05000285/FIN-2011002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Determine the Cause of the Out Of Tolerance Condition Regarding Reactor Protection System |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, which states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to the this, between July 28, 2003, and November 29, 2010, the licensee failed to determine the cause of the out of tolerance condition impacting reactor protection system channel A trip unit 6, which was a significant condition adverse to quality. This was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-6190. The licensees repeated failure to preclude the out-of-tolerance condition regarding reactor protection system channel A trip unit 6 is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding could have become more significant, in that, the licensee could fall below the technical specification Minimum Operable Channels if two additional trip unit six channels (B, C, or D) became inoperable. Because this finding occurred while the unit was operating at full power, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 to determine its significance. Using Attachment 4 of that chapter, the inspectors determined that this finding has a very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function, nor did it screen as potentially risk significant for external events. The finding was indicative of present performance and had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision-making. The failure of the licensee to preclude repetition of the out-of-tolerance condition of reactor protection system channel A trip unit 6 is a significant condition adverse to quality. H.1(b) |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
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| Report | IR 05000285/2011002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Kirkland J Clark A Fairbanks J Wingebach |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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