05000528/FIN-2012002-04
From kanterella
Revision as of 15:05, 30 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure in the Choice of Protective Actions Consistent with Federal Guidance |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) for the licensees failure to develop and have in-place guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency that were consistent with federal guidance. Specifically, the licensees procedure EP-0905, Protective Actions, Revision 2, did not implement the guidance of EPA-400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, which states, in part, that evacuation is rarely justified when the projected dose does not exceed 1 rem (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). This issue is documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report Disposition Request-3403829. The licensees automatic process that extended protective action during plant conditions and changes in wind direction without considering radiation dose was identified as a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affects the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency, and is associated with the cornerstone attributes of emergency response organization performance and procedure quality. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements, was associated with risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and was not a risk significant planning standard functional failure or a planning standard degraded function. The finding was not a functional failure or degraded planning standard function because appropriate protective action recommendations for the public would have been made for all areas where protective action guides were exceeded. The finding is related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed take appropriate corrective actions to address the safety issue in a timely manner |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2012002 Section 1EP5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71114.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra R Lantz M Brown E Uribe M Baquera D Reinert S Hedger D Bradley |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||