ML15022A062

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments

ML15022A062
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	01/07/2015
From:	Recasha Mitchell Yankee Atomic Electric Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
BYR 2015-001
Download: ML15022A062 (2)

Text

YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY 49 Yankee Road, Rowe, Massachusetts01367 BYR 2015-00 1 10 CFR 72.4 and 10 CFR 72.48 ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 - 0001 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Yankee Rowe Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation NRC License No. DPR-3 and SFGL- 13 (NRC Docket Nos.50-029 and 72-31)

Subject:

Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments In accordance with 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2), Yankee Atomic Electric Company is required to submit to the NRC a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48(c), including a summary of the evaluation of each. This report covers the period from January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2014. The attachment provides a summary of the changes, tests, or experiments made pursuant to paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 72.48 during that time period.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please do not hesitate to contact me at (413) 424-5261 ext. 303.

R pectfu y, obert M. Mitchell ISFSI Manager cc: D. Dorman, NRC Region I Administrator M. S. Ferdas, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, NRC, Region 1 J. Goshen, NRC Project Manager, Yankee Rowe J. Giarrusso, Planning, Preparedness & Nuclear Section Chief, MEMA J. Cope-Flanagan, Assistant General Counsel, MDPU J. Reyes, State of Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General

• N~i15$s I iLiSS1(c,

Attachment to BYR 2015-001 Summary of Changes and Evaluations Made in Accordance with 10 CFR 72.48(c) 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation No. 2014 Revision 0 Summary of Change The 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report was revised to adopt the change evaluated in NAC 10 CFR 72.48 Determination ID No. NAC-13.MPC-001. The Technical Specification (TS)

Bases for NAC-MPC Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.6.1 was revised to clarify an inconsistency between the NAC-MPC TSs, NAC-MPC TS Bases and NAC-MPC Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident analysis. Specifically, the Bases for NAC-MPC TS SR 3.1.6.1 currently describes the system as being inoperable when two or more inlet or outlet vents are blocked. This is being revised to state that the system is inoperable when more than two inlet or outlet vents are fully blocked or the equivalent effective screen area of more than two inlet or outlet vents is fully blocked.

Summary of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation The TS Bases for NAC-MPC SR 3.1.6.1 is revised to clarify an inconsistency between the NAC-MPC TSs, NAC-MPC TS Bases and NAC-MPC FSAR accident analysis. Thus, the operability of the Concrete Cask Heat Removal System is assured.

Per NAC 10 CFR 72.48 Determination ID No. NAC-13-MPC-001, the TS bases for SR 3.1.6.1 is not consistent with what is described in the FSAR accident analysis or administrative TS A 5.3.

The accident analysis, as presented in NAC-MPC FSAR, demonstrates that when half of the air inlets are fully blocked the system remains within the allowable temperature limits for all components and is therefore operable. This is also reflected in administrative TS A 5.3 where at least one-half of the inlets and outlets on each concrete cask must be cleared of blockage or debris within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore air circulation.

In addition, as stated in the NAC 10 CFR 72.48 Determination ID No. NAC- I 3-MPC-00 1, the thermal evaluation of the system utilizes an axisymmetric model. When performing the thermal evaluation for half of the inlets blocked, the axisysmmetric model assumes an effective screen area being blocked that is equivalent to two vents being blocked in their entirety if the entire system was being modeled. In other words, the thermal model evaluates an effective screen area reduction that is equivalent to the area of two air inlets being fully blocked.

The change does not:

• Affect any evaluations of accidents or malfunctions made in the NAC International (NAC) -

Multi-Purpose Canister System (MPC) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (NAC-MPC FSAR).

• Creation of a new type of event not previously evaluated in the NAC-MPC FSAR.

" Affect any Fission Product Barriers as described in the NAC-MPC FSAR.

" Affect any Evaluation Methodologies described in the NAC-MPC FSAR.