ML19029A825
| ML19029A825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1979 |
| From: | Onsdorff K State of NJ, Dept of the Public Advocate |
| To: | Milhollin G Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| Download: ML19029A825 (11) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:f, \* DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE CARLS. BISGAIER DIVISION OF PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY DIRECTOR P.O. BOX 141 TEL. 609*292-1693 STANLEY C. VAN NESS TRENTON. NEW .JERSEY 08625 PUBLIC ADVOCATE June 14, 1979 Gary L. Milholl.in, Esq. Chairman, Atomic Safety
& Licensing Board 1815 Jefferson Stre~t Madison, Wisconsin 53711 Re: PSE&G Co. Salem One SFP Reracking Application Docket No. 50-272
Dear Chaixman }1ilhollin:
I have enclosed herewith the brief on behalf of the Intervenors, Colemans, in opposition to the Staff's objection to the Board's considera-tion of the impacts of a Class Nine accident on the Salem One spent fuel pool. The States of Delaware and New Jersey, admitted to this proceeding as interested States, have joined in this consolidated opposition to the staff objection. The Department of the Public Advocate respectfully requests oral argument on this matter. Respectfully submitted,
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KEITH A. ONSDORFF Assistant Deputy Public Advoeate KAO/le cc: Service list New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COl-h'ilSSION Be£ore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Docket No_ 50-272 In the Matter*of : ** ... -- PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTaIC* . . Proposed Issuance of Amendment.
& GAS CO. . to FaciJ..ity Operating License (Salem Nucl~ar Generating : No. DP.R-70 Station, Unit *l)
INTERVENO~, COLEMAN, RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF OBJECTION
'XO BOARD QUESTION NO. THREE STANLEY C. V1\N NESS PUBLIC: ADVOCATE OF NEN JERSEY DEPAR'l.'HEN'l' OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE .
DIVISIOll OF PUBLIC: INTEREST ADVOCAd POST OEFJ:CE BOX 14l. .-. 520 EAS".r STATE STREE"r: TRENTOllJ. NEW JERSEY KEITH A. ONSDORFF ASSISTAL~T DEPUTY PUBLIC ADVOCATE On the Brief
PRELIMINARY.* STATEMENT By Order dated April 18. 1979, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, :*.:.:!..--
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charged with the responsib,il~ty for adjudica_ting the a~tted. contentions . pertaining to Publ.ic Service Electric* and Gas Company *s application to rerack . _. * -*-__ its spen~- fuel. poo1::at the- Salem One Nuclear Generating Station.,. _indicated ,--,. __ -- _
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the fol.lowing:
* - * "The Board wishes to add the fGl.1owing -_, .-.
questions for. discussion- -at *the hear.inc;:*-_-,* -
- 3. If an accident such as the ome at 'l"hree
. Mile Island occurred at Sal.em, to What -
extent would the, accident af£ect the spent fuel pool? If an exp1osion or
'mel "C!own' occurred at Sal.em, to what extent would that affect :the spent fuel.
pool? To what extent woul.d i.1= have-mattered how much spent fue.1 was present at the pool at Salem?"
- In objecting to not only its participation in this hearing d;iscussion of_
the effects a C~c_iss_~ine accident *on the- Sal~ SFP, the "NRC staff has sought: to foreclose any party from examining this issue or even the Boa.rd itself from -inquiring about this particular Subject. The authority relied upon by the MRC staff in -interposing this objection focuses on the purported exl:reme un1ikeli-hood of such a catastrophic event, which_ in the past has been used to justify their exclusion from the final Safety Evaluation Reports prepal:ed for NRC licensing reviews. The rational for this exclusion wonl.d appear to be that for reasons of administrative convenience and efficiency itw~s nOt worthwhi1~ to devote months and months of time by scarce technical resources-to evaluating consequences of events which were deemed realist_ically incapabl.e of occurring __ , __ * -
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- It should be noted thiit in i"ts objection dated June 1,. 1979, the l'JRC staf:f ~~~
incorrectly asserts that "the Board propounded three questions to be answered by the staff and the licensee." (Staff objection, p:t; Background)_
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For two basic relons, however, this rational.-. i~ot
- appl.icable to the Board* s Order of April 18, 1979. Intiti'ally,it is important to note that the Board has not directed the NRC staff to redo its final SER done on either the Salem One-plant_
or the final SER prep.aied on . the proposed reracki:ng of the saJ.em One spent_ fuel. pco1. Rather, the Order is very limited in scope, requesting OD.l.y that a discussion be ._ held at the hearing conce::i:nin,g -two specific potential. jm_pacts of a Cl.ass N:ine cu;~~~ I t contains no directive to either the Staff or the LiCflfl~e tO ~pend months of -:* -:* _::~,~-
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time by experts* examining al.J. the :cany ramifications of a full-b.lown C1ass Nine---~* _=*, *:
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accident at a nuclear power plant. 11 Thus, since the Board s Order compeJ.s no Undue level of resource committment by the staff or PSE&G Co-, reasons of administrative-expediency are* not implicated in this request.* Secondly,. since the Board's Order is directed* to a 1egitimate safety concern which is gexmane to the admitted contentions in this proceeding-.,. the panel. members, pursuant to the authority vested in them by 1.0 CFR ~ 2- 721. and 2- ~18,. may examue hea=ing witnesses -pertaining to the potential. iI:tpacts Cl ass Nine type accidents at their own discretion. The entry of an order affording the parties advance notice of the Board's intention to do so can not be construed in.any .fashion to l.imit the e~cpress authority of an Atomic Safety and Licensing Boa.rd t.--o manage the con-duct o*f a hear~g as i t progresses, including the r;ight t:o examine witnesses at t:he panel members soie discretion. A good exa:inple of this type of ASLB panel. member witness examination occurred .dtiring the May 1979 hearings in this matter when.*
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Dr. Lamb questioned Mr. Liden on the possible safety consicerations invol.ved in ____ ,, --~
-*.- * *** - I It can even be stated convincingly that the Order, on its face,.* al.lows the staff and licensee to offer no affirmative evidence on the Class Nine impacts issue while *al.lowing the burden to be carried by intervenor's witnesses and limiting their - ~-. "discussion" of this topic to reacting to whatever is proffered by these other parties, as deemed appropriate in light of the evidence submitted. Of course, this approach involves no use of agency resources to evaluate the CJ.ass Nine .impacts in advance of the hearings and removes entirely the administrative convenience rational I for the staff objection to the ASLB infonni.ng itsel.f about an issue of potentially paramount importance to the public safety. .
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e e maintained a full core discharge capability at the Salem One Reactor_ (May 4 l.979 transcript at ps. 866-869). Despite Mr. Liden's acknow1edgment that £u11 core
~scharge capability is not a safety factor. in .any way ~gul.ated by the NRC,. :_ : .
Dr. Lamb continued to explore in detail the possible safety. and envircm:mental. imp associated with its absence, without significantly, .any objection thereto by .:.:~'~,~~-*-J~: _.;-~""';-_- . :- - - . either the: staff or the licensee.* For either the staff or licensee ta ~~ c;;bject. **~,-:
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to the Board's examinati~ of witnesses on a subject* which they po~sib1:JZ .do n~t::~~~~~:**.
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deem as favorabJ.e to their position is simply not consist:ent with their earlier I receptivity to prior board initiated questioning in this proceeding_ Fonda.mental. i I fairness dictates that either the staff and licensee consent to striking Liaen*s *! I testimony regarding full core discharge or inclusion of Cl.ass Nine accident testi-mony. """/
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They should not, however*. be entitled to obtain the ]l)enefits of the former while seeking to excl.ude the perceived disadvantages of the latter testimony. I
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ARGUMENT THE BOARD SHOULD EXA.."ilNE THE CONSE-QUENCES OF A CLASS NINE ACCIDENT BE~!\.USB THE FAILURE TO CONSIDER ALL POTENTIAL RISKS TO THE.HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBr.Ic m LIGHT OF THE TMI-2 EXPERIENCE . --*- -- . . ..- ..
. WOULD CONST.ITOTE ABDICATION OF THE . :_.*.. - ~ --- -:
NRC'S STATOTORY RESPONSIBILITIES - .;_*_-.: ----* Repeatedly since March 28, l.979," the *highest federal. officia1s ~~".:.-~:-,*~'.(-:*>~~'-. with the respons.il::>ility for regulation of nuclear.. power generation ~ the .*. ~ : ~~:\f~~1:~~:: United States have assured the public that they would not ignore the lessons -: : - to be learned from the near catastrophy at Three Mil.e Isl.and Nncl.ear Genera-tion Station No. Two.
- All aspects of the nucl.ear pl.ant safety woul.d be examined, we have been told, to prevent a recurrence of the situation where NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie was reduced to exclaiming in appa:rent desperation:
"We are operating almost totally in the bl..in~,.
*his <information is ambiguous, mine is non-
* - *-***existent and -- I don't know, its l.ike a
- couple of blind men staggering around making decision." (Nucleonics Week, 4 .. 26.79, p-.3;
.transcript of Commission meeting March 30, 1979 regarding then ongoing TMI-2 crisis).
Chai:c:ian Hendrie* s remarks were closely echoed by Harold Denton, Director r* Nucl.ear*Reaction Regulation and Roger Mattson, Director,. Systems Safety Division, NRC, in repo.rti_ng to the Commission their understanding. of the then.unfolding T!*II accident=
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"We saw fai1ure modes, the likes of which bave never been ana1yzed." (Mattson, Nucleonics Week,.
4.26.79, p.10; transcript March 30, 1979, Commission meeting). We kind of had the feeling this morning _ *
- that the 1icensee doesn't recognize the_prob1em.that .
we* re facing with regard to the bubble and damage
- and what might happen if we were to lose vacuum and * :
so forth." (Denton, Nucleonics Week, 4.26.79, p.8;
- transcript March 30, l.979, Commission Meeti:nq) * *
- See, e.*g., New York Times, April 10, 1979, p. 1, report of NRC ....,,__.:.:..__ __
testiI:tony before U.S. Senate. -&~ Hendrie*s
Apparentl.y1 hot'iever, these reassurances may have been somewhat over-stated and it continues to be business as usual. for tlhe U~S- regul.ation of the nuclear industry, despite the unprecedented events at the Metropolitan Edison, TMI-2 nuclear generating facility which na:rrmo..ly avo:ided. (it seems
-:-- _.. by mere good fortlllle) the ultimate nuclear acc::ident. :- In its brief _:_,._ ... ;::* *--~~
in support* of its objection to Board consideration of .a class nin~ ~~cident.:<~:-~~I
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at the Salem One facility, the Staff. asserts that ~uclil an event is d~ -~;..* -~*-:?:'**---:
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"highly unlikel.y," citiiig an eight year old document" ars .au~~~ ~~~ ..-i:his.--'.: ...*:.~::(':;~:'
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now somewhat dubious pro.Position -- 36 F .R. 22851. (Deo?Jnber 1; i971)- A more current expression of the Commission* s thiimking on the probability of such a catastrophic event at a reactor can be follmii in its Th:?:"ee Mi1e Island deliberations this past March: Mattson: "They are working on some alternatives. One, we thought of, and one that B&W kind CJif. ..likes, but .
.it doesn't _have a lot of promise. BSW says start up all the :reactor coolant pumps, b1imOl them out, *
* - * - * - *- -blow the seals and hope they cause* aa 1oss of coo~t
- accident that way, which would depressurize the system rapidly. Then we get into a: mode* , for which ail these systems were designed and v;ue could cope.
with." * (emphasis*added). Commissioner Gilinsky: n1et me ask you again suppose we go S:nto this maneuver, or one of them, and i t ttui:m.s bad, what sort of. time scales are involved there?" Mattson: Hours. Gilinsky: Hours before what? Mattson: Before you had core melt down*. * (Nucleonics Week, 4.30. 79, pp *. 2-4,,. -ttranscript
.March 30, 1979, Commission Meeting):, -
In light of the Three Mile Island accident, simpl:e prudence dictates that all potential consequences of the storage of massjLve amounts of radioactive mat.erials 80 feet from an active reactor be carefully and full.y
- examined, unless compelling reasons exist demonstrating; that this not be done. Surely, the proposition that a Class Nine accidemt .is 9bigh1.y unlikely 11 no longer can be deemed persuasive. The onelbypothetical. study which the NRC used to reach this conclusion, WASH-140a* has now been officially rescinded by the Commission and the actual eixperience with nuclear power plants in the United States (Fenni, Detroit~ BrO'!ilillt\s Ferry, A1abama1 and Three Mile Island, Harrisburg) lends little suppont: *.for the glib assertion that a core melt down just cannot and will nmt happen.
Nonetheless, even assuming that the chances of a en.ass Nine accident are still determined to be small and such an occurence* ::i.s deemed un1ikely, such a conclusion'does not justify the responsibl.e regm"!Latory-official.s taking a categorical position that they refuse to examifune this eventuality despite its catastrophic consequences. The reasoned an:il conservative analytical approach to the safe use of nuclear energy mequired close scrutiny of the class nine consequences, particularly when licenasing decisions involve . authorization to place the eqU.ivalent **of five nuclear ClOres. 80 feet from an* active reactor. No additional insights into reactor safety Call!l be g1eaned by ignoring the consequences of a Class Nine accident and: :if this "highly unlikely" eventually does in fact occur, the NRC will. again find itsel.f confronted with "failure modes, the likes of which have never been ana1yzed." (Mattson, supra, at p. 4 ) * : Of course, this need not be the case. Adoption of a conservative approach to the analysis of the Salem One reracking proposal. can produce a planning document that would be availab1e in the event it was ever required over the next forty years of reactor operations at Lower Alloways Creek which could prevent the responsible reqa].atory officials from
'*.*< despairing of their non-existent data base. {Hendrie,. supra, at p.4* )
- Having shown no countervailing considerations warranting exclusion of this evidence, the staff~s position is wholly lacking :in a rational basis necessary to sustain it.
Moreover, it is readily apparent that the NRC's pol..i:ey-on *consideration* of Class Nine accidents is far more flexible that the staff*s brief contends. At no time did the Commission, the NRC staff or anyone else determine that -
- a core melt down at a floating nuclear power plant was *reasonably likely to occur" and therefore warranting scrutiny of the consequences flowing therefrom.
- Rather, the Corilmission has adopted a pol.icy which does not require consideration of Class Nine accidents, absent a. shoWinq of.special.
circumstances. This flexible standard pernd ts the NRC staff. and licensing boards sufficient discretionary authority to exercise t:beir judgment as to when such *analysis would be appropriate and prudent. I t should also be note4 at this juncture that since the annex to fonner Appendix D to 10 C.F.R., Part :': SO (1970), publi*shed at 36 Fed. ~eg. 22851-52 (December 1.,' 1971) ha:s not been > adopted as a regulation by the Commission, it does not have force and effect of "law." In any event, the Commission's most recent articulation of its policy on this matter, as reflec~ed by Chairman Hendries'summation at its JanuaJ:Y 31, Power systems 1979 meeting on the Offshore/appeal, indicates the exbcemely broad discretion which has been delegated on-the Class Nine question: 9the thrust of the In fact, the NRC staff in the pending Offshore Power Systems proceeding "does not dispute that the probabilities of experiencing a Class Nine accident at a nuclear power plant ashore or afloat are the same." 8 NRC at 211; Slip Opinion at 32 (emphasis in origina1).
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Commission's decision, then, is that indeed these considerations the staff has raised in this case are appropriately considered."* (Tr. at 51). Most assuredly, then, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has been deleqated
- no less authority than the NRC staff to raise Clas.s Nine considerations where such an examination is appropriate. This is clearly the situation here. The Atomic Energy Report -- The0retical Possillilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, (Wash- - 740, March 1957),
calculated that the release of .15 million curies of strontium 90 could result in the contamination of 150,000 square miles of :land mass. A loss of coolant water accident at the Salem One spent fuel pool could conceivably cause the release of forty-five million.curies of strontium 90, or three-hundred times the WASH-740 predicted release of lethal. :radiation. In light of the near catastrophy at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, this Board's expressed desire to eXamine the conseq1lences of a Class Nine accident at the Salem plant on this huge stockpile of radio-active materials is entirely justified, reasonable and prudent. No further special circumstances need be shown than the close proximity of the spent fuel pool :Cwi thin 80 feet) to the reactor core to warnm.t review of the consequences of a core melt down on the spent fuel. pool.-
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"CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Board deny the NRC staff'*s objection to consideration of the consequences .
. of a Class Nine accident on the reracked Salem One spent fuel. pool..
Respectfully submitted, 7{{,-li aO~t,,Yff KEITH A. ONSDORFF --ZJ{) Assistant Deputy Public Advocate DATED: JUNE 14, 1979
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