05000498/FIN-2016007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Include Applicable Safety System Criteria in the Final Safety Analysis Report |
| Description | The team identified a Severity Level IV, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2), Final Safety Analysis Report which requires, in part, that the final safety analysis report shall include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility, with emphasis upon performance requirements, the bases, with technical justification therefor, upon which such requirements have been established, and the evaluations required to show that safety functions will be accomplished. The description shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Specifically, since March 22, 1988, the licensee failed to include, in the final safety analysis report, the safety system criteria specified by IEEE 603-1980 and IEEE 7.4-3-2 for the Eagle 21 control system, which described the facility, presented the design bases, and the limits on its operation. This violation does not represent an immediate safety concern. In response to this issue, the licensee created corrective actions to determine the appropriate information to include in the next update to the updated final safety analysis report. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR 16-1281. The team determined that the failure to revise the final safety analysis report with the supplemental information that presented the design bases of the qualified display processing system was a violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2). The violation was more than minor because the design basis information affected certain safety system functions (i.e., the auxiliary feedwater system control valves), which had a material impact on safety. Because the issue affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, the inspectors evaluated this violation using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy, Subsection 6.1, Reactor Operations, dated February 4, 2015, to evaluate the significance of this violation. This violation is similar to example 6.1.d.3 in the Enforcement Policy. Therefore, this was a Severity Level IV violation because the violation represented a failure to update the final safety analysis report as required by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2), but the lack of up-to-date information has not resulted in any unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. The team determined there was no cross-cutting aspect because cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. |
| Site: | South Texas  |
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| Report | IR 05000498/2016007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21M |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Baron C Stott G Gardner J Kirkland M Williams S Hedger T Fanelli T Farnholtz |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.34 |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2016007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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