Information Notice 2005-07, Results of Hemyc Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System Full Scale Fire Testing

Results of Hemyc Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System Full Scale Fire Testing

ML050890089
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/01/2005
From:	Hiland P NRC/NRR/DIPM/IROB
To:
frumkin d, 415-2280, NRR/DSSA/SAPLB
References
IN-05-007
Download: ML050890089 (8)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON D.C. 20555-0001April 1, 2005INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-07:RESULTS OF HEMYC ELECTRICAL RACEWAY FIREBARRIER SYSTEM FULL SCALE FIRE TESTING

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who havepermanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed

from the reactor vessel, and fuel facilities licensees.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to informaddressees of the results of Hemyc electrical raceway fire barrier system (ERFBS) full-scale firetests. The Hemyc ERFBS did not perform for one hour as designed because shrinkage of the

Hemyc ERFBS occurred during the testing. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions as appropriate to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

BACKGROUND

The Hemyc ERFBS, manufactured by Promatec, Inc., has been installed at nuclear powerplants (NPPs) to protect circuits in accordance with regulatory requirements (Reference 1) and

plant-specific commitments.As a result of fire protection inspections, unresolved items (URIs) were opened at some nuclearpower stations due to questions raised regarding the fire resistance capability of the HemycERFBS (Reference 2). The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) performed a review ofthe Hemyc ERFBS (Reference 3) and requested the NRC's Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch (RES) to perform confirmatory testing of this ERFBS. RES performed the testing at

the Omega Point Laboratories in Elmendorf, Texas.

DISCUSSION

This information notice describes the results of the investigation of the fire resistance capabilityof the Hemyc ERFBS (Attachment 1). The NRC performed two ASTM E 119 furnace tests on anumber of cable raceway types that are protected by the Hemyc ERFBS (with and without air

gaps) in accordance with the Hemyc ERFBS test plan (see ADAMS Accession No.

ML043210141 for a preliminary version of the test plan). The test plan provides a detailed discussion of the assemblies and the thermocouple positions. The Hemyc ERFBStests were performed for a period of 60-minutes each, followed by a hose stream test and post- test visual inspection of the ERFBS.A bare No. 8 stranded copper conductor, instrumented with thermocouples every 6 inchesalong its length, was routed through each of the conduit and cable tray test specimens.

Additional thermocouples were mechanically attached to the outer surfaces of the conduit test

specimens and along the length of both side rails of the cable tray test specimens at 6-inch

intervals. All results in Attachment 1 refer to the additional thermocouples attached to the outer

surfaces of the conduits and cable trays unless otherwise stated. Shrinkage of the Outer CoveringThe Hemyc ERFBS is constructed of Hemyc mats consisting of Kaowool insulation inside anouter covering of Siltemp high-temperature fabric. The mats are machine-stitched at the

factory to fit each electrical raceway installation. Hemyc mats that are directly wrapped around

the electrical raceway use 2-inch-thick Kaowool. Hemyc mats that are installed over spaced

frames to provide a 2-inch air gap between the Hemyc and the electrical raceway (for cable tray

protection) use 11/2-inch-thick Kaowool. While Siltemp is a frequently used descriptor for the outer covering, and thus is usedgenerically in this information notice, the material originally known as Siltemp is not now

available commercially. The Promatec vendor manual references either Siltemp, Refrasil, or

Alpha 600 as equivalent materials for the outer covering of the Hemyc ERFBS mats. This

testing used the Refrasil brand fabric. The term "Siltemp" is most commonly used in the

nuclear industry to describe the outer covering fabric of the Hemyc ERFBS mats. The

NRC'spreliminary testing indicates that the material density, thickness, and fabric weave are identical

for both Siltemp and Refrasil. During the fire testing, the outer layer of Siltemp consistently showed thermal shrinkage andchange of color from tan to white. This shrinkage led to some gaps opening between the

Hemyc ERFBS mats. NRC's preliminary findings indicate that the color change and shrinkageof both Siltemp and Refrasil materials are spatially uniform. Based on preliminary testing both

Siltemp and Refrasil shrink approximately 8 percent during the ASTM E 119 furnace exposure. Opening of the JointsThis testing examined the four most common methods of joining the Hemyc material into acomplete ERFBS: (1) using stitched joints, (2) using minimum 6-inch collars over a joint,

(3) using minimum 2-inch overlapping of the mats, and (4) using through bolts with fender

washers. The Siltemp shrinkage led to the opening of each of the joint systems, which exposedthe assembly (conduit, cable tray, junction box, air drop cable) to the furnace environment. For

method (1), the shrinkage led to the seams being torn open. For method (2), the mats also

experienced shrinkage, causing openings in the Hemyc ERFBS. It appeared that the 6-inch

collar contracted and moved with one side of the material. For method (3), the 2-inch

overlapping joints also opened. For method (4), the through-bolting of the Hemyc mats on the

cable tray designs using the 2-inch air gap appeared to provide the most robust resistance to

Siltemp shrinkage. However, due to this rigid fixed mounting of the Hemyc mats, the Siltemp experienced tearing of the machine sewn seams and tearing of the Siltemp fabric. All but oneassembly (conduit or cable tray) experienced temperatures capable of damaging plant cables

(Reference 4). Supports and Intervening Item ProtectionWith only the 3-inch thick Kaowool protection on supports as required by the vendor manual,the single point temperature rise of 325 oF was exceeded in 13 to 32 minutes. To preventcorruption of the thermal measurement data for the raceways because of potential thermalshort-circuiting from structural supports, this program did not test the raceway and the structural

supports together. Intervening metallic items would also be expected to permit the sametemperature rise.Significance of ResultsThe significance of the test results is that the Hemyc ERFBS did not perform for one hour asdesigned. Observations made during the testing, such as mat shrinkage and thermal shorts

through the support protection, were not identified during previous testing of the material.

Consequently, the Hemyc ERFBS does not provide the level of protection expected for a rated

1-hour fire barrier.

CONTACT

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct anyquestions about this matter to the technical contact(s) listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager./RA/Patrick L. Hiland, Chief

Reactor Operations Branch

Division of Inspection Program Management

Technical Contact:

Daniel Frumkin, NRR/DSSA301-415-2280

E-mail: dxf1@nrc.govAttachment 1:Hemyc 1-Hour Fire-Rated Test ResultsNote: NRC generic communications may be found on the

NRC public Web site,http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. experienced tearing of the machine sewn seams and tearing of the Siltemp fabric. All but oneassembly (conduit or cable tray) experienced temperatures capable of damaging plant cables

(Reference 4). Supports and Intervening Item ProtectionWith only the 3-inch thick Kaowool protection on supports as required by the vendor manual,the single point temperature rise of 325 oF was exceeded in 13 to 32 minutes. To preventcorruption of the thermal measurement data for the raceways because of potential thermalshort-circuiting from structural supports, this program did not test the raceway and the structural

supports together. Intervening metallic items would also be expected to permit the sametemperature rise.Significance of ResultsThe significance of the test results is that the Hemyc ERFBS did not perform for one hour asdesigned. Observations made during the testing, such as mat shrinkage and thermal shorts

through the support protection, were not identified during previous testing of the material.

Consequently, the Hemyc ERFBS does not provide the level of protection expected for a rated

1-hour fire barrier.

CONTACT

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct anyquestions about this matter to the technical contact(s) listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager./RA/Patrick L. Hiland, Chief

Reactor Operations Branch

Division of Inspection Program Management

Technical Contact:

Daniel Frumkin, NRR/DSSA301-415-2280

E-mail: dxf1@nrc.govAttachment 1:Hemyc 1-Hour Fire-Rated Test ResultsNote: NRC generic communications may be found on the

NRC public Web site,http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.ADAMS ACCESSION #: ML050890089 OFFICEDSSA:SPLBTech EditorDSSA:SPLBBC:DSSA:/SPLBD:DSSANAMEDFrumkinPKleeneSWeerakkodyJHannonSBlackDATE04/01/200504/01/200504/01/200504/01/2005 / /2005OFFICENMSSOES:IROB:DIPMA:SC:OES:IROB:DIPMC:IROB:DIPMNAMERPiersonCVHodgeEJBenner /RLaura for/PLHilandDATE04/01/200504/01/200504/01/200504/01/2005OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

References:1.Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2 2.NRC Inspection Report 50-400/1999-13 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003685341); NRCInspection Reports 50-369/2000-09 and 50-370/2000-09 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML003778709)3. NRR Response to Task Interface Agreement (TIA)99-028, "Shearon Harris Nuclear PowerPlant, Unit 1 - Resolution of Pilot Fire Protection Inspection Fire Barrier Qualification

Issues," dated August 1, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003736721)4. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance DeterminationProcess, Attachment 7, page F7-2 IN 2005-07Attachment 1 Hemyc 1-Hour Fire-Rated Test Results

Conduit , Supports & Junction BoxRacewayTime to Tave > 250 o F(minutes)Time toSingle PointT > 325 o F(minutes)Max. Temp.Bare #8@ 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 (o F)Joint Opening

2Yes/No1" Conduit (1E)(Empty)46421013Yes1" Conduit (1F)1.02 lb./linear foot (lin.ft.) Cable Fill44341177Yes2 1/2 " Conduit (1C)(Empty)4841709Yes2 1/2 " Conduit (1D)5.85 lb./lin.ft. Cable Fill5138446Yes4" Conduit (1A)(Empty)4933865Yes4" Conduit (1B)14.84 lb./lin.ft. Cable Fill5743199YesJunction Box18" x 24" x 8"1715NAYesUnistrut Support

3NA22 - 32NANA2" Tube Steel Support

3NA13 - 25NANA

IN 2005-07Attachment 1 Hemyc 1-Hour Fire-Rated Test Results

Cable Tray, Junction Box, & AirdropRacewayRight SideTray Rail Tave >250 o F(minutes)Right SideTray RailSingle PointT > 325 o F(minutes)Left SideTray Rail Tave > 250 o F(minutes)Left SideTray RailSingle PointT > 325 o F(minutes)Bare #8 Tave >250 o F(minutes)Bare #8Single PointT > 325 o F(minutes)Bare #8Max.Temp.@ 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (o F)JointOpening 2Yes/No12" Cable Tray Empty,(2A) Direct Attachment3634271832321260Yes12" Cable Tray Empty,(2B) 2" Air Gap3735383533341002Yes36" Cable Tray Empty,(2C) Direct Attachment4139343335351330Yes36" Cable Tray Empty,(2D) 2" Air Gap3231333228271117YesAir Drop, (2E)Direct AttachmentNANANANA35321712YesAir Drop, (2F)2" Air GapNANANANA32281411Yes18" x24" x 8"JunctionBox,(2G)Direct Attachment with

Bands 43132NANANANANAYes

IN 2005-07Attachment 1 Notes: 1. The temperatures recorded on the Bare No. 8 conductor may not be indicative of the actual temperature inside the assemblyfor two reasons. First, to insure the integrity of the thermocouple's jacket and insulation during installation, the instrumen

tedBare No. 8 conductor was located in the center of the cable; therefore it may not have been exposed to the highesttemperature within the conduit. The second reason was that the joints opened during the testing, producing local hot spotson the interior of the raceway that may or may not have been picked up by the Bare No. 8 conductor.2. All Hemyc ERFBSs experienced some thermal shrinkage of the outer Siltemp covering. As a result, some joints opened andexposed the conduits or cable trays to the furnace environment at various points during the test.3. The time provided for the structural supports was determined to be the time when the single point temperature rise (T )exceeded 325 oF at a distance 3 inches into the Hemyc insulation protecting the structural steel. Three inches is theminimum structural support protection recommended in the vendor manual.4. The junction box average temperature is the average across all thermocouples mounted on the outside of the box's surface. The single-point temperature is also measured on the external surface of the junction box.