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With the plant in Mode 1 and 100% reactor power at 2043 (EDT) on September 30, 2003, while shifting divisions of Control Center HVAC (CCHVAC), the Division 1 chiller failed to start and Division 1 CCHVAC was declared INOPERABLE. At 2050, a restart of Division 2 CCHVAC was attempted and the Division 2 chiller failed to start. Division 2 CCHVAC was declared INOPERABLE, and the plant entered LCO 3.0.3 as required by LCO 3.7.4 Condition D. Plant shutdown was initiated at 2146. Division 1 CCHVAC was declared OPERABLE at 2315, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Plant shutdown was terminated at 2315 with the reactor at 84% power. Division 2 CCHVAC remains INOPERABLE and under investigation, with plant operating under LCO 3.7.4 Condition A. Plans are to return to 100% reactor power. All ECCS systems remained OPERABLE during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

• * * UPDATE 1428 EDT ON 10/20/03 FROM JEFF YEAGER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting the notification required per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) based on the following: At 2050 hours on September 30,2003 with the plant operating at 100 percent reactor power air conditioning chillers for both divisions of the Control Center Air Conditioning System failed to start. Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.0.3 was entered as directed by LCO 3.7.4, Control Center Air Conditioning System, Condition D.1 and a plant shutdown initiated at 2146 hours. Notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), a Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications. The chiller for Division 1 Control Center Air Conditioning System was started after approximately one hour and subsequently declared operable at 2315 hours. TS 3.0.3 was exited and power reduction was terminated at 84 percent reactor power. Notification was also made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Investigation revealed an oil pressure permissive was not met for start of the chiller due to a small amount of air leaking into a pressure switch while shutdown. This delayed meeting the oil pressure permissive for starting the chiller. Subsequent start attempts removed the air, allowing the pressure permissive to be met and the chiller to be restarted. This restart of the chiller was accomplished from the main control room in accordance with plant procedures. Therefore, Division 1 Control Center Air Conditioning was capable of performing its intended function. This condition is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The original notification, Event Number 40210, is retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Jim Creed).

At 1734 on 2/7/2005, received an Area Radiation Monitor alarm in the reactor building basement airlock area at approximately 75Mr/hr. The valid alarm caused entry into EOP flowcharts for High Radiation in the Secondary Containment. Check of the relay room monitor showed 100 Mr/hr. Investigation showed that a failed open main steam line drain valve combined with placing hydrogen water chemistry in service caused the increasing radiation levels. A downstream steam line drain isolation valve was closed to isolate the steam flow path past the monitor. Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection rate was lowered. The Rad levels returned to about 4 Mr/hr (normal levels) following valve closure (at 1745). The EOPs were exited at 1755. After review of the event it was determined that an unusual event should have been entered at the time of the EOP entry (EAL AU2, Unexpected Increase of Plant Radiation Levels), 1734 and exited at 1745 when area radiation levels returned to normal values. This is an after the fact notification of a missed emergency classification. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

• * * UPDATE ON 2/10/05 AT 1907 HRS. EST BY CROUCH * * *

This event notification reporting criteria has been changed to comply with the guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR 50.72 and 50.73". There is specific discussion that states (in part) that if a licensee discovers that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery, an actual declaration of the emergency class is not necessary. An ENS notification of the missed classification is an acceptable alternative. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R3DO (Duncan).

At approximately 1100 EST on 1/10/06, the capability of the ENS and commercial telephones to communicate with offsite authorities was found to be not functioning. In addition, the capability of the ERDS system to communicate with the NRC is not functioning. Communications to offsite authorities have been verified using microwave communications (RERP phone lines). The cause of the problem has been determined to be an offsite cable break within the telecommunication provider's network. All onsite communications (including onsite telephones) are functioning properly. Offsite telecommunication company personnel are working to repair the broken cable. Currently, repairs are estimated to be complete by 1800 EST. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capabilities.

• * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HIMEBAUCH TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1753 ON 01/10/06 * * *

This is a follow-up to NRC Event No. 42246: Offsite repairs of the broken telecommunications cable which caused a loss of capability to communicate with offsite authorities using ENS, commercial telephones and ERDS has been completed. Proper operation of ENS, commercial telephone lines and ERDS to communicate with offsite authorities has been verified. All offsite communication systems have been returned to normal. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (O'Brien)

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM JEFF YEAGER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2050 EST ON 01/10/06 * * *

At 1850 on 1/10/06, the capability of the ENS and commercial telephones to communicate with offsite authorities was again found to be not functioning. Discussion with telecommunication personnel indicate that troubleshooting and repair to the broken cable is continuing and will take approximately 4 hours. During this time, the communications with outside authorities will be intermittent. Therefore, this report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of off-site communications capabilities. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and state and local emergency response organizations. Notified R3DO (O'Brien)

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM JEFF YEAGER TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 0406 EST ON 01/11/06 * * *

Offsite repairs of the broken telecommunications cable which caused a loss of capability to communicate with offsite authorities using ENS, commercial telephones and ERDS has been completed. Proper operation of ENS, commercial telephone lines and ERDS to communicate with offsite authorities has been verified. All offsite communication systems have been returned to normal." State and Local governments notified. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. R3DO (O'Brien) notified.

On June 6, 2006 at 1600 EDT the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Service Water System (EESW) was in service for a planned surveillance test when the system failed to achieve required flows as specified in the surveillance. These flow rates are acceptance criteria and therefore resulted in system inoperability. EESW cools the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System which in turn cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Area Cooler. Unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW/EESW inoperability based on loss of the HPCI System Area Cooler. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION AT 08:14 ON 6/15/2006 FROM JEFF GROFF TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On June 6, 2006 at 1600 EDT, during the performance of the quarterly pump and valve operability surveillance test on Division 2 of the Emergency Equipment Service Water System (EESW), the minimum pump flow required by the procedure to perform the test could not be established. Because minimum pump flow could not be established, Division 2 of EESW was declared inoperable. EESW cools the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System which in turn cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Area Cooler. HPCI was declared inoperable based on loss of the HPCI System Area Cooler due to the Division 2 EECW/EESW inoperability. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. A report was made to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. On June 7, 2006, the test was re-performed with the valve in the bypass line around the heat exchanger Temperature Control Valve (TCV) throttled open. The required pump flow was established and the surveillance was successfully completed at 1815 EDT. Further Engineering evaluation concluded that minimum pump flow could not be established on June 6, 2006 due to normal pump wear and heat exchanger fouling. The pump flow required for performing the pump and valve operability surveillance test was established to monitor pump degradation and is higher than the flow required for the EESW system to perform its safety function. It has been verified that the measured flow exceeds the system design basis required flow with an adequate margin and that the pump and heat exchanger remain adequate to support the HPCI room cooling operation. The HPCI safety function was maintained throughout this period; therefore, this event is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Louden).

At 1326 on 7/31/06 there was a discharge of CO2 to the cable tray room. This is not a normally accessible room. Plant personnel verified no smoke, no fire. At 1340 the order was given to evacuate all personnel from the Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings as a precautionary measure. An Unusual Event was declared (HU3) at 1344 due to the affect on normal operation of the plant. The CO2 has been isolated, the buildings are being walked down and atmospheric testing is underway in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Canada, State and County officials.

• * * UPDATE ON 07/31/06 AT 15:17 FROM B. WALLAND TO A. COSTA * * *

At 1344 an Unusual Event was declared due to a toxic release into the Auxiliary Building (HU3). Release was due to a CO2 initiation, and has been isolated. Reactor building and Auxiliary building have been evacuated. Air sampling of the affected areas is underway. Notified R3 DO (O'Brien).

• * * UPDATE ON 07/31/06 AT21:44 FROM N. MAJOR TO M. RIPLEY * * *

Walk downs for atmospheric conditions are complete and satisfactory for all areas of the Auxiliary Building. Normal access to Auxiliary building has been restored. This restores access to all affected areas. Unusual Event is terminated at 2133. Notified IRD (T. Blount), R3 DO (K. O'Brien), NRR EO (M. Tschiltz), DHS (Biasco) and FEMA (Kimbrell).

Fermi 2 commenced an upgrade to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) on February 19, 2007 at 0800. The upgrade consists of furniture replacement and rearrangement of the seating layout. During this work, some floor panels will be removed for cable routing and accordingly the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event EOF activation is necessary, the Alternate EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the alternate EOF is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work, which is scheduled for Friday February 23, 2007. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

• • • UPDATE FROM KONRAD TO KNOKE AT 17:55 EDT ON 02/23/07 ***

This is a follow-up to NRC Event No. 43171. The upgrades to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), which caused it to be unavailable for emergency use, have been completed and the EOF is now available for use. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Fermi 2 removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating ventilation and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate preventive maintenance activities on August 14, 2007. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work, which is scheduled for Wednesday August 15, 2007. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JEFF GROFF TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2342 EDT ON 08/14/07 * * *

Preventive Maintenance activities on the TSC HVAC system have been complete. The TSC is now available for use. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (J. Cameron)

At 1722 hours, on 11/3/2007, the SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will he unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1715 ON 11/7/2007 FROM SUE REITH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Maintenance activities are continuing on the power supply for the SPDS and ERDS systems. Current estimate will restore the computer systems by 2000 on 11/08/07. An update will be provided once SPDS and ERDS are restored." R3DO (M. Phillips) notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1234 ON 11/8/2007 FROM DAVID HEMMELE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of SPDS and ERDS has been completed. SPDS and ERDS have been restored to service as of 1115 11/8/2007. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Phillips).

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) became unavailable when a storm took down the power line supplying the building that houses the EOF. The emergency diesel generator failed to start, leaving the EOF without power. Notification being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). If EOF actuation is necessary, the alternate EOF will be utilized. The licensee is investigating the failure of the backup emergency diesel generator to start. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 0335 ON 6/12/2008 FROM JIM KONRAD TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Power had been restored to the EOF at the time of the initial notification. Power was unavailable on 6/9/2008 from 2007 to 2312, a period of three hours and five minutes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Louden).

Fermi 2 is removing, on October 14, 2008, the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate maintenance activities. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work which is expected to be approximately one day. The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM G. MILLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1616 EDT ON 10/14/08 * * *

Preventative Maintenance Activities on the TSC HVAC system have been completed. The TSC is now available for use. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Phillips).

On February 2, 2009, at 1400, the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system was discovered to be nonfunctional. Initial investigation revealed an electrical fault in the supply fan motor. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event that TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) will be used. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup facility for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of corrective maintenance. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM KONRAD TO CROUCH @1609 EST ON 02/04/09 * * *

Corrective maintenance activities on the TSC HVAC system are complete and the TSC is now available for use. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Ring).