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| Discovered date | Reporting criterion | Title | Description | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 40084 | 17 August 2003 19:51:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of "a" Condensate Pump. | At 3:51 PM EDT, on August 17, 2003, with the reactor at 100% in Mode 1, the reactor was manually tripped in response to a trip of the A condensate pump and subsequent trip of the A main feed pump. Both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump started automatically due to Lo-Lo steam generator level. The operations crew responded to the event in accordance with the applicable plant procedures. The plant was stabilized at a normal operating no-load Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and pressure following the reactor trip. The condensate pump electrical supply breaker tripped due to instantaneous overcurrent, possibly related to a severe electrical storm in the area at the time. The feed pump tripped due to the loss of the condensate pump. Offsite power remained available throughout the transient. A local fire department responded to a downed power line in the vicinity of the Harris plant but the response was not related to any onsite activities. This condition is being reported as actuation of the reactor protection system and AFW in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 10CFR50.72 requires an 8-hour report for "Any condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation." In this case, the AFW pumps start signal was due to Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level. A root cause team is being formed to identify the cause and corrective actions Due to low decay heat in the core, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed and the Steam Generator PORVs are being used to maintain the plant in a Hot Standby condition. No known leaking steam generator tubes are known. Both motor-driven and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were secured after main feedwater was returned to service. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | 05000400/LER-2003-005 |
| ENS 40170 | 18 September 2003 18:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of More than 20% of Offsite Emergency Sirens | The following was received via fax from the licensee: As of 2:33 PM EDT, more than 20% of the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable for greater than one hour due to loss of power caused by Hurricane Isabel. Currently 27 of 81 sirens are out of service. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified and are in stand-by to implement mobile route alerting if needed. At this time, Harris cannot estimate the time of siren recovery. This requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed.
The licensee is updating this report to include that less than 20% of the emergency sirens are inoperable as of 2000 hours 9/18/03. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Boland). | |
| ENS 40730 | 6 May 2004 16:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip and Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System | The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile: On May 6, 2004, with the reactor at 100 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. At 1252 (EDT) the reactor was automatically tripped from a power range negative flux rate trip signal. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected to stabilize steam generator levels. All systems functioned as required and no other safety systems were actuated. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system temperature and pressure following the reactor trip. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using normal main feedwater. All emergency core cooling system equipment is available. The plant electrical system is available and in a normal configuration. The cause of the plant trip is under investigation. This condition is being reported as an unplanned reactor protection system actuation and specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) . During the transient, a steam generator power-operated relief valve lifted momentarily and then re-seated. No reportable radiological release occurred during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000400/LER-2004-003 |
| ENS 41129 | 18 October 2004 11:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Unplanned Emergency Diesel Start | At 0741 (EDT), an unplanned actuation of an ESF system occurred due to the unplanned start and loading of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The plant was in a refueling outage in Mode 5 with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized. The 'B' Emergency Safety Bus was operable and protected. The 'A' EDG started when the feeder breaker to the 'A' train Emergency Safety Bus opened unexpectedly, de-energizing the bus. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and re-energized the bus as designed, and the 'A' Safeguard Sequencer initiated loading of the bus. Two anomalies occurred during re-energization of the 'A' emergency bus loads. Bus 1A3-SA, which provides power to various safety related load centers and supplies support system loads, did not re-energize. Additionally, the 'A' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump did not start. The cause of the initial bus feeder breaker opening, and the cause of the subsequent equipment failures is under investigation. Bus 1A3-SA was manually re-energized at 1029. The 'A' ESW pump was manually restarted at 1054." The 'A' EDG cooling water was provided by the service water system which was not affected by the trip. The 'A' RHR pump was in service to provide Shutdown cooling and the pump tripped when the 'A' Train Emergency Safety Bus was deenergized. Reactor plant temperature rose from 116 to 122 degrees F in the four minute period prior to the restart of the 'A' RHR pump. 'A' RHR pump was restarted at 0745, and 'B' RHR pump was started at 0843 as a backup. Shutdown cooling was transferred to the 'B' Shutdown cooling loop at 1343 and the 'A' RHR pump was secured. The licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector. | 05000400/LER-2004-005 |
| ENS 41179 | 7 November 2004 21:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | "a" Auxiliary Feedwater (Afw) Pump Manually Started Due to Decreasing Steam Generator Water Level. | The 'A' motor driven AFW pump was manually started in response to lowering Steam Generator (SG) level. The plant was in Mode 1 with reactor power at approximately 7%, preparing for startup of the turbine generator. Steam Generator Feedwater flow to the Steam Generators was being supplied by the main feedwater system through the main feedwater regulating bypass valves operating in automatic control. The operating crew observed a lowering trend in 'C' Steam Generator level. Upon reaching the lower end of the procedurally established normal control band (time=1633), the operating crew took the following actions in accordance with plant procedures: (1) the associated feedwater regulating bypass valve was taken to manual control to attempt restoration of normal SG level, (2) the 'A' motor driven AFW pump was manually started (time= 1635) to supply AFW to the SG and (3) reactor power lowered to reduce steam demand. These actions resulted in the restoration of 'C' SG level to normal. Normal operating SG level is 57%. Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Trip occurs at 25%. The lowest SG level observed during the evolution was approximately 43%. The cause of the irregular Feedwater control is currently being investigated. The plant is currently at approximately 2.5% power with all Steam Generator levels at normal operating levels. No automatic ESF Actuations occurred. The NRC Senior Resident was informed. | 05000400/LER-2004-006 |
| ENS 41654 | 1 May 2005 04:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condensate Pump | The plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. At 0021 (EDT) the reactor was manually tripped following a loss of 1B Condensate pump per AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. The cause of the 1B Condensate pump trip is not known at the present time. The plant is stable in Mode 3 at normal temperature and pressure. All safety systems functioned as expected; AFW automatically actuated due to low level in the steam generators to provide continued decay heat removal. All control rods fully inserted on the manual reactor trip. Secondary PORVs opened on the trip and reclosed. Steam generators are discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine steam dump valves. AFW has been secured and main feedwater is operating to maintain SG levels. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000400/LER-2005-002 |
| ENS 41671 | 6 May 2005 08:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communication | At approximately 5:45 AM, (EDT), the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Control Room was informed by Chatham County that the county had lost the ability to receive communication due to the loss of a major fiber ring that services the area. The county would not have been able to receive notification from HNP via the Selective Signaling System or the public phone lines from approximately 0415 to 0539 hours. HNP verified that communications are presently available for the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Only the Selective Signaling System to Chatham County remains inoperable and under investigation for repair. This requires an 8 hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. Since the phones are now operable, the licensee would notify Chatham County via the public phone system if required. | |
| ENS 42631 | 12 June 2006 02:56:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of 20% of Offsite Emergency Sirens Due to Severe Weather | As of 10:56 P.M. EDT, (on 06/11/06) more than 20% of the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable for greater than one hour due to loss of power caused by severe weather/thunderstorms passing through the area. At 10:56 P.M. 21 of 81 sirens were out of service. At this time, the Harris Plant cannot estimate the time of siren recovery. However, crews are currently in the field surveying the damage and restoring power. This requires an 8-hour non-Emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. As of 01:40 A.M. 6/12/06, 16 of 81 sirens are out of service. The state and local emergency response organizations will implement compensatory measure of route alerting in the areas of the siren malfunction if needed during an emergency. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the North Carolina State EOC and the local counties of Chatham, Lee, Harnett, and Wake. | |
| ENS 42848 | 19 September 2006 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Generator Lockout Signal | At approximately 1000 EDT on September 19, 2006, with the reactor at 100 percent power in Mode 1, the reactor was automatically tripped from a turbine trip due to a generator lockout signal. The cause of this signal is under investigation. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected to stabilize steam generator levels. All systems functioned as required and no other safety systems were actuated. All control rods inserted (fully) on the reactor trip. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system temperature and pressure following the reactor trip. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using normal feedwater. All emergency core cooling system equipment is available. The plant electrical system is available and in a normal configuration. This condition is being reported as an unplanned reactor protection system actuation and specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)." The MSIVs are open with the steam generators discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dump valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000400/LER-2006-003 |
| ENS 42948 | 30 October 2006 12:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Offsite Emergency Sirens Inoperable | At approximately 0721, Eastern Standard Time, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Control Room was informed that the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified and were standing by to implement mobile route alerting if needed, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. Tone Alert Radios for notification of residents within the 5-mile emergency planning zone were also available and operable. The most probable cause was a controller malfunction at the microwave tower. This controller was reset at 0600. A successful system interrogation was initiated and restored operability of all sirens following the controller reset. Operability of the offsite emergency sirens was restored at 0922 following two successful silent tests. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified of system restoration by 1035. The cause of the controller malfunction and required corrective action will be determined in accordance with HNP's Corrective Action Program. | |
| ENS 42951 | 31 October 2006 11:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Offsite Emergency Sirens Inoperable | At 0810, Eastern Standard Time, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) determined that the offsite emergency sirens were not capable of being activated. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. In the event that the sirens had been needed, the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would have implemented mobile route alerting, as detailed In the Emergency Plan. Tone Alert Radios for notification of residents within the 5-mile emergency planning zone were also available and operable. The siren failures began to occur during the regularly scheduled 12-hour test at 0510. The most probable cause was a failed 'B' Repeater which rendered the controller at the microwave tower unable to activate the sirens. The 'B' Repeater was removed from the system and all sirens were operating as designed following a satisfactory system test at 0748. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were briefed on this occurrence and notified of system restoration by 1145. The plant continues to troubleshoot to determine the cause of the 'B' Repeater failure. In the interim, HNP is conducting frequent interrogation of the siren system to ensure that the system continues to function correctly. The system is now operating with the 'A' Repeater. The 'B' Repeater will be replaced as a part of the troubleshooting and repair plan. HNP is responding to local media inquiries. See directly related event EN # 42948 of 10/30/06 | |
| ENS 43617 | 6 September 2007 17:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communication to Harnett County Due to Damaged Phone Lines | At 1312 EDT, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) discovered that the Harnett County Warning Point could not be contacted while doing weekly communications drill in the Main Control Room. At 1345 Harnett County Warning Point was contacted using the Bell South phone line and Harnett County stated that the phone lines had been damaged and the Harnett County Warning Point could not receive or transmit communications from approximately 1100 to 1340 hours. HNP verified that communications are presently available for the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Only the Selective Signaling System to Harnett County remains inoperable and under investigation for repair. This requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. The licensee has a compensatory measure of communication via an alternate phone line to Harnett County. | |
| ENS 43676 | 29 September 2007 02:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of a Startup Transformer | On September 28, 2007, while reducing power for a planned refueling outage with the reactor at approximately 30 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. At 2232 a fault pressure trip signal was received on the A Startup Transformer (SUT), causing a loss of power to Aux Buses D, A & C electrical buses as well as the A-SA safety bus. The loss of A & C buses initiated the RCP underfrequency trip which tripped the Reactor and all three RCPs as designed. The A Diesel Generator automatically started and reenergized bus A-SA as designed. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected due to undervoltage on the A-SA safety bus and loss of the main feedwater pumps. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system temperature and pressure following the reactor trip. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using auxiliary feedwater. All emergency core cooling system equipment is available. The plant electrical system is being restored at this time. The A SUT remains out of service. The cause of the loss of power from A SUT is under investigation. This condition is being reported as an unplanned reactor protection system actuation and specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. The plant was in natural circulation for approximately 1 hour. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were manually isolated per procedure due to loss of EHC indication. Presently the B RCP has been restored to service, MSIVs are still closed, and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are feeding the Main Steam Generators. There are not any leaking steam generator tubes. The A EDG will be secured after backfeeding of the deenergized buses have been established. | 05000400/LER-2007-003 |
| ENS 43749 | 26 October 2007 15:49:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Press Release Issued Due to Train Derailment | Harris Nuclear Plant has issued a press release at 1149 EDT today related to the events previously reported to the NRC on 10/25/07. Plant operation has not been affected. The following is the content of the licensee's press release: Rail incident on Harris Plant property reported. The wheels of a caboose and part of an empty flatbed car came off the train tracks while accompanying a spent fuel shipping container on Harris Plant property. No injuries occurred and all rail cars remained upright and sustained no damage. The wheels of the rail car carrying the shipping container remained on the tracks, fully upright and fully intact the entire time. There was no damage or impact to the shipping container, and there was no danger to the health and safety of the plant or the public. The rail car was moved safely into its storage location and the shipping container was not affected. This occurred on Harris Plant property. According to procedure, the NRC and local law enforcement were immediately notified. Plant officials report that the rail cars came off the tracks when individuals inaccurately communicated about whether the tracks were prepared for the train's movement. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 43865 | 24 December 2007 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Telecommunications Capability Due to Damaged Fiber Optic Cable | At approximately 11:00 AM Eastern Standard Time, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) identified the inability for offsite agencies to contact the plant using the telecommunications systems. This condition was the result of a damaged fiber optics cable remote from the plant site. No information is available regarding the cause of the damaged cable. The ability for HNP to contact offsite agencies and HNP Emergency Response Organization was maintained at all times. Alternate methods to contact HNP were established for selected agencies. The telecommunication capabilities were restored at 2:11 PM Eastern Standard Time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 43906 | 15 January 2008 18:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Damaged Fiber Optic Cable Affected Communications | At approximately 1:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) identified the inability for the NRC to contact the plant using the telecommunications system. The dedicated phone line to the State and County Warning Points and Emergency Operating Centers was maintained and verified. This condition was the result of a damaged fiber optics cable remote from the plant site. The cable was damaged during construction in Apex, NC. The ability for HNP to contact offsite agencies and HNP Emergency Response Organization was maintained at all times. Alternate methods for the NRC to contact HNP were established at 2:45 PM. The telecommunication capabilities were restored at 3:04 PM Eastern Standard Time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 43984 | 30 January 2008 10:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of All 81 Offsite Sirens for Approximately 80 Minutes | On 1/30/08 at approximately 0617 Eastern Standard Time, while conducting a routine public warning siren interrogation test, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) determined that the offsite emergency sirens were not capable of being activated. Initial investigations revealed that HNP lost power to the sirens due to a failure of the control module in the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) of the siren system. At approximately 0644, an interrogation test of the system was completed and the sirens were verified to be operating normally. This event was initially viewed as not reportable. Subsequent investigation conducted between 1/31/08 and 2/13/08 revealed that other equipment supplied by the UPS was lost for between 70 and 80 minutes. As there is no direct monitoring capability for siren power supplies, it is reasonable to conclude that the sirens had been lost for a period of time between 70 and 80 minutes. This event should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) on 1/30/08. A completely new UPS system has been installed, and (the) siren systems are fully functional at this time. The UPS was replaced on 2/7/08. Its loss on 1/30/08 affected all 81 sirens. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. | |
| ENS 44404 | 11 August 2008 04:49:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Degrading Condenser Vacuum | At 0049 EDT on 8/11/2008, the Harris Nuclear Plant was manually scrammed from 21% power due to indications of degrading condenser vacuum. At the time, a reactor shutdown was in progress with indications of a degraded condenser boot seal. The unit was stabilized in Mode 3 with no additional equipment failures or other complications. The reactor is currently at normal operating pressure and temperature. The highest vacuum observed was 8". All rods inserted into the core after the manual trip. Auxiliary feed water did not start as a result of the trip. Steam generator level is being maintained via normal feed water flow path. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. No power-operated or manual reliefs lifted during the transient. The grid is stable and loads are being supplied via the station start-up transformer. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 44423 | 19 August 2008 13:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Rod Control System Malfunctioned | On August 19, 2008, with the Unit shut down in Mode 3, post maintenance testing was being performed for the Digital Rod Position Indication System. While performing this test, a 'Rod Control Urgent Failure' alarm was received upon initial withdrawal of Control Bank-C. All other control and shutdown banks remained fully inserted in the core. Local inspection revealed a phase failure on movable gripper coils in a power cabinet. In accordance with plant procedures, at 0905 hours, a manual reactor trip was initiated by operators opening the reactor trip breakers. All Safety Systems functioned as designed and Rod Control System repairs are in progress. This event posed no significant safety implications because the reactor was subcritical when the reactor trip breakers were opened. Compliance with all Technical Specification requirements was maintained. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
| ENS 44951 | 1 April 2009 18:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to State/Local Agencies Regarding Tritium Release Onsite | On April 1, 2009, the results of an ongoing hydrology study being conducted by Harris Nuclear Plant as part of the voluntary Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative revealed that a pipe leak in the buried Cooling Tower Blowdown line was releasing water containing tritium into surrounding soil. The maximum tritium activity level discovered was 2,120 pCi/L, well below maximum levels allowed by regulation. While the leak rate has not been determined, it appears to be small. The Cooling Tower Blowdown line is used for liquid effluent dilution as part of permitted, routine releases. The permitted liquid effluent release point is the discharge from the Cooling Tower Blowdown line into Harris Lake. This line is leaking upstream of the permitted release point. All leaking water is contained within the site boundary, and based on studies performed by an independent hydrologist, offsite migration is not anticipated. Immediate corrective actions include voluntary notifications, installation of additional monitoring wells at various locations to determine groundwater flow and to check for the presence of tritium. The water containing low levels of tritium is in a localized area immediately surrounding the Cooling Tower Blowdown line. The health and safety of the public are not affected by this event, as the activity levels discovered are significantly below maximum levels allowed by regulation. Harris Nuclear Plant is following the guidance contained in NEI 07-07 and has initiated this Event Notification as a result of our voluntary communication to State agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative. The licensee informed the State of North Carolina (Division of Radiation Protection and Department of Water Quality) and the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also inform local agencies. | |
| ENS 45499 | 16 November 2009 03:42:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Oil Leak | At 2242 (EST) on 11/15/09, the reactor was manually scrammed from 100% power due to a large oil leak on the main generator seal oil system. Condenser vacuum was broken immediately following the reactor trip, and the main turbine stopped rotating at 2324 (EST). Following the reactor trip, the 'B' steam generator Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) failed to fully close on demand, but was closed due to field actions at 2303 (EST). The reactor remained stable at NOP/NOT following the reactor trip. Offsite power remained available throughout the event. This condition is being reported as actuation of the reactor protection system in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). All control rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed through the S/G relief valves to the atmospheric dumps. No known primary to secondary leakage exists. The plant remains stable in Mode 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45625 | 10 January 2010 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Discovery of Tritium in Water Leakage Onsite | At 8:30 a.m. on January 10, 2010, an operator on regular rounds discovered the underground Waste Neutralization Basin Flash Mixer Return Pipe had developed a leak. The eight-inch fiberglass pipe carries secondary plant and water treatment building waste water for chemical processing. Approximately 1,000 gallons of water containing a low level of tritium (5,590 picocuries per liter) leaked into the surrounding soil. The EPA Drinking Water Standard is 20,000 picocuries per liter. Once the leak was discovered, the system was secured and the leak was isolated. Crews are repairing the pipe. The spill has been contained within the plant backfill and is unlikely to migrate off-site or reach the water table. The affected area is located within the plant's site boundary, approximately 15 feet west of the Water Treatment Building, and involves roughly 100 cubic feet of soil. Once repaired, the system will be tested and returned to service. Immediate remedial actions involving the affected area include: pumping the water from the saturated ground back into the waste neutralization basin, removal of the tritiated soil and sampling soil in the area for tritium analysis. The health and safety of the public are not affected by this event, based on the location of the leak and the low tritium levels. Harris Nuclear Plant is following the guidance in NEI 07-07 and has initiated this Event Notification as a result of our voluntary communication to State agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative. The licensee will be notifying North Carolina Divisions of Radiation Protection and Water Quality and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45838 | 16 February 2010 15:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Actuation of a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). On 2/16/10 at 1122 EST, following maintenance activities on 'B' Emergency Safeguards Sequencer, Clearance Order 213623, was in the process of being lifted when an automatic start of 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump occurred. Water flowed to all three Steam Generators resulting in an increase of reactor power by 0.1%. Isolation of Steam Generator Blowdown and Blowdown Sampling also occurred. The actuation occurred during work associated with replacement of relay 2-55/1163 which was installed incorrectly in the "B" Sequencer cabinet. At the time of the event, all Steam Generator levels were normal. No actual condition existed that would require an automatic start of the "B" MDAFW pump and therefore this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. All equipment operated properly. The 'B' MDAFW pump was secured by operations at 1123 EST. This invalid actuation was entered into the corrective action program as (Harris Nuclear Condition Report) NCR 381672. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal. The 'B' MDAFW pump started and operated normally and the 'A' MDAFW and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pumps were available. Immediate corrective actions were to secure the "B" MDAFW pump and restore Steam Generator Blowdown and Sampling. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46396 | 5 November 2010 05:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Valid Actuation of an Emergency Diesel Generator Following Inadvertent De-Energization of Safety Bus | This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), an event or condition that resulted in a valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems. At 0104 EDT on November 5, 2010, the plant was in Mode 5 Cold Shutdown in a refueling outage. Maintenance personnel were performing post maintenance testing on the main generator relay panel when the 'B-SB' Safety Bus was inadvertently de-energized, resulting in automatic starting of the 'B-SB' Emergency Diesel Generator. Safety systems responded as expected during the event, and the 'A-SA' Emergency Bus remained operable with power available from both offsite power and the 'A-SA' Emergency Diesel Generator throughout the event. The 'B-SB' Safety Bus was powering shutdown cooling, which was restored using 'B-SB' Residual Heat Removal system at 0107 EDT with the 'B-SB' Emergency Diesel Generator supplying the bus. The testing procedure was not intended to result in the safety bus being de-energized nor automatic start of the Emergency Diesel Generator. Although the specific cause of the safety bus being de-energized is not known at the present time, it appears that it was directly related to the testing being performed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The 'B-SB' Safety Bus has been returned to its normal offsite power source and the 'B-SB' Emergency Diesel Generator secured and returned to standby status. | |
| ENS 46435 | 10 November 2010 05:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Telephone Notification in Lieu of Written Ler - Invalid Actuation of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | Event: Invalid actuation of the 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump. Report Type: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). Description: On November 10, 2010, the 'A' Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) was started per plant operating procedures. When the 'A' MFP was started, there was a partial activation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System with the start of the 'B' MDAFW. The plant was in Mode 3 after completing refueling outage 16 during this event. Actual plant conditions and parameters did not exist that required an automatic start of the 'B' MDAFW pump. Therefore, this actuation is classified as invalid. The system started and functioned successfully. This invalid actuation was entered into the corrective action program as NCR-432566. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46467 | 28 October 2010 20:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Actuation of the "B" Emergency Service Water (Esw) Pump | Text provided by the licensee. Quotations omitted for readability. Report Type: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). Description: On October 28, 2010, during the performance of MST I0073, "Train 'B' 18 Month Manual Reactor Trip, Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic & Master Relay Test", two sequential errors resulted in the inappropriate activation of the 'B' ESW pump. During night shift on October 27/28th, the Master Relay Selector Switch was not returned to the required OFF position. This caused day shift to find one of the two general warning lights to be lit. During the troubleshooting for the light, a technician discovered the Master Relay Selector Switch out of the expected OFF position as required by the procedure. A technician moved the switch to the OFF position outside of procedural guidance, resulting in the partial activation of the Reactor Protection System, including the 'B' ESW pump. The plant was in Mode 6 due to refueling outage 16 during the event. Actual plant conditions and parameters did not exist that required an automatic start of the 'B' ESW Pump. Therefore, this actuation is classified as invalid. The system started and functioned successfully. This invalid actuation was entered into the corrective action program as NCR 430289. Cause: Poor performance of task by the individual. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47139 | 10 August 2011 11:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens Out of Service Due to a Communication Problem | At approximately 0730 (EDT) on 8/9/11 a siren system communication problem was discovered by Emergency Preparedness personnel at the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP). Telecommunications was contacted to troubleshoot the problem and at approximately 0820 (EDT) the communications system was restored. A previously scheduled quarterly growl test was conducted with 83 sirens performing satisfactorily. Upon further investigation, it was determined that there were communication failures recorded during the 0600 (EDT) report. 20 of the 83 sirens were impacted by the communications errors. The previous 0000 (EDT) report indicated no communications errors. Investigation is continuing as to the ability of the sirens to be activated during the period the errors were received. It is likely that the ability to activate the sirens had been lost, therefore, this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The cause of the communication errors are believed to be due to radiofrequency disturbances however the investigation is ongoing. In the event that the sirens had been needed, the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would have implemented mobile route alerting, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47171 | 21 June 2011 17:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of Invalid Specified System Actuation | Invalid Actuation of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump. This telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). On 6/21/11 at 1308 EDT, during maintenance activities for replacement of relay UVTXSB/1732, associated with 6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB undervoltage trip circuitry, an automatic start of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump occurred while using a new procedure, CM-E0032. At the time of the event, all steam generator levels were normal. The TDAFW pump was secured by Operations on 6/21/11 at 1311 EDT. No actual condition existed that would require an automatic start of the TDAFW pump and therefore this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. The start of the TDAFW is considered a complete train actuation. The system started and functioned successfully. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47193 | 23 August 2011 18:06:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Notification of an Unusual Event Due to a Seismic Event | The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) under EAL HU1.1 based on an earthquake felt at the plant with confirmation by the National Earthquake Center. They have made state and local notifications and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee has terminated from the NOUE at 1757 EDT. The termination basis was that no safety equipment was impacted by the earthquake and walkdowns of plant safety equipment was complete. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities Notified R2 IRC (Franke), IRD (Gott), DHS (Bean), FEMA (Via), USDA (Kraus), and DOE (Turner). | |
| ENS 47655 | 9 February 2012 22:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Potential Degradation of Technical Support Center Habitability | The dose calculation of record documents is that the assumed inleakage to the technical support center (TSC) is 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM), The calculation does not provide a documented validation of why the 60 CFM value is conservative and acceptable. Engineering judgment supports the likely validity of the 60 CFM value. However, if the inleakage value is not valid by a sufficient margin, the TSC would not meet the habitability design basis requirements. This report is submitted based upon a potential loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or off site communications capability in accordance � 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Existing procedures require monitoring habitability of the TSC and taking action in the event radiological conditions preclude occupancy. The on-duty TSC Site Emergency Coordinator, TSC Radiological Control Director, and Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Response Manager have been informed of the condition and the protocol for utilization of alternate facilities. A walkthrough of the process will be held for others holding those positions in a timely manner. The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | |
| ENS 47729 | 9 March 2012 19:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Failure of a Technical Support Center Air Handling Unit | At approximately 14:00 on March 9, 2012, with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 100% power in mode 1, Air Handler 17 was discovered not operating. Air Handler 17 provides ventilation supporting environmental habitability to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to keep ambient temperatures comfortable for personnel and to ensure communications and assessment equipment remain functional. This degrades the heating and cooling capacity of the TSC by approximately a third. Due to the cool weather in the forecast, the remaining cooling systems will be operating more efficiently than they would in the hot summer months, which mitigates the impact of the degraded ventilation system. The system will be repaired expeditiously. The cause of the equipment failure is not yet known but will be investigated in the site corrective action program. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The plant continues to operate at 100%. Other equipment functioned as expected. The on call Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator (TSC) have been notified and the alternate TSC is available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47736 | 13 March 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Operations Facility Planned Maintenance | At approximately 0800 EDT on March 13, 2012, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for charcoal sampling and filter testing. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require activation of the EOF, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Maintenance was completed and the system tested operable at 1645 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie). | |
| ENS 47740 | 14 March 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Planned Maintenance | At approximately 0800 EDT on March 14, 2012, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for door seal replacement, ventilation shaft seal and belt replacement. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require activation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was completed at 1730 EDT. The TSC is now fully functional. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
At approximately 0800 on March 14, 2012 preplanned maintenance will be performed on the TSC ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for door seal inspections and ventilation fan belt inspections. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require evacuation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plant has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity reflects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
At approximately 1630 on March 15, 2012, all scheduled maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been restored to a fully functional status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie). | |
| ENS 47775 | 27 March 2012 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Historical Unavailability of Emergency Operations Facility Ventilation Due to Maintenance | During a review of past maintenance that was performed on the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation system, it was identified that there were three periods of time when the maintenance would have impacted the functionality of the facility and the ventilation system would not be able to be restored promptly. Site reporting guidance has been revised to assure accurate reporting. The periods of time where maintenance impacted the functionality of the EOF are as follows: 1. April 30 to May 1, 2009 for approximately 36 hours due to condenser and air handler replacement. 2. January 14 to 18, 2010 for approximately 96 hours due to damper and ductwork replacement. 3. November 17 to 19, 2010 for approximately 72 hours due to a compressor failure. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the work activities affected an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
On several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation systems were in a degraded state and/or removed from service, for extended periods of time. There were no actual emergencies that occurred during those periods that required activation of the EOF. A calculation indicated that with the degraded air conditioning system during summer conditions, the temperature in the EOF could reach 87 degrees F. While there is no specific temperature limit for EOF habitability, an elevated temperature is of concern when emergency response organization members are under potential stress, as in emergency response situations. On January 25, 2010, Harris staff found a damper in the ventilation system stuck in the nearly closed condition. The damper was reopened on the day it was discovered. A calculation indicated that with the ventilation system in the normal mode and the damper stuck, the carbon dioxide concentration in the EOF could have exceeded 0.5%. The elevated carbon dioxide concentration due to the stuck damper, combined with the stress associated with an actual emergency in a facility and temperatures of 87 degrees, had the potential to impair a key responder's ability to perform an assigned emergency response function. The licensee has informed the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser). | |
| ENS 47838 | 16 April 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance on the Technical Support Center Normal Power Supply | At approximately 0800 (EDT) on April 16, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) normal power feed will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance. The maintenance will consist of first switching the TSC to the TSC backup power supply. The normal supply will be disconnected and replaced with another offsite power source which is independent of the Harris switchyard. This power arrangement will remain in place while maintenance is performed on the TSC normal power supply and is expected to last approximately two months. A backup diesel generator is stationed near the TSC which can be connected if necessary during an emergency. An update will be provided when the TSC normal power supply has been returned to its normal alignment This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | |
| ENS 47840 | 16 April 2012 13:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unavailability of Technical Support Center Radiation Monitor | At 0932 EDT on April 16, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) normal power feed was removed from service for scheduled maintenance. Upon restoration of power to the TSC, it was identified that the TSC radiation monitor (RM-3653C) did not return to service as expected. Following discovery, Radiation Protection technicians were dispatched to investigate the cause of RM-3653C not operating properly. At 1627 EDT, the TSC radiation monitor has been returned to service and is operable. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG�1022, Rev. 2 due to the loss of the TSC radiation monitor. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed The cause of the radiation monitor failure was related to a dead back-up battery which did not allow the radiation monitor to properly re-boot after power was restored. | |
| ENS 47843 | 17 April 2012 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Had Only One Power Source During Preplanned Maintenance | On April 16, 2012, at 0738 hours, the Harris Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center (i.e., Event Number 47838) of preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) normal power supply. Following completion of the power transfer, it was discovered that in the current alignment, the TSC is only powered from one power source, which is the backup power supply. A backup diesel generator is stationed near the TSC which can be connected if necessary during an emergency. Activities are in progress to modify the existing procedure to allow the TSC to be connected to the offsite power source which will restore two sources of power to the TSC. This normal power arrangement is expected to remain in place while maintenance is performed on the TSC normal power supply for approximately two months. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. This report was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
On April 19, 2012, the power configuration was revised to restore the availability of two sources of power to the TSC. An extent of condition review identified two similar conditions in 2009 and 2010 where the TSC had only one source of power for approximately two months each time. The backup diesel generator described in the initial report was not available during these two periods; providing an alternate power source in the event it was needed would have required lifting a clearance and closing a breaker. These conditions might be of generic interest or concern and are therefore provided as a follow-up report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer). | |
| ENS 47855 | 19 April 2012 21:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Ventilation Inoperable | At approximately 1724 EDT on April 19, 2012 with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 90% power in mode 1, Air Handler 17 was discovered not operating. Air Handler 17 provides ventilation supporting environmental habitability to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to keep ambient temperatures habitable for personnel and to ensure communications and assessment equipment remains functional. This degrades the heating and cooling capacity of the TSC by approximately one third. Due to the cool weather in the forecast, the remaining cooling systems will be operating more efficiently than they would in the hot summer months, which mitigates the impact of the degraded ventilation system. The system has been repaired as of 1950 EDT on April 19, 2012. The cause of the equipment failure was a broken belt and a condition report has been entered into the site's corrective action program. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The plant continues to operate at 90%. Other equipment functioned as expected. The on call Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator (TSC) have been notified and the alternate TSC is available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47857 | 21 April 2012 09:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Main Steam Isolation Valves Fail to Shut | At approximately 0515 EDT on April 21, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) was in the process of a normal plant shutdown for a refueling outage. HNP was at 0% power in Mode 4. During OST-1046, MSIV Operability Test, 'B' and 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV), failed to close from the main control board. At 0648 EDT an April 21, 2012 'B' MSIV shut immediately after the instrument air supply was isolated. At 0938 EDT an April 21, 2012 'C' MSIV shut after the instrument air supply was isolated. The cause of the equipment failure is not yet known but is currently being investigated. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C), inability to isolate and mitigate a radioactive release, and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The plant continues to remain shutdown at 0% power. Other equipment functioned as expected including the turbine isolation valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Investigation into the condition revealed the instrument air supply to the MSIVs was isolated at 0530 EDT and 'B' MSIV indicated (drifted) shut at 0607 EDT. The plant is currently in Mode 6, Refueling, and the investigation is ongoing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser). | |
| ENS 47894 | 3 May 2012 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Preplanned Maintenance on Tsc Ventilation System | At approximately 0830 EDT on 5/3/12, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for TSC Fan OA-2 for a motor replacement. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 8 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require evacuation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Maintenance work has been completed and the TSC is considered operable as of 1713 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour). | |
| ENS 47904 | 7 May 2012 12:47:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Violation of Fitness for Duty Program | A non-licensed contractor employee supervisor was found in violation of the Fitness for Duty Program. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. | |
| ENS 47973 | 21 September 2011 15:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Inoperable | On Sept. 20, 2011, with the reactor at 100% power in mode 1, a scheduled test of the technical support center ventilation system revealed that the adsorber stage leak test did not meet acceptance criteria. The system was returned to service on Sept. 21, 2011, following corrective maintenance and a satisfactory test. It was not recognized at the time that the condition met 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) reporting criteria for the emergency filtration function. The system was returned to service within approximately 30 hours of discovery. Investigation of Condition Report 526951 in the Harris Corrective Action Program determined that this event should have been reported upon discovery. The NRC Resident Inspector has been Informed. | |
| ENS 47984 | 1 June 2012 03:37:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), Transport of a Contaminated Person Offsite | Transport of Potentially Contaminated Person Offsite | At 11:11 PM on May 31, 2012, the Harris main control room was notified that a contract employee in a radiation controlled area was in need of medical assistance. The individual was transported by ambulance to the hospital, accompanied by Harris radiation protection personnel. The individual was considered potentially contaminated because a complete survey to confirm the absence of contamination was not completed prior to transport of the person off site for medical treatment. The individual and the ambulance used to transport the individual were surveyed and released after arrival at the hospital. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47985 | 1 June 2012 16:47:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Due to a Bomb Threat | Two individuals (one male and one female) drove up to the site security gate and stated they had a bomb in the vehicle (Jeep Cherokee). LLEA was notified and responded to the site. The two individuals are in custody and the Raleigh Police bomb squad is enroute to the site. The site is in a heightened level of security. Notified DHS, NICC, and FEMA.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 1530 EDT on 6/1/2012. The vehicle search did not find a bomb and the two individuals are in custody. Notified the R2DO (Vias), NRR EO (Chernoff), DHS, NICC, and FEMA. | |
| ENS 48127 | 24 July 2012 09:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service | At approximately 0555 (EDT) on 07/24/2012, the AH-17 TSC Cooling Fan was found with the cooling system not fully working. The fan is running, but the condensing compressor is not. Repairs are being planned and will be worked immediately. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Revision 2. The on call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The Alternate TSC is available per plant procedure, if required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
TSC cooling system repairs have been completed and the system has been returned to normal. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Franke). | |
| ENS 48149 | 1 August 2012 16:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Inoperable Due to Non-Functional Ventilation Support System | At 1212 EDT on August 1, 2012, Harris Operations discovered that cooling function was degraded on Technical Support Center (TSC) air handler 17. The TSC has three air handlers that provide the ventilation function, and the other two are operating with no known problems. Air Handler 17 has been removed from service and troubleshooting is in progress. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the Technical Support Center ventilation support system being potentially non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The Alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | |
| ENS 48250 | 29 August 2012 12:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Limited Range on Indicator | ||
| ENS 48373 | 4 October 2012 12:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Repairs | At approximately 0802 EDT on 10/04/2012, (Air Handler) AH-17, TSC Cooling Fan, was discovered not running. The fan belt for AH-17 TSC was found broken. AH-17 TSC belt has been replaced; it is expected to be placed back in service by 1200 (EDT), 10/04/2012 and after verification of proper operation will be declared operable. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. In addition, at approximately 0900 EDT, on October 4, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance on TSC outside air fan OA-2 (belt replacement). The fan was out of service for greater than one hour for this activity then returned to service for an 8 to 24 hour run in period for the new belts. After the run in period, the TSC outside air fan and AH-17 TSC will be taken out of service again for greater than one hour for belt adjustment. Following the belt adjustment, the fans will be returned to service and TSC ventilation will be declared operable. Compensatory actions are in place for periodic monitoring of TSC temperatures and the two other TSC HVAC units which are operating satisfactorily. The assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the TSC ventilation system is non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 48381 | 5 October 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Facility Information System Due to Planned Modification | At approximately 0800 EDT, on October 5, 2012, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) will be removed from service to perform a planned modification for the improvement of site wide data communications between various plant process computing platforms. The expected duration of ERFIS non-functionality should not exceed 24 hours and during this time would not be able to be restored within one hour. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above described functions. Therefore, assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS computer system is non-functional. The on call Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the ERFIS outage. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 48396 | 9 October 2012 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Potential Fitness for Duty Violation | A non-licensed employee supervisor was administered a for-cause chemical test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |