ML17334B343
| ML17334B343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1990 |
| From: | ALEXICH M P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | MURLEY T E NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A555 | List: |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC:1120, NUDOCS 9002070466 | |
| Download: ML17334B343 (14) | |
Text
ACCELERATEDDUTIONDEMONATIONSYSlHMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9002070466DOC.DATE:90/01/31NOTARIZED:NO'OCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONALEXICH,M.P.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONMURLEY,T.E.DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
SUBJECT:
ApplicationforamendtoLicenseDPR-58,changingTechSpec3/4.7.1.5.l.b,"SteamGeneratorStopValves."DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTESRI.D'S/RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LAGIITTER,J.INTERNAL:NRR/DET/ECMB9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS1RES/DSIR/EIBEXTERNAL:LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL11551111111110111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB11NRR/DST/SELB8DNRR/DST/SRXB8EOCQ~QCBREGFILENRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'011'1DDS',I,NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS'}CONTACTTHE,DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEEDtTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR21,ENCL19D
~~I indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus,OH432168AEP:NRC:1120DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58EXPEDITEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGEREQUESTSTEAMGENERATORSTOPVALVESU.STNuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyJanuary31,1990
DearDr.Murley:
Thisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforanexpeditedtechnicalspecification(T/S)changeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1,Specifically,weproposetochangeT/S3/4,7.1.5.1.b,"SteamGeneratorStopValves,"suchthatfullvalveclosureiswithin8secondsonany-closureactuationsignal.ThereasonsforthechangeandourevaluationconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderationareprovidedinAttachment1.TheproposedrevisedT/SpagesareincludedinAttachment2.Attachment3andAttachment4containtheanalysisofmainsteamlinebreakinsidecontainmentandofsteamlinebreakcoreresponse,whichwerenotpreviouslyprovidedtotheNRC.(ThesteamlinebreakinsidecontainmentattachmentwillalsobesubmittedwiththeUnit2fuelreloadsubmittal.)ThisletteralsoproposeschangestoT/STable3.3-55.h,6.h,and7.c.Thesearethesteamlineisolationresponsetimesrequiredfortheaccidentanalyses.Webelievethattheproposedchangewillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.ThechangehasbeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyDesignReviewCommitteeatitsnextregularlyscheduledmeeting.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtoMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.>002070%66900lslPDRADGCK05000315PDC.
Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1120ThisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowingCorporateproceduresthatincorporateareasonablesetofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompletenesspriortosignatureoftheundersigned.Sincerely,M.P.AlexichVicePresidentldpAttachmentscc:D.H.Williams,Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNFEMSectionChiefA.B,Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector-Bridgman ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1120REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS9002070466 Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page1IntroductionTheprimarypurposeofthesteamgeneratorstopvalves(mainsteamisolationvalve[MSIVs])istopreventexcessiveblowdownofthesteamgenerators.Therearefourtechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1associatedwiththeclosuretimeoftheMSIVs.T/S4.7.1.5.brequiresthateachMSIVbedemonstratedoperablebyverifyingfullclosurewithinfivesecondsonanyclosureactuationsignalwhileinhotstandbywithTavggreaterthanorequalto541Fduringeachreactorshutdownexcept0thatverificationoffullclosurewithinfivesecondsneednotbedeterminedmoreoftenthanonceper92days.ThethieeotherT/SsarethesteamlineisolationresponsetimerequirementslistedinT/S3.3'.1Table3.3-5"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesResponseTimes."Thesearelistedbelow.Item5.hSteamlineisolationresultingfromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincidentwithTavg--low-low(lessthanorequalto10.0seconds)Item6.hSteamlineisolationresultingfromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincidentwithsteamlinepressure-low(lessthanorequalto8.0seconds)Item7.cSteamlineisolationresultingfromcontainmentpressure--high-high(lessthanorequalto7.0seconds)EvaluationTheCookNuclearPlantsafetyanalysesthatassumeactuationoftheMSIVsandsteamlineisolationincludethefollowingevents:,steamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrityanalysis,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforoutsidecontainmentequipmentqualificationanalysis,steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR),andlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheLOCAanalysesdonotassumeactuationtimesfortheMSIVs,butconservativelyassumesteamlineisolationoccursatreactortrip.Theothersafetyanalyseslistedaboveassumeanoverallengineeredsafetyfeatures(ESF)responsetimeforsteamlineisolationfromthetimethattheisolationsetpointisreached
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page2SteamLineBreakCoreResonseTheUnit1licensingbasisanalysisperformedforthereducedtemperatureandpressureprogramassumedanESFresponsetimewhichincludesanadditionalthreesecondsforsteamlineisolationwithrespecttotheT/Srequirements.Thus,athree-secondincreaseintheT/SMSIVclosuretimeandsteamlineisolationESFresponsetimesissupportedbytheanalysis.ThisanalysiswassubmittedinAEP:NRC:1067andapprovedbytheNRCbySERdatedJune9,1989.AlthoughtheWCAP-11902analysisspecifiedthataMSIVclosuretimeofsevensecondswasassumed,Westinghousehasdocumentedthataneight-secondMSIVclosuretimeissupported.Theeight-secondMSIVclosuretimerepresentsanincreaseofthreesecondsfromthecurrentT/Slimitoffiveseconds.Assuch,theWCAP-11902steamlinebreakcoreresponseanalysissupportsarelaxationoftheMSIVclosuretimerequirement.ThisdocumentationiscontainedasAttachment4ofthisletter.SteamLineBreakMEReleasesInsideContainmentAnanalysishasrecentlybeenperformedtosupporttheproposedtransitiontoWestinghouse17x17V-5fuelforUnit2whichincludesanadditionalthreesecondsforsteamlineisolationwithrespecttotheT/Srequirements(WCAP-11902,Supplement1,containedasAttachment3tothisletter).Thisanalysisbounds'bothUnits1and2andisapplicableforbothV-5andANFfueltypes,includingafullcoreofANFfuel,aslongastheT/Slimitsoncoreparameterassumptions(e.g.,moderatorcoefficient)aremet.Thus,themass/energyreleaseinputtothecontainmentresponseanalysisremainsvalidandathree-secondincreaseintheT/SMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationESFresponsetimesissupportedbytheanalysis.SteamLineBreakMEReleasesOutsideContainmentThecurrentlicensingbasismass/energyreleasedataforuseinoutsidecontainmentequipmentqualificationfortheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2areprovidedinWCAP-10961.Units1and2arecoveredbytheWCAPCategory3andCategory1analysesrespectively.Themass/energyreleasecalculationsassumedanESFresponsetimeforsteamlineisolationconsistentwiththeT/Srequirements.OurcurrentequipmentqualificationanalysiswassuppliedbyImpell,(AEP:NRC:0775AJ).Theeffectofincreasingthesteamlineisolationtimeistoslightlyincreasethesteamflowatanygiventimefollowingisolationwhileslightlydelayingtheonsetofsuperheatedsteamreleases.AllcasesanalyzedintheWCAPwouldbeexpectedtobesimilarlyaffectedbythissmalladditionaldelay.TheWCAPCategory1cases1,16and59,alllargebreakcases(4.6ft),were Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page3identifiedaslimitingbyImpellandusedtoboundbothUnits1and2.TheselimitingcaseswerereanalyzedbyWestinghouseassuminganoverallsteamlineisolationtimewhichincludesanadditionalthreesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements.AEPSCevaluatedtheeffectsofthismassandenergyreleaseratechangeonthesteamenclosuretemperaturesandconcludedthattheinstrumentsremainedinsidetheiranalyzedlimits.TheeffectoflongerMSIVclosuretimesimplyshiftsthetemperaturepeakslightlyoutwardintime,butdoesnotincreaseitsseverity.Therefore,theincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting.SteamGeneratorTubeRutureTheSGTRaccidentanalysisforCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2wasreviewedtodeterminetheimpactofanincreaseintheMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimesbythreeseconds.IntheSGTRanalysis,theprimary-to-secondarybreakflowwasassumedtobeterminatedat30minutesafteraccidentinitiation,buttheoperatoractionstoterminatethebreakflowwerenotexplicitlymodeledintheanalysis.Theoperatoractionsincludeisolationoftherupturedsteamgenerator,whichrequirestheclosureoftherupturedsteamgeneratorMSIV.SinceMSIVclosureisnotexplicitlymodeledintheanalysisandanadditionalthreesecondstoclosetherupturedsteamgeneratorMSIVisrelativelyshortcomparedtotheassumedtotalrecoverytimeof1800seconds,itisconcludedthattheincreasedtimeforMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationwillnotaffecttheconclusionsoftheFSARSGTRanalysisnortheconclusionsoftherecentanalysescompletedforupratedpowerplusrevisedtemperatureandpressureoperation.AreviewwasperformedbyAEPSCoftheoff-siteradiologicaldoseconsequencesofaddingthreesecondstothesteamgeneratorstopvalveclosuretime.Theadditionalthreesecondswouldresultinanin]ectionof210poundsofadditionalreactorcoolanttoaninitialtotalmassofreactorcoolantof125,000poundsassumedintheFSARforaSGTR.Thiscorrespondstoafractionalincreaseof0.00168forthetotalreactorcoolantmasstransferredtothesteamgenerator.Withtheoff-sitedosesbeingproportionaltotheamountofactivityreleased,andassumingthatallofthereactorcoolanttransferredtotherupturedsteamgeneratorisreleased,theoff-sitedoseswouldalsoincreaseby0.00168.Thisminutefractionalincreaseintheoff-sitedosescannotbedifferentiatedfromthegraphsofthedoseconsequencesforaSGTRaccident.Basedonthisreview,ithasbeenconcludedthattheadditionalthreesecondsdonotimpacttheFSARenvironmentalconsequencesofaSGTR, Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page4SmallandLareBreakLOCAThesmallbreakandlargebreakloss-of-coolant:(SBLOCAandLBLOCArespectively)analysesarenotadverselyaffectedbyincreasedMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimes.TheSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalysesassumethatsteamgeneratorisolationoccursimmediatelyafterthereactortriplowpressurizerpressuresetpointisreached.Byisolatingthesteamgeneratorsatthetimeofreactortrip,thestoredenergyinthesecondaryisconservativelygreaterthanwhatwouldexistiftheanalysesmodelledalatersteamgeneratorisolation.FortheSBLOCAanalysis,thehigherenergyinthesecondaryisconservativesincetheprimary-to-secondaryheattransferrateisreduced.IntheLBLOCAanalysis,theearliersteamgeneratorisolationtimeincreasesthesecondary-to-primaryheattransfer,whichisconservative.Therefore,anincreaseinMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimesbythreesecondsdoesnothaveanimpactonSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalyses.LOCABlowdownForcesHotLeSwitchovertoPrecludeBoronPreciitationPost-LOCALon-TermCoreCoolinSubcriticalitandPose-LOCALon-TermCoreCoolinMinimumFlowReactorvesselandloopLOCAblowdownforces,hotlegswitchovertoprecludeboronprecipitation,post-LOCAlong-termcorecoolingsubcriticality,andpost-LOCAlong-termcorecoolingminimumflowarenotadverselyaffectedbytheproposedchange.IncreasingMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimesdoesnotadverselyaffectthenormalplantoperatingparameters,thesafeguardssystemsactuationsoraccidentmitigationcapabilitiesimportanttoaLOCA;ortheassumptionsusedintheLOCA-relatedanalyses.Inaddition,theproposedchangedoesnotcreateconditionsmorelimitingthanthoseassumedintheLOCAanalyses.JustificationforReuestandSinificantHazardsConsiderationWebelievethatincreasingtheMSIVclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotadverselyimpactpublichealthandsafety.AnincreasedsteamlineisolationresponsetimehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1safetyanalyses.Baseduponpreviouslyperformedanalyses,thesteamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrityanalysis,SGTR,andLOCAanalysessupportanincreaseintheMSIVclosuretimeisolationtimesofthreesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements,Forsteamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesoutsidecontainment,limitingcaseshavebeenreanalyzedassumingasteamlineisolationtimethreesecondslongerthanthecurrentT/Srequirements.Also,revisedmass/energydatawereevaluatedbyAEPSC,resultingintheconclusionthattheincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting,
'f Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page510CFR50.92CriteriaPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:1)involve,asignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Ourevaluationoftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion1BasedonthesafetyanalysesperformedbyWestinghouseforthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrity,SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangetoincreasethesteamlinebreakisolationresponsetimeandthesteamgeneratorstopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Criterion2Thethree-secondincreaseforthesteamlineisolationresponsetimewillnotchangethedesignoroperationoftheplant.Thereforewebelievethatthischangewillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3BasedonthesafetyanalysesperformedbyWestinghouseforthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrity,SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangeincreasingthesteamlinebreakisolationresponsetimeandthesteamgeneratorstopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page6Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident,buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablishedasacceptable.Forthereasonsdetailedabove,webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexample.Therefore,webelievethischangedoesnotinvolvesignificanthazardsconsiderationasdefinedin10CFR50.92.