05000263/FIN-2011005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | E Condensate Demineralizer Alarm Response Procedure Limits Exceeded |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, when the operators did not take conservative action to address a high differential pressure condition on an inservice condensate demineralizer vessel. Specifically, operators allowed the E condensate demineralizer to exceed differential pressure operating limits prescribed in Alarm Response Procedure 80-DPAH-2215, Vessel T-7E D/P High, and remain above those prescribed limits for approximately a shift before taking action to correct the abnormal condition. Specific corrective actions taken by the licensee to address this issue included updating the applicable alarm response procedures and operating procedures to reflect current system limitations; engineering management reinforcing the expectation that informal processes are not acceptable when communicating technical guidance to operations staff; and site management reinforcing the expectation that, once a degrading trend is recognized, actions must be taken in sufficient time to prevent crossing established operating limits. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to maintain the E condensate demineralizer differential pressure within prescribed operational limits was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement or a standard; the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; and should have been prevented. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency per IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, and determined that the issue was more than minor because it impacted the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. The inspectors utilized Column 1 of the Table 4a worksheet to screen the finding. For transient initiators, the inspectors answered no to the question, Does the finding contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip AND the likelihood that mitigation equipment of functions will not be available, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having Work Control components, and involving aspects associated with the licensee planning and coordinating work activities, consistent with nuclear safety, specifically the need for planned contingencies, compensatory actions, and abort criteria |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2011005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Munir C Zoia K Riemer M Phalen K Stoedter S Thomas R Walton P Voss J Beavers S Bell |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| Finding closed by | |
| IR 05000263/2011005 (1 February 2012) | |
| ' | |
Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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