ML18344A399

LER 1975-010-00 for Palisade Nuclear Plant, Axial Growth of Poison Rods in the A&B Type Fuels

ML18344A399
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	10/14/1975
From:	Bixel D Consumers Power Co
To:	Purple R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 1975-010-00
Download: ML18344A399 (3)

Text

• consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

• A rea C ode 51 7 788-0550 October 14, 1975 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att: Mr Robert A. Purple, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No 1 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKEI' 50-255, LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT -UE-75-10 \9. nEC[/V£D OCT 201975 ... ll.S.N*tr ., AI ORY Mail Section Attached is Unusual Event Report 75-10 which concerns the receipt of liminary information on axial growth of poison rods in the A&B type fuels at Palisades.

Investigation of this event is continuing.

David A. Bixel Assist a nt Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC: JGKeppler, USNRC File 1 . I -) :: ...

• *

• UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT 75-10 Palisades Plant 1. Report Number: UE-75-10, Docket 50-255. 2. a. Report Date: October 13, 1975. b. Event Date: October 2, 1975 (information received).

J. Facility:

Palisades Plant, Covert. 4. Identification of Event: Poison rod growth in Palisades fuel. 5. Condition Prior to Event: Plant operating at 80% power. 6. Description of Event: Preliminary information received from the Palisades fuel supplier indicates that the axial growth of poison rods in the A&B type fuels may have reached the limit allowed in the fuel bundle design. 7. Designation of Apparent Cause: Preliminary information available in the industry indicates that the most probable cause is related to induced growth . 8. Analysis of Event: Based on preliminary e valuations, we have concluded that continued poison rod growth following touchdown could cause the poison rod to gradually bow. This, in turn, could have an effect on the heat transfer capability of the adjacent fuel rods. Any effect on the fuel clad integrity would be gradual. The corrective action described in No 9 below is designed to provide more margin than is normally available and to promptly detect any abnormal fuel clad degradation that might occur. At the heat fluxes perienced at present operating levels, considerable degradation of heat transfer can occur without jeopardizing fuel rod integrity.

Further, based on observations at the last fuel inspection, only approximately one of twenty poison rods had experienced the growth phenomenon to the extent that it was observable, We are pursuing this event with the fuel supplier and will keep you informed.

9. Corrective Action: As an interim measure, we observe the following:

a. Administratively we are limiting the power level to a nominal 80% (of 2200 MWt). b. As required in Appendix B of the Technical Specifications, we are monitoring the primary coolant gross gamma radioactivity continuously or by daily samples. 10. Failure Data: N/A . I I

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