05000285/FIN-2009007-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform an Operability Evaluation of a Degraded Condition |
| Description | The team identified a Green non-cited violation for the licensees failure to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V in that the licensee failed to perform an operability determination for a degraded condition. The licensee determined that certain relays classified as Functional Importance Determination 1, should be replaced every 9or 15 years depending on the duty cycle and environmental conditions. Most of the relays in the emergency diesel generator had been in service since initial installation, over 35 years ago. Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee performed an operability determination that showed all the effected relays were operable. This condition has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009-2319 and 2342.The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the procedure quality attribute (maintenance procedures)of the mitigating system cornerstone, and the performance deficiency adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Significance Determination, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green) because the failure to perform the operability determination did not result in loss of operability or functionality and because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making, in that the licensee did not make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure safety is maintained H.1(a |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
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| Report | IR 05000285/2009007 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Kirkland G Werner M Vasquez P Goldberg |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2009007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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