ML17332A717

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Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Modify TS 3.9.4 to Provide Flexibility in Operation of Containment Personnel Airlocks During Core Alterations
ML17332A717
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 03/31/1995
From: FITZPATRICK E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17332A718 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1220, NUDOCS 9504060190
Download: ML17332A717 (16)


Text

PR.IC)R.I"EV1ACCELERATED RIDSPROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9504060190, DOC.DATE:

95/03/31NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKETgFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316, AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74.Amends wouldmodifyTS3.9.4toprovideflexibility inoperation ofcontainment personnel.

airlocksduringcorealterations.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:.LTR tENCLJSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAHICKMAN,J INTERNAL:

LECENTE01NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2'XTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111110RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDP NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELI!vIINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS'YOU DON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR13ENCL12 R

IndianaMichiganPowerCompany'P.O.Box16631Columbus, OH43216FIMarch31,1995AEP:NRC'1220 DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2PROPOSEDAMENDMENT TOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION3/4.9.4FORCONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCKREQUIREMENTS Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication for,amendment tothetechnical specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, weareproposing tomodifyT/Ss3.9.4entitledRefueling Operations,.

Containment BuildingPenetrations, toprovideflexibility intheoperation ofthecontainment personnel airlocksduringCOREALTERATIONS byexpanding theexistinglimitingcondition foroperation toincludetheestablishment ofcontainment closurecapability requirements.

Thisproposedamendment isconsistent withAmendments 194(DPR-53)and171(DPR-69)approvedforuseattheCalvertCliffsNuclearPowerPlantintheNRC'stransmittal ofAugust31,1994.TheCalvertCliffsamendment allowsthepersonnel airlockdoorstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONS providedcertainadministrative controlsareinplace.Attachment 1providesadetaileddescription oftheproposedchanges,thejustification forthechanges,andourdetermination ofnosignificant hazardsconsideration performed pursuantto10CFR50.92.Attachment 2containstheexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttheproposedchanges.Attachment 3containstheproposedT/Spages.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

I.GC03>95040601'PO 950331PDRADOCK05000315~,.P'PDR

U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC'1220 TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.

Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(l),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.Sincerely, qg'E9r(~E.E.Fitzpatrick VicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS8/n/DAYOF~A1995No,aryPubiicMyCommission Expires:-M-5'5'hAttachments CC:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett

'I ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1220 DESCRIPTION ANDJUSTIFICATION OFCHANGES10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

~~E, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page1I.DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESTheproposedamendment totechnical specification (T/S)3.9.4makesthefollowing specificchangestotheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2T/Ss:S394A.ExpandLimitingCondition ForOperation 3.9.4,item"b"(page3/49-4)toincludetheabilitytoleavebothpersonnel airlockdoorsinthe"open"positionduringCOREALTERATIONS.

Asaresult,closurecapability ofthecontainment airlockdoorswillbeassuredinoneoftwoways;1)oneairlockdoorwillbemaintained closedduringCOREALTERATIONS, or2)bothairlocksmayremainopenprovidedcertainrestrictions aresatisfied including thepositioning ofdedicated personnel attheairlocktofacilitate closure.,

B.Afootnotehasalsobeenaddedtodefinewhatconstitutes anOPERABLEairlockdoorwhenimplementing the"bothairlockdoorsopen"optionofthespecification.

C.RevisetheBasesforspecification 3/4.9.4(pageB3/49-1)toincludetherestrictions associated withthe"bothairlockdoorsopen"option.II.JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGESTechnical specification 3.9.4requiresthataminimumofonepersonnel airlockdoor,aswellasothercontainment penetrations beclosedduringCOREALTERATIONS andmovementofirradiated fuelwithinthecontainment.

Althoughthepresenttechnical specification requiresaminimumofoneairlockdoortobeclosedduringrefueling, theUFSARanalysisofaradioactive releaseresulting fromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment, takesnocreditforcontainment isolation.

Duringarefueling outage,otherworkinthecontainment doesnotstopduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.

Thisrequiresthatpersonnel operatetheairlockdoorstoenterandexitthecontainment.

Studiesofairlockdooroperation andmaintenance atCookNuclearPlanthaveidentified thefollowing trends.Airlockusage,duringthe1994refueling outage,fortheperiodsboundingCOREALTERATIONS (Sept.16th-20thandOct.18th-25th)totalled10,200entriesandexits.Assumingfourtofiveindividuals enteredthecontainment perairlockcycle,theaveragenumberofairlockcyclesduringCOREALTERATIONS isconservatively estimated tobegreaterthan200perday.Suchheavyuseoftheairlockdoorswasnotanticipated duringitsdesign.Asaresultofthisunexpectedly heavyuse,failuresofthedoorhavemanifested themselves as Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page2problemsinthegearandinterlock alignments ofthedoorslockingmechanism andhandwheel failures.

Inadditiontothewearandmaintenance concernsdescribed above,theCalvertCliffssubmittal raisedconcernsregarding workersafetyandthepractical realityoftheairlock's abilitytopreventthereleaseofradioactive materialfollowing afuelhandlingaccident.

CalvertCliffsprovidedthefollowing argumentwhichwebelievetobeaccurate, realistic andapplicable toCookNuclearPlant:"Therearealargenumberofpeopleinthecontainment duringarefueling outage,evenduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.

Shouldafuelhandlingaccidentoccur,itwouldtakeanumberofcyclesoftheairlocktoevacuatepersonnel fromcontainment.

Witheachairlockcycle,morecontainment airwouldbereleased.

Whilewaitingfortheirturntoexit,the"workerswouldbeexposedtothereleasedactivity."

Toaddressthepotential forworkerexposureandtoincreasetheavailability/maintainability ofthepersonnel airlockdooratCookNuclearPlant,weproposetoallowbothairlockstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONS providedthefollowing administrative controlsareestablished.

Theairlockdoorsshallbecontrolled inthefollowing manner:1.aminimumofonedoorineachairlockisclosed,or2.bothairlockdoorsmaybeopenprovided:

a.onedoorineachairlockisOPERABLE, b.refueling cavitylevelisgreaterthan23feet,andc.adesignated individual isavailable atalltimestoclosetheairlockifrequired.

Whenconsidering theproposedamendment, thedoseconsequences ofafuelhandlingaccidentwerereviewed.

Twocasesarediscussed intheUFSAR,oneforafuelhandlingaccidentintheauxiliary

building, theotherforasimilaraccidentinsidecontainment.

Thedesignbasisaccidentisthecompleteruptureofthehighestratedspentfuelassembly.

Whenconsidering thetwoaccidentanalysesthecontainment eventwasconsidered toprovidetheboundingconditions.

Thiswasbasedonthefactthatnoreduction inthepotential thyroiddoeswasassumedsincecharcoalfiltration wasnotconsidered andnocreditwastakenforcontainment isolation.

Theaccidentinsidecontainment (assuming 3588MWTpoweroperation) gave

Attachment 1to,AEP:NRC:1220 Page3a0-2hoursiteboundarythyroiddoseofapproximately 100rem,andawholebodydoseof1.4rem.Bothofthesevaluesremainsignificantly belowthe300remthyroidand25remwholebodylimitsestablished in10CFR100.Basedonthesefindings, itwasdetermined thatallowingbothairlockdoorstoremainopenduringCOREALTERATIONS wouldnotincreasetheanalyzedsiteboundarydoseresulting fromafuelhandlingaccident.

Comparedtotheanalyzedcase,thedoseconsequences ofareleasethroughanopenairlockmayevenbereducedbecauseofretention timeintheauxiliary buildingandthepossibility offiltration throughtheauxiliary buildingventilation system.III.0CFR5092CRITERIAPer10CFR50.92,aproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration ifthechangedoesnot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thedesignbasisfuelhandlingaccidentistheruptureofthehighestratedfuelassembly.

Asdiscussed previously, theconsequences ofanaccidentinsidecontainment (i.e.,siteboundarydose),withbothairlockdoorsareboundedbytheexistingfuelhandlingaccidentcurrently presented inourUFSAR.Sincethecontainment airlockdoorsdonotaffectthefailuremechanism ofafuelassemblyduringafuelhandlingaccident, webelievethatthisamendment requestdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Additionally, nocreditwastakenforcontainment closureintheaccidentanalysis.

Therefore, basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page4Criterion 2Asstatedinresponsetocriterion one,thepositionofthecontainment airlockdoorsinnowayaffectsthemechanism bywhichaspentfuelassemblyisdamagedduringafuelhandlingaccident.

Thus,itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Criterion 3Themarginforsafetyasdefinedin10CFR100hasnotbeenreduced.Asdiscussed previously, theexistingfuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforaneventinsidecontainment takesnocreditfortheisolation ofcontainment.

Asaresult,thepositionoftheairlockdoorshasnoimpactontheanalyzedsiteboundarydosesresulting fromsuchanaccident.

Basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:1220 EXISTINGTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGESMA%MDTOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGES e1~~