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{{#Wiki_filter:Z USGSscience for a changing worldDepartment of the InteriorUS Geological SurveyBox 25046 MS-974Denver, CO 80225December 3, 2014Re: Docket 50-274License R-113U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDocument Control RoomWashington DC 20555Sirs:This letter is a follow-up to the November 25, 2014 violation report made to the NRCOperations Center for the US Geological Survey TRIGA (GSTR) reactor facility (licenseR-1 13, Docket 50-274).On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, a violation of Technical Specification A.1 "Shutdown"occurred at the USGS TRIGA research reactor. Contrary to the specification, the key tothe console key switch was left in the control console, in the OFF position, while thecontrol room was unoccupied. This condition existed intermittently for approximately 9minutes during the time period from 1421 to 1436, at which time the Reactor Supervisorentered the cc.ntrol room and discovered the key. The reactor was shut down during thistime period and the staff members were performing routine maintenance. Prior to thisevent, the key had been locked in its lock box and verified by another operator, but thekey was subsequently removed from the lock box by a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)and put in the console switch for maintenance checks. The reactor facility wascontinuously occupied by reactor staff during this event and there were no non-staffpersonnel present. All USGS reactor staff are licensed SROs. This event was reportedto the NRC's facility inspector, NRC Operations Center, the USGS ReactorAdministrator, and the USGS Reactor Operations Committee.This violation was caused by failure of the senior;operator to remove the control consolekey prior to leaving the control room., The senior operator was aware that the key mustbe turned off :and removed in order for the. reactor to meet the Technical Specificationfor "shutdown", but he was preoccupied with. other activities that he had planned for theafternoon.Two actions were being routinely used at the facility in an effort to prevent operatorsfrom leaving the console key in the console without an operator being present. Thesewere (1) a required second check that the key had been locked in the key box after a reactor shutdown and (2) the use of an electronic tether by the operator that would beepif he approached the exit to the control room. These actions were only being takenduring reactor operations that involved making log book entries. The violationdiscussed in this report occurred during monthly maintenance when the reactor was notstarted up and no log book entries were made. As a result, neither the second check ofthe lock box or the electronic tether were in use.As a result of this event, the following actions have been taken:A meeting of facility operators was held on Monday, Dec 1, after the full staff wasback from the Thanksgiving holiday. The discussion covered the importance ofproperly controlling the console key and the need to be vigilant about that control.Possible corrective actions for the event, in order to prevent recurrence, werealso discussed. Since this event was not a part of normal, routine reactoroperations, the corrective action must apply to all activities that could require useof the reactor key.Use of the electronic tether will now apply to any activity that requires removal ofthe console key from the key lock box. A small basket has been positioned overthe face of the lock box, with the electronic tether located inside the basket. It isimpossible for an operator to open the lock box without moving the basket, and atthat time the operator will attach the electronic tether to himself. When the key isput into the lock box, the basket again must be moved out of the way and theoperator will put the electronic tether back into the basket for future use.The GSTR Reactor Operations Committee approved the above actions and they, alongwith GSTR management, believe these steps will be effective in preventing any futureconsole key control problems at the facility.Please contact me if you have any further questions regarding this issue.Sincerely,Tim DeBeyUSGS Reactor SupervisorCc: Vito Nuccio, Reactor AdministratorUSGS Reactor Operations CommitteeMike Morlang, USNRC}} | |||
Revision as of 07:22, 15 June 2018
| ML14365A350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | U.S. Geological Survey |
| Issue date: | 12/03/2014 |
| From: | DeBey T M US Dept of Interior, Geological Survey (USGS) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML14365A350 (2) | |
Text
Z USGSscience for a changing worldDepartment of the InteriorUS Geological SurveyBox 25046 MS-974Denver, CO 80225December 3, 2014Re: Docket 50-274License R-113U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDocument Control RoomWashington DC 20555Sirs:This letter is a follow-up to the November 25, 2014 violation report made to the NRCOperations Center for the US Geological Survey TRIGA (GSTR) reactor facility (licenseR-1 13, Docket 50-274).On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, a violation of Technical Specification A.1 "Shutdown"occurred at the USGS TRIGA research reactor. Contrary to the specification, the key tothe console key switch was left in the control console, in the OFF position, while thecontrol room was unoccupied. This condition existed intermittently for approximately 9minutes during the time period from 1421 to 1436, at which time the Reactor Supervisorentered the cc.ntrol room and discovered the key. The reactor was shut down during thistime period and the staff members were performing routine maintenance. Prior to thisevent, the key had been locked in its lock box and verified by another operator, but thekey was subsequently removed from the lock box by a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)and put in the console switch for maintenance checks. The reactor facility wascontinuously occupied by reactor staff during this event and there were no non-staffpersonnel present. All USGS reactor staff are licensed SROs. This event was reportedto the NRC's facility inspector, NRC Operations Center, the USGS ReactorAdministrator, and the USGS Reactor Operations Committee.This violation was caused by failure of the senior;operator to remove the control consolekey prior to leaving the control room., The senior operator was aware that the key mustbe turned off :and removed in order for the. reactor to meet the Technical Specificationfor "shutdown", but he was preoccupied with. other activities that he had planned for theafternoon.Two actions were being routinely used at the facility in an effort to prevent operatorsfrom leaving the console key in the console without an operator being present. Thesewere (1) a required second check that the key had been locked in the key box after a reactor shutdown and (2) the use of an electronic tether by the operator that would beepif he approached the exit to the control room. These actions were only being takenduring reactor operations that involved making log book entries. The violationdiscussed in this report occurred during monthly maintenance when the reactor was notstarted up and no log book entries were made. As a result, neither the second check ofthe lock box or the electronic tether were in use.As a result of this event, the following actions have been taken:A meeting of facility operators was held on Monday, Dec 1, after the full staff wasback from the Thanksgiving holiday. The discussion covered the importance ofproperly controlling the console key and the need to be vigilant about that control.Possible corrective actions for the event, in order to prevent recurrence, werealso discussed. Since this event was not a part of normal, routine reactoroperations, the corrective action must apply to all activities that could require useof the reactor key.Use of the electronic tether will now apply to any activity that requires removal ofthe console key from the key lock box. A small basket has been positioned overthe face of the lock box, with the electronic tether located inside the basket. It isimpossible for an operator to open the lock box without moving the basket, and atthat time the operator will attach the electronic tether to himself. When the key isput into the lock box, the basket again must be moved out of the way and theoperator will put the electronic tether back into the basket for future use.The GSTR Reactor Operations Committee approved the above actions and they, alongwith GSTR management, believe these steps will be effective in preventing any futureconsole key control problems at the facility.Please contact me if you have any further questions regarding this issue.Sincerely,Tim DeBeyUSGS Reactor SupervisorCc: Vito Nuccio, Reactor AdministratorUSGS Reactor Operations CommitteeMike Morlang, USNRC