ML17334A976

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing Tech Spec 3/4.7.5.1 Re Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys & Adding Tech Spec 3/4.3.3.11 Re Chlorine Detection Sys, Per NUREG-0737,Item III.D.3.4.Fee Paid

ML17334A976
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	07/10/1986
From:	ALEXICH M P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	DENTON H R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17334A977	List: ML17334A976 ML17334A978
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM AEP:NRC:0856-0, AEP:NRC:856, NUDOCS 8607150183
Download: ML17334A976 (45)

Text

Ai'EPULATIPFORNA1'-IbN'DIBTR1'BgkhOh&/BTEN (jIjBI'CCESSION NBR:Bb07150183 DOC.DATE:8b/07/10NOTARIZED:

NODOCKET0FACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPoIverPlant.Unit1iIndiana50500031550-3}bDonaldC.CookNuclearPoeerPlant.Unit24Indiana5050003}bAUTH.NA~EAUTHORAFFILIATION ALEXICH4N.P.IndianaZcNichiganElectricCo.RECIP.NAl'tERECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONIH.R.OfFiceoFNuclearReactorRegulation.

Director(post851125

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstoLicenseDPR-588cDPR-74,changingTechSpec3/4.7.5.1recontrolroomemergencg ventilation sgsZcaddingTechSpec3/4.3.3.11rechlorinedetection sgsiperNUREQ-07374 ItemIII.D.3.4.Feepaid.-Ea~~4'e~e.O~NCee-O~CH~pt.~.DISTRIBUTION CODE:AO4ADCOPIEBRECEIVED:

LTRJ.ENCL4BIIE:+~4TITLE:ORSubmittal:

TNIActionPlanRgmtNUREQ-0737 u8NUREQ-Ob60 NOTESRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAI'fE PWR-AADTSPWR-AEICSBQWR-APD4LAWIQQINQTONp DPWR-ARSBINTERNALADl'1/LFNB IE/DEPERDIR33NRRBWRADTSNRRPWR-AADTSNRHFTFLE04COPIESLTTRENCL1221011011f11111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PWR-AEBPWR-AFOBPWR-APD4PD01PWR-APSBELD/HDS3IE/DEPER/EPB NRRPAULSONiW.NRRPWR-BADTSNRR/DSROESPRITRQN3COPIESLTTRENCL1115510331111EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSIC03052211NRCPDR02TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR32ENCL29 L~<<LJILIee<<fN0fw',.IN"IN'llel,<<eJ,,lt)'~Ki$)<<Ih<<j>>,j>>".te'e>>ftlelK~I<<It,l<<e'IeN,~~w,K<<lxX',"hI."Ntge<<g.jIh'l~V>>ll'Q'j;i,t'e>>',twIt,II~e',e~wje,IIIwII"I)<<tieeIN0'0'g.rfjw,el(eh,ejeIVhh<<Ir<<rl'>>I.~V,'VKeewe)hh,h',hhtweelWlwK~l'ee"I',hNilej'(>>1"I"<<VNf,le~('l<<'jhowCl~l,'eWeel>>I"pj<<e INDIANA8MICHIGANELECTRICCOMPANYP.O.BOX16631COLUMBUS, OHIO43216DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNos.1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74CONTROLROOMVENTILATION ANDCHLORINEDETECTION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS July,10,1986AEP:NRC'0856 0Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.Nuclear'Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

DearMr.Denton:

Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foramendment totheTechnical Specifications (T/Ss)fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNos.1and2.Specifically, weproposetomodifyT/S3/4.7.5.1 (ControlRoomEmergency Ventilation System)andtoaddT/S3/4.3.3.11 (Chlorine Detection System).Thechangesaredesignedtoaddresscontrolroomhabitability concernsrelatedtoNUREG-0737 ItemIII.D.3.4, andtoclarifyventilation systemoperability requirements asdiscussed withmembersofyourstaffinBethesda, MDonJanuary13,1986.Thereasonsfortheproposedchangesandouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations arecontained inAttachment 1tothisletter.TheproposedrevisedT/Spagesarecontained inAttachment 2.AttheJanuary13,1986meeting,membersofyourstaffrecommended modifications toourT/S-specified testtemperature forlaboratory testingofcharcoaladsorbermethyliodideefficiency (reference T/Ss4.7.5.l.c and4.7.5.l.d).

Thatrecommendation iscurrently underreview,aswehavedescribed inItem2ofAttachment l.IAMQ',OPIA~~OIL(NO,OOt%LAmoIg~'Rtlat<<fOILNANLLQWebelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee (PNSRC)andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee (NSDRC)attheirnextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted toMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andMr.GeorgeBruchmann oftheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.

/

Mr.HaroldR.Denton-2-AEP:NRC:0856 0Pursuantto10CFR170.12(c),

wehaveenclosedanapplication feeof$150.00fortheproposedamendments.

Thisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing Corporate procedures whichincorporate areasonable setofcontrolstoinsureitsaccuracyandcompleteness priortosignature bytheundersigned.

VerytrulyyouM.P.exichy,f(.VicePresident PiMPA/rjnAttachments cc:JohnE.DolanW.G.Smith,Jr.-BridgmanG.Bruchmann R.C.CallenG.CharnoffNRCResidentInspector

-Bridgman

'I0~'It ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:0856 0REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSESFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITNOS.1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS I1III;-iE Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0Thislicenseamendment requestproposestomodifyT/S3/4.7.5.1 (ControlRoomEmergency Ventilation System)andtoaddaT/S3/4.3.3.11 (Chlorine Detection System).Theproposedchangesareintendedtoaddresscontrolroomhabitability issuesrelatedtoNUREG-0737 ItemIII.D.3.4 andGenericLetter83-37.Additionally, thechangesclarifyseveralaspectsofcontrolroomventilation systemoperability requirements whichwerediscussed withyourstaffinameetinginBethesda, MDonJanuary13,1986.Tofacilitate yourstaff'sreviewofthesechanges,wehavedividedthemintoelevencategories.

Eachofthesecategories isdiscussed separately below.Preceding thesecategories isadescription ofthecontrolroomemergency ventilation system,whichincludesdiscussions oftheradiological andtoxicgasmodesofoperation.

ControlRoomVentilation SstemDescritionFigure1isasimplified Italsoshowsthelayoutroomventilation system.HVACmachineroom(whichP-250computerroom.flowdiagramofthecontrolroomventilation system.ofthevariousroomswhichareservedbythecontrolTheseroomsincludethecontrolroomitself,thehousesthevariousventilation equipment),

andtheDuringnormaloperation ofthecontrolroomHVACsystem,outdoorairisdrawnintothesystemthroughbubble-tight damperHV-ACRDA-1.

TheHVACsystemsuppliesairtotheP-250computerroomandtothecontrolroom.Airfromthecomputerroomtransfers tothemachineroomthroughatransfergrill.AirreturnstotheHVACsystemfromthecontrolroomandthemachineroom.DamperHV-ACRDA-2 ismaintained inapositionsufficient toprovidepressurization intheeventofaradiological release.DamperACRDA-3ismaintained closedforreasonsrelatedtotoxicgasreleaseswhichwillbedescribed below.DamperACRDA-4,thetoiletroomexhaust,isnormallymaintained open.Intheeventofaradiological

accident, thesystemwouldautomatically berealigned intherecirculation/cleanup mode.Thiswouldoccuronasafetyinjection signalfromeitherunit.Inthismode,dampersHV-ACRDA-1 andHV-ACRDA-4 wouldautomatically close,topreventunfiltered airfrombeingdrawnintothesystem.DamperHV-ACRDA-3 wouldautomatically opentoproviderecirculation capability, andbothpressurization fanswouldautomatically start.Theoperatorwouldthenturnoffoneoftheredundant fanstoensurethatairvelocitythroughthefilterunitwillprovideminimumiodineresidence timesofapproximately 0.25seconds.Intherecirculation/cleanup mode,pressurization oftheareasisprovidedbyoutdoormakeupairdrawnbythepressurization fansthroughdamperHV-ACRDA-2.

Thesystemisdesignedtoprovideaflowratethroughthefilterunitof6000cfm+10%.Thisflowrateisacombination ofairrecirculated throughdamperHV-ACRDA-3 anddrawnfromtheoutsidethroughHU-ACRDA-2.

Thedesignofthesystemissuchthataminimum1/16inchW.G.pressurewouldbemaintained inthecontrolroomitself.Thecomputerroomandequipment roomswouldseesignificantly lessingressandegressunderaccidentconditions thanthecontrolroom.Therefore, theyaredesignedtoprovideapressuregreaterthanambient,butpotentially lowerthanthecontrolroomitself.

P1" A"tachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0Achlorinegasdetectorislocatedinthenormalairinletduct.Intheeventchlorineisdetected, theventilation systemwouldbemanuallyrealigned intheisolation modeofoperation.

Thisisaccomplished byclosingdampersHV-ACRDA-1 andHV-ACRDA-4.

Thecontrolroompressurization fansarenotrun,tolimittheamountofcontaminated outdoorairwhichcanenterthecontrolroom.DamperHV-ACRDA-2 cannotbeclosedfromthecontrolroombeyondthesettingfortherecirculation/cleanup mode.Withoutthepressurization fansrunning,airenteringthroughHV-ACRDA-2 islimitedtothatamountdrivenbythesmalldifferential pressurewhichmayexistbetweenthecontrolroomandadjoining areasandtheoutsideatmosphere.

Maintaining damperHV-ACRDA-3 closedensuresthatairenteringviadamperHV-ACRDA'-2 passesthroughthecharcoaladsorbers priortoenteringthecontrolroom.

A'=tachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0Adotionofthe1980VersionofANSIN510Theproposedchangeconsistsofreplacing reference tothe1975version/oftheANSIN510Standardwithreference tothe1980version,inT/S4.7.5.1Thechangewilladdressproblemswehaveexperienced withliteralapplication ofthe1975version,asdescribed below.AttheD.C.CookPlant,ourEngineered SafetyFeatures(ESF),storagepool,andcontrolroomventilati.on systemsarenotofANSIN509-1976 design.Additionally, theywereoperational beforetheissuanceofANSIN510-1975.

Thus,literalcompliance withallrequirements oftheANSIN510testingstandardcannotphysically beachieved.

The1980versionofANSIN510recognizes thatallventilation systemsarenotofANSIN509-1976 design.Section1.2ofANSIN510-1980 states:Itistheintentofthisstandardthatitberigorously appliedonlytosp'stemsdesignedandbuilttoANSIN509;however,sectionsofthisstandardmaybeusedfortechnical guidancefortestingofnon-N509systems.ANSIN510(1975and1980)requiresthatanair-aerosol mixinguniformity testbeperformed uponcompletion ofinitialsysteminstallation.

ANSIN510specifies theuniformity testasaprerequisite toT/S-required in-placeleaktestingofcharcoalandHEPAfilters.Thepurposeoftheuniformity testistoverifythattracerinjection andsampleportsarelocatedsoastoprovidepropermixing,ofthetracerintheairapproaching thecomponent stagetobetested.InJulyandAugustof1985,weperformed theuniformity testontheunitswhichwereexpectedatthattimetoexhibittheworst-case airdistribution.

TheseweretheESFventilation unitsdesignated 1-HV-AES-1 and2-HV-AES-l.

Fortheuniformity test,ANSIN510-1975 requiresthatvaluesofupstreamaerosolconcentration inthesampleplanedifferbynomorethan10%.ANSIN510-1980 isslightlylessstringent, requiring individual samplesintheupstreamsampleplanetobewithin+20%ofthemeanconcentration.

Ourtestsshowedaworse-case varianceof+42%,-30%ofthemeanconcentration.

However,readingsinthecenterofthesampleplane,wherethenormalupstreamsampleistakenforcharcoalandHEPAleaktesting,werewithin20%ofthemeanconcentration.

Thetestingdescribed abovewasconducted withthehelpofaconsultant.

Theconsultant wasamemberoftheANSIN510Committee, althoughhewasnotrepresenting thecommittee whileworkingforus.Hestated:Inmyopinion,youhaveoptimized thelocationoftheinjection portandtechnique ofinjection forthissystem.Additionofbafflingorotherattemptstoenhancetheair-aerosol mixingwouldbefruitless....Your testresultsshowconclusively thateachareainthesamplingplaneupstreamoftheHEPAfilterbankisbeingadequately challenged.

Whilecertainindividual recordings differfromthemeanconcentration bysomewhatmorethan+20%,theintent,thoughnottheletterofANSIN510-80iscertainly beingmet.

4 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0Thisinformation wasbroughttotheattention ofyourstaffonSeptember 9,1985.Weweretoldatthattimethatourtestingresultswereacceptable andthatbasedonthistheunitscouldbeconsidered operable.

Wewereinstructed, however,tosubmitaT/Schangetodocumentthisdiscussion.

Subsequent testinghasbeenperformed ontheControlRoomVentilation Systems.Resultswerenotwithintheboundsofthepreviously described tests.Concentrations intheupstreamsampleplaneshowedaworse-case varianceof+73%,-72%ofthemeanconcentration.

Readingsinthecenterofthesampleplanewerewithin38%ofthemeanconcentration.

Tocorrectforthishighvariance, weproposetouseacorrection factor.Thisfactorwillbeusedinlieuofthemuiltpoint samplingtechnique suggested bySectionllofANSI-N510.

Asdiscussed previously, ourcontrolroomventilation systempre-dates ANSIN510-1975 andisnotofANSIN509design.Thus,noprovisions wereincludedinthesystemdesigntoallowformultipoint sampling.

Thecorrection factorisderivedfromdataobtainedfromperformance ofanair-aerosol mixinguniformity testwhichissimilartothatrecommended bySection9ofANSIN510-1980.

Thedataisevaluated usingstatistical methodsbasedonSection11ofANSIN510-1980.

Thelowerlimit95%confidence levelconcentration attheupstreamsamplematrixisdividedintotheupperlimit95%confidence levelconcentration atthenormalupstreamsinglesamplepoint.Thisresultsinthecorrection factor,whichismultiplied bythepenetration determined usingin-placeleaktesting.Ifthiscorrection factorislessthan1.0,1.0willbeused.Asimilarcorrection factoriscurrently beingapplied.Toaddressthesituation described above,weproposetoadoptthe1980versionofANSIN510(whichincludesprovisions fornon-ANSIN509systems)andtomodifytheBasessectionofT/S3/4.7.5.1 totakespecificexemption fromtheliteralrequirements oftheair-aerosol mixinguniformity test.Ourcomparison ofthe1975tothe1980versionofANSIN510hasdetermined thatthedifferences discussed aboveweretheonlyonesofmajorsignificance, withtheexception ofrequirements whichwillbedescribed laterrelatedtomethyliodidelabtesting.Severalminorchangesrelatedtopenetrometer sensitivity, adsorberresidence timecalculations, andbackground dusttestingwerealsomadeinthe1980edition,butourreviewdetermined thesetobeeithermorerestrictive ortohaveminimalimpactonsafety.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration'if theproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0Criterion 1Thechangetothe1980versionoftheANSI-N510 testingstandardwillupdateourT/Sstocurrently acceptable testingstandards.

Sincethe1980versioncorresponds morecloselytotheD.C.CookPlantventilation systemdesign,webelievethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Criterion 2Thechangeinvolvesonlyourtestingmethodstoverifyventilation systemoperability.

Asthischangedoesnotinvolvemodifications totheplantorchangesinoperation ofthesystemsinvolved, webelieveitwillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Weareproposing totestourventilation systemsinamannerwhichcorresponds morecloselytothesystemdesign.Sincethe1980versionofthecodeisthecurrentindustrystandard, webelievethatnoreduction inamarginofsafetywilloccur.

IAttachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 02.Laborator TestinofAdsorbent T/Ss4.7.5.1.c and4.7.5.l.d requirealaboratory testtoverifycharcoaladsorberremovalefficiency formethyliodides.Wecurrently testtotheRDTM16-1T-1973

standard, whichisreferenced byANSIN510-1975.

Thistestspecified testconditions of130Cand95%relativehumidity, whichhavebeenincludedinourpresentT/Ss.The1980versionofANSIN510,whichwearepro'posing toadopt,specifies ASTMD3803-1979 asthetestingstandard, andstatesthattestconditions shallbeinaccordance withplantT/Ss.AtameetinginBethesda, MDonJanuary13,1986,membersofyourstaffcommented thattheefficiencies determined undertestconditions of130Cmightnotbeindicative ofefficiencies whichcouldbeanticipated underaccidentconditions.

Thiswasbecausethehightemperature mightcausevaporization ofvolatilefiltercontaminants, including

moisture, thusincreasing indicated adsorberefficiency.

Yourstaffrecommended weconsideratesttemperature of30C.0Wearecurrently evaluating yourstaff'sconcern.Wehaverecentlyperformed alabtestontestcanisters obtainedfromoneofourEngineered Safeguards Features(ESF)ventilation units.Onesamplewas0testedat130C,usingthe1975versionofANSIN510,andtheotherat030Cusingthe1980version,whichweareproposing toadopt.The0samgletestedat30Chadanindicated efficiency whichwaslessthanthe130Csamplebyonly0.28%.Weplantocontinueevaluating theneedfordifferent testconditions throughJuly1988,usingparalleltestingmethodswhereverpracticable.

TheEngineering Safeguards FeaturesandStoragePoolVentilation unitswillalsobeevaluated duringthistime.Shouldourreviewdetermine theneedforadoptingdifferent testconditions, wewillsubmitproposedT/Schangesrequesting them.Untilthattime,wewillcontinuetoabidebyourcurrentT/Srequirements.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0FilterTrainInoerabilitAspresently written,T/S3.7.5.1allowsthecharcoaladsorberandHEPAfiltration unittobeinoperable foronly24hoursbeforeshutdownoftheplantmustbegin.Thisamountoftimeisnotsufficient toallowfororderlyfilterunitrepairandadequatepost-maintenance testing.Forexample,labtestingofthecharcoaladsorbermightberequiredduringpoweroperation becauseoftheT/Srequirement totestafterevery720hoursofadsorberoperation.

Ifthecharcoalshouldconclusively failthelabtest,therepairwouldmostlikelyinvolveemptyingandrefilling all18charcoaltraysintheunit.Thisisatime-consuming process,becauseofthegreatcarenecessary toensurethatthe'charcoal ispackedsufficiently tighttopreventexcessive settlingandresultant bypass.Whenthisprocessiscomplete, leaktestingoftheadsorberbankmustbeperformed toensurethatnoexcessive bypassleakageoccurs.Becauserepairandtestingasdescribed aboveareessentially impossible to.completeina24-hourperiod,weareproposing toincreasetheallowable out-of-service timeforthefiltertrainfromthepresent24hoursto72hours.TheDonaldC.CookPlantwasthefirsttowhichStandardT/Sswereapplied.Becauseofsuchthingsasinconsistencies betweenspecifications thatcouldnotbeenvisioned beforethespecifications wereactuallyusedinoperation, itbecamenecessary tomodifytheT/Ssfromtimetotime.Becausesomanychangeswerenecessary, theT/SswerereissuedintotalinAmendment 12toUnit1,whichwasdatedMarch30,1976.Inyourstaff'sSafetyEvaluation Reportwhichaccompanied theamendment itwasstated:Manyofthetimesandfrequencies originally specified werearbitrary; operating experience indicates thatthesetimescanbeadjustedtoprovidetimeformoreorderlyandthoroughplanningandaccomplishment oftherequiredtasksandreducetheradiation exposureofplantpersonnel withoutasignificant impactonsafety.ItisourbeliefthatT/S3/4.7.5.1, whichhasnotbeenamendedsinceitsoriginalissue,fallsintothiscategory.

Theextension to72hourswillallowmoreorderlymaintenance andtestingactivities, andshouldcontribute significantly toreducingthechanceofpersonnel error.Theincreaseintheprobability ofanaccidentduringtheadditional 48hoursisextremely small.Moreover, itisanticipated thatsomelevelofprotection wouldstillbeavailable intheeventofanaccident.

Forexample,thedoorswhichconnectthecontrolroomscouldbeopened,thusallowingtheaffectedunittobenefitfromthefiltertrainintheotherunit,assumingitisavailable.

Theaffectedunitcouldalsobeisolatedfromtheoutsideatmosphere, drastically reducingtheamountofcontaminated outdoorairwhichwouldentertheroom.(Theisolation procedure willbedescribed later,inthediscussion ofthechlorinedetection systemproposedT/Ss.)Lastly,respirators andself-contained breathing packsareavailable incloseproximity tothecontrolroom.Itistherefore ourbeliefthattheextension oftimewouldnotsignificantly compromise safety.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Sincenophysicalchangeswillbenecessary totheplant,thisgroupofchangeswouldnotbeexpectedtoincreasetheprobability ofanaccident'evaluated previously.

Sincethefiltertrainwillbepermitted tobeoutofserviceforalongerperiodoftime,thesignificance oftheconsequences ofanaccidentrequiring controlroomventilation filtration couldbeincreased.

However,webelievethatthedecreased likelihood ofpersonnel errorinvolvedinfiltertrainrepair,theavailability ofotheralternatives foraccidentmitigation, andtheverysmalllikelihood ofanaccidentduringtheadditional out-of-service time,resultinthefactthatanyincreaseinaccidentconsequences wouldbeinsignificant.

Criterion 2Sincenochangeswillresultinplantdesignoroperations, thisgroupofchangeswouldnotbeexpectedtocreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thisrougpofchangesmayreduceamarginofsafety,butforthereasonsdetailedunderCriterion 1,above,anyreduction inasafetymarginisbelievedtobeinsignificant.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0ControlRoomPressureBoundarT/S4.7.5.1.e requirestheControlRoomEmergency Ventilation Systemtobecapableofmaintaining thecontrolroomatapositivepressureofatleast1/16inchW.G.relativetotheoutsideatmosphere.

Theactionstatements ofT/S3.7.5.1addresstheheatingandcoolingsystems,thepressurization fans,andthefiltertrain.Theydonot,however,specifically addressthepressureboundary.

ThepurposeofthisproposedchangeistoclarifytheT/Spressurization requirements, sincethe1/16inchW.G.requirement islimitedtothecontrolroom,anddoesnotincludethemachineroomandP250computerroom,asdescribed intheintroduction tothisattachment andbelow.Ourinterpretation ofourpresentT/S3/4.7.5.1 isthatthepressureboundaryisapartofthefiltertrain,andthusfallsundertheactionstatements associated withit.Wedonotinterpret thepressurization fanactionstatement asapplicable, becauseitaddresses inoperability ofoneofthetworedundant fans,whereasthepressureboundary, likethefiltertrain,isnotredundant.

Ourinterpretation hasbeendiscussed withMr.J.HayesofyourstaffduringhisApril2,1986visittotheD.C.CookPlant,andhasbeendocumented inourletterAEP:NRC:0975B, datedApril8,1986.BecausethepressureboundaryisanintegralpartoftheControlRoomEmergency Ventilation System,necessary tolimitamountsofunfiltered in-leakage towithinanalyzedlimits,weproposetodefineitasasubsystem oftheControlRoomVentilation System.Wehaveaddedanactionstatement (d)whichallowsthesameinoperability timeasproposedforthefiltertraininModes1through4,consistent withtheinterpre-tationdescribed previously.

Wehavealsoincludedpressureboundaryrequirements inactionstatement (f),whichweareproposing toaddtoaddresscontrolroomhabitability requirements inModes5and6.Requirements forthisactionstatement weremadeconsistent withthoseproposedforthefiltertraininModes5and6.Furtherdetailsontheadditions ofMode5and6requirements willbeprovidedlater.Wealsoproposetoaddasurveillance requirement (4.7.5.1.e.4) forthepressureintheHVACmachineroomandP250computerroom.WehaveincludedasketchasFigure1whichillustrates thelayoutoftheareasandtheircommunication paths.Underradiological accidentconditions, thecontrolroomitselfwouldbemaintained atapositivepressureofatleast1/16inchW.G.relativetotheoutsideatmosphere byoperation ofoneoftheredundant pressurization fans.TheHVACmachineroomandtheP250roomwouldnotbeexpectedtobeenteredorexitedveryfrequently intheeventofanaccident, aswouldbeexpectedforthecontrolroomitself.Therefore, theirdesignprovidespressures aboveambient,butpotentially lowerthanthecontrolrooms.Thus,ourproposedT/S4.7.5.1.e.4 requiresasurveillance onan18-monthbasisto~erifythatpressures arepositivewithrespecttotheoutsideatmosphere.

WenotethatairissupplieddirectlytotheP-250computerroom,andthentransfers tothemachineroomviatransfergrillslocatedinthewallbetweentherooms.PressureintheP-250computerroomwouldalwaysbe/

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 010slightlyhigherthanthemachineroombecauseofthesmallpressuredropassociated withairpassagethroughthetransferopenings.

Therefore, positivemeasurement inthemachineroomwillensureapositivepressureinthecomputerroom.Asdiscussed previously, ourinterpretation ofT/S3/4.7.5.1 establishes thepressureboundaryasapartofthefiltertrain.Therefore, weareproposing anActiontimeof72hours,asproposedforthefiltertrain.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thepurposeofthisgroupofchangesistoformalize intheT/Ssourinterpretation oftherelationofthecontrolroompressureboundarytotheControlRoomEmergency Ventilation System.Thisinterpretation haspreviously beendiscussed withtheNRCandhasbeendocumented inourletterAEP:NRC:0975B.

Therefore, thisgroupofchangesisadministrative innature.Thisgroupofchangesalsocreatesadditional surveillance requirements, whilenotdeletingormodifying anypreviousrequirements.

Therefore, thesechangeswouldnotbeexpectedtoresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Thisgroupofchangeswillresultinnophysicalchangestotheplant,andonlyminorchangesintestingrequirements.

Theseadditional testingrequirements are-onlytomeasurepressureinroomsconnected tothecontrolroom,andwillutilizestandardequipment andstandardtestingprocedures'hus, itisnotanticipated thatthesechangeswillcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesdonotdeleteorreduceinanywaypreviousrequirements forsafety.Thus,theyshouldnotreducepreviousmarginsofsafety.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 05.AdditionofModes5and6Alicabilit andActionsGenericLetter83-37,whichconcerned NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications, statedthatT/Ssshouldrequirethat"twoindependent controlroomemergency aircleanupsystemsshouldbeoperablecontinuously duringallmodesofplantoperation andcapableofmeetingdesignrequirements."

Becauseofthis,weareproposing thatT/S3.7.5.1fortheControlRoomEmergency Ventilation Systemberevisedtoincludetherequi,rement thatthissystembeoperableinallmodesratherthanjustModes1through4.Forinoperability ofthefiltertrainorthepressureboundary, orforthecaseofinoperability ofbothtrainsofredundant components, weproposesuspension ofalloperations involving corealterations orpositivereactivity changes.Thesechangesrepresent additional restrictions requiredbyNUREG-0737 andGenericLetter83-37,andinnowayreduceprevioussafetyrequirements.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechangesconstitute additional restrictions ontheplantintermsofT/Smodeapplicability andactionstatement requirements.

Sincenone"ofthesechangesreduceinanywayprevioussafetyrequirements, theywouldnotbeexpectedtoresultinanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Nophysicalchangeswillbenecessary totheplantasaresultofthisgroupofchanges.Additionally, nonewtypesofplantoperation willbeintroduced; rather,presentoperating requirements willbeextendedtoincludeadditional modes.Therefore, thesechangesshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesaddadditional safetyrequirements andinnowayreduceanyexistingrequirements.

Thus,noreduction inmarginofsafetyshouldoccurbecauseofthesechanges.

0 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 012LimitsonOutdoorMakeuAirInordertoensurethatthecontrolroomismaintained habitable duringaradiological-type

accident, itisnecessary tolimittheamountofoutdoorairthatisbroughtintothecontrolroomventilation systemforpressurization purposesorduetoin-leakage.

Ascurrently written,T/S3/4.7.5.1 doesnotestablish limitsontheamountsoffilteredoutdoormakeupairwhichmaybedrawnintothecontrolroomsforthepurposeofproviding pressurization duringoperation intherecirculation/cleanup mode.Additionally, nolimitsaresetforamountsofunfiltered airwhichmayleakintothecontrolroom.(AttheCookPlant,ourprimarysourceofunfiltered airin-leakage wouldbethroughdamperHV-ACRDA-1, duetooperation oftheairconditioning system.Netleakagethroughotherdamperswouldbetotheoutsideatmosphere, becauseofthepositivepressuremaintained intheareas.)Limitsonairin-leakage arenecessary toensurethatdosestocontrolroompersonnel willnotexceedthelimitsestablished inGeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)19of10CFR50,AppendixA.Inordertodetermine tolerable limitsonairin-leakage, wehadtheWestinghouse ElectricCorporation performcontrolroomhabitability analyses.

TheseanalyseshavebeenincludedasAttachment 3tothisletter.TheWestinghouse analysesforskinandwholebodydoseswereanalyzedforairin-leakage ratesof200to800cfm.Thesearetotalin-leakage valueswhichinpracticewouldconsistofthesumoffilteredandunfiltered contributions.

TheWestinghouse methodology attributes wholebodyandskindosesonlytothenoblegases,whichareunaffected bycharcoalandHEPAfiltration.

WehavebeeninformedbyWestinghouse thattheirresults,presented inFigure1ofAttachment 3,canbelinearlyextrapolated toyieldconservative resultsatin-leakage ratesinexcessof800cfm.TheWestinghouse thyroiddoseanalysisassumedvaluesoffilteredin-leakage rangingfrom200to800cfm,whileunfiltered in-leakage rangedfrom0to60cfm.Aswiththeskinandwholebodydoses,Westinghouse hasinformedusthattheirthyroidresultscanbelinearlyextrapolated toobtaindosesforhigherin-leakage rates.Forunfiltered in-leakage, weproposetoassumeanominal10cfmunfiltered in-leakage toaccountforlossofpressurization duetoopeningandclosingofcontrolroomdoorsduringthecourseoftheaccident.

Theunfiltered in-leakage contribution ofthebubble-eight damperHV-ACRDA-1 willbeaddedontothe10cfmbaselinetoobtainthetotalunfiltered in-leakage rate.Itisourintenttooperatewithinlimitsonfilteredandunfiltered in-leakage whichwillensurethatdosestooperators duringthecourseofaLOCAwillnotexceedGDC-19limitsof5remwholebody,30remskin,and30remthyroid.TheWestinghouse figures,linearlyextrapolated asnecessary, willbeusedtoestablish theselimits.Linearlyextrapolated versionshavebeenincludedintheBasessectionofT/S3/4.7.5.1.

Toensurethatweoperatewithintheselimits,weproposetoadda,T/S4.7.5.1.e.5, whichwillrequireustomeasurein-leakage ratesonan18-monthschedule.

Thesemeasurements willincludeairintakethroughdamperHV-ACRDA-2 andin-leakage throughdamperHV-ACRDA-1 whileoperating intherecirculation/cleanup mode.

A'ttachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 013TheWestinghouse thyroidanalysisassumed95%charcoaladsorberefficiency formethyliodideremoval.Therefore, weproposetoincreaseourT/Srequirements onmethyliodidetestingfromthepresentrequirement of90$to95%toachieveconsistency withtheWestinghouse analysis.

ThischangeaffectsT/Ss4.7.5.1.c.3, 4'.5.1.d.l, and4.7.5.led.2.

WenotethattheWestinghouse analysisassumedapowerlevelof3391MWt.Thisisconsistent withthefullpowerratingofUnit1,butslightlylowerthanthe3411MWtforwhichUnit2islicensed.

Sincefissionproductproduction isproportional topowerlevel,itisexpectedtheerrorinvolvedwouldbelessthan1%.Thiserroriswithinthereadability limitsassociated withFigures1and2oftheWestinghouse

analysis, andtherefore willnotsignificantly impacttheanalysisresults.iTheanalysesperformed byWestinghouse tookcreditfortheiodineremovalcapabilities oftheNaOHcontainment sprayadditive.

InourletterAEP:NRC:0914C, datedFebruary28,1986,wesubmitted analysesinsupportofremovalofthesprayadditivetankanddeletionoftheT/Swhichgovernsit,3/4.6.2.2.

Theseanalysesincludedananalysisofcontrolroomthyroiddosefollowing aLOCA.Theairin-leakage limitfiguresincludedinourproposedversionoftheBasessectionforT/S3/4.7.5.1 wereobtainedtakingcreditfortheNaOHsprayadditive.

Thus,NRCapprovalofourproposedT/SchangesinAEP:NRC:0914C willrequirethatweobtainmodifications totheBasessectionofT/S3/4.7.5.1 priortoourimplementation ofthesprayadditiveT/Schanges.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion AsthecurrentT/Ssdonotrequiretestingforairin-leakage, thischangerepresents additional restrictions totheT/Sswhich,shouldenhancesafety.Thelimitsarebasedonanalysesperformed byWestinghouse whichwehaveincludedinthisletter.Becausethesechangesrepresent additional restrictions, andbecausetheyareconsistent withtheWestinghouse

analyses, webelievethattheywillnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Theaccidents ofconcernforcontrolroomventilation systemsaregenerally considered tobefires,radiological

releases, ortoxicgasreleases.

Causesofthesearenotafunctionoftheamountofin-leakage totheControlRoomVentilation System.Therefore, weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 014Criterion 3Sincethesechangesrepresent additional restrictions totheT/Ss,andsincein-leakage limitsandfilterefficiency havebeenestablished consistent withtheanalyses, wedonotbelievethattheywillsignificantly decreasemarginsofsafety.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 015Clarification ofSstem0erationDescritionThepurposeofthesechangesistoclarifydescriptions ofcontrolroomventilation systemoperation whichareincludedintheT/Ss.Aspresently written,T/S4.7.5.1.e.2 instructs ustoverifyevery18monthsthat:OnaSafetyInjection SignalfromeitherUnit1orUnit2,oronacontainment phaseAisolation signal,thesystemautomatically divertsitsinletflowthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberbankandthateitherfancanthenbemanuallystartedintherecirculation mode.Thisdoesnotadequately describetheCookPlantSystemforthefollowing reasons:,(1)Automatic systemactuation oc'cursonasafetyinjection signalfromeitherunit.Thesafetyinjection signalwillalsoinitiatetherespective unit'sphaseAcontainment isolation.

However,thecontainment phaseAisolation signalwillnotofitselfinitiateventilation systemactuation.

(2)Intheeventofasafetyinjection signalfromeitherunit,bothpressurization fanswouldautomatically start.Onewouldthenbeturnedoffbytheoperators toensureadequateiodineresidence times.TheT/Sascurrently writtenimpliesthatthefansmustbeturnedonmanually.

TomaketheT/Smoreaccurately reflecttheCooksystem,weproposetoreviseittorequireverification that:a)OnaSafetyInjection SignalfromUnit1,thesystemautomatically initiates operation intherecirculation/cleanup mode.b)OnaSafetyInjection SignalfromUnit2,thesystemautomatically initiates operation intherecirculation/cleanup mode.Wehaveseparated thetestingrequirements fortheUnit1andUnit2signalstoemphasize thatthesignalfrombothunitsmustbetested,i.e.,thateither/or isnotsufficient.

Inadditiontochangestothesystemstartdescription, wealsoproposetomodifyT/Ss4.7.5.1.c.4 and4.7.5.1.e.3.

TheseT/Ssweremodifiedtoreflectthefactthatthedesignrequirements of6000cfm+10%and1/16inchW.G.areforoperation intheradiological, orrecirculation/cleanup modeofoperation.

Detailsonsystemconfiguration intherecirculation modewillbeprovidedintheBasessection.Placingthesystemdescription intheBasesallowsustoexpandourdescription ofhowthesystemisintendedtofunctionwithoutmakingtheT/Sitselflongerorwordierthannecessary.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 016Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechangesareadministrative innature,intendedprimarily tocorrecterrorsintheT/Sdescription ofControlRoomVentilation Systemoperation.

Sincenochangesinplantoperations orphysicalchangestotheplantwilloccurduetothesechanges,theydonotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously

'evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Sincenochangestothephysicalplantorplantoperations willoccurbecauseofthesechanges,theyshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesareadministrative innature,intendedprimarily tocorrecterrorsinthepresentT/Sswithregardtosystemoperation descriptions.

Thus,theyshouldinvolvenoreduction inmarginsofsafety.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0178.Leak-Testin of'Charcoal andHEPAFiltersT/Ss4.7.5.1.c and4.7.5.1.d requiretestingofcharcoalsamplestodemonstrate adequateremovalefficiencies formethyliodides.Thesamplesmaybeobtainedfromtestcanisters orfromsamplesremovedfromthecharcoalbed.Toobtainasamplefromthecharcoalbedrequirestheremovalofanadsorbertray.Prudencedictatesthatafterthetrayisreplacedinthehousing,aleaktestshouldbeperformed onthecharcoaladsorberunittoensurethatthegasketsremainintactandthatexcessive bypassleakagewillnotoccur.Leak-testing ofthecharcoaladsorberbankafteradsorbertrayreinstallation isrequiredbyourT/S4.7.5.3,.d.2, andaftercompleteorpartialreplacement ofacharcoaladsorberbankbyT/S4.7.5.1.g.

Itisnot,however,specifically requiredbyT/S4.7.5.1.c.3, eventhoughthisT/Salsoallowsremovalofacharcoaltraytoobtainasample.Toachieveconsistency throughout theT/S,weareproposing toaddtheleak-testing requirement toT/S4.7.5.1.c.3.

Inadditiontoleak-testing ofthecharcoaladsorbers, T/S4.7.5.l.d.2 requiresleak-testing oftheHEPAfiltersfollowing reinstallation ofthecharcoaltrayusedtoobtainacarbonsample.CharcoaltraysandHEPAfiltersarelocatedindifferent sectionsofthefilterhousing;reinstallation ofacharcoaltraywouldnotbeexpectedtoimpacttheleakagecharacteristics oftheHEPAunits.Leak-testing oftheHEPAunitsfollowing charcoaltrayinstallation isnotarecommended testperTable1ofANSIN510-1980, norisitrecommended byRegulatory PositionC.5ofRegulatory Guide1.52,Revision2,March1978.Itistherefore ourbeliefthatthistestrequirement isanerrorinourpresentT/Ss.Wehavedeletedtherequirement inourproposedversionofT/S4.7.5.d.2.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseinthep'robability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Theadditionoftestingrequirements toT/S4.7.5.1.c ismadetoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss.ThedeletionofHEPAtestingrequirements fromT/S4.7.5.l.d isintendedtocorrectanerrorinourpresentT/Ss.Sincetestingrequirements arebeingdeleted,thischangemaybeperceived toinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentorareduction inamarginofsafety.However,forreasonsdescribed previously, itisourbeliefthatthesewouldbeinsignificant.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 018Criterion 2Theaccidents ofconcernforcontrolroomventilation systemsaregenerally considered tobefires,radiological

releases, ortoxicgasreleases.

Causesofthesearenotafunctionoftestingrequirements forthecontrolroomventilation system.Therefore, weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3SeeCriterion 1,above.

A'ttachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 0199.AdditionofChlorineDetection TSsTheguidancegiveninGenericLetterNo.83-37statesthat:"Licensees shouldassurethatcontrolroomoperators willbeadequately protected againsttheeffectsoftheaccidental releaseoftoxicand/orradioactive gasesandthatthenuclearpowerplantcanbesafelyoperatedorshutdownunderdesignbasisaccidentconditions.

Iftheresultsoftheanalysesofpostulated accidental releaseoftoxicgases(atorneartheplant)indicateanyneedforinstalling thetoxicgasdetection system,itshouldbeincludedintheTechnical Specifications.

Typicalacceptable LCOandsurveillance requirements forsuchadetection system(e.g.,chlorinedetection system)areprovidedinEnclosure 3.AllPdetection systemsshouldbeincludedintheTechnical Specifications."

Weareproposing anewT/S3/4.3.3.11 onthechlorinedetection systemforbothUnits1and2T/Sstoensurethatthecontrolroomoperators willbeadequately protected againsttheeffectsofaccidental releaseoftoxicgases(specifically chlorine) atorneartheplant.T/S3/4.3.3.11 followsthesampleT/SgiveninEnclosure 3toGeneric'Letter No.83-37,exceptforthefollowing deviations:

Wedonothavetwoindependent chlorinedetection systemsineachunit;wehaveonechlorinedetectorperunitlocatedinthefreshairinletducttotheControlRoomVentilation system.Wehavetherefore changedtherequirement fromtwoindependent chlorinedetection systemstoonechlorinedetection system.Becauseoftheproximity oftheUnit1andUnit2controlrooms,intheeventthechlorinedetectorofeitherunitisinoperable theproposedT/Srequiresthattheventilation systemsofbothcontrolroomsbeplacedinanisolatedcondition, asdescribed intheintroduction tothisattachment.

Inaddition, wehaveremovedaction(a)fromthesampleT/Ssinceitisnolongerapplicable.

(Sincewehaveonlyonedetection system,action(b)issufficient.)

ii.Ourchlorinedetection systemwilltriggeranalarminthecontrolroomwhenthechlorineconcentration oftheairbeingventedintothecontrolroomventilation systemisgreaterthanthealarmsetpoint.

Whenthisoccurs,theoperators havebeeninstructed toplacetheControlRoomVentilation Systemsofbothunitsinani,solated condition, asdescribed intheintroduction tothisattachment.

Thereisnoautomatic tripfunctionconnected withthechlorinedetection system.Wehavetherefore eliminated thereference toatripsetpoint.

iii.'A"qualitative assessment ofchannelbehaviorduringoperation byobservation" isnotpossiblewithoutinjection ofchlorineintothecontrolrooms.Sincechlorineisnotnormallypresentinthecontrolroomatmosphere, thedetectors wouldnormallybereading0ppm,whichisnotindicative ofdetectoroperability.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 020iv.Wehavealsomadeanomenclature changetothesurveillance requirement.

Morespecifically, wehavechanged"ANALOGCHANNELOPERATIONAL TEST"to"CHANNELFUNCTIONAL TEST"Inaddition, weareproposing toaddaT/SBasessection3/4.3.3.11, entitled"Chlorine Detection Systems."

ThissectionwillexplainthepurposeofthechlorinedetectorT/Sandtheoperation ofthecontrolroomventilation systeminanisolatedcondition.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechangesrepresent additional restrictions andinnowayreducepreviousT/Scommitments.

Thustheyarenotexpectedtoincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated-accident.

Criterion 20*Nophysicalchangestotheplantwillresultfromthesechanges.Additionally, nochangesinplantoperation willbenecessary.

Therefore, thesechangesshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Sincenoreduction inpreviousT/Scommitments willoccurasaresultofthesechangestheyshouldnotinvolveareduction inanymarginsofsafety.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 02110.ChanestotheControlRoomVentilation SstemBasesWealsoproposetomodifytheBasessectionforT/S3/4.7.5.1.

Ourproposedchangesincludediscussions ofthefollowing:

a.Theuseofthe1980versionoftheANSIN510standard.

b.ControlRoomVentilation Systemoperation underconditions oftoxicgasandradiological releases.

c.Analysislimitsonairin-leakage.

d.Definition ofthepressureboundary.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 02211.Editorial ChanesInadditiontothechangesdescribed previously, severaleditorial changesweremade.Thesewerechangestocorrecttypographical e'rrorsinourpresentT/Ss,orchangesthatwerenecessary asaresultofthosechangesdescribed previously.

Thesechangesaredescribed inTable1below.Becausethesechangesarepurelyeditorial, theydonotreduceamarginofsafety,donotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, anddonotintroduce thepossibility ofanewaccident.

Therefore, webelievethesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedby10CFR50.92.Table1.ListinofEditorial ChanesUnitDescrition3/4.7.5.b, c"and"movedfromT/S3.7.5.1.b toT/S3.7.5.1.c.

3.7.5.1Applicability changedto"AllMODES"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and6.3.7.5.1-Action "MODES1,2,3,and4"addedafter"ACTION"becauseof'theadditionofactionforModes5and6.4.7.5.1.c Acommawasdeletedaftertheword"system".

4.7.5.1.d.2 4.7.5.1.e.l T/S3/4.7.5"s"addedto"demonstrate."

"(W.G.)"addedafter"WaterGauge".TheentireT/Swasretyped;thus,thelocationofsectionsonthevariouspageshaschanged.BasesforT/S3/4.3.3.9,10 T/Snumbersweredeletedfromthebeginning oftheparagraphs.

BasesforT/S3/4.7.5"GeneralDesignCriteria10"waschangedto"GeneralDesignCriteria19";"t"addedto"consistent."

10BasesforT/S3/4.7.6,7 MovedtoBasespageB3/47-5fbecauseoftheextension oftheBasessectionofT/S3/4.7.5.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 023UnitDescrition12LCOforT/S3.7.5.13.7.5.1"whall"changedto"shall."Applicability changedto"AllMODES"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and6.133.7.5.1-Action

,"MODES1,2,3,and4"addedafter"ACTION"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and6.14164.7.5.1.d.2 4.7.5.1.e.l 3/4.7.5"s"addedto"demonstrate."

"(W.G.)"addedafter"WaterGauge."TheentireT/Swasretyped;thus,thelocationofsectionsonthevariouspageshaschanged.17BasesforT/S3/4.3.4MovedtoBasespageB3/43-4becauseoftheadditionofaBasessectionforT/S3/4.3.3.11.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0856 024Conclusion Inconclusion, webelievethattheproposedchangesdonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations because,asdemonstrated inthepreviousdiscussion, operation oftheD.C.CookPlantinaccordance withthechangeswouldnot:(l)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

pzGUml:CONTROLROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMP-250ROOMFPAIRCONOITIONINQ SYSTEMFPEMERQENCY AIRFLOWXCHPRECIRCULATION DAMPERMHV-ACROA-3 GCLEANUPSYSTEMSTATIONMEASURINNORMALINTAKEDAMPERHVACROA-1MACHINEROOMTOILETEXHAUSTDAMPERHV-ACRDA-4 EMERQENCY INTAKEDAMPERHV-ACRDA-2 lllY0I-02IO-I-coOIII~O~rcO2yIXIUI2D2IIIYOrOI-02I'DCL'0lDIAIOO~00R0LEGENDSACKDRAFT DAMPERfOAMPERCONTROLROOMENTRIFUQAL MOTOR-FANMOPERATEDBUTTERFLY DAMPERCHARCOALCADSORSERVORTEXDAMPERMMOTOR-OPERATEOPARALLELBLADEDAMPERHEPAFILTERTOILET{UNIT+2ONLY)C0ILINQCOILSITRANSFEROPENINGMEDIUMPPREFILTER FEFFICIENCY FILTERcl$V