05000333/FIN-2013005-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Untimely 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of a HPCI System Functional Failure |
Description | The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of when it should reasonably have been discovered, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, identification that issues with two of the condensate storage tank (CST) level detectors that provide automatic transfer of the HPCI suction from the CSTs to the suppression pool would have caused this transfer to occur at less than the minimum CST level allowed by Technical Specifications (TSs) and therefore caused the HPCI system to be inoperable, was not promptly recognized as a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2013-06344. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the HPCI system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process; in that, a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. |
Site: | FitzPatrick ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000333/2013005 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Sienel E Knutson J Brand J Nicholson R Rolph S Mccarver S Pindale T Setzer |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.72 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Loss of Safety Function Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2013Q4
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