05000313/FIN-2009007-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Design Control for Class 1E Batteries and Battery Racks |
| Description | The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to adequately perform a seismic evaluation for a modification to the Unit 2 safety-related 125 Vdc battery racks. Specifically, on June 17, 1986, a design change was made to the battery racks to add hand-hold and step-on rails for ease of maintenance and inspection of the battery cells. The seismic evaluation for these rails addressed the impact to the battery rack seismic rating, and determined that the bolts for the rails must not be tightened to a specified torque value, but installed hand tight only. However, the seismic evaluation failed to address the potential for the rails to fall because the bolts were only hand tight. The licensee has entered this into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2009-01573. The failure to perform a seismic evaluation for a modification to the Class 1E battery racks was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is similar to Example 3.a of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Section 1-3, Screen for More than Minor ROP, and it also affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of design control to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of safety systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective because actions were required to be taken to ensure the hand tight bolts and rail met seismic qualifications. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design issue that did not result in loss of operability or function. The inspectors reviewed the finding for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified because the finding was not indicative of current performance. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2009007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll B Henderson T Farnholtz W Sifre |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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