05000528/FIN-2012004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Boric Acid Evaluation |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of engineering personnel to follow Procedure 70TI-9ZC01, Boric Acid Walkdown Leak Detection, to provide an adequate evaluation of an active boric acid leak. Specifically, an evaluation of a boric acid leak from the packing of the charging backpressure header control valve did not assess all consequences of continued operation. The licensee performed a subsequent boric acid leakage evaluation and determined that monitoring coupled with mitigating actions of cleaning and greasing all susceptible components was sufficient to support the functionality of the valve. The licensee will repair the valve at the soonest available opportunity; prior to restart after any maintenance or refueling outage. The inspectors concluded that the failure of the engineering personnel to provide an adequate evaluation of an active boric acid leak was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could possibly become a more significant safety concern in that unevaluated boric acid leaks could result with unmitigated boric acid corrosion of components. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue under the Significance Determination Process, as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings. Inspectors determined that the finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power. Inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety-significance (Green) because the finding is a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to make conservative assumptions and allowed corrosion of carbon steel components without an appropriate understanding of their function or unintended consequences |
Site: | Palo Verde |
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Report | IR 05000528/2012004 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Baquera D Reinert D You R Lantz M Brown J Melfi J Laughlin B Parks |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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