ENS 45541
ENS Event | |
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15:59 Dec 5, 2009 | |
Title | Hpci Out of Service Due to the Loss of the Suction Auto-Swap Function |
Event Description | On 12-04-09 at 16:00, condensate storage tank (CST) level switch [2E41 N002], was declared inoperable due to not actuating at the correct set point. A RAS [Required Action Statement] was entered to align high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) suction to the suppression pool within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by Tech Spec [Technical Specification] action statement 3.3.5.1.D 2.2. The switch was found stuck and was freed up after manual manipulation and tripped correctly during a functional test. It was decided on 12-05-09 to perform a calibration on the level switch prior to declaring it operable.
During performance of calibration procedure 57CP-CAL-012-2 at 1059 EST on 12-05-09, a jumper was installed that rendered the HPCI and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) auto-transfer suction swap from CST to suppression pool inoperable. This is a loss of function for the initiation capability of HPCI and RCIC CST low level suction swap instrumentation. This loss of function was not discovered until 1330 on 12-05-09, at which time TS [Technical Specification] 3.3.5.1.D was entered for HPCI and TS 3.3.5.2.D for RCIC, until HPCI and RCIC suction were manually aligned to the suppression pool which allowed the plant to exit the required actions to declare HPCI and RCIC inoperable within 1 Hour. HPCI and RCIC were aligned to the suppression pool at 1341 EST. The RCIC suction was realigned to the suppression pool as required by the Tech Specs in order to restore its operability. It should be noted that no credit is taken for RCIC in the safety analysis nor is this system considered an ESF system. For this reason there are no reporting requirements associated with the inoperability of RCIC. HPCI was declared inoperable in accordance with the instrumentation Tech Specs, but during this time frame HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. However- additional review will be needed to confirm that HPCI could have operated for the duration of its mission time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> while aligned to the condensate storage tank. Absent that information this report is being made due to HPCI being declared inoperable until its suction was realigned to the suppression pool. This assumed loss of function for HPCI is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) since a final determination has not been made that HPCI would have continued to perform its safety function for the required mission time while aligned to the CST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
Where | |
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Hatch Georgia (NRC Region 2) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.82 h0.0758 days <br />0.0108 weeks <br />0.00249 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Barry Coleman 17:48 Dec 5, 2009 |
NRC Officer: | Vince Klco |
Last Updated: | Dec 5, 2009 |
45541 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Hatch with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 568962023-12-18T07:23:00018 December 2023 07:23:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable ENS 554482021-09-08T05:59:0008 September 2021 05:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable ENS 546772020-04-22T14:15:00022 April 2020 14:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System (Hpci) Inoperable ENS 542372019-08-23T02:34:00023 August 2019 02:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 539442019-03-19T05:40:00019 March 2019 05:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable ENS 525432017-02-08T16:51:0008 February 2017 16:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Degraded Dc to Ac Inverter ENS 500802014-05-02T00:45:0002 May 2014 00:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Hpci Operability Due to Water Accumulation in the Hpci Turbine ENS 488272013-03-18T13:10:00018 March 2013 13:10:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable Following Refueling Outage ENS 455412009-12-05T15:59:0005 December 2009 15:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Out of Service Due to the Loss of the Suction Auto-Swap Function ENS 448492009-02-12T17:30:00012 February 2009 17:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Suction Source Instrument Malfunction ENS 438842008-01-06T16:00:0006 January 2008 16:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Surveillance Test ENS 433742007-05-18T21:45:00018 May 2007 21:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Inoperable Hpci Pump ENS 432422007-03-15T19:32:00015 March 2007 19:32:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable During Startup Testing ENS 432212007-03-08T01:50:0008 March 2007 01:50:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable Following Surveillance Testing ENS 431532007-02-08T09:32:0008 February 2007 09:32:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 431522007-02-07T21:40:0007 February 2007 21:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolent Injection (Hpci) Declared Inoperable ENS 429142006-10-17T15:21:00017 October 2006 15:21:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Accident Mitigation - Hpci System Inoperable ENS 426572006-06-21T04:15:00021 June 2006 04:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Declared Inoperable Due Excessvie Aux Oil Pump Motor Current ENS 425782006-05-16T13:38:00016 May 2006 13:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Hpci Discharge Check Valve Body Leak ENS 422622006-01-16T23:31:00016 January 2006 23:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci System Isolated Due to Atts Card Failure ENS 408242004-06-17T09:21:00017 June 2004 09:21:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Declared Inoperable 2023-12-18T07:23:00 | |