ENS 43884
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
16:00 Jan 6, 2008 | |
| Title | Hpci Declared Inoperable Due To Failed Surveillance Test |
| Event Description | During HPCI pump operability surveillance in preparation for a system outage, the system failed to achieve rated flow and pressure in the time required by procedure and Tech Specs. The procedural requirement is <49 seconds and the Tech Spec requirement is < 50 seconds. The system achieved rated flow and pressure in 54 seconds. The system outage has been delayed until troubleshooting plans can be developed and implemented.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The initial notification was made as a result of the failure of HPCI to meet its response time of 50 seconds as defined in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) due to a degraded component. Failure to meet the operability procedure requirements resulted in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system being considered inoperable. Since HPCl is a single train system, its inoperability was the event that warranted a notification to meet the following reporting requirement: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. An additional review and evaluation of the licensing basis was performed and demonstrated that the procedural required response time was set conservatively. As expected, the licensing basis does not require or assume any specific start time and HPCl is not credited in the accident analyses. The acceptance criterion contained in the TRM is within licensee control via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Consequently, the TRM criterion was revised to 75 seconds to retain a value to assure continued monitoring and trending of HPCl performance in order to recognize and prevent continued performance degradation. Additionally, it is reasonable to conclude that HPCl would have completed its mission time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> despite the degraded condition of the EGR [Electronic Governor Remote] that caused the initial slower response time. This is based on the fact that HPCl started and ran at rated flow and pressure for approximately 39 minutes prior to shutdown with no problems identified. This removes any questions regarding its ability to restart and run based on demand during its mission time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. An industry expert on this system and the engineer from the vendor that supports this system concurred with that conclusion. Since this subsequent review and evaluation determined that the slower response time did not render HPCl inoperable, no single train failure of HPCl occurred. The system was fully capable of performing its intended safety functions during the event timeline. Based on this information this notification serves to retract notification # 43884 made on 1/06/08. The licensee notified the Resident Inspector of this retraction. Notified the R2DO (Musser). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Hatch  Georgia (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.63 h-0.0263 days <br />-0.00375 weeks <br />-8.62974e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Tony Spring 15:22 Jan 6, 2008 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | Mar 4, 2008 |
| 43884 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Hatch with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 568962023-12-18T07:23:00018 December 2023 07:23:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable ENS 554482021-09-08T05:59:0008 September 2021 05:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable ENS 546772020-04-22T14:15:00022 April 2020 14:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System (Hpci) Inoperable ENS 542372019-08-23T02:34:00023 August 2019 02:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 539442019-03-19T05:40:00019 March 2019 05:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable ENS 525432017-02-08T16:51:0008 February 2017 16:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Degraded Dc to Ac Inverter ENS 500802014-05-02T00:45:0002 May 2014 00:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Hpci Operability Due to Water Accumulation in the Hpci Turbine ENS 488272013-03-18T13:10:00018 March 2013 13:10:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable Following Refueling Outage ENS 455412009-12-05T15:59:0005 December 2009 15:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Out of Service Due to the Loss of the Suction Auto-Swap Function ENS 448492009-02-12T17:30:00012 February 2009 17:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Suction Source Instrument Malfunction ENS 438842008-01-06T16:00:0006 January 2008 16:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Surveillance Test ENS 433742007-05-18T21:45:00018 May 2007 21:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Inoperable Hpci Pump ENS 432422007-03-15T19:32:00015 March 2007 19:32:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable During Startup Testing ENS 432212007-03-08T01:50:0008 March 2007 01:50:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable Following Surveillance Testing ENS 431532007-02-08T09:32:0008 February 2007 09:32:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 431522007-02-07T21:40:0007 February 2007 21:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolent Injection (Hpci) Declared Inoperable ENS 429142006-10-17T15:21:00017 October 2006 15:21:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Accident Mitigation - Hpci System Inoperable ENS 426572006-06-21T04:15:00021 June 2006 04:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Declared Inoperable Due Excessvie Aux Oil Pump Motor Current ENS 425782006-05-16T13:38:00016 May 2006 13:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Hpci Discharge Check Valve Body Leak ENS 422622006-01-16T23:31:00016 January 2006 23:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci System Isolated Due to Atts Card Failure ENS 408242004-06-17T09:21:00017 June 2004 09:21:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Declared Inoperable 2023-12-18T07:23:00 | |