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{{#Wiki_filter:RIDRIWY1CELERATED RIDSPROCESSING)
{{#Wiki_filter:RID RIWY 1 CELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9505240165 DOC.DATE:
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9505240165 DOC.DATE: 95/05/19 NOTARIZED:
95/05/19NOTARIZED:
YES DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 50-316 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.
YESDOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.
Indiana Michigan'ower Co.(formerly Indiana&Michigan Ele P RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT'AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)R  
IndianaMichigan'ower Co.(formerly Indiana&MichiganElePRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT'AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)R


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,revising TSsection3.7.1.1,Table 3.7-1&basesreturbinecyclesafetyvalves.DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR JENCL/SIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:
Application for amends to licenses DPR-58&DPR-74,revising TS section 3.7.1.1,Table 3.7-1&bases re turbine cycle safety valves.DISTRIBUTION CODE: AOOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL/SIZE: TITLE: OR Submittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAHICKMAN,J INTERNA~LECELEBOilNRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2EXTERNAL:
General Distribution NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA HICKMAN,J INTERNA~LE CELEB Oil NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2 EXTERNAL: NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRC, PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D 0 u Y'OTE TO ALL RIDS" RECIPIEYTS:
NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111111011RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRC,PDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11'11111111D0uY'OTETOALLRIDS"RECIPIEYTS:
PLEASE IIELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE!COYTACT'I'I IE DOCUifEYT CONTROL DESK, ROOhi PI-37 I EXT.504-DOS3)TO ELIlhf I%ATE YOUR XAXf E FROif DISTRI DU'I'IOY LIS'I'S I'OR DOCUz f EX'I'S YOU DOY" I'l L'D!TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR'2 ENCL 11 Indiana Michigan Power Company P.O.Box 16631 Columbus, OH 43216 FI May 19, 1995 AEP:NRC'1213 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:
PLEASEIIELPUSTOREDUCEiVASTE!COYTACT'I'I IEDOCUifEYT CONTROLDESK,ROOhiPI-37IEXT.504-DOS3)TOELIlhfI%ATEYOURXAXfEFROifDISTRIDU'I'IOYLIS'I'SI'ORDOCUzfEX'I'SYOUDOY"I'lL'D!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST, SECTION 3.7,1.1, TABLE 3.7-1, AND THE BASES FOR SECTION 3.7.1.1 (TURBINE CYCLE-SAFETY VALVES)This letter and its attachments constitute an application for amendment to the technical specifications (T/Ss)for the Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.Specifically, we are proposing to modify T/S 3.7.1.1, Table 3.7-1, and the associated bases description.
LTTR'2ENCL11 IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus, OH43216FIMay19,1995AEP:NRC'1213 DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:
The changes modify the power range neutron flux high setpoint in response to an issue raised in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL)94-001, and provide clarification of the existing action statements in T/S Section 3.7.1.1.Attachment 1 provides a detailed description of the proposed changes, the justification for the changes, and our determination of no significant hazards consideration performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92.Attachment 2 contains the existing T/S pages marked to reflect the proposed changes.Attachment 3 contains the proposed T/S pages.Attachment 4 contains a copy of the Westinghouse NSAL 94-001.We believe the proposed changes will not result in (1)a significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (2)a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.These proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee.
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGEREQUEST,SECTION3.7,1.1,TABLE3.7-1,ANDTHEBASESFORSECTION3.7.1.1(TURBINECYCLE-SAFETYVALVES)Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foramendment tothetechnical specifications (T/Ss)fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, weareproposing tomodifyT/S3.7.1.1,Table3.7-1,andtheassociated basesdescription.
9505240165,.950519 PDR ADQCK 05000315 P''DR f
ThechangesmodifythepowerrangeneutronfluxhighsetpointinresponsetoanissueraisedinWestinghouse NuclearSafetyAdvisoryLetter(NSAL)94-001,andprovideclarification oftheexistingactionstatements inT/SSection3.7.1.1.Attachment 1providesadetaileddescription oftheproposedchanges,thejustification forthechanges,andourdetermination ofnosignificant hazardsconsideration performed pursuantto10CFR50.92.Attachment 2containstheexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttheproposedchanges.Attachment 3containstheproposedT/Spages.Attachment 4containsacopyoftheWestinghouse NSAL94-001.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 AEP:NRC:1213 In compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), copies of this letter and its attachments have been transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and to the Michigan Department of Public Health.884j~E.E.Fitzpatrick Vice President SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS~~DAY OF 1995 Notary Public eh Attachments CC: A.A.Blind G.Charnoff J.B.Martin NFEM Section Chief NRC Resident Inspector-Bridgman J.R.Padgett  
TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.
~J r+>~~r P t 1 I ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP'NRC'1213 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 ANALYSIS FOR CHANGES TO THE DONALD C.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES The proposed amendment to technical specification (T/S)3.7.1.1 makes the following specific changes to the Cook Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 T/Ss: Table 3.7-1 is to be modified to reflect the corrected values for the neutron flux high setpoints (setpoints) to be used in the event that one or more main steam safety valves (MSSVs)are determined to be inoperable, as provided in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL)94-001.A copy of this letter is provided as Attachment 4.2.The bases for Section 3.7.1.1 are to be modified to reflect the corrected methodology for developing the setpoints.
9505240165,.950519 PDRADQCK05000315P''DR f
3.The ACTION statement of the T/S is to be revised to clarify what actions are required in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when main steam safety valves are declared inoperable.
U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC:1213 Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),
Specifically, ACTION a.will apply only to MODES 1 and 2 and will refer the reader to ACTION b.when the requirements for continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 cannot be met.ACTION statement b.is modified to allow 3 or 4 loop operation in MODE 3.It also clarifies that the unit should be in HOT SHUTDOWN (instead of COLD SHUTDOWN)when the other required actions are not accomplished.
copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.884j~E.E.Fitzpatrick VicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS~~DAYOF1995NotaryPublicehAttachments CC:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector
REASONS FOR CHANGES AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGES CHANGES TO TABLE 3.7-1 AND BASES FOR 3.7.1.1 We were notified by Westinghouse in Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL)94-001 that the present methodology for calculating the setpoints when one or more MSSVs are inoperable is not conservative.
-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett  
The present methodology includes an assumption that the maximum allowable initial power level is calculated based on a linear function of the available MSSV relief capacity.Under certain conditions, and with typical safety analysis assumptions, a loss of load/turbine trip transient at part-power conditions may result in overpressurization of the main steam system when operating in accordance with the setpoints calculated by this methodology.
~Jr+>~~rPt1I ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP'NRC'1213 DESCRIPTION ANDJUSTIFICATION OFCHANGES10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1213 Page1DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESTheproposedamendment totechnical specification (T/S)3.7.1.1makesthefollowing specificchangestotheCookNuclearPlantunits1and2T/Ss:Table3.7-1istobemodifiedtoreflectthecorrected valuesfortheneutronfluxhighsetpoints (setpoints) tobeusedintheeventthatoneormoremainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSVs)aredetermined tobeinoperable, asprovidedinWestinghouse NuclearSafetyAdvisoryLetter(NSAL)94-001.AcopyofthisletterisprovidedasAttachment 4.2.ThebasesforSection3.7.1.1aretobemodifiedtoreflectthecorrected methodology fordeveloping thesetpoints.
The revised methodology presented by Westinghouse in the NSAL was used to determine conservative setpoints.
3.TheACTIONstatement oftheT/SistoberevisedtoclarifywhatactionsarerequiredinMODES1,2,and3whenmainsteamsafetyvalvesaredeclaredinoperable.
This guidance provides a method to calculate the maximum power level that will provide sufficient heat removal capability during operation with the given number of inoperable MSSVs.These new setpoints, along with the revised methodology, are to replace the existing text in Table 3.7-1 and the bases for Section 3.7.1.1 in the Cook Nuclear Plant T/Ss.  
Specifically, ACTIONa.willapplyonlytoMODES1and2andwillreferthereadertoACTIONb.whentherequirements forcontinued operation inMODES1and2cannotbemet.ACTIONstatement b.ismodifiedtoallow3or4loopoperation inMODE3.Italsoclarifies thattheunitshouldbeinHOTSHUTDOWN(insteadofCOLDSHUTDOWN) whentheotherrequiredactionsarenotaccomplished.
REASONSFORCHANGESANDJUSTIFICATION FORCHANGESCHANGESTOTABLE3.7-1ANDBASESFOR3.7.1.1WewerenotifiedbyWestinghouse inNuclearSafetyAdvisoryLetter(NSAL)94-001thatthepresentmethodology forcalculating thesetpoints whenoneormoreMSSVsareinoperable isnotconservative.
Thepresentmethodology includesanassumption thatthemaximumallowable initialpowerleveliscalculated basedonalinearfunctionoftheavailable MSSVreliefcapacity.
Undercertainconditions, andwithtypicalsafetyanalysisassumptions, alossofload/turbine triptransient atpart-power conditions mayresultinoverpressurization ofthemainsteamsystemwhenoperating inaccordance withthesetpoints calculated bythismethodology.
Therevisedmethodology presented byWestinghouse intheNSALwasusedtodetermine conservative setpoints.
Thisguidanceprovidesamethodtocalculate themaximumpowerlevelthatwillprovidesufficient heatremovalcapability duringoperation withthegivennumberofinoperable MSSVs.Thesenewsetpoints, alongwiththerevisedmethodology, aretoreplacetheexistingtextinTable3.7-1andthebasesforSection3.7.1.1intheCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.  


Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1213 Page2CHANGESTOACTIONSTATEMENT Aspresently written,theACTIONstatements ofT/S3.7.1.1requirethatthepowerrangeneutronfluxhighsetpointbereduced(toaccountfordecreased heatremovalcapability) whenoneormoreoftheMSSVsisdeclaredinoperable inMODES1,2,and3.Theneutronfluxhighsetpointisnotaproperconstraint forMODE3operation, sincenooperation atpowercantakeplaceduringthisMODE.Therefore, ACTIONa.hasbeenrewritten toproviderequirements foroperation onlyinMODES1and2withfourreactorcoolantloops.Ascurrently written,ACTIONb.permitscontinued operation withinoperable MSSV'sprovidedthereactortripbreakersareopened;however,thewordingissuchthatthisprovision isspecifically providedonlyforthecaseofthreereactorcoolantloopsinoperation.
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 2 CHANGES TO ACTION STATEMENT As presently written, the ACTION statements of T/S 3.7.1.1 require that the power range neutron flux high setpoint be reduced (to account for decreased heat removal capability) when one or more of the MSSVs is declared inoperable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.The neutron flux high setpoint is not a proper constraint for MODE 3 operation, since no operation at power can take place during this MODE.Therefore, ACTION a.has been rewritten to provide requirements for operation only in MODES 1 and 2 with four reactor coolant loops.As currently written, ACTION b.permits continued operation with inoperable MSSV's provided the reactor trip breakers are opened;however, the wording is such that this provision is specifically provided only for the case of three reactor coolant loops in operation.
ThepurposeoftheMSSVsistoremoveenergysuchthatanoverpressurization ofthesecondary sidedoesnotoccur.Withthebreakersopen,theprincipal concernistheremovalofdecayheat.Becauseenergyremovalcapability isenhancedwithadditional reactorcoolantloopsinoperation, theT/Ssaspresently writtenareoverlyrestrictive.
The purpose of the MSSVs is to remove energy such that an overpressurization of the secondary side does not occur.With the breakers open, the principal concern is the removal of decay heat.Because energy removal capability is enhanced with additional reactor coolant loops in operation, the T/Ss as presently written are overly restrictive.
Weareproposing tomodifyACTIONb.toallowoperation withinoperable MSSVsinMODE3withaminimumofthreereactorcoolantloopsinoperation.
We are proposing to modify ACTION b.to allow operation with inoperable MSSVs in MODE 3 with a minimum of three reactor coolant loops in operation.
Thischangecorrectsanoversight inthepresentversionoftheT/Ss.BothACTIONa.andACTIONb.presently requiretheapplicable unittobeinCOLDSHUTDOWN(MODE5)iftherequirements oftheACTIONarenotmet.Thisrequirement inACTIONa.hasbeenchangedtonotethatatransition fromACTIONa.toACTIONb.isrequiredifotherspecified actionsarenottaken.ACTIONb.hasbeenrevisedtorequiretheunittoultimately beinHOTSHUTDOWN(MODE4)iftheotheractionsarenottaken.T/S3.7.1appliesonlyinMODES1,2,and3;therefore, thecurrentdirection togotoCOLDSHUTDOWN(MODE5)isconsidered tobeinappropriate.
This change corrects an oversight in the present version of the T/Ss.Both ACTION a.and ACTION b.presently require the applicable unit to be in COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 5)if the requirements of the ACTION are not met.This requirement in ACTION a.has been changed to note that a transition from ACTION a.to ACTION b.is required if other specified actions are not taken.ACTION b.has been revised to require the unit to ultimately be in HOT SHUTDOWN (MODE 4)if the other actions are not taken.T/S 3.7.1 applies only in MODES 1, 2, and 3;therefore, the current direction to go to COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 5)is considered to be inappropriate.
10CFR5092CRITERIAPer10CFR50.92,aproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration ifthechangedoesnot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.
10 CFR 50 92 CRITERIA Per 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration if the change does not: involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, 2.create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3.involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1213 Page3Criterion 1Correction ofthesetpointmethodology doesnotrepresent acredibleaccidentinitiator.
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 3 Criterion 1 Correction of the setpoint methodology does not represent a credible accident initiator.
Thenewmethodology reducestheallowable powerlevelsetpoints andisconservative comparedtothepresently evaluated setpoints.
The new methodology reduces the allowable power level setpoints and is conservative compared to the presently evaluated setpoints.
Theconsequences ofanypreviously evaluated accidentarenotadversely affectedbythisactionbecausethedecreaseinthesetpoints resulting fromthenewcalculational methodology willensurethattheMSSVsarecapableofrelieving thepressureattheallowable powerlevels.Basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
The consequences of any previously evaluated accident are not adversely affected by this action because the decrease in the setpoints resulting from the new calculational methodology will ensure that the MSSVs are capable of relieving the pressure at the allowable power levels.Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Correcting.
Correcting.
theoverlyrestrictive actionstatements ofT/S3.7.1doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofanaccident.
the overly restrictive action statements of T/S 3.7.1 does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident.The proposed changes modify existing text to more accurately reflect the intention of the restrictions imposed by the action statements.
Theproposedchangesmodifyexistingtexttomoreaccurately reflecttheintention oftherestrictions imposedbytheactionstatements.
The changes do not create any situation that would initiate a credible accident sequence.Criterion 2 The change in Table 3.7-1 reduces the allowable power levels that can be achieved in the event that one or more main steam safety valve(s)is inoperable.
Thechangesdonotcreateanysituation thatwouldinitiateacredibleaccidentsequence.
This change is a result of vendor guidance to correct an error in the existing methodology used to determine the setpoints for the power level.Changing the methodology used to determine the setpoints, and lowering the setpoints themselves, do not create a new condition that could lead to a credible accident.Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2ThechangeinTable3.7-1reducestheallowable powerlevelsthatcanbeachievedintheeventthatoneormoremainsteamsafetyvalve(s)isinoperable.
The action statements remain in effect to perform the intended function of protecting the plant's secondary side when the main steam safety valves are inoperable.
Thischangeisaresultofvendorguidancetocorrectanerrorintheexistingmethodology usedtodetermine thesetpoints forthepowerlevel.Changingthemethodology usedtodetermine thesetpoints, andloweringthesetpoints themselves, donotcreateanewcondition thatcouldleadtoacredibleaccident.
They have only been modified to correct the overly restrictive language that specifies when, in each MODE, specific actions must be taken.Therefore, the proposed change does not create a new or different type of accident.Criterion 3 The margin of safety presently provided is not reduced by the proposed change in the setpoints.
Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
The change will correct the limiting power levels that are to be implemented when MSSVs are inoperable.
Theactionstatements remainineffecttoperformtheintendedfunctionofprotecting theplant'ssecondary sidewhenthemainsteamsafetyvalvesareinoperable.
This action does not adversely affect the margin that Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 4 was previously allocated for the ability of the MSSVs to relieve secondary side pressure.Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.The margin of safety is also not significantly reduced by the proposed change to the action statements of the T/S.The proposed revision clarifies when specific actions are to be taken in response to inoperable main steam safety valves.The changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the actions to be taken;therefore, they do'not significantly reduce any margin of safety.}}
Theyhaveonlybeenmodifiedtocorrecttheoverlyrestrictive languagethatspecifies when,ineachMODE,specificactionsmustbetaken.Therefore, theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanewordifferent typeofaccident.
Criterion 3Themarginofsafetypresently providedisnotreducedbytheproposedchangeinthesetpoints.
Thechangewillcorrectthelimitingpowerlevelsthataretobeimplemented whenMSSVsareinoperable.
Thisactiondoesnotadversely affectthemarginthat Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1213 Page4waspreviously allocated fortheabilityoftheMSSVstorelievesecondary sidepressure.
Basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Themarginofsafetyisalsonotsignificantly reducedbytheproposedchangetotheactionstatements oftheT/S.Theproposedrevisionclarifies whenspecificactionsaretobetakeninresponsetoinoperable mainsteamsafetyvalves.Thechangesdonotdecreasetheeffectiveness oftheactionstobetaken;therefore, theydo'notsignificantly reduceanymarginofsafety.}}

Revision as of 08:10, 6 July 2018

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Section 3.7.1.1,Table 3.7-1 & Bases Re Turbine Cycle Safety Valves
ML17332A763
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/19/1995
From: FITZPATRICK E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17332A764 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1213, NUDOCS 9505240165
Download: ML17332A763 (11)


Text

RID RIWY 1 CELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9505240165 DOC.DATE: 95/05/19 NOTARIZED:

YES DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 50-316 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.

Indiana Michigan'ower Co.(formerly Indiana&Michigan Ele P RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT'AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)R

SUBJECT:

Application for amends to licenses DPR-58&DPR-74,revising TS section 3.7.1.1,Table 3.7-1&bases re turbine cycle safety valves.DISTRIBUTION CODE: AOOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL/SIZE: TITLE: OR Submittal:

General Distribution NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA HICKMAN,J INTERNA~LE CELEB Oil NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2 EXTERNAL: NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRC, PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D 0 u Y'OTE TO ALL RIDS" RECIPIEYTS:

PLEASE IIELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE!COYTACT'I'I IE DOCUifEYT CONTROL DESK, ROOhi PI-37 I EXT.504-DOS3)TO ELIlhf I%ATE YOUR XAXf E FROif DISTRI DU'I'IOY LIS'I'S I'OR DOCUz f EX'I'S YOU DOY" I'l L'D!TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR'2 ENCL 11 Indiana Michigan Power Company P.O.Box 16631 Columbus, OH 43216 FI May 19, 1995 AEP:NRC'1213 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:

Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST, SECTION 3.7,1.1, TABLE 3.7-1, AND THE BASES FOR SECTION 3.7.1.1 (TURBINE CYCLE-SAFETY VALVES)This letter and its attachments constitute an application for amendment to the technical specifications (T/Ss)for the Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.Specifically, we are proposing to modify T/S 3.7.1.1, Table 3.7-1, and the associated bases description.

The changes modify the power range neutron flux high setpoint in response to an issue raised in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL)94-001, and provide clarification of the existing action statements in T/S Section 3.7.1.1.Attachment 1 provides a detailed description of the proposed changes, the justification for the changes, and our determination of no significant hazards consideration performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92.Attachment 2 contains the existing T/S pages marked to reflect the proposed changes.Attachment 3 contains the proposed T/S pages.Attachment 4 contains a copy of the Westinghouse NSAL 94-001.We believe the proposed changes will not result in (1)a significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (2)a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.These proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee.

9505240165,.950519 PDR ADQCK 05000315 PDR f

U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 AEP:NRC:1213 In compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), copies of this letter and its attachments have been transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and to the Michigan Department of Public Health.884j~E.E.Fitzpatrick Vice President SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS~~DAY OF 1995 Notary Public eh Attachments CC: A.A.Blind G.Charnoff J.B.Martin NFEM Section Chief NRC Resident Inspector-Bridgman J.R.Padgett

~J r+>~~r P t 1 I ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP'NRC'1213 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 ANALYSIS FOR CHANGES TO THE DONALD C.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES The proposed amendment to technical specification (T/S)3.7.1.1 makes the following specific changes to the Cook Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 T/Ss: Table 3.7-1 is to be modified to reflect the corrected values for the neutron flux high setpoints (setpoints) to be used in the event that one or more main steam safety valves (MSSVs)are determined to be inoperable, as provided in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL)94-001.A copy of this letter is provided as Attachment 4.2.The bases for Section 3.7.1.1 are to be modified to reflect the corrected methodology for developing the setpoints.

3.The ACTION statement of the T/S is to be revised to clarify what actions are required in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when main steam safety valves are declared inoperable.

Specifically, ACTION a.will apply only to MODES 1 and 2 and will refer the reader to ACTION b.when the requirements for continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 cannot be met.ACTION statement b.is modified to allow 3 or 4 loop operation in MODE 3.It also clarifies that the unit should be in HOT SHUTDOWN (instead of COLD SHUTDOWN)when the other required actions are not accomplished.

REASONS FOR CHANGES AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGES CHANGES TO TABLE 3.7-1 AND BASES FOR 3.7.1.1 We were notified by Westinghouse in Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL)94-001 that the present methodology for calculating the setpoints when one or more MSSVs are inoperable is not conservative.

The present methodology includes an assumption that the maximum allowable initial power level is calculated based on a linear function of the available MSSV relief capacity.Under certain conditions, and with typical safety analysis assumptions, a loss of load/turbine trip transient at part-power conditions may result in overpressurization of the main steam system when operating in accordance with the setpoints calculated by this methodology.

The revised methodology presented by Westinghouse in the NSAL was used to determine conservative setpoints.

This guidance provides a method to calculate the maximum power level that will provide sufficient heat removal capability during operation with the given number of inoperable MSSVs.These new setpoints, along with the revised methodology, are to replace the existing text in Table 3.7-1 and the bases for Section 3.7.1.1 in the Cook Nuclear Plant T/Ss.

Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 2 CHANGES TO ACTION STATEMENT As presently written, the ACTION statements of T/S 3.7.1.1 require that the power range neutron flux high setpoint be reduced (to account for decreased heat removal capability) when one or more of the MSSVs is declared inoperable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.The neutron flux high setpoint is not a proper constraint for MODE 3 operation, since no operation at power can take place during this MODE.Therefore, ACTION a.has been rewritten to provide requirements for operation only in MODES 1 and 2 with four reactor coolant loops.As currently written, ACTION b.permits continued operation with inoperable MSSV's provided the reactor trip breakers are opened;however, the wording is such that this provision is specifically provided only for the case of three reactor coolant loops in operation.

The purpose of the MSSVs is to remove energy such that an overpressurization of the secondary side does not occur.With the breakers open, the principal concern is the removal of decay heat.Because energy removal capability is enhanced with additional reactor coolant loops in operation, the T/Ss as presently written are overly restrictive.

We are proposing to modify ACTION b.to allow operation with inoperable MSSVs in MODE 3 with a minimum of three reactor coolant loops in operation.

This change corrects an oversight in the present version of the T/Ss.Both ACTION a.and ACTION b.presently require the applicable unit to be in COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 5)if the requirements of the ACTION are not met.This requirement in ACTION a.has been changed to note that a transition from ACTION a.to ACTION b.is required if other specified actions are not taken.ACTION b.has been revised to require the unit to ultimately be in HOT SHUTDOWN (MODE 4)if the other actions are not taken.T/S 3.7.1 applies only in MODES 1, 2, and 3;therefore, the current direction to go to COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 5)is considered to be inappropriate.

10 CFR 50 92 CRITERIA Per 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration if the change does not: involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, 2.create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3.involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 3 Criterion 1 Correction of the setpoint methodology does not represent a credible accident initiator.

The new methodology reduces the allowable power level setpoints and is conservative compared to the presently evaluated setpoints.

The consequences of any previously evaluated accident are not adversely affected by this action because the decrease in the setpoints resulting from the new calculational methodology will ensure that the MSSVs are capable of relieving the pressure at the allowable power levels.Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Correcting.

the overly restrictive action statements of T/S 3.7.1 does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident.The proposed changes modify existing text to more accurately reflect the intention of the restrictions imposed by the action statements.

The changes do not create any situation that would initiate a credible accident sequence.Criterion 2 The change in Table 3.7-1 reduces the allowable power levels that can be achieved in the event that one or more main steam safety valve(s)is inoperable.

This change is a result of vendor guidance to correct an error in the existing methodology used to determine the setpoints for the power level.Changing the methodology used to determine the setpoints, and lowering the setpoints themselves, do not create a new condition that could lead to a credible accident.Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The action statements remain in effect to perform the intended function of protecting the plant's secondary side when the main steam safety valves are inoperable.

They have only been modified to correct the overly restrictive language that specifies when, in each MODE, specific actions must be taken.Therefore, the proposed change does not create a new or different type of accident.Criterion 3 The margin of safety presently provided is not reduced by the proposed change in the setpoints.

The change will correct the limiting power levels that are to be implemented when MSSVs are inoperable.

This action does not adversely affect the margin that Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1213 Page 4 was previously allocated for the ability of the MSSVs to relieve secondary side pressure.Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.The margin of safety is also not significantly reduced by the proposed change to the action statements of the T/S.The proposed revision clarifies when specific actions are to be taken in response to inoperable main steam safety valves.The changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the actions to be taken;therefore, they do'not significantly reduce any margin of safety.