05000313/FIN-2010003-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Troubleshooting in Switchyard Causes Loss of Power to Unit 1 and Unit 2 Startup Transformers |
Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for failure to implement Procedure OP-1015.033, ANO Switchyard Controls, Revision 12. Specifically, On March 26, 2010, while performing 161 kV breaker B1205 postinstallation testing, several issues developed and testing activities transitioned into troubleshooting activities. Per the above mentioned procedure, a new component and plant impact statement should have been performed. The impact statement should have described the new work activities, objectives and potential for plant impacts so that a proper assessment could be made by operations management to allow the work or not. These troubleshooting activities ultimately resulted in a lockout of the auto-transformer, which resulted in the lockout of startup transformers 1 and 3 (offsite power source) for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2010-0726.
Failure to properly implement Procedure OP-1015.033, ANO Switchyard Controls, Revision 12, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not stop and obtain a component and plant impact statement when test activities transitioned into troubleshooting activities in the Arkansas Nuclear One switchyard. The troubleshooting activities led to an auto lockout of the auto transformer and resulted in the loss of offsite power to startup transformers 1 and 3. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute and directly affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown conditions, and is therefore a finding. The significance of the finding was determined using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 4, and determined to be of very low safety significance, because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices, H.4(c), in that the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities in the switchyard such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, the licensee became too involved helping solve the issue discovered in the switchyard and failed to recognize that Procedure OP-1015.033 needed to be implemented. |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
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Report | IR 05000313/2010003 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey J Rotton N Greene A Sanchez D Stearns E Uribe G George J Clark |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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