ML19337A048

Affidavit Re Tx Pirg Contention 50.Concern Re Effects of Ionization on Aircraft Guidance Sys Unfounded Per Elementary Physical Laws.Prof Qualifications,Affidavit,Supporting Documentation & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19337A048
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	08/04/1980
From:	Sumpter J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19330C545	List: ML19330C544 ML19330C550 ML19337A048
References
NUDOCS 8008080502
Download: ML19337A048 (15)

Text

.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD,

In the Matter of S

S HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER S

COMPANY S

Docket No. 50-466 S

(Allens Creek Nuclear S

Generating Station, Unit S

No. 1)

S AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R.

SUMPTER

~~

,_,i STATE.OP TEXAS S

S COUNTY OF S

., James R.

Sumpter, Manager, Nuclear Department,-

Ecuston Lighting & Power Co., first being duly sworn,. upon my oath certify that I have reviewed and am thoroughly familiar with the statements contained in the attached affidavit addressing Intervenor TexPirg's Additional Contention' 50 on

" latching" and that all my statements contained therein are true and correct to the best of my 'mowledge and belief.

h

/

Ja h R.

Sumpter V

Subscribed and sw9rn to before me by the.said James R.

Sumpter on this day of August, 1980.

AJu MM Notiary Aublic in and for Harpis County, Texas

' MARY E. MESSERSMITH Notary Public in and for Harris Qounty, Texas A

JA/.hy, O

b I

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS mwSA P00R QUAUTY PAGES

~-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR hEGULATORY CCMMISSION BEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ___

In the Matter of 5

5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 5

COMPANY 5

Docket No. 50-466 5

(Allens Creek Nuclear 5

Generating Station, Unit 5

No. 1) 5 AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JAMES R.

SUMPTER My name is James R. Sumpter.

I am employed by Houston Lighting & Power Company as Manager,' Nuclear Depart-ment.

I have been so employed for eight years.

A statement of my background and qualifications is attached as Exhibit 1.

This affidavit addresses TexPirg Additional Con-tention 50--that Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station (ACNGS) is a ha:ard because its radioactive emissions may confuse the electronic guidance systems of aircraft that fly nearby.

I.

I hold a Ph.D. degree in nuclear engineering, frcm Texas A & M University.

I have supervised the licensing, nuclear engineering, and health physics of two nuclear power

-.I

plants and I have kept abreast of matters related to the safety and licensing of such plants.

My expe:ience with nuclear power spans more than ten years.

To the best of my knowledge, there has never been a documented instance of an air crash due to the purported phenomenon of " latching".

I believe that no such incidents have occurred.

Intervenors cite only one newspaper reportM of-the crash of an aircraft coincidental with its passage near a nuclear power plant (Attachment A) and one-undocumented' passage from a b'cok on nuclear power M suggesting that such a phenomenon might exist (Attachment 3).

I have examined these items and find nothing therein that meets the standards 4

of scientific support for the existence of such a phenomenon or of any casual mechanism or plausible relationship between nuclear plant emissions and guidance system malfunctions and air crashes.

Furthermore, I am aware of no support for such a phenomenon in the scientific literature.

In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also never reviewed, investigated or reported on " latching" or otherwise ex-pressed any support for the existence of such a phenomenon.-

In short, I know of no support for the existence of air crashes due to " latching".

l l

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II.

Intervenor is apparently concerned about the effects of ionization on aircraft guidance systems.

A review of certain elementary physical laws is useful in understanding why the concern is unfounded.

i As certain radionuclides decay, they produce ionizing radiation that may dislodge electrons from atoms or molecules in the pathway of the radiation.

These atoms or molecules, now lacking an electron, bear a negative electrical charge.

They are, therefore, subject to electromagnetic attraction or repulsion by positive or negative fields.

Thus, in theory, it is possible that some ions'may be attracted into the fields of aircraft guidance circuitry.

Intervenor apparently fears that radionuclides in gaseous emissions from the plant will produce ions in this manner near the plant, that aircraft will be exposed to these ions on flights near the plant, that these ions will be attracted onto the guidance systems of these craft, that these ions will create electrical fields of their own, interfering with.the proper behavior of the host currents, that this interference will alter the information carried by these currents, and that--as a final result--the guidance system will fail or degrade in performance, causing these exposed aircraft to crash.

III.

Intervenor's fears are unfounded.

As previously discussed, -no air crash has been traced to " latching" from ionization caused by nuc1 car plant emissions.

In addition, the daily flights of thousands of aircraft in the presence

. of natural ioni=ation is strong evidence in favor of the safety of ACNGS, which will be a less significant source.

Ioni=ation occurs naturally in the atmosphere.

Lightning, for example, produces ozone, an ion of oxygen.

In addition, cosmic radiation from solar flares and other sources regularly bombards the upper atmosphere, creating an ion-rich environment, compared to lower altitudes.

For example, calculations show that radiation levels on the order of 100 to 10,000 millirad / hour can be expected from solar flares.1/

Even at ground level--where cosmic radiation has been sharply reduced by atmospheric shielding--background levels from 70-150 millirad / year may typically be expected in regions near sea level.$/

These exposures increase with altitude, of course.

It goes almost without saying that i

aircraft travel regularly and safely in these ion-rich environments.

l I

i.

By contrast to these natural sources, ACNGS will be an extremely ninor ionization source.

NRC regulationsb/

limit the annual air dose of gamma radiation to an individual at the plant bouadary to 10 millirad / year, a figure that would raise background levels only slightly and is several orders of magnitude lower than radiation from solar flares.

( Actual releases from operating plants are, of course, much lower than these' limits.)

Furthermore, the impact of these emissions will decrease with distance through dispersion of the gases and with time through radiological decay.

At air travel altitudes, the enhanced ionisation due to ACNGS emissions will be negligible.

Additionally, the period of exposure by any aircraft passing near the facility will be extremely brief.

IV.

In conclusion, there is no scientific basis to support speculation that airborne radiological emissions from ACNGS will cause aircraft to crash as a result of ion exposure that degrades their guidance systems.

l l..

1 1

l References 1.

"B-52 hit lake, exploded," Detroit Daily News, January 9, 1971.

2.

R. Webb, Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power, 195 (l?,_).

3.

Calculations are based on data from E. Smith &

E. Smith, Solar Flares 169(19__).

4.

K. Morgan & J. Turner, Principles of Radi ation Protection 10, Table 1-2 (1973).

5.

10 CFR 50, Appendix I, 5 B.1.

GC:00:0 1

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Exhibit I 1

l PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS JAMES R. SCMPTER

Title:

Manager-Nuclear Department-Housten Lighting

& Power Company Responsibility:

Nuclear System design and engineering, and the safety analysis, nuclear licensing, and radiation protection aspects of EL&P's nuclear pcwer plant projects.

Employment History with Ccmpany:

Joined HL&P as Nuclear Engineer, August 1972 Prcmoted to Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Safeguards & Licensing, March 1973 Promoted to Manager, Nuclear Department, February 1975 Education:

3.S.,

Penn State University, Engineering Science, 6/65 M.S.,

University of Michigan, Nuclear Engineering, 12/67 Ph.D., Texas A&M University, Nuclear Engineering, 12/70 Civic & Professional Affiliations:

Registered Professional Engineer, State of of Texas American Nuclear Society, South Texas Section Program Co-Chairman, 1977; Treasurer, 1978-80; Vice President, 1981 Secretary, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard on Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units & Components, N509, 1972-75 Lecturer for Internationa'. Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Power Projects Course 1976, 1977 Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) Steering Committee on Reactor-Licensing & Safety, 1975-78 American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

Steering Committee on Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection, 1976-78 Chairman, Technical Session on.New Developments in Radwaste Management, ASME Joint Power Generation Conference, 1978 Member, Industrial Representatives Committee, Doctor;of Engineering Program, Texas A&M, 1977

Member, Gas Cooled Reactor Associates Direct Cycle Technical Advisory Committee, 1977 Member, Technical Program Committee, ANS Reactor Operating Experience Conference, 1979 Member, Utility. Occupational Radiation Standards Groups, 1978 Mamber, Edison Electric Institute, Nuclear Power Subecmmittee, 1979 Sierra Club, 1973 Chairman, HL&P Three Mile Island Task Force, 1979 Member, Advisory Committee on Nuclear' Energy, Texas Energy & Natural Resources Advisory Council, 1980 Lecturer, 23rd Petroleum Institute for Educators, 1980 Lecturer, Institute on Energy, Economics, and the Environment, U of H, Clear Lake City, 1979, 1980 Co-Chairman, Topical Session on Human Factors, ANS Reactor Operating Experience Conference, 1981 Awards, Honors.-

Sigma Pi Sigma (Physics)

Psi Chi (Psychology)

NSF, AEC Traineeships at college Publications:

"BWR Liquid Radwaste System Optimization Studies"-

1975 Winter Meeting of American Nuclear Society, "AN3 Transactions," 22, 542 (1975)

" Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection-Status"-

AIF Conference on Reactor Licensing & Safety, February, 1977

" Impact of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations on Fire Protection for Nuclear Plants" - American Power Conference, March, 1977,

" Proceedings of the American Power Conference,"

39, 127 (1977) l s

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By ALLEN P5T.T.IPS bissk,,'..~n'~cteline'for any otheeG 3yf(I was remarki:

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that it was very low." said 1! ~.. CHARLEVOIX;/ - All thata*;" Aft' F-dfice' investigsdrsuStsphan. an,,er;erienced pri..

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frc=r a: Strategic Air Com*. feet a d crashed isto Lakedtiej,ig 2 "m=d,(SAC) y.e s t a rd ar b' He sairf the place tauched

'N near here are severs!'Iagged showe,,d.:mwsmen swhat little.athe... water, like a skippic; y metal !ragmentsloder deoris ' ' was p1 u e k e d from the ic7 stone. there were two sma;l

.j?:f ' and some egi;=ent beksg'. wat2:s ' alter the b o.r2 b o r ; e=;bsk:.s, 6s pla.e bounced

. t. A ing 13.the cine crewman were killed. A '*fe.3 y,pg yc r a s h ed about 6:33 p.nr..f. upward and then blew apart.

. cd Taursday.

"It.was one hell ci an 4xplo.

'f9 But militat7 ef rts tofi:d

A=c: the salvaged mate..'sion. It :ent up a hall of fla=e e I out what caused the crash of-rial wer-sw coIIapsed rubber.. at least 200 feet," he said.

M the eight.en'gine bomber are. life rafts. a crewman's flight But Stephw. lika cess resi.

. ;., just beginning. De first me=.

suit a d a pair of flame-black-deits he:e i.: usad.La see!:g'

%4 bers of ar. accidentinvestigs-ened oxygen bottles. Investi ' Air I" cree bo=Bers flyi::13 7

.cilj tion Ecard began.ar-iving in gators had no. pub!IOccm-There are an av'erage of 13 c) this snoey lakeside t:wnlast ments, to what caused the such flights over the Charle.

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m 2 ;.. cra V' i voix ares every daybecause

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91. viem.the cras!uite aboutsix:... B c

--P miles from Charlevett from Normas Stephan..0.' who op-simulated bombit; targer.

the Coast Gaard cutter Sun. entes = trailer park en a bluif 1

y dew which.has kept s tonelyf overkoking LittleTraverse., ONE THING 'that caught s

Stephan's. eye was the att.

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.~ vigil at de scene.le:t to tE;s.. Bay. said he saw the pla:e hit. craft's rcute - ht a !!:s wi:h

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. f the Censumers Power. Co.'s

. Bay Shore radar seaeIca.;a Stephs:rhad!beti cleari::L;-

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Ig it r:s a sim:12t:d bombi:ig? said he saw the bomber come'.. viewed said if is co==cu for

~ run. 3 Meanwhile.. 5s. airmen., ing from the north at low alti-the' giant aircraftto pass.ow

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234 Appendix Two s.

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and nuclear runaway explosion. and inally in a maar public disaster. Such is the signiacance of a SCRAh! system.ailure.

Though de AEC never traced the origin of the manufacturing error, they suspect that &e faulty switches were the result of the manciacturing plant being moved to a different location. The new personnel were not as experienced as the old. and dis could have j

accounted for the error in manufacture. Prior to the =ove. the company had had a record of thirty years witnout signincant I

failure of its switches-which is why they were selected for use I

in reactors. The incident thus shows how reliable equipment can I

suddenly become unreliable. General Electric Co.. the makers of l

the BWRs. testined before the incident occurred. or was made known. that the probability that the SWR SCRAhi system would fail is 10-. ur one failure in every ten billion atte-spts. Yet, the above incident indicates a 10-' failure probability, or one in every j

g 10.000 attempts. With a projected 300 LWRs. a 10-+ failure prob-ability is very serious for if we assume two incidents requiring j

SCRAh! per year per reactor (too generous to the inductry). 300 reactors would mean at least one major accident every ten years.

The AEC in 1973 issued a regulation requiru:g back.up SCRAh!

systems (though not in a cc:nplete sense) for reactors whose 3

license applications are submitt2d after 1977, but this will leave 200 reactors without back.up systems. Aforeover, it is possible that the failure record will get worse with de passage of time, g

as the industry becomes !ax or overconfident-that is. complex multiple failures can occur, as is weil founded in human experi-ence.8 1

8. B.52 SAC Bomber Crash C:ose to a BWR

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In January 1971 a B-52 bomber was flying a reutine practice s

flight over a small BWR located near Charievoix. Stich.. when it I

crasned in Lake hiichigan about two miles from the reactor 1

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(Traverse Bay). An eyewitness said the plane was heading directly In lina with the reactor when it crashed, skipping off the surface

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of the water, and raising a fireball 200 to 600 feet into the air.

1[}.,~ W.D5_S 98 (

If the plane had crashed into the reactor, there would have been a CO

+.,M 11h major public disaster. since a loss-of-coolant would have occurred

-Q g4g at the very least. Radioactivity release would have been pro.

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moted by the punctured reactor container and the burning petro-4

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Q fuel.

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In 1967 the bombers and Sghter-bombers were routinely (3C0 9d-@M-y[j.7-g iights a month) flying !aw. level (1,000 foot) flights directly over 3-the plant. despite U.S. Air Force instructions to the pilots to stay

5.-

l

- '- s'" :~ '7. f.-V, L L==

.,--:3: c3 n, w w,_~e""- ";. ;. 3A... ey7 2. '.. -- - y : ..t.> : s 5 :.,a _4 n y cm. 3 - $x==f-g, .e.., _ cn." ~

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[_ ._ m;~.' y.:, %. L g L y -M+-2gqt.M [ 1 - C.~" ; h7[-.. h, '[.hh.?[. Th;[ [Q.f__ [hy.I U Yh 4( 1 i 4-t iss Accidents and Near Accidents AnalI7 in a major public clear of the plant. and the practice continued until the crash in sCR.ut system failure. 1971. It has been speculated by a Crumman aerospace oficial that rigin of the manufacturing the plane may have flown into radioactive gases normally dis-nes were the result of the .iferent locatien. The new charged by the reactor plant's edluent stack. The radioactivity could have interfered with the plane's electronic guidance systems .e cid, and dis could have (a process called !atching), which might then have caused the J

e. Pdor to de move. the pilot to misjudge its altitude. No report of the cause of the crash years widour sign:iicant has been =ade public.'

ney were selected for use w reliable equipment can i

ectdc Co., ie makers of

r. Vermont Yankse BWR Criticality Incident t occurred. or was =ade The Ver=ont Yankee reactor accidentally went "chtical" during a h

'R SCR.OI system would =aintenance operation when the reactor was shut down, and billion attempts. Yet. de almost suffered a power excursion with both the reactor vessel f coacility. or one in every closure head and de containment,lome off. The reactor vessel and d' / N a 10" failure prob-containment are required to be sealed whenever the reactor is 0 (.Jo incidents requiring made cr:tical, so that should the reactor scifer a design basis, f

uy to de industrj). 500 power excursion accident. 6e vessel and containment would pre.

I ac : cent every ten year:. vent de serious release of radioactivity into the atmosphere (ac. 9'.uring cacx-up SCR.ui cording to prediction). Fortunately, de SCR.u! system functioned f, ase) for reactors whose to shut down the reactor safely, e t97~. but $is will leave The incident occurred when de reactor operator was with. d hfareover it is possible drawing a single control r::d to test its SCRAhi ability (each con. }k li6 the passage of time. trcl rod is so tested during maintenance outages). The reactor is so ,:ndertt-that is. complex designed that a total withdrawal of one control rod will not make h lunded in human experi-the reactor critical, that is, it will not produce 5ssioning. The rest j of the control rods, of course, are to be fully inserted into the y core when the reactor and containment are open. Furthermore, p va an electrical " inter!cck" safet/ device is installed which prevents j the reactor operator from withdrawing (raising) a control rod if d l y!":g a routine practice any other rods are not fully inserted in the core. However. to i-at:evoix. Mich. whe:t it m:les fr0m the reactor save time, the coerators violated safety procedures by installing ? a " jumper cable that negated the interiock in order to permit i ane was headag dire :17 another. semirelated operation. Then two more human errors oc. q sc; ping cif the surface curred: the reactor operator in one work shift pulled one control 'o 500 feet into the air. rod and inadvertently left it fully out; the operator in the next i ":ere wouid have been a shift failed to notice the condition on his instrument board. nor c int would have occurred was he informed of the status of de withd;twn control tod. Also. would nave been pro-the maintenance crews failed to remove the jumper cable, and h

• and de burning petro

• when the reactor operator proceeded to raise an adjacent cot ol I

rod, the reactor went critical. Had the cable been removed, the 2ers were routinely (300 second rod could not have been raired. otl :hgnts cirectly over The circumstances were such that, even if de SCRuf had to tne pilots to stay - - failed te occur, there may not have been a serious accident in-0 I: f; I l m. w= ,x .M. ~ ~ .AW __ ? \\ r_ --,--. w., < : &m e M. '..~ - _ _ J; wsm_w.r..? ~ -=- m m ! M w-_

m. -=c h M r

V o 'i .c

s References and Notes of Regulation. USAEC. to R. E. Webb. dated Cec. 9.197+. Reactor Cperating Expar:ence report. USAEC ROE.7115.

S. Cansumers Power Ca Consumers Power News. Nov.1967 (Jack. ~ son, Michigan), p. 0: Detroit News, Jan. 9.1971. p. 3.

• i

7. Nuc!act Safety 13. no. 2 (Mar /Apr.1974): 210-11. Letter from

/' Vermont Yankce Nuclear Power Corp. to AEC. Nov. 14. 1973 f (VYV.3071. AEC docket no. 30 2"1. pp.1%. j

f. See CRNL NSIC.103. " Abnormal Reactor Cperating Exper:eness, j

j m 1969-1971." RCE.712. m__ a fa esans.@ >;- m - ---

9. Ibid.. " Unscheduled 3WR Blowdown." RCE.714.

j _-3 l- ' ' ' ' - ~ ~ '

10. Nuclect Safety I's, no. 4 (1973): 310. D. D. Comey, "*"he Incident at Browns Ferry."in Friends of the Earth. Not Man Apart. Sept.1973.

l ~ - !; "3rowns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fire." U.S. Congress. Hect:ngs before } l ll IS.1973), pt.1. pp. 73-73, and app. 7 and 13. Ras. Rpt WASH. the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 94th Cong 1st sess. (Sept. \\ I l I

,I 1400 (draft). 3

71. CRNL.NSIC.103. pp. 7-10 and 9.

I l

11. Nuclect Sc/ety IS, no. 3 (Mayifune 1973h 173. " Nuclear Regulatory l

Cammiss:on Action Requ: ring Safety Innections Which Resulted . g I in Shutdcwn of Certain Nuclese Power Plants." U.S. Congress. loint Hect:ng befare the loint Commstree on Atomsc Energy :nd l _ _ll -. ___ L' the Cammtttee on Cavernment Operations of the U.S. Congress. ~ ~._ n ~ - 4 2-fl. 94th Cong Ist sess, fFeb. 5,1E73). f .if r' ' s'M.-,+v e '.'__@. eA k" ~ M2 i

12. J. M. Miller. ". Incident at the Lucens Reactor." Nuclear Sclery 16.

. T Ni-QN ; _.;j no.1 (Jan.iFeo.1973): 76 r9. Nuclect Safety 16. no. 4 (July /Aug, ..~ i ~. ~ .J 1973): 311. US AEC ROE-70-4. " Lass of Coolant Accident." CRNL- _ r. r 2.%,. m;.#T 1 7-a / -g NSIC.103, pp. 6Ha. l

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,2.' fi,, ?. -

13. Thompson and Beckerley. Technology.1: 633.

_v;, - f gp

14. Ibid., pp. 633-38. H. J. Dunster et al.. "Oistetet Surveys Following

'i C :. $.51' J., the Windscale Incident. Cet.1937." p/316 UK. sess. 319. Inter: a- .I l _r a, ;%%. 3 -3

c:

tional Conference on the ?eaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva. .. -.c. S,.~ 1938)* -_.N-.-. a -'T . % y. . ; 3: 2. -. y 1 ~...*..;-.'" _ '_e. 3.; ) .w..'.'N ~ _'A- ;. h.7 C -? N ;;.'., ', - =.... e.-.'] i g \\ - -~..... .~ 7' ~ 1= j -i '[p '" ' f.~, '} f ' '~1 i X.? = Fj .4,. '. e -..r.C - s.; .C, 'q~-- Ir' Q~. ~ - _K-c * *..*- I( ) l ,'m-: 3 r _ y,- -} gt ~ ~ _ -~ f} f0'h N ty g,= 3 w,my. c _g. t g_ w.g ) e e M . 6 --. ;5s\\ q' ~ cCCW* Y 9 uss e yo TW -7 20.* @ i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j hifgg ef afs tn.eg y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -MEint 3 dr.i:2 f 4 .itc;;c.) 1 f SEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD /' w,,o k.,r In the Matter.of S S HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY S Docket No. 50-466 S (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating S Station, Unit 1) S ts.sTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Applicant's Motion for Su= mary Disposition of Pctthoff Con-tantion 6, Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of TexPirg Additional Contention 50', and Applicant's Response to Marrack's Motions.to Compel Answers to Interrogatories in the above-captiened proceeding were served on the follow-ing by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, or by hand-delivery this 4th day of August, 1980. Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chair:Ean Hon. Charles J. Dusek Atomic Safety and Licensing Mayor, City of Wallis Board Panel P. O. Box 312 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission Wallis, Texas 77485 Washington,'D.- C. 20555 Hon. Leroy H. Grebe .Dr. E. Leonard Cheatum County Judge, Austin County Route 3, 3cx.350A P. O. Box 99 Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 Bellville, Texas 77418 ~ Mr. Gustave.A. Licenberger Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing. Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatorf Corraission' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 l Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Chase R. Stephens. Appeal Board Decketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Offica'of the Secretary Washington, D. C. 20555 l. of~the Commission l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Steve Schinki, Esq. ' Washington, D. C. 20555 Staff Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Richard ~Lowerre, Esq. Washington, D.'C. 20555 Assistant Attorney General-for the State of Texas .P.'O.' Box 112548 Capitol' Station < Austin, Texas 178711' 2, Bryan =L. 3aker D. Marrack 1113 Montrose 420 Mulberry Lane Houston, Texas 77019 Bellaire, Texas 77401 J. Morgan Bishop Brenda McCorkle 11418 Cak Spring 6140 Darnell Houston, Texas 77043 Houston, Texas 77074 Stephen A. Doggett W. Matthew Perrened P. O.-Sox 592 4070 Merrick Rosenberg, Texas 77471 Houston, Texas 77025 John F. Doherty F. H. Potthoff 4327 Alconbury 7200 Shady villa, No. 110 Houston, Texas 7702L Houston, Texas 77055 Carro Hinderstein Wayne E. Rentfro 609 Fannin, Suite 521 P. O. Box 1335 Houston, Texas 77002 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 James M. Scott e 13935 Ivy Moun: Sugar Land, Texas 77478 William Schuessler 5810 Darnell Houston, Texas 77074 W Darrell Hancock .