ML18249A380

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Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9412 and MF9413; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001)
ML18249A380
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/2018
From: Doug Broaddus
Special Projects and Process Branch
To: Nazar M
Florida Power & Light Co
Wall S
References
CAC MF9412, CAC MF9413, EPID L-2016-LRC-0001, GL-16-001
Download: ML18249A380 (4)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 September 26, 2018 0MB Control No. 3150-0231 Mr. Mano Nazar President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Division Florida Power & Light Company Mail Stop EX/JB 700 Universe Blvd.

Juno Beach, FL 33408

SUBJECT:

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 3 AND 4 - CLOSEOUT OF GENERIC LETTER 2016-01, "MONITORING OF NEUTRON-ABSORBING MATERIALS IN SPENT FUEL POOLS" (CAC NOS. MF9412 AND MF9413; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001)

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On April 7, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Generic Letter (GL) 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16097A169), to address the degradation of neutron-absorbing materials (NAMs) in wet storage systems for reactor fuel at power and non-power reactors.

The generic letter requested that licensees provide information to allow the NRC staff to verify continued compliance through effective monitoring to identify and mitigate any degradation or deformation of NAMs credited for criticality control in spent fuel pools (SFPs).

To facilitate a licensee's response, GL 2016-01 established four categories (Category 1, Category 2, Category 3, and Category 4). Categories 1, 2, and 3 identify situations where a detailed response to the GL 2016-01 would not be required. The categorization criteria were generally based on if a licensee does not credit NAMs for criticality control, or if a licensee's NAM monitoring program has been incorporated in the licensing basis by an NRC-approved technical specification (TS) change or license condition.

By letter dated November 3, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16312A050), as supplemented by letter dated May 24, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18149A127), Florida Power and Light Company, et al. (the licensee), responded to GL 2016-01 for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4 (Turkey Point). In the licensee's response to GL 2016-01, as supplemented, the licensee stated that, for Turkey Point, the licensee credits Metamic for criticality control and reported Turkey Point as meeting Category 3 for Metamic. The NRC staff performed a thorough review of the licensee's response, any documents referenced therein, and other applicable licensing basis documents. The NRC staff's review determined that the licensee credits Metamic NAMs for criticality control and has established a Metamic NAM monitoring program.

However, the NRC staff review also determined that the Metamic NAM monitoring program has

M. Nazar not been incorporated into the licensing basis through an NRG-approved TS change or license condition. Therefore, the NRC staff reviewed the previously docketed information referenced in the responses to determine if it contained the information consistent with an acceptable Category 4 response. The staff determined that previously docketed information sufficiently addressed the five areas of information described in Appendix A to GL 2016-01 for Metamic. In particular, the described monitoring program for the Boral includes the following key features:

  • Neutron attenuation testing of coupons.
  • Established processes to ensure that the licensee will take the appropriate corrective actions if any potentially non-conforming material is discovered.
  • A testing frequency not to exceed 1O years.
  • Acceptance criteria to ensure maintenance of the 5-percent subcriticality margin for the SFP.

The NRC staff found that the licensee intends to continue monitoring the condition of its NAMs as described in its response.

In the licensee's response to G L 2016-01, as supplemented, the licensee also stated that, for Turkey Point, it relies on continual monitoring industry operating experience, including ongoing participation in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Neutron Absorber Users Group (NAUG) and its related programs, to evaluate the condition of the Boral in its SFP. The licensee indicated that the NAUG, through EPRI, has completed a study which analyzes the criticality impact of blisters and pits on Boral. This study is described in EPRI document 3002013119, "Evaluation of the Impact of Neutron Absorber Material Blistering and Pitting on Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity," May 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18226A292). The licensee also stated that the NAUG, through EPRI, is developing an industry-wide program to gather water chemistry and Boral coupon data for SFPs. This program is described in EPRI document 3002013122, "Roadmap for the lndustrywide Learning Aging Management Program (i-LAMP) for Neutron Absorber Materials in Spent Fuel Pools," May 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18226A291 ).

The licensee stated that relevant issues emerging from such industry efforts will be monitored through the licensee's Operating Experience Program and Corrective Action Program.

The stated purpose of this program is to inform the condition of the Boral at sites with no coupon, or in-situ, testing of its Boral, with results from other sites using the "sister pool criteria."

The NRC staff notes that aspects of the industry-wide program referenced in EPRI Report 3002013122 (i.e., the Boral coupon database, water chemistry database, sister pool criteria, etc.) are not yet complete and some guidelines might not be fully developed until 2020.

While the program as described in EPRI Report 3002013122 is not yet complete, the NRC staff did use the information found in EPRI Report 300203119 to support the conclusion that no additional information is needed, at this time, to address the five areas of information described in Appendix A to GL 2016-01 for Boral.

The NRC staff also notes that the studies documented in EPRI Reports 3002013119 and 3002013122 are intended to be generic analyses and were not provided as site-specific analyses. Therefore, the results of the analyses, or any part of those analyses, have currently not been shown as directly applicable to Turkey Point. In addition, the NRC staff did not review whether the EPRI Reports could be used to justify equipment operability, design basis changes,

M. Nazar or licensing changes requested pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit."

However, the NRC staff's review determined that the EPRI reports provide the information required to satisfy the request in GL 2016-01 for Boral, at this time.

For Turkey Point, the NRC staff's review determined that the information provided sufficiently addressed the five areas of information described in Appendix A to GL 2016-01. Based on the review of the information provided, the NRG staff concludes no further information is requested regarding GL 2016-01.

Sincerely, Douglas A Broaddus, Chief Special Projects and Process Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 cc: Listserv

ML18249A380 *via email OFFICE NRR/DORL/LSPB/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-2PM NRR/DORL/LAiT NRR/DORL/LSPB/LA NAME SWall MWentzel PTalukdar JBurkhardt DATE 9/25/18 9/25/18 9/11/18 9/17/18 OFFICE NRR/DMLR/MCCB/BC* NRR/DIRS/IRGB/BC* NRR/DSS/SNPB/BC* NRR/DORL/LSPB/BC NAME SBloom BPham RLukes DBroaddus DATE 9/25/18 9/25/18 9/19/18 9/26/18