lake Michigan Federation Washington, D.C. 20553.

53 West Jackson Boulevard Chicago, Illinois 60604 Marcia Mulky Counsel for the NRC Michael Swygert Regulatory Staff DePaul School of Law U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 25 East Jackson Boulevard Commission Room 759 Washington, D.C. 20555 Chicago, Illinois 60604 Susan Sekuler Assistant Attorney General 188 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601

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