ML15037A724: Difference between revisions
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==Subject:== | ==Subject:== | ||
FW: Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing From: aceactivists@comcast.net | FW: Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing From: aceactivists@comcast.net | ||
[mailto:aceactivists@comcast.net | [mailto:aceactivists@comcast.net | ||
Line 55: | Line 54: | ||
* Plant Drawings | * Plant Drawings | ||
* Updated Final Safety Assessment Report (UFSAR) | * Updated Final Safety Assessment Report (UFSAR) | ||
NRC's reviews and acceptance of Exelon's self | NRC's reviews and acceptance of Exelon's self-evaluations put the public at risk. | ||
-evaluations put the public at risk. | |||
: 1. We have no confidence in Exelon's self-assessment of its own changes for Limerick operations because Exelon obviously has a vested interest in the outcome. Evidence shows Exelon's data and reports fail to provide full, accurate, and timely disclosure. | : 1. We have no confidence in Exelon's self-assessment of its own changes for Limerick operations because Exelon obviously has a vested interest in the outcome. Evidence shows Exelon's data and reports fail to provide full, accurate, and timely disclosure. | ||
: 2. It is reckless for NRC to have failed to conduct its own independent rigorous testing fo r Exelon's risky changes at Limerick. | : 2. It is reckless for NRC to have failed to conduct its own independent rigorous testing fo r Exelon's risky changes at Limerick. 3. It is irresponsible fo r NRC to relicense Limerick without requiring Exelon to comply with Commitment #46, which required the testing of Exelon's aging-manage ment program for Limerick. | ||
: 4. NRC is putting on blinders and faili ng to protect the public, while mindlessly allowing Exelon's self-s erving reports to substitute for actual safeguards. | : 4. NRC is putting on blinders and faili ng to protect the public, while mindlessly allowing Exelon's self-s erving reports to substitute for actual safeguards. | ||
DANGEROUS PERMANENT LIMERICK PLANT MODIFICATIONS TO LIMERICK'S MOV SYSTEM: | DANGEROUS PERMANENT LIMERICK PLANT MODIFICATIONS TO LIMERICK'S MOV SYSTEM: | ||
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* NRC defined the violation as a "weakness in maintaining long-term plant stability". | * NRC defined the violation as a "weakness in maintaining long-term plant stability". | ||
* NRC stated that this was a "V iolation of a legally binding requirement". | * NRC stated that this was a "V iolation of a legally binding requirement". | ||
In 2012, Exelon requested an amendment taking the MOV out of Technical Specifications (TS), under NRC regulatory control, and into the Technical Manual (TM), | In 2012, Exelon requested an amendment taking the MOV out of Technical Specifications (TS), under NRC regulatory control, and into the Technical Manual (TM), under Exelon's control and not regulated by NRC. NRC contacted an unnamed state official for comment on this amendment prior to its approval. It is far from routine for the NRC to ask a state official for comment on its amendment approval | ||
under Exelon's control and not regulated by NRC. NRC contacted an unnamed state official for comment on this amendment prior to its approval. It is far from routine for the NRC to ask a state official for comment on its amendment approval | |||
: s. The NRC stated, in its approval, that the unnamed state official had no comment. | : s. The NRC stated, in its approval, that the unnamed state official had no comment. | ||
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The reason this is a major concern is because at TMI, on March 28, 1979, the | The reason this is a major concern is because at TMI, on March 28, 1979, the | ||
immediate cause of the loss-of | immediate cause of the loss-of-coolant accident that allowed the uncovering of the core and the melting of about half of it was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of water to escape. | ||
-coolant accident that allowed the uncovering of the core and the melting of about half of it was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of water to escape. | |||
EXELON CHANGES CLEARLY CREATE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD. | EXELON CHANGES CLEARLY CREATE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD. | ||
* In 2014, Exelon made design changes to the Motor Operated Valve system for delivering water to the reactor core that | * In 2014, Exelon made design changes to the Motor Operated Valve system for delivering water to the reactor core that | ||
Line 89: | Line 84: | ||
* NRC IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE RISKS INVOLVED WITH THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT. | * NRC IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE RISKS INVOLVED WITH THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT. | ||
* NRC IGNORED LIMERICK'S HISTORY OF VALVE PROBLEMS TO RELICENSE LIMERICK. | * NRC IGNORED LIMERICK'S HISTORY OF VALVE PROBLEMS TO RELICENSE LIMERICK. | ||
QUESTIONS RELATED TO YOUR 12-23-14 LETTER TO EXELON ABOUT LIMERICK: | QUESTIONS RELATED TO YOUR 12-23-14 LETTER TO EXELON ABOUT LIMERICK: 1. Because the MOV is associated with plant stability, the potential consequences of NRC's lax oversight could be catastrophic. | ||
* Why would NRC excuse Exelon from compliance with original NRC regulations? | * Why would NRC excuse Exelon from compliance with original NRC regulations? | ||
* It appears that Exelon's MOV experiment would violate NRC regulations if the MOV was still in NRC's Technical Specifications (TS). Isn't that true? | * It appears that Exelon's MOV experiment would violate NRC regulations if the MOV was still in NRC's Technical Specifications (TS). Isn't that true? | ||
: 2. Was the defective hydrogen remover ever repaired or replaced? If so, when? | : 2. Was the defective hydrogen remover ever repaired or replaced? If so, when? | ||
: 3. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon refe rs to a "team". Was this team comprised of NRC engineers? If not, what company or contractor supplied the engineers? Are they a permanent engineer ing inspection team for Limerick?}} | : 3. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon refe rs to a "team". Was this team comprised of NRC engineers? If not, what company or contractor supplied the engineers? Are they a permanent engineer ing inspection team for Limerick?}} |
Revision as of 08:16, 9 July 2018
ML15037A724 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Limerick ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/19/2015 |
From: | Cuthbert L Alliance For A Clean Environment |
To: | Krohn P G Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
Krohn P G | |
References | |
EDATS RegionI-2015-0021 | |
Download: ML15037A724 (5) | |
Text
From: Krohn, Paul Sent: Friday, February 06, 2015 4:37 PM To: Heater, Keith
Subject:
FW: Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing From: aceactivists@comcast.net
[mailto:aceactivists@comcast.net
] Sent: Monday, January 19, 2015 3:35 PM To: Krohn, Paul Cc: Bower, Fred; Ennis, Rick; NRDC; Evan Brandt
Subject:
Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing January 19, 2015 To: Paul Krohn, NRC Chief Engineering Branch 2
From: Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, ACE President Re: Limerick Nuclear Plant Changes, Tests, Experiments, and Permanent Plant Modifications Approved by NRC, Based On Exelon's Self-Serving, Self-Assessment It is alarming that problems identified by NRC in 1984, before Limerick Nuclear Plant's original license was approved, have persisted up to and through NRC's 10-14 relicensing of Limerick. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon exposes the unresolved complexity of Limerick's problems. Your letter and attachment to Exelon reveals an alarming NRC hands-off-safety trend at Limerick.
Limerick's safety problems were not resolv ed before Limerick was originally licensed. The NRC section chief in 1984 stated that his staff wanted four items cleared up before licensing Limerick (Mercury 8/31/84).
Items he identif ied included:
- 1. Improper procedures
- 2. Incomplete safety measures
- 3. Faulty valves
- 4. A defective hydrogen remover
- Three of the four items ident ified by NRC in 1984 remain unresolved to this day (Confirmed by NRC's safety reports for
Limerick relicensing).
- It is unclear whether or not the fourth item, a defective hydrogen remover, was ever repaired or replaced.
o We are concerned because At Limerick, at least one accident occurred involving a hydrogen leak. This docum ented hydrogen leak, identified by NRC in a safety report occurred after Exelon submitted its application for Limerick relicensing.
o We are concerned about Limerick's original defective hydrogen remover because at TMI, it was a hydrogen expl osion that rocked the control room during the TMI partial meltdown.
UNACCEPTABLE History repeated itself for Limerick relicensing.
Your letter to Ex elon indicates that permanent Limerick plant modifications were initiated by Exelon BEFORE NRC's approval of Limerick relicensing (10-14).
- NRC allowed Exelon to put t he cart before the horse and rubberstamped its approval of those modifications two months AFTER NRC relicensed Lime rick (12-23-14).
EVEN WORSE Exelon assessed the "adequacy" of changes it made at Limerick based on its own reviews.
- Of major concern: Exelon c oncluded that an NRC safety evaluation was NOT required for risky changes, including experiments, that Exelon had already begun im plementing at Limerick.
Changes include:
- Experiments
- Calculations
- Analyses
- Design Change Documentation
- Procedures
- NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)
- Plant Drawings
- Updated Final Safety Assessment Report (UFSAR)
NRC's reviews and acceptance of Exelon's self-evaluations put the public at risk.
- 1. We have no confidence in Exelon's self-assessment of its own changes for Limerick operations because Exelon obviously has a vested interest in the outcome. Evidence shows Exelon's data and reports fail to provide full, accurate, and timely disclosure.
- 2. It is reckless for NRC to have failed to conduct its own independent rigorous testing fo r Exelon's risky changes at Limerick. 3. It is irresponsible fo r NRC to relicense Limerick without requiring Exelon to comply with Commitment #46, which required the testing of Exelon's aging-manage ment program for Limerick.
- 4. NRC is putting on blinders and faili ng to protect the public, while mindlessly allowing Exelon's self-s erving reports to substitute for actual safeguards.
DANGEROUS PERMANENT LIMERICK PLANT MODIFICATIONS TO LIMERICK'S MOV SYSTEM:
Background:
In 2011, NRC issued a "white violation" citing Exelon with noncompliance of a legally binding requirement involving the failure of the feedwater Motor Operated Valve (MOV) which resulted in loss of Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) for longer than specifications allow, according to NRC's Technical Specifications (TS).
- NRC defined the violation as a "weakness in maintaining long-term plant stability".
- NRC stated that this was a "V iolation of a legally binding requirement".
In 2012, Exelon requested an amendment taking the MOV out of Technical Specifications (TS), under NRC regulatory control, and into the Technical Manual (TM), under Exelon's control and not regulated by NRC. NRC contacted an unnamed state official for comment on this amendment prior to its approval. It is far from routine for the NRC to ask a state official for comment on its amendment approval
- s. The NRC stated, in its approval, that the unnamed state official had no comment.
In 2013, the NRC inexplicably granted Exelon's r equest to remove the MOV valve from NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)
The reason this is a major concern is because at TMI, on March 28, 1979, the
immediate cause of the loss-of-coolant accident that allowed the uncovering of the core and the melting of about half of it was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of water to escape.
EXELON CHANGES CLEARLY CREATE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD.
- In 2014, Exelon made design changes to the Motor Operated Valve system for delivering water to the reactor core that
included:
o permanently fixing the valves in an open position o cutting the power to the valve alarms o removing loss-of-power/overload alarms
- 1. How can this be? Isn't the opening and closing of valves essential to preventing core meltdowns?
- 2. Was this done because the MOV valve stem broke? If so, when did that happen?
- 3. The MOV valve was inoperable for a month, verified by an NRC inspection report letter to Exelon dated 11-4-11.
- 4. The 11-4-11 letter shows NRC iss ued a white violat ion, stating that it may require additional NRC inspection, yet now NRC has abandoned rigorous oversight of the MOV and its associated systems and alarms.
- NRC IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE RISKS INVOLVED WITH THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT.
- NRC IGNORED LIMERICK'S HISTORY OF VALVE PROBLEMS TO RELICENSE LIMERICK.
QUESTIONS RELATED TO YOUR 12-23-14 LETTER TO EXELON ABOUT LIMERICK: 1. Because the MOV is associated with plant stability, the potential consequences of NRC's lax oversight could be catastrophic.
- Why would NRC excuse Exelon from compliance with original NRC regulations?
- It appears that Exelon's MOV experiment would violate NRC regulations if the MOV was still in NRC's Technical Specifications (TS). Isn't that true?
- 2. Was the defective hydrogen remover ever repaired or replaced? If so, when?
- 3. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon refe rs to a "team". Was this team comprised of NRC engineers? If not, what company or contractor supplied the engineers? Are they a permanent engineer ing inspection team for Limerick?