ML19330C550
| ML19330C550 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1980 |
| From: | BAKER & BOTTS, HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO., LOWENSTEIN, NEWMAN, REIS, AXELRAD & TOLL |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19330C545 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-CP, NUDOCS 8008080488 | |
| Download: ML19330C550 (16) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- _ - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD __ _. ._ .. In the Matter of 5 5 EOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 5 COMPANY 5 Docket No. 50-466 5
.(Allens Creek Nuclear 5 Generating Station, Unit i No . 1 ) - 5
' MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE FE .T _ _ . _ .
- 1. No aircraft is known to have crashed after passing near an operating nuclear power plant as a documen-ted result of exposure to airborne radiation from the plant, which produced ions that purportedly " latched" onto the aircraft's guidance circuits and interfered with their proper functioning. 1
- 2. The scientific literature, including NRC 1
publications, contains no support for the existence of the ; phencmenon of air crashes due to this so-called " latching". l
- 3. Natural sources of ioniration in the atmosphere l are many times greater than the permitted emissions from ACNGS. Aircraft regularly fly in the presence of the resultant natural atmospheric ion concentrations without failure or degradation of the guidance circuitry.
- 4. The already low emissions from ACNGS will be dispersed by distance and radionuclides will decay with time. The ionizing effect of these emissions- at flight altitudes will be negligible. Furthermore, aircraft exposure to these emissions will be quite brief.
- 5. Aircraft flying near ACNGS will not suffer failure or degradation of guidance system circuits due to the so-called " latching" of ions produced by' airborne radio-logica_1 emissions from ACNGS.
GC:00:P 1 1 1 1
EAF/ COMP 80-804 PAID Sv M.F. DEF. TexPirg Contention No. 50/ l g Latching - 3 IN THE UNITED STATES O F AME RICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTE R OF : ) HOUSTON LIGHTING AND ) %f, POWER COMPLNY , DOCKET NOS. 50-44+
) 50 '00 (ALLENS CREEK NUCLEAR _.
GENERATING STATION , ) UNIT NO. 1)
)
DEPOSITION OF: CLARE NCE LEE JOHNSON k ) r cesE!i o _, , ao rg . . - _ . . .
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24 1 A. I'd say, yes, that the contention may 2 not be a meritorious one. 2 O. Thank you. Le t 's move on to TexPIRC's 4 contention 50 on latching. 5 Would you explain to =e what la tching is? 6 A. La t c h i n g is a phenomenon of ionizing 7 radiation affecting r ad io instumentation and S el ec t ro n ic in s t um en ta tio n . 9 I think la tc h i ng o r ig in all y comes from a 10 phrase used by nam radio operators and so forth 11 who have noticed various natural phenomena which 12 may result from rad ia tion and so fo r th that 12 affects their r a d io signals. 14 Tha t 's basically where the term ' 15 " latching" comes'from. And I should s ta te that l 16 this contention is based almost solely on the i l 17 sta temen t by Richard Webb, Accident !!a :a rd s of 19 Atomic Power on pag e 195. 19 C. What does be say there? 20 ~ A. He basically suggests that it is 21 possible that planes that fly through radioactive 22 releases from nuclear power pl a n ts may have their 22 systems e f f ec ted by the radiation in the form of 24 latching on the electronic guidance systems. 25 c. t. b a t causes hic to suggest tha t?
35 1 A. He states that a Crumman e'ng i n e e r 2 suggested that to him as a po s si b il i t y . He cited 3 the Detroit news article. 4 Q. Did you ever read the Detroit news 5 a r ticl e? 6 A. I have. 7 0 Do e s it say anything about latching?
? A. No, it does not.
9 C. Doesn't tha t cast some doubt on Mr. 10 Webb's basis for his somewhat speculative 11 al eg a ti o n? 12 A. I think it -- to us , it leaves a 12 question as to whether Mr. Webb himself is 14 accurate. 15 C. Do you -- - 16 A. Someone from TexPIRC has talked to Mr. 17 Webb about it. He says tha t Norman Rasmussen is 18 somewha t of an expert on this subject, and he 19 thinks that a serious accident in a nuclear power 20' plant with larg e releases of radioactive could 21 cause la tch ing in airplancs. 22 He does not sa y that normal releases 23 would be sufficient. !!o we v e r , Mr. Webb disagrees j 24 with him and tninks it's po s s i bl e . l 25 C. Mhat does TexP:RC believe? l
_ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ . 26 1 A. I'd have to tell you that quite frankly 2 I'm skeptical of the -- I'm skeptical of the 3 phenomena. I'd like the opportunity to see if we 4 can find anything else on it. I've talked to a 5 space physicist at Rice about it and h a v e n,' t 6 gotten any good .in f o rm a t i o n to really provide any 7 more basis beyond what ti r . 'rie b b says, j 8 Q. Your sole basis is Fr. Webb's spec- ! 9 ula tion and tha t 's it? l IC A. Yes. I 11 Q. Al l right. And yo u know no more or less 12 than his pa s s i ng comment in his book, and this 13 telephone conversation; is that co r r ec t? 14 A. Yes. 15 - C. All right. j 16 A. Ana I talked to Dr. Freeman at Pice. ' l 17 C. What d id he tell you? 15 A. He tho ug h t about it a while and said , 19 that he thought it was possible for very h ig h l 1 20 levels -- he said he had never really given it ) 21 much thought. He kind of looked at it as sort of 22 a precarious cuestion. 23 C. Tell me this: At the end of the l 24 discovery period, if yo u have found no more than 1 25 what exists in Mr. Webb's book or further, does 1
i ~~ l 27 1 TexPIRG intend to pursue this? , 2 A. I'm no t sure. I'd have to consult our l ! 2 attorney. I thiak it's very likely that we ety 4 withdraw the contention if we can get no firmer 5 in f o rma t ion on it. 6 Q. When will that decision be made so we 7 know how to conduct our discovery, because we are, 8 in fact, overawed by the nebulousness of this 9 con ten tio n? 10 A. First of all, I don't think it's quite 11 that nebulous. 12 Q. Can you explain to me a single causal 13 mechanism between the release of radioactivity 14 and the frequency of airplane guidance systems? 15 A. It's possible tha t an ion sheet could 16 f o rm around the plane and that wo ul d al te r the 17 resistance on the antennas and so forth and the 18 in s t umen ta tio n tha t is tied in to the electronic 19 system within the plane. 20 Q. What's an io n sheet? 21 A. To tell the the truth, I couldn't tell 22 you. Th a t wa s Dr. Freeman's description of the l 22 causal mechanism that he could im ag in e . 1 l 24 Q. He could im ag in e? Does he have any 25 evidence of such a possibility?
.- - - - - ------------ .----mm_,__________ se 1 A. No. - 2 0 So this is just an o u tg rowt h of his 2 fertile imag ina tio n ; is that co r r ec t? 4 A. I wouldn't sa y it necessarily is his 5 fertile imagine. I a s k ed him a specific question, 6 and I mentioned to him that Mr. Webb s ug g e s t e d 7 this could occur, and I asked him if there's any 8 possible causal mechanism for this, and' he 9 thought about it and sa id that was a possibility. 10 Ho wev e r , it wa s -- I should'nake it -I 11 clear that it was his opinion t ha t in low levels 12 of radia tio n , that could cause that ion sheet. 13 .Q. What level of r ad ia tion would it take -- 14 A. I don't know. 15 Q. What radioactive omissions from a 16 nuclear power plant either normal or under 17 accident conditions would give rise to this level 18 of r ad io ac tiv i ty? 19 A. I don't know the exact level. 20 Q. What level or al ti t ud e , say, above l 21 Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Sta tion would , 22 this activity have to reach to influence passing 22 a ircra f ts? 24 A. I don't know. I would assume that Webb 25 spoke of planes passing directly t h ro ug h a p l ura e .
29 1 I suggest it has a lot to do with weather 2 conditions if tha t's the case. Ra the r than the 3 excessive diffusion, for instance, of the 4 rad io ac tiv e plume that, in fact, it wa s not S difussed by the atmosphere, and the plane passes 6 di r ec tl y t h r o ug h the concentrated dosage. l 7 0 knat al ti t ud e would this plume have to 8 extend to? 9 A. I don't know. 10 C. What al ti tud e would yo u expect the 11 pluces under accident or normal conditions from f 12 Allens Creek to rise? 13 A. I can't answer that cuestion at the i 14 present time. l 15 c. Lo yo u know of any other causal 16 r ela tion ship between the release of r ad io ac tive 17 omissions and effects on guidance systems other 18 than the ion sheet phenomenon? l Ic A. I don't know. 20 C. You don't know if you know? 21 A. No. I mean, I'm not a wa r e of any other f 22 explanations or s ta t emen t s I could make on the 23 subject. 24 Q.. Ha s there ever been, to your knowledge, 25 a single document entered on occurrences of
40 . l l 1 latching r ela t i ng to the o p e r a t i o' n of nuclear F 2 power pl an ts? l 2 A. Well, there's always questions of what ; 4 you mean by documents? If you mean -- Webb has l 1 i 5 felt in his mind he d ocum en te d a case in Michigan f 6 on June 9, 1971. 7 Now, that d ocum en ta tio n consists purely 1 8 of his believe tha t la tching can occur and that 9 - those who sa w the plane sa id it passed d i r ec tly 10 over the plant. It was a bomber, and he says i 11 that such of the in f o rma tio n concerning what ;- l 12 ha p pen ed and the cause of the accident is a 12 =ilitary secret, because the =ilitary will not. 14 r elea se it. l 15 0 Was there a sim ul ta n eo us accident at sig 16 Rock when t h i. s bomber flew over? ! I 17 A. No . l 18 C. So there's no reason to believe that 19 there were any radioactive omissions from Eig i 20 acek -- 21 A. Cther than the normal omissions. , 22 C. Does TexPIRC believe that normal l 22 omissions will cause the phenomenon of latching? o 24 A. That is part of our contention. 25 C. No w , tha t's no t wha t I asked you. I i _ sm._ __ _ - . _ . __
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41 I s 1 asked you if TexFIRG believes that normal 2 omissions will cause the phenomena of latching
- 1 1 A. We don't know. l i
4 0 So you don't know whether or not this j l 1 5 incident at Big Rock' wa s a la ter ing occurrence or S no t? f 7 A. Tha t 's correct. 1 8 C. So, to your k no wl edg e , there's never 9 been a single inc id en t of latching that yo u 10 believe in? I 11 A. Well, I don't know of any inc id en t where f 12 it's been proven to any hig h degree of 12 reliability. I 14 Q. Co you know of any incident tha t TexPIRC 15 believes was a mani f e s ta tio n of the latching 16 phenomena? 17 A. Well, as I say, I think it's possible l 13 that latching occurred in the Michigan case at 19 that reactor. I 20 C. You believe that it could have occurred 21- t h e r e ?. 22 A. Yes. I 23 C. Co you believe it was caused by no rmal l 24 releases? l 25 A. I believe it's po s s ibl e it could have l l i h
' 42 I i 1 been, but we don't know for c e r t a" in that tha t's !!
2 the case. 3 Q. Maybe I'm no t expressing myself clearly. 4 I'm a s k i ng you about TexPIRC's belief. No t S ne c e s sa r il y wnat they have as an array of facts 6 to support that belief right now. 7 Does Tex PIRG believe that sig Rock was t 4 8 the release of no rma l -- f
. 9 A. Well, we are not ce r ta in . It's our 1C belief that this is a matter of true scientific j n
11 debate or question. - 12 c. Who is involved in the scientific debate 13 or cuestion? 14 A. Obviously .M r . Webb is, 15 C. Is Mr. Webb d eba ting himself, or his he f 16 he debating anyone else? I I don't know how much co nv e r sa tion he's 17 A. f le had witn Mr. Rasmussen. 19 c. lia s the NRC ever expressed any interest 20 in this phenomena? 21 A. I don't believe they ever have other 22 than admitting our contention. I 22 c. They noted tha t they could find no 24 causal nechanism or plausible relationship 25 between this phenomenon and the operation of L.
. ~ . . .- - .. . -.
43 1 nuclear power plants. 2 A. Who sa id tha t? 3 c. The Licensing Board did. 4 A. Ch. They couldn't find -- well, that's 5 their opinion. 6 Q. No v , I'm asking you have they found the 7 causal mechanism or the plausible relationship B between latching phenomenon in the o p e r a t. i c n of
,; 9 nuclear power plants? TexPIRG that is.
10 A. I can't sa y we've proven anything fo r a 11 sc i en ti f ic fact. All we know is wha t I've told 12 you s.o far, and I would leave that up to 13 conclusion of whoever wants to exanine it.to what 14 ex ten t they think it's -- 15 Q. Well, what we have thus far is tha t a 16 single plane flew over a single operating power 17 plant and crashed? 13 A. Webb also cited a second in sta n t. But
, 19 right offhand I'd have to have his bock. Cn page
'20 195 he cites a second in sta n t.
1 21 Q. Le t 's just assume for the monent there 22 were two instances of airplanes flying over j 1 23 nuclear power plants and crash. A11fqned against < I 1 24 that is, uhat would yo u guess, several million
-25 flights of aircea f es over oper ting nuclear power
_v. 4LI 44 1 plants that have not crashed? "I s that correct? 2 A. Well, planes are not supposed to be 3 flying directly over nuclear power plants. They 4 are supposed to be fl ig h t- pa thed around nuclear ' 5 power plants. So the population of' flights 6 across nuclear power plants are much more limited 7 than that. I don't know what the pop ula tion is.
. 8 Q. Ho w many nuclear power plants are in the 9 country right n'o w? -
- 10 A. Oh , I'm no t sure. 60 something. I i
l 11 a s s um e somewhere -- within probably 50 or so. 12 Q. Okay. I'd sa y it's somewhere close to 12 that. They all abide by the NFC's present le regulation stipulation; which stipulation refers 45 to a c e r ta in rela tionshi p to airplane flight l f 16 pa t te r ns . 17 Allens Creek, likewise, will be cited 15 a c c o rd i ng with those r eg ula tions.
~
So we know 1S that there coexists 70 or so operating nuclear 20 power plants and hundreds of thousandc of flights 21 by aircraft coinmercial and non-commercial every 22 year. And o pe ra ti ng plants started operating in 22 1957, and there are two pessible instances 2e co n n ec ti ng crashes and operatino power plants. 25 Does that suggest to yo u r scientific n
1 43.. ] i 1 mind that there is a p h e n osa e no n de work whereby 2 operating nucicar power plants effect, j 3 d a ng e ro u sly effect the guidance systems of 4 aircrafts? 5 A. I don't think it's proven anything for a 6 scientific fact. .} 7 Q. I didn't ask you if it proved a 8 scientific fact. I asked your opinion. 9 A. Well, in in my opinion, I do no t have } 10 enough in f o rma tion to say or s ta te one way or the 11 other as to what the reason is fo r those l 12 a c c id ent e s . It would be much more helpful if you 13 had sone id e a of what the population of total 14 planes that accidentally fly over nuclear power 15 plants are anc compare the two accidents to that l - 16 population. I 17 Obviously, tho ug h , since it's not legal 18 for plants to do that, they will -- they wo n ' t l 19 report it, so we don't have a repulation of it. 20 C. Ckay. I think that's all I have on this j 21 contention. l 22 A. All right. I 23 C. Le t' u go onto the next one. 24 A. All right. 15 C. It's your contention, I believe, number
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of S S HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER S COMPANY S Docket No. 50-466 5 (Allens Creek Nuclear S Generating Station, Unit S No. 1) S
-~~
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. SUMPTER -
- STATE OF TEXAS S S
COUNTY OF HARRIS S I, James R. Sumpter, Manager, Nuclear Department,- Houston Lighting & Power Co., first being duly sworn,.upon my oath certify that I have reviewed and am thoroughly familiar with the statements contained in the attached affidavit addressing Intervenor TexPirg's Additional Contention 50 on
" latching" and that all my statements contained therein are ! true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belied.
Sumpter V Ja 9 R. Subscribed and sw9rn to before me by the said James R. Sumpter on this # day of August, 1980.
~
JN/u, WM Sotiary fuelic in and for Har-Js County, Texas
' MARY E. MESSERSMITH Notary Public in and for Harris Qounty, Texas
,4f JJ/ rs
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION BEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD._,- _ . . _ . _ . . In the Matter of 5 5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 5 COMPANY 5 Docket No. 50-466 5 (Allens Creek Nuclear 5 Generating Station, Unit 5 - No. 1) 5 AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JAMES R. SUMPTER ___ .__ ...____ _
, My name is James R. Sumpter. I am employed by -
i Houston Lighting & Power Company as Manager, Nuclear Depart-ment. I have been so employed for eight years. A statement of my background and qualifications is attached as Exhibit 1. This affidavit addresses TexPirg Additional Con-tention 50--that Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station (ACNGS) is a hazard because its radioactive emissions may confuse the electronic guidance systems of aircraft that fly nearby. I. I hold a Ph.D. degree in nuclear engineering, from Texas'A & M University. I have supervised the licensing,
. nuclear engineering, and health physics of two nuclear power
plants and I have kept abreast of matters related to the safety and licensing of such plants. My experience with nuclear power spans more than ten years. Tc the best of my knowledge, there has never been a documented instance of an air crash due to the purported phenomenon of " latching". I believe that no such incidents have occurred. Intervenors cite only one newspaper report 1/ of-the crash of an aircraft coincidental with its passage near a nuclear power plant (Attachment A) and one undocumented 2 passage from a book on nuclear power / suggesting that such a phenomenon might exist (Attachment B). I have examined these items and find nothing therein that meets the standards of scientific support for the existence of such a phenomenon or of any casual mechanism or plausible relationship between nuclear nlant emissions and guidance system malfunctions and air crashes. Furthermore, I ma avsre of no support for such a phenomenon in the scientific literature. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also never reviewed, investigated or reported on " latching" or otherwise ex- ; pressed any support for the existence of such a phenomenon. In short, I know of no support for the existence l of air crashes due to " latching".
-2 _
l l
;
l II. Intervenor is apparently concerned about the effects of ionization on aircraft guidance systems. A - review of certain elementary physical laws is useful in understanding why the concern is unfounded. As certain radionuclide; decay, they produce ionizing radiation that may dislodge electrons from atoms or molecules in the pathway of the radiation. These atoms or molecules, now lacking an electron, bear a negative electrical charge. They are, therefore, subject to electromagnetic attraction or repulsion by positive or negative fields. Thus,-in theory, it is possible that some ions may be attracted into the fields of aircraft guidance circuitry. Intervenor apparently fears that radionuclides in gaseous emissions from the plant will produce ions in this manner near the plant, that aircraft will be exposed to these ions on flights near the plant, that these ions will be attracted onto the guidance systems of these craft, that these-ions will create electrical fields of their own,
- interfering with the proper behavior of the host currents, that this interference will alter the information carried by these currents, and that--as a final result--the guidance system will fail or degrade in performance, causing these exposed aircraft to crash.
l l l
III. Intervenor's fears are unfounded. As previously discussed, no air crash has been traced to " latching" from ionization caused by nuclear plant emissions. In addition, the daily flights of thousands of aircraft in the presence of natural ionization is strong evidence in favor of the safety of ACNGS, which will be a less significant source. -
Ionization occurs naturally in the atmosphere. - Lightning, for example, produces ozone, an ion of oxygen. In addition, cosmic radiation from solar flares and other sources regularly bombards the upper atmosphere, creating an ion-rich environment, compared to lower altitudes. For example, calculations show that radiation levels on the 4 order of 100 to 10,000 millirad / hour can be expected from i solar flares. M Even at ground level--where cosmic radiation has been sharply reduced by atmospheric shielding--background
; levels from 70-150 millirad / year may typically be expected in regions near sea level.M These exposures increase with i
altitude, of course. It goes almost without saying that aircraft travel regularly and safely in these ion-rich environments. 'l l i
By contrast to these natural sources, ACNGS will be an extremely minor ionisation source. NRC regulationsb! limit the annual air dose of gamma radiation to an individual at the plant boundary to 10 milli ad/ year, a figure that would raise background levels only slightly and is several orders of magnitude lower than radiation from solar flares. ( Actual releases from operating plants are, of course, much lower than these limits.) Furthermore, the impact of these emissions will decrease with distance through dispersion of the gases and with time through radiological decay. At air travel altitudes, the enhanced ionization due to ACNGS emissions will be negligible. Additionally, the period of exposure by any aircraft passing near the facility will be extremely brief. IV. In conclusion, there is no scientific basis to support speculation that airborne radiological emissions from ACNGS will cause aircraft to crash as a result of ion exposure that degrades their guidance systems. References
- 1. "B-52 hit lake, exploded," Detroit Daily News, January 9, 1971.
- 2. R. Webb, Accident Hazards of Nuclear Puwer,'
195 (19__).
- 3. Calculations are based on data from E. Smith &
E. Smith, Solar Fla,res.159(-19__).
- 4. K. Morgan & J. Turner, Principles of Radiation Protection'10, Table 1-2 (1973).
- 5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, 5 B.1.
GC:00:0
. Exhibit I
! PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS JAMES R. SUMPTER
Title:
Manager-Nuclear Department-Houston Lighting
& Power Company l Responsibility: Nuclear System design and engineering, and the safety analysis, nuclear licensing, and radiation protection aspects of EL&P's nuclear pcwer plant projects.
Employment History with Ccmpany: Joined EL&P as Nuclear Engineer, August 1972 Promoted to Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Safeguards & Licensing, March 1973 Prcmoted to Manager, Nuclear Department, February 1975 Education: 3.S., Penn State University, Engineering Science, 6/65 M.S., University of Michigan, Nuclear Engineering, 12/67 Ph.D., Texas A&M University, Nuclear Engineering, 12/70 Civic & Professional Affiliations: Registered Professional Engineer, State of of Texas American Nuclear Society, South Texas Section Program Co-Chairman, 1977; Treasurer, 1978-80; Vice President, 1981 Secretary, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard on Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units & Components, N509, 1972-75 Lecturer for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Power Projects Course 1976, 1977 Atcmic Industrial Forum (AIF) Steerir.g Committee on Reactor _ Licensing & Safety, 1975-78 American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Steering Committee on Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection, 1976-78 Chairman, Technical Session on New Developments in Radwaste Management', ASME Joint Power Generation Conference, 1978 Member, Industrial Representatives Committee,
, Coctor of Engineering Program, Texas A&M, 1977 l
1
Member, Gas Cooled Reactor Associates Direct Cycle Technical Advisory Committee, 1977 Member, Technical Program Committee, ANS Reactor Operating Experience Conference,_1979 Member, Utility occupational Radiation Standards Groups, 1978 Member, Edison Electric Institute, Nuclear Power Subcommittee, 1979 Sierra Club, 1973 Chairman, EL&P Three Mile Island Task Force, 1979 Member, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Energy, Texas Energy & Natural Resources Advisory Council, 1980 Lecturer, 23rd Petroleum Institute for Educators, 1980 Lecturer, Institute on Energy, Economics, and
. the Environment, U of E, Clear Lake City, 1979, 1980 Co-Chairman, Topical Session on Human Factors, ANS Reactor Operating Experience Conference, 1981 Awards, Honors: Sigma Pi Sigma (Physics)
Psi Chi (Psychology) NSF, AEC Traineeships at college Publications: "3WR Liquid Radwaste System Optimization Studies"- 1975 Winter Meeting of American Nuclear Society, "ANS Transactions,"_22, 542 (1975)
" Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection-Status"-
AIF Conference on Reactor Licensing & Safety, February, 1977
" Impact of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations on Fire Protection for Nuclear Plants" - American Power Conference, March, 1977,
" Proceedings of the American Power Conference,"
39, 127 (1977)
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. that it was very low." said
- .I. ]..:.. CHARLEV012 . A!! thati~h'reckage.- Air' F-o'r e e' Invest eStephan, an experienced pri-.
' has been recovered of :tha< gtem the Stratigic vate ptfot. "It was 23 to OO ir Com. ;A.igstbrs
- .4 Air Forca 242D that feet above the water."
-, *}' giant crashed into.LakaJUcM::s im=d,,d newsmen.what little . .the.,(SAC) y.e s t e r.d a7. ? He said'th near here aro several'Isgrad showe . water. like a ski;pi:3
..E.%. l r:etal fragments, oder decris " ' was al u e k e d frecs the icy " stoni, there were two sc:a:1 t
A;r.jing . and some mise eq=pment crewmerg g belcng$ :.'*C r a s h ed about 6d3 p.ur; t . upward and then blew apa 13-de 3 - ,. -
"It.was one hell.cf an 4xplo.
.. y. were
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military e'ff6rts to fi:d Titursday. A=c:g the. salvaged cate. Jsion. It sent up a ball of fla=e
# 4 out what caused the crash of- rial were tow collapsed rubber. . at least :30 feet." he said.
@ the eight er gine a bo=her are. life rafts, a crewmas's flight But Stepha:, lika most resi-
.; just beginmng. The first =e=. suit and a pairof flame-black- dents
%;.1 bers of an ac:identinvestiga- ened oxygen bottles. Investi Air Fo.here.h.usad.ts rce bo=bers flyi::g 1 w.'
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tion board began.arrivmg m gators had no publiE:com- There are an av~ rage e of 13
% , this snowy lakeside,townlast ments . to. what caused the such flights over the Charle.
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voix ares every daybecause
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i1 'view..ca 'A spokesm. .;,;disoc:e wil ;r UT ONE EYEWITNESS,. crash.sitec abour.six:. .. B 7 is a prime the communi:
~t. miles from Charfevoix. from Nor=rn Stephan; 50; who op- si=cla*ed bo#-- ta get.
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.J'y the, Coast Gestd, cutter Sun.?.- er:tes strailer park en a bluff , ONE THING 't' tat caught
" .i - dew which.has kept a lonely! overicoking Li t tl e Traverse Stephan's . eye was the air.
, .'. yigil et tne scene.. . -
0:hers wi1F be'se:t to tEs. and. empipde.. Bay, said : E he . sag:the
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; f the pla:e hit . craft's Cc=succers Pcwer. r uteCs.'s-in a 1::e with
, G p. . which
- Bay Sher.e tracketde rada.* s e aeion.8 her..heresw hisStephan-
. drivenayhadiheur of snow.nhen c! ear::;j-B!z he 3 plant. Rock Point nuclear Several persenspower i ter..
It it r:n a simulat:4 bomhidg? said he saw the bomber com.'.. viewed said if is'co==en for
; .run. Meanwhite,, :le. air: ten-; i:fg from the north at low alti. the'gia t aircraft to passlow O)t.Rill..centinus-- . to sear:h ,thest tude. r'.: ; - ; v.'. over the ge:erating station.
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_ .m "T talked with Ccasumers
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~ MQ ? ;.;:!-;-QW.* .r/..e . h.v'.y%(~~' li*
~7* 'g $y power when WiE! mthese
, . ;i started is.1353." said C$arle.e f 1 i h t s
..--r. r , voix Mayer Fccht.
.. M.g" ,2 "$ 4. p. N w ' w .-V.J-'fd ?;~' d 7 " %g; ,. . .Q, ,, . .J cqg man.", and they don't seem -
,. w . .l v; . - - r .. . y 4 :.'4.,.mg conce=ed. But.t o d ay Iva
. - 7 ;.,'!. '- M, e t . . ,g ;~h.:'g([ 'p;.@,,lM. Wih ' given i-y ,a let'cf,.E.thcught to what M/S : ,e-p -
%.:..j.M.M!..
. . ., d. * *=e n" .
m.c-
"...n .:',4' M.; might, have happe:ed if it hit.-
dg Eg***' "- . *,'* city or a schocL -
. ~v . MM*'~ D.vi.. .
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; CY: ,;.a .
/csr.y. .;I.d:n't .wn=t~ts be' f .*sW1.,(d.c.W' ""Jndj.'..";Uli"* MW.6, alkrmed. Crashes like this
. g ,ei ~;: -
can.
. %./ .
occur anytime. Thuk Go'd tha
. 'f.-W~
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' :.*. & N C' Q Q -
',f,*A; .,j.R .which have Cow::over here issQ'.thilast seven
! %..;x ef w- s-Asi .t.Qk.Y' sW*i Q,.%j ^q:lv*.2% T
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.e . d% .cwevefic.
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* - ' <. 'A spokescan'f:r de utility I
[%~ : ~^ - .' ? *.>' I said tas: shortly af:er the Big ( 4 _. *i Rock Point plant be::=e ca. .
- 'N; v ] ersticnal de Air F::ce was .
~ } ' asked to avcid passes directly '
's over it.
- r t 2 While there is some slight !
~ chanca the force ci such a ,
6 . 7 G e plane. ' L ..j/ crash nd c2:semight a raciation destr: !cak. .
. 2 company efficials dcn't thh:1 -
, - v.. .' this wocid h : pen.
i ',
- - .; ( : COINCIDENT.1LLY. C o n.sumers Pc*ver rece -
[-t ~
~- '*i dered as 2:2!vsis cf what -
( " J might ha:pe s if :n circr.ft ; t e st:e of a c o rn et e r e al ;
. [' jumbo jet were to fail .n the
.j ,a , company's new at:=i: t,ower i s
' , .,,g' pla:t 1 .
at Palisades cor:h c! Sentos Harbor and the pro.
<. ;.:.-.-._.....
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pdsed facility ai Midland". ~ O". a dom'i and several trhek' trail ,l(%', @. Such a crash, the study c:n. errhousi g sophisttes;cd cisc-cluded, wou!d still n:t be able ~ trocic equzament used to de -;'y . .g .
~
to penetrate the thick steel
- fermi =e. de accurac7.offthe:. %[.y,:
and remforced cencrete strue. ;ractics bombi=g n=si. # - : (y.g tures/'centaini=s de nuc' tar .: .Capt; James Bmbos, of Dc. said.thetrainirrt..'.g i. $';P.fi material The same applies and tomain Sir Reck,J#medod a:carams.use ,. tachment 8,,d is ictJc!s'ssified, < W w,M Consumers., agi:eers believe; 7 a [ t h o.s gh.the,ecub=ent ir,.is Md
,."We. checked this today with.. and is-relatively simo!s.:-;g'*j., - i our eneneering staff 3:d dey..'. J An apprcachinit hats b e r c r sayetaars is no reason .3i , beams, a tone sical whidf.Tt.M"g-l Rock ;would =ot hold idtact ' broken when a. lever aboard p'
' b-M pren iHe was hit by a bis air . the craft is. pulled Bay 5'nore- 'O-b I
'.= plane"a spokesman said "It.J.then-uses*M standard bombine-- l E h anyt.ac. desig=ed to. withstand" tables and com:utes the point ' t .. g
- sinable atP the ' at which.the tene ended to de.
time itwas bull * - . t e r m i n'a accuracy,' 3rabbs A .. p.-T The;b om ba:.o. . e rfilaher)".said i . ~ Bomc, e,r c:ews,assig=ed tas .,.,.;., ":.'~; h' Q were a matter of cencer:t ere r several' =ceths ' ago to t.. .Chartevcirprac5ce.nm see:dt. re c: com:any pla=c which insures
- A Consu=ers Power-arebiem the 'seve:al a:d' : lac days-s i=x their t h dy-w I c r the i* . - ['.'7 -
stuff then indicated.that theT sihtulated bombini;f Once.in . !;Et .. bombers. fly at a =ini=ust of the 'asi everydist is tdma. ase.q 1,30 feet.. a.sd seldom i.t.tur. bulen weather. C. . ~i ' It wohid be in combat..rwrex @,. @y-the-
. tio:t of =r a ctu al * .a w-The Air Fores had no~off! ;Fdrop C .' ~ .* 'P '*
M W cini comme:t on de recise - ~ - a :- 5 . '.~ nature . cf de training miss..; ESTDISTES"cf the nu=ber . r, l' siens other das they are *of scch!!Ishrs over Ch'arlevoi..r ' . ; a asiin ed to simulate arr' ;escYmen,6\ yary imm 20 m-Q -g appresch at low !avel -l pre.M0;;-43 Sine.e.!;tane usually p, E[*.A e s su=foly a real attp.ck-to ss t!'s avcid y wou!drS7'ih. radar can6ihe sight.i:t =akescs,(v.et e huge ai r al,bom'omes W;c-M . detecticts ;; for i bemb dren. *.crahtrtaken6ri: ranted:- - . . - g ,,; le voizicM:tw30mbers. .eperationak,my,3rit)they;surt.to.cu!L c nverge cn Charr. yp" "9.*tYctredes't Q. , ,j. a.; hear the=r cocr:: . p ' t,.; p} ins pg. T .,.* ..t.r.:y33 4 - gyer ,,7, rtg2ti U
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ATTACHMENT 3 _y
- 2. .
5 134 Appendix Two - and nuclear runaway explosion. and Enally in a maior public disaster. Such is the signi5cance of a SCRAh! system failure. . Though de AEC never traced de origin of the manufacturing error, they suspect dat the faulty switches were the result of de manufacturing plant being tuoved to a different location. The new
', personnel were not as experienced as the old and dis could have
; accounted for the error in manufacture. Price to de =ove, de
'. company had had a record of dirty years without signiEcant I .
I failure of its switches-which is why they were selected for use ' u .u ,c. .r e_= in reactors. The incident thus shows how reliable equipant can i
'.. . M._. T O'r Mj- ? % . 1 suddenly bec==e unreliable. General Electric Co.. de makers of c . ; '_h. c. -;f-C. +2' -
' ~ '
de BWRs testined before de incident occurred, or was =ade S w, 7 A_ _~_. ~g .q_ -
._. ,- l'
- known, that the probability that the SWR SCRAAf system would
- _ q 5 ' ._. , t ' .- : . y c-
~
fail is 10-, or one failure in every ten billien attempts. Yet, de
. - N- ? : above incident indicates a 10-+ failure probability, or one in every J Q.;,'i {(' ;J- ..; :c k '~ ,'f.,h,>
; ,- g . g 10.C00 atten. pts. With a projected 500 f WRs. a 10-4 failure p:0b-
; J- _rc+
ability is very serious. for if we assume two incidents requir:ng _ .~
' c "' ,
. 7,, . g.g,y,.M
~
n ._ n p--- l SCRAM per year per reactor (tco generous to de industry), 500 Z. > .!P.5cd=3 ' reactors would mean at least one major accident every ten years. i _f ?,.' f.i c Q j- E h 3
- The AEC iri 1973 issued a regulation recuiring back-up SCRAh!
g , systems (though not in a c mplete sense) for reactors whose f;l a:y. .. - 7,nM .'. D -(t ~ i'w tC 3 license applications are submitted after 1977, but iis will Ieave
' , f .[', Q T T 8 000 reactors without back-up systems. Moreover, it is possible
- ? "_L :# _.
that the failure recerd will get worse with the passage of time, w _ N -% ;. y d ' G _'7
--;mcWp ; as the industry becomes lax or overconndent-that is, complex
, . -,_S* : .. ; & ==; m w
'_ ; f.-t/-:: M multiple failures can occur, as is weil founded in human experi.
__ , *nc =.3
' "~p'~'*-
_ _; , $ , * - r_- zu_ . _ ._; C.^,."-f I
> - ~' g cf
. ._. _ . . ; . _ _ QA.,_s., s 6. 3-32 SAC Bomber Crash C!cse to a BWR
-; ; 7. <w;, "s 3- g, . ~~ l
\ '
- In January 1971 a B-50 bomber was flyir.g a cutine practica
'_ L j-i'.Q [ 7 flight over a small SWR located near Charievoix. Stich.. when it 7-Wg;L ;.
{ crashed in Lake Michigan about two miles from the reactor i
..- $ ,p g;,.477W-2-. y (Traverse Bay). An eyewitness said the plane was heading directly
- M{:
.O - f.;__ w a- M n w 3" e -
in line with the reactor when it crashed. skipping off the surface u - _ _ = of ,,he water, and raising a nrecall 200 to 600 teet into the air.
> M$-Q'A_ d g -My Z.Qc'e- 'T . If the plane had crashed into the reactor there would have been a 't -f_ '
7 . . major public disaster, since a loss-of-coolant would have occurred
" 7'~[-7f'%.J.dy.7 at the ver'/ least. Radicactivity release would have been pru-v 'r ;~':.}[; Q % @ .I moted by the punctured reactor container and the burning petro.
s fuel. Jf.,<% -Wf .-- y.il [j f g f Qj
~
ge.-Q~ - In 1967 the bombers and Sghter bombers were routinely 9C0 t - w- ; ilights a month) flying low.levei (1,000 foot) flights directly over l
.6d&I cm. .,~ %
Whi.g,p _~
,. r the piant, despite U.S. Air Force instructions to the pilots to stay l
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-1 c- i
~
135 Accidents and Near Accidents
. 1
.nally m. a major public clear of the plant, and the practice continued until the crash in n
SCRMI system failure. 1971. It has been speculated by a Grumman aerospace official that i rigin of the manufacturing ' l'E the plane may have flown into radioactive gases normally dis-nes were de result of de charged by the reac:ce plant's effluent stack. The radioactivity ufferent location. The new could have interfered with the clane9 elec:ronic guidance systems i
.e old. and this could have (a process called latching). w'hich might then have caused de
- e. Prior to the =ove, de pilot to misjudge its altitu;ie. No report of the cause of the crash h 6
years withou: significant has been made public.i I, ney were selec:ed for use ' w reliable equipment can ; u
.ectric Co &e makers of 7. Vermont Yankee BWR Criticality Incident j t cccurred, or was made The Vermont Yankee reactor accidentally went " critical" during a IR SCRMI system would maintenance operatice when the reac:or was snut down, and d; billica atte= pts. Yet. de coacility. or one in every D. a 10-* failure prob-almost suffered a power excursion with both the reactor vessel closure head and the containment dome off. The reactor vessel and f)d containment are required to be sealed whenever the reac:or is k do in= dents requiring made critical. so that should the reac:or suffer a design basis. "
cus to de industry) 500 power excursion accident, the vessel and contain=ent would pre-secment every ten years. U vent the serious release of radioactivity into the atmosphere (ac- "
'quirmg back-up SCRAM cording to prediction). Fortunately, de SCRMI system funcuened j nse) :or reac: cts wnese to shut down the reactor safely. d 197~. but dis will leave The incident occurred when the reactor operatc; was with- ?
Moreover, it is possible drawing a single control r::d to test its SCRMt ability (each con-
'id de passage ci :ime, trol rod is so tested dunng maintenance outages). The reac:or is so f fident-that is, complex designed dat a total withdrawal of one control rod will not make )unded in human experi- :he reactor critical, that is, it will not produce fissioning. The rest f-it of de control rods, of course, are to be fully insured into the 1 core when the reactor and containment are ocen. Furdermore. O va an electr: cal " interlock" safety device is installe.1 which prevents ,
de reactor operator from withdrawing (raising) a contrc! rod if ytng a reutine prac: ice any other rods are not fully inserted in the core. However. :o anevoix. Mich.. when it save time, the operators viciated safety pror.edures by installing m:les : rom the reac:or a " jumper cable" that negated the intericci in order to permit b ane was neading direc:iy another, semirelated operation. Then two :rore human errors oc-d.:ppmg cif de surface s curred: the reac:or operator in one work s'nft pulled one control d o 500 fee into de air. - rod and inadvertently left it fully out; de operator in de nex: e mere would have been 2 shift failed :o notice the condition on his instrument board. nor i: int wcu!d have occurred was he informed of the status of de withdrawn control red. Also, would have been pro- the maintenance crews failed to remove the jumper caole, and u and de burning petro- when the reac:or operator proceeded to raise an adjacent controi l rod, the reac:or went critical. Had the cable been removed, de [ :ers were reutinely (300 otl ihgn:s cirec:!y over second rod could not have been raised. The circumstances were such that, even if the SCRMt had
- s ne pilots to stay - - - -
- - failed to occur. there may not have been a serious accident in- t I
e e w e - - - - - ,w,w ww -,,--------.,e-,-e- - , , - w,w,,, ,,,,--,---,p.e,,-m,---
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.i
- s References and Notes f Regulation. USAEC. to R. E. Webb. dated Dec. 9.1974. Reactor Operating Experience report. USAEC ROE-71-15. . s. .
S. Consu=ers Power Co.. Consumers Power News Nov.1967 (Jack-son Michigan) p. 20: Detrost New?. Jan. 9,1971. p. 3.
*j
- 7. Nuclear Safety 15. no. 2 (MarJApr.1974): :10-11. Letter from ..
si Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. to AEC Nov. 14. 1973 (VYV 3071. AEC docket no. 30.: 1, pp.1-a). S. See ORNL.NSIC-103. " Abnormal Reactor Operating Exper:ences, t 7Q 1 M y 1969-1971.* ROE.71.:.
- 9. Ibid.. " Unscheduled SWR Blowdown." RCE-71-4.
2_- --ae d . , )
~ --
- "W ' ; 10. Nuclear Safety 15. no. 4 (1975): 510. D. D. Comey. """he Incident at .
;; 3rowns Ferry." in Friends of the Earth. Not Men Apart. Sept.1975.
ji " Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fire." U.S. Congress. Hect:ngs before l the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 94th Cong.,1st sess. (Sept. 10.1975), pt.1. pp. 73 rs, and app. ? and 15. Ras. Rpt WASH-Ei
.. 1400 (draft). 3: 71. ORNL-NSIC.103, pp. 7-10 and 9.
.' +
- 11. Nuclear Safety 15. no. 3 (May/ June 1975): 378. " Nuclear Regulatory g
~---
j ' Commission Action Requiring Safety Inspections Which Resulted . I g . in Shutdown of Certam Nuclear Power P! ants." U.S. Congress. Joint Hear:ng before the Joint Commsttee on Atomic Energy :nd j
.he Comenittee on Covernment Operations of the U.S. Congress. ;
," 94th Cong., ist sess. (Feb. 5.1975). l
- 12. J. M. Miller. " Incident at the Lucens Reactor." Nuclect Safety is. l
-' ' aj no.1 (JansFeb.1975): 76 9. Nuclear Sciety 15. no. 4 (July /Aug. 'l E!
.. ?975): 511. USAEC ROE-70-4. "I.oss of C00iant Accident." CRN' O ! NSIC-103. pp. 66-68.
- 13. Thompson and Beckerley '"echnoicgy.1: 653.
l
- 14. Ibid pp. 533-36. H. [. Dunster et ai.. " District Surveys Fellowing 'i
- the Windscale Incident. Oct.1957." p/316 UK. sess. 3-19. Interna- _i i? tional Conference on the ?saceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva. l 1958).
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4 f /o u 9 fa u$$ s C- w- 7580*g' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 -Slet of ths !!catz.7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AuW 5 2323 I<, R 3:can l SEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ' e.s )wsMg In the Matter of S S HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY S Docket No. 50-466 S (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating S Station, Unit 1) S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Applicant's Motien for Su= mary Disposition of Potthoff Con-tantion 6, Applicant's Motion for Su= mary Disposition of I TexPirg Additional' Contention 50, and Applicant's Response to Marrack's Motions to Compel Answers to Interrogatories in the above-captioned proceeding were' served on the follow-ing by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, or by hand-delivery this 4th day of August, 1980. Shelden J. Wolfe, Esq. , Chair: dan Hon. Charles J. Dusek Atomic Safeny and Licensing Mayor, City of Wallis Board Panel P. O. Box 312 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wallis, Texas 77485 Washington, D. C. 20555 Hon. Leroy H. Grebe Dr. E. Leonard Cheatus County Judge, Austin County Route 3, Sex 350A P. O. Box 99 Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 Bellville, Texas 77418 Mr. Gustave A.'Linenberger Atomic Safety and Licensing , Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
- Soard-Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission a
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20535 Washington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Chase R..Stephens Appeal Board Docketing and' Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission Offica of the Secretary Washington, D. C. 20555 of.the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Steve Schinki, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20555 Staff Counsel U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission-
' Richard Lowerre, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20555
. Assistant Attorney Genera'.
for the State of Texas P. O. Box 12548
-Capitol Station =
Austin ~, Texas 73711
d l Bryan L. Baker D. Marrack 1118 Montrose 420 Mulberry Lane
-Houston, Texas 77019 . Bellaire, Texas 77401 J. Morgan Bishop Brenda McCorkle 11418 Cak Spring. 6140 Darnell Houston, Texas 77043 Houston, Texas 77074 Stephen A. Doggett W. Matthew Perrened P. O. Box 592- 4070 Merrick Rosenberg, Texas 77471 Houston, Texas 77025 John F. Doherty F. H. Potthoff ,
4327 Alconbury- 7200 Shady Villa, No. 110 Houston, Texas 7702L Houston, Texas 77055
- Carro Hinderstein Wayne H. Rentfro 609 Fannin, Suite 521 P. O. Box 1335 Houston, Texas 77002 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 James M. Scott e 13935 Ivy Mount Sugar Land, Texas 77478
. William Schuessler
. _ . 5810 Darnell Houston, Texas 77074 CW MC Darrell Hancock l
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